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1800-1873.**

Critical and exegetical hand-book to
the Epistle to the Romans

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CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL

HAND-BOOK

TO

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS

BY

HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, TH.D.

OBERCONSISTORIALRATH, HANNOVER.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FIFTH EDITION OF THE GERMAN BY
REV. JOHN C. MOORE, B.A., AND REV. EDWIN JOHNSON, B.A.

THE TRANSLATION REVISED AND EDITED BY

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WITH A PREFACE AND SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES TO THE AMERICAN EDITION BY

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NEW YORK:
FUNK & WAGNALLS, PUBLISHERS,
18 AND 20 ASTOR PLACE.

1889.

BS

2344

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1889

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1884,
By FUNK & WAGNALLS,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D.C.

PREFACE

BY THE AMERICAN EDITOR.

IN Dr. Dickson's General Preface to the English Translation of Meyer's Commentary on the New Testament, which is placed at the beginning of the volumes on the Epistle to the Romans, the following sentences descriptive of its character are found. "In estimating the character and value of Dr. Meyer's work, it is essential that we should always bear in mind the precise standpoint from which it is written. That is simply and solely the standpoint of the exegete, who endeavours in the exercise of his own independent judgment to arrive, by the use of the proper means, at the historical sense of Scripture. His object is not to seek support for the doctrines, nor does he bind himself or regulate his operations by the definitions or decisions, of any particular church. On the contrary, he reaches his results by a purely exegetical process, and places them, when so found, at the disposal of the Church." In other words, his Commentary is what an exegetical commentary ought to be. For this reason, the introduction of this work, a few years since, to the knowledge of English and American students of the New Testament who had no acquaintance with the language in which it was originally written, was an event of much significance in the progress of Biblical learning. In our own country, by reason of the peculiar circumstances of our history, the study of Theology began, and for a long period was carried forward, almost wholly on the doctrinal and philosophical side. A few scholars, indeed, like Moses Stuart and Josiah W. Gibbs, investigated the Scriptures in the purely exegetical way, and thus became leaders in the right path. But it is only within the last quarter of a century that such investigation has made its great advance movement among us and assumed for itself its proper relative position. That the effect of German scholarship in this department of study has been greatly beneficial to our Theology cannot be questioned. It has tended directly and strongly to the end of bringing us to the immediate, fair-minded, intelligent examination of the New Testament words, and to the interpretation of them, as the thing of primary importance, according

to strict grammatical and linguistic principles. No better example of the right method of explaining and commenting has ever been presented to the student than that which Meyer has given. He was eminently fitted, both by his learning and his spirit, to be an interpreter of the Apostolic writings, and, like all candid and large-hearted seekers after the truth, he entered more fully into the possession of its treasures as the years of his life moved onward. The knowledge and influence of such a commentator's writings are of peculiar value in the study of the Epistle to the Romans, in the atmosphere of which our theological thinking needs continually to be brought to measure and adjust itself by the true principles of interpretation.

The design of the publishers of the present edition of Meyer's work is to place it within the reach of the largest possible number of theological students and ministers, in order that the influence of its profound scholarship, its true methods, its honest truth-seeking purpose, its religious spirit and its manly confidence in Christianity may be most widely extended. The commentary is printed in full and precise accordance with the English Translation—except that, in many instances, references to authorities and to Greek writers are transferred from the page to foot-notes—and by an arrangement with the English publishers. The translation of this volume was made, as indicated on the title-page, by the Rev. John C. Moore and the Rev. Edwin Johnson; the work of the former covering the first eight chapters, and that of the latter the remainder of the Epistle. The translation, it is believed, has commended itself to those who have used it since its first publication. The Rev. Dr. William P. Dickson, of the University of Glasgow, was the superintending editor of the work when this portion of it was prepared, and the entire translation, so long as his editorship continued, was reviewed and revised by him. As the Commentary on the Romans was the first of the series which was published, Dr. Dickson introduced it by a General Preface. This preface it has been thought proper to omit in this edition, inasmuch as the principal facts connected with Meyer's life, which it contained, have been already stated in the volume on the Acts, edited by Dr. Ormiston, and because the Commentary is now so much better known than when it was first issued in Edinburgh, that such introductory words seem to be scarcely necessary. The Topical Index at the end of the volume has been prepared by the Rev. G. F. Behringer, of Brooklyn, N. Y., who has kindly exercised a general supervision of the work, while passing through the press.

As to my own share in the present volume, as American Editor, I may be permitted to say a few words. The limitations of the volume have allowed me to add only about eighty pages of annotations. Within so

small a space it was manifestly impossible to consider with fulness or freedom all the points of interest which the Epistle presents, or even to set forth and establish by arguments the view which I hold of its character, its design and purpose, its line of thought, its circle of doctrinal teaching, or what, if the expression may be allowed me, I may call its peculiar Paulinism. The discussion of these and other questions would demand a volume, which I hope that, at some future time, I may be able to prepare. All that I have attempted to do, at present, is to give some brief notes, at the close of each chapter, upon words or sentences respecting which it has seemed to me that suggestions might be helpful towards a true understanding of the Apostle's meaning. In connection with the setting forth of this meaning, I have occasionally raised the inquiry whether Paul intended to declare a particular doctrine in a particular verse or passage, and have sometimes endeavored to show that he had no such intention. But I have not deemed it to be within my sphere in these annotations—a sphere which is purely exegetical—to affirm or to deny that any such doctrine belonged to the Pauline system. For this reason, also, as well as because the book is intended, as the English editor says in his Preface, for the professional scholar, who can endure in a writer some views with which he may not himself agree, I have not considered it necessary to discuss any doctrinal opinions to which Meyer has incidentally given expression in his remarks upon points with which they have no vital and essential connection. I have purposely made but few references in the notes to commentators and writers upon the Epistle. As I have long been engaged in the work of theological instruction in the department of New Testament Greek, it will not be supposed, I trust, that the omission is due to any want of reading the works of such writers, or of acknowledgment of what I have gained in my studies from their views or thoughts. Occasional allusions to some of the most recent authors appeared to me not inappropriate, but the limited space at my command rendered it impracticable to mention names, as Meyer himself has done so constantly and abundantly. The edition of Meyer's work on the Epistle which was published about two years since by Dr. Bernhard Weiss has been referred to somewhat frequently, because it gives—where he differs from Meyer, as well as where he adds his assent to what Meyer had said—the views of the scholar who is, at present, perhaps more prominent than any other, in this line of studies, in Germany. It is a matter of satisfaction to me that in some important points, respecting which my own opinions were formed many years ago, I find myself confirmed by the words of this very able writer. In some cases mentioned in my notes, on the other hand, where I am constrained to take a position opposite to his, I hope

that the reasons presented may be regarded as not unworthy of serious consideration. In a number of these cases I have the pleasing consciousness of standing with Meyer himself.

If the few pages which I have inserted in this volume shall prove to be helpful to any students of the Pauline writings—especially, if they shall be viewed as, in any measure, deserving of a place in such near connection with the words and thoughts of a commentator whom I have long held in so much honour, I shall be glad to have had the privilege of associating my name, even in the most unpretending way, with his, as his work goes forth for a wider circulation among the clergy and the members of Theological Schools in our country. To those who have been connected with the Divinity School of Yale College during the past twenty-six years,—in whose life and work I have a personal and most friendly interest,—I commend the volume in all its parts.

TIMOTHY DWIGHT.

YALE COLLEGE, February 18, 1884.

NOTE.—In my own annotations, the edition of Meyer's work by Weiss is commonly referred to as Weiss ed. Mey. The letters T. R. are used to designate the Textus Receptus. The references to Winer's Grammar are to the American translation. I may state that, for the convenience of students, I have inserted the numbers of the pages of the American translations of both Buttmann's and Winer's Grammars, wherever Meyer has cited these works in his notes. In regard to other abbreviations, see page xxiv.

The reader will allow me to correct one or two errors, which were accidentally overlooked by me in revising the proof-sheets of my notes. In the first line of page 75, "*οἰκονόμου*ς, so etc." should be read, instead of "*οἶκ*". So etc." In the seventh line of page 79, for "Gal. iii." read Gal. v. On page 108, Note XX., line 7, for "to the approving" read "of the approving." Page 254, line 3, for "ver. 20" read "v. 20," and page 255, line 2, for "vv. 12-19" read "v. 12-19," and at the end of Note LXXIII. read "ver. 20" for "ver. 19." On the other hand, on page 294, line 15 of Note LXXXVI., for "v. 25" read "ver. 25." On page 289, Note LXXVII. in the last two lines let the words "first" and "second" exchange places. These cases include all, I think, which are of any importance and which the reader will, without trouble, adjust for himself.

T. D.

PREFACE

SPECIALLY WRITTEN BY THE AUTHOR FOR THE ENGLISH EDITION.

It cannot but be of great importance in the interests of a thorough, sure, and comprehensive knowledge, that the results of progressive effort and research in the wide domain of the sciences should be mutually exchanged and spread from people to people, and from tongue to tongue. In this way of a living fellowship of mind, penetrating to the farthest limits of civilization, the various scientific peculiarities of national development and culture are necessarily more and more elevated into common property as regards their excellences, while their several defects and shortcomings are reciprocally compensated and supplied ; and thus the honest efforts and labours of individuals, pressing forward in common towards a deeper and clearer knowledge, are at once encouraged by their mutual respect and stimulated by a generous rivalry. Especially, and in an eminent degree, does this hold true within the sphere devoted to the highest object of human effort—the sphere of scientific theology. To the cultivation of this science, in accordance with its healthy life springing from the Divine Word and with its destination embracing time and eternity, belongs in an eminent sense the noble vocation of applying every gift received from God freely and faithfully to the service of the great whole—the building up of His kingdom. In its view the nations with their various characteristic powers, capacities, and tongues, are members of the one body, to which they are to hail each other as belonging in the fellowship of the one Head, which is Christ, and of the one Spirit, whose motions and influences are not restrained by any limits of nation or of language.

From this point of view it cannot but be in every sense a matter for congratulation that in our day more than formerly those literary works of German theology, which have on their native soil obtained a fair position in the literature of the science to which they relate, should by translation into the English tongue have that more extended field opened

up to them, whose only limit is the ever-increasing diffusion and prevalence of that language in both hemispheres. Thus German theological labor goes forth into the wide world ; becomes at home in distant lands and in a foreign dress ; communicates what has been given to it, in order, by the mutual working of the Spirit, to receive in its turn from abroad ; stimulates so far as in it lies, in order that it may itself find stimulus and furtherance, instruction and correction ; and in all this lends its aid, that the divided theological strivings of the age and the various tendencies of religious national character may be daily brought closer together, and united in the eternal focus of all genuine science, which is truth and nothing but truth—and in the realm of theology the highest truth of all, that of divine revelation.

In the transplanting of the literary products of German theology to the soil of the English language the well-known publishing house of the Messrs. T. & T. Clark, of Edinburgh, have earned special distinction ; and their efforts, supported by select and able professional scholars, have already found, and continue increasingly to find, an appreciation corresponding to their merits both in British and American circles. I have therefore readily and willingly given my consent to the proposal of the above-mentioned honorable publishers to set on foot and to issue an English translation of my Commentary on the New Testament ; and with no less readiness have my esteemed German publishers, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht in Göttingen, declared their agreement to it. I earnestly wish that the version thus undertaken, the first portion of which is given to the public in the present volume, may not fail to receive, in the field of the English language and of the science which it represents, an indulgent and kindly reception, such as, during a long series of years, has been accorded to the German work by the German theological public. And if I venture to couple with this wish some measure of a hope corresponding to it, I am induced to do so simply by the fact that even in the German idiom these works have already found their way, in no inconsiderable numbers, both to England and America.

Respecting the object and intention of my Commentaries no special explanation is needed, since, in point of fact, these are obvious on the face of them. They aim at exactly ascertaining and establishing on due grounds the *purely historical sense of Scripture*. This aim is so clear and so lofty, that all the produce of one's own thoughts and subjective speculation must fall entirely into the background, and must not be allowed to mix up anything of its own with what objectively stands forth in the revelation of the New Testament and simply seeks to be understood just as it stands. For exegesis is a historical science, because

the sense of Scripture, the investigation of which is its task, can only be regarded and treated as an historical fact; as positively given, it can only be known, proved, established, and set forth so as to be clearly and surely understood, by the positive method of studying the grammar, the *usus loquendi*, and the connection in detail as well as in its wider and widest sense. Exegetical research therefore cannot regard any definitions of the doctrinal system of a Church as binding or regulative for its operations, as if forsooth, in cases where the Confession has spoken, its duty were to seek only what it was *à priori* directed to seek, and thereupon to find only what it so seeks. No! it is just when perfectly unprejudiced, impartial, and free—and thus all the more consciously and consistently guided simply and solely by those historically given factors of its science—that it is able with genuine humility to render to the Church, so far as the latter maintains its palladium in the pure Word of God, real and wholesome service for the present and the future. Unhappily the Church of Rome, by its unchangeable tradition beyond the pale of Scripture, and now completely by its Vaticanum, has refused to receive such service in all points affecting its peculiar doctrine. But with the Evangelical Church it is otherwise. However deep may be the heavings of conflicting elements within it, and however long may be the duration of the painful throes which shall at last issue—according to the counsel of God and when His hour has come—in a happier time for the Church when men's minds shall have attained a higher union, the pure word of Scripture, in its historical truth and clearness and in its world-subduing divine might, disengaged from every addition of human scholasticism and its dividing formulae, must and shall at length become once more a wonderful power of peace unto unity of faith and love. The Evangelical Church bears inalienably in its bosom the Word as the living and imperishable leaven of that final development.

Such is the ideal goal, which the scientific exposition of Scripture, while it desires nothing else than to elucidate and further the true historical understanding of Scripture, may never lose sight of in regard to the Church, which is built on the Word. But how limited is the measure of the attainments and of the gifts conferred upon the individual! and how irresistibly must it impel him, in the consciousness of his fragmentary contributions, to the humbling confession, “Not as though I had already attained!” Nevertheless let each strive faithfully and honestly, according to what has been given to him, for that noble goal in the field of Scripture-science, in firm assurance that God can bless even what is little and be mighty in what is weak. And so may the gracious God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ accompany my humble labors on His Word, as they are now going forth in the dress of

another language to far distant brethren, with the blessing on which all success depends, that they may conduce to the knowledge of His Truth, to the service of His Church, and to the glory of His Holy Name.

DR. HEIN. AUG. WILH. MEYER,
OBERCONSISTORIALRATH.

HANNOVER, *March*, 1873.

PREFACE

TO THE GERMAN EDITION.

FORTY years have now elapsed since my Commentaries on the New Testament were first given to the public. The first edition of the first volume—the weak commencement—appeared in January, 1832. A scientific work, which has passed through a long course of development and still continues that course, has always a history—a biography—of its own, which of course is intimately interwoven with that of its author. Yet in this retrospect I can only be filled with praise and thanksgiving to the divine grace ; of myself I have nothing to say. The indulgence of friendly readers, which I have experienced so long, will not, I hope, fail to be still extended to me, when my day's work is drawing to its end.

This fifth edition of the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans is based—as was of course to be expected, and may be inferred from the increase in the number of the sheets—on a new and careful revision of the fourth edition, which was issued in 1865. This enlargement—although in particular instances much has been abridged or even deleted—could not be avoided, if on the one hand the more recent publications relating to the Epistle were to meet with due attention,¹ and if on the

¹ I could not take into consideration the treatise of Dr. Eklund : “*σάπξ vocabulum, quid ap. Paulum significet*,” Lund, May, 1872, which, cautiously proceeding by a purely exegetical method, in the definition of the ethical side of that notion arrives substantially at the explanation of Augustine and Luther—a result, nevertheless, in which I am still precluded from concurring, as regards the Epistle to the Romans, by the contrast of *σάπξ* and *νοῦς*, as well as that of *σάπξ* and the moral *ἐγώ* in ch. vii.—I must here also make supplementary mention of Hilgenfeld's dissertation “*Petrus in Rom und Johannes in Kl. Asien*” (*Zeitschrift*, 1872. 3) ; in it he declares himself in favor of the nearly contemporary martyrdom of Peter and Paul in Rome as a historically accredited fact, and, as I must still even after the doubts of Lipsius assume, with just reason, even as respects its independence of the Simon legend.—During the very printing of this Preface there have come into my hands the two dissertations by Harmsen, who defends the reference of the doxology in ix. 5 to God, and Hilgenfeld, who maintains the genuineness of chapters xv. and xvi. (in the latter's *Zeitschrift*, 1872. 4).

other hand the general plan of the book—according to which it has to provide along with the exposition itself a critical view of the interpretations contrasting with it, and so of the detailed history of the exegesis—was to be preserved.

But on what portion of the New Testament could the labour and trouble—which are being continually renewed, wherever exegetical science conscientiously strives to reach its pure and clear historic aim—be less spared than on this, the grandest and richest in contents of all the Apostle's letters? Especially at the present time. The Epistle to the Romans still stands forth as a never silent accuser confronting the Roman ecclesiasticism, which has strained to the uttermost spiritual arrogance in the dethroned head, and Loyolist submissiveness in the members, of its hierarchy (*perinde ac si essent cadavera*) ; it is still the steadfast divine charter of the Reformation, as formerly our Luther found mainly in it the unyielding fulcrum by the aid of which he upheaved the firmly-knit Roman structure from its old foundations. Amidst the vehement and pretentious conflicts, which continually surround us in the field of evangelic belief, we still have in this Epistle—just because it sets clearly before us the pure apostolic Gospel in its deepest and most comprehensive scope—the clearest and most prominent criterion for the recognition of what belongs to the pith and marrow of the Confession, in order that we may distinguish with steadfast eye and conscience that which is essential from all the fleeting, temporary, controversial or scholastic forms, with which it has become connected and interwoven through the historical relations of ecclesiastical symbols ; a distinction, to which even the Introduction to the Formula Concordiae, although this most of all bears the theological impress of the time, significantly enough points, and which better meets the exigencies of the restless present than the overbearing cry—recklessly transcending limit or measure—after unity of doctrine, which yet does not remove or even so much as conceal the dissensions among the criers themselves. The unity which they desire—were it uniformly established, as it were in the lump, for *all* doctrinal definitions of the Confession—would be Roman, and the very negation of truth and truthfulness in the church, because it would be contrary to the *freedom of conscience in the understanding of Scripture*, which has its ground and support, its standard and limit, and the holy warrant of its upright confidence, not *beyond the pale of Scripture*, but *in it*, and *in it alone*.

Let us only advance with clearness along the straight path of pure historical exegesis, in virtue of which we have always to *receive* what Scripture gives to us, and never to *give* to it aught of our own. Otherwise we run a risk of falling into the boundless maze of an interpreta-

tion of Scripture at our own pleasure, in which artificial and violent expedients are quickly enough resorted to, with a view to establish results which are constructed from foregone premisses, and to procure doctrines which are the creations—obtruded on Scripture—of a self-made world of thought and its combinations. Exegetes of this sort—whose labours, we may add, are usually facilitated by a lack of sure and thorough philological culture,¹ and of needful respect for linguistic authorities—have the dubious merit of provoking *refutation* more than others do, and thereby indirectly promoting the elucidation of the true sense of Scripture. Yet they may, as experience shows, attain for a time an influence, especially over younger theologians who have not yet reached the steadiness and soberness of mature exegetic judgment, by the charm of novelty and of a certain originality, as well as of a dialectic art, which veils its mistakes so that they are not at once recognized—an influence under which good abilities are misled and learn to be content with extracting from the words of Scripture a meaning which, originating from their own presuppositions, belongs really to themselves. Indeed, if such a mode of handling Scripture, with its self-deceptions and with its often very singular caprices, could become dominant (which, looking to the present state and progress of science, I do not reckon possible), there would be reason to fear that gradually the principle of Scripture authority, which preserved in its full objectivity is the aegis of the evangelical churches, would become *illusory*. All the worse and more confusing is it, when such an exegesis employs as the organ of presenting and communicating its views a mode of expression, the quaint drapery of which hinders us from clearly discerning the substance of the meaning lying beneath it, and in fact frequently permits the effort

¹ We theologians are far too much given to neglect a comprehensive and precise knowledge of the Greek grammar. If the exegete of the present day supposes himself adequately furnished with such a Grammar as that of Rost (whose memory, as my former Gymnasial teacher, I gratefully revere) he is mistaken; it is no longer sufficient. We ought not to overlook the *progress* of philology in the field of the classics, but should be diligent in turning to account, for the New Testament, whatever the contributions of the *present day* furnish. Otherwise we neglect an eminently important part of our duty. I cannot but here recommend very urgently to the theologian, in the interest of pure exegesis, the second edition of Kühner's Large Grammar (in two parts, 1869–1872)—to which my citations will always henceforth refer—as the most complete and most solid work on the structure of the Greek language regarded from the present standpoint of science. This entirely remodelled edition is a glorious monument of thorough and comprehensive erudition, and of clear and ripe familiarity with the genius of the language of classic Hellenism.

of translating it into current forms of speech, which cannot mislead, to be attended with but dubious success.¹

For the critical remarks the part of the *editio octava* of Tischendorf's New Testament, which includes the present Epistle, was in good time to be turned to account. As it deviates in many cases from the *editio septima*, and this diversity is partly due to a modification of the critical principles adopted, I have deemed it advisable to specify not merely the readings of the *octava*, but also those of the *septima*. The one I have indicated by *Tisch.* (8), the other by *Tisch.* (7); but where the two editions agree, I put merely *Tisch.*

With confidence then in God, who sits as Ruler and knows how to guide all things well, this work is left to make its way once more into the much agitated theological world. May He ward off harm, so far as it contains what is erroneous, and grant His blessing, so far as it may minister to the correct, unstinted, and undisguised understanding of His revealed Word.

DR. MEYER.

HANNOVER, 24th July, 1872.

¹ In presence of such wretched evils of style we may be allowed to recall the simple rule, which the epigrammatist bids the rhetoricians (*Anthol. Pal.* xi. 144, 5 f.) lay to heart :

Νοῖν ὑποκρίσθαι δεῖ τοῖς γράμμασι καὶ φράσιν αὐτῶν
εἶναι κοινωτέραν, ὥστε νοεῖν ἂ λέγεις.

EXEGETICAL LITERATURE OF THE EPISTLE.

[For Commentaries, and collections of Notes, embracing the whole New Testament, see Preface to the Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew. The following list includes works which deal with the Apostolic or the Pauline Epistles generally, or which treat specially of the Epistle to the Romans. Works mainly of a popular or practical character have, with a few exceptions, been excluded, since, however valuable they may be on their own account, they have but little affinity with the strictly exegetical character of the present work. Several of the older works named are of little value; others are chiefly doctrinal or controversial. Monographs on chapters or sections are generally noticed by Meyer *in loc.* The editions quoted are usually the earliest; *al.* appended denotes that the work has been more or less frequently reprinted. † marks the date of the author's death, c. = circa, an approximation to it.]

ABAILARD (Peter), † 1142, Scholastic : *Commentariorum super S. Pauli Epistolam ad Romanos libri v.* [Opera.]

ALESIIUS [or HALES] (Alexander), † 1565, Prof. Theol. at Leipzig : *Disputationes in Epistolam ad Romanos, cum P. Melanthonis praeefatione.*

8°, Vitemb. 1553.

ALEXANDER Natalis. See NOEL (Alexandre).

ALTING (Jacobus), † 1679, Prof. Theol. at Gröningen : *Commentarius theoretico-practicus in Epistolam ad Romanos.* [Opera.]

2°, Amstel. 1686.

AMBIANENSIS (Georgius), † 1657, Capuchin monk at Paris : *Trina Pauli theologia . . . seu omnigena in universas Pauli epistolas commentaria exegetica, tropologica et anagogica.*

2°, Paris. 1649-50.

AMBROSIASTER [or PSEUDO-AMBROSIUS], c. 380, generally identified with Hilarius the Deacon : *Commentarius in Epistolas xiii. B. Pauli.* [Ambrosii Opera.]

ANSELMUS [or HERVEUS], c. 1100 : *Enarrationes in omnes S. Pauli Epistolas.*

2°, Paris. 1533.

AQUINAS (Thomas), † 1274, Scholastic : *Expositio in omnes Epistolas S. Pauli.*

2°, Basil. 1475 *al.*

ARBOREUS (Joannes), c. 1550, Prof. Theol. at Paris : *Commentarius in omnes Pauli Epistolas.*

2°, Paris. 1553.

ARETIUS (Benedictus), † 1574, Prof. Theol. at Berne : *Commentarii in omnes Epistolas D. Pauli, et canonicas.*

2°, Morgiis, 1683.

BALDUIN (Friedrich), † 1627, Prof. Theol. at Wittenberg : *Commentarius in omnes Epistolas apostoli Pauli . . .* (Separately, 1608-1630).

4°, Francof. 1644 *al.*

BAUMGARTEN (Sigmund Jakob), † 1757, Prof. Theol. at Halle : *Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer.*

4°, Halae, 1749.

BAUMGARTEN CRUSIUS (Ludwig Friedrich Otto), † 1843, Prof. Theol. at Jena : *Commentar zum Römerbrief.*

8°, Jena, 1844.

BEDA Venerabilis, † 735, Monk at Jarrow : *Expositio in Epistolas Pauli* [a Catena from the works of Augustine, probably by Florus Lugdunensis, c. 852], *et In Epistolas septem catholicas liber.* [Opera.]

- FEELLEN (Jean-Théodore), R. C. Prof. of Or. Lang. at Louvain : *Commentarius in Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos.* 8°, Lovani, 1854.
- BEET (Joseph Agar), *A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans.* London, 1877.
- BELSHAM (Thomas), † 1829, Unitarian minister in London : *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle translated, with an exposition and notes.* 4°, Lond. 1822.
- BENECKE (Wilhelm), † 1837, retired Hamburg merchant : *Der Brief Pauli an die Römer erläutert ;* 8°, Heidelb. 1831.
Translated 8°, Lond. 1854.
- BIRPING (August), R. C. Prof. Theol. at Münster : *Exegetisches Handbuch zu den Briefen des Apostels Paulus.* 8°, Münster, 1854-8 *al.*
- BOEHME (Christian Friedrich), † 1844, Pastor at Lucka near Altenburg : *Epistola Pauli ad Romanos Græce cum commentario perpetuo.* 8°, Lips. 1806.
- BRATS (Etienne de), c. 1680, Prof. Theol. at Saumur : *Epistolæ Pauli ad Romanos analysis paraphrastica cum notis.* 4°, Salmurii, 1670.
- BRENT (Johann), † 1570, Provost at Stuttgard : *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos.* 2°, Francof. 1564 *al.*
- BROWN (David), D.D., Prof. Theol. Free Church College, Aberdeen : *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, embracing the last results of criticism.* 12°, Glasg. 1860.
- BROWN (John), D.D., † 1858, Prof. Exeg. Theol. to the United Presbyterian Church, Edinburgh : *Analytical Exposition of the Epistle of Paul . . . to the Romans.* 8°, Edin. 1857.
- BRUNO, † 1101, Founder of the Carthusian Order : *Commentarius in omnes Epistolas Pauli.* 2°, Paris. 1509.
- BUCER (Martin), † 1551, Prof. Theol. at Cambridge : *Metaphrasis et enarratio in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos.* 2°, Basil. 1562.
- BUGENHAGEN (Johann), † 1558, Prof. Theol. at Wittenberg : *Interpretatio Epistolæ Pauli ad Romanos.* 8°, Hagenoe, 1523.
- BULLINGER (Heinrich), † 1575, Pastor at Zürich : *Commentarii in omnes Epistolas apostolorum.* 2°, Tiguri, 1537 *al.*
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- WOODHEAD (Abraham). See FELL (John).
- ZACHARIAE (Gotthilf Traugott). † 1777, Prof. Theol. at Kiel: Paraphrastische Erklärung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer. 8^o, Götting. 1786.

ABBREVIATIONS.

al., *et al.* = and others ; and other passages ; and other editions.

ad. or *in loc.*, refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

cf. = compare.

comp. = compare. "Comp. on Matt. iii. 5" refers to Dr. Meyer's own commentary on the passage. So also "See on Matt. iii. 5."

codd. = codices or manuscripts. The uncial manuscripts are denoted by the usual letters, the Sinaitic by *Σ*.

min. = codices *minusculi*, manuscripts in cursive writing. Where these are individually quoted, they are marked by the usual Arabic numerals, as 33, 89.

Rec. or *Recepta* = *Textus receptus*, or *lectio recepta* (Elzevir).

l.c. = *loco citato* or *laudato*.

ver. = verse, *vv.* = verses.

f. ff. = and following. *Ver. 16 f.* means verses 16 and 17. *vv. 16 ff.* means verses 16 and two or more following.

vss. = versions. These, when individually referred to, are marked by the usual abridged forms. *E.g.* *Syr.* = Peshito Syriac ; *Syr. p.* = Philoxenian Syriac.

p. pp. = page, pages.

e.g. = *exempli gratia*.

s.c. = *scilicet*.

N. T. = New Testament. *O. T.* = Old Testament.

A. V. = The Authorized English Version of the New Testament.

R. V. = The Revised English Version of the New Testament.

A. R. V. = The American Appendix to the Revised English Version of the N. T.

κ.τ.λ. = *καὶ τὰ λοιπά*.

The colon (:) is largely employed, as in the German, to mark the point at which a translation or paraphrase of a passage is introduced, or the transition to the statement of another's opinions.

... indicates that words are omitted.

The books of Scripture and of the Apocrypha are generally quoted by their usual English names and abbreviations. *Eccles.* = Ecclesiasticus. 3 *Esd.*, 4 *Esd.* (or *Esr.*) = the books usually termed 1st and 2d Esdras.

The classical authors are quoted in the usual abridged forms by book, chapter, etc. (as *Xen. Anab.* vi. 6, 12) or by the paging of the edition generally used for that purpose (as *Plat. Pol.* p. 291 B. of the edition of H. Stephanus). The names of the works quoted are printed in *Italics*. Roman numerals in small capitals are used to denote books or other internal divisions (as *Thuc.* iv) ; Roman numerals in large capitals denote volumes (as *Kühner*, II.).

The references to Winer's and Buttmann's N. T. Grammars, given in brackets thus [*E. T.* 152], apply to the corresponding pages of Prof. Thayer's English translations of these works.

THE

EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE ROMANS.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. SKETCH OF THE APOSTLE'S LIFE.

PAUL, who received this Roman name, according to Jerome, *Catal.* 5—and from Acts xiii. 9, this view seems the most probable¹—on occasion of the conversion of Sergius Paulus the Roman Proconsul of Cyprus, but was at his circumcision named פָּאָוְלוֹס,² was the son of Jewish parents belonging to the tribe of Benjamin (Rom. xi. 1 ; Phil. iii. 5), and was born at Tarsus³ (Acts ix. 11, xxi. 39, xxii. 3), a *πόλις μεγάλη καὶ ἐνδοξή* (Xen. *Anab.* i. 2, 23) of ancient renown, founded according to the legend by Perseus, in Cilicia. The year of his birth is quite uncertain (A.D. 10–15 ?) ; but it is certain that he was of Pharisaic descent (see on Acts xxiii. 6), and that his father was a Roman citizen (see on Acts xvi. 37). He therefore possessed by birth this right of citizenship, which subsequently had so important a bearing on his labours and his fate (Acts xxii. 27 f.). Of his first youthful training in his native city, where arts and sciences flourished (Strabo, xiv. 5, 13, p. 673), we know nothing ; but it was probably conducted by his Pharisaic father in entire accordance with Pharisaic principles (Phil. iii. 5 ; Gal. i. 14), so that the boy was prepared for a Pharisaic rabbinical school at Jerusalem. While yet in early youth (Acts xxii. 3, xxvi. 4, comp. vii. 58 ; Gal. i. 14 ; Tholuck,

¹ See the particulars on Acts xiii. 9.

² Since both names were generally current, every attempt to explain their meaning in reference to our Paul is utterly arbitrary—from that of Augustine, according to whom he was called *Saul* as persecutor (as Saul persecuted David), and *Paulus* as praedicator (namely, as the *minimus apostolorum*, 1 Cor. xv. 9), down to Umbreit's play on the word פָּעוּל (the *made one*, created anew) in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1852, p. 377 f., and Lange's fancy that the Apostle was called the *little*, because he

overcame Elymas as the little David overcame Goliath.

³ Not at *Gischala* in Galilee, according to the statement of Jerome, *de Vir. ill.* 5 (comp. also what he says on Philem. 23), which cannot be taken into consideration after the Apostle's own testimony (see especially Acts xxii. 3), unless with Krenkel (*Paulus d. Ap. d. Heiden*, 1869, p. 215) we distrust the accounts of the Book of Acts even in such a point lying beyond the scope of its dogmatic tendency.

in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1835, p. 364 ff.; also in his *Vermischte Schr.* II. p. 274 ff.) he was transferred to Jerusalem, where he had perhaps even then relatives (Acts xxiii. 16), though there is no evidence that the entire family migrated thither (Ewald). He entered a training-school of Pharisaic theology, and became a rabbinic pupil of the universally honoured (Acts v. 34) Gamaliel (Acts xxii. 3), who, notwithstanding his strict orthodoxy (Lightfoot, *ad Matt.* p. 33), shows himself (Acts v. 34 ff.) a man of wise moderation of judgment.¹ In accordance with a custom, which was rendered necessary by the absence of any regular payment of the Rabbins and was very salutary for their independence (see on Mark vi. 3, and Delitzsch, *Handwerkerleben zur Zeit Jesu*,* 1868, V.), the youthful Saul combined with his rabbinical culture the learning of a trade—tentmaking (Acts xviii. 3)—to which he subsequently, even when an apostle, applied himself in a way highly honourable and remarkably conducive to the blessing of his official labours, and for that reason he felt a just satisfaction in it (Acts xviii. 3, xx. 34; 1 Thess. ii. 9; 2 Thess. iii. 7 ff.; 1 Cor. iv. 12, ix. 6, xii. 15; 2 Cor. xi. 8, xii. 13). At the feet of Gamaliel he of course received an instruction which, as to form and matter, was purely rabbinic; and hence his epistles exhibit, in the mode in which they unfold their teaching, a more or less distinct rabbinico-didactic impress. But it was natural also that his susceptible and active mind should not remain unaffected by Hellenic culture, when he came into contact with it; and how could he escape such contact in Jerusalem, whither Hellenists flocked from all quarters under heaven? This serves to explain a dilettante² acquaintance on his part with Greek literary works, which may certainly be recognized in Acts xvii. 28, if not also in 1 Cor. xv. 33 (Tit. i. 12); and which, perhaps already begun in Tarsus, may have been furthered, without its being sought, by his subsequent relations of intercourse with Greeks of all countries and of all ranks. It is impossible to determine how much or how little of the virtues of his character, and of the acuteness, subtlety, and depth of lofty intellect which he displayed as apostle, he owed to the influence of Gamaliel; for his conversion had as its result so entire a change in his nature, that we cannot distinguish—and we should not attempt to distinguish—what elements of it may have grown out of the training of his youth, or to what extent they have done so. We can only recognize this much in general, that Saul, with excellent natural gifts,

¹ See traits of the mild liberality of sentiment, which marked this grandson of the celebrated Hillel, quoted from the Rabbins in Tholuck, *l.c.* p. 378. The fact that nevertheless the youthful Saul developed into a zealot cannot warrant any doubt, in opposition to Acts viii. 34 ff., as to his having been Gamaliel's pupil (such as Hausrath expresses, *neut. Zeitgesch.* II. p. 419 ff.).

² The exaggerations of the older writers (see *e.g.* Schramm, *de stupenda eruditione Pauli*, Herborn. 1710) are pure inventions of fancy. So too is Schrader's opinion, that Paul had by Greek culture prepared him-

self to be a Jewish missionary, a proselytizer. It cannot even be proved that he formed his diction on the model of particular authors, such as Demosthenes (Köster in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1854, p. 305 ff.). The comparisons instituted with a view to establish this point are too weak and general. How many similar parallels might be collected, *e.g.* from Plato, and even from the tragedians! On the whole the general remark of Jerome at Gal. iv. 24, is very appropriate: "*P. scisse, licet non ad perfectum, literas saeculares.*"

* Translation pub. by Funk & Wagnalls.

with the power of an acute intellect, lively feelings, and strong will, was, under the guidance of his teacher, not merely equipped with Jewish theological knowledge and dialectic art, but had his mind also directed with lofty national enthusiasm towards divine things; and that, however deeply he felt sin to be the sting of death (Rom. vii. 7 ff.), he was kept free (Phil. iii. 6) from the hypocritical depravity which was at that time prevalent among Pharisees of the ordinary type (Schrader, II. p. 23 ff.; comp. also Keim, *Gesch. Jesu*, I. p. 265). Nevertheless it is also certain that the moderation and mildness of the teacher did not communicate themselves to the character of the disciple, who, on the contrary, imbibed in a high degree that prevailing rigour of Pharisaism, the spirit of which no Gamaliel could by his individual practical wisdom exorcise. He became a distinguished zealot for the honour of Jehovah and the law (Acts xxii. 3), as well as for Pharisaic principles (Gal. i. 14), and displayed all the recklessness and violence which are wont to appear, when fiery youthful spirits concentrate all their energies on the pursuit of an idea embraced with thorough enthusiasm. His zeal was fed with abundant fuel and more and more violently inflamed, when the young Christian party growing up in Jerusalem became an object of hostility as dangerously antagonistic to the theocracy and legal orthodoxy (comp. Acts vi. 13, 14), and at length formal persecution broke out with the stoning of Stephen. Even on that occasion Saul, although still in a very subordinate capacity, as merely a youth in attendance,¹ took a willing and active part (Acts viii. 1, xxii. 20); but soon afterwards he came forward on his own account as a persecutor of the Christians, and, becoming far and wide a terror to the churches of Judaea (Gal. i. 22 f.), he raged against the Christians with a violence so resolute and persistent (Acts xxii. 3 f., xxvi. 10 ff.), that his conduct at this time caused him ever afterwards the deepest humiliation and remorse (1 Cor. xv. 8, 9; Gal. i. 13; Eph. iii. 8; Phil. iii. 6; comp. 1 Tim. i. 13). Yet precisely such a character as Saul—who, full of a keen but for the time misdirected love of truth and piety, devoted without selfish calculation his whole energies to the *idea* which he had once embraced as his highest and holiest concernment—was, in the purpose of God, to become the chief instrument for the proclamation and extension of the divine work, of which he was still for the moment the destructive adversary. A transformation so extraordinary required extraordinary means. Accordingly when Saul, invested with full powers by the Sanhedrin (Acts ix. 1, xxvi. 9), was carrying his zealous labours beyond the bounds of Palestine, there took place near Damascus (35 A.D.) that wonderful appearance to him of the exalted Jesus in heavenly glory (see on Acts ix. 3; 1 Cor. ix. 1, xv. 8) which arrested him (Phil. iii. 12), and produced no less a result than that Saul—thereby divinely called, and subsequently favoured with an inward divine revelation of the Son of God² (see on Gal. i. 15 f.)—gradually

¹ Not as a married man or already a widower, of about thirty years of age, (Ewald, Hausrath); comp. on Acts vii. 58.

² The attempts of the Tübingen school (especially of Baur and Holsten) to repre-

sent the Gospel of Paul as having originated from the intrinsic action of his own mind, and the event at Damascus as a visionary picture drawn from his own spirit, are noticed and refuted at Acts ix., and by

became, under the further guidance of the divine Spirit and in the school of his own experiences so full of trial, the Apostle, who by the most extensive and most successful proclamation of the Gospel, especially among the Gentiles, and by his triumphant liberation of that Gospel from the fetters of Mosaism on the one hand and from the disturbing influences of the current theosophic speculations on the other, did more than all the other apostles—he, the Thirteenth, more than the Twelve, who had been called in the first instance for the δωδεκαφύλον of Israel (Gal. ii. 9; 1 Cor. xv. 10). His conversion was completed through Ananias, who was directed to him by means of an appearance of Christ (Acts ix. 10 ff.); and, having been baptized, he at once after a few days, in the resolute consciousness of his spiritual life transformed with a view to his apostolic vocation (Gal. i. 16), preached in the synagogues of Damascus Jesus¹ as being the Son of God (Acts x. 19 f.). For all half-heartedness was foreign to him; now too he was, whatever he was, *thoroughly*, and this energetic unity of his profound nature was now sanctified throughout by the living spirit of Christ. His apostolic labours at Damascus, the birthplace of his regenerate life, lasted three years, interrupted however by a journey to *Arabia* (Gal. i. 17), the object of which most probably was to make merely a preliminary and brief trial of his ministry in a foreign field.²

Persecution on the part of the Jews—which was subsequently so often, according to the Divine counsel, the salutary means of extending the sphere

Beyschlag in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1870, 1. Compare generally Dörner, *Gesch. d. prot. Theol.* p. 829 ff.

¹ The chief facts in the life of Jesus could not but have been already known to him in a general way, whilst he was actively opposing the Christians at Jerusalem; but now, for the first time, there dawned upon him the *saving knowledge* of these facts and of their *truth*, and his constant intercourse with believers henceforth deepened more and more this saving knowledge. Thus, following the living historical tradition within the circle of Christianity under the influence of the Christ revealed in him, he became the most important witness for the history of Jesus apart from the Gospels. Comp. Keim, *Geschichte Jesu*, I. p. 36 ff.; also Hausrath, *neut. Zeitgesch.* II. p. 457. But that he had seen Christ Himself, cannot be inferred from 2 Cor. v. 16; see on that passage.

² Schrader, Köllner, Köhler (*Abfassungen d. epistol. Schr.* p. 43 f.), Rückert, and Schott on Gal. i. c., Holsten, Döllinger, Krenkel, and others, think that Paul withdrew immediately after his conversion to a neighbouring desert of Arabia, in order to prepare himself in retirement for his calling. Compare also Hausrath, *neut. Zeitgesch.* II. p. 455. This view is decidedly at variance

with Acts ix. 19, 20, where the *immediate* public teaching at Damascus, a few days after the conversion, receives very studious prominence. But we should only have to assume such an inconsistency with the passage in Acts, in the event of that assumed object of the Arabian journey being *exegetically* deducible from the Apostle's own words in Gal. i. 17, which, however, is by no means the case. Luke, it is true, makes no mention at all of the Arabian journey; but for that very reason it is highly improbable that it had as its object a silent preparation for his official work. For in that case the analogous instances of other famous teachers who had prepared themselves in the desert for their future calling (Ex. xxiv. 18, xxxiv. 28; Deut. ix. 9; 1 Kings xix. 8), and the example of John the Baptist, and even of Christ Himself, would have made the fact seem too important either to have remained wholly unknown to Luke, or to have been passed over without notice in his history; although Hilgenfeld and Zeller suppose him to have omitted it *intentionally*. On the other hand, we cannot suppose that the sojourn in Arabia extended over the whole, or nearly the whole of the three years (Eichhorn, Hensen, Anger, Ewald, Laurent, and older expositors). See generally on Gal. i. 17.

of the Apostle's labours—compels him to escape from Damascus (Acts ix. 19–26; 2 Cor. xi. 32 f.); and he betakes himself to the mother-church of the faith on account of which he has suffered persecution in a foreign land, proceeding to Jerusalem (A.D. 38), in order to make the personal acquaintance of Peter (Gal. i. 18). At first regarded by the believers there with distrust, he was, through the loving intervention of Barnabas (Acts ix. 27 f.), admitted into the relation of a colleague to the Apostles, of whom, however, only Peter and James the brother of the Lord were present (Gal. i. 19). His first apostolic working at Jerusalem was not to last more than fifteen days (Gal. i. 18); already had the Lord by an appearance in the temple (Acts xxii. 17 ff.) directed him to depart to the Gentiles; already were the Hellenists resident in the city seeking his life; and he therefore withdrew through Syria to his native place (Acts ix. 30; Gal. i. 20). Here he seems to have lived and worked wholly in quiet retirement, till at length Barnabas, who had appreciated the greatness and importance of the extraordinary man, went from Antioch, where just at that time Gentile Christianity had established its first church, to seek him out at Tarsus, and brought him thence to the capital of Syria; where both devoted themselves for a whole year (A.D. 43) without interruption to the preaching of the Gospel (Acts xi. 25, 26). We know not whether it was during this period (see Anger, *temp. rat.* p. 104 ff.), or during his sojourn in Cilicia (see Ewald, *apost. Zeit.* p. 440, ed. 3), that the Apostle became the subject of that spiritual ecstasy and revelation which, even after the lapse of fourteen years, continued to be regarded by him as so extremely remarkable (2 Cor. xii. 2–4).

But the great famine was now approaching, which, foretold at Antioch by the prophet Agabus from Jerusalem, threatened destruction to the churches of Judaea. On this account the brethren at Antioch, quite in the spirit of their new brotherly love, resolved to forward pecuniary aid to Judaea; and entrusted its transmission to Barnabas and Saul (Acts xi. 27–30). After the execution of this commission (A.D. 44), in carrying out which however Saul at least cannot have gone all the way to Jerusalem (see on Gal. ii. 1), the two men were formally and solemnly consecrated by the church at Antioch as apostles to the Gentiles (Acts xiii. 1–3); and Saul now undertook—at first with, but afterwards without, Barnabas—his missionary journeys so fruitful in results. In the course of these journeys he was wont, where there were Jews, to attempt the fulfilment of his office in the first instance among them, in accordance with what he knew to be the divine order (Rom. i. 16, xv. 8 ff.), and with his own deep love towards his nation (Rom. ix. 1 ff.); but when, as was usually the case, he was rejected by the Jews, he displayed the light of Christ before the Gentiles. And in all variety of circumstances he exhibited a vigour and versatility of intellect, an acuteness and depth, clearness and consistency, of thought, a purity and steadfastness of purpose, an ardour of disposition, an enthusiasm of effort, a wisdom of conduct, a firmness and delicacy of practical tact, a strength and freedom of faith, a fervour and skill of eloquence, a heroic courage amidst dangers, a love, self-denial, patience, and humility, and along with all this a lofty power of gifted genius, which secure for the Saul whom

Christ made His chosen instrument the reverence and admiration of all time.¹

In accordance with the narrative of Acts, three² missionary journeys of the Apostle may be distinguished; and in the description of these we may insert the remaining known facts of his history.

(1.) On his consecration as Apostle to the Gentiles, Paul went along with Barnabas the Cyprian, and with Mark accompanying them as apostolic servant, first of all to the neighbouring Cyprus; where, after his advance from Salamis to Paphos, his work was crowned by a double success—the humiliation of the *goetes* Elymas, and the conversion of the proconsul Sergius Paulus (Acts xiii. 6–12). Then Pamphylia, where Mark parted from the apostles (xiii. 13), Pisidia and Lycaonia became in turn fields of his activity, in which, together with Barnabas, he founded churches and organized them by the appointment of presbyters (xiv. 23). At one time receiving divine honours on account of a miracle (xiv. 11 ff.), at another persecuted and stoned (xiii. 50, xiv. 5, 19), he, after coming down from Perga to Attalia, returned to the mother-church at Antioch.

While Paul and Barnabas were here enjoying a quiet sojourn of some duration among the brethren (Acts xiv. 28), there came down from Judaea Pharisaic Christians jealous for the law, who required the Gentile converts to submit to circumcision as a condition of Messianic salvation (Acts xv. 1; Gal. ii. 4). It was natural that this demand should encounter a decided opponent in the highly enlightened and liberal-minded Paul, whose lively assurance of the truth, resting on revelation and upheld by his own experience, could tolerate no other condition of salvation than faith in Christ; and in consequence both he and the like-minded Barnabas became entangled in no small controversy (Acts xv. 2). The dispute involved the fundamental essence and independent standing of Christianity and the whole freedom of a Christian man, and was therefore of such importance that the church at Antioch, with a view to its settlement, deputed their most influential men, Paul, who also received a revelation for this purpose (Gal. ii. 2), and Barnabas along with some others (Paul also took Titus with him, Gal. ii. 1), to proceed to Jerusalem (fourteen years after the Apostle's first journey thither, A.D. 52), and there discuss with the apostles and elders the points

¹ Comp. Holsten, *l.c. Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 88 ff.; Luthardt, *d. Ap. Paul. e. Lebensbild*, 1869; Krenkel, *Paul. d. Ap. d. Heiden*, 1869; Hausrath, *neut. Zeitgesch.* II. 1872; Grau, *Entwicklungsgesch. d. neutest. Schriftth.* 1871, II. p. 10 f.; also Sabatier, *l'apôtre Paul, esquisse d'une histoire de sa pensée*, Strasb. 1870. Still the history of the spiritual development of the Apostle cannot be so definitely and sharply divided into periods as Sabatier has tried to do. See, against this, the appropriate remarks of Gess, *Jahrb. f. D. Theol.* 1871, p. 159 ff. The motive power and unity of all his working lay in his inward fellowship with Christ,

with His death and resurrection—in the subjective living and moving in Christ, and of Christ in him. Comp. Grau, *l.c.* p. 15 ff.

² The supposition that there were other chief journeys, which, it is alleged, are left unnoticed in the Acts (Schrader), is quite incompatible with the course of the history as there given. He must, however, have made many subordinate journeys, for the Book of Acts is far from giving a complete account of his labours, as is clearly shown by various intimations in the Epistles. For example, how many journeys and events not noticed in the Acts must be assumed in connection with 2 Cor. xi. 14 ff.?

in dispute. And how happy was the result of this so-called *Apostolic Council*! Paul laid the Gospel which he preached to the Gentiles before the church, and the apostles in particular, with the best effect (Gal. ii. 2, 6); and, as to the point of circumcision, not even his apostolic associate Titus, a Gentile, was subjected to the circumcision demanded by members of the church who were zealous for the law. With unyielding firmness Paul contended for the truth of the Gospel. The apostles who were present—James the brother of the Lord, Peter and John—approved of his preaching among, and formally recognized him as Apostle to, the Gentiles (Gal. ii. 1–10); and he and Barnabas, accompanied by the delegates of the church at Jerusalem, Judas Barsabas and Silas, returned to Antioch bearers of a decree (Acts xv. 28–30) favourable to Christian freedom from the law, and important as a provisional measure for the further growth of the church (Acts xvi. 4 f.), though not coming up to that complete freedom of the Gospel which Paul felt himself bound to claim, and for this reason, as well as in virtue of his consciousness of independence as Apostle to the Gentiles, not urged by him in his Epistles. Here they prosecuted afresh their preaching of Christ, though not always without disturbance on the part of Jewish Christians, so that Paul was compelled in the interest of Christian freedom openly to oppose and to admonish even Peter, who had been carried away into dissimulation, especially seeing that the other Jewish Christians, and even Barnabas, had allowed themselves to be tainted by that dissimulation (Gal. ii. 11 ff.). Paul had nevertheless the welfare of his foreign converts too much at heart to permit his wishing to prolong his stay in Antioch (Acts xv. 36). He proposed to Barnabas a journey in which they should visit those converts, but fell into a dispute with him in consequence of the latter desiring to take Mark (Acts xv. 37–39)—a dispute which had the beneficial consequence for the church, that the two men, each of whom was qualified to fill a distinct field of labour, parted from one another and never again worked in conjunction.

(2.) Paul, accompanied by Silas, entered on a second missionary journey (A.D. 52). He went through *Syria* and *Cilicia*, strengthening the Christian life of the churches (Acts xv. 41); and then through *Lycaonia*, where at *Lystra* (see on Acts xvi. 1) he associated with himself Timothy, whom he circumcised—apart however from any connection with the controversy as to the necessity of circumcision (see on Acts xvi. 3)—with a view to prevent his ministry from causing offence among the Jews. He also traversed *Phrygia* and *Galatia* (Acts xvi. 6), in the latter of which he was compelled by bodily weakness to make a stay, and so took occasion to plant the churches there (Gal. iv. 13). When he arrived at *Troas*, he received in a vision by night a call from Christ to go to *Macedonia* (xvi. 8 ff.). In obedience to this call he stepped for the first time on the soil of Europe, and caused Christianity to take permanent root in every place to which he carried his ministry. For in Macedonia he laid the foundation of the churches at *Philippi*, *Thessalonica*, and *Beroea* (Acts xvi. 12 ff., xvii. 1 ff., 10 ff.); and then, driven away by repeated persecutions (comp. also 1 Thess. ii. 1 f., i. 6)—but leaving Silas and Timothy behind in Beroea (Acts xvii. 14)—he brought to

Christ His first-fruits even in *Athens*, where he was treated by the philosophers partly with contempt and partly with ridicule (Acts xvii. 16 ff.). But in that city, whence he despatched Timothy, who had in the meanwhile again rejoined him, to Thessalonica (1 Thess. iii. 1 ff.), he was unable to found a church. The longer and more productive was his labour in *Corinth*, whither he betook himself on leaving Athens (Acts xviii. 1 ff.). There, where Silas and Timothy soon joined him, he founded the church which Apollos afterwards watered (1 Cor. iii. 6, 10, iv. 15, ix. 1); and for more than a year and a half (Acts xviii. 11, 18; A.D. 53 and 54)—during which period he received support from Macedonia (2 Cor. xi. 9), as he had previously on several occasions from the Philippians (Phil. iv. 15 f.)—overcame the wisdom of the world by the preaching of the Crucified One (1 Cor. ii. 1 ff.). The relation here formed with his fellow-craftsman Aquila (Acts xviii. 1 ff.), who as a Roman emigrant was sojourning with his wife Priscilla in Corinth, could not fail to exercise essential influence on the Christian church at Rome (Rom. xvi. 3). In Corinth he wrote also at this time the first of his doctrinal Epistles preserved to us—those to the *Thessalonians*. Corinth was the terminus of his second missionary journey. From Corinth he started on his return, not however taking a direct course, but first making by way of *Ephesus* (whither he brought Aquila and Priscilla with him) a journey to Jerusalem to attend a festival (Acts xviii. 18–22; A.D. 55), whence, without prolonging his stay, he returned to the bosom of the Syrian mother-church. But he did not remain there long (Acts xviii. 23); his apostolic zeal soon impelled him to set out once more.

(3.) He made his *third* missionary tour through *Galatia* and *Phrygia*, strengthening the churches which he had founded from town to town (Acts xviii. 23); and traversed Asia Minor as far as *Ephesus*, where for nearly three years (A.D. 56–58) he laboured with peculiar power and fervour and with eminent success (Acts xix. 1–xx. 1), although also assailed by severe trials (Acts xx. 19; 1 Cor. xv. 32, comp. 2 Cor. i. 8). This sojourn of the Apostle was also highly beneficial for other churches than that at Ephesus; for not only did he thence make a journey to *Corinth*, which city he now visited for the second time (see on 2 Cor. *introd.* § 2), but he also wrote towards the end of that sojourn what is known to us as the *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, receiving subsequently intelligence of the impression made by it from Timothy, whom he had sent to Corinth before he wrote, as well as from Titus, whom he had sent after writing it. The Epistle to the *Galatians* was also issued from Ephesus. He was impelled to leave this city by his steadfast resolution now to transfer his labours to the far West, and indeed to Rome itself, but before doing so to revisit and exhort to steadfastness in the faith his Macedonian and Achaean converts (Acts xix. 21, xx. 2), as well as once more to go to Jerusalem (Acts xix. 21). Accordingly, after Demetrius the silversmith had raised a tumult against him (Acts xix. 24 ff.), which however proved fruitless, and after having suffered in Asia other severe afflictions (2 Cor. i. 8), he travelled through *Macedonia*, whither he went by way of Troas (2 Cor. ii. 12). And here, after having been joined by both Timothy and Titus from Corinth, Paul wrote the *Second Epis-*

tle to the Corinthians. He then remained three months in *Achaia* (Acts xx. 3) where he issued from Corinth—which he now visited for the third time (2 Cor. xii. 14, xiii. 1)—his *Epistle to the Romans*. Paul now regards his calling in the sphere of labour which he has hitherto occupied as fulfilled, and is impelled to pass beyond it (2 Cor. x. 15 f.); he has preached the Gospel from Jerusalem as far as *Illyria* (Rom. xv. 19, 23); he desires to go by way of Rome to Spain, as soon as he shall have conveyed to Jerusalem a collection gathered in Macedonia and Greece (Rom. xv. 23 ff.). But it does not escape his foreboding spirit that suffering and tribulation await him in Judaea (Rom. xv. 30 ff.).

The Apostle's missionary labours may be regarded as closed with this last sojourn in Achaia; for he now entered on his return journey to Jerusalem, in consequence of which the capital of the world was to become the closing scene of his labours and sufferings. Hindered solely by Jewish plots from sailing directly from Achaia to Syria, he returned once more to Macedonia, and after Easter crossed from Philippi to Troas (Acts xx. 3-6), where his companions, who had set out previously, awaited him. Coming thence to Miletus, he bade a last farewell with touching fervour and solemnity to the presbyters of his beloved church of Ephesus (Acts xx. 17 ff.); for he was firmly convinced in his own mind, filled as it was by the Spirit, that he was going to meet bonds and afflictions (xx. 23). At Tyre he was warned by the Christians not to go up to Jerusalem (xxi. 4); at Caesarea Agabus announced to him with prophetic precision the approaching loss of his freedom (xxi. 10 ff.), and his friends sought with tears to move him even now to return; but nothing could in the least degree shake his determination to follow absolutely the impulse of the Spirit, which urged him towards Jerusalem (xx. 22). He went thither (A.D. 59) with heroic self-denial and yielding of himself to the divine purpose, in like manner as formerly the Lord Himself made His last pilgrimage to the Jewish capital. Arriving there shortly before Pentecost—for his object was not only to convey to the brethren the gifts of love collected for them, but also to celebrate the national festival, Acts xxiv. 17—he was induced by James and the presbyters to undertake immediately on the following day, for the sake of the Judaists, a Nazarite vow (xxi. 17 ff.). But, while it was yet only the fifth day of this consecration (see on Acts xxiv. 11), the Asiatic Jews fell upon him in the temple, accusing him of having, as an enemy of the law and the temple, brought Gentiles with him into the holy place; and they would have killed him, had not the tribune of the fort Antonia rescued him by military force from their hands (xxi. 28-34). In vain he defended himself before the people (Acts xxii.), and on the following day before the Sanhedrin (xxiii. 1-10); but equally in vain was a plot now formed by certain Jews who had bound themselves by an oath to put him to death (xxiii. 11-22); for the tribune, when informed of it, had the Apostle conducted immediately to the Procurator Felix at Caesarea (xxiii. 23-35). Felix was base enough, in spite of Paul's excellent defence, to detain him as a prisoner for two years, in the expectation even of receiving a bribe; and on his departure from the province, from a wish to gratify the Jews, left the Apostle to

be dealt with by Porcius Festus his successor (summer, A.D. 61), Acts xxiv. Even from the more equitable Festus, before whom the Jews renewed their accusations and Paul the defence of his innocence, he did not receive the justice that was his due ; wherefore he found himself compelled to make a formal appeal to the Emperor (xxv. 1-12). Before this date however, whilst living in the hope of a speedy release, he had written at Caesarea his *Epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philemon* (which are usually assigned to the *Roman* captivity) ; see on Eph. *introd.* § 2. His appeal, notwithstanding the unanimously favourable opinions pronounced regarding him (Acts xxvi.) after his solemn defence of himself before King Agrippa II. and his sister (xxv. 13 ff.), was necessarily followed by his transference from Caesarea to Rome. During the autumn voyage, on which he was accompanied by Luke and Aristarchus, danger succeeded danger, after the Apostle's wise warnings were despised (Acts xxvii. 10, 11, 21) ; and it was only in consequence of his advice being afterwards followed (Acts xxvii. 30-36) that all were saved and, after the stranding of their vessel at Malta, happily landed to pass the winter on that island. In the following spring he saw Rome, though not—as it had been so long his earnestly cherished wish to visit it (Rom. i. 10 ff.)—as the free herald of the Gospel. Still he there enjoyed the favour—after receiving a custodia militaris—of being permitted to dwell in his own hired house and to continue without interruption his work of instruction among all who came to him. This mild imprisonment lasted two full years (from the spring of 62) : and as at this time his intrepid fidelity to his office failed not to make oral proclamation of the kingdom of God (Acts xxviii. 30, 31 ; Phil. i. 12 ff.), so in particular the *Epistle to the Philippians*, which emanated from this time of captivity, is a touching proof of that fidelity, as well as of the love which he still received and showed, of the sufferings which he endured, and of the resignation and hope which alternated within him. This letter of love may be called his *swan's song*. The two years' duration of his further imprisonment did not decide his cause ; and it does not make his release by any means self-evident,¹ for Luke reports nothing from this period respecting the progress of the Apostle's trial. But now all at once we lose all trustworthy accounts bearing on the further course of his fate ; and only thus much can be gathered from the testimonies of ecclesiastical writers as historically certain, that he died the death of a martyr at Rome under Nero, and nearly at the same time² as Peter suffered crucifixion at the same place. See the testimonies in Credner, *Einl.* I. p. 318 ff. ; Kunze, *praecip. Patrum testim., quae ad mort. P. spect.*, Gott.

¹ In opposition to Stölting, *Beitr. z. Exeg. d. Paul. Br.* p. 195.

² Whether Peter suffered martyrdom somewhat earlier than Paul (Ewald), or some time later, cannot be made out from Clement, *Cor.* I. 5, any more than from other sources. Moreover this question is bound up with that as to the place and time of the composition of the First Epistle of Peter. But that Peter *never* came to

Rome—as, following Baur and others, Lipsius, *Chronol. d. Röm. Bischöfe*, 1869, and *Quellen d. Röm. Petrussage*, 1872, and Gundert in the *Jahrb. f. D. Th.* 1869, p. 306 ff., seek to prove (see the earlier literature on the question in Bleek's *Einleitung*, p. 562)—cannot, in view of the church tradition, be maintained. The discussion of this question in detail belongs to another place.

1848 ; and generally Baur, *Paulus*, I. p. 243 ff. ed. 2 ; Wieseler, p. 547 ff. ; Otto, *Pastoralbr.* p. 149 ff. ; from the Catholic point of view, Döllinger, *Christenth. und Kirche*, p. 79 ff. ed. 2.

The question however arises, Whether this martyrdom (beheading) was the issue of his trial *at that time* (Petavius, Lardner, Schmidt, Eichhorn, Heinrichs, Wolf, *de altera Pauli captivitate*. Lips. 1819, 1821, Schrader, Hemsen, Köllner, Winer, Fritzsche, Baur, Schenkel, de Wette, Matthies, Wieseler, Schaff, Ebrard, Thiersch, Reuss, Holtzmann, *Judenth. u. Christenth.* p. 549 f., Hausrath, Hilgenfeld, Otto, Volckmar, Krenkel, and others, including Rudow, *Diss. de argumentis historicis, quibus epistolar. pastoral. origo Paul. impugnata est*, Gott. 1852, p. 6 ff.), or of a *second* Roman captivity, as has been assumed since Eusebius (ii. 22) by the majority of ancient and modern writers, including Michaelis, Pearson, Hänlein, Bertholdt, Hug, Heidenreich, *Pastoralbr.* II. p. 6 ff., Mynster, *kl. theol. Schr.* p. 291 f., Guericke, Böhl, *Abfassungsz. d. Br. an Timoth. u. Tit.*, Berl. 1829, p. 91 ff., Köhler,¹ Wurm, Schott, Neander, Olshausen, Kling, Credner, Neudecker, Wiesinger, Baumgarten, Lange, *apost. Zeitalt.* II. i. p. 386 ff., Bleek, Döllinger, Sepp, Gams, *d. Jahr d. Märtyrertodes d. Ap. Petr. u. Paul.* 1867, Ewald, Huther, and others. Since the testimony of Eusebius, *i. e.*, which is quite of a general character, confessedly has reference merely to a tradition (*λόγος ἔχει*), which was acceptable to him on account of 2 Tim. iv. 16 f., the historical decision of this question turns on the statement of Clemens Romanus.² He says, according to Dressel's text,³ 1 Cor. 5 : *Διὰ ζήλον καὶ ὁ Παῦλος ὑπομονῆς βραβεῖον ὑπέσχευ, ἐπτάκις δεσμὰ φορέσας, φυγαδευθεὶς, ληθασθεὶς. Κῆρυν γενόμενος ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ δύσει, τὸ γενναῖον τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ κλέος ἔλαβεν, δικαιοσύνην διδάξας ὅλον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως ἑλθὼν, καὶ μαρτυρήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων. Οὕτως ἀπῆλλάγη τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ εἰς τὸν ἅγιον τόπον ἐπορεύθη, ὑπομονῆς γενόμενος μέγιστος ὑπογραμμός.* This passage, it is thought, indicates clearly enough that Paul before his death, passing beyond Italy, had reached the farthest limit of the West, Spain,⁴ and that therefore a second Roman

¹ Who, curiously enough, further assumes a third and fourth captivity.

² Nothing at all bearing upon our question can be derived from the testimony of Dionysius of Corinth, quoted by Euseb. ii. 25, to which Wiesinger still attaches weight. It merely affirms that Peter and Paul having come to Italy, there taught, and died as martyrs. Comp. Caius *ap. Eus. l. c.*, Iren. *Haer.* iii. 1 ; Tertull. *Scorp.* 15, *praescr.* 36 ; and even the *κῆρυγμα Πέτρου* (Clem. *Strom.* vi. 5). These testimonies do not in the least suggest the idea of a *second* presence in Rome.

³ Dressel follows the recension of Jacobson (Oxon. 1838, and 2d ed. 1840), who collated Cod. A anew, and carefully rectified its text of the Epistle first issued by Patricius Junius (Oxon. 1633), followed substantially in that form by Cotelierius (Paris 1672), and then amended by Wotton (Cantabr.

1718). The variations however of the different revisions of the text, which is only preserved, and that in a very faulty form, in Cod. A, do not essentially affect the present question. Even the form in which Laurent (*neutest. Stud.* p. 105 ff., and in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1870, p. 135 ff.) gives the text of the passage in Clement on the basis of Tischendorf's reproduction of Cod. A, is without influence on our question. This holds true also with respect to the latest critical editions of the Clementine Epistles by Hilgenfeld (*N. T. extra canonicum*, 1866, I.), by Lightfoot (*S. Clement of Rome. The two Epistles*, etc. 1869), and by Laurent (*Clem. Rom. ad Cor. epistula*, etc. 1870).

⁴ So also Ewald, *apost. Zeit.* p. 620 ff. ed. 3, who supposes that, when Paul heard in Spain of the horrors of the Neronian persecutions, he hurried back to Rome to bear witness for Christianity ; that there he was

imprisonment must be assumed. See especially Credner, *Gesch. d. Kanon*, p. 51 ff.; Huther, *Pastoralbr. Einl.* p. 32 ff. ed. 3; Lightfoot *l.c.*, who understands by *τέρμα τ. δ. Gades*. In opposition to this view we need not seek after any different interpretation of *τὸ τέρμα τ. δύσεως*; whether it may be taken to signify *the western limit appointed to Paul* (Baur, Schenkel, Otto)—which certainly would be very meaningless—or the *line of demarcation* between East and West (Schrader, Hilgenfeld, *apost. Väter*, p. 109); or even the *centre of the West* (Matthies). But it is to be observed:—1st. That the language generally bears a highly rhetorical and hyperbolic character, and, were it only for this reason, it is very hazardous to interpret the “limit of the West” (*τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως*) with geographical accuracy. And is not even the immediately preceding *δικαιωσ. διδάξας ὅλον τὸν κόσμον* a flourish of exaggeration? 2d. Clement does not speak of East and West from his own Roman standpoint, but, as was most naturally accordant with the connection and design of his statement, from the standpoint of Paul, into whose local relations he in thought transports himself. While the Apostle laboured in Asia, he was in the *East*: then he passed over to Greece, and thus had become, from his Oriental point of view, a herald also in the *West*. But in the last crisis of his destiny he came even to the far West, as far as Rome: and for this idea how naturally, in the midst of the highly coloured language which he was using, did the expression *ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως ἔλθων* suggest itself! It could not have been misunderstood by the readers, because people at Corinth could not but *know* the place where Paul met his death. 3d. *Ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων* denotes (in allusion to Matt. x. 18) the rulers generally, before whom Paul gave testimony concerning Christ (*μαρτυρήσας*), after he had reached this *τέρμα τῆς δύσεως*. If the latter denotes *Rome*, then we may without hesitation, on historical grounds, conclude that the rulers are those Roman magistrates before whom Paul made his defence in Rome. But if *Spain* should be the “goal of the West,” we should find ourselves carried by the *μαρτυρήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγουμ.* to some scene of judicial procedure *in Spain*; and would it not in that case be necessary to assume a sojourn of the Apostle there, which that very trial would render specially memorable? But how opposed to such a view is the fact, that no historical trace, at all certain, is preserved of any church founded by Paul in Spain! For the testimonies to this effect adduced by Gams, *Kirchengesch. v. Spanien*, p. 26, Sepp, *Gesch. der Ap.* p. 314, ed. 2, and others, contain nothing but traditions, which have merely arisen from the hypothetical Spanish journey of Paul. And to say with Huther that the Apostle had *travelled* (*ἔλθων*) to Spain, but had not *laboured* there, is to have recourse to an explanation at variance with the intrinsic character of Paul himself and with the context of Clement. Besides, according to Rom. xv. 23 f., Paul desired to transfer his *ministry*, that was accomplished in the East, to Spain. 4th. If *ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τ. δύσεως ἔλθων* was intended to transport the reader to Spain, then it would be most natural, since *οὕτως* sums up the previous participial clauses, to transfer the *ἀπηλλάγη*

arrested, placed once more on trial, and condemned to death. According to Ewald

the Book of Acts itself, at i. 8, points by way of anticipation to the Spanish journey.

τοῦ κόσμον also to *Spain*; for just as this ἀπὸ τ. κ. is manifestly correlative to the δικαιοσύνην διδάξ. ὅλον τ. κόσμον, so εἰς τ. ἅγιον τόπον ἐπορεύθη corresponds with the ἐπὶ τ. τέρμα τ. δύσεως κ.τ.λ.; so that Paul, starting from the τέρμα τ. δύσεως, which he has reached, and where he has borne his testimony before the rulers, enters on his journey to the holy place. It is only, therefore, when we understand *Italy* as the western limit, that the language of Clement is in harmony with the historical circumstances of the case.¹ See, moreover, Lipsius, *de Clem. Rom. ep. ad Cor.* I. p. 129, and *Chronol. d. röm. Bischöfe*, p. 163 ff. It cannot withal be overlooked that in the so-called *Epist. Clem. ad Jacobum*, c. 1, there is manifestly an echo of our passage, and yet Rome alone is designated as the final goal of the Apostle's labours: τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν ὅλον τῷ κόσμῳ μὲνσαι βασιλέα, μέχρις ἐνταῦθα τῇ Ῥώμῃ γενόμενος, θεοβουλήτω διδασκαλίῃ σώζων ἄνθρωπους, αὐτὸς τοῦ νῦν βίου βίαιος τὸ ζῆν μετέλλαξεν. After this the conjecture of Wieseler (and Schaff, *Hist. of Apost. Church*, p. 342), who, instead of ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα, as given by Junius, would read ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα, and explain it "before the supreme power of the West," is unnecessary. It is decisive against this view that Jacobson, as well as Wotton, found ἐπὶ in the Cod. A, and that Tischendorf likewise has attested the existence of καὶ ἐπὶ as beyond doubt. But, besides, Wieseler's expedient would not be admissible on grounds of linguistic usage, for τέρμα in the sense assumed is only used with ἔχειν; see Eur. *Suppl.* 617, *Or.* 1343, Jacobs. *ad Del. epigr.* p. 287. From the very corrupt text of the *Canon Muratorii*,² nothing can be gathered bearing on our question, except that

¹ If we render μαρτυρίας *martyrium passus* (Credner, Lange, and older writers), this result comes out the more clearly, since at all events Paul died in Rome; along with which indeed Döllinger further finds in ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγούμ. an evidence for the year 67 that has been the traditional date since Eusebius, *Chron.* (comp. also Gams, *Jahr d. Märtyrertodes*, etc.; and Sepp, *l.c.* p. 379), when Nero was absent and the *Prefects* ruled in Rome. See his *Christenth. u. Kirche*, p. 101, ed. 2. Against that chronological determination, see generally Baxmann, *dass Petr. u. Paul nicht am 29. Junius 67. gemartert worden sind*, 1867.

² The passage in question runs, "Acta autem omnium apostolorum sub uno libro sunt. Lucas optime Theophile comprindit (comprehendit), quia sub praesentia ejus singula gerebantur, sicuti et semote passionem Petri evidenter declarat, sed profectorem Pauli ab urbe ad Spaniam proficiscentis." Wieseler conjectures that after *proficiscentis* the word *omittit* has been left out; that *semote* means: at a separate place, viz. not in the Acts of the Apostles, but in the *Gospel*, xxii. 81-83. A very forced conjecture, with which nevertheless Volkmar (in Credner's *Gesch. d. Canon*, p. 348) agrees, supposing that a *non* has dropped out after

proficiscentis. Credner, *l.c.* p. 155 f., conjectured *semota* (namely *loca*, which is supposed to refer to John xxi. 18 ff., and Rom. xv. 24), and then *et* instead of *sed*. Otto, p. 154, would read *sic et* instead of *sed*; making the meaning: "consequently (*sic*) he declares openly, that just as (*uti et*) in his absence the martyrdom of Peter took place, so likewise (*sic et*) the journey of Paul," etc. But how much must we thus introduce into the *semote*! Laurent alters into: "*semotâ passione . . . et profectione*," etc. Various suggestions are made by others; see Ewald, *Jahrb.* VIII. p. 126, whose own procedure is the boldest. Hilgenfeld, *Kanon u. Krit. d. N. T.*, p. 42, thinks that the author has "*guessed*" the martyrdom of Peter and the Spanish journey of Paul from the abrupt close of the Acts of the Apostles. Such a theory should have been precluded by the "*evidenter declarat*," for which indeed Ewald would read "*evidenter descripti*" or "*decolat*." If we must resort to conjecture (and it is necessary), it seems the simplest course, instead of *et semote*, to insert *id semotam*, and then instead of *sed*, *et*. This would yield the sense: *as this circumstance (id)*, viz. the writing down only what took place in his presence, *evidently explains the exclusion (semotam) of the passion of Peter and*

the author was already *acquainted with* the tradition of the journey to Spain afterwards reported by Eusebius; not, that he wished to *refute* it (Wieseler, p. 536). On the other hand, Origen (in Euseb. iii. 1: τί δεῖ περὶ Παύλου λέγειν ἀπὸ Ἱερουσαλὴμ μέχρι τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πεπληρωκότος τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἐπὶ Νέρωνος μεμαρτυρηκότος) tacitly excludes the Spanish journey. The tradition regarding it arose very naturally out of Rom. xv. 24 (Jerome: "ad Italiam quoque et, *ut ipse scribit*, ad Hispanias—portatus est"), and served as a needed historical basis for the explanation of 2 Tim., acquiring the more general currency both on this account and because it tended to the glorification of the Apostle. It is further worthy of attention that the pseudo-Abdias, in his *Historia Apostolica*, ii. 7, 8 (in Fabricius, *Cod. Apocr.* p. 452 ff.), represents the execution as the issue of the captivity reported in the Acts. Had this author been a believer in a liberation, as well as in a renewed missionary activity and second imprisonment, he would have been the last to refrain from bringing forward wonderful reports regarding them. Substantially the same may be said of the *Acta Petri et Pauli* in Tischendorf, *Act. ap. apocr.* p. 1 ff.

Note.—If we regard the *Epistles to Timothy and Titus*—which, moreover, stand or fall together—as genuine, we *must* take, as Eusebius in particular has done with reference to 2 Tim., the tradition of the Apostle's liberation from Rome and of a second captivity there as an historical postulate,¹ in order to gain the room which cannot otherwise be found for the historical references of those Epistles, and the latest possible time for their other contents. But the more defective the proof of the second imprisonment is, the more warranted remain the doubts as to the genuineness of these Epistles, which arise out of their own contents; while in virtue of these doubts the Epistles, in their turn, cannot themselves be suitably adduced in proof of that captivity. Besides, it cannot be left out of view that in all the unquestionably genuine Epistles which Paul wrote during his imprisonment, every trace of the previously (Rom. xv. 24) cherished plan of a journey to Spain has vanished; and that in the Epistle to the Philippians, which was certainly not written till he was in Rome (i. 25 f., ii. 24), he contemplates as his further goal in the event of his liberation, not the far West, but Macedonia, or in other words a return to the East. From Acts xxiii. 11, however, no evidence can be adduced against the Spanish journey (as Otto contends), because in this passage there is no express mention of a *last* goal, *excluding* all further advance.

of the journey of Paul from Rome to Spain. On both of these occasions the author accordingly thinks that Luke was not present, and thereby the fact that he has omitted them in his book is explained.

¹ This is the ground assumed by the latest expositors of the Pastoral Epistles, who maintain their genuineness, Wiesinger and Huther; whilst Rudow, again, in the already mentioned *Dissert.* 1852, only rejects the First Ep. to Timothy (comp. Bleek), and

calling in question a second captivity, ascribes the Second Ep. to Timothy to the first imprisonment; and the Ep. to Titus to the sojourn at Ephesus. So also Otto, with respect to the two last-named Epistles; but he regards the First Ep. to Timothy as a letter of instruction for Timothy in view of his mission to Corinth, consequently as nearly contemporaneous with the Ep. to Titus. See, in opposition to Otto, Huther on the *Pastoral Epistles*, *Introd.* ed. 3.

§ 2. THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH AT ROME.¹

That the Christian Church in Rome had been in existence for a considerable time when Paul wrote to it, is clear from i. 8-13 and xiii. 11, 15; and that it was already a church formally constituted, may be gathered from the general analogy of other churches that had already been long in existence, from xii. 5 ff., and less certainly from xvi. 5. Especially may the existence of a body of presbyters, which was essential to church organization (Acts xiv. 23), be regarded as a matter of course. In the Acts of the Apostles the existence of the Church is presupposed (xxviii. 15) as something well known; and the author, who follows the thread of his *Apostle's* biography, had no occasion to narrate its origin or development.

The *origin* of the Roman Church cannot therefore be determined with certainty. It is not incredible that even during the lifetime of Jesus faith in Him had taken root, in individual cases, among the Roman Jews (comp. Clem. *Recogn.* i. 6). For among the pilgrims who flocked to the festivals at Jerusalem from all countries Romans also were wont to be present (Acts ii. 10), and that too in considerable numbers, because the multitude of Jews in Rome had since the time of Pompey become extraordinarily great (see Philo, *leg. ad. Caj.* II. p. 568; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 6; Joseph. *Antt.* xvii. 11, 1), including Jews directly from Palestine (prisoners of war, see Philo, *l.c.*), of whom a large portion had attained to freedom, the rights of citizenship, and even wealth. Is it unlikely that individual festal pilgrims from Rome, impressed by the words and works of Jesus in Jerusalem, carried back with them to their homes the first seeds of the faith? To this view it cannot be objected (as by Reiche), that Christianity did not spread beyond the bounds of Palestine until after the miracle of Pentecost; for there is mention, in fact, in Matt. x. of the official *missionary activity* of the Apostles, and in Acts viii. 1 ff. of that of emigrants from Jerusalem. If the former and the latter did not labour in foreign lands until a subsequent period, this by no means excludes the possibility of the conversion of individual foreigners, partly Jews, partly proselytes, *who became believers in Jerusalem*. It is further probable that there were some Romans among the three thousand who came over to the Christian faith at the first Pentecost (Acts ii. 10); at least it would be very arbitrary to exclude these, who are expressly mentioned among the *witnesses* of what occurred at Pentecost, from participation in its results. Lastly, it is probable that the persecution which broke out with the stoning of Stephen drove some Palestinian Christians to take refuge even in the distant capital of the world, distinguished by its religious toleration, and in fact inclined to Oriental modes of worship (Athenaeus, *Deipnos.* I. p. 20 B., calls it *ἐπιτομὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης*, and says: *καὶ γὰρ ὅλα τὰ ἔθνη ἀθρόως αὐτόθι*

¹ See Th. Schott, *d. Römerbriefs. Endzweck u. Gedankengang nach*, Erl. 1858; Mangold, *d. Römerbr. u. d. Anfänge d. röm. Gem.* Marb. 1866; Wieseler in *Herzog's Encykl.* XX. p. 583 ff. (1866); Beyschlag in the *Stud.*

u. Krit. 1867, p. 627 ff.; comp. also Grau, *z. Einführ. in d. Schriftth. N. T.*, Stuttg. 1868, and his *Entwicklungsgesch. d. neut. Schriftth.* II. 1871, p. 102 ff.; Sabatier, *l'apôtre Paul*, 1870.

συνῆκισται). For that this dispersion of the Christians of Jerusalem was not confined to Samaria and Judaea (an objection here urged by Reiche and Köllner), is proved by Acts xi. 19, where emigrants are mentioned who had gone as far as Phoenicia and Cyprus. And how easily might some find their way even to Rome, seeing that the brisk maritime intercourse between these places and Italy afforded them opportunity, and seeing that they might expect to find admittance and repose among their countrymen in Rome, who were strangers to the fanatical zeal of Palestine. But although, in consequence of the constant intercourse maintained by the Jews at Rome with Asia, Egypt, and Greece, and especially with Palestine (Gieseler, *Kirchengesch.* I. § 17), various Christians may have visited Rome, and various Jews from Rome may have become Christians, all the influences hitherto mentioned could not establish a Christian *congregational* life in Rome. Individual Christians were there, and certainly also Christian fellowship, but still no organized church. To plant such a church, there was needed, as is plain from the analogy of all other cases of the founding of churches with which we are acquainted, official action on the part of teachers endowed directly or indirectly with apostolic authority.

Who the *founder* of the Roman *congregational* life was, however, is utterly unknown. The Catholic Church names the Apostle *Peter*; concerning whom, along with the gradual development of the hierarchy, there has been a gradual development of tradition, that he came to Rome in the second year, or at any rate about the beginning of the reign of the Emperor Claudius (according to Gams, A.D. 41), to overcome Simon Magus, and remained there twenty-five years (Gams: twenty-four years and an indefinite number of days), till his death, as its first bishop. See Eusebius, *Chron.* (in Mai's *Script. vet. nov. coll.* VIII. p. 376, 378); and Jerome, *de vir. ill.* 1.¹ But that Peter in the year 44, and at the date of the apostolic conference in the year 52, was still resident in Jerusalem, is evident from Acts xii. 4, xv. 7, and Gal. ii. 1 ff. From Acts xii. 7 a journey to Rome cannot be inferred.² Further, that still later, when Paul was living at Ephesus, Peter had not been labouring in Rome, is evident from Acts xix. 21, because Paul followed the principle of not interfering with another Apostle's field of labour (Rom. xv. 20; comp. 2 Cor. x. 16); and, had Peter been in Rome

¹ See generally, Lipsius, *d. Quellen d. Röm. Petrusage*, Kiel, 1872. As to the way in which that tradition, the germs of which are found in Dionysius of Corinth (Euseb. *H. E.* ii. 25), gradually developed itself into the complete and definite form given above, see Wieseler, *chronol. Synops.* p. 571; regarding the motley legends connected with it, see Sepp, *Gesch. d. Ap.* p. 341, ed. 2; concerning the unhistorical matter to be eliminated from the report of Jerome, see Huther on 1 *Peter*, *Introd.*; comp. Credner, *Einkl.* II. p. 382. The alleged presence of Simon in Rome is probably the mere product of a misconception, by which Justin, *Apol.* i. 26 (comp. Irenaeus, *Haer.* i. 23),

explained an old inscription as referring to Simon Magus. Comp. also Uhlhorn, *d. Homil. u. Recogn. d. Clem.* p. 378 f.; Möller in *Herzog's Encykl.* XIV. p. 392 ff.; Bleek, p. 563 f.

² Even if Peter had actually, in the course of his foreign travels (1 Cor. ix. 5), visited Rome once in the time of Claudius (comp. on Acts xii. 17), which Ewald (*apost. Zeit.* p. 606 f. ed. 3.) concedes to ecclesiastical tradition, not calling in question even a meeting with Simon Magus there, yet we cannot regard this as involving the foundation of the Roman church and the episcopal position. Otherwise Paul would have intruded on another labourer's field. See the sequel.

when Paul wrote to the Romans, he would have been saluted by the latter before all others; for the numerous salutations in ch. xvi. presuppose an accurate acquaintance with the teachers who were then in Rome. Peter cannot have been labouring in Rome at all before Paul himself was brought thither, because the former, as Apostle to the Jews, would have brought Christianity into closer contact with the Jewish population there than is apparent in Acts xxviii. 22. It is even in the highest degree improbable that Peter was in Rome prior to the writing of the Epistle to the Philippians—the only one which was certainly written by Paul in Rome—or at the time of its being written; for it is inconceivable that Paul should not in this letter have mentioned a *fellow-Apostle*, and that one Peter, especially when he had to complain so deeply of being forsaken as at Phil. ii. 20. Consequently the arrival of Peter in Rome, which was followed very soon by his execution—and which is accredited by such ancient and strong testimony (Dionysius of Corinth, in Euseb. ii. 25; Caius, in Euseb. ii. 25; Origen, in Euseb. iii. 1; Irenaeus; Tertullian, etc.) that it cannot be in itself rejected—is to be placed only towards the end of Paul's captivity, subsequent to the composition of the Epistle to the Philippians. If, therefore, the tradition of the Roman Church having been founded by Peter—a view disputed even by Catholic theologians like Hug, Herbst, Feilmoser, Klee, Ellendorf, Maier, and Stengel, who however are vehemently opposed by Windischmann, Stenglein, Reithmayr, and many others¹—must be entirely disregarded (although it is still defended among Protestants by Bertholdt, Mynster, and Thiersch), it is on the other hand highly probable, that a Christian church was founded at Rome only subsequent to Paul's transference of his missionary labours to Europe; since there is no sort of indication, that on his first appearance in Macedonia and Achaia he anywhere found a congregation already existing. He himself in fact stood in need of a special direction from Christ to pass over to Europe (Acts xv. 9 f.); and so another official herald of the faith can hardly before that time have penetrated as far as Italy. But, when Paul was labouring successfully in Greece, it was very natural that apostolic men of his school should find motive and occasion for carrying their evangelic ministry still further west-

¹ Döllinger, *Christenth. u. Kirche*, p. 95 ff. ed. 2, still seeks to support it on the usual grounds, and in doing so starts from the purely fanciful *à priori* premiss, that the Roman Church *must* have been founded by an Apostle, with the equally arbitrary conclusion: "and that Apostle *can only* have been Peter." He gives to the twenty-five years' duration of the Petrine *episcopatus* a curious round-about interpretation, according to which the episcopate is made to mean merely *ecclesiastical dignity* in general; see p. 317. The passage of Dionysius of Corinth in Euseb. ii. 25 is misinterpreted by him.—It ill accords with the Roman episcopate of Peter that in Euseb. iii. 2, and Irenaeus, iii. 3, *Linus* is expressly named as

the first Roman bishop; and in fact in the *Constit. ap.* vii. 46, 1, it is said that he was appointed by *Paul*; while Peter only nominated the *second* bishop (Clemens) after the death of Linus. According to this statement Peter had nothing to do with the founding of the Roman episcopate, and neither Paul nor Peter was bishop in Rome. On the whole it is to be maintained that *no* Apostle at all was bishop of a church. The apostolate and the presbyterate were two specifically distinct offices in the service of the Church. In *Rome* especially the succession of bishops can only be historically proved from Xystus onward (ob. 125); see Lipsius, *l. c.*

ward,—to the capital of the Gentile world. The expulsion of the Jews from Rome under Claudius (Sueton. *Claud.* 25 ; Acts xviii. 2) served, under Divine guidance, as a special means for this end. Refugees to the neighbouring Greece became Christians, Christians of the Pauline type, and then, on their return to Rome, came forward as preachers of Christianity and organizers of a church. We have historical confirmation of this in the instance of Aquila and Priscilla, who emigrated as Jews to Corinth, dwelt there with Paul for upwards of a year and a half, and at the date of our Epistle had again settled in Rome, where they appear, as previously in Ephesus (1 Cor. xvi. 19), according to Rom. xvi. 3 as teachers and the possessors of a house where the Roman church assembled.¹ It is probable that others also, especially among the persons mentioned in ch. xvi., were in similar ways led by God ; but it is certain that a chief place among the founders of the church belongs to Aquila and Priscilla ; since among the many who are greeted by Paul in the 16th chap. he presents to them the *first* salutation, and that with a more laudatory designation than is accorded to any of the others.

Christianity, having taken root in the first instance among the *Jews*, found the more readily an entrance among the *Gentiles* in Rome, because the popular heathen religion had already fallen into a contempt inducing despair both among the cultivated and uncultivated classes (see Gieseler I. i. § 11–14 ; Schneckenburger, *neutest. Zeitgesch.* p. 59 f. ; Holtzmann, *Judenthum u. Christenthum*, p. 305 ff.). Hence the inclination to Monotheism was very general ; and the number of those who had gone over to Judaism was very great (Juvenal, *Sat.* xiv. 96 ff. ; Tac. *Ann.* xv. 44, *Hist.* v. 5 ; Seneca, in Augustine, *de civ. Dei*, vii. 11 ; Joseph. *Antt.* xviii. 3, 5). How much attention and approval, therefore, must the liberal system of religion, elevated above all the fetters of a deterrent legal rigour, as preached by Aquila and other Pauline teachers, have met with among the Romans dissatisfied with heathenism ! From the description of most of the persons named in ch. xvi., from the express approval given to the doctrine in which the Romans had been instructed, xvi. 17, vi. 17, and even from the fact of the composition of the letter itself, inasmuch as not one of the now extant letters of the Apostle is directed to a *non-Pauline* church, we may with certainty infer that *Pauline* Christianity was preponderant in Rome ; and from this it is a further necessary inference that a very important part of the Roman church consisted of *Gentile-Christians*. This *Gentile-Christian* part must have been the *preponderating* one, and must have formed its *chief constituent* element (in opposition to Baur, Schwegler, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, van Hengel, Volkmar, Reuss, Lutterbeck, Thiersch, Holtzmann, Mangold, Grau, and Sabatier),

¹ That this married pair came to Corinth, not as Christians, but as still Jews, and were there converted to Christianity through Paul, see on Acts xviii. 1, 2. Comp. Relche, I. p. 44 f. ; Wieseler, *l.c.* p. 586.—Moreover, that the *Christians* (Jewish-Christians) resident in Rome were driven into exile along with other Jews by the edict of Claudius,

can neither be proved nor yet controverted from the well-known passage in Sueton. *Claud.* 25 (see on Acts xviii. 1) ; for at that time the Christian body, which at all events was very small and isolated, was not yet independent, but still united with the Jewish population.

since Paul expressly and repeatedly designates and addresses the Romans in general as belonging to the *ἔθνη* (i. 6, 13, xi. 13) ; and asserts before them the importance of his calling as *Apostle to the Gentiles* (xv. 15 f., i. 5 ; comp. xvi. 4, 26). Comp. Neander, *Gesch. d. Pflanzung*, etc., ed. 4, p. 452 ff., Tholuck, Philippi, Wieseler, Hofmann. Indeed, we must presume, in accordance with the apostolic agreement of Gal. ii. 7 ff., that Paul would not have written a doctrinal Epistle to the Romans, especially one containing his entire gospel, if the church had been, in the main, a church of the *περιτομῇ* and not of the *ἀκροβυστία*.¹ Even ch. vii. 1, where the readers are described as *γινώσκοντες νόμον*, as well as the numerous references to the Old Testament, and proofs adduced from it, are far from attesting the predominance of Jewish Christianity in Rome.² They are fully explained, when we recollect that in the apostolic age *all* Christian knowledge was conveyed through the channel of the Old Testament (xvi. 26) ; that an acquaintance with the law and the prophets, which was constantly on the increase by their being publicly read in the assemblies (comp. on Gal. iv. 21), was also to be found among the *Gentile-Christians* ; and that the mingling of Jews and Gentiles in the churches, even without a Judaizing influence being exerted on the latter (as in the case of the Galatians), could not but tend to further the use of that Old Testament path which Christian preaching and knowledge had necessarily to pursue. The grounds upon which Baur (in the *Tübing. Zeitschr.* 1836, 3, p. 144 ff., 1857, p. 60 ff., and in his *Paulus*, I. p. 343 ff. ed. 2 ; also in his *Christenth. d. drei erst. Jahrb.* p. 62 ff. ed. 2 ; see also Volkmar, *d. Röm. Kirche*, p. 1 ff. ; Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 411) seeks to establish the preponderance of Jewish Christianity will be dealt with in connection with the passages concerned ; as will also the defence of that preponderance which Mangold has given, while correcting in many respects the positions of Baur. The middle course attempted by Beyschlag, *l.c.* p. 640—that the main element of the church consisted of native Roman *proselytes* to Judaism, so that we should regard the church as *Gentile-Christian* in its lineage, but as *Jewish-Christian* in its habits of thought—is unsupported by any relevant evidence in the Epistle itself, or by any indication in particular of a previous state of *proselytism*.

But even if there was merely a considerable portion of the Christian church at Rome consisting of those who had been previously Jews (as, in particular, xiv. 1 ff. refers to such), it must still appear strange, and might even cast a doubt upon the existence of a regularly organized church (Bleek, *Beitr.* p. 55, and *Einl.* p. 412 ; comp. Calovius and others), that when Paul arrives

¹ By this Epistle he would have gone beyond the line laid down by him for his own field of labour (comp. 2 Cor. x. 13 ff.), and would have interfered in the sphere not assigned to him—the *Apostleship to the Jews*.

² Even in the Epistle of Clement, written in the name of the Roman Church, with its numerous O. T. references, the Gentile-Christian and Pauline element of thought predominates, although there is a manip-

ulation of Pauline views and ideas in accordance with the "Christian legalism" (Ritschl, *altkath. K.* p. 274 ff.) of a later period. Comp. Lipsius, *de Clem. Rom. Ep. ad Cor. pr.* 1855 ; and Mangold, p. 167 ff. I cannot agree with Wieseler and others that this Epistle was written before the destruction of Jerusalem, but with Ritschl and others assign it to the time of Domitian ; comp. Cotelierius.

as a prisoner in Rome, and wishes to acquaint himself with the Jewish community there, the leaders of the latter make no mention of a Christian congregation at Rome, but evince merely a superficial cognizance of the Christian sect in general (Acts xxviii. 22). But the Jewish leaders are here speaking as *officials*, and, as such, are not inclined without special immediate occasion to express their views before the captive stranger as to the position of the Christian body which existed *in Rome itself*. A designation of the Christian sect *generally* in accordance with its notorious outward reputation—such as might bring it into suspicion—is enough for them ; but as to the precise relation in which this sect stands to them in *Rome itself* they do not feel themselves called upon to say anything for the present, and, with discreet reserve, are therefore wholly silent respecting it. This narrative therefore of Acts is neither to be regarded as a fiction due to the tendency of the author (Baur, Zeller, Holtzmann), nor to be explained, arbitrarily and inadequately, by the expulsion of the Jews under Claudius (Olshausen), which had induced the Roman Jewish-Christians to separate themselves entirely from the Jews, so that on the return of the latter from exile the former remained unnoticed by them. Neither is it to be accounted for, with Neander—overlooking the peculiar character of Jewish religious interests—by the vast size of the metropolis ; nor, with Baumgarten, by the predominance of the Gentile-Christians there ; nor yet, with older writers, by the hypothesis—unjust and incapable of proof—that the Roman Jews acted a dishonest and hypocritical part on the occasion. Not dishonesty, but prudence and caution are evinced in their conduct (comp. Schneckenburger, Philippi, Tholuck, Mangold), for the explanation of which we do not require, in addition to what they themselves express in ver. 22, to assume any special outward reason, such as that they had been rendered by the *Claudian measure* more shy and reserved (Philippi ; comp. Ewald, *apost. Zeit.* p. 588, ed. 3) ; especially seeing that there is no just ground for referring the words of Suetonius, “*Judaeos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Roma expulit*” (*Claud.* 25), to disputes between Jews and Christians relative to the Messiahship of Jesus, contrary to the definite expression “*tumultuare.*”¹

We may add that our Epistle—since Peter cannot have laboured in Rome before it was written—is a *fact destructive of the historical basis of the Papacy*,

¹ The *Chrestus* of Suetonius was a Jewish agitator in Rome, who was actually so called. See on Acts xviii. 2, and Wieseler, p. 585. Every other interpretation is fanciful, including even the one given above, which is adopted by the majority of modern writers, among others by Baur, Holtzmann, Keim, Grau, and Mangold. Thiersch is peculiar in adding to it the groundless assertion, that “the disturbances arose through the testimony of *Peter* to the Messiah in Rome, but that Peter had again left Rome even before the expulsion of the Jews by Claudius.” Groundless is also the opinion of Philippi, that, if *Chrestus* is to be taken as an agitator, he must have been a

pseudo-Messiah. The pseudo-Messiahs appeared much later. But after the analogies of Judas and Theudas, other insurgents are conceivable enough—enthusiasts for political freedom and zealots. Beyerslag, p. 652 ff., likewise taking *Chrestus* as equivalent to *Christus*, infers too rashly, from the passage in Suetonius, that the Roman Church was chiefly composed of proselytes, who, when the native-born Jews were expelled, *remained behind*. Märcker (*Lehre von der Erlös. nach d. Römerbr.* Meining, 1870, p. 3) rightly rejects the interchange of the names *Chrestus* and *Christus*.

in so far as the latter is made to rest on the founding of the Roman church and the exercise of its episcopate by that Apostle. For Paul the writing of such a didactic Epistle to a church of which he knew Peter to be the founder and bishop, would have been, according to the principle of his apostolic independence, an impossible inconsistency.

§ 3. OCCASION, OBJECT AND CONTENTS OF THE EPISTLE.¹

Long before writing this epistle (*ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐτῶν*, xv. 23) the Apostle had cherished the fixed and longing desire (Acts xix. 21) to preach the Gospel in person at Rome (i. 11 ff.)—in that metropolis of the world, where the flourishing of Christianity would necessarily exert an influence of the utmost importance on the entire West ; and where, moreover, the special relation in which the church stood to the Apostle through its Pauline founders and teachers, and through the many friends and fellow-labourers whom he possessed in the city (ch. xvi.), claimed his ardent and loving interest. His official labours in other regions had hitherto prevented the carrying out of this design (i. 13, xv. 22). Now indeed he hoped that he should soon accomplish its realization ; but, partly because he wished first to undertake his collection-journey to Jerusalem (xv. 23–25), and partly because Spain, and not Rome (xv. 24–28), was to be the goal of his travels to the West, a lengthened sojourn in Rome cannot have formed part of his plan at that time. Accordingly, in pursuance of his apostolic purpose with reference to the Roman church, he could not but wish, on the one hand, no longer to withhold from it at least such a written communication of his doctrine, which he had so long vainly desired to proclaim orally, as should be suitable to the church's present need ; and on the other hand, by this written communication to pave the way for his intended personal labours in such fitting manner as to render a prolonged stay there unnecessary. This twofold desire *occasioned* the composition of our Epistle, for the transmission of which the journey of the Corinthian deaconess Phoebe to Rome (xvi. 1) afforded an opportunity which he gladly embraced. He could not fail to possess a sufficient *acquaintance* with the circumstances of the church, when we consider his position towards the teachers saluted in ch. xvi., and the eminent importance of the church itself—of whose state, looking to the active intercourse between Corinth and Rome, he was certainly thoroughly informed—as well as the indications afforded by ch. xii. xiv. xv. That the Epistle was called forth by special communications made from Rome itself (possibly by Aquila and Priscilla) is nowhere apparent from its contents ; on the contrary, such a view is, from the *general nature* of the contents, highly improbable. Of all the Apostle's letters, our present Epistle is that which has least arisen out of the necessity of dealing with special *casual* circumstances. According to Baur, the readers, as Jewish Christians (imbued also with erroneous Ebionite views), gave rise to the letter by their opposition to Paul, in so far, namely, as they saw in Paul's apostolic labours among the Gentiles

¹ See, besides the works quoted in § 2, Riggenbach in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1868, p. 33 ff.

a detriment to the Jews, contrary to the promises given to them by God, and therefore asserted the national privileges of their theocratic primacy in an exclusive spirit as opposed to the universalism of the Pauline teaching. Comp. also Schwegler, *nachapost. Zeit.* I. p. 285 ff. ; Volkmar, *l.c.* p. 7 ff. ; and also Reuss, *Gesch. d. N. T.* § 105 ff. ed. 4. In this view the Epistle is made to assume a specifically polemic character, which it manifestly has not (how very different in this respect the Ep. to the Galatians and those to the Corinthians !) ; it is assumed that the Church was a Jewish-Christian one ; and an importance, too great in relation to the whole, and indefensible from an exegetical point of view,¹ is attached to the section, chs. ix.—xi. (even in Baur's second edition, which contains on this point a partial retraction), while, on the other hand, the two last chapters have to be sacrificed to critical doubts that have no foundation. In no other Pauline Epistle is the directly polemical element so much in the background ; and where it does find expression, it is only for the moment (as in xvi. 17–20),—a sure proof that it was least of all the concrete appearance and working of Antipaulinism which the Apostle had occasion in *this* Epistle to oppose. Against *that* enemy he would have waged a very different warfare, as is shown in particular in the case of the Epistle to the Galatians, so nearly allied in its contents. Nor is *that* enemy to be discovered in the weak in faith of xiv. 1 ff. Of course, however, Paul could not present *his* Gospel otherwise than in antagonism to the Jewish righteousness of works and arrogance, which it had already overcome and would continue to do so ; for this antagonism belonged to the *essence* of his Gospel and had to assert itself, wherever there was Judaism—only in various forms and degrees according to the given circumstances—and therefore at Rome as well. The view of Thiersch (*Kirche im apostol. Zeitalt.* p. 166), that Paul desired to elevate the Jewish Christian church, which had consisted of the simple followers of Peter, from their still somewhat backward standpoint to more enlarged views, rests on the erroneous opinion that Peter had laboured in Rome.

The *object* of our Epistle, accordingly, was by no means the drawing up of a systematic doctrinal system in general (see, against this view, Köstlin in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1856, p. 68 ff. ; Grau, *Entwicklungsgesch.* II. p. 114) ; but it is not on the other hand to be restricted more specially than by saying : *Paul wished to lay before the Romans in writing, for their Christian edification* (i. 11, xvi. 25), *his evangelic doctrine*—the doctrine of the sole way of salvation given in Christ—*viewed in its full, specific character as the superseding of Judaism, in such a way as the necessities and circumstances of the church demanded, and as he would have preached it among them, had he been present in person* (i. 11). The mode in which he had to accomplish this was determined by the circumstance, that he deemed it necessary for his object fully to set forth before the

¹ Baur previously, after his dissertation in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1836, 3, found even the *principal theme* of the whole Epistle in chs. ix.—xi., for which chs. i.—viii. only serve as introduction. See against this view

Huther's *Zweck u. Inhalt d. 11 ersten Kap. d. Römerbr.* 1846, p. 24 f. Baur, in his *Christenth. d. drei ersten Jahrh.* p. 62 ff. ed. 2, has modified his view on this point.

Roman church, in a manner proportioned to the high importance of its position, this Gospel as to which his disciples had already instructed them, *in the entire connection of its constituent fundamental principles*.¹ In no other letter has he done this so completely and thoroughly;² hence it is justly regarded as a grand scheme of his whole teaching,³ in the precise form which he held to be suitable for its presentation to the *Romans*. How much he must have had this at heart! How much he must have wished to erect such a complete and abiding memorial of *his* Gospel in the very capital of the Gentile world, which was to become the Antioch of the West! Not merely the present association of Jews and Gentiles in the church, but, generally, the essential relation in which according to the very Pauline teaching, Christianity stood to Judaism, required him to subject this relation in particular, viewed in its strong antagonism to all legal righteousness, to an earnest and thorough discussion. This was a necessary part of his design; and consequently its execution, though on the whole based on a thoroughly didactic plan, nevertheless assumed, in the presence of the given points of antagonism, partly an apologetic, partly a polemic form, as the subject required; without however any precise necessity to contend against particular *doctrinal misconceptions among the Romans*, against divisions and erroneous views, such as had appeared, for example, among the Galatians and Corinthians; or against a Judaistic leaven brought with them by the Jews and Jewish-Christians who had returned to Rome (comp. Grau). The actual dangers for the moment in the Church were more of a moral than a dogmatic character—a remark which applies also to the opposition between the Gentile Christians strong in faith, and the scrupulous Jewish Christians—and have merely given occasion to some more special notices (xiii. 1 ff.; xiv. 1 ff.), and hints (xvi. 1 ff.) in the hortatory portion of the Epistle. The Judaistic opponents of Pauline Christianity had not yet penetrated as far as Rome, and were not to arrive there till later (Ep. to the Philippians). It was therefore an untenable position when even before the time of Baur, who assumed the object of the Epistle to be the *systematic and radical refutation of Jewish exclusiveness*, its aim was very frequently viewed as that of a *polemic against Jewish arrogance*, which had been specially aroused on account of the calling of the Gentiles (Augustine, Theodoret, Melancthon, Michaelis, Eichhorn, Schmidt, Flatt, Schott, and others).⁴ The same may be said of the hypothesis that Paul wished, *in a conciliatory sense*, to obviate misunderstandings between Jewish and Gentile Christians (Hug). There is no evidence in

¹ Against which Hofmann unjustifiably urges ἀπο μέρους and ὡς ἐπαναμνήσκων ὑμᾶς in xv. 15. See on that passage.

² So completely, that we can well enough understand how this Ep. could become the basis of Melancthon's *loci communes*.

³ Comp. Hausrath, *neut. Zeitgesch.* II. p. 514 ff. Observe, at the same time, that though the Epistle deals very much with legal notions, this does not arise from its being destined for the *Romans* to whom

Paul had become a *Roman* (Grau, *l.c.* p. 113), but from the very nature of the Pauline Gospel in general, and is therefore found *e.g.* also in the Epistle to the Galatians.

⁴ Comp. van Hengel, who assumes that Paul desired to instruct the Romans *how to refute the subtleties of the Jews* with reference to the calling of the Gentiles, and to free them from errors and doubts thence arising.

the Epistle of actual circumstances to justify any such special definitions of its object; and even from xvi. 20 it cannot be assumed that Judaistic temptation had already begun (as Grau thinks). The *comprehensiveness* of the object of our Epistle—from which, however, neither the combating of Judaism, which arose naturally and necessarily out of the nature of the Pauline Gospel, nor (seeing that the *future* coming forward of his opponents could not be concealed from the Apostle) the *prophylactic* design of it, may be excluded—has been justly defended by Tholuck, Rückert, de Wette, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche, Philippi, Wieseler, Hausrath and others. Comp. Ewald, p. 317 f. Along with it, however, Th. Schott (comp. also Mangold, Riggensbach, Sabatier) has assumed a special *personally apologetic* purpose on the part of the Apostle; ¹ namely that, being now on the point of proceeding with his Gentile mission-work in the far West, Paul wished to gain for his new labours a fixed point of support in the Roman church, ² and on this account wished to instruct the Romans as to the significance and justification of the step, and to inspire them with full confidence regarding it, for which reason he exhibits to them in detail the nature and principles of his work. Against this view it may be urged, in general, that Paul nowhere gives expression to this special purpose, though the announcement of it would have been of decided importance, both for his own official interests and for the information of the Roman church (they could not read it between the lines either in the preface, vv. 1–15, or in the conclusion, xv. 14–44); and in particular, that the Apostle's intention of visiting the Romans only in *passing through, without making a lengthened sojourn*, is incompatible with the assumed purpose which he is alleged to have formed regarding the church. Moreover, a justification on so great a scale of the *Gentile* mission would presuppose not a *Gentile-Christian*, but a *Jewish-Christian*, church and its requirements. Hence Mangold, holding the same view that the Epistle contains a *justification of the Gentile apostleship*, has the advantage of consistency in his favour; his theory is nevertheless based on the unsatisfactory ground adopted by Baur, namely, that the Church was Jewish-Christian. See, further, Beyschlag, *l.c.* p. 636 ff., and especially Dietzsch, *Adam. u. Christus*, p. 14 ff.

¹ Hofmann also makes the object of the Apostle *personal*. Paul assumes it to be a matter of surprise in Rome that he, the Apostle of the Gentiles, should have hitherto always kept aloof from the world's capital, and even now had not come to it. It might seem as if the church, that had arisen without his aid, had no interest for him; or as if he were afraid to proclaim the message of salvation in the great centre of Gentile culture. This twofold erroneous notion he was especially desirous to refute. As a proof how far he was from being thus afraid, he sets forth what in his view the message of salvation was, etc., etc. Thus he might hope that the church

in the metropolis of the world would be just as steady a point of support for his ministry in the farthest West, as if it had been founded by himself. In this way, however, assumptions and objects are assigned to the Epistle which are not expressed in it, but are imputed to it on the ground of subordinate expressions, as will be shown in the exposition.

² Compare also Sabatier, *l'apôtre Paul*, p. 160 f., who at the same time affirms of the "grand missionnaire:" "*dont l'ambition était aussi vaste que le monde*." According to Sabatier, Paul gives down to chap. viii. the defence of his *doctrine*, and in chaps. ix.–xi. that of his *apostleship*.

As to *contents*, our Epistle, after the salutation and introduction (i. 1-15), falls into two main portions, a theoretical and a hortatory, after which follows the conclusion (xv. 14-xvi. 27). The *theoretic portion* (i. 16-xi. 36) bears its theme at the outset, i. 16, 17: "Righteousness before God, for Jews and Gentiles, comes from faith." Thereupon is established, in the first place, the necessity of this plan of salvation, as that which the whole human race required, Gentiles and Jews alike, because the latter also, even according to their own law, are guilty before God, and cannot attain to righteousness (i. 17-iii. 20). The nature of this plan of salvation is then made clear, namely, that righteousness really and only comes from faith; which is especially obvious from the justification of Abraham (iii. 21-iv. 25). The blessed results of this plan of salvation are, partly the blissful inward condition of the justified before God (v. 1-11); partly that justification through Christ is just as universally effective, as Adam's fall was once universally destructive (v. 12-21); and partly that true morality is not only not endangered by the manifestation of grace in Christ, but is promoted and quickened by it (chap. vi.), and made free from the fetters of the law (vii. 1-6). This last assertion demanded a defence of the law, as that which is in itself good and holy, but was abused by the sinful principle in man, against his own better will, to his destruction (vii. 17-25)—a sad variance of man with himself, which could not be removed through the law, but only through Christ, whose Spirit produces in us the freedom of the new divine life, the consciousness of adoption, and assurance of future glory (ch. viii.). From the lofty description of this blessed connection with Christ, Paul now suddenly passes to the saddening thought that a great part of that very Jewish people, so signally favoured of God, has rejected the plan of redemption; and therefore he develops at length a Theodicy with regard to the exclusion, apparently irreconcilable with the divine promises, of so many members of the theocracy from the attainment of salvation in Christ (chs. ix.-xi.). The *hortatory portion* (chs. xii.-xv. 13) gives the essentials of the Pauline ethical system, partly in the form of general exhortations (xii. 1-21; xiii. 8-14), and partly in some special discussions which were deemed necessary in the circumstances of the Romans (xiii. 1-7, xiv. 1-xv. 13). The *conclusion* comprises in the first place—corresponding to the introduction (i. 8-15)—personal explanations with regard to the Apostle's intended journey by way of Rome to Spain (xv. 14-33); then the recommendation of Phoebe (xvi. 1 ff.) and salutations (xvi. 3-16); a warning with a closing wish (xvi. 17-20); some supplementary salutations with a second closing wish (xvi. 21-24); and finally, a concluding doxology (xvi. 25-27).

"*This Epistle is the true masterpiece of the N. T., and the very purest Gospel, which is well worthy and deserving that a Christian man should not only learn it by heart, word for word, but also that he should daily deal with it as with the daily bread of men's souls. For it can never be too much or too well read or studied; and the more it is handled the more precious it becomes and the better it tastes.*"—Luther, *Preface*.

§ 4. PLACE AND TIME OF COMPOSITION.—GENUINENESS OF THE EPISTLE.

Since the Apostle, when he composed his letter, was on the point of conveying to Jerusalem the proceeds of a collection made in Macedonia and Achaia (xv. 25-27), and intended to journey thence by way of Rome to Spain (xv. 28, comp. Acts xix. 21), we are thus directed to his last sojourn—of three months—in Achaia, Acts xx. 3. His purpose was to cross over directly from Achaia to Syria in order to reach Jerusalem, but he was led, owing to Jewish plots, to take quite a different route, namely, back through Macedonia (Acts xx. 3). This change in the plan of his journey had not been made when he wrote his Epistle; otherwise he would not have failed to mention in ch. xv.—where he had at vv. 25 and 31 very immediate inducement to do so—a circumstance so remarkable on account of its novelty and importance. We justly infer therefore—even apart from the fact that the composition of *such* an epistle presupposes a somewhat lengthened and quiet abode—that it was written before Paul again departed from Achaia. Although Luke mentions no particular city as the scene of the Apostle's three months' residence at that time, still it is, *a priori*, probable that he spent at least the greater part of the time in *Corinth*. For Corinth was the principal church of the country, and was in the eyes of the Apostle pre-eminently important and precious on account of his earlier labours there. But our attention is also directed to Corinth by the passages 1 Cor. xvi. 1-7, 2 Cor. ix. 4, xii. 20-xiii. 3, from which it is plain that, on his journey down from Macedonia to Achaia, Paul had chosen that city as the place of his sojourn, where he wished to complete the business of the collection, and from which he would convey the money to Jerusalem. Now, since the recommendation of the deaconess Phoebe from the Corinthian seaport Cenchreae (xvi. 1, 2), as well as the salutation from his host Gaius (xvi. 23, comp. with 1 Cor. i. 14), point to no other city than *Corinth*, we may, beyond all doubt, abide by it as the *place* of writing, and not with Dr. Paulus (*de orig. ep. P. ad Rom. paralip.* Jen. 1801, and *Römerbrief*, p. 231), on account of xv. 19 (see on that passage) put forward a claim on behalf of a town in Illyria. Theodoret has admirably proved in detail its composition at Corinth.

The *time* of composition accordingly falls in A.D. 59, when Paul regarded his ministry in the East as closed, and (see xv. 19, 23) saw a new and vast scene of action opened up to him in the West, of which Rome should be the centre and Spain the goal.

The *genuineness* is decisively attested by the testimonies of the orthodox church (the first express and special quotations from it are found in Irenaeus, *Haer.* iii. 16, 3, 9, while previously there are more or less certain echoes of its language or traces of its use),¹ as well as of the Gnostics Basilides, Valentinus, Heracleon, Epiphanes, and Theodotus; and there is not a single

¹ Clem. *Cor.* i. 35; Polycarp, *ad Phil.* 6; Theoph. *ad Autol.* i. 20, iii. 14; letter of the

Churches of Vienne and Lyons in Euseb. v. 1.

trace that even the Judaizing heretics, who rejected the authority of the Apostle, at all rejected the Pauline authorship of our Epistle. In order to warrant any doubt or denial of its authenticity, therefore, the most cogent internal grounds would need to be adduced; and in the utter absence of any such grounds, the worthless scruples of Evanson (*Dissonance of the four generally received Evangelists*, 1792, p. 259 ff.) and the frivolities of Bruno Bauer could find no supporters. The Epistle bears throughout the lively original impress of the Apostle's mind, and his characteristic qualities, in its matter and its form; is the chief record of *his* Gospel in its entire connection and antagonism; and is therefore also the richest original-apostolic charter and model of all true evangelical Protestantism. The opinion of Weisse (*philosoph. Dogm.* I. p. 146), which ultimately amounts to the suggestion of a number of interpolations as interwoven throughout the Epistle (see his *Beitr. z. Krit. d. Paul. Br.*, edited by Sulze, p. 28 ff.), rests simply on a subjective criticism of style, which has discarded all weight of external evidence.

The originality of the Epistle extends also to its *language*, the *Greek*, in which Paul dictated it to Tertius.¹ The note of the Syrian Scholiast on the Peshito, that Paul wrote his letter in *Latin*—a theory maintained also, but for a polemical purpose, by Hardouin, Salmeron, Bellarmine, Corn. à Lapide, and others—is based merely upon a hasty inference from the native language of the readers. Its composition in Greek however corresponds fully, not only with the Hellenic culture of the Apostle himself, but also with the linguistic circumstances of Rome (see Credner's *Einl.* II. p. 383 f.; Bernhardt, *Griech. Literat.* ed. 2, p. 483 ff.), and with the analogy of the rest of the ancient Christian writings addressed to Rome (Ignatius, Justin, Irenaeus, *et al.*).

That *the two last chapters* are genuine and inseparable parts of the Epistle, see in the critical remarks on ch. xv.

¹ The reason why Paul himself did not usually write his Epistles is to be sought, not in a want of practice in the writing of Greek—which is a supposition hardly reconcilable with his Hellenic culture—but

in his apostolic position. In this, when he had to enter on written communication, instead of the oral preaching for which he was called, friendly and subordinate hands were at his service. Comp. on Gal. vi. 11.

Παύλου ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους.

The simplest and most ancient superscription is : πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, in A B C $\aleph$.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 1. Ἰησοῦ X.] Tisch., following B, reads Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ against decisive testimony.—In ver. 7 ἐν Ῥώμῃ, and in ver. 15 τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ, are wanting in G. Born; and on ver. 7 the scholiast of cod. 47 remarks : τὸ ἐν Ῥώμῃ οὔτε ἐν τῇ ἐξηγήσει, οὔτε ἐν τῷ ῥητῷ μνημονεύει (who? probably the codex, which lay before the copyist). This quite isolated omission is of no critical weight; and is in no case to be explained by the very unnatural conjecture (of Reiche) that Paul in several Epistles (especially in that to the Ephesians) addressed the readers simply as Christians, and that then the place of residence was inserted by the copyists in accordance with the context or with tradition. In ver. 7 the omission might be explained by the reading ἐν ἀγάπῃ which G and a few other authorities give instead of ἀγαπητοῖς; but, since τοῖς ἐν Ῥ. is wanting in ver. 15 also, another unknown reason must have existed for this. Perhaps some church, which received a copy of the Epistle from the Romans for public reading, may have, for their own particular church-use, deleted the extraneous designation of place, and thus individual codices may have passed into circulation without it. Rückert's conjecture, that Paul himself may have caused copies without the local address to be sent to other churches, assumes a mechanical arrangement in apostolic authorship, of which there is elsewhere no trace, and which seems even opposed by Col. iv. 16. — Ver. 8. ἐπὶ] A B C D* K, $\aleph$, min., Dam. read περὶ, which Griesb. has recommended, and Lachm. and Tisch. have adopted: justly, on account of the preponderant attestation, since both prepositions, though ἐπὶ less frequently (Eph. i. 16; Phil. i. 4), were used for the expression of the thought (in opposition to Fritzsche). — Ver. 13. The less usual position τινὰ καρπὸν (Elz. κ. τ.) is established by decisive testimony; as also ὁ Θεὸς γάρ (Elz. ὁ. γ. Θ.) in ver. 19; and δὲ καὶ (Elz. τὲ καὶ) in ver. 27, although not on equally strong authority.—Instead of οὐ θέλω in ver. 13, D* E G, It. and Ambrosiaster read οὐκ οἶμαι. Defended by Rinck. But the very assurance already expressed in vv. 10, 11 might easily cause the οὐ θέλω to seem unsuitable here, if due account was not taken of the new element in the progress of the discourse contained in προεθέμην.—After εὐαγγ. in ver. 16 τοῦ Χριστοῦ (Elz.) is omitted on decisive authority; πρῶτον, however, which Lachmann has bracketed, ought not to be rejected on the inadequate adverse testimony of B G, Tert. as it might seem objectionable along with πιστεύοντι (not so in ii. 9 f.). — Ver. 24. The καὶ is indeed wanting after διό in A B C $\aleph$, min., Vulg. Or. al.; but it was very easily passed over as superfluous; comp. ver. 26; ii. 1. Nevertheless Lachm. and Tisch. (8) have deleted it. — ἐν αὐτοῖς] Lachm. and Tisch. read ἐν αὐτοῖς following A B C D* $\aleph$, min. But how frequently was

the reflexive form neglected by the copyists. It occurred also in ver. 27 (B K). — Ver. 27. ἀρρενες] B D* G, 73, Or. Eus. Oec. read ἄρσενες. Adopted by Lachm. Fritzsche and Tisch. (7). Since two different forms cannot be supposed to have been used in the same verse, and in that which follows ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσι is undoubtedly the true reading (only A* N, min., and some Fathers reading uniformly ἀρρ. ἐν ἀρρ.), we must here adopt the form ἄρσενες almost invariably used in the N. T. (only the Apocal. has ἀρρ.). — Ver. 29. πονηρία] wanting after ἀδικ. in A B C K N, min., and several vss. and Fathers. Deleted by Lachm. Fritzsche, and Tisch., and rightly so; it is an interpolation introduced by those who did not perceive that the naming of this vice was not again appropriate here. It was written in the margin, and introduced at different places (for we find it *after* πονηρία also, and even after κακία), so that it in some instances even supplanted πονηρία.—The placing of κακία immediately after ἀδικία (Lachm. on weak authority), or according to A N, Syr., after πονηρία, (Tisch. 8), is explained by the aggregation of terms of a similar kind.—Ver. 31. After ἀστόργους Elz. and Scholz read ἀσπόνδους, which Mill condemned, and Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted. It is wanting in A B D* E G and N*, Copt. Clar. Germ. Boern. and several Fathers. It is found before ἀστόργ. in 17, 76, Theophyl. Taken from 2 Tim. iii. 3. — Ver. 32. After ἐπιγινόντες, D E Bas. read οὐκ ἐνόησαν, and G, οὐκ ἔγνωσαν. That death is the wages of sin—this Christian doctrinal proposition seemed not at all to correspond with the natural knowledge of the *Gentiles*.—Instead of αὐτὰ ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνευδοκοῦσι B reads αὐτὰ ποιοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνευδοκοῦντες; so Lachm. in margin. This arose from the fact, that εἰδέν was erroneously taken for the chief verb in the sentence; or else it was a consequence of the introduction of οὐκ ἔγνωσαν, which in other witnesses led to the insertion of γάρ or δὲ after οὐ μόνον.

Vv. 1-7.—*The Apostolic salutation.*

Ver. 1. Παῦλος] See on Acts xiii. 9. [See Note I. p. 72.] — δούλος . . . εὐαγγ. Θεοῦ is the exhaustive statement of his official dignity, proceeding from the general to the particular, by which Paul earnestly—as dealing with the Church of the metropolis of the world, which had as yet no personal knowledge of him—opens his Epistle as an official apostolic letter; without, however, having in view therein (as Platt thinks) opponents and calumniators of his apostleship, for of the doings of such persons in Rome the Epistle itself contains no trace, and, had such existed, he would have set forth his dignity, not only positively, but also at the same time negatively (comp. Gal. i. 1). — In the first place Paul describes by δούλος 'I. X. [See Note II. p. 73.]—his relation of service to Christ, as his Ruler, whose servant he is, and that in general (comp. on Phil. i. 1), just as the Old Testament יהוה עבד expresses the relation of service to Jehovah, without marking off in itself exclusively any definite class, such as the prophetic or the priestly (see Josh. i. 1, xiv. 7, xxii. 4; Judg. ii. 8; Ps. cxxxi. 10; comp. Acts xvi. 17). This relation of entire dependence (Gal. i. 10; Col. iv. 12) is then specifically and particularly indicated by κλητὸς ἀπόστολος, and for this reason the former δούλος 'I. X. cannot be rendered merely in general *Christi cultor* (so Fritzsche), which is inadequate also at 1 Cor. vii. 22; Eph. vi. 6. Paul was called to his office, like all the earlier Apostles; he did not arrive at it

by his own choice or through accidental circumstances. For the history of this divine calling, accomplished through the exalted Christ Himself, see Acts ix. (xxii. 26), and the remarks thereon. This κλητὸς presented itself so naturally to the Apostle as an essential element¹ in the full description of his official position which he meant to give (comp. 1 Cor. i. 1), that the supposition of a side-glance at uncalled teachers (Cameron, Glöckler) seems very arbitrary. — ἀφορισμένος εἰς εὐαγγ. Θεοῦ] characterizes the κλητὸς ἀπόστολος more precisely: *set apart* (definitely separated from the rest of mankind) *for God's message of salvation*, to be its preacher and minister (see on Eph. iii. 7). The article before εὐαγγ. elsewhere invariably given in the N. T., is omitted here, because Paul views the message of God, of which he desires to speak, primarily under its *qualitative* aspect (comp. also van Hengel and Hofmann). Concrete definiteness is only added to it gradually by the further clauses delineating its character. This mode of expression implies a certain *festal* tone, in harmony with the whole solemn character of the pregnant opening of the Epistle: *for a gospel of God*, which He promised before, etc. Still we are not to understand, with Th. Schott, a *work* of proclamation, since εὐαγγ. is not the *work* of conveying a message, but the *message* itself. Θεοῦ is the genitive *subjecti* (*auctoris*), ver. 2, not *objecti* (Chrysostom). See on Mark i. 1. It is *God* who causes the message of salvation here referred to, which is *His λόγος* (Acts x. 36), to be proclaimed; comp. xv. 16; 2 Cor. xi. 7; 1 Thess. ii. 2, 8, 9; 1 Pet. iv. 17. The designation of Apostle to the *Gentiles* is involved in ἀφωρ. εἰς ἐν. Θ. though not expressed (against Beza and others). Further, since ἀφωρ. is parallel with the previous κλητὸς, it is neither to be explained, with Toletus and others, including Olshausen, by Acts xiii. 2, nor with Reiche, Ewald, and van Hengel (following Chrysostom and others) by Gal. i. 15, comp. Jer. i. 5; but rather by Acts ix. 15 (σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς), comp. xxvi. 16 ff. The setting apart took place as a historical fact in and with his calling at Damascus. Entirely different is the mode of presenting the matter in Gal. i. 15, where ἀφορίσας με ἐκ κοιλ. μητρ. as the act of predestination in the counsel of God, is *placed before* the καλέσας, as the historically accomplished fact. The view of Drusus (*de sectis*, ii. 2, 6) and Schoettgen (comp. Erasmus and Beza), which Dr. Paulus has again adopted, viz. that Paul, in using the word ἀφωρ., alludes to his former *Pharisaism* ("the true Pharisee in the best sense of the word"), is based on the Peshito translation (see Grotius), but is to be rejected, because the context gives no hint of so peculiar a reference, for which also no parallel can be found in Paul's other writings.

Ver. 2. A more precise description of the character of this εὐαγγέλιον Θεοῦ, according to its concrete peculiarity, as far as ver. 5 inclusive, advancing and rising to a climax under the urgent sense of the sacredness of his office, which the Apostle has frankly to assert and to establish before the church of the metropolis of the world, personally as yet unknown to him. — ὁ προεπηγγέλματο κ.τ.λ.] How natural that the Apostle with his Old Testament training should, in the light of the New Testament revelation which he had re-

¹ See Weiss in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1857, p. 97 ff.

ceived, first of all glance back at the connection divinely established in the history of salvation between the gospel which he served and ancient prophecy, and should see therein the *sacredness* of the precious gift entrusted to him ! To introduce the idea of an *antithetic* design ("ut invidiam novitatis depelleret," Pareus, Estius, Grotius and others, following Chrysostom and Theophylact) is quite arbitrary, looking to the general tenor of vv. 1-7. The news of salvation God has *previously promised* (προεπηγγέλματο, 2 Cor. ix. 5; Dio Cass. xlii. 32) *through His prophets*, not merely in so far as these, acting as the organs of God (αὐτοῦ), foretold the Messianic age, with the dawn of which the εὐαγγέλιον, as the "*publicum de Christo exhibitio praeconium*" (Calovius), would necessarily begin, but they foretold also this *praeconium itself*, its future proclamation. See x. 18, xv. 21; Isa. xl. 1 ff., xlii. 4, lii. 1 ff.; Zeph. iii. 9; Ps. xix. 5, lxxviii. 12; Deut. xviii. 15, 18. It is the less necessary therefore to refer δ, with Philippi and Mehrling, to the *contents* of the gospel. — τῶν προφητῶν] is not to be limited, so as either to include merely the prophets *proper* in the narrower sense of the word, or to go back—according to Acts iii. 24, comp. xiii. 20—only *as far as Samuel*. The following ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγ. suggests, on the contrary, a reference to *all who in the O. T. have prophesied the gospel* (even Moses, David and others not excluded); comp. Heb. i. 1. — ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις] Not : *in the holy Scriptures* (so most expositors, even Fritzsche), in which case the article must have been used; but qualitatively: *in holy writings*. The divine promises of the gospel, given through the prophets of God, are found in *such* books as, being God's records for His revelations, are *holy* writings. Such are the prophetic writings of the O. T.; thus designated so as to lay stress on their *qualitative* character. In a corresponding manner is the anarthrous γραφῶν προφητικῶν to be understood in xvi. 26.

Vv. 3, 4.¹ We must, with Lachmann and Tischendorf, set aside the view which treats τοῦ γενομένου . . . νεκρῶν, and vv. 5, 6, as parentheses, because we have to deal with intervening clauses which accord with the construction, not with insertions which interrupt it. See Winer, p. 526 [E. T. 565]. — περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ] [See Note III. p. 73.] "Hoc refertur ad illud quod praecessit εὐαγγέλιον; explicatur nempe, de quo agat ille sermo bona nuntians," Grotius. So, also, Toletus, Cajetanus, Calvin, Justiniani, Bengel, Platt, Reiche, Köllner, Winzer, Baumgarten-Crusius, Krehl, Umbreit, Th. Schott, Hofmann, and others. But it may be objected to this view, on the one hand, that περὶ is *most naturally* connected with the *nearest* suitable word that precedes it; and on the other that εὐαγγ., frequently as it is used with the *genitive* of the object, nowhere occurs with περὶ in the N. T.;² and still further, that if this connection be adopted, the important thought in ver. 2 appears strangely isolated. Therefore, the connection of περὶ with δ προεπηγγ., is to be preferred, with Tholuck, Klee, Rückert, Fritzsche,

¹ Comp. Pfeiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 502 ff.

² Hofmann erroneously thinks that Paul could not have added the object of his divine message otherwise than by περὶ. He

would have only needed to repeat the εἰς εὐαγγέλιον with rhetorical emphasis, in order then to add the object in the genitive (τοῦ υἱοῦ ἁ.). Comp. Dissen. *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 315.

Reithmayr, Philippi, van Hengel, Ewald, Mehring, and others, following Theodoret; so that *the great personal object* is introduced, *to which* the divine previous promise of the gospel *referred*; consequently, the *person concerning whom* was this promise of the future message of salvation. God *could not* (we may remark in opposition to Hofmann's objection) have previously promised the gospel *in any other way at all* than by speaking of Christ His Son, who was to come and to be revealed; otherwise his προεπαγγέλλεσθαι εὐαγγέλιον would have had no concrete tenor, and consequently no object. — τοῦ γενομένου *down to νεκρῶν* describes under a twofold aspect (κατά) the *exalted dignity* of Him who had just been designated by τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ: (1) κατὰ σάρκα, He entered life as *David's* descendant; (2) κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγίωσ., He was powerfully instated as Son of God by His resurrection. Nevertheless ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, in the words περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (not αὐτοῦ), is not by any means to be taken in the general, merely historical theocratic sense of *Messiah* (Winzer, *Progr.* 1835, p. 5 f.; comp. also Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 424; and Pfeiderer, *l.c.*), because this is opposed to the constant usage of the Apostle, who *never* designates Christ as υἱὸς Θεοῦ otherwise¹ than from the standpoint of the knowledge which God had given to him by revelation (Gal. i. 16) of the *metaphysical Sonship* (viii. 3, 32; Gal. iv. 4; Col. i. 13 ff.; Phil. ii. 6 ff. *al.*); and the hypothesis of a *modification* having taken place in Paul's view (Usteri, Köllner; see, on the other hand, Rückert) is purely fanciful. Here also the υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ is conceived in the *metaphysical sense* as He who had proceeded out of the *essence* of the Father, like Him in substance (not, as Baur thinks, as organ of the Spirit, which is the purer form of human nature itself), and is sent by Him for the accomplishment of the Messianic counsel. But since it was necessary for this accomplishment that He should appear as *man*, it was necessary for Him, — and these essential modal definitions are now added to the υἱοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, — as a human phenomenon, (1) to be *born* κατὰ σάρκα, and indeed of the seed of David,² and yet (2) to be actually *instated* κατὰ πνεῦμα, as that which, although from the time of His birth in appearance not different from other men (Phil. ii. 7; Gal. iv. 4), He *really was*, namely the Son of God. These two parallel clauses are placed in *asyndetic* juxtaposition, whereby the second, coming after the first, which is itself of lofty and honourable Messianic significance, is brought out as of *still greater importance*.³ Not perceiving this, Hofmann fails to recognize the contrast here presented between the two aspects of the Son of God, because Paul has not used κατὰ πνεῦμα δὲ δρισθέντος in the second clause. — κατὰ σάρκα] *in respect of flesh*; for the Son of God had a fleshly mode of being on earth, since His concrete manifestation was that of a *materially human* person. Comp. ix. 5; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Pet. iii. 18; Phil. ii. 7; Rom. v. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 21; 1 Tim. ii. 5. To

¹ Comp. Gess, *v. d. Pers. Christi*, p. 89 ff.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 309.

² But at the same time the idea of "an accommodation to the Jewish-Christian mode of conception" (Holsten, *z. Ev. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 427), is not to be entertained. Paul gives

the two main epochs in the history of the Son of God, as they actually occurred and had been already prophetically announced.

³ See Bernhardt, p. 448; Dissem. *ad Find. Exc.* II., *de Asynd.* p. 275.

the *σάρξ* belonged in the case of Christ also, as in that of all men, the *ψυχή* as the principle of the animal life of man ; but this sensuous side of His nature was not, as in all other men, the seat and organ of sin. He was not *σαρκικός* (vii. 14), and *ψυχικός* (1 Cor. ii. 14), in the ethical sense, like all ordinary men, although, in virtue of that sensuous nature, he was capable of being tempted (Heb. ii. 18 ; iv. 15). Although in this way His body was a *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός* (Col. i. 22), yet He did not appear *ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας*, but *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας* (Rom. viii. 2). With reference to His *fleshly nature*, therefore, i.e. in so far as He was a materially-human phenomenon, He was *born* (*γενόμενον*, comp. Gal. iv. 4), *of the seed* (as descendant) of *David*, as was *necessarily* the case with the Son of God who appeared as the promised Messiah (Jer. xxiii. 5 ; Ps. cxxxii. 11 ; Matt. xxii. 42 ; John vii. 42 ; Acts xiii. 23 ; 2 Tim. ii. 8). In this expression the *ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ* is to be understood of the *male* line of descent going back to David (comp. Acts ii. 30, *ἐκ καρποῦ τῆς ὁσπνός*), as even the genealogical tables in Matthew and Luke give the descent of *Joseph* from David, not that of *Mary* ;¹ and Jesus Himself, in John v. 27 (see on that passage), calls Himself in contradistinction to His Sonship of *God*, son of a *man*, in which case the correlate idea on which it is founded can only be that of *fatherhood*. It is, therefore, the more erroneous to refer *ἐκ στ. Δαυ.* to *Mary* ("ex semine David, i.e. ex virgine Maria," Melancthon ; comp. also Philippi), especially since Paul nowhere (not even in viii. 3, Gal. iv. 4) indicates the view of a supernatural generation of the bodily nature of Jesus,² even apart from the fact that the Davidic descent of the mother of Jesus can by no means be established from the N. T. It is the more unjustifiable, to pronounce the metaphysical divine Sonship without virgin birth as something *inconceivable*³ (Philippi). — There now follows the *other*, second mode in which the Son of God who has appeared on earth is to be contemplated, viz.

¹ In opposition to Hofmann, (*Weissag. u. Erfüll.* II. p. 49 (comp. the Erlangen Zeitschr. 1868, 6, p. 359 f.), who generalizes the sense of the words in such a way as to convey the meaning that Christ appeared as one belonging to the collective body which traces its descent back to David. But in fact it is simply said that Christ was born of the seed of David. The reading *γενόμενον* (in min., and MSS. used by Augustine) is a correct gloss ; and Hofmann himself grants (*hell. Schrift. N. T.*, in loc.) that *γίνεσθαι ἐκ* here signifies descent by birth. And even if *γενόμενον* be taken as meaning : who appeared, who came (comp. on Mark i. 4 ; Phil. ii. 7 ; so Ewald), still the genetic relation to the *σπέρμα* of David remains the same. He came *κατὰ σάρκα* of the seed of David, and that in no other way than through His birth. This remark holds good also against other obscure evasions to which Hofmann resorts in his *Schriftbew.* II. 1, p. 113 ; in his *hell. Schr. N. T.* he adheres substantially to his

earlier view ("come of the race which called itself after David, because tracing its descent to his ancestry"). No, the *σπέρμα* of David is nothing else than his *semen virile*, out (*ἐκ*) of which, transmitted (comp. *ἀπό*, Acts xiii. 23) through the male line from *γενεά* to *γενεά* (Matt. i. 6 ff.), at length the Son of God *κατὰ σάρκα*—Christ, the David's son of promise—was born. See besides, against Hofmann, Rich. Schmidt, *l.c.*—Because Christ was *ἐκ σπέρματος* of David, He might also Himself be called *σπέρμα* of David, in the same way as He is called in Gal. iii. 16 *σπέρμα* 'Αβραάμ ; and He is so called Matt. i. 1. Comp. further on *ἐκ σπέρματος*, in the sense of fatherhood, Soph. O. C. 214 : *τίνος εἰ σπέρματος . . . πατρὸς*.

² Usteri, *Lehrbegr.* p. 323 ; Rich. Schmidt, *Paulin. Christol.* p. 140 ff. ; Pfeleiderer, *l.c.*

³ This opinion rests on a premiss assumed *à priori*, on an abstract postulate, the propriety of which it is impossible to prove. Comp. on Matt. i. 18, *note*.

with reference to the spirit of holiness, which was in Him. The parallelism between *κατὰ σάρκα* and *κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγ.*, apparent even in the position of the two elements, forbids us to understand *κατὰ πν. ἁγίωσ.* as denoting the *pre-supposition and regulative cause* of the state of glorious power ascribed to the Son of God (Hofmann). In that case Paul must have used another preposition, conveying the idea *on account of*, perhaps *διὰ* with the accusative (comp. the *διό*, Phil. ii. 9), in order to express the thought which Hofmann has discovered, namely, that the holiness of His spirit, and therefore of His life, *was to make* His divine Sonship a state of glorious power. Regarding the view taken of *ἐν δυνάμει* in connection with this, see the sequel. *Ἀγιωσύνη*, in Paul's writings as well as in the Sept. (in Greek authors and in the other writings of the N. T. it does not occur), invariably means *holiness* (2 Cor. vii. 1 ; 1 Thess. iii. 13 ; Ps. xcvi. 6, xcvii. 12, exliv. 5), not *sanctification* (as rendered by the Vulgate, Erasmus, Castalio, and many others, including Glöckler and Schrader). So also in 2 Macc. iii. 12. The *genitive* is the gen. *qualitatis*,¹ and contains the specific character of the *πνεῦμα*. This *πνεῦμα ἁγίωσ.* is, in contradistinction to the *σάρξ*, the other side of the being of the Son of God on earth ; and, just as the *σάρξ* was the outward element perceptible by the senses, so is the *πνεῦμα* the inward mental element, the substratum of His *νοῦς* (1 Cor. ii. 16), *the principle and the power of His INNER life*, the intellectual and moral "Ego" which receives the communication of the divine—in short, the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* of Christ. His *πνεῦμα* also was *human* (Matt. xxvii. 50 ; John xi. 33, xix. 30)—altogether He was an *entire* man, and the Apollinarian conception is without support in the N. T. teaching—but it was the seat of the divine nature belonging to His person ; not excluding the specialty of the latter (in opposition to Beyschlag, *Christol.* pp. 212, 231), but being rather that which contained the metaphysical *υἱότης Θεοῦ*, or—according to the Johannine type of doctrine—the seat and the organ of the *Λόγος*, which became flesh in the human person of Jesus, as also of the fulness of the Holy Spirit which bore sway in Him (John iii. 34 ; Acts i. 2 ; 2 Cor. iii. 17). Consequently the *πνεῦμα* of Christ, although human (comp. Pfeiderer), was exalted above all other human spirits, because essentially filled with God, and thereby *holy*, sinless, and full of divine unpolluted life, as was no other human *πνεῦμα* ; and for this reason His unique quality is characterized by the distinguishing designation *πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης*, *i.e. spirit full of holiness*. This purposely-chosen expression, which is not to be abated to the *studium sanctitatis* (van Hengel), must, seeing that the text sets forth the two sides of the *personal nature of Christ*, absolutely preclude our understanding it to refer to the *πνεῦμα ἁγιον*,² the *third* person of the divine Trinity, which is not meant either in 1 Tim. iii. 16, or in Heb. ix. 14. Nevertheless, the majority of commentators, since Chrysostom, have so explained it ; some of them taking it to mean : "*secundum Sp. S. ei divinitus concessum*" (Fritzsche ; comp. Beza, Calixtus,

¹ Hermann, *ad Viger*, pp. 887, 891 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 226.

² This is called in the *Test. XII. Patr.* p.

588, *πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης*, in so far as it produces holiness.

Wolf, Koppe, Tholuck, and others),¹ some referring it to the *miraculous working of the Holy Spirit* (Theodoret) or to the *bestowal* of the Spirit which took place through Christ (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Luther, Estius, Böhme, and others). Since the contrast between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is not that between the human and the divine, but that between the bodily and the mental in human nature, we must also reject the interpretation which refers the words to the *divine nature* (Melancthon, Calovius, Bengel, and many others); in which case some take *ἀγιασμένη*, as equivalent to *θεότης* (Winzer); others adduce in explanation of *πνεῦμα* the here irrelevant *πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός*, John iv. 24 (Beza, Winzer, Olshausen, Maier, Philippi); others take the expression as substantially equivalent to the Johannine *λόγος* (Rückert, comp. Reiche, "the principle of His higher essence"), and thus have not avoided an Apollinarian conception. The correct interpretation is substantially given by Köllner, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald (also in his *Jahrb.* 1849, p. 93), and Mehring. Comp. Hofmann ("spirit which supposes, wherever it is, a condition of holiness"), and also Lechler, *apost. u. nachapost. Zeitalt.* p. 49, who nevertheless understands the divine nature of Christ as also included,² — *ὑποθέτων*] The translation of the Vulgate, *qui predestinatus est*, based on the too weakly attested reading *προορισθέντος* (a mistaken gloss), drew forth from old writers (see in Estius) forced explanations, which are now properly forgotten. *Ὅριζεν*, however, with the double accusative, means to *designate a person for something*, *to nominate*, *to instate* (Acts x. 42; comp. Meleager in the *Anthol.* xii. 158, 7: *σὲ θεὸν ὥρισε δαίμων*), nor is the meaning different here.³ For although Christ *was* already the Son of God before the creation of the world, and as such was *sent* (viii. 3; Gal. iv. 4), nevertheless there was needed a fact, by means of which He should receive, after the humiliation that began with His birth (Phil. ii. 7 f.), *instating* into the rank and dignity of His divine Sonship; whereby also, as its necessary consequence with a view to the knowledge and conviction of men, He was legitimately established as the Son. The fact which constituted instatement was the *resurrection*, as the transition to His *δόξα*; comp. on Acts xiii. 33; and *ἐποίησε* in Acts ii. 36. Inaccurate, because it confounds that consequence with the *thing itself*, is the gloss of Chrysostom: *δείχθέντος, ἀποφανθέντος, κριθέντος*; and that of Luther: "*shewn*." Umbreit's rendering is errone-

¹ Comp. also Zeller in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1842, p. 496. In his view (2 Cor. iii. 17), the *πνεῦμα* is the element of which the higher personality of Christ consists. According to Baur, *Paulus* II. p. 375, it is the *Messianic spirit*, the *intrinsic principle* constituting the Messiahship of Christ. According to Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 425, it is in itself a *transcendent pneumatic force*, which produces the *ἀγιασμένη*, a radiance of the divine *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*.

² A more accurate and precise definition of the idea may be found in Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 313; also Rich. Schmidt, p. 105 f.;

Pfleiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 169, 503 f.

³ But not in the sense: *destined to become something*, as Hofmann thinks: nor generally, in the sense: *qui destinatus est*, but rather: *qui constitutus est* (was *instated*). For otherwise the *aorist* participle would be unsuitable, since it must necessarily indicate an act following the *γενομένου*, etc.; whereas the divine *destination* would be *prior* to the birth. Consequently, were that sense intended, it must have been, as in Acts x. 42, *ὑπομένον*.

ous : “*separated*,” namely from all men. — *ἐν δυνάμει*] Not : *through omnipotence* (Umbreit), but : *mightily* (Luther), *forcibly* ; for this installation of the Son of God as Son of God was a *work of divine power*, which (see what follows) was accomplished by means of the resurrection from the dead. Thus commanding power, divinely-energetic and effectual, forms the *characteristic quality in which* the *ὁρισμός* took place. On *ἐν*, as paraphrase of the adverb (Col. i. 29 ; 2 Thess. i. 11), see Bernhardt, p. 209. *ἐν δυν.* is not, with Melancthon, Schoettgen, Pareus, Sebastian Schmid, and others, including Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius, Philippi, Mehring, Holsten, Hofmann, and Pfleiderer, to be connected with *ἰσχύ Θεοῦ* (*as the mightily powerful Son of God*) ; for it was here of importance to dwell, not on a special predicate of the Son of God,¹ but, in contradistinction to the *ἐκ σπερμ. Δαν. κατὰ σάρκα*, upon the *divine Sonship in itself* ; of which Sonship He was indeed the hereditary possessor, but yet needed, in order to become *instated in it with glorious power*, resurrection from the dead. Thus, however, *ἐν δυνάμει*, even when rightly connected with *ὁρισθ.*, is not, with Chrysostom and Theophylact, to be taken as “*per virtutem, i.e. per signa et. prodigia*” (Calovius, comp. Grotius) ; nor with Fritzsche : *vi ei datā* ; for Paul himself defines the *how* of the mighty *ὁρισμός* by : *ἐξ ἀναστ. νεκρῶν*. This, namely, was the causal fact, *by virtue of which* that *ὁρισμός* was accomplished ; for by the resurrection of Christ, God, who raised Him up (comp. 2 Cor. xiii. 4), accomplished in point of fact His instating declaration : Thou art my Son, this day, etc., Acts xiii. 33. Paul *might* accordingly have written *διά*, but *ἐκ* is more expressive of the thought that Christ *in virtue of* the resurrection, etc. On *ἐκ*, used of causal issuing forth, see Buttmann's *neut. Gr.* p. 281 [E. T. 327] ; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 550 f. The *temporal* explanation, *since* or *after* (Theodoret, Erasmus, Luther, Toletus, and others, including Reithmayr ; comp. Flatt, Umbreit, and Mehring) is to be rejected, because the raising up of Jesus from the dead was itself *the great divine act*, which, completed through the majesty of the Father (vi. 4), powerfully instated the Son in the Son's position and dignities ; hence it was also the basis of the apostolic preaching, Acts i. 22, ii. 24 ff., xiii. 30, xvii. 31 f., xxvi. 23 ; Rom. iv. 24 ; 1 Cor. xv. 3 ff. We are not to take the *expression* *ἐξ ἀναστ. νεκρ.*, as is often done, for *ἐξ ἀναστ. ἐκ νεκρ.*, the second *ἐκ* being omitted for the sake of euphony : but it must be viewed as a *general designation of the category* (*νεκρῶν*, see on Matt. ii. 20) : *through resurrection of the dead*, of which category the personal rising of the dead Jesus was the concrete case in point. Comp. xvii. 32.

¹ As if only a change of His attributes was concerned, or the transition into the full reality of the divine Sonship (Pfleiderer). The question concerned the *installation* of the Son of God as such, as it were His *enthronization*, which had not taken place previously, but was accomplished by the resurrection with a mighty power. By means of the latter He received—as the Son of God, which from the beginning and even in the days of His flesh He really was—a *de*

facto instatement, which accomplished itself in a way divinely powerful. What accrued to Him thereby, was not the full reality (see viii. 3 ; Gal. iv. 4), but the full efficiency of the Son of God ; because He was now exalted above all the limitations of the state of His *γένεσις* (Phil. ii. ; 2 Cor. viii. 9) ; comp. e.g. vi. 9 ; xi. 33 f. ; v. 10 ; 2 Cor. xiii. 4 ; and numerous other passages. The Son was now the *κύριος πάντων*, had the name above every name, etc., etc.

So, also, de Wette, *Fis'mann* ; comp. Philippi, who however, following Erasmus and Bengel, introduces also the idea, foreign to this passage, that *our* resurrection is involved in that of Christ. — The following Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is in apposition to τοῦ νοῦ αὐτοῦ in v. 3 ; not necessary in itself, but in keeping with the *fulness* of expression throughout this opening portion of the Epistle, which exhibits a character of *majesty* particularly in vv. 3, 4. — Observe, further, that the exhibition of the holy and exalted nature of Christ in our passage serves to express the high dignity of the apostolic office. Of diversities in faith and doctrine in Rome regarding the person of Christ there is not a trace in the whole Epistle.¹

Ver. 5. To the general τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν, which designates Christ as *the Lord of Christians in general*, Paul now adds the special relation in which *he himself* stands to this common κύριος. He entertained too lively a consciousness of the bliss and dignity of that relationship, not to set it forth once more (comp. ver. 1) in this overflowing salutation ; this time, however, with closer reference to the *readers*, in accordance with his definite character as Apostle of the *Gentiles*. — Vv. 5, 6 are not to be enclosed in a parenthesis ; and only a comma should be placed after ver. 6. — δι' οὗ] *through whom*, denotes nothing else than the *medium* ; nowhere, not even in Gal. i. 1, the *causa principalis*. The view of the Apostle is, as Origen rightly perceived, that he had received grace and apostleship through the mediation of Christ, through whom God called him at Damascus. Regarding Gal. i. 1, see on that passage. — ἐλάβομεν] He means *himself* alone, especially since in the address he specifies no joint author of the letter ; not however—as Reiche, following Estius and many others, thinks—using the plural *out of modesty* (in the solemnity of an official epistolary greeting ?), but rather (comp. iii. 9) in accordance with the custom, very common among Greek authors, of speaking of themselves in the plural of category (Krüger, § 61, 2 ; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 2, 46). This is, no doubt, to be traced back to the conception “I and my equals ;” but this original conception was in course of use entirely lost. The opinion, therefore, that Paul here includes along with himself the other apostles (Bengel, van Hengel) is to be all the more rejected as unsuitable, since the subsequent ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν points to *Paul himself* alone as the *Apostle of the Gentiles*. To understand Paul's *official assistants* as included (Hofmann) is forbidden by the subsequent ἀποστολήν, which does not mean *mission* in general, but, as invariably in the N. T., specially *apostleship*. — χάριν κ. ἀποστολήν] *grace* (generally) *and* (in particular) *apostleship*. [See Note IV. p. 74.] Χάριν is to be understood, not merely of *pardonning* grace (Augustine, Calvin, Calovius, Reiche, Tholuck, Olshausen, and others), or of the extraordinary *apostolic gifts of grace* (Theodoret, Luther, and others, including Platt and Mehling) ; for such special references must be demanded by the context ; but on the contrary generally of the *entire divine grace*, of which Paul was made partaker through Christ, when he was arrested by Him at Damascus in his career which was hateful to God (Phil. iii. 12 ; 1 Cor. xv. 10), converted, enlightened (Gal. i.

¹ Comp. Gess, *von d. Pers. Chr.* p. 56,

16), and transferred into the communion of God's beloved ones and saints. The special object (Gal. i. 16) and at the same time the highest evidence of this χάρις which he had received, was his reception of the ἀποστολή,¹ and that for the Gentile world. Others find here a ἐν διὰ δυοῖν (Chrysostom, Beza, Piscator, Grotius, Glass, Rich. Simon, Wetstein, Semler, Koppe, Böhme, Fritzsche, Philippi, and others : χάριν ἀποστολῆς. This might certainly be justified in linguistic usage by the explicative καί ;² but it arbitrarily converts two elements, which taken separately yield a highly appropriate sense, into one, and fails to recognize—what is involved in the union of the general and the particular—the fulness and force of the discourse moving the grateful heart. This remark applies also against Hofmann, according to whom the Apostle terms one and the same vocation “*a grace and a mission* ;” in which view ἀποστ. is erroneously rendered (see above), and in consequence thereof εἰς ὑπακ. π. is then joined merely to χάρ. κ. ἀπ., and not also to ἐλάβ. — εἰς ὑπακ. πίστ.] Object of the ἐλάβ. χάρ. κ. ἀποστ. : *in order that obedience of faith may be produced, i.e. in order that people may subject themselves to the faith, in order that they may become believing.* [See Note V. p. 75.] Comp. xvi. 26 ; Acts vi. 7 ; 2 Cor. x. 5 f. ; 2 Thess. i. 8. To take πίστις for *doctrina fidei* (Beza, Toletus, Estius, Bengel, Heumann, Cramer, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Fritzsche, Tholuck, and others), is altogether contrary to the linguistic usage of the N. T., in which πίστις is always *subjective* faith, although often, as in the present instance, conceived of *objectively* as a *power*. Comp. xvi. 26 ; Gal. i. 23. The *activity* of faith in *producing works* (Reithmayr), however, is not contained in the expression. The πίστις is, according to Paul, the conviction and confidence (*assensus* and *fiducia*) regarding Jesus Christ, as the only and perfect Mediator of the divine grace, and of eternal life, through His work of atonement. Faith *alone* (to the exclusion of works) is the *causa apprehendens* of the salvation promised and obtained through Christ ; but, because it transfers us into living and devoted fellowship with Him, altogether of a moral character, it becomes the *subjective moral power* of the new life regenerated through the power of the Holy Spirit—of the life *in* Christ, which, however, is the necessary consequence, and never the ground of justification. See Luther's Preface.—The *genitive* πίστεως, in accordance with the analogy of the expressions kindred in meaning ὑπακοῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ in 2 Cor. x. 5, and ὑπακ. τῆς ἀληθείας in 1 Pet. i. 22, necessarily presents itself (comp. Acts vi. 7 ; Rom. x. 16 ; 2 Thess. i. 8 ; also 2 Cor. ix. 13) as denoting that to which the obedience is rendered ; not (Grotius, following Beza) the *causa efficiens* : “*ut Deo obediatur per fidem*,” in which explanation, besides, the “*Deo*” is arbitrarily introduced.³ Hofmann is also wrong in taking the genitive

¹ Augustine aptly remarks : “*Gratiam cum omnibus fidelibus, apostolatium autem non cum omnibus communem habet.*” Comp. Bengel : “*Gratia et singularis gratiae mensura apostolis oblitit.*”

² Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 856 ; Nägelsbach, *z. Illas*, iii. 100.

³ So also van Hengel, on the ground of passages like v. 19 ; Phil. ii. 12, where however the sense of obedience *to God* results from the context ; and Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, II. p. 281 ff., who urges against our view that it makes ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου. αὐτοῦ superfluous. But the glory of Christ is pre-

πίστεως as *epexegetical* (an obedience consisting in faith). — ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν] is to be joined with εἰς ὑπακ. πίστεως, *beside which it stands*; the ἔθνη, however, are not all *nations* generally, inclusive of the Jews (so most expositors, including Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche, Baur), but, in accordance with the historical destination of the Apostle (Gal. i. 16; Acts ix. 15, xxvi. 17 f.), and in consequence of the repeated prominence of his calling as *Gentile Apostle* in our letter (ver. 13, xi. 13, xv. 16), all *Gentile* nations, to which also the Romans belonged (Beza, Tholuck, Philippi, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, van Hengel, Ewald, Hofmann and others); and these regarded not from a *geographical* point of view (Mangold, p. 76), but from a *popular* one, as ׀׀׀; which precludes us from thinking—not as to a section, but at any rate as to the *mass*, of the Roman congregation—that it was *Jewish-Christian*. This his apostolic calling for the *Gentiles* is meant by Paul in *all* passages where he describes the ἔθνη as the object of his labours (Gal. i. 16, ii. 2, 8, 9; Eph. iii. 1, 8; Col. i. 27; 1 Thess. ii. 16). — ἐπεὶ τοῦ ὀνόμ. αὐτοῦ] belongs, in the most natural connection, not to ἐλάβ. . . . ἀποστ. (Rückert) or to δι' οὗ . . . ἔθνεσιν (de Wette, Mehring, Hofmann), but to εἰς ὑπακοήν . . . ἔθνεσιν; “in order to produce obedience to the faith among all Gentile nations *for the sake of* (for the glorifying of, comp. Acts v. 41; Phil. ii. 13) *His name*.” Acts ix. 15, xv. 26, xxi. 13; 2 Thess. i. 12, serve to illustrate the matter referred to. The idea of wishing to exclude the glorifying of *his own* name (Hofmann) is not for a moment to be imputed to the Apostle. He would have needed a very special motive for doing so.

Ver. 6. Application of the contents of ver. 5 to the relation in which the Apostle stood to his readers, whereby he indicates how he is officially entitled to address them also, teaching, exhorting, and so forth — ἐν οἷς ἔστε καὶ ὑμεῖς κλητοὶ 'I. X.] To be written thus, without a comma after ὑμεῖς, with Heumann, Lachmann, Tischendorf, de Wette, Hofmann, and Bisping: *among whom also are ye called (ones) of Jesus Christ*. Among the Gentile nations the Roman Christians were, like other Gentile-Christian churches, called of the Lord; amidst the Gentile world, nationally belonging to it (in opposition to Mangold's mere geographical interpretation), they also shared this high distinction. The reference of the καὶ to Paul (Th. Schott), and consequently the interpretation: *as I, so also ye*, is erroneous, because the Apostle has asserted concerning himself something far higher than the mere Christian calling. The common interpretation of κλητοὶ 'I. X. as an *address* (so too Rückert, Fritzsche, Philippi, van Hengel, Mehring) makes the ἐν οἷς ἔστε κ. ὑμ. quite a meaningless assertion; for Bengel's suggestion for meeting the difficulty, that ἐν οἷς has the implied meaning: among which *converted* nations, is purely arbitrary. — Since the *calling* (to the Messianic salvation; see on Gal. i. 6; also 1 Cor. vii. 17) is invariably ascribed by Paul to God (viii. 30, ix. 24; 1 Cor. i. 9, vii. 15, 17; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. ii. 14),¹ we must explain it, not as: *called by Christ* (Luther, Rückert, Mehring,

cisely the lofty end of all ὑπακοῦν τῇ πίστει. Where it takes place, it is acknowledged that Jesus Christ is Lord, Phil. ii. 11.

¹ Comp. Usteri, p. 281; Weiss, *ibid.* Theol.

§ 127; what Schmidt urges in opposition, in Rudelbach's *Zeitschr.* 1849, II. p. 188 ff. is untenable.

Hofmann, and others), but as : *called* (by God) *who belong to Christ* (so Erasmus, Beza, Estius, and most modern commentators, also Winer, p. 183 [E. T. 195]). The genitive is *possessive*, just as in the analogous τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς αὐτοῦ in Matt. xxiv. 31. With the substantive nature of κλητός (comp. Buttmann, *newt. Gr.* p. 147 [E. T. 169]) the genitive by no means admits merely the interpretation which points to the *calling subject*, as in 2 Sam. xv. 11 ; 1 Kings i. 41, 49 ; Zeph. i. 7 ; but admits of very different references, as *e.g.* in Homer, *Od.* xvii. 386, κλητοὶ γε βροτῶν are not those called *by* mortals, but those who are called *among* mortals (genitive *totius*).

Ver. 7. Now for the first time, brought by ver. 6 nearer to his readers, Paul passes from the throng of the great intervening thoughts, ver. 2 ff., in which he has given full and conscious expression to the nature and the dignity of his calling, to the formal *address* and to the apostolic *salutation*. — πᾶσι κ.τ.λ.] directs the letter to *all beloved of God who are in Rome*, etc., and therefore to the *collective Roman Christian church*, Phil. i. 1 ; Eph. i. 1 ; Col. i. 1,¹ but not, as Tholuck thinks,² at the same time also to those foreign Christians who were accidentally staying in Rome, for against this view ver. 8, in which ὑπὲρ πάντων ἡμῶν can only refer to the Romans, is decisive. The πᾶσι would be self-obvious and might have been dispensed with, but in this Epistle, just because it is so detailed and is addressed to a great church still far away from the Apostle, πᾶσι carries with it a certain *diplomatic* character. Similarly, though from other grounds, Phil. i. 1. — ἀγαπητ. Θεοῦ, κλητοῖς ἁγίοις] Characteristic special analysis of the idea “*Christians*” in accordance with the high privileges of their Christian condition. For, as reconciled with God through Christ, they are *beloved of God* (v. 5 ff., viii. 39 ; Col. iii. 12) ; and, as those who through the divine *calling* to the Messianic salvation have become separated from the κόσμος and *consecrated to God*, because members of the new covenant of grace, they are *called saints* ; comp. 1 Cor. i. 2. This *saintship* is produced through the *justification* of the called (viii. 30), and their accompanying subjection to the *influence of the Holy Spirit* (1 Cor. i. 30). De Wette erroneously interprets : “those who are called to be saints.” So also Baumgarten-Crusius. The calling always refers to the salvation of the Messiah’s kingdom. But that the ἀγιότης is to be understood in that Christian *theocratic* sense after the analogy of the Old Testament שׁוֹרֵק, and not of *individual moral holiness* (Pareus, Toletus, Estius, Grotius, Flatt, Glöckler, de Wette, and others), is plain from the very fact, that *all* Christians as Christians are ἅγιοι. — χάρις . . . εἰρήνη] See Otto, in the *Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* 1867, p. 678 ff. Χάρις is the disposition, the subjective feeling in God and Christ, which the Apostle wishes to be entertained towards and shown to his readers ; εἰρήνη is the actual result, which is produced through the manifestation of the χάρις :

¹ With these parallels before us, it is unreasonable to ask why Paul does not designate the readers as a *church*. Bengel and van Hengel are of opinion that no regular congregational bond was as yet in existence. Th. Schott thinks that Paul as yet

stood in no relation whatever to the church. The ὄντες ἐν Ῥώμῃ κ.τ.λ. are the church, and it is to the *churches* that he has written where he does not write to specified *persons*.

² Comp. Turretin, Wolf, and Böhme.

grace and salvation (δὴψ), the latter in every aspect in which it presents itself as the Christian issue of the χάρις. Comp. Melancthon. The specifically Christian element in this salutation¹ lies in ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς . . . Χριστοῦ. Comp. 1 Cor. i. 3 ; 2 Cor. i. 2 ; Eph. i. 2 ; Phil. i. 2 ; 1 Thess. i. 1 ; 2 Thess. i. 1 f. ; 1 Tim. i. 2 ; 2 Tim. i. 2 ; Tit. i. 4 ; Philem. 3. The special rendering of εἰρήνη, *peace*, which, following Chrysostom and Jerome, the majority, including Reiche, Olshausen, Tholuck, Philippi, Umbreit, and others retain (the higher peace which is given, not by the world, but by the consciousness of divine grace and love, see especially Umbreit, p. 190 ff.), must be abandoned, because χάρις καὶ εἰρήνη represent the general epistolary χαιρεῖν (Acts xv. 23 ; James i. 1), and thus the *generality* of the salutation is expressed in a way characteristically Christian. — πατὴρ ἡμῶν means God, in so far as we, as Christians, are His children through the *νιοθεσία* (see on Gal. iv. 5 ; Rom. viii. 15). — καὶ κυρίου] *ἰ.ε. καὶ ἀπὸ κυρίου*, not, as Glöckler, following Erasmus, takes it, “and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,” for against this view stands the decisive fact that God is never called *our* and Christ’s Father ; see also Tit. i. 4 ; 2 Tim. i. 2. The formal equalization of God and Christ cannot be certainly used as a proof (as Philippi and Mehrling contend) of the divine nature of Christ—which, however, is otherwise firmly enough maintained by Paul—since the different predicates πατρὸς and κυρίου imply the different conceptions of the *causa principalis* and *medians*. For this purpose different *prepositions* were not required ; comp. on Gal. i. 1.

Vv. 8–15. First of all the Apostle now—as under various forms in all his epistles, with the exception of that to the Galatians (also not in 1 Timothy and Titus)—expresses with thanksgiving towards God his pious joy at the faith of his readers ; and then assures them of his longing to be with them and to labour among them personally. The thanksgiving is *short*, for it relates to a church not only personally unknown to him, but also far removed from the sphere of labour which he had hitherto occupied ; but the *expression* of it is in accordance with the position of the church in the metropolis of the world.

Ver. 8. Πρῶτον μὲν] [See Note VI. p. 75.] To that, which Paul desires *first of all* to write, there was meant to be subjoined *something further*, possibly by *ἔπειτα δέ*. But, amidst the ideas that now crowd upon him, he abandons this design, and thus the *μέν* remains alone. Comp. iii. 2 ; and on Acts i. 1 ; 1 Cor. xi. 18.² — τῷ Θεῷ μου] οὐ εἰμὶ, ὃ καὶ λατρεύω, Acts xxvii. 23 ; comp. 1 Cor. i. 4 ; Phil. i. 3, iv. 19 ; Philem. 4. — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] These words—to be connected with εὐχαριστῶ, not with μου, as Koppe and Glöckler think, against which vii. 25 and Col. iii. 17 are clearly decisive—contain the *mediation*, through which the εὐχαριστῶ takes place. The Apostle gives thanks not on his own part and independently of Christ, not δι’ ἑαυτοῦ, but is conscious of his thanksgiving *being conveyed through Jesus Christ, as one who is present to his grateful thoughts* ; in so far, namely, as that for which he thanks

¹ Regarding Otto’s attempted derivation of it from the *Aaronic* benediction, see on 1 Cor. i. 8.

² Schaefer, *ad* Dem. IV. p. 142 ; Hartung, *Partikel*. II. p. 410.

God is vividly perceived and felt by him to have been brought about through Christ. Comp. on Col. iii. 17 ; Eph. v. 20. Thus Christ is the mediating *causal agent* of the thanksgiving. To regard Him as its mediating *presenter* (Origen, Theophylact, Bengel, and others, including Hofmann) cannot be justified from Paul's other writings, nor even by Heb. xiii. 15. Theodore of Mopsuestia well observes : τοῦ Χριστοῦ ταύτης ἡμῖν τῆς εὐχαριστίας τὴν αἰτίαν παρασχομένου. — ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν] quite simply : *your faith* (on Christ) ; the praiseworthy character of the πίστις is only set forth by the *context* (καταγγέλλ. ἐν ὅλῳ τ. κ.) afterwards. Everywhere one hears your faith openly spoken of. Comp. xvi. 19. Observe how this flattering expression of the Apostle and the *thanksgiving* coupled with it, as also the στήριχθῆναι κ.τ.λ., in vv. 11, 12, point to the church not as Jewish-Christian, but as *Pauline*. Mangold's reference to Phil. i. 15–18, in opposition to this inference, leaves out of view the quite different *personal situation* under which the latter was written. Comp. on Phil. i. 18, *note*. — ἐν ὅλῳ τ. κόσμῳ] a popular hyperbole, but how accordant with the position of the church in *that city*, towards which the eyes of the whole world were turned ! Comp. 1 Thess. i. 8. It is, moreover, obvious of itself, that the subjects of the καταγγέλλειν are the *believers*. As to the unbelievers, see Acts xxviii. 22.

Ver. 9. Γάρ] The pith of the following *proof of the assurance conveyed in ver. 8* lies in ἀδιαλείπτως, not in the desire to come to Rome, which is not subjoined till ver. 10 (Th. Schott). The interest felt by the Apostle in the Romans, which was so vivid that he *unceasingly* remembered them, etc., had even now urged him to his εὐχαριστῶ τῷ Θεῷ κ.τ.λ. — μάρτυς . . . Θεός] The asseveration in the form of an oath (comp. 2 Cor. i. 23, xi. 31 ; Phil. i. 8) is intended solemnly to strengthen the impression of what he has to say ; viewed with reference to the circumstance which might readily excite surprise, that he, the Apostle of the Gentiles, had never yet laboured in the church—which nevertheless was Pauline—of the capital of the Gentile world. See vv. 10–13. The hypothesis of “*iniquos rumores*,” that had reached his ears from Rome (van Hengel), is unnecessary and unsupported by any trace in the letter. — ὃ λατρεύω κ.τ.λ.] added to strengthen the asseveration with respect to its sacred conscientiousness : *to whom I render holy service in my spirit, i.e. in my moral self-consciousness, which is the living inner sphere of that service.*¹ This ἐν τῷ πν. μου, on which lies the practical stress of the relative clause, excludes indeed all λατρεύειν of a merely external kind, exercising itself in works, or even impure ; but is not intended to suggest a definite *contrast* to this, which would here be without due motive. It is rather the involuntary expression of the profoundly vivid *feeling of inward experience*. The Apostle knows and feels that the depths of his innermost life are pervaded by his λατρεύειν. Comp. ὃ λατρεύω . . . ἐν καθαρᾷ συνειδήσει, in 2 Tim. i. 3 ; also Heb. xii. 28. Τὸ πνεῦμα μου cannot be the Holy Spirit (Theodoret),² but Paul bore the *witness* of that Spirit in

¹ Comp. Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, II. p. 89 f.; see also on John iv. 23.

² Holsten also (*z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 286) understands it of the Holy Spirit as be-

stowed on the Apostle (μου). See, against this view, Rich. Schmidt, *Paul. Christol.* p. 33 ff.

his own spirit (viii. 16 ; ix. 1). — ἐν τῷ εὐαγγ. τ. νιοῦ αὐτοῦ] *in the gospel of his Son*, which I preach, defend, etc. That is the great sphere to which He is called in the service of God, in the consciousness of which he is impelled by an inward necessity to devote to his readers that fervent sympathy of which he assures them. Grotius and Reiche think there is an implied contrast to the λατρεία ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, which however is quite foreign to the connection. Can we think of a side-glance at the Jewish style of teaching—when the discourse breathes only love and warmth of affection? — ὥς ἀδιαλ.] ὥς does not stand for ὅτι (as following the Vulgate, the majority, including Fritzsche, think), but expresses the manner (the degree). God is my witness, how unceasingly, etc. Comp. Phil. i. 8 ; 2 Cor. vii. 15 ; 1 Thess. ii. 10 ; Acts x. 28 ; Calvin ; Philippi ; van Hengel.¹ The idea of modality must be everywhere retained, where ὥς takes the place of ὅτι.² — μν. ἡμ. ποιῶμ.] *make mention of you, viz. in my prayers*. See ver. 10. Comp. Eph. i. 16 ; Phil. i. 3 ; 1 Thess. i. 2.

Ver. 10. Πάντοτε . . . δέόμενος] annexes to ὥς ἀδιαλ. the more precise definition: *in that* (so that) *I always* (each time) *in my prayers request*. ἐπὶ, which is to be referred to the idea of definition of time (Bernhardy, p. 246), indicates the form of action which takes place. Comp. 1 Thess. i. 2 ; Eph. i. 16 ; Philem. 4 ; Winer, p. 352 [E. T. 376]. — εἰπὼς ἥδη ποτέ] *if perhaps at length on some occasion*. For examples of ἥδη, already (Baumlein, Part. p. 138 ff.), which, comparing another time with the present, conveys by the reference to something long hoped for but delayed the idea *at length*, see Hartung, Partikel. I. p. 238 ; Klotz, ad Devar. p. 607 ; comp. Phil. iv. 10, and the passages in Kypke. Th. Schott incorrectly renders πάντοτε, *under all circumstances*, which it never means, and ἥδη ποτέ as if it were ἥδη νῦν or ἄρτι. The mode of expression by εἰπὼς implies somewhat of modest fear, arising from the thought of possible hindrances.³ — εὐδοθήσομαι] *I shall have the good fortune*. The active εὐδοῶν is seldom used in its proper signification, *to lead well, expeditum iter praeberere*, as in Soph. O. C. 1437 ; Theophr. de caus. pl. v. 6, 7 ; LXX. Gen. xxiv. 27, 48 ; the passive, however, never means *via recta incedere, expeditum iter habere*, but invariably (even in Prov. xvii. 8) metaphorically: *prospero successu gaudere*.⁴ Therefore the explanation of *a prosperous journey*, which besides amounts only to an accessory modal idea (Beza, Estius, Wolf, and many others following the Vulgate and Occumenius ; including van Hengel and Hofmann), must be rejected, and not combined with ours (Umbreit). — ἐν τῷ θελ. τ. Θεοῦ] *in virtue of the will of God ; on this will the εὐδοθ. causally depend*.

Ver. 11. Ἐπιποθῶ] not *valde cupio*, but denoting the *direction* of the longing. Comp. on 2 Cor. v. 2 ; Phil. i. 8. — χάρισμα πνευματικόν] Paul calls that, which he intends to communicate to the Romans through his longed-for personal presence among them (ιδεῖν ; comp. Acts xix. 21, xxviii. 20) *a spiritual*

¹ See also Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 1000.

² See the passages in Heindorf, *ad Plat. Hipp. maj.* p. 281, Jacobs. *ad Ach. Tat.* p. 556.

³ Comp. xl. 14 ; and on Phil. iii. 11 ; 1 Macc. iv. 10.

⁴ See Herod. vi. 73 ; 1 Cor. xvi. 2 ; 3 John 2 ; LXX. 2 Chron. xiii. 12 ; Ps. i. 3, and frequently ; Eccles. xi. 16, xli. 1 ; Tob. iv. 19, v. 16 ; Test. XII. Patr. p. 684.

gift of grace; because in his apprehension all such instruction, comfort, joy, strengthening, etc., as are produced by means of his labours, are regarded not as procured by his own human individuality, but as a result which the πνεῦμα ἁγίων works by means of him—the gracious working of the Spirit, whose organ he is. While it was highly arbitrary in Toletus, Bengel, Michaelis, and others to refer the expression to the *apostolic miraculous gifts*—against which the εὐαγγελισσάσθαι in ver. 15 is conclusive—it was a very gratuitous weakening of its force to explain it (as is done by Morus, Rosenmüller, Köllner, Maier, Th. Schott) as a *gift referring to the (human) spirit*; “a gift for the inner life,” Hofmann. In such an interpretation the specifically *Christian* point of view (1 Cor. xii. 4; comp. εὐλογία πνευματική, Eph. i. 3) is left out of account; besides, πνευματικόν would imply nothing characteristic in that case; for that Paul did not desire to communicate any gifts of another sort, e.g. external, would be taken for granted. — The expression τι . . . χάρ. is *modest* (μετριάζοντος, Oecumenius). Note also the arrangement by which the words are made to *stand apart*, and this delicate τι, the substantial χάρισμα, and the qualifying πνευματικόν, are brought into the more special prominence.¹ — εἰς τὸ στηρ. ὑμᾶς] Object of the intended communication of such a gift; *that ye may be established*, namely, in the Christian character and life. [See Note VII. p. 75.] See ver. 12; comp. Acts xvi. 5; Rom. xvi. 25; 1 Thess. iii. 2. The στηρίξαι is conceived as being divinely wrought by means of the Spirit, hence the *passive* expression; it was to be accomplished however, as Paul hoped, *through him* as the instrument of the Spirit. Mangold, p. 82, has, without any ground in the text, assumed that this establishment has reference to “their abandoning their Jewish-Christian *scruples regarding the mission to the Gentiles*,” whereas ver. 12 rather testifies to the *Pauline Christianity* of the Romans. This remark applies also against Sabatier, p. 166, who understands “une conception de l’évangile de Jésus plus large et plus spirituelle.”

Ver. 12. Τοῦτο δέ ἐστι] *This, however*, which I have just designated as my longing (namely, ἰδεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἵνα . . . στηρίχθ. ὑμᾶς) *means, thereby I intend to say nothing else than*, etc. By this modifying explanation, subjoined with humility, and expressed in a delicate complimentary manner (Erasmus puts the matter too strongly, “*pia vafrities et sancta adulatio*”), Paul guards himself, in presence of a church to which he was still a stranger, from the possible appearance of presumption and of forming too low an estimate of the Christian standpoint of his readers.² — συμπαράκληθῆναι] must be under-

¹ On μεταδιδόναι τινί τι (instead of τινί τινος), comp. 1 Thess. ii. 8; Tob. vii. 9; 2 Macc. i. 35. So sometimes, although seldom, in classic authors, Herod. viii. 5, ix. 34; Xen. *Anab.* iv. 5, 5; Schaef. *Melet.* p. 21; Kühner, II. i. p. 295.

² The delicate turn which he gives to the matter is this: “to see you, in order that I,” etc., means nothing more than “to be quickened along with and among you,” etc. Consequently συμπαράκλη. is parallel to the

ἰδεῖν; for both infinitives must have the same subject. If συμπαράκλη. κ.τ.λ. had been meant to be merely a delicate explanation of στηρίχθῆναι ὑμᾶς (the usual exposition after Chrysostom), then ἐμέ must necessarily have been added to συμπαράκλη. Grotius aptly says: “*συμπαράκλη. regitur ab ἐπιποθῶ.*” The true interpretation is given also by Bengel and Th. Schott; comp. Olshausen, Ewald, and Hofmann, who erroneously imputes to me the common view.

stood not, with the Peshito, Vulgate, Valla, Erasmus, Luther, Piscator, de Dieu, and many others, including Koppe and Ewald, in the sense of *comfort* or of *refreshment* (Castalio, Grotius, Cramer, Rosenmüller, Böhme)—which it would be necessary that the context should call for, as in 1 Thess. iii. 2; 2 Thess. ii. 17, but which it here forbids by the general ἰδεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἵνα κ.τ.λ.—but in the quite general sense of *Christian encouragement and quickening*. The συμ.—however is not to be explained by ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐμᾶτον; on the contrary, the ἐν ὑμῖν renders it necessary that *Paul alone* should be conceived as the subject of συμπαράκληθῆναι. He desires to be quickened among the Romans (ἐν ὑμῖν) *at the same time with them*, and this by the faith common to both, theirs and his, which should mutually act and react in the way of the Christian sympathy that is based on specific harmony of faith. That the *readers* are not the subject of the συμπαράκλ. (Fritzsche, van Hengel) is certain from ἐν ὑμῖν, which, if it meant *in animis vestris* (van Hengel), would be a perfectly superfluous addition. — The compound συμπαράκλ. occurs only here in the N. T., and is not found in the LXX. or Apocr. ;¹—ἡ ἐν ἀλλήλοις πίστις, more significant of the hearty character of the faith than ἡ ἀλλήλων πίστις, is the faith of both viewed in its mutual identity, so that the faith which lives in the one lives also in the other. — ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐμοῦ] placed in this order with delicate tact.

Ver. 13. My longing towards you has *often* awakened in me the *purpose* of coming to you, in order also among you, etc. Paul might have placed a καὶ before προσθ., but was not *obliged* to do so (in opposition to Hofmann's objection); and he has not put it, because he did not *think* of it. The discourse proceeds from the *desire* (ver. 11) to the *purpose*, which is coming nearer to realization. Hence it is the less necessary to transfer the weight of the thought in ver. 13 to the clause expressive of purpose (Mangold). — οὐ θέλω, δὲ ὑμ. ἀγν.] The Apostle lays stress on this communication. Comp. on xi. 25. The δὲ is the simple μεταβατικόν. — καὶ ἐκωλ. ἄχρι τοῦ δεῦρο] is a parenthesis separated from the structure of the sentence, so that ἵνα attaches itself to προσθ. ἐλθ. πρ. ὑμ. The καὶ, however, is not to be taken as adversative, as Köllner still thinks (see, in opposition to this, Fritzsche), but as the simple *and* marking the sequence of thought, which here (comp. John xvii. 10) intervenes *parenthetically*. For the view which makes it still dependent on οὐτι, so that it introduces the second part of what the readers are to know (Hofmann), is precluded by the following clause of purpose, which can only apply to that *resolution* so often formed. — δεῦρο] used only here in the N. T. as a particle of *time*, but more frequently in Plato and later authors; see Wetstein. *That by which* Paul had been hitherto hindered, may be seen in xv. 22; consequently it was neither by the devil (1 Thess. ii. 18) nor by the Holy Spirit (Acts xvi. 6 f.). Grotius aptly observes (comp. xv. 22): “Magis urgebat necessitas locorum, in quibus Christus erat ignotus.” — ἵνα τινὰ καρπὸν κ.τ.λ.] is entirely parallel in sense with ἵνα τι μεταδῶ κ.τ.λ. in ver. 11, and it is a gratuitous refining on the figurative καρπὸν to find specially indicated here the *conversion of unde-*

¹ But see Plat. *Rep.* p. 555 A; and Polyb. v. 83, 3.

lievers beyond the range which the church had hitherto embraced (Hofmann); comp. also Th. Schott, and even Mangold, who takes the Apostle as announcing his desire to take in hand the *Gentile mission* also among his readers, so that the καρπός would be *Gentiles to be converted*. No; by καρπὸν Paul, with a complimentary egotism flattering to the readers, describes that which his personal labours among the Romans would have effected—consequently what had been said without metaphor in ver. 11—according to a current figure (John iv. 36, xv. 16; Phil. i. 22; Col. i. 6), as *harvest-fruit* which he would have *had* among them, and which as the produce of his labour would have been his (ideal) *possession* among them. But in this view the literal sense of ἔχειν (comp. vi. 21 f.) is not even to be altered by taking it as *consequi* (Wolf, Kypke, Koppe, Köllner, Tholuck, and others). To postpone the *having* the fruit, however, till the *last day* (Mehring) is quite alien to the context. — καθὼς καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθν.] *as also among the remaining nations, i.e. Gentiles* (see on ver. 5), namely, I have fruit. In the animation and fulness of his thought Paul has inserted twice the καὶ of comparison, inasmuch as there was present to his mind the twofold conception: (1) “among you also, ¹as among;” and (2) “among you, as also among.” So frequently in Greek authors.² There is therefore no grammatical reason for commencing the new sentence with καθὼς (Mehring), nor is it in accordance with the repetition of the ἐν.

Vv. 14, 15. Fuller explanation regarding the previous ἵνα τινὰ καρπ. σχῶ καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν, καθὼς καὶ ἐν τ. λοιπ. ἔθνεσιν. — Respecting βάρβαροι (ὄνομα τὸ οὐχ Ἑλληνικόν, Ammonius), which, according to Greek feeling and usage, denotes generally all *non-Greeks* (Plat. *Polit.* p. 262 D)—all who were strangers to Greek nationality and language—see Dougt. *Anal.* II. p. 100 f.; Hermann, *Staatsalterth.* § 6, 1. How common it was to designate all nations by thus dividing them into Ἑλλ. κ. βάρβ., see in Wetstein and Kypke, with examples from Philo in Loesner, p. 243. Of course the Hellenes included the Jews also among the βάρβαροι (a view which is attributed even to Philo, but without sufficient ground), while the Jews in their turn applied this designation to the Hellenes. See Grimm on 2 Macc. ii. 21, p. 61. Now it may be asked: *did Paul include the Romans among the Ἑλλήνες or among the βάρβαροι?* The latter view is maintained by Reiche and Köllner, following older writers; the former is held by Ambrosiaster, Estius, Kypke, and others, and the former alone would be consistent with that delicacy which must be presumed on the Apostle's part, as in fact, since Hellenic culture

¹That the “you” must mean the Roman Christians, and not the still *unconverted* Romans (Th. Schott), is clearly shown by all the passages, from ver. 8 onward, in which the ὑμεῖς occurs; and especially by the ὑμῖν τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ in ver. 15. As regards their nationality, they belong to the category of *Gentiles*. Comp. xi. 13, xvi. 4; Gal. ii. 12, 14; Eph. iii. 1. But if Paul is the *Apostle of the Gentiles*, the Gentiles already converted also belong to his apostolic sphere of labour, as e.g. the Colossians and

Laodiceans, and (vv. 5, 6) the Romans. Schott is compelled to resort to very forced suggestions regarding ἐν ὑμῖν and ὑμῖν, especially here and in ver. 15; as also Mangold, who can only find therein a *geographical* designation (comp. Hofmann: “he addresses them as a *constituent portion of the people of Rome*”). Comp. on ver. 15.

²See Baumelein, *Partikell.* p. 153; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Gorg.* p. 457 E; Winer, p. 409 [E. T. 440].

had become prevalent in Rome, especially since the time of Augustus, the Roman community was regarded from the Roman point of view as separated from the *barbaria*, and only nations like the Germans, Scythians, etc., were reckoned to belong to the latter.¹ But the following σοφοῖς τε καὶ ἀνόητοις, as also the circumstance that the Romans, although they separated themselves from the barbarians (*Greek* authors included them among these, Polyb. v. 104, 1, ix. 37, 5, Krebs and Kypke *in loc.*), are nowhere reckoned among the *Hellenes* or designated as such, make it evident that the above question is to be entirely excluded here, and that Paul's object is merely to set forth generally his obligation as Apostle of the Gentiles in its *universality*. This he does in the form of a twofold division, according to *nationality*, and according to *condition of culture*, so that the thought which he would express is: I am in duty bound to *all* Gentiles, *without distinction of their nationality or of their culture*; therefore I am ready, to you also, etc. — ὀφειλέτης] Paul regards the divine obligation of office, received through Christ (ver. 5), as the undertaking of a *debt*, which he has to discharge by preaching the Gospel among all Gentile nations.² — οὕτω] so, that is, *in accordance with this relation*, by which I am in duty bound to the Ἑλλῆσι τ. κ. βαρβ., to the σοφ. τ. κ. ἀνόητ. It does not refer to καθώς, ver. 13, which is dependent on the preceding καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν, but gathers up in itself the import of Ἑλλῆσι . . . εἰμι: *so then, ita, sic igitur*.³ Bengel well says: "est quasi ephiphonema et illatio a toto ad partem insignem." — The οὕτω τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ πρόθυμον (sc. ἐστὶ) is to be translated: *accordingly, the inclination on my part* [lit. *the on-my-part inclination*] is, so that τὸ belongs to πρόθυμον, though the expression τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ πρόθυμον, is not substantially different from the simple τὸ πρόθυμόν μου, but only more significantly indicative of the idea that Paul *on his part* was willing, etc. Comp. on Eph. i. 15. He says therefore: *in this state of the case the inclination which exists on his side is, to preach to the Romans also*. At the same time κατ' ἐμὲ is purposely chosen out of a feeling of dependence on a higher Will (ver. 10), rather than the simple τὸ πρόθυμόν μου, instead of which τὸ ἐμοῦ πρόθυμον would come nearer to the expression by κατ' ἐμέ.⁴ The above connection of τὸ . . . πρόθυμον is adopted by Seb. Schmid, Kypke, Reiche, Fritzsche, Philippi, van Hengel, Mehring, and others. So also Th. Schott, who however takes οὕτω in a *predicative* sense; as does likewise Hofmann: *Thus the case stands as to the fact and manner of the inclination on my part*. This however is the less appropriate, because ver. 14 contains, not the mode, but the regulative basis of the προθυμία of ver. 15. If τὸ κατ' ἐμέ be taken *by itself*, and not along with πρόθυμον, there would result the meaning: *there is, so far as I am concerned, an inclination*; comp. de Wette. But, however correct in linguistic usage might be τὸ κατ' ἐμέ,⁵

¹ Comp. Cicero, *de fin.* ii. 15, "non solum Graecia et Italia sed etiam omnis barbaria."

² Comp. in reference to this subject, Acts xxvi. 17 f.; Gal. ii. 7; 1 Cor. ix. 16.

³ See Hermann, *ad Luc. de hist. conscr. p.* 161; Buttmann, *neut. Gr. p.* 307 [E. T. 357].

⁴ On the substantival πρόθυμον, in the sense of προθυμία, comp. 3 Macc. v. 26; Plat. *Leg.* ix. p. 859 B; Eur. *Med.* 178; Thuc. iii. 82, 8; Herodian, viii. 3, 15.

⁵ See Schaefer, *ad Bos. Ell. p.* 278; Matthiae, p. 734.

which would here yield the sense *pro mea virili*, as in Dem. 1210, 20, the *πρόθυμον* without a verb would stand abruptly and awkwardly, because not the mere copula *ἐστί*, but *ἐστί* in the sense of *πάρεστι*, *adest*, would require to be supplied. Beza, Grotius, Bengel, Tholuck, Rückert, Köllner, Baumgarten-Crusius, take τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ as a periphrasis for ἐγώ, so that *πρόθυμον* must be taken as the predicate (*I on my part am disposed*). Without sanction from the *usus loquendi*; what is cited by Köllner from Vigerus, p. 7 f., and by Tholuck, is of a wholly different kind. The Greek would express this meaning by τὸ γ' ἐμὸν πρόθυμον.¹—καὶ ὑμῖν] as also included in that general obligation of mine; and not: although ye belong to the σοφοί (Bengel, Philippi), which the text does not suggest. But τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ is added with emphasis, since Rome ("caput et theatrum orbis terrarum," Bengel) could least of all be exempted from the task assigned to the Apostle of the Gentiles. Hofmann erroneously holds (comp. Mangold, p. 84) that Paul addresses the readers by ὑμῖν, not in their character as *Christians*, but as *Romans*, and that *εὐαγγελισαῖσθαι* means the preaching to those still *unconverted*; comp. Th. Schott, p. 91. No, he addresses the *Christian church in Rome*, to which he has not yet preached, but wishes to preach, the tidings of salvation, which they have up to the present time received from others. As in *every* verse, from the 6th to the 13th, so also here the *ὑμεῖς* can only be the *κλητοὶ* 'I. X., ver. 6 f., in Rome.²

Vv. 16, 17. Transition to the theme (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχ. τ. εὐαγγ.), and the theme itself (δύναμις . . . ζήσεται).

Ver. 16. Γὰρ] Paul confirms negatively his *προθυμία* . . . εὐαγγελισαῖσθαι, for which he had previously assigned a positive motive. — οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχ. τ. εὐαγγ.] Written, no doubt, with a recollection of what he had experienced in other highly civilized cities (Athens, Corinth, Ephesus), as well as, generally, in reference to the contents of the Gospel as a preaching of the *cross* (1 Cor. i. 18).³ Hence the *negative* form of the expression, as in contrast with the feeling of *shame* which that experience *might* have produced in him, as if the Gospel were something worthless, through which one could gain no honour and could only draw on himself contempt, mockery, etc. Comp. 2 Tim. i. 12. — ἐπαισχύνομαι (Plat. *Soph.* p. 247, D; 2 Tim. i. 8), and αἰσχύνομαι, with accusative of the object: see Kühner, II. i. p. 255 f.; Bernhardt, p. 113. — δύναμις γὰρ Θεοῦ ἐστίν] Ground of the οὐκ ἐπαισχ. τ. εὐαγγ. *Power of God* (genitive of the *subject*) is the Gospel, in so far as God works by means of the message of salvation. By awaking repentance, faith, comfort, love, peace, joy, courage in life and death, hope, etc., the Gospel manifests itself as *power*, as a mighty potency, and that *of God*, whose revelation and work the Gospel is

¹ Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 533 A.

² See besides, against Mangold, Beyschlag in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1887, p. 642 f.

³ From his own point of view, viz. that the church in Rome was *Jewish-Christian*, Mangold, p. 98 f., suggests *theocratic* scruples on the part of the readers regarding the *Apostle's universalism*. An idea inconsistent with the notion conveyed by ἐπαισχ.,

and lacking any other indication whatever in the text; for the subsequent Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. cannot have been designed cautiously to meet such doubts (see, on the other hand, ii. 9); but only to serve as expressive of the *objective* state of the case as regards the historical order of salvation, in accordance with the doctrinal development of *principles* which Paul has in view.

(hence τὸ εὐαγγ. τοῦ Θεοῦ, xv. 16 ; 2 Cor. xi. 7 ; 1 Thess. ii. 2). Comp. 1 Cor. i. 18, 24. The expression asserts more than that the Gospel is "a powerful means in the hand of God" (Rückert), and is based on the fact that it is the living self-manifestation and effluence of God, as ῥῆμα Θεοῦ (Eph. vi. 17). Paul knew how to honour highly the message of salvation which it was his office to convey, and he was not ashamed of it. Here also, as in vv. 1, 9, τὸ εὐαγγ. is not the *work* or *business* of conveying the message (Th. Schott), but the *message itself*. — εἰς σωτηρίαν] Working of this power of God : *unto salvation*, consequently *with saving power*. And *what* salvation is here meant, was understood by the reader ; for σωτηρία and σώζεσθαι are the standing expressions for *the eternal salvation in the Messianic kingdom* (comp. ζήσεται, ver. 17), the opposite of ἀπώλεια (Phil. i. 28 ; comp. θάνατος, 2 Cor. ii. 16). Comp. generally, James i. 21, τὸν λόγον τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν. As to *how* the Gospel works salvation, see ver. 17. — παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι] shows to *whom* the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation. [See Note VIII. p. 76.] *Faith* is the condition on the part of man, without which the Gospel cannot be to him effectually that power ; for in the unbeliever the *causa apprehendens* of its efficacy is wanting. Comp. ver. 17. Melancthon aptly says : "Non enim ita intelligatur haec efficacia, ut si de calefactione loquermur : ignis est efficax in stramine, etiamsi stramen nihil agit." — παντὶ gives emphatic prominence to the *universality*, which is subsequently indicated in detail. Comp. iii. 22. — Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον κ. Ἕλληνι] τε . . . καὶ denotes the equality of what is added.¹ πρῶτον expresses the *priority* ; but not merely in regard to the divinely appointed order of *succession*, in accordance with which the preaching of the Messiah was to begin with the Jews and thence extend to the Gentiles, as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Grotius, and many others, including Olshausen, van Hengel and Th. Schott, have understood it ; but in reference to the *first claim* on the Messianic salvation in accordance with the promise, which was in fact the ground of that external order of *succession* in the communication of the Gospel. So Erasmus, Calovius, and others, including Reiche, Tholuck, Rückert, Fritzsche, de Wette, Philippi, Ewald, Hofmann. That this is the Pauline view of the relation is plain from iii. 1 f. ; ix. 1 ff. ; xi. 16 ff. ; xv. 9 ; comp. John iv. 22 ; Matt. xv. 24 ; Acts xiii. 46. The Jews are the *υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλ.*, Matt. viii. 12. — Ἕλληνι] denotes, in contrast to Ἰουδαίῳ all *Non-Jews*. Acts xiv. 1 ; 1 Cor. x. 32 *al.*

Ver. 17 illustrates and gives a reason for the foregoing affirmation : *δύναμις Θεοῦ ἐστὶν εἰς σωτ. π. τ. πιστ.*, which could not be the case, unless *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ κ. τ. λ.* [See Note IX. p. 76.] — *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*] That this does not denote, as in iii. 5, an attribute of God,² is plain from the passage cited in proof

¹ See Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 99 ; Baumlein, *Part.* p. 225.

² It has been understood as the truthfulness of God (Ambrosiaster) ; as the *justitia Dei essentialis* (Oslander) ; as the *justitia distributiva* (Origen, and several of the older expositors, comp. Flatt) ; as the good-

ness of God (Schoettgen, Semler, Morus, Krehl) ; as the *justifying righteousness* of God (Mäcker). According to Ewald it is the divine righteousness regarded as power and life-blessing, in the goodness of which man may and must fully participate, if he would not feel its sting and its penalty.

from Hab. ii. 4, where, by necessity of the connection, ὁ δίκαιος must denote the person who is in the state of the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ. Comp. iii. 21 ff. It must therefore be an *ethical relation of man* that is meant; and the genitive Θεοῦ must (otherwise in Jas. i. 20)¹ be rendered as the *genitive of emanation from*, consequently: *rightness which proceeds from God, the relation of being right into which man is put by God* (i.e. by an act of God declaring him righteous).² This interpretation of the genitive as gen. *originis*, acutely and clearly set forth anew by Pfleiderer,³ is more specially evident from iii. 23, where Paul himself first explains the expression δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, and that by δικαιοῦμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, which is turned in ver. 26 to the active form: δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως; comp. ver. 30, viii. 33, according to which the genitive appears equivalent to ἐκ Θεοῦ (Phil. iii. 9), in contrast to the ἐμὴ and ἰδία δικαιοσύνη (Rom. x. 3), and to the δικαιοῦν ἑαυτὸν (Luke xii. 15). The passage in 2 Cor. v. 21 is not opposed to this view (as Fritzsche thinks); see *in loc.*; nor are the expressions δικαιοῦσθαι ἐνώπιον Θεοῦ (iii. 20), and παρὰ Θεῷ (Gal. iii. 11), for these represent a special form under which the relation is conceived, expressing more precisely the *judicial* nature of the matter. Hence it is evident that the interpretation adopted by many modern writers (including Köllner, Fritzsche, Philippi, Umbreit), following Luther: “*righteousness before God*,” although correct in point of substance, is unsuitable as regards the analysis of the genitive, which they take as genitive of the *object*. This remark applies also against Baur, who (*Paulus*, II. p. 146 ff.) takes the genitive *objectively* as the δικαιοσύνη determined by the idea of God, adequate to that idea; whilst in his *neutest. Theol.* p. 134, he prefers to take the genitive *subjectively*: the righteousness *produced* through God, i.e. “the manner in which God places man in the adequate relation to Himself.”—The following remarks may serve exegetically to illustrate the idea of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, which in the Gospel is revealed from faith:—Since God, as the holy Lawgiver and Judge, has by the law imposed on man the task of keeping it entirely and perfectly (Gal. iii. 10), He can only receive and treat as a δίκαιος *who is such, as he should be*—as one normally guiltless and upright, who should be so, therefore, *habitually*—the person who keeps the whole law; or, in other words, only the man who is perfectly obedient to the law can stand to God in the relation of δικαιοσύνη. Such perfection however no man could attain; not merely no Gentile, since in his case the natural moral law was obscured through immorality, and through disobedience to it he had fallen into sin and vice; but also no Jew, for natural desire, excited by the principle of sin in him through the very fact of legal prohibition, hindered in his case the fulfilment of the divine law, and ren-

Comp. Matthias on iii. 21: a righteousness, such as belongs to God, consequently, “a righteousness which exists also inwardly and is in every respect perfect.”

¹ Where what is meant is the *rightness required by God*, which man is supposed to realize through exerting himself in works.

² Comp. Chrysostom, Bengel, and others, including Rückert, Olshausen, Reiche, de

Wette, Winer, p. 175 [E. T. 186]; Winzer *de vocib. δίκαιος, δικαιοσύνη, et δικαιοῦν in ep. ad Rom.* p. 10; Bisping, van Hengel, Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 153; Mehring; also Hofmann (comp. his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 627); Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 408 f.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 330 f.; Rich. Schmidt, *Paulin. Christol.* p. 10.

³ In Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1872, p. 168 ff.

dered him also, without exception, morally weak, a sinner and object of the divine wrath. If therefore man was to enter into the relation of a righteous person and thereby of a future participator in the Messianic blessedness, it was necessary that this should be done by means of an extraordinary divine arrangement, through which grace and reconciliation should be imparted to the object of wrath, and he should be put forward for the judgment of God as righteous. This arrangement has been effected through the sending of His Son and His being given up to His bloody death as that of a guiltless sacrifice; whereby God's counsel of redemption, formed from eternity, has been accomplished,—objectively for all, subjectively to be appropriated on the part of individuals through faith, which is the *ὄργανον ληπτικόν*. And, as this plan of salvation is the subject-matter of the *Gospel*, so in this *Gospel* that which previously, though prefigured by the justification of Abraham, was an unrevealed *μυστήριον*, namely, *righteousness from God*, is revealed (*ἀποκαλύπτεται*), inasmuch as the *Gospel* makes known both the accomplished work of redemption itself and the means whereby man appropriates the redemption, namely, *faith in Christ*, which, *imputed* to him as righteousness (iv. 5), causes man to be regarded and treated by God out of grace and *δωρεάν* (iii. 24) as righteous (*δίκαιος*), so that he, like one who has perfectly obeyed the law, is certain of the Messianic bliss destined for the *δίκαιοι*.¹ The so-called obedientia Christi *activa* is not to be included in the *causa meritoria* of the divine justification; but is to be regarded as the fulfilment of a *preliminary condition* necessary to the death of Jesus, so far as the justification of man was objectively based on the latter; without the complete *active* obedience of Christ (consequently without His sinlessness) His *passive* obedience could not have been that *causa meritoria* (2 Cor. v. 21). — *ἀποκαλύπτεται*] is revealed; for previously, and in the absence of the *Gospel*, the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* was and is something quite hidden in the counsel of God, the

¹ Justification is simply imputative, an *actus forensis*, not *inherent*, and therefore not a *gradual* process, as Romang anew maintains, but produced by the imputation of faith. The new moral life in Christ is the necessary consequence (Rom. vi. 8), so that regeneration comes after justification—a divine order of salvation inconsistent with all Oslandrian views. See Ritschl, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1857, p. 795 ff., *alkath. Kirche*, p. 76 ff. The regenerate life is neither a *part* (Baumgarten-Crusius) nor the *positive side* (Baur) of justification, the conception of which is not to be referred either to the consciousness of liberation from guilt given with conversion (Schleiermacher); or to the unity of forgiveness with the *instilling of love* (Marheineke); or to an *anticipation of the judgment of God* on faith in respect to the divine life which develops itself from it as its *fruit* (Rothe, Martensen, Hundeshagen, and others, including Tholuck on v. 9, and Catholics like Döllinger, see on iv. 8)—

so that, with regard to its *truth*, it would have to be made dependent on *sanctification* (Nitzsch), or the *dying out of sin* (Beck), and so forth,—or to the establishment of the *new sanctified humanity* in the person of Christ (Menken-Hofmann). The *Form. Conc.*, p. 687, rightly warns: "ne ea quae fidem praecedunt et ea quae eam sequuntur articulo de justificatione, tanquam ad justificationem pertinentia, admisceantur." Respecting the *sensus forensis* of justification, which is by no means a product of mediæval scholasticism (in opposition to Sabatier, p. 263), comp. Köstlin in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1856, p. 89 ff.; and in its purely exegetical aspect, especially Wieseler on Gal. ii. 16, Pfleiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1872, p. 161 ff., and Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* § 112. We may add that with Luther's doctrine of justification Zwingli substantially concurs. See, for defence of the latter (against Stahl), Ritschl, *Rechtfert. u. Versöhnung*, 1870, I. p. 165 ff.

knowledge of which is first given in the Gospel (comp. xvi. 25 ; Acts xvii. 30). The prophecies of the Old Testament were only *preparatory* and *promissory* (ver. 2), and therefore were only the *means of introducing* the evangelical revelation itself (xvi. 26). The *present* is used, because the Gospel is conceived of in its continuous proclamation. Comp. the perfect, *πεφανέρωται*, iii. 21, and on the other hand the historical aorist *φανερωθέντος* in xvi. 26. Through the *ἀποκάλυψις* ensues the *φανερῶσθαι*, through the *revelation* the *being manifest* as object of knowledge. — *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν*] may not be connected with *δικαιωσ.* (Luther, Hammond, Bengel, Koppe, Rückert, Reiche, Tholuck, Philippi, Mehring, and others), but rather—as the only arrangement which the position of the words admits without arbitrariness—with *ἀποκαλύπτεται*. So also van Hengel and Hofmann ; comp. Luke ii. 35. The *δικαιοσύνη* Θεοῦ, namely, is revealed in the Gospel *ἐκ πίστεως*, *inasmuch as in the Gospel faith on Christ is made known as the subjective cause from which righteousness comes*. Thus the Gospel, as the *ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως* (x. 8) and *λόγος τῆς καταλλαγῆς* (2 Cor. v. 19), makes the divine righteousness become manifest *from faith*, which it in fact preaches as that which becomes imputed ; for him who does *not* believe the *ἀκοὴ πίστεως* (Gal. iii. 2), it leaves this *δικαιοσύνη* to remain a locked-up *unrevealed* blessing. But it is not merely *ἐκ πίστεως*, but also *εἰς πίστιν* ; *to faith* (comp. 2 Cor. ii. 16). Inasmuch, namely, as righteousness is revealed in the Gospel *from* faith, faith is *aimed at*, i.e., the revelation spoken of proceeds from faith, and is *designed to produce faith*. This sense, equivalent to “*ut fides habeatur*,” and rightly corresponding alike with the simple words and the context, is adopted by Heumann, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Krehl, Nielsen, and van Hengel. It is not “too meaningless” (de Wette), nor “saying pretty nearly nothing” (Philippi) ; but is on the contrary emphatically appropriate to the purpose of representing faith as the *Fac totum* (“*prora et puppis*,” Bengel, comp. Baur, II. p. 161).¹ Therefore *εἰς πίστιν* is not to be taken as equivalent to *εἰς τὸν πιστεύοντα*, *for the believer* (Oecumenius, Seb. Schmid, Morus, Rosenmüller, Rückert, Reiche, de Wette, Olshausen, Reithmayr, Maier, and Philippi), a rendering which should have been precluded by the abstract correlative *ἐκ πίστεως*. Nor does it mean : *for the furtherance and strengthening of faith*. (Clem. Al. *Strom.* v. 1, II. p. 644. Pott., Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Melancthon, Beza, Cornelius à Lapide, and others, including Köllner ; comp. Baumgarten-Crusius, Klee, and Stengel ; for the thought : “from an *ever new*, never tiring, *endlessly progressive* faith” (Ewald)² is here foreign to the connection, which is concerned only with the great fundamental truth in its simplicity ; the case is different in 2 Cor. iii. 18. Quite arbitrary, moreover, was the interpretation : “*ex fide legis in fidem evangelii*” (Tertullian).³ Finally, to take *πίστιν* as *faithfulness*, and to understand *πίστις εἰς πίστιν* in the sense of *faith in the faithfulness of God* (Mehring), is to introduce what is neither in the words

¹ See also Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 629 f. Comp. vi. 19 ; 2 Cor. ii. 16.

² Comp. Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 7, 116, and Umbreit.

³ Comp. Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret : *δεῖ γὰρ πιστεῦσαι τοῖς προφήταις, καὶ δεῖ ἐκείνων εἰς τὴν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου πίστιν ποδηγηθῆναι*, Zeger, and others.

nor yet suggested by the context. Ewald in his *Jahrb.* IX. p. 87 ff., interprets : *faith in faith*, the reference being to the faith with which man meets the *divine* faith in his power and his good will (?). But the idea of "faith from beneath on the faith from above," as well as the notion generally of God *believing* on men, would be a paradox in the N. T., which no reader could have discovered without more clear and precise indication. After *ἐκ πίστ.* every one could not but understand *εἰς πίστ.* also as meaning *human* faith ; and indeed everywhere it is man that believes, not *God*. — καθὼς γέγραπται represents what has just been stated, *δικαιοσύνη* . . . *πίστιν*, as taking place *in accordance with a declaration of Scripture*, consequently according to the necessity of the divine counsel of salvation. *He who from faith (on Christ) is righteous* (transferred into the relation of the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*) shall live (be partaker of the Messianic eternal life). This, as the Messianic sense intended to be conveyed by the Spirit of God (2 Peter i. 21) in the prophetic words, Hab. ii. 4, "*the righteous shall by his faithfulness*¹ *live*" (attain the theocratic life-blessedness), is recognized by Paul, and expressed substantially in the language of the LXX., rightly omitting the *μὴν*, which they inaccurately add to *πίστεως*. In doing so Paul *might*, in accordance with the Messianic reference of the passage, connect *ἐκ πίστεως* (נֶאֱמָר)—seeing that on this causal definition the *stress* of the expression lies—with *ὁ δίκαιος* ; because, if the *life* of the righteous has *πίστις* as its cause, his *δικαιοσύνη* itself can have no other ground or source. That he has *really* so connected the words, as Beza and others rightly perceived (see especially Hölemann, *de justitiæ ex fide ambab. in V. T. sedibus*, Lips. 1867), and not, as most earlier expositors have supposed (also de Wette, Tholuck, Delitzsch, on Hab. *l.c.*, Philippi, Baumgarten-Crusius, van Hengel, Ewald, and Hofmann, *ἐκ πίστ. ζήσεται*, is plain from the connection, according to which it is not the *life ἐκ πίστ.*, but the *revelation of righteousness ἐκ πίστ.* that is to be confirmed by the Old Testament. The case is different in Heb. x. 38. See further, generally, on Gal. iii. 11.—The *δέ* is, without having any bearing on the matter, adopted along with the other words from the LXX. Comp. on Acts ii. 17. A contrast to the unrighteous who shall die (Hofmann) is neither here nor in Hab. ii. 4 implied in the text.

Vv. 18–32. [See Note X. p. 77.] Proof of ver. 17 deduced from experience, and that in the first instance with respect to *Gentile* humanity (the proof in regard to the *Jews* begins at ch. ii.).

Ver. 18. This great fundamental proposition of the Gospel, ver. 17, is proved (γὰρ) agreeably to experience, by the fact that, where there is no *πίστις*, there is also no ἀποκάλυψις of righteousness, but only of the wrath of God. "Horrendum est initium ac fulmen," Melanchthon, 1540. — ἀποκαλύπτεται Emphatically placed, in harmony with the ἀποκαλ. in ver. 17, at the beginning. — ὁργὴ Θεοῦ The antithesis of δίκαιος Θεοῦ, ver. 16. The ὁργὴ of God is not to be explained with several of the Fathers (in Suicer), Eras-

¹ This *faithfulness*, in the prophet's sense, the נֶאֱמָר, and the *πίστις* in the *Christian* sense, have the same fundamental idea,

trustful self-surrender to God. Comp. Umbreit, p. 197.

mus, and many later authorities, as *poena divina*, which is nothing but a rationalizing interchange of ideas, but rather in the proper literal sense : *wrath*, an affection of the personal God, having a necessary connection with His love. The wrath of God, the reality of which is indisputable as the very presupposition of the work of atonement, is the love of the holy God (who is neither neutral nor one-sided in his affection), for all that is good in its energy as antagonistic to all that is evil.¹ See on Matt. iii. 7 ; Eph. ii. 3. — ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ] is neither to be connected with ὁργή Θεοῦ, as Beza, Estius, and many others hold, nor with the bare Θεοῦ (Mehring), but, as the order of the words and the parallel definition ἐν αὐτῷ in ver. 17 require, belongs to ἀποκαλύπτεται ; so that heaven, the dwelling-place and throne of God (comp. on Matt. vi. 9), is designated as the place from which the ἀποκάλυψις of the ὁργή Θεοῦ issues. "*Majestatem irati Dei significat*," Bengel. The revelation of righteousness takes place ἐν εὐαγγελίῳ, ver. 17, as something spiritually brought home to the consciousness through the medium of the Gospel ; but that of the divine wrath descends *from heaven*, manifested as a divine matter of fact ; by which description, however, the *destructive* character of this working of divine power is not expressed (Th. Schott), although it is in fact implied in the entire context. *But what revelation of divine wrath is meant?* Paul himself supplies the information in ver. 24 ff., in which is described what God in His sufficiently well-grounded (vv. 19–23) wrath did (παρέδωκεν αὐτοῖς). God's wrath therefore is revealed from heaven *in this way*, that those who are the objects of it are given up by God to terrible retribution in unchastity and all vice. Against this interpretation (comp. Mehring), which is adopted also by Tholuck, Weber (*vom Zorne Gottes*, p. 89), and Th. Schott, it cannot be objected, with Hofmann, that Paul must have written ἀπεκαλύφθη ; for he here in fact expresses the *general* proposition of experience, to which the concrete *historical* representation subsequently shall correspond ; the divine *axiom* is placed first (*present*), and then the history of it follows (*arist*). Irrelevant is also the objection of Philippi, that ἀποκαλύπτειν always denotes a *supernatural* revelation. For ἀποκαλύπτειν means to *reveal* what was previously unknown, what was veiled from our cognition, so that it now becomes manifest ; and, in reference to this, it is a matter of indifference whether the revelation takes place in a natural or in a supernatural manner.² The *mode* of revealing is not indicated in the word itself, but in the context ; and hence according to the connection it is used also, as here, of a revelation *in fact*, by which a state of things previously unknown comes to our knowledge (Matt. x. 26 ; Luke ii. 35 ; 2 Thess. ii. 3, 6, 8). Moreover, even according to our interpretation, a *divine* revelation is meant, by which there is certainly brought to light a *μυστήριον*, namely, the connection of the phenomenon with the divine ὁργή. According to

¹ The idea of the divine ὁργή is diametrically opposed to every conception of sin as a necessity interwoven with human development. Even Lactantius has aptly remarked, *de ira Dei*, v. 9 : "Si Deus non irascitur impiis et injustis, nec pios justosque diligit ; in rebus enim diversis aut in ut-

ramque partem moveri necesse est, aut in neutram."

² In this case it cannot make any difference whether *God* is or is not the revealing subject, as is most plainly seen from Matt. xvi. 17.

others, Paul means the *inward* revelation of the divine wrath, given by means of *reason and conscience* (Ambrosiaster, Wolf, and others, including Reiche and Glöckler), in support of which view they appeal to ver. 19. But, on the contrary, ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ requires us to understand an ἀποκάλυψις *cognizable by the senses*; and ver. 19 contains not the *mode* of the manifestation of wrath, but its *moving cause* (διότι). Others hold that the ἀποκάλυψις of the divine wrath has come *through the Gospel* ("continens minas," Grotius), and that ἐν αὐτῷ is to be again supplied from ver. 17. So Aquinas, Bellarmine, Corn. à Lapide, Estius, Grotius, Heumann, Semler, Morus, Böhme, Benecke, Maier; comp. Umbreit, who includes also the Old Testament. It is decisive against this view that ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ, just because it is parallel to ἐν αὐτῷ in ver. 17, lays down a mode of manifestation quite different from ἐν αὐτῷ. Had the latter been again in Paul's mind here, he would have repeated it with emphasis, as he has repeated the ἀποκαλύπτεται. Others hold that the manifestation of wrath *at the general judgment* is meant (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Toletus, Limborch, Koppe, Philippi, Reithmayr, and Ewald). The present, considered in itself, might be chosen in order to express a vivid realization of the future, or might be accounted for by the ἐν αὐτῷ, which, it is alleged, is to be again mentally supplied (Ewald); but the former explanation is to be rejected on account of the preceding purely present ἀποκαλ. in ver. 17; and against the latter may be urged the very fact, that ἐν αὐτῷ is not repeated. Had this been the meaning, moreover, the further course of the exposition must have borne reference to the general judgment, which it by no means does; and therefore this interpretation is opposed to the connection, as well as unwarranted by ii. 5 (where the mention of the revelation of judgment belongs to quite a different connection); and not required by the idea of ἀποκαλύπτειν itself, since that idea is adequately met by the divine matter-of-fact revelation of wrath here intended (see above), and besides, the word is repeated intentionally for rhetorical effect. Lastly, while others have contented themselves with leaving the ἀποκάλυψις here *in its entire generality* (Olshausen, Tholuck; comp. Calovius), and thus relieved themselves from giving any explanation of it, the reference to the religion of the O. T. (Bengel and Platt) seems entirely arbitrary and groundless, and the interpretations which apply it to *evils generally* affecting the world as an expression of the divine wrath (Hofmann), or to the external and internal *distress of the time* (Baumgarten-Crusius), are too general and indefinite, and thereby devoid of any concrete import in keeping with the text. — ἐπὶ πᾶσ. ἀσέβ. κ. ἀδικ. ἄνθρ.] contains the *hostile direction* (comp. Dem. 743, 22) of the ἀποκαλύπτεται . . . οὐρανοῦ: *against every ungodliness and immorality of men*, which, etc. Ἀσέβεια and ἀδικία¹ are distinguished as *irreligiousness* and *immorality*, so that both describe the *improbitas*, but under different aspects, in reference to the fear of *God* and to the standard of *morals*; hence the former, as involving the idea of impiety, is the stronger expression.² * That the distinction between them is

¹ Plat. Prot. p. 323 E; Xen. Cyr. viii. 8, 7; Tittmann, Synon. N. T. p. 48.

² Comp. Dem. 548, 11: ἀσέβημα, οὐκ ἀδίκημα μόνον.

not to be understood, with Köllner, following Theophylact, Grotius, Calovius, Wolf, and many others, as *profanitas in Deum* and *injuria in proximum*, is proved by the following ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχ. — τῶν τ. ἀλήθ. ἐν ἀδικ. κατεχ.] *who keep down the truth through immorality*, do not let it develop itself into power and influence on their religious knowledge and their moral condition. The article (*quippe qui*) introduces that *characteristic* of the ἀνθρώπων, not yet more precisely defined, which excites the divine wrath. Rightly in the Vulgate: *eorum qui*. See Winer, p. 127 [E. T. 134]. It may be paraphrased: “*of those, I mean, who.*” Comp. Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* ii. 7, 13. Bengel, moreover, aptly remarks: “*veritas in mente nititur et urget, sed homo eam impedit.*” This is the peculiar, deeply unfortunate, constant self-contradiction of the heathen character.¹ On κατέχειν, *to hinder*, comp. 2 Thess. ii. 6; Luke iv. 42; 1 Macc. vi. 27.² Against the interpretation of Michaelis, Koppe, and Baur, who take κατέχειν here as meaning *to possess* (1 Cor. vii. 30; 2 Cor. vi. 10), “*who possess the truth in unrighteousness, who know what God’s will is, and yet sin,*” ver. 21 is decisive, where the continuous possession of the truth is *negatived* by ἐματαιώθησαν . . . καρδία; wherefore also it cannot be rendered with Melancthon and van Hengel: *who hold the truth in the bondage of immorality* (vii. 6; Gen. xxxix. 20, xlii. 19). The ἀλήθεια is correctly interpreted in the sense of *divine truth generally*; the *mode of revelation*, in which it is presented to man’s knowledge, is furnished by the context, here, by ver. 19 f., as the truth apparent by natural revelation in the works of God; not therefore in the sense of the *doctrine of the Gospel*, which is hindered in its diffusion by Jews and Gentiles (Ammon, comp. Ewald). — ἐν ἀδικίᾳ] *instrumental*. To make it equivalent to ἀδίκως (Reiche, following Theophylact, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Raphel, and others; comp. ἐν δυνάμει in ver. 4) arbitrarily deprives the representation of an element essential to its fulness and precision, and renders it tame; for it is self-evident that the κατέχειν τ. ἀλ. is unrighteous or sinful, but not so much so that it takes place *through sin*. — Finally, it is to be noted that Paul, in ἀνθρώπ. (correlative of Θεοῦ) τῶν τ. ἀλήθ. ἐν ἀδικ. κατεχ., expresses himself quite *generally*, making apparent by ἀνθρώπ. the *audacity* of this *God-opposing* conduct; but he means the *Gentiles*, as is indicated even by ἐν ἀδικίᾳ (comp. 1 Cor. vi. 1), and as is confirmed beyond doubt by the continuation of the discourse in ver. 19 ff. Koppe supposed that Paul meant the Jews especially, but included also the Gentiles; Benecke, that he speaks of the whole human race in general, which view Mehring specially defends. But the peculiar character of what is contained in vv. 21–32 shows that the Jews are to be entirely excluded from the description which is carried on to the end of the chapter. It is not till ch. ii. 1 that the discourse passes over to them, and makes them suddenly see themselves reflected in the Gentile mirror.

Ver. 19. Διότι] *propterea quod*—only to be separated by a comma from the foregoing—specifies more precisely the *causal relation*, on account of which the

¹ Comp. Nägelsbach, *Homer. Theol.* I. p. 11 ff.

² Plat. *Phaed.* p. 117 C; Soph. *El.* 754; Pind. *Isthm.* iii. 2, and Dissen *in loc.*

wrath of God comes upon such men, etc. (ver. 18). They keep down the truth through immorality ; if they did so out of ignorance, they would be excusable : but they do not do so out of ignorance, and *therefore* God's wrath is manifested against them. This view of the connection is *suggested* by the literal meaning of *διότι* itself, and *confirmed* by *εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογ.* Comp. Hofmann. So also Fritzsche, who, however, takes *διότι* as equivalent to *γάρ*, as does also Philippi,—a use of it that never occurs, not even in Acts xviii. 10. This linguistically erroneous interpretation of *διότι* condemns also the view of Tholuck, Rückert, de Wette, and Reithmayr, who discover here the *proof*, that the Gentiles *keep down the truth* by immorality ; or (so Th. Schott) that Paul rightly describes them as *κατέχοντες κ.τ.λ.* No ; for the *very reason* that they have the *γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, which renders them *inexcusable*, does the wrath of God go forth against the *κατέχοντες* ; ver. 18. — *τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*] *that which is known concerning God*, not : that which is *knowable* concerning God, a signification which, though adopted by Origen, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Erasmus, Beza, Castalio, Calvin, Piscator, Estius, Grotius, Wolf, Koppe, Rückert, Köllner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Maier, Ewald, Umbreit, Mehring, Hofmann, and others, is never conveyed by *γνωστός* in the N. T. or in the LXX. and Apocrypha, though it frequently occurs in classic authors.¹ In all the places where it occurs in the Scriptures, as also, though less frequently, in the classics,² it means *quod notum est* (Vulgate), and is therefore equivalent to *γνωτός* or *γνώριμος*, also in Acts iv. 16 ; Eccles. xxi. 7. The opposite : *ἄγνωστος*, Acts xvii. 23. Comp. Luther, 1545 : “*das* (nicht : *dass*) man weiss, *das* (nicht : *dass*) Gott sei.” That which is *known* of God excludes that which needed a special revelation to make it known, as in particular the contents of the Gospel ; the former is derived from the general revelation of nature. If we should take *γνωστὸν* as *knowable*, the assertion of the Apostle would be incorrect without some limiting qualification ; for the positively revealed belonged to that which was *knowable*, but not to that which was *known* of God,³ into which category it was brought only through special revelation, which it would otherwise not have needed. — *ἐν αὐτοῖς*] *i.e. in their consciousness*, *ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν*, ii. 15. Comp. Gal. i. 16. The explanation *inter ipsos*, which Erasmus and Grotius (both referring it arbitrarily to the Gnosis of the *philosophers* among the Gentiles), Köllner and Baumgarten-Crusius give, is to be rejected for this reason, that *αὐτοῖς ἐφάνερωσε*, compared with *νοούμενα καθορᾶται*, points to a manifestation of the *γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ* which is *inward*, although conveyed through the revelation of nature. — *ἐφάνερωσε*] God—and this subject is

¹ See the passages from Plato quoted by Ast, *Lex.* I. p. 401 ; Dorvill. *ad Charit.* p. 502 ; Hermann, *ad Soph. Oed. T.* 361 ; comp. *ἄγνωστος*, which in Plato invariably means *unknowable*.

² Xen. *Cyr.* vi. 3, 4 ; Arrian. *Epict.* ii. 20, 4 ; Aesch. *Choeph.* 702 ; Beck, *Antiatt.* p. 87, 25.

³ Which, however, is not to be transformed, with Fritzsche, Tholuck, Krehl, and others, into the subjective *scientia Dei*

—which has no precedent in usage, is unsuitable to the following *φανερὸν ἐστὶ*, and is not to be supported even by the LXX. Gen. ii. 9 ; in which passage, if the text be not corrupted, *τὸ ξύλον τοῦ εἰδέναι γνωστὸν καλοῦ κ. πονηροῦ* must be rendered : the tree by which they were to learn what is known of good and evil, *i.e.* by which they were to become aware of that which they—by the very enjoyment—had known of good and evil.

again named with emphasis—*has laid it clearly* before them, made it lie openly before their view as an object of knowledge. Comp. on the matter itself Acts xiv. 17, xvii. 26 f. ; 1 Cor. i. 21.

Ver. 20 f. Τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα . . . θεϊότης] Giving a reason for, and explaining, the previous ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφάνερωσε. — τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ] *His invisible things*, the manifold invisible attributes, that constitute His nature. [See Note XI. p. 77.] Paul himself explains it afterwards by ἡ αἰδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης ; therefore it is not *actiones Dei invisibiles* (Fritzsche ; comp. Theodoret). — νοούμενα καθορᾶται] *through the works are seen becoming discerned* ; νοούμενα defines the *manner* in which the καθορᾶται takes place, otherwise than through the senses (the νοεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὁμμασι θεωρεῖν, Plat. Rep. p. 529 B), in so far as it is effected by means of *mental discernment*, by the agency of *intelligent perception*. The καθορᾶται forms with ἀόρατα a striking oxymoron, in which the compound selected for that purpose, but not elsewhere occurring in the N. T., heightens still further the idea conveyed by the simple form.¹ — τοῖς ποιήμασι] embraces all that God as *Creator* has produced, but does not at the same time include His governing in the world of history, as Schneckenburger thinks, Beitr. p. 102 f. ; for Πῶς, with which ποίημα corresponds (LXX. Eccles. iii. 11, vii. 13, *al.*), is the *formal* expression for God's works of creation ; as also Paul himself, in Eph. ii. 10, describes the renewing of man as analogous to creation. It is only of the works of creation that the Apostle could assert what he here says, especially as he adds ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου. Since, moreover, τοῖς ποιήμασι, *by means of the works*, contains the *instrumental* definition appended to νοούμενα καθορᾶται,² ἀπὸ κτίσ. κόσμου cannot be taken in a causal sense (see Winer, p. 348 [E. T. 370]), as the *medium cognoscendi* (so Luther and many others, including Calovius, Pearson, Homberg, Wolf, Heumann, Morus, and Reithmayr), but only in the sense of temporal beginning : *since* the creation of the world they are so perceived. — ἡ τε αἰδιος αὐτοῦ δύν. κ. θεϊότης] A more precise definition of the previous τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ. 'Αἰδιος, *everlasting*, belongs to both substantives ; but καὶ annexes the general term, the category, of which the δύναμις is a species. See Fritzsche *ad Matt.* p. 786. Its relation to the preceding τέ consists in its completing the climax and cumulation, for which τέ prepares the way. Hartung, Partikell. I. p. 98. Hofmann is unsupported by linguistic usage in inferring from the position of τέ, that αἰδιος is not meant to apply also to θεϊότης. It is just that position that makes αἰδιος the common property of both members (see especially Hartung, *l.c.* p. 116 f.), so that, in order to analyze the form of the conception, we may again supply ἡ αἰδιος αὐτοῦ after καὶ.³ The θεϊότης is the totality of that which

¹ Comp. Xen. Cyr. iii. 3, 31 : εἰ γὰρ . . . ἡμᾶς οἱ πολέμιοι θεάσονται . . . πάλιν καθορῶντες ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος. Pind. Pyth. ix. 45 : οἶσθα . . . εὖ καθορᾶς. On the oxymoron itself, comp. Aristotle, *de mundo*, 6, p. 399, 21. Bekk : ἀθεωρήτος ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται (ὁ Θεός).

² Not merely to νοούμενα (Hofmann), which is closely bound up with καθορᾶται as

showing the *manner* of it, so that both together are defined instrumentally by τοῖς ποιήμασι. On νοεῖν, as denoting the *intellectual animadvertere* in seeing (Hom. II. λ. 599, in the inverse position : τὸν δὲ ἰδὼν ἐνόησε), comp. Nägelsb. z. *Ilias*, p. 416, ed. 3 ; Duncan, ed. Rost, p. 787.

³ Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Crit.* p. 43 B. ; Schaefer, *Poet. gnom.* p. 73 ; Schoemann,

God is as a Being possessed of divine attributes, as *θεῖον*,—the collective sum of the divine realities.¹ This comprehensive sense must by no means be limited. The eternal *power*—this aspect of His *θεϊότης* which comes into prominence at first and before all others—and the *divinity* of God in its collective aspect, are rationally perceived and discerned by means of His works. Arbitrary is the view of Reiche, who holds that Paul means especially *wisdom and goodness*, which latter Schneckenburger conceives to be intended; and also that of Hofmann (comparing Acts xvii. 29; 2 Pet. i. 4), that the *spiritual nature* of the divine being is denoted. We may add that Rückert holds the strange view, that *θεϊότης*, which could not properly be predicated of God, is only used here by Paul for want of another expression. It might be and was necessarily said of God, as being the only adequate comprehensive expression for the conception that was to be denoted thereby. For analogous references to the physico-theological knowledge of God, see Wetstein, and Spiess, *Logos spermaticos*, 1871, p. 212. The suggestion of Philo as the Apostle's source (Schneckenburger) is out of the question. Observe further how completely, in our passage, the *transcendental* relation of God to the world—the negation of all identity of the two—lies at the foundation of the Apostle's view. It does not exclude the *immanence* of God in the world, but it excludes all *pantheism*. See the passages from the O. T. discussed in Umbreit. — *εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολ.*] has its logically correct reference to the immediately preceding *τὰ γὰρ ὁράτα . . . θεϊότης*, and therefore the *parenthesis*, in which Griesbach and others have placed *τὰ γὰρ ὁρ.* . . . *θεϊότης*, must be expunged. The *εἰς* cannot be said of the *result*, as Luther, and many others, including Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Rückert, Fritzsche, Reithmayr, Philippi, Ewald, following the Vulgate (*ita ut sint inexcusabiles*), have understood it; for the view, which takes it of the *purpose*, is not only required by the prevailing usage of *εἰς* with the infinitive² (see on 2 Cor. viii. 6), but is also more appropriate to the connection, because the *καθορᾶται* is conceived as a result effected through God's revelation of Himself (ver. 19), and consequently the idea of the divine purpose in *εἰς τὸ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* is not to be arbitrarily dismissed. Comp. Erasmus ("ne quid haberent," etc.), Melancthon ("propter quas causas Deus," etc.), Beza, Calvin ("in hoc ut"), Bengel, and others. But Chrysostom, even in his time, expressly opposes this view (comp. also Oecumenius), and at a later period it

ad Is. p. 325 f.; also Winer, p. 520 [E. T. 559].

¹ On the difference between this word and *θεότης* (Col. ii. 9), which denotes *Deitas*, *Godhead*, the *being God*, see Elsner, *Obs.* p. 6, and Fritzsche *in loc.* Van Hengel has erroneously called in question the distinction. In Wisd. xviii. 9, namely, *ὁ τῆς θεϊότητος νόμος* is not the law of the *Godhead*, but the law whose nature and character is *divinity*—of a divine kind; and in Lucian, *de Calumnia*. 17, ἡ Ἡφαίστιονος θεϊότης is the *divinity* of Hephaestion, his divine *quality*. In Plutarch *θεϊότης* very frequently occurs.

Appropriately rendered in Vulgate by *divinitas*.

² *Eis*, with an infinitive having the article, is not used in a single passage, of the Epistle to the Romans in particular, in any other than a *telic* sense. See i. 11, iii. 26, iv. 11, 16, 18, vi. 12, vii. 4, 5, viii. 29, xi. 11, xii. 2, 3, xv. 8, 13, 16. Far too hastily de Wette terms this interpretation in our passage *senseless*, and Baumgarten-Crusius agrees with him. Tholuck calls it grammatical terrorism. Hofmann recognizes the *telic* view as the true one in all cases where *εἰς* is used with the infinitive.

became a subject of contention between the *Lutherans* and the *Reformed*. See Calovius. The view, which interprets it of the *result*, hesitates to admit the conception of a divine *decree*, under which Paul places the inexcusableness of men ; and yet not only *may* this stand to the perception of God from His works which has existed since the beginning in the relation of *result*, but, in accordance with the thoroughly Scriptural idea of destiny (comp. e.g. v. 20), it *must* stand to it in the relation of that *decree*. In this connection, which inserts the results in the divine *counsel*, the inexcusableness of man appears as *telically given* with the self-manifestation of God. Ver. 21, as in general even ver. 18, contains the perverse conduct of men manifesting itself in the course of human history, *on account of which* God, who foresaw it, has in His natural self-manifestation made their inexcusableness His aim. *Inexcusable* they are intended to be ; and that indeed *on account of the fact, that, although they had known God* (namely from that natural revelation), *they have not glorified Him as God*. — *δοῦναι*] as in ver. 19, only to be separated by a comma from what precedes : *inexcusable on this account, because*. [See Note XII. p. 78.] — *γινώσκοντες*] not : cum agnoscere *potuissent* (Flatt, Nielsen ; also as early as Oecumenius) ; nor yet : although they *knew* God, so that it would be *contemporaneous* with *οὐχ . . . ἐδόξασαν*. So Philippi and van Hengel ; also Delitzsch, *bibl. Psychol.* p. 346. They had attained the knowledge from the revelation of nature (for to this, according to vv. 19, 20, we must refer it, and not, with Rückert, to the history in Genesis of the original revelation), but only *actu directo*, so far as that same self-manifestation of God had presented itself objectively to their cognition ; the *actus reflexus* remained absent (comp. Delitzsch, p. 347), and with them who keep down the truth *ἐν ἀδικίᾳ*, ver. 18, the issue was not to the praise of God, etc. ; so that *γινώσκοντες* is thus *previous* to the *οὐχ . . . ἐδόξασαν*. Paul sets forth the historical *emergence* of that for which they were inexcusable. They *had* known God, and yet it happened that they did not praise Him, etc. — *οὐχ ὥς Θεὸν ἐδόξασαν ἢ ἡνέχον*.] It would have been becoming for them to have rendered to God as such, agreeably to His known nature, praise and thanks ; but they did neither the one nor the other. Regarding *ὥς* in the sense : *according to the measure of His divine quality*, comp. on John i. 14. The *praising* and *thanksgiving* exhaust the notion of the *adoration*, which they should have offered to God. — *ἀλλ' ἐματ. ἐν τοῖς διαλ. αὐτῶν*] *but they were frustrated in their thoughts* (comp. 1 Cor. iii. 20), so that the conceptions, ideas, and reflections, which they formed for themselves regarding the Deity, were wholly devoid of any intrinsic value corresponding with the truth. Comp. Eph. iv. 17. The *ματαιότης* is a specific attribute of heathenism. Jer. ii. 5 ; 2 Kings xvii. 5 ; Ps. xciv. 11. Comp. also Acts xiv. 15 ; Judith vi. 4. — *καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη κ.τ.λ.*] forms a climax to the foregoing. Comp. Eph. iv. 18, i. 18. Their heart that had been rendered by the *εματαιώθησαν* unintelligent, incapable of discerning the true and right, became *dark*, completely deprived of the light of the divine *ἀλήθεια* that had come to them by the revelation of nature. *καρδία*, like *לֵב*, denotes the whole *internal seat of life*, the power which embraces all the activity of reason and will within the personal consciousness. Comp. on Eph. i. 18 ; Delitzsch, p. 250.

To take ἀσύνετος here in a *proleptic* sense (see on Matt. xii. 13) is quite inappropriate, because it destroys the climax. Comp. moreover on ἀσύνετος, Wisd. xi. 15 ; as also on the entire delineation of Gentile immorality, ver. 20 ff. ; Wisd. xiii.-xv. This passage as a whole, and in its details, presents unmistakable reminiscences of this section of the book of Wisdom.¹ Without reason Tholuck argues against this view.

Vv. 22, 23. In a *false conceit of wisdom* (comp. 1 Cor. i. 17 ff.) this took place (viz. what has just been announced in ἐμπαυίδθησαν . . . καρδία), and what a horrible *actual result* it had !—The construction is independent, no longer hanging on the δὲ in ver. 21 (Glöckler, Ewald) ; the *further* course of the matter is described. *While they said that they were wise* (comp. 1 Cor. iii. 21), *they became foolish*. Comp. Jer. x. 24 f. This becoming foolish must be understood as something *self-incurred*—produced through the conceit of independence—as is required by the description of God's *retribution* on them in ver. 24 ; therefore the “*dirigente Deo*,” which Grotius understands along with it in accordance with 1 Cor. i. 21, is here foreign to the connection. The explanation of Köllner, Baumgarten-Crusius, and others, including Usteri : “*they have shown themselves as fools*,” is erroneous, because the aorist passive in ver. 21 does not admit of a similar rendering.—For examples of φάσκειν, *dictitare*, in the sense of *unfounded* assertion (Acts xxiv. 9, xxv. 19 ; Rev. ii. 2), see Raphel, *Xenoph.* and Kypke. Comp. Dem. *Phil.* i. 46, iii. 9 ; Herodian, iii. 12, 9. Their pretended wisdom was a μάταιος δοξασοφία, Plat. *Soph.* p. 231 B. We may add that this definition is not aimed at the Gentile *philosophers*, who came much later, and in fact did not do what is declared in ver. 23 (comp. Calvin), but generally at the *conceit of wisdom* (1 Cor. i. 21), which is necessarily connected with an estrangement from divine truth, and from which therefore idolatry also, with its manifold self-invented shapes, must have proceeded. For heathenism is not the primeval religion, from which man might gradually have risen to the knowledge of the true God, but is, on the contrary, the result of a falling away from the known original revelation of the true God in His works. Instead of the practical recognition and preservation of the truth thus given comes the self-wisdom rendering them foolish, and idolatry in its train.—καὶ ἡλλάξ. κ.τ.λ.] *and they exchanged the majesty of the imperishable God for a likeness of an image of a perishable man*, etc., i.e. instead of making, as they ought to have done, the glory of the eternal God manifested to them in the revelation of nature—יְהוָה יְבִרֵי, i.e. His glorious perfection (ver. 20)—the object of their adoration, they chose for that purpose *what was shaped like an image of a perishable man*, etc. ; comp. Ps. cvi. 20 ; Jer. ii. 11. The ἐν (comp. Eccus. vii. 18) is *instrumental*, as is elsewhere the simple dative (Herod. vii. 152 ; Soph. *Niob.* fr. 400, Dind.) : thereby, that they made and adored such an ὁμοίωμα, and on the other hand rejected the glory of God, which they ought to have worshipped. Comp. LXX. Ps. l.c. ; ἡλλάξαντο τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν ἐν ὁμοιώματι μύσχων.² It is not mere *similarity*, but *conformity* with the object of compari-

¹ See Nitzsch in the *Deutsch. Zeitschr.* 1850, p. 287 ; Bleek in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1853, p. 340 f.

² On the *genitive* εἰκότος comp. also 1 Macc. iii. 48 ; Rev. ix. 7 ; and on ὁμοίωμα itself in

son concerned as agreeing therewith in appearance.¹ — καὶ πετεῖν. κ. τετραπ. κ. ἐρπ.] No doubt as Paul, in using ἀνθρώπου, thought of the forms of the Hellenic gods, so in πετεῖν. κ.τ.λ. he had in his mind the Egyptian worship of animals (Ibis, Apis, serpents).² We may add that, like the previous φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου, the genitives πετεινῶν κ.τ.λ. are dependent on εἰκόνας, not on ὁμοιώματι (van Hengel), which is less natural and not required by the singular εἰκόνας, that in fact refers to *each particular instance* in which a man, birds, etc. were copied for purposes of divine adoration by means of statues and other representations.

Ver. 24. *Wherefore* (as a penal retribution for their apostasy) *God also gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity.* [See Note XIII. p. 78.] καὶ, also, indicates the giving up as a thing *corresponding* to the guilt. Comp. on Phil. ii. 9. — ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθ. τ. κ. αὐτ.] contains that, *in which they were involved*, i.e. the moral condition in which they were found when they were given up by God to impurity. Comp. ver. 27; Eph. ii. 3; Bernhardt, p. 209. The *instrumental* rendering (Erasmus, Er. Schmid, Glöckler, and Krehl) is unnecessary, because the immediate literal sense of ἐν is quite sufficient, and the former is less suitable as to sense, since it conveys something which is obvious of itself. — παρέδωκεν] expresses the *real active giving up* on the part of God. The favourite explanation of it by εἶσε, so often resorted to since Origen and Chrysostom, is nothing but a rationalizing gloss at variance with the literal meaning. To the Apostle God is the *living* God, who does not passively *permit* the retributive consequences of fidelity or of apostasy—thus, as it were, letting *them run their course*, as an artificer does with his wheel work—but Himself, everywhere active, pervades and effectively develops the arrangements which He has made. If then God has so arranged that man by apostasy from Him should fall into moral impurity, and that thus sin shall be punished by sin (and this connection of sin with sin is in accordance both with experience and Scripture, Is. vi. 10; Job viii. 4; Ps. lxi. 28, lxxxi. 13; Mark iv. 12), this arrangement can only be carried out in reality through the effective action of its originator; and God Himself must give up the apostates unto impurity, inasmuch as it is by *His* doing that that moral connection is in point of fact accomplished.³ Consequently, if the understanding of παρέδωκεν in its strictly proper and positive meaning is quite in keeping with the universal agency of God, in His physical and moral government of the world, without, however, making God appear as the author of sin, which, on the contrary, has its root in the

the sense of likeness, v. 14, vi. 5, viii. 3; Phil. ii. 7; Eccles. xxxviii. 28; 2 Kings xvi. 10; Isa. xl. 18; 1 Sam. vi. 5; Plat. *Phaedr.* p. 250 A; *Parm.* p. 132 D.

¹ See also Holsten, *z. Ev. des Paul. u. Petr.* p. 440; Pfleiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* p. 523 f.

² Philo. *Leg. ad. Caj.* p. 566, 570. For passages from profane authors respecting the *folly* (at which the φθαρτοῦ here also points) of image-worship, see especially

Douttaeus, *Anal.* 69, p. 102, Grotius and Wetstein.

³ Comp. Acts vii. 42; Rom. ix. 19; also 2 Thess. ii. 11 f.; and the rabbinical passages quoted by Schoettgen, especially from *Pirke Aboth*, c. 4: "Festina ad praeceptum leve tanquam ad grave, et fuge transgressionem; praeceptum enim trahit praeceptum et transgressio transgressionem: quia merces praecepti praeceptum est, et transgressionis transgressio."

ἐπιθυμία τ. καρδ., we must reject as insufficient the *privative* interpretation¹ that became current after Augustine and Oecumenius, which Calovius has adopted in part, and Rückert entirely. Comp. Philippi, who thinks of the withdrawal of the Divine Spirit and its results, though in the sense of a positive divine infliction of punishment. This withdrawal, through which man is left in the lurch by God, is the immediate negative *precursor* of the παρέδωκεν (Ecclus. iv. 19). Reiche thinks that Paul here avails himself, with more or less consciousness of its being erroneous, of the general view of the Jews regarding the origin of the peculiar wickedness of the Gentiles (Ps. lxxxi. 13; Prov. xxi. 8; Ecclus. iv. 19; Wisd. x. 12, xiii. 1; Acts vii. 42); and that this representation of moral depravity as a divine punishment is to be distinguished from the Christian doctrinal system of the Apostle. But how very inconsistent it is with the character of Paul thus consciously to bring forward what is erroneous, and that too with so solemn a repetition (vv. 26, 28)! And is it not an arrangement accordant with experience, that apostasy from God is punished by an ever deeper fall into immorality? Can this arrangement, made as it is by God “justo judicio” (Calvin), be carried out otherwise than by God? Analogous are even heathen sayings, such as Aesch. *Agam.* 764 ff., and the heathen idea of the θεοβλάβεια.² But just as man, while his fidelity is rewarded by God through growth in virtue, remains withal free and does not become a virtuous machine; so also he retains his freedom, while God accomplishes the development of His arrangement, in accordance with which sin is born of sin. He *gives himself* up (Eph. iv. 19), while he is given up by God to that tragic *nexus* of moral destiny; and he becomes no machine of sin, but possesses at every moment the capacity of μετάνοια, which the very reaction resulting from the feeling of the most terrible misery of sin—punished through sin—is designed to produce. Therefore, on the one hand, man always remains responsible for his deterioration (ver. 32, ii. 6, iii. 5, vii. 14); and, on the other, that punishment of sin, in which the teleological law of the development of evil fulfils itself, includes no contradiction of the holiness of God. For this reason the view of Köllner—that the Apostle’s idea is to be separated from its Jewish and temporal form, and that we must assume as the Christian truth in it, that the apostasy of men from God has brought them into deepest misery, as certainly as the latter is self-inflicted—is a superfluous unexegetical evasion, to which Fritzsche also has recourse. — ἀκαθαρσίαν *spurcitia, impurity*, and that *lustful* (comp. Gal. v. 19; Eph. iv. 19; Col. iii. 5), as is plain from the following context; not generally: “all action and conduct dishonouring the creaturely glory of man” (Hofmann). The τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι may be taken either as the genitive of the purpose: *that they might be dishonoured* (Rückert, Philippi, van Hengel),

¹ It is at bottom identical with the *permissive* rendering. Therefore Chrysostom not only explains it by εἶσεν, but illustrates the matter by the instance of a general who leaves his soldiers in the battle, and thus deprives them of his aid, and abandons them to the enemy. Theodoret explains

it: τῆς οἰκίας προμηθείας ἐγύμνωσε, and employs the comparison of an abandoned vessel. Theophylact illustrates the παρέδωκεν by the example of a physician who gives up a refractory patient (παραδίδωσιν αὐτὸν τῷ ἐπὶ πλείον νοσέειν).

² Comp. also Ruhnken, *ad Vellej.* li. 57, 3.

or as the genitive of more precise definition depending on ἀκαθαρσ. (impurity of the becoming dishonoured, i.e. which consisted therein; so Fritzsche, Winer, Tholuck, and de Wette). The latter¹ is the more probable, partly because the ἀτιμάζεσθαι κ.τ.λ. already constitutes the impurity itself, and does not merely attend it as a result; and partly on account of the parallel in ver. 28, where ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. is likewise *exegetical*. ἀτιμάζεσθαι is not however the *middle*, whereby the αὐτοπαθές would be expressed, for which there is no empirical usage, but the *passive*: that their bodies were dishonoured among themselves, mutually. This ἐν ἑαυτοῖς refers to the persons (αὐτῶν, not to be written αὐτῶν), not asserting that the ἀτιμάζεσθαι takes place on themselves, which is in fact already conveyed by τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν,² but rather based on the nature of participation in unchastity, according to which they bring *one on the other reciprocally* the dishonouring of the body. In this personal reciprocity of those who practise unchastity with each other lies the characteristic abominableness of the dishonouring of the body; and this point is designated by ἐν ἑαυτοῖς more expressly, because in contrast to non-participating third persons, than it would have been by ἐν ἀλλήλοις.³ — The vices of unchastity, which moreover are still here referred to quite generally (it is otherwise in ver. 26 f.), and not specially as unnatural, according to their disgraceful nature, in whatever forms they may have been practised, are specifically *heathen* (in fact, even partially belonging to the heathen *cultus*), as a consequence of apostasy from the true God (comp. 1 Thess. iv. 5). As they again prevail even among Christians, wherever this apostasy spreads through unbelief, they must verify even in Christendom their *heathen* nature, and, along with the likewise essentially heathen πλεονεξία, pre-eminently exclude from the salvation of the Messiah (Eph. v. 5 f.; Col. iii. 5; 1 Cor. vi. 9 f.). — With ἀτιμάζ. τ. σώμ. compare the opposite, 1 Thess. iv. 4, where τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος must be explained of the body as the vessel of the Ego proper.

Ver. 25. Οἵτινες μετήλλαξαν κ.τ.λ.] as those who exchanged, etc. In this description of the character of those who are given up, attached to ver. 24, Paul makes once more apparent the motive which determined God to give them up. The words are a renewed tragic commentary (comp. vv. 22, 23) on the δῶ, ver. 24. On ὅστις, *qui prope qui*, which brings up the class to which one belongs, and thereby includes the specification of the reason, see Hermann, *ad Soph. Oed. R.* 688; Matthiae, p. 1073. Hofmann erroneously makes a relative protasis begin with οἵτινες, with which then διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., ver. 26, would be connected by way of apodosis: *them, who exchanged, etc., God has therefore given up*. This would not be inconsistent with αὐτοῖς in ver. 26, which would then be resumptive; but the very praise of God, in which ver. 25 terminates, and still more the concluding ἀμήν, which can only indicate the end of the sentence (comp. ix. 5, xi. 36; Gal. i. 5; Eph. iii.

¹ See Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 280 f. [E. T. 268].

² Hofmann refers the reading which he follows, ἐν αὐτοῖς, to the σώματα, but explains this: the body of each person *in himself*; consequently, as if the expression were ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, and that in the sense in

semet ipsis. With the reading ἐν αὐτοῖς we should rather render *At simply*: in order that among them (i.e. in their common intercourse) their bodies should be dishonoured. Such was to be the course of things among them.

³ Kühner *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 6, 20.

21), ought to have decidedly precluded such a forced intermixture of sentences, which is not to be justified by subtleties. — The compound *μετήλλ.* (*exchanged*) is more significant than *ἠλλαξαν* (*changed*) in ver. 23. — *τὴν ἀλήθ. τοῦ Θεοῦ*] to be taken entirely in harmony with the expression *τὴν δόξαν τοῦ Θεοῦ* in ver. 23 ; therefore *τοῦ Θεοῦ* is to be taken as genitive of the *subject* : *the truth of God*, the true divine reality,¹ so as to make it in point of actual meaning, though not in the abstract form of the conception, identical with : “*true God*” (Luther, and most expositors, including Rückert, de Wette, Tholuck, Fritzsche, Philippi, van Hengel). It is differently rendered by Wolf, whom Köllner follows : *the truth revealed to the Gentiles by God*. Reiche and Mehring (following Pareus, Camerarius, Estius, Seb. Schmid, and Cramer) take it as *the true knowledge of God*, so that *Θεοῦ* would be genitive of the *object*. Compare Piscator, Usteri, and Glöckler, who understand by it the original consciousness of God. Opposed to these views is the exact parallel in which ver. 25 stands to ver. 23, so that *τοῦ Θεοῦ* ought not to be taken without necessity as having a different reference in the two verses. *τὴν ἀλήθ. τ. Θεοῦ* is explained concretely by *τὸν κτίσαντα* in the second half of the verse. — *ἐν τῷ ψεύδει* *with the lie* ; *ἐν* as in ver. 23. By this Paul means, in contrast to *τὴν ἀλήθ. τ. Θεοῦ* (but otherwise than in iii. 7), *the false gods*, which are *κατ’ ἐξοχὴν* the *ψεύδος* *in concreto*, the negation of the truth of God. Comp. on 1 Cor. viii. 4 f., x. 20. Grotius has aptly said : “*pro Deo vero sumserunt imaginarios.*”² — *καὶ ἐσεβάσθησαν. . . κτίσαντα*] more precise explanation of the first clause of the verse. — *ἐσεβ. κ. ἐλάτρ.*] The former is *general* (*coluerunt*), the latter took place through *sacrifices*, and other definite *rites* and *services* ; hence Paul designates his own specific service of God in ver. 8 by *λατρεύω. σεβάζομαι*, in Homer : *to be afraid of* (*Il. vi. 167, 417*), is employed in the later Greek like *σέβομαι* in the sense *to revere*, Orph. *Arg.* 550, Aq. *Hos.* x. 5. In the N. T. it only occurs here. — *τῇ κτίσει*] Corresponding with the verb standing next to it, so that the accusative is to be supplied with *ἐσεβ.* See Matthiae, § 428, 2. — *παρὰ τ. κτίσαντα*] in the sense of *comparison* : *prae creatore*, in which case the context alone decides whether the preference of the one before the other is only *relative*, or whether it *excludes* the latter altogether (see on Luke xviii. 14 ; and van Hengel on our passage). The second case is that which occurs here, in accordance both with the nature of the case, seeing that the Gentiles did not worship the Creator at all, and with the immediate connection (*μετήλλαξαν. . . ἐν τῷ ψεύδει*). The sense therefore substantially amounts to *praeterito creatore* (Hilary), or *relicto creatore* (Cyprian), *i.e.* they honoured the creature and *not* the Creator, whom they ought to have honoured. Theophylact says aptly, with reference to the *comparative* *παρὰ* : *ἐκ τῆς συγκρίσεως τὸ ἐγκλημα ἐπαίρων*. So in substance also Beza, Estius, and others, including Reiche, Tholuck, Olshausen, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Krehl, Reithmayr, Maier, Philippi, van Hengel. The *relative* interpretation :

¹ Not “the truth, which God Himself is” (Hofmann) ; but that, *which God is in true reality*. That is just the adequate substance

of His *δόξα*.

² Comp. Is. xlv. 20 ; Jer. iii. 10, xiii. 25, xvi. 19, *al.* ; Philo, *vit. Mos.* p. 678 C, 679 A.

more than the Creator (Vulgate, Erasmus, Luther, Castalio, Grotius, Ammon, Rückert, and others), is therefore in point of fact erroneous. The *contra creatorem*, which Hammond, Koppe, Platt, Fritzsche, and Mehring find here, may likewise be traced to the sense of comparison,¹ but has against it the fact, that in the whole context Paul presents the matter in the light of a *μετάλλαξις*, of an *exchanging* the true for the false, not of *hostility* to the true. From that point of view the Gentiles have worshipped the creature, and not the Creator. Quite parallel is *παρ' ἐκεῖνον* in Luke, xviii. 14, Lachm. — The doxology : *who is praised*, *הַלְלוּ*, not : *celebrandus* (comp. on Eph. i. 3 ; 2 Cor. xi. 31 ; Mark xiv. 61), *for ever ! Amen*, — is a natural effusion of deeply-moved piety, called forth by the detestable contrast of the Gentile abominations just described, without any further special design (Koppe : “ne ipse in maiestatem divinam injurius videri possit ;” comp. Tholuck).

Vv. 26. 27. *Διὰ τοῦτο*] Beginning an independent sentence (against Hofmann, see on ver. 25), refers to the description *οἱτινες . . . κρίσαντα* contained in ver. 25. The giving up is set forth *once more* (comp. ver. 24, *διό*) as the punishment of apostasy, and now indeed with such increasing force of delineation, that out of the category which is kept quite general in ver. 24 *unnatural sensual abominations* are specially adduced. — *εἰς πᾶθ' ἀτιμίας*] Genitive of quality.² Parallel to the *passions of a disgraceful character* is *εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν* in ver. 24 ; comp. Col. iii. 5 ; but the stronger expression here selected prepares the way for the following description of a peculiarly abominable form of vice. Still the *unnatural* element is not implied in *πᾶθ' ἀτιμίας* itself (Hofmann : they are a dishonouring, not merely of the *body*, but of “*humanity*”), since morally dishonouring passions are the agents, not only in the case of unnatural, but also in that of natural unchastity.³ — The expressions *θήλειαι* and *ἀρσενες*, their *females* and their *males*, not *γυναῖκες* and *ἄνδρες*, are chosen *because* the predominant *point of view* is simply that of *sex* ; Reiche thinks : out of contempt, because the words would also be used of beasts ; but in fact, such unnatural things are foreign to the very beasts. Besides, the words are used even of the gods (Homer, *Il.* viii. 7, and frequently). — *τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν*] of *their sex*, not : of the *male*, which is unsuitable to the vice indicated. Regarding *χρῆσις* in the sense of sexual use, see Wetstein and Kypke, also Coray, *ad Heliodor. Aeg.*, p. 31.⁴ — That *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ* after the preceding *τέ* makes the latter an *anakoluthon*, is commonly assumed, but altogether without foundation, because in *τὸ γάρ* the *τέ* does not necessarily require any

¹ See Bernhardt, p. 259 ; Winer, p. 377 [E. T. 404] ; and the passages from Plato in *Ast. Lex.* III. p. 28.

² Comp. on *πνεῦμα ἀγαπώνης* in ver. 4, and Bornemann, *Schol. in Luc.* p. 21.

³ Respecting *τὸ γάρ*, *namque*, for . . . indeed (vii. 7 ; 2 Cor. x. 8), see Hermann, *ad Soph. Trach.* 1015 ; Hartung, I. p. 115 ; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 749 ff.

⁴ How very prevalent among the Gentiles (it was found also among the Jews, see

Schoettgen, *Hor. in loc.*) was the so-called *Lesbian vice*, *λεσβιάζειν* (Lucian, *D. Mer.* 5. 1), women with women abusing their sex (*tribades*, in Tertullian *frictrices*), see Salmastius, *foen. Trapez.* p. 143 f., 152 f. ; and the commentators on Ael. *V. H.* iii. 12. Comp. the *ἐρασπιστρῖαι* in Plat. *Symp.* p. 191 E, and the *ἀσέλγεια τριβακή* in Luc. *Amor.* 28 ; and see Ruhnken. *ad Tim.* p. 124, and generally Rosenbaum, *Gesch. d. Lustsueche im Alterth.* ed. 2, 1845.

correlative. See Klotz *l.c.* If it were put correlatively, we should have in *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ* the other corresponding member really present (as is actually the case, *e.g.* in Plat. *Symp.* p. 186 E), which however would in that case inappropriately stand out with *greater emphasis* and *weight* than the former.¹ The reading *τέ* (instead of *δέ*) in Elz., as well as the entire omission of the particle (C, min., Origen, Jerome), is a too hasty emendation. — *ἐξεκαύθησαν*] Stronger than the simple form.² Such a *state* is the *προϋσθαι* in 1 Cor. vii. 9. Moreover, Paul represents here not the heat that *precedes* the act of unchastity, but that which is kindled *in the act itself* (*κατεργαζόμενοι . . . ἀπολαμβάνοντες*). — *ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσι*] *whilst they, males on males, performed the* (known, from ver. 26) *unseemliness*. On the emphatic juxtaposition of *ἄρσ.* *ἐν ἄρσ.* comp. generally Lobeck, *ad Aj.* 522, and in particular Porphyr. *de abstin.* iv. 20; and Wetstein *in loc.* On *κατεργάζεσθαι*, which is used both of evil (ii. 9, vii. 9, xv. 17 f.) and good (v. 3, xv. 18; Phil. ii. 12), but which, as distinguished from *ἐργάζεσθαι*, always expresses the *bringing to pass*, the *accomplishment*, comp. especially ii. 9, and van Hengel thereon; 1 Cor. v. 3; 2 Cor. vii. 10, and the critical remarks thereon. On *ἀσχημ.* see Gen. xxxiv. 7. — *τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν κ.τ.λ.*] The *aberration*, which Paul means, see in vv. 21–23, 28; it is the aberration *from God to idols*, not that implied in the *sexual perversion of the divine order* (Hofmann), which perversion, on the contrary, is brought by *δύο* in ver. 24, and by *διὰ τοῦτο* in ver. 26, under the point of view of penal *retribution* for the *πλάνη*. By the *recompense* for the *πλάνη* Paul does not at all mean that the men “*have that done to them by their fellows, which they themselves do to theirs*” (Hofmann), but rather, in harmony with the connection of cause and effect, the abominable *unnatural lusts* just described, to which God has given up the Gentiles, and thereby, in recompensing godlessness through such wicked excesses (ver. 18), revealed His *ὀργή*. Therefore also *ἦν ἔδει* is added, namely, in accordance with the necessity of the holy divine order. See vv. 24, 26, 28. On *ἀντιμισθία* comp. 2 Cor. vi. 13; Clem. Cor. II. 1. It occurs neither in Greek authors, who have the adjective *ἀντιμισθος* (Aesch. *Suppl.* 273), nor in the LXX. or Apocrypha. — *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς*] *on themselves mutually* (*ἐν ἀλλήλοις*), as in ver. 24. It enhances the *sadness* of the description. For a number of passages attesting the prevalence of unchastity between man and man, especially of paederastia among the Gentiles, particularly the Greeks (it was forbidden to the Jews in Lev. xviii. 22), see Becker, *Charikl.* I. p. 346 ff.; Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § 29; Bernhardt, *Griech. Lit.* ed. 2, p. 50 ff. Moreover, Bengel aptly observes regarding the whole of this unreserved exposure of Gentile unchastity: “*In peccatis arguendis saepe scapha debet*

¹ Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Polit.* p. 270 D, *Rep.* p. 367 C; Dissen. *ad Pind. Ol.* vii. 56; Klausen, *ad Aesch. Choeph.* p. 199. Hofmann thinks that with *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.* the argument ascends to the *greater danger for the continuance of the human race*. But that is a purely imported thought. The Apostle's point of view is the moral *ἀρμία*, which, in the case of female depravity,

comes out *most glaringly*. And therefore Paul, in order to cast the most tragic light possible on these conditions, puts the brief delineation of female conduct in the foreground, in order then symmetrically to subjoin, with *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ*, the *male vice* as the second part of the filthy category.

² Comp. Alciph. iii. 67; *ἐξεκαύθησαν εἰς ἔσθρα*.

scapha dici. Pudorem praeposterum ii fere postulant, qui pudicitia carent. . . . Gravitas et ardor stili judicialis proprietate verborum non violat verecundiam." Observe, nevertheless, how the Apostle delineates the *female* dishonour in less concrete traits than the male. He touches the matter in ver. 26 briefly and clearly enough, but with delicate avoidance of detailed description.

Ver. 28. From the previous exclusive description of the sensual vice of the Gentiles, Paul now proceeds to a summary enumeration of yet other vices to which they had been given up by God in punishment of their apostasy. — καθώς] is not causal, but *quemadmodum*. The giving them up was something *corresponding* to their disdainful rejection of the knowledge of God, *proportionate* as punishment. — οὐκ ἔδοκίμασαν] *they deem God not worth* (1 Thess. ii. 4) ; οὐ γὰρ ἀγνοίας, ἀλλὰ μελέτης εἶναι φησὶ τὰ τολμήματα, Chrysostom. — ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει] Their γνῶναι τὸν Θεόν, derived from the revelation of nature (ver. 21), ought to have been brought by cultivation to an ἐπιγνώ- ναι, that is, to a penetrating and living knowledge of God (see on Eph. i. 17 ; 1 Cor. xiii. 12) ; thus they would have attained to the having God ἐν ἐπιγνώσει ; but they would not, and so became τὰ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ εἰδότα τὸν Θεόν, 1 Thess. iv. 5 ; Gal. iv. 8 ; Eph. ii. 12 ; Acts xvii. 30. On ἔχειν ἐν with an abstract noun, which represents the object as appropriated in the action, so that it is *possessed* in the latter (here in ἐπιγνώναι), comp. Locella, *ad Xen. Eph.* p. 255. Similar is ἐν ὁργῇ ἔχειν, and the like, Krüger on *Thucyd.* ii. 8, 3. — εἰς ἁδόκ. νοῦν] An ingenious paronomasia with οὐκ ἔδοκίμ., to set forth the more prominently the *recompense*, to which the emphatically repeated ὁ Θεός also contributes : as they did not esteem God worthy, etc., God gave them up *to an unworthy*, reprobate νοῦς (the collective power of the mind's action in theoretic and moral cognition.)¹ The rendering *judicii experts* (Beza, Glöckler and others) is opposed to the genius of the language, even as Bengel turns it, and Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 280, defines it. The ἁδόκιμος of the νοῦς is its blameworthiness according to an *objective* moral standard, but does not express the mode of thinking which they themselves must condemn *among one another* (Th. Schott ; comp. Hofmann), which is neither to be taken by anticipation from ver. 32, nor extracted from μὴ. — ποιεῖν τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα] *to do what is not becoming*, what is not moral. Comp. 3 Macc. iv. 16. The Stoical distinction between καθήκον and κατόρθωμα Paul has not thought of (as Vitranga conceives). The infinitive is exegetical : *so that they do*. The participle with μὴ indicates *the genus of that which is not seemly* (Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 296) ; τὰ οὐ καθήκοντα (comp. Eph. v. 4), would be the *un-seemly*. The *negative* expression is correlate to the ἁδόκιμος νοῦς.

Vv. 29–31. Πεπληρωμένους πάσῃ ἀδικίᾳ] a more precise definition of ποιεῖν τὰ μὴ καθήκ. : *as those who are full of every unrighteousness* (ver. 18). This is the *general* statement, and all the points subsequently introduced are its *several species*, so that μεστοὺς φθόνου and then ψιθυριστὰς κ.τ.λ. are *appositions*

¹ Comp. on vii. 23, and Kluge in the *Jahrb. f. D. Th.* 1871, p. 329. The νοῦς is ἁδόκιμος when, not receptive for divine truth, it does

not determine the ethical conduct in accordance with it.

to πεπληρ. π. ἀδικ. Similar catalogues of sins are 2 Cor. xii. 30 ; Gal. v. 19 ff. ; Eph. v. 3 f. ; 1 Tim. i. 9 f. ; 2 Tim. iii. 2 ff. — πονηρία . . . κακία] *maliginity* (malice), comp. Eph. iv. 31 ; Col. iii. 8 ; Tit. iii. 8 . . . *vileness* (meanness), the latter, in Aristotle and other writers, opposed to ἀρετή, and translated in Cicero, *Tusc.* iv. 15, 34, by *vitiositas*. Comp. 1 Cor. v. 8. — φόνον] Conceived here as the *thought* which has filled the man, the μεμριρίζειν φόνον, Homer, *Od.* xix. 2, comp. Acts ix. 1. On the paronomasia with φόνον comp. Gal. v. 21. The latter is just the σημείον φύσεως παντάπασιν πονηρᾶς, Dem. 499, 21. — κακοηθείας] *malicious disposition*, whose peculiarity it is ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ πάντα (Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 13). As the context requires a special vice, we may not adopt, with Erasmus, Calvin, and Homberg, the general signification *perversitas, corruptio morum* (Xen. *Cyn.* xiii. 16 ; Dem. 542, 11 ; Plat. *Rep.* p. 348 D).¹ — ψιθυρ.] *whisperers, tale-bearers*, consequently secret slanderers (Dem. 1358, 6) ; but κατάλαλοι, calumniators, detractors *generally*, not precisely *open ones* (Theophylact, Köllner, de Wette, and others). Comp. ψιθυρισμούς τε καὶ καταλαλιάς, Clem. *Cor.* i. 35. The construction of καταλάλους as an adjective with ψιθυρ (Hofmann), must be rejected, because none of the other elements has an adjectival definition annexed to it, and because καταλάλ. would not add to the notion of ψιθυρ. anything characteristic in the way of more precise definition. ψιθυρ would be better fitted to form a limiting definition of καταλ. But in 2 Cor. xii. 20 also, both ideas stand independently side by side. — θεοστυγεῖς] *hated by God, Deo odibiles* (Vulgate). This *passive* rendering of the word which belongs especially to the tragedians (Pollux, i. 21), so that it is equivalent to Θεῷ ἐχθαιρόμενος (comp. Soph. *Aj.* 458), is clearly attested by the *usus loquendi* as the only correct one.² Since no passage whatever supports the *active* signification, and since even Suidas and Oecumenius clearly betray that they knew the active meaning adopted by them to be a deviation from the usage of the ancient writers,³ we must reject, with Koppe, Rückert, Fritzsche, de Wette, Philippi, Baumgarten-Crusius, and Hofmann, the interpretation, *Dei osores*, that has been preferred by the majority since the time of Theodoret.⁴ Even the analogous forms that have been appealed to, θεομίσῃς, βροτοστυγῃς (Aesch. *Choeph.* 51, *Prom.* 799), to be taken as

¹ See regarding the word generally Homberg, *Parerg.* p. 196 ; Kypke, II. p. 155 f.

² See Eurip. *Troad.* 1213, *Cycl.* 395, 598, Neophr. *ap. Stob. serm.* 20, p. 172. Comp. θεοστυγῆτος in Aesch. *Choeph.* 635, Fritzsche *in loc.*, and Wetstein.

³ Suidas says : Θεοστυγεῖς θεομίσῃται, οἱ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ μισοῦμενοι καὶ οἱ Θεὸν μισοῦντες· παρὰ δὲ τῷ ἀποστόλῳ θεοστυγεῖς οὐκ οἱ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ μισοῦμενοι, ἀλλ' οἱ μισοῦντες τὸν Θεόν. Oecumenius : Θεοστυγεῖς δὲ οὐ τοὺς ὑπὸ Θεοῦ μισουμένους, οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο δεῖξαι πρόκειται νῦν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μισοῦντας Θεόν. These *negative* definitions, which both give, manifestly point to the use of the word in other authors, from which Paul here departs. It is doubtful whether Clement, *Cor.* I. 35,

where there is an echo of our passage, had in view the active or the passive sense of θεοστυγεῖς. He uses indeed the evidently active θεοστυγία, but adds at the close of the list of sins : ταῦτα οἱ πράσσοντες στυγητοὶ τῷ Θεῷ ὑπάρχουσιν. Chrysostom does not express his opinion regarding the word.

⁴ The *Dei osores* was taken to refer to the heathen vice of wrath against the gods conceived as possessing human passions. See Grotius and Reiche. Others have understood it variously. Tholuck thinks of accusers of providence, *Promethean characters*; Ewald, of blasphemers of God; Calvin, of those who have a horror of God on account of His righteousness. Thus there is introduced into the general expression what the

passives, and therefore testify against the active interpretation.¹ Comp. *θεοβλαβής*, stricken of God, Herod. viii. 137, *al.* In particular, *θεομισῆς* is quite the same as *θεοστυγής* the opposite of *θεοφιλής*, beloved of God.² The accentuation *θεοστύγης*, approved of even by Grotius and Beza, to distinguish it from the passive *θεοστυγής*, is nothing but an ancient (*Suidas*) unsupported fiction.³ *God-hating* is expressed by *μισόθεος*, Lucian, *Tim.* 35, Aesch. *Ag.* 1090; comp. *φιλόθεος*, *God-loving*. The adoption, nevertheless, of the active sense was occasioned by the consideration: "ut in passivo positum dicatur, nulla est ratio, quum P. hic homines ex vitiis evidentibus reos faciat," Calvin; but even granting a certain unsuitableness in the passive sense, still we should not be justified in giving an explanation contrary to the *usus loquendi*; we should be obliged to abide by the view that Paul had mixed up a less suitable term among the others. But this objection is diminished, if we take *θεοστ.*, in accordance with the idea of divine holiness, as a characteristic designation of *infamous evil-doers* in general. So Fritzsche, and also Philippi.⁴ And it vanishes altogether, if, leaving the word in its strict signification, *hated of God*, we recognize in it a *summary judgment of moral indignation respecting all the preceding particulars*; so that, looking back on these, it forms a resting point in the disgraceful catalogue, the continuation of which is then carried on by *ὑβριστάς κ.τ.λ.* According to Hofmann, *θεοστυγ.* is an *adjective* qualifying *ὑβριστάς*. But we do not see why precisely this single point⁵ in the entire catalogue, *insolence* (the notion of which is not to be arbitrarily heightened, so as to make it denote "the *man-despiser who treads upon his fellows*"), among so many particulars, some of them even worse, should be accompanied by an epithet, and one, too, of so extreme severity. — The continuation begins with a threefold description of *self-exaltation*, and that in a descending climax. Regarding the distinction between *ὑβρισταί*, the *insolent* (qui prae superbia non solum contemnunt alios, sed etiam contumeliose tractant, comp. 1 Tim. i. 13), *ὑπερήφανοι*, the *proud* (who, proud of real or imaginary advantages, despise others), and *ἀλαζόνες* (*boasters, swaggerers*, without exactly intending to despise or insult others with their vainglory), see Tittmann, *Synon. N. T.* p. 73 f.⁶ If *ὑπερηφ.* be taken as *adjective* with the latter (Hofmann), then the vice, which is invariably and intrinsically immoral,⁷ would be limited merely to a particular *mode* of it.

context gives no hint of. This applies also to Luther's gloss: "the real *Epicureans*, who live as if there were no God."

¹ Even in Clem. *Hom.* i. 12, there is nothing whatever in the connection opposed to the passive rendering of *θεοστυγείς*.

² See Plat. *Rep.* p. 612 E, *Euth.* p. 8 A; Dem. 1436, ult.; Arist. *Ran.* 443. Comp. *θεῶ μισητοί*, *Wisd.* xiv. 9; and, as regards the idea, the Homeric *ὅς κε θεοῖσιν ἀπέχθεται μακάρεσσιν*, *Od.* κ. 74.

³ See Buttman, II. p. 371, Winer, p. 53 [E. T. 53].

⁴ Comp. Plat. *Legg.* viii. p. 838 B: *θεομισῆ . . . καὶ αἰσχρῶν αἰσχίστα*,

⁵ For neither *καταλάλ.* nor *ὑπερηφ.* are to be taken as adjectives. See on those words. Hofmann seems to have adopted such a view, merely in order to gain analogies in the text for his inappropriate treatment of the objectionable *θεοστυγείς* as an adjective.

⁶ Comp. Grotius and Wetstein; on *ἀλαζ.* especially Ruhnke. *ad. Tim.* p. 28, Ast, *ad. Theophr.* *Char.* 23.

⁷ See Xen. *Mem.* i. 7, 1 ff., where *ἀλαζονεία* is the antithesis of *ἀρετή*. It belongs to the category of the *ψεύδεσθαι*, Aesch. *adv. Cleistph.* 99; Plat. *Lys.* p. 218 D. Compare also 2 Tim. iii. 2; Clem. *Cor.* I. 35.

—ἐφευρ. κακῶν] *devisers* (Anacr. xli. 3) *of evil things*, quite general; not to be limited to things of *luxury*, with Grotius; nor, with Hofmann, to *evils* which they desire to *do to others*.¹ —ἀσυνέτους] *irrational, unreflecting*, who, in what they do and leave undone, are not determined by the *σύνεσις*, by morally intelligent insight. Luther rightly says: “Mr. Unreason going rashly to work [Hans Unvernunft, mit dem Kopfe hindurch].” So also Eccles. xv. 7. The rendering *devoid of conscience* (according to Suidas) deviates from the proper signification of the word. —ἀσυνθέτους] makes a paronomasia with the foregoing, and means, not *unsociable* (Castalio, Tittmann, Ewald, comp. Hofmann), for which there is no warrant of usage, but *covenant-breakers*.² On ἀστόργ. (without the natural affection of love) and ἀνελεῖν (unmerciful), see Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 69. —The *succession* of the accumulated particulars is not arranged according to a *systematic* scheme, and the construction of such a scheme leads to arbitrary definition of the import of individual points; but still their distribution is so far in accordance with approximate categories, that there are presented:—1st, The *general* heathen vices, πεπληρωμένους κακία; 2nd, *dispositions inimical to others*, μεστοὺς κακοηθείας, and calumnious *speeches*, ψευδ., καταλάλ.; both series concluding with the general θεοστρυγεῖς; then, 3rd, The *arrogant* character, ἰβριστὰς ἀλαζόνας; and finally, 4th, A series of negative particulars (all with α privative), but headed by the positive, general ἐφευρ. κακῶν. This negative series portrays the want of dutiful affection in family life (γον. ἀπειθ.), of intelligence (ἀσυνέτ.), fidelity (ἀσυνθ.), and love, (ἀστόργ. ἀνελ.),—consequently the want of every principle on which moral action is based. [See Note XIV. p. 78.]

Ver. 32. Οἷτινες] *quippe qui*, of such a character, that they, cannot be the specification of a reason, as in ver. 25, and cannot consequently be intended to repeat once more the laying of the blame on themselves, since ver. 32 merely continues the description of the wickedness. It rather serves to introduce the *awful completion of this description of vice*; and that in such a way, that the Gentile immorality is brought clearly to light as *an opposition to knowledge and conscience*, and is thereby at the last very evidently shown to be wholly inexcusable (comp. ii. 1). —τὸ δικάσιμα τ. Θεοῦ] *i.e. that which God as Lawgiver and Judge has ordained; what He has determined, and demands, as right*.³ Paul means the natural law of the moral consciousness (ii. 15), which determines: ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες κ.τ.λ. This ὅτι κ.τ.λ. therefore is not to be treated as a parenthesis. —ἐπιγινόντες] *although they have discerned* (comp. on ver. 28), not merely γινόντες; but so much the greater is the guilt. —θανάτου] What in the view of the heathen was conceived of as *the state of punishment in Hades* (comp. Philippi and Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 277), which was incurred through vice and crime, Paul designates, in accordance with the truth involved in it (comp. Plat. *Rep.* p. 330 D), from *his* standpoint as θάνατος, and by this he means *eternal death*

¹ Comp. 2 Macc. vii. 21, and the passages from Philo in Loesner; also Tacit. *Ann.* iv. 11, and Virg. *Aen.* ii. 161.

² Jer. iii. 8, 10 f.; Suidas, Hesychius; see

also Dem. 383, 6.

³ Comp. Krüger on *Thuc.* i. 41, 1; and see on v. 16.

(comp. 2 Thess. i. 8) ; not *temporal* (Bengel, van Hengel, Mehring) ; or *execution* (Grotius, Hofmann) ; also not indefinitely *severe punishments*,¹ *the misery of sin*, and so forth (so even Fritzsche and de Wette). — *συνευδοκ. τοῖς πρᾶσσ.*] *they are consenting with them that do them* (comp. Luke xi. 48 ; Acts viii. 1 ; 1 Cor. vii. 12 ; 1 Macc. i. 60 ; 2 Macc. xi. 24. They not only *do* those things, but are also in their moral judgment (so wholly antagonistic to conscience has the latter become in the abandonment unto which God has decreed them, ver. 28) *in agreement* with *others* who so act. Bengel well remarks : “ *pejus est συνευδοκεῖν ; nam qui malum patrat, sua sibi cupiditate abducitur,*” etc., and how sharply are we otherwise ourselves accustomed to see and judge the mote in the eye of another ! (Matt. vii. 3). This climax² to the description of immorality, moreover, is neither to be referred with Grotius and Baumgarten-Crusius to the philosophers, who approved of several vices (paederastia, revenge, etc.) or regarded them as *adiaphora* ; nor with Heumann and Ewald to the magistrates, who left many crimes unpunished and even furthered them by their own example ; but, in harmony with the quite general delineation of Gentile depravity, to be taken as a general feature marking the latter, which is thus laid bare in the deepest slough of moral perversity. — The *πράσσοντες* and *πράσσουσι* are more *comprehensive* than the simple *ποιῶσιν* (do), designating the *pursuit* of these immoralities as the aim of their activity.³

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

I. Ver. 1. Παῦλος.

The view of the origin of the name *Paul* advocated by Meyer in his Introduction to the Epistle, § 1, and in his notes on Acts xiii. 9—that it was received on occasion of the conversion of Sergius Paulus—is also given by Olshausen, Ewald, and some others, but it is rejected by most writers of recent times, and by Weiss in his edition of Meyer's work. Weiss holds that it is rendered improbable by the fact that the name is mentioned in the Acts three verses earlier than the statement of the conversion of the proconsul. It may be questioned whether this argument can be regarded as having, in itself, special or decisive force. But, when the manner of introducing the new name into the narrative is considered, as related both to the preceding and following context, it will be observed that there is nothing, except what may easily be a mere accidental juxtaposition of words to favor the derivation suggested ; while, on the other hand, there is, in addition to the improbability that the Apostle would have adopted a name from one of his converts, a noticeable absence of any such indication that he did thus adopt it, as might naturally be expected if the historian had intended to convey this idea. It seems better, therefore, to hold that the Apostle had two names : one connected with his Hebrew origin, and the other with his Roman citizenship.

¹ Melancthon says well against this view : “ *P. non loquitur de politica gubernatione, quae tantum externa facta punit : verum de judicio proprio in cujusque conscientia intuente Deum.*”

² The *climax* lies necessarily in ἀλλὰ καὶ (in opposition to Reiche, *Comm. crit.* p. 6).

³ See on John iii. 20. Comp. Rom. ii. 3, vii. 15, xiii. 4 ; Dem. *de cor.* 62 : τί προσήκον ἦν ἐλέσθαι πράττειν κ. ποιεῖν.

II. δούλος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

The word δούλος involves two ideas—that of belonging to a master, and that of service as a slave. As connected with the latter idea, the δούλος is in a δουλεία, which answers to our conception of slavery; as connected with the former, though he may, indeed, be in this condition, yet he also may not be. When speaking of Christian disciples, Paul always uses the word in the former sense. To his view, the believer, so far as his work and life are concerned, passes at his conversion out of the state of δουλεία into that of ἐλευθερία. The only slavery is that of sin. The service of Christ is perfect freedom. Whether the word is here used as referring to official position or with a more general meaning, cannot be determined with absolute certainty. As we find it, however, when employed in connection with the names of individual persons, always applied to those who had some special work as teachers or ministers, and as in most of the places where it is thus applied it occurs in the opening salutations of the Apostolic letters, it seems probable that it carries with it the official reference. Yet this reference must be regarded as quite general (as Meyer says), and the idea of the word—as when used of the private Christian—is that of wholly belonging to Christ.

III. Ver. 3. περὶ τοῦ νου αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.

The following points must be regarded as established by the manifest parallelism of the clauses: (a) that two things are declared respecting the Son, one on the σάρξ side of his nature, and the other on the πνεῦμα side; the πνεῦμα being, thus, not the Holy Spirit, but the Son's own spirit, and ἁγ. being a characteristic or descriptive genitive; (b) that the former of these two things is his descent from David and birth in the line of David's family, while the latter is designated by ὁρισθέντος—δυνάμει. That σάρξ, as used in the former statement, does not, in itself, exclude the idea of a descent from David so far as the human πνεῦμα is concerned, is evidenced by the common representation, in the Pauline Epistles (as well as the other N. T. writings), of Jesus as a complete man, and by the fact that there is nothing in the contrast of this particular sentence which necessarily contradicts the general representation. That there is nothing of this character is clear, because the contrasted πνεῦμα here may refer to the divine nature in Christ as distinguished from his human nature; and if, on the other hand, it is interpreted as referring to his human spirit, the statement of the clause must be understood as made with reference to it,—and as declaring what was true of it,—only after the resurrection. It must be admitted, however, that the phrase “according to the flesh” may be employed here, as often in the case of similar expressions in common speech, to call attention to the physical origin, without making prominent—though, indeed, it does not deny—the human-spiritual descent; and thus that the mere use of this phrase cannot properly be considered as decisive proof that the human nature is contrasted with the divine, and that πνεῦμα must refer to the divine nature.

The fact, however, that the contrast is thus filled out to greater fulness, and its introduction is more satisfactorily accounted for; that the expression πνεῦμα ἁγιασμένης is not only a peculiar one, which would not be expected when speaking of men, but one having a near affinity to πνεῦμα ἅγιον, the name given to the Divine Spirit; and that Paul elsewhere exalts Christ above all other beings

except God, or even gives him Divine exaltation, must be regarded as strongly pointing to the conclusion that something more is intended by the word than the mere "ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, which receives the communication of the divine," and that to the writer's mind there was in Christ a peculiar divine element of nature, by virtue of and in accordance with which he was constituted Son of God with power by his resurrection.

In respect to *ὀρίσθέντος*, Meyer has satisfactorily shown that it is equivalent to *qui constitutus est*. The verb carries with it the idea of *marking as by a boundary*, and so, when connected with the matter of office, position, etc., of *constituting, appointing*, in which sense it is used in Acts x. 42, xvii. 31. It is evident, however, that the Apostle does not mean to affirm that Christ was constituted Son of God, in connection with his resurrection, in any such sense as would involve the declaration that he was not Son of God before this. Such a declaration would be clearly opposed to the Pauline doctrine, as exhibited in all his Epistles. Moreover, the constituting did not consist simply in a demonstrating or proving him to be Son of God to the view of men. This idea is neither presented in the participle itself, nor in any other words of the sentence. That the writer, however, in such a statement, would not fail to set forth the precise sense in which he designed to use the word, is altogether probable. If we connect *ἐν δυνάμει* with *ὑιοῦ Θεοῦ* we have such an explanatory phrase which meets the demands of the case and accords with New Testament teaching. Otherwise there is none. We may regard this as the true construction, therefore, rather than that which is favored by Meyer (with whom de Wette, Godet, Alford, Gifford, Shedd, and others agree), although the possibility of the latter must undoubtedly be admitted. It was by the resurrection that Christ was made Son of God with power, as he had not been in his earthly condition and as born of the seed of David. Weiss ed. Mey. agrees with this view.

IV. Ver. 5. *χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν.*

The explanation of these words is to be sought, (a) in connection with such passages as Rom. xii. 6-8; Eph. iii. 7-12; Gal. ii. 9; Rom. xii. 3; xv. 15; 1 Cor. iii. 10. From these passages it is evident, that, in addition to his conception of divine grace as bestowed upon all believers, and as lying at the basis of their Christian life, Paul had the thought of a special impartation of this grace to individual men, for the purpose of fitting them for various offices and duties. In his own case, it had been given in such measure and manner as to qualify him to be a preacher of the Gospel, an apostle, a missionary to the Gentiles rather than the Jews, a founder of churches in regions into which others had not previously entered. It is also to be sought, (b) in connection with passages such as Gal. iv. 2, in which a word of a more specific character is added by *καὶ* to one that is more general, the design of the addition being to point the reader to that particular application of the general word which is, at the time, in the writer's mind. The form of expression in such cases is not precisely a hendiadys (as if in this verse, *e.g.* the words were equivalent to *χάριν ἀποστολῆς*; but the latter word is nevertheless explanatory, and carries with it the principal thought. As the writer says of the heir of an estate in Gal. iv. 2, that, in his minority, he is under guardians (*ἐπιτρόπους*, the general word), *and* [*i.e.* to mark more particularly the relation to the point in hand]

guardians in the matter of property (*οἰκονόμους*). So here he declares of himself, that he had, through Jesus Christ, received grace, and, specially, the gift of and qualification for the apostolic office. The striking similarity in the main thought of this verse and that of xv. 15, 16 can scarcely fail to be noticed as confirming this view of the meaning here. It is this particular and peculiar gift of grace, on which the Apostle founds his claim to address and admonish the Gentile churches.

V. Ver. 5. εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως.

That Meyer is correct in his explanation of these words, as against the view of Calvin, Hofmann, Godet, and others, including Weiss ed. Mey., who regard *πίστεως* as gen. appos., *obedience which consists in faith*, and that of Sanday, Shedd, and others, who hold it to be a gen. subj. *obedience which springs from faith*, is proved by the fact that in all other cases, where *ὑπακοή* is used in a similar way, the gen., whether denoting a person or thing, is objective, and also by the fact that where a kindred expression is employed having the kindred verb *ὑπακούειν*, the object and not the source, of the obedience is referred to. Philippi, de Wette, Alford, Gifford, Olshausen, Schaff, Beet, and others agree with Meyer, Godet and Weiss claim that faith is never in N. T. conceived of objectively as a power, and hence that Meyer's view has no foundation. But this claim can hardly be substantiated, in view of Acts vi. 7; Gal. i. 23 (cf. Gal. iii. 2, 5; 2 Tim. iv. 7). The correctness of Meyer's opinion, that *πίστις* here means subjective faith, and not *doctrina fidei* or the gospel, is admitted by the larger part of the best modern commentators. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether *faith* is ever used in N. T. as having the sense of *the faith*, i.e. the system of Christian doctrine, and certain that it does not ordinarily have this meaning. The probability against this sense of the word is, therefore, exceedingly strong in this and all similar cases.

VI. Ver. 8. πρῶτον μὲν.

The second point of the introductory passage, which is indicated by his use of *πρῶτον* as in the writer's mind, is his desire to visit the readers. He is led, however, in the progress of his sentences, to bring out this desire in a grammatical subordination to the expression of his thankfulness for the widespread knowledge of their Christian life, and, thus, to abandon his original design of introducing it by a *δεύτερον* or *ἔπειτα*. The presentation, in such a grammatically subordinate way, of thoughts which are logically co-ordinate with others already expressed, belongs to the epistolary style as distinguished from that of a formal treatise, and is especially characteristic of the style of the Pauline letters.

VII. Ver. 11. εἰς τὸ στηριχθῆναι ὑμᾶς.

This verb is found again in xvi. 25;—at the beginning, thus, and the end of the letter. It indicates what the Apostle hoped might be the result of a personal visit to the readers, if he should be permitted to make such a visit, and also what he thought of as the great blessing which God was able to bestow upon them. As this letter was apparently written in order that it might be a kind of representative of himself, until the hoped-for visit should be accomplished, we can scarcely doubt that in the idea of this verb is to be found the final purpose of his writing. However fully the epistle has the doctrinal

character, it was designed to accomplish a practical result—namely, to establish and strengthen the Roman believers in the Christian life. This, and not the mere knowledge of true doctrine, was what he desired as the fruit of his labors (ver. 13), and by reason of this he expected to be encouraged when he saw the evidence of their faith (ver. 12), as, at the same time, he trusted that they would be encouraged by the manifestation of his own.

VIII. Ver. 16. παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι.

What the Apostle means by the word παντὶ is manifest from that which he adds at the end of the sentence—to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. The same thing is seen in ii. 9, 10, iii. 9, 19; cf. iii. 22, 23, 29; iv. 16; cf. iv. 11, 12; that is, in all those passages (from the beginning to the end of his direct argument for his doctrine of justification), in which the relations of the faith system and the legal system are set forth, in their contrast with each other, by the use of this word. It is of all men as distinguished from Jews only, and not of all men as opposed to all with the exception of a certain portion or number, that he speaks in his discussion of the method of salvation. The Pauline universalism finds its opposite in the limitations of Judaism. According to the latter, justification is confined to those who are born into the Jewish nation, or are united with it as proselytes; according to the former, it is open to men everywhere, Gentiles equally with Jews,—to all who believe, without regard to national distinctions or boundaries.

IX. Ver. 17. δικαιοσύνη γὰρ Θεοῦ κ.τ.λ.

Ver. 17 may be regarded as containing in itself the subject of the Epistle, or the proposition which the writer undertakes to establish and defend: *Righteousness is by faith*. This proposition, however, is not presented in an independent and formal way. On the contrary, it is made, through the γὰρ at the beginning of the verse, to be a proof that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every believer; and this latter statement, again, through the γὰρ by which it is introduced, is brought forward as the ground of the writer's declaration, that he is not ashamed of the gospel. The form of expression in the 17th verse is naturally affected by this manner of its introduction, and hence we have the words as they stand: A (or the) righteousness of God is revealed in it [the gospel] as proceeding from faith. The argument which follows, however, is directed to the end of proving the truth of the proposition in its simplest statement.

The interpretation of ἐκ πίστεως as denoting the subjective source or cause from which righteousness comes is proved to be correct, (a) from the fact that this verse stands in the relation above described to the entire discussion of the Epistle, which is upon righteousness by faith; (b) from the meaning of ἐκ πίστεως in the confirmatory passage cited, in the latter part of the verse, from O. T.; (c) from the use of διὰ πίστεως in the parallel passage, iii. 21, 22; (d) from the fact that Paul in several places employs the expression δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως (e.g. ix. 30, x. 6; cf. Gal. v. 5) in this sense, but never in any other. The explanation of εἰς πίστιν, on the other hand, is suggested by the mode of arguing adopted by the writer (see Note X. also). The phenomena of the case are as follows: The proposition presented in ver. 17 is proved by showing that the only other doctrine supposable—namely, that of justification

by works—cannot be maintained. This negative proof is evidently completed at iii. 20. The only thing remaining to be done, at that point, is, accordingly, to repeat the original proposition, as having been already established. There is, in fact, such a repetition in iii. 21, 22, as we must admit from the striking similarity, both in the thought and expression of those verses, to what is found in i. 17. We cannot doubt, therefore, that the Apostle intended to restate, in the later verses, what he had said in the earlier ones, and that, if so, the two must throw light upon each other. As we examine the passages, however, we find that *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* occurs in both; that *πεφάνερωται* of the latter answers to *ἀποκαλύπτεται* of the former; that *διὰ πίστεως* corresponds with *ἐκ πίστεως*; and that *χωρὶς νόμου* suggests the idea of *ἐν αὐτῷ*. This being so, the probability becomes overwhelming that *εἰς τοὺς πιστεύοντας* answers to *εἰς πίστιν* so far as to give us the author's meaning in the latter phrase. The *πίστις* of i. 17 is, accordingly, that which is in the minds and hearts of the persons referred to in iii. 22, and that which makes them *οἱ πιστεύοντες*. It is that in them to which the revelation of righteousness comes and the offer of justification is presented.

X. Ver. 18. ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὁργὴ Θεοῦ.

The discussion, which is entered upon at the 18th verse and continued as far as iii. 20, assumes as a thing admitted by both parties to the controversy, that there is a method by which men can be justified. It also assumes that, if there is such a method, it must be either in the line of faith or in that of works. These things being granted at the outset, it was evidently necessary for the Apostle only to prove that justification is not by works, in order to the establishment of the proposition that it is by faith. It is this indirect course which he takes in his argument—the direct proof being, in this part of the Epistle, left entirely without consideration. The negative argument is divided into two sections, the first having reference to the Gentiles, the second to the Jews. This division is connected with the defence of the doctrine as against Judaistic views, for, whatever opinion we may have as to the design or character of the Epistle, it cannot be doubted that the discussion takes hold upon the great question between the Pauline and Jewish Christianity.

XI. Ver. 20. τὰ ἀόρατα κ.τ.λ.

Evidently the invisible things are the everlasting power and divinity mentioned afterward. The evidence for the existence of God here presented is that which the visible creation furnishes to the mind. The creation proves a creator with power adequate to produce it, i.e. an omnipotent creator; omnipotence carries with it the proof of the other divine attributes; and thus the things that are made are, and ever since the beginning of time have been, bearing witness to God—a witness which is clearly understood, so soon as the *νοῦς* is directed to it and it is intelligently considered (*νοούμενα*). In this way the knowledge of God was manifested from the first, and is manifest still, to the Gentile nations; and because of this fact, their turning away to idolatry is due, not to a want of revelation of the truth, but to a repressing of the truth, (*κατεχόντων* ver. 18), and a preventing it from having its legitimate influence upon their minds, through their own unrighteousness.

XII. Ver. 21. διότι—πῦχαρίστησαν, ἀλλ' ἑματαιώθησαν.

διότι justifies and confirms the preceding word, ἀναπολογήτους, and the two following verbs set forth the attitude which, as the natural and legitimate result of knowing God, they should have held toward Him: they should have glorified Him for what He is in Himself, and have had thankfulness to Him for what He had given to them. Neither of these things had they done, but—the very opposite of this—they had turned away to the worship of idols. This turning to idolatry is set forth in ἑματαιώθησαν κ.τ.λ., as the result of the vain and empty speculations (διαλογισμοίς) into which they were led by reason of wilfully preventing (ἐν ἀδικίᾳ) the knowledge of God from having its true influence upon their thoughts, and of the consequent darkness and folly in which they were involved. Weiss ed. Mey. denies any immediate connection between ἑματαιώθησαν and the use of μάταια as employed in O. T. of idols, such as Meyer and many others hold, and regards it as pointing only to the fact that they directed their thoughts, not to the highest object of all thought, the true God, but to earthly things. He thus accords substantially with the view expressed above.

XIII. Ver. 24. διὸ παρέδωκεν κ. τ. λ.

The evidence that there is no justification by works for the Gentiles, but rather a revelation of wrath, is presented by a mere setting forth of the works which characterize them. For such works there can be nothing but condemnation. In his unfolding of the heathen sins, the writer lays the foundation of all in idolatry (vv. 18–23), and then brings forward other evils as the result of this. These other evils he divides into two sections—(1) the sins of impurity (vv. 24–27), and (2) all other sins (vv. 28–32). Among these other sins, it is noticeable that the first *specific* one is πλεονεξία, covetousness (ἀδικία, πονηρία, and κακία, having a *general* character). The relation of all sin among the Gentiles to idolatry, and the development of idolatry on the side of impurity and of covetousness, seem to have been prominent before the mind of Paul, as we find him connecting them elsewhere. He also presents these latter evils as the two chief and distinguishing evils of the heathen nations. The parallelizing of impurity, in the first of the two sections here, with sins of every other sort, as if in one great class, in the second, is very suggestive. It is noticeable, also, that these multitudinous evils which spring from idolatry are presented before the reader as arising from it in the way of a divine judgment: God gives over these who thus voluntarily abandon the truth respecting Himself, to the consequences in moral action of their own chosen errors.

XIV. Ver. 29–31. ἀδικία—ἀνελεήμονες.

That there is no designed arrangement according to a definite classification in vv. 29–31, is rendered altogether probable by the following considerations: (a) in the midst of a series of words which designate particular kinds of evil-doers, we find general words applicable to all evil-doers, θεοστογείς, ἐφευρέτας κακῶν. [The explanation of the former of these by Meyer, as a *general* word closing the list which conveys the idea of *hostility*, and of the latter as a *positive* opening the *negative* series (with ἀ privative), seems quite unsatisfactory, because θεοστυγείς, on the one hand, is as truly inclusive of the words which im-

mediately follow it, as of those which precede, and *ἐφ. κακ.*, on the other, is not peculiarly related in its signification to the compound words which it is supposed to introduce] ; (b) the arrangement within the individual classes is not so accurate as such a purposed classification would call for ; *e.g.* the words from *φθόνου* to *κακοηθείας* ; (c) in other cases, where similar lists of words are found, there are difficulties of the same character in the supposition of any such formal division, *e.g.* Gal. iii. 22, 23 ; Heb. xi. 36, 37 ; (d) these accumulations of descriptive terms generally occur (as here, and in Heb. *l.c.*), in parts of the author's discourse where he is rising towards the climax of his thought, and also towards the highest point of feeling—that is, in just those places where he would be least disposed to classify with care. All these lists of this character are, doubtless, to be explained as accumulations for rhetorical effect. In this way, rather than in any other, we may account in the present instance, not only for the insertion of general words, as indicated above, but also for the succession of negative compounds at the end, the force of which, as the apostle uttered them one after another when dictating to his amanuensis, can be easily appreciated.

CHAPTER II.

Ver. 5. After ἀποκαλ. D*** K L S**, min., and several versions and Fathers, including Or., read καὶ, which is adopted by Mill, Wetst. Matth. and Fritzsche.¹ Against it is the greatly preponderant authority of the uncials, and the suspicion of having been added by way of relief to the accumulation of genitives. — Ver. 8. μὲν after ἀπειθ. is wanting in B D* G S*, and is omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. (8), but was easily passed over from inattention as seeming superfluous. — The order ὁργῇ καὶ θυμῷς (thus also Lachm. and Tisch.) is decisively attested. — Ver. 13. The article before νόμον, which Elz. and Fritzsche read both times, but which Lachm. and Tisch. both times omit, is wanting in A B D E (which however has it in the first case) G S, 31, 46, Damasc. ; and betrays itself in the general form of the saying as inserted in order to denote the Mosaic law. — Ver. 14. ποιῇ] Lachm. and Tisch. read ποιῶσιν, following A B S, min., Clem. Or. Damasc. (D* G have ποιούσιν). The plural is an amendment suggested by the context. — Ver. 16. Instead of ὅτε Lachm. following A and some Fathers, has ἡ ; an interpretation ; as is also ἐν ἡ ἡμέρᾳ in B. — Ver. 17. εἰ δέ] The too weakly attested Recepta ἰδε or ἰδέε is either a mere copyist's error, or an alteration to get rid of the supposed anakoluthon. See Reiche, *Comm. crit.*

Ver. 1.—ch. iii. 20. Having shown, ch. i. 18–32, in the case of the *Gentiles*, that they were strangers to the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, Paul now, ch. ii.—iii. 20, exhibits the same fact with reference to the Jews, and thus adduces the second half of the proof as to the *universal* necessity of justification by *faith*. [See Note XV. p. 105.] Naturally the Apostle was chiefly concerned with this *second* half of the proof, as the ἀδικία of heathenism was in itself clear ; but we see from ch. ii. that the detailed character of that delineation of Gentile wickedness was intended at the same time as a mirror for degenerate Judaism, to repress all Jewish conceit. Comp. Mangold, p. 102.

Ver. 1. Διό] [See Note XVI. p. 105.] refers back to the *main tenor of the whole previous exposition* (vv. 18–32), and that indeed in its more special aspect as setting forth the moral condition of heathenism in respect to its *inexcusableness*. This reference is confirmed by the fact, that ἀναπολόγητος εἰ is said with a manifest glancing back to i. 20 ; it is laid down by Paul as it were as a finger-post for his διό. The reference assumed by Reiche, Fritzsche, Krehl, de Wette, and older writers, to the proposition in ver. 32, that the rightful demand of God adjudges death to the evil-doers ; or to the *cognizance* of that verdict, in spite of which the Gentiles were so immoral

¹ Defended also by Philippi and Reiche, *Comm. crit.*, who thinks that the καὶ has been rejected on account of ἀποκαλ. ap-

pearing not to receive more precise definition. See on the other hand van Hengel.

(Philippi, Baur, Th. Schott, Hofmann, Mangold), has against it the fact that this thought formed only a *subsidiary sentence* in what went before ; whereas here a new section begins, at the head of which Paul very naturally has placed a reference, even expressly marked by ἀναπολόγητος, to the entire section ending with ver. 32, over which he now throws once more a retrospective glance. The connection of ideas therefore is : “wherefore,” i.e. on account of that abomination of vice pointed out in vv. 18–32, “thou art inexcusable,” etc. ; “for”—to exhibit now more exactly this “wherefore”—wherein thou judgest the other, thou condemnest thyself, because thou doest the same thing. In other words : before the mirror of this Gentile life of sin all excuse vanishes from thee, O man who judgest, for this mirror reflects thine own conduct, which thou thyself therefore condemnest by thy judgment. A deeply tragic *de te narratur* ! into which the proud Jewish consciousness sees itself all of a sudden transferred. A proleptic use of δό (Tholuck) is not to be thought of ; not even γάρ is so used in the N. T. (see on John iv. 44), and δό neither in the N. T. nor elsewhere. — ὁ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων] Just as Paul, i. 18, designated the Gentiles by the general term ἄνθρωπων, and only brought forward the special reference to them in the progress of the discourse ; so also he now designates the *Jews*, not as yet by name (see this first at ver. 17), but generally by the address ἄνθρωπε, which however already implies a trace of reproach (ix. 20) ;¹ while at the same time he makes it by his πᾶς ὁ κρίνων sufficiently apparent that he is no longer speaking of the class already delineated, but is turning now to the *Jews* contrasted with them ; for the self-righteous *judging* respecting the *Gentiles* as rejected of God² was in fact a *characteristic of the Jews*. Hence all the more groundless is the hasty judgment, that this passage has *nothing whatever to do* with the contrast between Jews and Gentiles (Hofmann)., Comp. ver. 17 ff. And that it is the *condemning κρίνειν* which is meant, and not the moral capacity of judgment in general (Th. Schott) and its exercise (Hofmann) (comp. on Matt. vii. 9), follows from the subsequent κατακρίνεις more precisely defining its import. Consequently the quite general interpretation (Beza, Calovius, Benecke, Mehring, Luthardt, vom freien Willen, p. 416) seems untenable, as well as the reference to the *Gentiles* as the judging subjects (Th. Schott), or to all to whom i. 32 applied (Hofmann), or even specially to Gentile *authorities* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Cajetanus, Grotius).³—ἐν ᾧ] either instrumental : *thereby, that*, equivalent to ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι (Hofmann) ; or, still more closely corresponding to the τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πρόσσευ : *in which thing, in which point*. Comp. xiv. 22. The temporal rendering : *eodem tempore quo* (Köllner, Reithmayr), arbitrarily obscures the moral identity, which Paul intended to bring out. The κατακρίνεις however is not *facto condemnas* (Estius, van Hengel), but the judgment pronounced upon the other is a *condemnatory judgment* upon thyself, namely, because it applies to thine own conduct. On the contrast be-

¹ Luke xli. 14 ; Plat. Prot. p. 330 D, Gorg. p. 452 B, and the passages in Wetstein, Ellendt, Lex. Soph. I. p. 164.

² Midr. Tillin f. 6, 3 ; Chetubb. f. 3, 2 ;

and many other passages.

³ Regarding the *nominative* as further ethical exegesis of the vocative, see Bernhardt, p. 67, Buttmann, Neut. Gr. p. 123. [E. T. 141.]

tween ἕτερον and σεαυτὸν comp. ver. 21 ; 1 Cor. x. 24, 29 ; Gal. vi. 4 ; Phil. ii. 4. — τὰ αὐτά] *the same sins and vices*, not indeed according to all their several concrete manifestations, as previously described, but according to their essential moral categories ; see vv. 17–24. Comp. on the idea John viii. 7. — ὁ κρίναν] with reproachful emphasis.

Ver. 2. Οἶδαμεν] Paul means to pronounce it as *in his own view and that of his readers an undoubted truth* (comp. iii. 19), that the judicial decision which God will one day pronounce, etc. The δέ carries on the discourse, and the entire sentence forms the *propositio major* to what is now (ver. 3) to be proved, namely, that the person judging (the Jew), who yet makes himself guilty of wickedness similar to the things (τὰ τοιαῦτα) in question, deceives himself if he thinks to escape *the true judgment of God* (ver. 5). Thus τὸ κρίμα¹ τ. Θεοῦ has the emphasis of contrast with that human judgment so inconsistent with their own conduct. The predicate of being κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐπὶ τοὺς κ.τ.λ. belongs not to the latter, but to the *divine κρίμα*. Th. Schott erroneously emphasizes πρᾶσσοντας, dislocating the clear train of thought, as if Paul were treating of the truth that the Gentile's *knowledge* of what was right would not shield him from sin and condemnation. Hofmann also introduces a similar confusion. — κατὰ ἀλήθειαν] contains the *standard*, in accordance with which the judgment of God is pronounced against the τὰ τοιαῦτα πρᾶσσοντες : *in accordance with truth*, so that it is, without error or partiality, entirely adequate to the moral condition of these subjects. Raphael, Köllner, Krehl, Mehring, and Hofmann take it as equivalent to ἀληθῶς, *really* (4 Macc. v. 15 ; and in Greek writers), so that the meaning would be : it is *in reality* issued over them. But it could not be the object of the Apostle to remind them of the *reality* of the divine judicial sentence, which was under all circumstances undoubted and undisputed, so much as of its *truth*, for the sake of the Jews who fancied that that judgment would condemn the Gentiles, but would spare the descendants of Abraham as such, and on account of their circumcision and other theocratic privileges ; by which idea they manifestly denied the ἀλήθεια of the κρίμα τοῦ Θεοῦ, as if it were an *untrue false* sentence, the contents of which did not correspond to the existing state of the facts.

Ver. 3. Antithesis of ver. 2, “That God judges evildoers according to truth, we know (ver. 2) ; *but judgest thou* (in the face of that proposition) *that thou shalt . . . escape?*” This would indeed be at variance with the ἀλήθεια of the judgment. Comp. Matt. iii. 7 ; and the *passages* from profane writers in Grotius. The *non-interrogative* rendering of vv. 3, 4 (Hofmann) is not called for by the connection with the assertive declaration in ver. 5 ; it weakens the lively force of the discourse, and utterly fails to suit the ἦ in ver. 4, so prevalent in double questions. — τοῦτο] preparing with emphasis (here : of surprise) for the following ὅτι σὺ ἐκφ. κ.τ.λ. ; Bernhardt, p. 284. — σὺ] *Thou* on thy side, as if thou madest an exception ; opposed to the Jewish self-conceit (Matt. iii. 7 ff. ; Luke iii. 7 f.). The emphasis is

¹ Not κρίμα. With Lachmann it is to be accentuated κρίμα ; see Lobeck, *Paralip.* p.

418. Lipsius is of a different opinion as regards the N. T. (*grammat. Unters.* p. 40 f.).

not on Θεοῦ (Chrysostom, Theophylact, and others). — ἐκφεύξῃ] not : through acquittal (Bengel),¹ but inasmuch as thou shalt not be subjected to the κρίμα of God, but shalt on the contrary escape it and be secure afar off from it. Comp. 2 Macc. vi. 26, vii. 35 ; 1 Thess. v. 3 ; Heb. ii. 3. According to the Jewish illusion only the *Gentiles* were to be judged (Bertholdt, *Christol.* p. 206 ff.), whereas all Israel were to share in the Messianic kingdom as its native children (Matt. viii. 12).

Ver. 4. [See Note XVII. p. 106.] Or—in case thou hast not this illusion—*despisest thou*, etc. The ἡ draws away the attention from the case first put as a question, and proposes another ; vi. 3 ; 1 Cor. ix. 6, and often elsewhere.² —The *despising* the divine goodness is the *contemptuous unconcern as to its holy purpose*, which produces as a natural consequence security in sinning (Eccles. v. 5 f.). — τοῦ πλοῦτον τῆς χρηστ.] πλοῦτος, as designation of the “abundantia et magnitudo” (Estius), is a very current expression with the Apostle (ix. 23, xi. 35 ; Eph. i. 7, ii. 4, 7, iii. 16 ; Col. i. 27), but is not a Hebraism (Ps. v. 8, lxxix. 17 *al.*), being used also by Greek authors ; Plat. *Euth.* p. 12 A, and see Loesner, p. 245.—χρηστότης] is the *goodness* of God, in accordance with which He is inclined to benefit (and not to punish). Comp. Tittmann's *Synon.* p. 195. — ἀνοχή and μακροθ., *patience* and *long-suffering*—the two terms exhausting the one idea—denote the disposition of God, in accordance with which He indulgently tolerates the sins and delays the punishments.³ — ἀγνοῶν] *inasmuch as it is unknown to thee*, that etc. By this accompanying definition of the καταφρονεῖς the (guilty) *folly* of the despiser is laid bare as its tragic source. Bengel says aptly : “*miratur Paulus hanc ignorantiam.*” The literal sense is arbitrarily altered by Pareus, Reiche, de Wette, Maier, and others, who make it denote the not being *willing* to know, which it does *not* denote even in Acts xvii. 23 ; Rom. x. 3 ; by Köhlner, who, following Grotius, Koppe, and many others, holds it to mean *non considerans* ; and also by Hofmann : “to perceive, as one ought.” Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 34. — ἀγει] of *ethical incitement* by influencing the will.⁴ But it is not to be taken of the *conatus* (*desires to urge*), but of the standing relation of the goodness of God to the moral condition of man.⁵ This relation is an *impelling* to repentance, in which the failure of result on the part of man does not cancel the act of the ἀγει itself.⁶

Ver. 5. A vividly introduced contrast to the preceding proposition δτι τὸ χρηστὸν . . . ἀγει ; not a continuation of the question (Lachmann, following Koppe and others ; also Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald), but *affirmative* (by which the discourse becomes far more impressive and striking) as a setting forth of the actual position of things, which is brought about by man through his impenitence, in opposition to the drawing of the divine kindness ; for the words can only, in pursuance of the correct *interrogative* rendering of ver. 3, be connected with ver. 4, and not also (as Hofmann holds)

¹ Comp. Dem. 602, 2, Aristoph. *Vesp.* 157 *al.*

² Baeumlein, *Partikell.* p. 132.

³ See Wetstein, and the passages from the Fathers in Suicer, *Theas.* II. p. 294. Comp. Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 194.

⁴ Plat. *Rep.* p. 572 D, *al.* See Kypke and Reisig, *ad. Soph. O. C.* 253. Comp. viii. 14.

⁵ Therefore no predestination to damnation can be supposed.

⁶ Comp. Wisd. xi. 23 ; Appian. ii. 63.

with ver. 3. - κατὰ] *in accordance with*; in a causal sense. Comp. on Phil. iv. 11. On σκληρ κ. ἀμεταν. καρδ. comp. Acts vii. 31. It is correlative with the previous εἰς μετάνοιαν. — θησαυρίζεις σεαυτῷ ὀργήν] Wolf aptly says: "in-nuitur . . . irae divinae judicia paulatim coacervari, ut tandem universa promantur."¹ The *purposely chosen* word glances back to the previous τοῦ πλοῦτου κ.τ.λ. and σεαυτῷ, to *thyself*, heightens the *tragic* nature of the foolish conduct that redounds to *one's own destruction*; comp. xiii. 2. — ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργ.] not to be taken with Luther, Beza, Castalio, Piscator, Calvin, Estius, and many others as *in diem irae* (Phil. i. 10; Jude 6; Tob. iv. 9), belongs to ὀργήν: *which breaks out on the day of wrath*. Comp. 1 Thess. iii. 13. Regarding the repetition of ὀργῆς after ὀργήν Bengel correctly remarks: "δεινότης sermonis magna vi." Whose wrath, is self-evident, without its being necessary to connect ὀργῆς with Θεοῦ (Hofmann), which is forbidden by the intervening ἀποκαλ. and by the previous absolutely put ὀργήν. The *article* was not required by ἡμέρα on account of the genitive definitions; 1 Cor. vi. 2; Eph. iv. 30; Phil. i. 6, *al.*²—Paul characterizes the *day of judgment*, and with what powerful emphasis! by an accumulation of genitives and weighty expressions, with reference to the fate of the *bad* as ἡμέρα ὀργῆς, but with reference to its general destination (afterwards ver. 6 ff. to be further carried out in detail) for *good and bad* as a day ἀποκαλ. δικαιοκρισ. τ. Θεοῦ, *i.e.* on which God's righteous judgment (which until then remains hidden) is *revealed*, publicly exhibited. With the exception of passages of the Fathers, such as Justin, *de resurr.* p. 223, δικαιοκρισία occurs only in an unknown translation of Hos. vi. 5 (where the LXX. read κρίμα) and the *Test. XII. Patr.* p. 547 and 581.

Ver. 6. Compare Ps. lxii. 13; Prov. xxiv. 12; analogies from Greek writers in Spiess, *Logos spermat.* p. 214. — κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ] *i.e.* according as shall be commensurate with the moral quality of his actions. [See Note XVIII. p. 106.] On this, and on the following amplification down to ver. 16, it is to be observed:—(1) Paul is undoubtedly speaking of the *judgment of the world*, which God will cause to be held by Christ, ver. 16; (2) The *subjects* who are judged are *Jews and Gentiles*, ver. 9 ff., consequently *all men*, ver. 16. The distinction, as to whether they are Christians or not, is left out of view in this exposition, as the latter is partly intended to *introduce* the reader to a knowledge of the necessity of justification by faith (down to iii. 20); and it is consequently also left out of view that judgment according to works cannot result in bliss for the unbelievers, because there is wanting to them the very thing whose vital action produces the works in accordance with which the Judge awards bliss, namely, faith and the accompanying regeneration. (3) *The standard of the decision is moral action* and its opposite, vv. 6–10; and this standard is really and in fact the only one, to which at the last judgment all, even the Christians themselves, shall

¹ Comp. Calovius; and see Deut. xxxii. 33–35; Prov. i. 18, ii. 7; Eccus. iii. 4. For passages of profane writers, where θησαυρός and θησαυρίζειν are used to express the accumulation of evils, punishments, and the like,

see Alberti, *Obs.* p. 297; Münthe *in loc.*, from Philo: Loesner, p. 246.

² Winer, p. 118 f. [E. T. 125]; Kühner, II. 1, p. 524.

be subjected, and by which their fate for eternity shall be determined, Matt. xvi. 27, xxv. 31 ff.; 2 Cor. v. 10; Gal. vi. 7 ff.; Eph. vi. 8; Col. iii. 24; Rev. ii. 23, xx. 12, xxii. 12. But (4) the relation of moral action in the case of the *Christian* to the *fides salvifica*, as the necessary effect and fruit of which that action must be demanded at the judgment, cannot, for the reason given above under (2), be here introduced into the discussion. (5) On the contrary, *the law* only (in the case of the Jews the Mosaic, in the case of the Gentiles the natural), must be presented as the medium of the decision, ver. 12 ff.; a view which has likewise its full truth (compare what was remarked under (3) above), since the Christian also, because he is to be judged according to his *action*, must be judged *according to law* (compare the doctrine of the *tertius legis usus*), and indeed according to the *πλήρωσι τοῦ νόμου* introduced by Christ, Matt. v. 17. Comp. xxv. 31 ff.; Rom. xiii. 8-10,—although he becomes partaker of salvation, not through *the merit* of works (a point the further development of which formed no part of the Apostle's general discussion here), but through faith, of which the works are the *practical evidence and measure*.¹ Accordingly the "phrasis legis" (Melancthon) is indeed to be recognized in our passage, but it is to be apprehended in its full truth, which does not stamp as a mere theoretic abstraction (Baur) the contrast, deeply enough experienced by Paul himself, between the righteousness of works and righteousness of faith. It is neither to be looked upon as needing the *corrective* of the Christian plan of salvation; nor as an *inconsistency* (Fritzsche); nor yet in such a light, that the doctrine of justification involves a partial abrogation of the moral order of the world (Reiche), which is, on the contrary, confirmed and established by it, iii. 31. But our passage yields nothing in favour of the possibility, which God may grant to unbelievers, of turning to Christ *after death* (Tholuck), or of becoming partakers of the salvation in Christ in virtue of an exercise of divine power (Th. Schott): and the representation employed for that purpose,—that the life of faith is the *product* of a *previous* life-tendency, and that the *ἔργα* perfect themselves in faith (Luthardt, Tholuck),—is erroneous, because incompatible with the N. T. conception of regeneration as a new creation, as a putting off of the old man, as a having died and risen again, as a being begotten of God through the Spirit, etc., etc. The new life (vi. 4) is the direct opposite of the old (vi. 19 ff.). The possibility referred to is to be judged of in connection with the *descensus Christi ad inferos*, but is irrelevant here.

Ver. 7. *To those, who by virtue of perseverance in morally-good work seek to obtain glory and honour and immortality, eternal life* sc. ἀποδώσει. Consequently καθ' ἵκον ἐργων ἀγαθ. contains the standard, the regulative principle, by which the seeking after glory, honour, etc. is guided, and ἐργων ἀγαθῶν,²

¹ It is rightly observed by Calovius: "*secundum opera*, i.e. secundum testimonium operum," is something different from "*propter opera*, i.e. propter meritum operum." Comp. *Apol. Conf. A*, art. 3, and *Beza in loc.*

² The singular without the article indicates the thing *in abstracto*; the rule is for every given case: *perseverance in good work*. The idea that the *work of redemption* is referred to (Mehring, in accordance with Phil. i. 6), so that ὅπου. ἐργ. ἀγ., would be

which is not with Beza to be connected with *δόξαν*, is the genitive of the object to which the *ὑπομονή* refers (1 Thess. i. 3 ; Polyb. iv. 51, 1 ; Theophr. *Char.* 6, 1) ; while *δόξαν κ. τιμὴν κ. ἀφθαρσ.* is an exhaustive description of the future salvation according to its *glorious appearing* (2 Cor. iv. 17 ; Matt. xiii. 43), according to the *honour* united with it (for it is the prize of victory, 1 Cor. ix. 25 ; Phil. iii. 14 ; 2 Tim. iv. 8 ; James i. 12 ; 1 Pet. v. 4, the joint heirship with Christ, viii. 17, the reigning along with Him, 2 Tim. ii. 12), and according to its *imperishableness* (1 Cor. xv. 52 ff. ; Rev. xxi. 4 ; 1 Pet. i. 4). Paul presents the moral effort under a character thus *specifically Christian*, just because he can attribute it only to *Christian* Jews and Gentiles ; and hence he is only able to give his description of this first half of the subjects of future judgment, notwithstanding the generality of his language, in the *Christian* form, in which alone it really takes place. In keeping with this is also the *ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, i.e. eternal life in the kingdom of the Messiah, v. 21, vi. 22 f. ; Gal. vi. 8. The above construction of the words is already followed by Theophilus, *ad. Autol.* i. 20, *ed. Wolf*, and by most expositors, including Tholuck, Rückert, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen, Philippi, Maier, van Hengel, Umbreit. The objection raised against it by Reiche and Hofmann, that according to the analogy of ver. 6 *καθ' ὑπομ. ἐργ. ἀγ.* must contain the standard of the *ἀποδόσει*, and cannot therefore belong to *ζητοῦσι*, is untenable, because *καθ' ὑπομ. ἐργ. ἀγ.*, though attached to *ζητοῦσι*, nevertheless does contain (indirectly) the standard of *ἀποδόσει* ; so that there remains only an immaterial difference, which however is in fact very consonant to the lively versatility of the Apostle's thought. Still less weight attaches to the objection, that to seek glory and honour is not in itself a praiseworthy thing ; for the *moral* tenor of the *ζητεῖν δόξαν κ. τ. λ.* (comp. Matt. vi. 33 ; John v. 44) is most definitely assured by *καθ' ὑπομ. ἐργ. ἀγ.* Utterly unfounded, in fine, is the objection of clumsiness (Hofmann) ; the symmetrical fulness of vv. 7, 8, has a certain solemnity about it. Reiche and Hofmann, following Oecumenius,¹ Estius, and others, arrange it so that to *δόξαν. κ. τιμ. κ. ἀφθαρσίαν* they supply *ἀποδόσει*, whilst *ζητοῦσι* is to be combined with *ζωὴν αἰών.* and regarded as an apposition or (Hofmann) reason assigned to *τοῖς μέν*, and *καθ' ὑπομ. ἐργ. ἀγ.* is the standard of *ἀποδόσει*. Substantially so also Ewald. No syntactic objection can be urged against this rendering ; but how tamely and heavily is the *ζητοῦσι ζωὴν αἰών.* subjoined ! Paul would have written clearly, emphatically, and in harmony with the contrast in ver. 8 : *τοῖς . . . ἀγαθοῦ ζωὴν αἰ. ζητοῦσι δόξαν κ. τιμ. κ. ἀφθ.*

Ver. 8. *Τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας* sc. οὔσι : paraphrase of the substantive idea, to be explained from the conception of the moral condition as drawing its origin thence (comp. iii. 26 ; iv. 12, 14 ; Gal. iii. 10 ; Phil. i. 17, *al.*).

equivalent to *ὑπακοὴ πίστews*, ought to have been precluded by the parallel in ver. 10. Comp. ver. 2.

¹ Τὸ ὑπερβατὸν οὕτω τακτέον· τοῖς καθ' ὑπομονὴν ἐργον ἀγαθοῦ ζητοῦσι ζωὴν αἰώνιον, ἀποδόσει δόξαν καὶ . . . ἀφθαρσίαν. But there is no ground whatever for the assumption of a hyperbaton, in which Luther also has

entangled himself. Very harshly Bengel, Fritzsche, and Krehl separate *τοῖς καθ' ὑπομον. ἐργον ἀγ.* from what follows, and supply οὔσι ; and then take *δόξαν . . . ζητοῦσι* as apposition to *τοῖς . . . ἐργον*, but make *ζωὴν αἰ.* likewise dependent on *ἀποδόσει*.

See Bernhardt, p. 288 f. Comp. the use of *νιοί* and *τέκνα* in Eph. ii. 2. We are precluded from taking (with Hofmann) *ἐκ* in a causal sense (*in consequence of ἐριθεία*), and as belonging to ἀπειθ. κ.τ.λ. by the *καί*, which would here express the idea, unsuitable to the connection: *even*.¹ This *καί*, the simple *and*, which is not however with Hofmann to be interpreted as if Paul had written *μᾶλλον* or *τοῦναντίον* ("instead of seeking after eternal life, rather," etc.), clearly shows that τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας is to be taken by itself, as it has been correctly explained since the time of the Vulgate and Chrysostom. — *ἐριθεία* is not to be derived from *ἐρις* or *ἐρίζω*, but from *ἐριθος*, a hired labourer,² a spinner; hence *ἐριθεύω*, to work for hire (Tob. ii. 11), then also: to act selfishly, to lay plots. Compare *ἐξεριθείεσθαι*, Polyb. x. 25, 9, and *ἀνεριθείτος* (without party intrigues) in Philo, p. 1001 E. *ἐριθεία* has therefore, besides the primary sense of *work for hire*, the twofold ethical signification (1) *mercenary greed*; and (2) *desire of intrigue, pursuit of partisan courses*; Arist. *Pol.* v. 2 f. See Fritzsche, *Excursus* on ch. ii.; regarding the composition of the word, see on 2 Cor. xii. 20. The latter signification is to be retained in all passages of the N. T. 2 Cor. xii. 20; Gal. v. 20; Phil. i. 16, ii. 3; James iii. 14, 16. — οἱ ἐξ ἐριθείας are therefore the *intriguers, the partisan actors*; whose will and striving are conducive not to the truth (for that in fact is a power of an entirely different kind, opposed to their character), but to *immorality*, wherefore there is added, as further characterizing them: *καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι*. Compare Ignatius, *ad Philad.* 8, where the opposite of *ἐριθ.* is the *χριστομάθεια*, i.e. the discipleship of Christ, which excludes all selfish partisan effort. *Haughtiness* (as van Hengel explains it), and the *craving for self-assertion* (Mehring and Hofmann) are combined with it, but are not what the word itself signifies. The interpretation formerly usual: *qui sunt ex contentione* (Vulg.), *those fond of strife* (Origen, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Beza, Calvin, etc.), which was understood for the most part as *those rebelling against God*, is based partly on the erroneous derivation from *ἐρις*, partly on the groundless assumption that in the other passages of the N. T. the sense of *quarrelsomeness* is necessary. Since this is not the case, Reiche's conjecture is irrelevant, that the *vulgar usus loquendi* had erroneously derived the word from *ἐρις* and had lent to it the corresponding signification. Köllner explains it rightly as *partisanship*, but gratuitously assumes that this was a special designation for "*godless character*" in general. So in substance also Fritzsche: "*homines nequam.*" The very addition, further describing these men, *καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι . . . ἀδικία*, quite allows us to suppose that Paul had before his mind the strict and proper meaning of the word *partisanship*; and it is therefore unwarrantable to base the common but linguistically erroneous explanation on the affinity between the notions of partisanship and of contentiousness (Philippi). The question to be determined is not the category of ideas to which the *ἐριθεύειν* belongs, but the definite individual idea which it expresses. — ὁργή κ. θυμός] sc. ἔσται. In the animation of his

¹ Baeuml. *Partik.* p. 150, also Xen. *Mem.* i. 3, 1.

² Homer, xviii. 550, 580; Hesiod, *ἔργ.* 600 f.;

Dem. 1313, 6; LXX. Is. xxxviii. 12. See Valck. *ad Theocr. Adonias.* p. 373. Compare *συνέριθος* frequent in Greek authors.

description Paul has broken off the construction previously followed. To connect these words with what follows (Mehring) disturbs unnecessarily the important symmetry of the passage. On the distinction between the two words, see Tittman's *Synon.* p. 131 ff. θυμός : *vehement passion*, in Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 9, 21 rendered *exandescencia*, here, as also in Gal. v. 20, Eph. iv. 31, Col. iii. 8, Rev. xvi. 19, xix. 15, often also in the O. T. and the Apocrypha, made known by its combination with ὀργή, and by its being put last as the more vehement, as the holy divine *wrath*.¹

Vv. 9, 10. Emphatic recapitulation of vv. 7 and 8, inverting the order, and in addition, giving special prominence to the universality of the retribution. The placing the *penal* retribution first gives to this an aspect the more threatening and alarming, especially as the terms expressing it are now accumulated in one breath. — θλίψις κ. στενοχωρία] *Tribulation and anguish*, sc. *estai*. The calamity is thus described as pressing upon them from without (θλίψις), and as felt inwardly with the sense of its being beyond help (στενοχ.), viii. 35 ; 2 Cor. iv. 7, vi. 12 ; compare LXX. Is. xxx. 6 ; Deut. xxviii. 53. — ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρ.] denotes not simply “upon every man” (so even Philippi), but “upon every soul which belongs to a man” who practises evil. The ψυχή is thereby designated as that which is affected by the θλίψ. κ. στενοχ. (Acts ii. 43 ; Matt. xxvi. 28, *al.*) ; comp. Winer, p. 147 [E. T. 156]. It is the part which *feels* the pain.² — πῶτον] Quite as in i. 16. The Jews, as the people of God, in possession of the revelation with its promises and threatenings, are therefore necessarily also those upon whom the retribution of judgment—not the reward merely, but also the punishment—has to find in the first instance its execution. In both aspects they have the priority based on their position in the history of salvation as the theocratic people, and that as certainly as God is impartial. “Judæi particeps Græcus,” Bengel. The Jewish conceit is counteracted in the first clause by Ἰουδαίων τε πῶτον, in the second by καὶ Ἑλλήνων, and counteracted with sternly consistent earnestness. The second πῶτον precludes our taking the first as *ironical* (Reiche). — εἰρήνη] *welfare*, by which is intended that of the Messiah's kingdom, as in viii. 6. It is not materially different from the ἀφθαρσία and ζωὴ αἰώνιος of ver. 7 ; the totality of that which had already been described in special aspects by δόξα and τιμή (comp. on ver. 7). — Regarding the distinction between ἐργαζ. and κατεργαζ. (*works* and *brings to pass*) see on i. 27.

Ver. 11. Ground assigned for vv. 9 and 10, so far as concerns the Ἰουδ. πρ. κ. Ἑλλήν. — προσωποληψία] Partial preference from personal considerations. See on Gal. ii. 6. Melancthon : “dare aequalia inequalibus vel inequalia aequalibus.” The ground specified is directed against the Jewish theocratic fancy. Comp. Acts x. 34 f. ; Ecclus. xxxii. (xxxv.) 15.

Ver. 12. Assigns the ground in point of fact for the proposition contained in ver. 11, in special reference to the future judgment of condemnation.³ — ἀνόμως] *i.e. without the standard of the law* (without having had it).

¹ Compare Isoc. xii. 81 : ὀργῆς κ. θυμοῦ μεστοί. Herodian, viii. 4, 1 : ὀργή κ. θυμῷ χρώμενος. Lucian, *de calumn.* 23, *al.*

² See Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, II. p. 101 ff.

³ Only in reference to the judgment of condemnation, because the idea of a Messi-

[See Note XIX. p. 107.] Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 21; Wisd. xvii. 2. Those whose sins were not transgressions of the Mosaic law (but of the moral law of nature), the sinful Gentiles, shall be transferred into the penal state of eternal death without the standard of the law, without having their condemnation decided in accordance with the requirements of a νόμος to which they are strangers. The ἀπολούνται, which is to set in at the final judgment, not through natural necessity (Mangold), is the opposite of the σωτηρία, i. 16, of the ζήσεται, i. 17, of the ζωὴ αἰώνιος, ii. 7, of the δόξα κ.τ.λ., ii. 10; comp. John iii. 15; Rom. xiv. 15; 1 Cor. i. 18. This very ἀπολούνται should of itself have precluded commentators from finding in the second ἀνόμως an element of mitigation (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius), as if it was meant to exclude the severity of the law. The immoral Gentiles may not hope to remain unpunished on account of their non-possession of the law; punished they shall be independently of the standard of the law. This is the confirmation of the ἀπροσωποληψία of God on the one side, in regard to the Gentiles.—The καί before ἀπολ. is the also of a corresponding relation, but not between ἀνόμως and ἀνόμως, as if Paul had written καὶ ἀνόμ. ἀπολ., but between ἡμαρτον and ἀπολ.: as they have sinned without law, so shall they also perish without law. In this way ἀνόμως retains the emphasis of the specific how. Compare the following. The praeterite ἡμαρτον is spoken from the standpoint of the time of the judgment. — καὶ ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ κ.τ.λ.] This gives the other aspect of the case, with reference to the Jews, who do not escape the judgment (of condemnation) on account of their privilege of possessing the law, but on the contrary are to be judged by means of the law, so that sentence shall be passed on them in virtue of it (see Deut. xxvii. 26; comp. John v. 45). — ἐν νόμῳ] Not on the law (Luther), which would be εἰς νόμον, but the opposite of ἀνόμως: with the law, i.e. in possession of the law, which they had as a standard,¹ Winer, p. 361 [E. T. 386]. On νόμος without the article, used of the Mosaic law, see Winer, p. 117 [E. T. 123]. So frequently in the Apocrypha, and of particular laws also in classical writers. To question this use of it in the N. T. (van Hengel, Th. Schott, Hofmann, and others) opens the way for artificial and sometimes intolerable explanations of the several passages. — κριθήσ.] an unsought change of the verb, suggested by διὰ νόμον.

Ver. 13 proves the correctness of the proposition, so much at variance with the fancy of the Jews, ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἡμαρτον, διὰ νόμον κριθήσονται.—The placing of vv. 13–15 in a parenthesis, as after Beza's example, is done by Grotius, Griesbach, and others, also by Reiche and Winer, is to be rejected, because ver. 13, which cannot be placed in a parenthesis alone (as Koppe and Mehring do), is closely joined with what immediately precedes, and it is only in ver. 14 that an intervening thought is introduced by way

anic bliss of unbelievers was necessarily foreign to the Apostle; as indeed in vv. 7 and 10 he was under the necessity of describing those to whom Messianic bliss was to be given in recompense, in terms of a Christian character.

¹ This opposition does not extend beyond the νόμον μὴ ἔχειν and νόμον ἔχειν, ver. 14. Therefore ἐν νόμῳ is not: within the law as the divine order of common life (comp. iii. 19) as Hofmann takes it.

of illustration. The parenthesis is (with Baumgarten-Crusius) to be limited to vv. 14, 15, as is done also by Lachmann. See on ver. 16. — οἱ ἀκροαταί] A reference to the public reading of the Thorah on the Sabbath. Comp. Acts xv. 21 ; 2 Cor. iii. 14 ; John xii. 34 ; Josephus, *Antt.* v. 1, 26, v. 2, 7. The *substantive* brings out more forcibly than the *participial* form of expression would have done the *characteristic* feature : *those, whose business is hearing.*¹ — παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ] ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ iii. 20, *according to God's judgment.* 1 Cor. iii. 9 ; 2 Thess. i. 6 ; Winer, p. 369 [E. T. 395]. — δικαιοθής.] *They shall be declared as righteous, normal.* See on i. 17. This οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμον δικαιοθήσονται is the general fundamental law of God who judges with righteousness (Gal. iii. 12) ; a fundamental law which required to be urged here in proof of the previous assertion ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἡμαρτον, διὰ ν. κριθῶσ. Compare Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* § 87. How in the event of its being impossible for a man to be a true ποιητὴς νόμον (iii. 9 ff.) faith comes in and furnishes a δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως, and then how man, by means of the καινότης ζωῆς (vi. 4) attained through faith, must and can fulfil (viii. 4) the law completed by Christ (the νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς, viii. 2), were topics not belonging to the present discussion. Compare on ver. 6. “Haec descriptio est justitia legis, quae nihil impedit alia dicta de justitia fidei,” Melancthon.

Vv. 14–16. The οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμον δικαιοθήσονται just asserted did not require proof with regard to the Jews. But, as the regulative principle of the last judgment, it could not but appear to need proof with regard to the *Gentiles*, since that fundamental rule might seem to admit of no application to those who sin ἀνόμως and perish ἀνόμως. Now the *Gentiles*, though beyond the pale of the Mosaic law and not incurring condemnation according to the standard of that law, yet possess in the moral law of nature a certain substitute for the Mosaic law not given to them. It is in virtue of this state of things that they present themselves, not as excepted from the above rule οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμον δικαιοθ., but as subjected to it ; namely, in the indirect way that they, although ἄνομοι in the positive sense, have nevertheless in the natural law a substitute for the positive one—which is apparent, as often as Gentiles do by nature that which the positive Mosaic law not given to them enjoins. The connection may therefore be paraphrased somewhat thus : “*With right and reason I say : the doers of the law shall be justified ; for as to the case of the Gentiles, that ye may not regard them as beyond reach of that rule, it is proved in fact by those instances, in which Gentiles, though not in possession of the law of Moses, do by nature the requirements of this law, that they are the law unto themselves, because, namely, they thereby show that its obligation stands written in their hearts,*” etc. It is to be observed at the same time that Paul does not wish to prove a justification of the *Gentiles* really occurring as a *result* through the fulfilment of their natural law—a misconception against which he has already guarded himself in ver. 12,—but he desires simply to establish the *regulative principle* of justification through the law in the case of the *Gentiles*. Real actual justification by the law takes place neither among Jews nor Gentiles ; because in no case is there a complete fulfil-

¹ Compare Theile, *ad Jac.* i. 22, p. 76.

ment, either, among the Jews, of the revealed law, or, among the Gentiles, of the natural law—which in fact is only a substitute for the former, but at the same time forms the limit beyond which their responsibility and their judgment cannot in principle go, because they have nothing higher (in opposition to Philippi, who refers to the πλήρωμα νόμου, xiii. 10).—The connection of thought between ver. 14 and what precedes it has been very variously apprehended. According to Koppe (compare Calvin, Flatt, and Mehring) vv. 14–16 prove the condemnation of the Gentiles asserted in ver. 12, and ver. 17 ff. that of the Jews; while ver. 13 is a parenthesis. But, seeing that in the whole development of the argument γάρ always refers to what immediately precedes, it is even in itself an arbitrary proceeding to make ὅταν γάρ in ver. 14, without any evident necessity imposed by the course of thought, refer to ver. 12, and to treat ver. 13, although it contains a very appropriate reason assigned for the second part of ver. 12, as a parenthesis to be broken off from connection with what follows; and decisive against this view are the words ἡ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων in ver. 15, which place it beyond doubt that vv. 14–16 were not intended as a proof of the ἀπολοῦνται in ver. 12. Philippi regards ver. 14 as establishing only the first half of ver. 13: “not the hearers of the law are just before God, for even the Gentiles have a law, *i.e.* for even the Gentiles are ἀκροαταὶ τοῦ νόμου.” But we have no right to exclude thus from the reference of the γάρ just the very assertion immediately preceding, and to make it refer to a purely negative clause which had merely served to pave the way for this assertion. The reference to the negative half of ver. 13 would only be warranted in accordance with the text, had Paul, as he might have done, inverted the order of the two parts of ver. 13, and so given to the negative clause the second place.¹ And the less *could* a reader see reason to refer the γάρ to this negative clause in the position in which the Apostle has placed it, since ver. 14 speaks of Gentiles who *do* the law, by which the attention was necessarily directed, not to the negative, but to the affirmative, half of ver. 13 (οἱ ποιηταὶ κ.τ.λ.).² Such a mode of presenting the connection is even more arbitrary than if we should supply after ver. 13 the thought: “*and therewith also the Gentiles*” (Köllner and others), which however is quite unnecessary. Our view is in substance that given already by Chrysostom (οὐκ ἐκβάλλω τὸν νόμον, φησὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαῖω τὰ ἔθνη), Erasmus, and others; more recently by Tholuck, Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, van Hengel, Ewald, Th. Schott, though with very various modifications.

Ver. 14. Ὅταν] *quando*, supposes a case which may take place at any time, and whose frequent occurrence is possible, as “*eventus ad experientiam revocatus*” (Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 689): *in the case if, so often as.*—γάρ] introducing the *proof* that the proposition of ver. 13 also holds of the

¹ Only thus—but not as Paul has actually placed it—could the *negative* clause be regarded as the *chief* thought, for which Philippi is obliged to take it, p. 54 f. 3d ed.

² These reasons may also be urged against

Hofmann, who, substantially like Philippi, takes vv. 14–16 as a proof, *that in the matter of righteousness before God nothing can depend on whether one belongs to the number of those who hear the law read to them.*

Gentiles. See above. — ἐθνη] not to be understood of the *Gentiles collectively*, to which Reiche, de Wette, Köllner, Philippi refer it—for this must have been expressed by the article (against which view neither ix. 30 nor iii. 29, nor 1 Cor. i. 23, is to be adduced), and the putting of the case ὅταν . . . ποιῇ with respect to the heathen generally would be in itself untrue—but Paul means rather *Gentiles among whom the supposed case occurs.* — τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα] *they who have not the law*; a more precise definition bearing on the case, and bringing forward the point on which here the argument turns. See Winer, p. 127 [E. T. 139]. Observe the distinction between μὴ νόμον ἔχ. and νόμον μὴ ἔχ. The former negatives—while the contrast of the φύσει floats before the mind—the possession of the *law*, instead of which they have merely a natural analogue of it;¹ the latter negatives the *possession* of the law, which *is wanting* to them, whilst the Jews *have* it. — φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμον ποιῇ] Most expositors uphold this connection, including Rückert, 2d ed. On the other hand Bengel and Usteri join φύσει τοῦ μὴ νόμ. ἔχοντα, but thus make it superfluous and even unsuitable, and deprive it of all weight in the connection, especially as the word φύσις has here no other sense than *nativa indoles*, i.e. the original constitution given with existence, and not moulded by any extraneous training, culture, or other influence beyond the endowments of nature and their natural development (comp. on Eph. ii. 3); φύσει: “*quia natura eorum ita fert*,” Stalb. *ad Plat. Phædr.* p. 249. The *dative* denotes the mediating cause. And that it is the *moral prompting of conscience left to itself*, which Paul means by φύσει in contrast to the *divine leading of the law*, is plain from ver. 15. The φύσει ποιεῖν lies beyond the sphere of positive revelation and its promptings, leadings, etc. It takes place in virtue of an indoles *ingenita*, not *interventu disciplinæ divinæ formata*, so that the thought of an operation of grace or of the Logos taking place apart from Christ is quite foreign to this passage, and its affirmation is not in harmony with the *truncus et lapis* of the Formula Concordiæ.² — τὰ τοῦ νόμον] *what belongs to the law*, i.e. *its constituent elements, its precepts.* Paul does not say simply τὸν νόμον; for he is thinking not of Gentiles who fulfil the law as a whole, but of those who in concrete cases by their action respond to the particular portions of the law concerned. Compare Luthardt *l.c.* p. 409. The close relation, in which the ποιεῖν τὰ τοῦ νόμον here stands to ποιηταὶ νόμον in ver. 13, is fatal to the view of Beza, Joh. Cappell., Elsner, Wetstein, Michaelis, Flatt, and Mehring, who explain it as *quæ lex facit*, namely, the commanding, convincing, condemning, etc. — ἐν τοῖς εἰς νόμος] *They are the law unto themselves*, i.e. their moral nature, with its voice of conscience commanding and forbidding, supplies to their own Ego the place of the revealed law possessed by the Jews. Thus in that ποιεῖν they serve for themselves as a regulator of the conduct that agrees with the divine law.³ Observe further that here, where the participle stands *without the article*—consequently not οἱ νόμ. μὴ

¹ Compare Stalb. *ad Plat. Crit.* p. 47 D.

² See the later discussions of dogmatic writers as to this point in Luthardt, *v. freien Willen*, p. 366 ff.

³ For parallels (Manil. v. 495, *al.*: *ipse sibi lex est*, Arist. Nicom. iv. 14: νόμος ὡς αὐτῷ *al.*) see Wetstein; compare also Porph. *ad Marc.* 25, p. 304.

ἔχοντες (as previously τὰ μὴ . . . ἔχοντα)—it is to be resolved by *since* they, *because* they ; which however does not convey the idea : because they *are* conscious of the absence of the law (as Hofmann objects), but rather : because this want *occurs* in their case. See Buttmann's *neut. Gr.* p. 301 [E. T. 306]. The resolution by *although* (Th. Schott) is opposed to the connection ; that by *while* (Hofmann) fails to convey the definite and logical meaning ; which is, that Gentiles, in the cases indicated by ὅταν κ.τ.λ. would not be ἐαυτοῖς νόμος, if they had the *positive* law.—The οὗτοι comprehends emphatically the subjects in question.¹

Ver. 15. Οἵτινες κ.τ.λ.] *quippe qui*. See on i. 25. The οὗτοι of ver. 14 are characterized, and consequently the ἐαυτοῖς εἰσὶ νόμος, just asserted, is confirmed : *being such as show* (practically by their action, ver. 14, make it known) *that the work of the law is written in their hearts, wherewithal their conscience bears joint witness, etc.*—That ἐνδείκνυνται should be understood of the *practical* proof which takes place by the ποιεῖν τὰ τοῦ νόμου (not by the testimony of conscience, Bengel, Tholuck) is required by the συν in συμμαρτυρούσης, which is not a mere strengthening of the simple word (Köllner, Olshausen ; comp. Tholuck, following earlier expositors ; see, on the other hand viii. 16, ix. 1), but denotes the *agreement of the internal evidence of conscience with the external proof by fact*.² It is impossible to regard the ἐνδείκνυνται as taking place on the day indicated in ver. 16 (Hofmann), since this day can be no other than that of the last judgment. See on ver. 16. —τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου] *The work relating to the law, the conduct corresponding to it, fulfilling it*. The opposite is ἀμαρτήματα νόμων, Wisd. ii. 12. Compare on Gal. ii. 16. The singular is collective (Gal. vi. 4), as a summing up of the ἔργα τ. νόμου (iii. 20, 28, ix. 32 ; Gal. ii. 16, iii. 2, 5, 10). Compare τὰ τοῦ νόμου above. This stands written in their hearts as *commanded, as moral obligation*,³ as ethical law of nature. —γραπτὸν] purposely chosen with reference to the *written* law of Moses, although the moral law is ἀγραφος.⁴

¹ Kühner, II. 1, p. 568 ; Buttmann *l.c.* p. 262 f.

² Where συμμαρτυρεῖν appears to be equivalent to μαρτυρ., it is only an *apparent* equivalence ; there is always mentally implied an agreement *with the person for whom witness is borne*, as e.g. Thuc. viii. 51, 2 ; Plat. *Hipp. Maj.* p. 282 B : συμμαρτυρῆσαι δέ σοι ἔχω ὅτι ἀληθὴ λέγεις, if that is meant is not a testimony agreeing with *others* (as Xen. *Hist. Gr.* vii. 1, 2, iii. 3, 2), or, as here, one that agrees with a *thing*, a phenomenon, a proof by fact, or the like. Compare Isoc. p. 47 A. In the passage, Plat. *Legg.* iii. p. 680 D, ἐνμαρτυρεῖν is expressly distinguished from μαρτυρ. ; for, after the τῷ σὺ λόγῳ εἴκοι μαρτυρεῖν preceding, the ναί· ἐνμαρτυρεῖ γάρ must mean : *he is my joint-witness*, whose evidence agrees with what I say. If the reference of συμ. in our passage to the proof by fact be not adopted, then αὐτοῖς would need be supplied ; but wherefore should we do so ? Ac-

cording to Tholuck συμ. indicates merely the agreement of the person witnessing with the contents of his testimony. This is never the case, and would virtually deprive the συμ. of all significance.

³ This inward law is not the conscience itself, but the regulative contents of the consciousness of the conscience ; consequently, if we conceive the latter, and with justice (in opposition to Rud. Hofmann, *Lehre vom Gewissen*, 1866, p. 54, 58 f.), as presented in the form of a syllogism, it forms the subject of the major premise of this syllogism. Comp. Delitzsch, *bibl. Psychol.* p. 136 f.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* p. 481 B, Thuc. ii. 37, 3, and Krüger, *in loc.* p. 200 ; Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4, 19 ; Soph. *Ant.* 450 ; Dem. 317, 23, 639, 32 ; Dion. Hal. vii. 41). Compare Jer. xxxi. 33 ; Heb. viii. 10, and the similar designations among the Rabbins in Buxtorf, *Lex Talm.* p. 852, 1349.

The supplying of *ὅν* serves to explain the adjective, which is used instead of the participle to denote what continues and is constant.¹ — *συμμερτυρούσης αὐτῶν συνειδήσεως, καὶ μετὰ κ.τ.λ.*] while they make known *outwardly by their action* that the *ἔργον* of the law is written in their hearts, their *inner moral consciousness* accords with it; namely (1), in reference to their own, *personal* relation: *the testimony of their own consciences*; and (2), in regard to their *mutual* relation: *the accusations or vindications*² that are carried on between Gentiles and Gentiles (*μετὰ ἀλλήλων*) by their thoughts, by their moral judgments. This view of the sense is required by the correlation of the points *αὐτῶν* and *μετὰ ἀλλήλων* placed with emphasis in the foreground (*μετὰ* occurring in Paul's writings only here, and therefore all the more intentionally chosen in this case); so that thus both the *personal individual* testimony of conscience (*αὐτῶν*) and the *mutual* judgment of the thoughts (*μετὰ ἀλλήλων*), are adduced, as accompanying internal acts, in confirmation of the *ἐνδείκνυνται*. The Gentiles, who do the requirement of the law, practically show thereby that requirement is inscribed on their hearts; and this is attested at the same time, so far as concerns the *actors themselves*, by their (following) *conscience*, and, so far as concerns their relation to *other Gentiles*, by the *accusations* or the *vindications* which they reciprocally practise in their moral thoughts, the one making reflections of a condemnatory or of a justifying nature on the other.³ The prominence thus given to *αὐτῶν* and *μετὰ ἀλλήλων*, and the antithetical correlation of the two points, have been commonly misunderstood (though not by Castalio, Storr, Flatt, Baumgarten-Crusius), and consequently *κ. μετ. ἀλλ. τῶν διαλογ. κ.τ.λ.* has been taken merely as an *explanatory description of the process of conscience*, in which the thoughts accuse or vindicate one another (i.e. *one thought the other*); so that *ἀλλήλων* is referred to the *thoughts*, and not, as is nevertheless required by the *αὐτῶν* standing in contradistinction to it, to the *ἔθνη*. This view ought even to have been precluded by attending to the fact that, since *συμμερτ. . . . συνειδήσεως* must, in harmony with the context, mean the *approving* conscience [See Note XX. p. 108.], what follows cannot well suit as an exposition, because in it the *κατηγορούντων* preponderates. Finally, it was an arbitrary expedient, rendering *μετὰ* merely superfluous and confusing, to *separate* it from *ἀλλήλ.*, and to explain the former as meaning *at a future time*, viz. *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κ.τ.λ.* (Koppe), or *between, at the same time* (Köllner, Jatho).

Ver. 16 has its connection with what goes before very variously defined. While Ewald goes so far as to join it with ver. 5, and regards everything intervening as a parenthesis, many, and recently most expositors, have connected it with the immediately preceding *συμμερτ. . . . ἀπολογ.*; in which

¹ Compare Bornemann, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 5, 1; *Symp.* 4, 25. See the truly classic description of this inner law, and that as divine, in Cicero, *de Republ.* iii. 23; of the Greeks, comp. Soph. *O. T.* 838 ff., and Wunder, *in loc.*

² The *καὶ* added to the *ἦ* is based on the

view taken of the moral state of the Gentiles, that the *κατηγορεῖν* forms the *rule*. See Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 126.

³ Compare Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 277: "It is testified by the conscience, which teaches them to judge the quality of *their own* and *others'* actions."

case, however, *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ* cannot be taken for *εἰς ἡμέραν* (Calvin), nor the *present* participles in a *future* sense (Fritzsche), since, in accordance with the context, they are *contemporary with ἐνδείκνυνται*. And for that very reason we must reject the view, which has been often assumed, that Paul suddenly transports himself from the present into the time of the judgment, when the exercise of conscience in the Gentiles will be specially active, and that for this reason he at once adds *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κ.τ.λ.* directly without inserting a *καὶ τοῦτο μάλιστα*, or *καὶ τοῦτο γενήσεται*, or the like (Rückert, Tholuck, de Wette, Reithmayr, Philippi, van Hengel, Umbreit; comp. Estius). The supposition of such an illogical and violent leap of thought in so clear and steady a thinker as Paul is thoroughly arbitrary and wholly without analogy. Moreover, the simple *temporal* self-judgment of the Gentiles fits into the connection so perfectly, that Paul cannot even have conceived of it as an *anticipation* of the last judgment (Mehring). Quite an incorrect thought, repugnant to ver. 12 and to the whole doctrinal system of the Apostle, is obtained by Luthardt (*v. freien Willen*, p. 410 f.), when, very arbitrarily joining it only with *ἡ καὶ ἀπολογούμενων*, he discovers here the hope “that to such the reconciling grace of Christ shall one day be extended.” This is not confirmed by ver. 26. A relative natural morality never in the N. T. supplies the place of faith, which is the absolutely necessary condition of reconciling grace. Compare iii. 9, 22, vii. 14 ff. *al.* Lastly Hofmann, who formerly held a view similar to Luthardt’s (see *Schriftbew.* I. p. 669), now connects *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κ.τ.λ.* to *ἐνδείκνυνται* in such a way, that he explains ver. 16 not at all of the final judgment, but, in contrast even to the latter, of *every day on which God causes the Gospel to be proclaimed among the Gentiles; every such day shall be for all, who hear the message, a day of inward judgment; whoever believingly accepts it, and embraces salvation, thereby proves that he himself demands from himself what the revealed law enjoins on those who possess it.* This interpretation, which would require us to read with Hofmann *κρίνει* (the present) instead of *κρινεῖ*, is as novel as it is erroneous. For the expressions in ver. 16 are so entirely those formally used to denote the *last judgment* (comp. on *ἡμέρᾳ* 1 Cor. i. 8, v. 5; 2 Cor. i. 14 *al.*; on *κρινεῖ*, vv. 2, 3, 5, iii. 6 *al.*; on *θεός* as the judge, iii. 6, xiv. 10, 12, *al.*; on *τὰ κρυπτά*, 1 Cor. iv. 5; on *διὰ Ἰησοῦ* X. 2 Cor. v. 10; Acts xvii. 31) that nothing else could occur to any reader than the conception of that judgment, which moreover has been present to the mind since ver. 2, and from which even *κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγ. μου* does not draw away the attention. Every element in Hofmann’s exposition is subjectively introduced, so that Paul could not have wrapped up the simple thought, which is supposed to be expressed in so precious a manner, in a more strange disguise—a thought, moreover, which is here utterly irrelevant, since Paul has to do simply with the natural law of the Gentiles in its relation to the revealed νόμος of Judaism, and apart as yet from all reference to the occurrence of their conversion; and hence also the comparison with Heb. iv. 12 is here out of place. The proper view of the passage depends on our *treating as a parenthesis*, not (with Winer and others) vv. 13–15, but with Lachmann, vv. 14, 15. This parenthetical insertion is already *indicated* as such by the fact,

that the great judicial proposition previously expressed : οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμον δικαιοῦνται is in vv. 14, 15 proved only with reference to a *part* of mankind, with regard to which it might seem possibly doubtful : it is *required* by the circumstance, that without it ἐν ἡμέρᾳ has no proper logical reference whatever ; and lastly, it is *confirmed* by the consideration that, if it is adopted, the whole is wound up not with an illustration having reference to the Gentiles, but—and how emphatically and solemnly !—with the leading thought of the whole discussion.¹ — τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνδρ.] *The hidden things of men, i.e.* everything in their inner or outer life which does not come to the knowledge of others at all, or not according to its moral quality. This *special* characteristic of the judgment is given with reference to ver. 13, inasmuch as it is just *such a judging* that is necessary for, and the preliminary to, the realization of what is affirmed in ver. 13. — κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον] contains, according to the *usual* view, the accordance of the assertion κρινεῖ ὁ Θεός τὰ κρυπτὰ τ. ἀνδρ. διὰ Ἰ. Χρ. with the Apostle's official proclamation of salvation. But *the fact* that God will judge, etc., was so universally known and so entirely undoubted, that the addition in that sense would have been in the highest degree superfluous ; and indeed the *μον* in that case would have no significance bearing on the matter, since *no one* proclaiming the Gospel could call in question that truth. We must therefore explain it, with Pareus, Calovius, and many others, including Umbreit and Hofmann, as referring to the *manner of the κρινεῖ*. Paul was so certain of the sole truth of the Gospel committed to him (xvi. 25 ; Eph. iv. 20 f.) which he had by revelation of God (Gal. i. 11 f.) that he could not but be equally certain that the future *judgment* would not be held otherwise than *according to his Gospel*, whose contents are conceived as the *standard of the sentence*. In that same Gospel he knew it to be divinely determined, to whom the στέφανος τῆς δικαιοσύνης, the eternal life and its δόξα, or on the other hand its opposite, eternal ἀπώλεια, should be awarded by the judge. But he knew at the same time the axiom announced in ver. 13, with which ver. 16 connects itself, to be not at variance therewith (comp. iii. 31) ; as indeed on the contrary, it is just in the Gospel that perfection in the fulfilment of the law is demanded, and accordingly (see ch. vi. 8, xiii. 8 ff.) the judicial recompense is determined conformably to the conduct, viii. 4 ; 2 Cor. v. 10 ; Eph. v. 5 ; 1 Cor. vi. 9 f. ; Gal. v. 19–23. On *μον* Calvin's note suffices : *sum appellat ratione ministerii*, and that, to distinguish it from the preaching not of other apostles, but of false, and especially of Judaizing teachers. Comp. xvi. 25 ; 2 Tim. ii. 8. The mistaken view is held by Origen, Jerome, and other Fathers,² that Paul meant by *his Gospel* that of *Luke*. — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χρ.] As He is the Mediator of eternal salvation, so also it is He who is commissioned by God to hold the judgment. Comp. Acts xvii. 30, 31 ; 1 Cor. iv. 5 ; 2 Cor. v. 10 *al.* ; John v. 27 ; Matt. xxv. 31.

Vv. 17–24. *The logical connection* of this “*oratio splendida ac vehemens*”

¹ There is therefore the less reason for assuming with Laurent that ver. 16 was a marginal note of the Apostle on ver. 13,

which was copied into the text at the wrong place.

² See Fabricius, *Cod. apocr.* p. 371 f.

(Estius), introduced once more in lively apostrophe,¹ *with what precedes* is to be taken thus : Paul has expressed in vv. 13-16 the rule of judgment, that not the hearers but the *doers* of the law shall in the judgment be justified. He wishes now vividly to bring home the fact, that the conduct of the Jews, with all their conceit as to the possession and knowledge of the law, is in sharp contradiction to that standard of judgment. The *δέ* and the emphatic *οὖν* are to be explained from the conception of the *contrast*, which the conduct of the Jews showed, to the proposition that only the doers *δικαιοῦνθαι*. As to the *construction* of vv. 17-23, the common assumption of an anakoluton, by which Paul in ver. 21 abandons the plan of the discourse started with *εἰ*, and introduces another turn by means of *οὖν*² is quite unnecessary. The discourse, on the contrary, is formed with regular and logically accurate connection as protasis (vv. 17-20) and apodosis, namely thus : *But if thou art called a Jew, and supportest thyself on the law, etc., down to ver. 20, dost thou* (interrogative apodosis, vv. 21, 22), *who accordingly* (*οὖν*, in accordance with what is specified in vv. 17-20) *teachest others, not teach thyself? Stealest thou, who preachest against stealing? Committest thou adultery, who forbiddest adultery? Plunderest thou temples, who abhorrest idols?* These questions present the contrast to the contents of the protasis as in the highest degree surprising, as something that one is at a loss how to characterize—and then follows in ver. 23, with trenchant precision, the explanation and decision regarding them in the *categorical* utterance : *Thou, who boastest thyself of the law, dishonourest God by the transgression of the law*, a result which is then in ver. 24 further confirmed by a testimony from the O. T. Ver. 23 also might indeed (as commonly explained) be taken as a *question* ; but, when taken as *declaratory*, the discourse presents a form far more finished, weighty and severe. Paul himself, by abandoning the participial expression uniformly employed four times previously, seems to indicate the cessation of the course hitherto pursued. According to this exposition of the connection, in which it must not be overlooked that *the force of the οὖν in ver. 21 is limited solely to the relation of the ὁ διδάσκων ἕτερον* and the following *participles to what has been said before*,³ we must reject the view of Benecke, Glöckler, and Hofmann that the apodosis only begins with ver. 23, but in ver. 21 f. there is a continuation of the hypothetical protasis—an idea which cannot be tolerated, especially at the beginning of the new form of discourse (the antithetical), without repetition of the *εἰ*. Paul would have written *εἰ οὖν ὁ διδάσκων κ.τ.λ.* (compare Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 178). Th. Schott erroneously finds in *ἐπαπαύειν* and *καυχᾶσαι* the apodosis, which is then explained.

Vv. 17-20 contain the protasis, whose tenor of *censure* (called in question

¹ To the *Jews*, not to the *Jewish-Christians*. Respecting the composition and character of the Roman congregation nothing can be inferred from this rhetorical form of expression. Comp. Th. Schott, p. 188 f.

² See Winer, p. 529 [E. T. 569]; Buttmann, p. 331 [E. T. 386].

³ This is the well-known *epanaleptic οὖν*,

gathering up and resuming what had been said previously. Regarding the frequency of its use also in Greek writers to introduce the apodosis, especially after a *lengthened* protasis, see Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 23 f.; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 718. Comp. Bengel on ver. 17.

without ground by Th. Schott and Hofmann) reveals itself at first gently, but afterwards, ver. 19 f., with greater force.—Ἰουδαῖος ἐπονομάζῃ] *if thou art named "Jew."* This was the theocratic title of honour opposed to heathenism (יהודה), see Philo, *Alleg.* I. p. 55 B, *de plant. Noë*, p. 233 A). Comp. Rev. ii. 9. So much the less therefore is ἐπονομάζ. to be here understood of a *surname* (Bengel). Full effect is given to the compound in classic writers also by the notion of name-giving, *imposing the name*.¹ Van Hengel arbitrarily imports the idea: *pro veteri nomine (Israelitarum) novum substituens*. —ἐπανάπαυη τῷ νόμῳ] *acquiescis, thou reliest* (Mic. iii. 11; 1 Macc. viii. 12; see Wetstein) *on the law*, comp. John v. 45, as if the possession and knowledge of it were to thee the guarantee of salvation. The rest, *of not being obliged first of all to seek* what God's will is (Hofmann), cannot be meant; since such a seeking cannot be separated from the possession of the law, but is on the contrary directed to that very law (see ver. 18). But in the law the Jew saw the *magna charta of his assurance of salvation*. He relied upon it. —ἐν Θεῷ] As being the exclusive Father and Protector of the nation. Comp. Gen. xvii. 7; Is. xlv. 25; Jer. xxxi. 33. Observe the climax of the three points in ver. 17. The ἐν with καθ. (2 Cor. x. 15; Gal. vi. 13), a verb which in Greek authors is joined with ἐπὶ or εἰς or the accusative, denotes that, *wherein* the καθ. rests, according to the analogy of χαίρειν, τέρπασθαι ἐν.² —Ver. 18, τὸ θέλημα] κατ' ἐξοχήν. *Whose will it was, that was to be obeyed on the part of man, was obvious of itself*. Comp. on ὄνομα Acts v. 41. —δοκιμάξεις τὰ διαφέρ.] *Thou approvest the excellent*. Respecting the *lexical* correctness of this rendering comp. on Phil. i. 10. Its correctness in accordance with the connection is plain from the climactic relation, in which the two elements of ver. 18 must stand to each other. "Thou knowest the will of God and approvest (theoretically) the excellent" —therewith Paul has conceded to the Jews all possible *theory* of the ethical, *up to the limit of practice*. Others, taking δοκιμάζειν as to *prove*, explain τὰ διαφέροντα as meaning *that which is different*; and this either (comp. Heb. v. 14) of the *distinction between right and wrong* (Theodoret, Theophylact, Estius, Grotius and others, including Reiche, Rückert, Tholuck, Fritzsche, Krehl, Philippi, van Hengel, Th. Schott), or *that which is different from the will of God, i.e. what is wrong, sinful* (Clericus, Glöckler, Mehring, Hofmann; compare Beza). But, after γινώσκεις τὸ θέλημα, how tame and destructive of the climax is either explanation! The Vulgate rightly renders: "probas utiliora." Compare Luther, Erasmus, Castalio, Bengel, Flatt, Ewald. —κατηχούμ. ἐκ τ. νόμου] *Being instructed out of the law* (through the public reading and exposition of it in the synagogues, comp. ἀκροάται, ver. 13), namely as to the will of God, and as to that which is excellent. —Vv. 19, 20 now describe, with a reference not to be mistaken (in opposition to Th. Schott and Hofmann) to the Jewish presumption and disposition to proselytize (Matt. xxiii. 15), the influence which the Jews, in virtue of their theoretic insight, fancied that they exercised over the Gentiles. The

¹ See Plat. *Crat.* p. 397 E, p. 406 A; *Phædr.* p. 238 A *al.*; Xen. *Oec.* 6, 17; Thuc. ii. 29, 3;

Polyb. i. 29, 2; comp. Gen. iv. 17, 25 f.

² Bernhardt, p. 211; Kühner, II. 1, p. 403.

accumulated asyndetic designations of the same thing lend lively force to the description. They are not to be regarded with Reiche as reminiscences from the Gospels (Matt. xv. 14 ; Luke xx. 32, ii. 32) ; for apart from the fact that at least no canonical Gospel had at that time been written, the figurative expressions themselves which are here used were very current among the Jews and elsewhere. See, *e.g.* Wetstein on Matt. xv. 14. Observe, further, that Paul does not continue here with the conjunctive *καί*, but with the adjunctive *τέ*, because what follows contains the conduct determined by and dependent on the elements of ver. 18, and not something independent.¹—*σεαυτὸν ὁδηγ.* κ.τ.λ.] *that thou thyself for thy part*, in virtue of this aptitude received from the law, etc. *πέποιθα*, accompanied by the accusative with the infinitive, occurs only here in the N. T., and rarely in Greek authors (Aesch. *Sept.* 444).—*παιδευτὴν* κ.τ.λ.] *trainer of the foolish, teacher of those in nonage.*²—*τὴν μόρφωσιν τ. γνώσ. κ. τ. ἀλήθ.*] *the form of knowledge and of the truth.* In the doctrines and precepts of the law, religious knowledge and divine truth, both in the objective sense, attain the conformation and exhibition (Ewald : “embodiment”) proper to them, *i.e.* corresponding to their nature (hence *τὴν μόρφ.*), so that we possess in the law those lineaments which, taken collectively, compose the *σχηματισμός* (Hesychius) of knowledge and truth and thus bring them to adequate intellectual cognizance. Truth and knowledge have become in the law *ἐμμορφος* (Plut. *Num.* 8, *Mor.* p. 428 F), or *μορφοειδής* (Plut. *Mor.* p. 735 A). Paul adds this *ἔχοντα τὴν μόρφ. τ. γν. κ. τ. ἀλ.* as an illustrative definition (*ut qui habeas*, etc.) to all the points previously adduced ; and in doing so he places himself entirely at the Jewish point of view (comp. *Wisd.* xxiv. 32 ff.), and speaks according to their mode of conception ; hence the view which takes *μόρφ.* here as the mere *appearance* (2 Tim. iii. 5), in contrast to the reality, is quite erroneous (in opposition to *τινές* in Theophylact, Oecumenius, Pareus, Olshausen). Even Paul himself could not possibly find in the law merely the *appearance* of truth (iii. 21, 31).³

Vv. 21, 22. Apodosis interrogating with lively indignation. See generally, and respecting *οὖν*, above on vv. 17–24. The *form* of the questions is expressive of *surprise at the existence* of an incongruity so much at variance with the protases, ver. 17 f. ; it must have been in fact *impossible*. So also in 1 Cor. vi. 2.—*Dost thou, who teachest others accordingly, not teach thine own self?* namely, a better way of thinking and living than thou showest by thy conduct.⁴—The following infinitives do not include in themselves the idea of *dein* or *εἰσὶναι*,⁵ but find their explanation in the idea of *commanding*, which is implied in the finite verbs.⁶—*ὁ βδελυσσόμενος τὰ εἰδωλα ἱεροσυλεῖς*] *Thou, who abhorrest idols, dost thou plunder temples?* This is necessarily to be

¹ Comp. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 790.

² Comp. Plat. *Pol.* x. p. 598 C : *παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄφρονας.*

³ On *μόρφωσις* compare Theophrastus *h. pl.* iii. 7, 4, and *διαμόρφωσις* in Plut. *Mor.* p. 1023 C.

⁴ Analogous passages expressing this con-

trast (comp. LXX. Ps. i. 16 ff. ; Ignat. *Eph.* 15) from Greek and Rabbinical authors may be seen in Wetstein.

⁵ See Lobeck *ad Phryn.* p. 753 f.

⁶ See Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 2, 1, *Anab.* v. 7, 34 ; Heindorf, *ad Plat. Prot.* p. 346 B ; Wunder, *ad Soph. O.* C. 837.

understood of the plundering of *idols' temples* (with Chrysostom, Theophylact,¹ Clericus, Wetstein, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Fritzsche, de Wette, Tholuck, Philippi, Mehring (Rückert indecisively); as is required by the anti-thetic relation in which *ιεροσυλεις* stands to the *βδελυσσόμεν. τὰ εἰδωλα*. "Thou who holdest all contact with idols as a detestable pollution—dost thou lay plundering hands on their temples?" *Abhorrence of idols* and (not, it might be, temple-destruction, Deut. vii. 25, but greedy) *temple-plundering*²—Paul could not have placed at the close of his reproachful questions a contrast between theory and practice more incisively affecting Jewish feeling. That robbery of temples actually occurred among the Jews, may justly be inferred from Acts xix. 37, but especially from Josephus, *Antt.* iv. 8, 10.³ It is differently explained by Pelagius, Pareus, Toletus, Grotius, Heumann, Michaelis, Cramer, Reiche, Glöckler, Reithmayr, van Hengel, Ewald, and Hofmann, who understand it of robbing the *Jewish temple* by the embezzlement or curtailment of the temple-moneys and sacrifices (for proofs of this crime, see Josephus, *Antt.* viii. 3, 5 f.), by withholding the temple tribute, and the like.⁴ Luther, Calvin, Bengel, and others, including Morus, Flatt, Köllner, and Umbreit, interpret it, with still more deviation from the proper sense, as denoting the "*profanatio divinæ majestatis*" (Calvin generally.⁵ Compare Luther's gloss, "Thou art a robber of God; for it is God's glory which all who would be holy through works take from Him." Such unjustifiable deviations from the literal sense would not have been resorted to, if attention had been directed on the one hand to the actual unity of the object in the whole of the antitheses, and on the other to the appropriate climax: *theft, adultery, robbery of idols' temples*.

Ver. 23 gives to the four questions of reproachful astonishment the decisive categorical answer. See above on vv. 17–24. [See Note XXI. p. 108.] — *διὰ τῆς παραβ. τ. νόμον*] To this category belonged especially the *ιεροσυλειν*; for in Deut. vii. 25 f. the *destruction* of heathen statues is enjoined, but the *robbery of their gold and silver* is repudiated. — *τὸν θεὸν ἀτιμάζεις*] How? is shown in ver. 24. — *τὸν θεὸν*] who has given the law.

Ver. 24. For confirmation of his *τὸν θεὸν ἀτιμάζεις* Paul subjoins a *Scripture quotation*, namely Is. lii. 5, in substance after the LXX., not the far more dissimilar passage Ezek. xxxvi. 22 f. (Calvin, Ewald, and others), which, according to Hofmann, he is supposed to express according to the Greek translation of Is. *l.c.* "more convenient" for him. But he applies

¹ Theophylact (whom Estius follows) very properly refers the *ιεροσυλεις* to the temples of idols, but limits it to the taking away of the *ἀναθήματα*. His exposition, moreover, aptly brings out the practical bearing of the point: *ιεροσυλίαν λέγει τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν τῶν ἀνατιθεμένων τοῖς εἰδώλοις. καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ ἐβδελύσσοντο τὰ εἰδωλα, ἀλλ' ὅμως τῇ φιλοχρηματίᾳ τυραννοῦμενοι ᾗπτοντο τῶν εἰδωλικῶν ἀναθημάτων δι' αἰσχροκερδίαν.*

² The objection urged by Reiche and van Hengel, that *ιεροσυλειν* always refers to temples which the speaker really looks upon as

holy places, is irrelevant for this reason, that Paul was obliged to take the word, *which he found existing in the Greek*, in order to indicate temple-robbery, while he has already sufficiently excluded the idea that the temples themselves were sacred in his eyes by *τὰ εἰδωλα*.

³ See also Rabbinical passages in Dölitzsch's Hebrew translation, p. 77.

⁴ Compare *Test. XII. Patr.* p. 578.

⁵ Olshausen thinks that *avarice*, as inward idolatry, is meant.

the quotation in such a way that *he makes it his own* by the γάρ not found in the original or the LXX.; only indicating by καθὼς γέγραπται at the close, that he has thus appropriated a *passage of Scripture*. Hence καθὼς γέγ. is placed at the *end*, as is never done in the case of express quotations of Scripture. The historical sense¹ of the passage is not here concerned, since Paul has not quoted it as a fulfilled prophecy, though otherwise with propriety in the sense of iii. 19. — δι' ὑμᾶς] i.e. *on account of your wicked conduct*. — βλασφημεῖται ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι] *among the Gentiles*, inasmuch, namely, as these infer from the immoral conduct of the Jews that they have an unholy God and Lawgiver, and are thereby moved to blaspheme His holy name. Comp. Clement, *Cor.* I. 47.

Ver. 25. Having in vv. 17–24 (not merely taken for granted, but) thrown a bright light of illumination on the culpability of the Jews in presence of the law, Paul now briefly and decisively dissipates the fancy of a special *advantage*, of which they were assured through *circumcision*. “*For circumcision indeed, the advantage of which thou mightest perchance urge against this condemnation, is useful, if thou doest the law; but if thou art a transgressor of the law, thou hast as circumcised no advantage over the uncircumcised.*” — γάρ therefore annexes a *corroboration* of the closing result of vv. 23, 24, and does so by excluding every advantage, which the Jew transgressing this law might fancy himself possessed of, as compared with the Gentile, in virtue of circumcision. *Stat sententia!* in spite of thy circumcision! Hofmann is the less justified, however, in taking the μὲν *elliptically*, with the suppression of its antithesis,² since against its correspondence with the immediately following δέ no well-founded logical objection exists. — περιτομή] *circumcision*, without the article. It is not however, with Köllner and many others, to be taken as a description of *Judaism* generally; but definitely and specially of *circumcision*, to which sacrifice of the body—consecrating men to membership of the people of God (Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 127), and meant to be accompanied by the inner consecration of moral holiness (see on ver. 28)—the theocratic Jewish conceit attributed the absolute value of a service rendering them holy and appropriating the Abrahamic promises. — ὠφελεῖ] seeing that it transfers into the communion of all blessings and promises conferred by God on His covenant people; which blessings and promises, however, are attached to the *observance of His law* as their condition (Gen. xvii. 1 ff.; Lev. xviii. 5; Deut. xxvii. 26; Gal. v. 3), so that circumcision points at the same time to the new covenant, and becomes a sign and seal of the righteousness that is by faith (see on iv. 11). This however the Apostle has *not yet in view here* [See Note XXII. p. 108.]. — ἐὰν νόμ. κ.τ.λ.] *Not on the presupposition* that, but rather, as also the two following ἐὰν: *in the case that*, Winer, p. 275 [E. T. 293]. — ἀκροβυστία γέγονεν] Has become עֲרֵלָה, has lost, for thee, every advantage which it was designed to secure to thee over the uncircumcised, so that thou hast now no advantage

¹ It refers to God's name being dishonoured through the enslaving of the Jews by their tyrants.

² Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 414, and generally Baeumlein, *Part.* p. 163.

over the latter, and art, just as he is, no member of God's people. Paul conceives of the latter as a *holy* people, like the invisible church of God, in which the mortua membra of the people have no part.¹ — γέγονεν] Present of the completed action ; vii. 2 ; xiv. 23 ; John xx. 23. It is the emergent *ethical result, which takes place.*

Ver. 26. Interrogative inference of the corresponding inverse relation, drawn from ver. 25. — ἡ ἀκροβυστία αὐτοῦ] referring to the concrete ἀκρόβυστος understood in the previous ἀκροβυστία.² — τὰ δικαιώματα τ. νόμον φυλ.] The same as τὰ τοῦ νόμον ποιεῖν in ver. 14, as also the following τ. νόμον τελοῦσα of ver. 27.³ A “*perfect, deep inner*” fulfilment of the law (Philippi), is a gratuitous suggestion, since there is no modal definition appended. Paul means the observance of the Mosaic legal precepts (respecting δικαιώματα comp. on i. 32 and v. 16), which in point of fact takes place when the Gentile obeys the moral law of nature, ver. 14 f. — εἰς περιτ. λογισθήσεται] *will be reckoned as circumcision* (εἰς in the sense of the result, see ix. 8 ; Acts xix. 27 ; Is. xl. 17 ; Wisd. ix. 6 ; Theile, *ad Jac.* p. 138). The *future* is not that of the logical certainty (Mehring and older expositors), or of the result (Hofmann), which latter sense would be involved in a form of expression corresponding to the γέγονε ; but the glance of the Apostle extends (see ver. 27) to the *last judgment*. To the uncircumcised person, who observes what the law has ordained, *i.e.* the moral precepts of the law, shall one day be awarded the same salvation that God has destined, subject to the obligation of fulfilment of the law, for those who through circumcision are members of His people. As to the thought comp. Matt. viii. 11, iii. 9 ; 1 Cor. vii. 19 ; Gal. v. 6. The reference to *proselytes of the gate* (Philippi) is not only arbitrary, but also incorrect, because the text has in view the pure contrast between circumcision and uncircumcision, without any hint of an intermediate stage or anything analogous thereto. The proposition is to be retained in its unlimited expression. The mediation, however, which has to intervene for the circumcised as well as for the uncircumcised, in order to the procuring of salvation *through faith*, is still left unnoticed here, and is reserved for the subsequent teaching of the Epistle. See especially ch. iv.

Ver. 27. is regarded by most modern expositors, including Rückert, Reiche (undecidedly), Köllner, Fritzsche, Olshausen, Philippi, Lachmann, Ewald, and Mehring, as a *continuation of the question*, so that οὐχί is again understood before κρινεῖ. But the sequence of thought is brought out

¹ The same idea is illustrated concretely by R. Berechias in *Schemoth Rabb.* f. 138, 13 : “ Ne haeretici et apostatae et impii ex Israelitis dicant : Quandoquidem circumcisi sumus, in infernum non descendimus. Quid agit Deus S. B. ? Mittit angelum et praeputia eorum attrahit, ita ut ipsi in infernum descendant.” See other similar passages in Eisenmenger's *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. p. 339 f.

² See Winer, p. 138 [E. T. 145].

³ τὸν νόμον τελεῖν means, as in James ii. 8,

to bring the law into execution. It is only distinguished from φυλάσσειν and τηρεῖν νόμον by its representing the same thing on its *practical* side, so far as the law is *accomplished* by the *action* which the law demands. Comp. Plat. *Legg.* xi. p. 926 A, xii. p. 958 D ; Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 1, 1 ; Soph. *Aj.* 528 ; Lucian. *d. Mortis Peregr.* 33. On the whole, τελεῖν frequently answers to the idea *parare, facere.* (Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 804.)

much more forcibly, if we take ver. 27 as *affirmative*, as the reply to the question contained in ver. 26, (as is done by Chrysostom, Erasmus, Luther, Bengel, Wetstein, and others ; now also by Tholuck, de Wette, van Hengel, Th. Schott, Hofmann). In this case the placing *κρῖναι* first conveys a strong emphasis ; and *καί*, as often in classic authors¹ is the simple *and*, which annexes the answer to the interrogative discourse as if in continuation, and thus assumes its affirmation as self-evident.² *And the natural uncircumcision, if it fulfils the law, shall judge*, i.e. exhibit in thy full desert of punishment (namely, *comparatione sui*, as Grotius aptly remarks),³ *thee, who*, etc. Compare, on the idea, Matt. xii. 41 ; the thought of the *actual direct* judgment on the last day, according to 1 Cor. vi. 2, is alien to the passage, although the *practical indirect* judgment, which is meant, belongs to the future judgment-day. — ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβ.] *The uncircumcision by nature*, i.e. the (persons in question) uncircumcised in virtue of their Gentile birth. This ἐκ φύσεως, which is neither, with Koppe and Olshausen, to be connected with τὸν νόμ. τελ., nor, with Mehring, to be taken as equivalent to ἐν σαρκί, is in itself superfluous, but serves to heighten the contrast διὰ γρ. κ. περὶ. The idea, that this ἀκροβυστία is a περιτομή ἐν πνεύματι, must (in opposition to Philippi) have been indicated in the text, and it would have no place in the connection of our passage ; see ver. 29, where it first comes in. — τὸν διὰ γράμμ. κ. περὶ. παραβ. νόμου] *who with letter and circumcision art a transgressor of the law*. διὰ denotes the surrounding circumstances *amidst which*, i.e. here according to the context : *in spite of which* the transgression takes place.⁴ Compare iv. 11, xiv. 20 ; Winer, p. 355 [E. T. 380]. Others take διὰ as instrumental, and that either : διὰ νόμου . . . προαχθεῖς (Oecumenius ; comp. Umbreit) or : “*occasione legis*,” (Beza, Estius, and others ; comp. Benecke), or : “*who transgresses the law, and art exhibited as such by the letter*,” etc. (Köllner). But the former explanations introduce a foreign idea into the connection ; and against Köllner's view it may be urged that his declarative rendering weakens quite unnecessarily the force of the contrast of the two members of the verse. For the most natural and most abrupt contrast to the *uncircumcised* person who keeps the law is he, who *transgresses the law notwithstanding letter and circumcision*, and is consequently all the more culpable, because he offends against written divine direction (γράμμ.) and theocratic obligation (περὶ.).

Vv. 28, 29. Proof of ver. 27. *For the true Judaism* (which is not exposed to that *κρῖναι*) *resides not in that which is external, but in the hidden world of the internal*. — ὁ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ] i.e. ὃς ἐν τῷ φ. ἐστὶ : ⁵ *for he is not a Jew, who is so openly*, i.e. not he who shows himself to be an Ἰουδαῖος in external visible

¹ Thiersch, § 354, 5 b. ; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 10, 2.

² Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 890.

³ Not so, that God in judging will apply the Gentile obedience of the law as a *standard for estimating* the Jewish transgression of it (Th. Schott), which is gratuitously introduced. The *standard of judgment* remains the law of God (ver. 12 f.) ; but the

example of the Gentile, who has fulfilled it, exposes and practically condemns the Jew who has transgressed it.

⁴ Th. Schott arbitrarily : who with the possession of the law and circumcision *does not cease to be a transgressor and to pass for such*.

⁵ See Bornemann, *Schol. in Luc.* p. 116.

exhibition (in profession, circumcision, dress, ceremonial service, and the like) is a genuine, ἀληθινός, Ἰουδαίος answering to the idea.¹ The second half of ver. 28, in which ἐν σαρκί forms an apposition to ἐν τῷ φανερῷ, more precisely defining it, is to be taken as quite parallel. — Ver. 29 is usually rendered : *But he who is a Jew in secret* (scil. *is a true Jew*), and *circumcision of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter* (scil. *is true circumcision*.) But against this view it may be urged that ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ is so completely parallel to the ὁ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ in ver. 28, that a different mode of connection cannot but seem forced. Hence the following construction and exposition result more naturally (comp. Luther, Erasmus, and others ; also Fritzsche) : *But he is a Jew* (in the true sense) *who is so in secret* (in the invisible inner life), and (instead of now saying, in parallel with ver. 28 : ἡ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ περιτομή, Paul defines both the ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ and the true spiritual meaning of περιτομή more precisely, and says) *circumcision of the heart resides* (the ἐστὶ to be supplied) *in the spirit, not in the letter*.² Stripped of figure, περιτομή καρδίας is : *the separation of all that is immoral from the inner life* ; for circumcision was accounted even from the earliest times as σύμβολον ἡδονῶν ἐκτομῆς (Philo).³ The uncircumcised heart is ἀμετανόητος, ver. 5. — ἐν πνεύματι] is the power, in which the circumcision of the heart finds its causal ground, namely, in the Spirit, i.e. in the Holy Spirit, through whose power it takes place, not in the letter, which effects the outward circumcision by its commandment. In true Judaism also the Holy Ghost is the divine active principle (comp. vii. 14). So much the less reason is there for making πνεῦμα in our passage mean the true Jewish public spirit proceeding from God (de Wette, comp. Tholuck), or the spirit of the law, in contrast to its outward observance (van Hengel, who wrongly urges the absence of the article) ; or the new life-principle in man, wrought in him by the Spirit of God (Rückert, comp. Luther's gloss) ; on the contrary, the πνεῦμα is to be left as the objective, concrete divine πνεῦμα, as the Holy Spirit in the definite sense, and as distinguished from the spiritual conditions and tendencies which He produces. The correct and clear view is held by Grotius, Fritzsche, and Philippi ; compare Hofmann. Others, as Theodore of Mopsuestia, Oecumenius (Chrysostom and Theophylact express themselves very indefinitely), Erasmus, Beza, Toletus, Heumann, Morus, Rosenmüller, Reiche, Mehring, take πνεῦμα as meaning the spirit of man. But that the circumcision of the heart takes place in the spirit of man, is self-evident ; and the similar contrast between πνεῦμα and γράμμα, vii. 6 and 2 Cor. iii. 6, clearly excludes the reference to the human spirit. — οὗ] of which, is neuter, and refers to the entire description of the true Jewish nature in

¹ See Matthiae, p. 1533, Buttman, *neut. Gr.* p. 335 f. [E. T. 392].

² Ewald, who likewise follows our construction in the first clause of the verse, takes in the second half of it καρδίας as predicate : and *circumcision is that of the heart*. But in that case, since περιτομή in itself would be the true circumcision, we should expect the article before it.

³ See Lev. xxvi. 41 ; Deut. x. 16, xxx. 6 ; Jer. iv. 14, ix. 26 ; Ez. xlv. 7 ; compare Phil. iii. 3 ; Col. ii. 11 ; Acts vii. 51 ; Philo, *de Sacrif.* p. 58 : περιτέμνεσθε τὰς σκληροκαρδίας, τότε ἐστί τὰς περιττὰς φύσεις τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, ἃς αἱ ἄμετροι τῶν παθῶν ἐσπεράν τε καὶ συνήξησαν ὀρμαὶ καὶ ὁ κακὸς ψυχῆς γεωργὸς ἐφύτευσεν, ἀφροσύνη, μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποκείρεσθε. See also Schoettgen, *Hor.* p. 815.

ver. 29. The exegetical relative definition bears to it an *argumentative* relation : *id quod laudem suam habet* etc. οὐ γὰρ would be still more emphatic. To interpret it as *masculine* with reference to 'Ιουδαῖος (Augustine, Erasmus, Beza, Bengel, and many others ; including Reiche, Rückert, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen, Tholuck, Fritzsche, Philippi, Ewald, and Hofmann ; compare van Hengel) is, especially seeing that Paul has not written ὧν, as in iii. 8 (Schoem. *ad Is.* p. 243), a very unnecessary violence, which Grotius, who is followed by Th. Schott, makes still worse by twisting the construction as if the εἰσίν of ver. 28 stood immediately before οὐ (*it is not the evident Jew*, etc., *whose praise*, etc). As is often the case in classic authors, the neuter of the relative belongs to the entire sentence.¹—ὁ ἑταῖρος] *i.e.* the due praise (not recompense). See on 1 Cor. iv. 5. Compare, on the matter itself, John v. 44, xii. 43. Occumenius rightly says : τῆς γὰρ κρυπτῆς καὶ ἐν καρδίᾳ περιτομῆς οὐκ ἔσται ἐπαινέτης ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐτάζων καρδίᾳ καὶ νεφροῖς Θεός. Compare the δόξα Θεοῦ iii. 23. This *praise* is the holy *satisfaction* of God [His being *well-pleased*], as He has so often declared it to the righteous in the Scriptures.—Observe how perfectly analogous ver. 28 f. in its tenor of thought is to the idea of the *invisible church*. Compare on ver. 25.

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

XV. Ver. 1—ch. iii. 20.

It may be said, with Meyer, that Paul “adduces here the second half of the proof as to the *universal* necessity of justification by *faith*,” or, rather, as to the fact that there is no justification by works, which fact carries with it this universal necessity. This second half of the proof is that with which the Apostle chiefly concerns himself, not only because the unrighteousness of the Gentiles was more plainly manifest, but also because the Jewish party would readily admit that this unrighteousness excluded the Gentiles from justification—while, on the other hand, this party would not easily acknowledge the same thing, and make the same admission, respecting themselves. It is for this reason that he approaches the declaration of the fact as related to the Jews more gradually, and with more careful preparation of the way, than he had done in the other case. He begins his argument in the most general form, and only at the 17th verse does he make the direct application to the Jews of what has previously been said.

XVI. Ver. 1 ff. διὸ ἀναπολόγητος εἰ, κ.τ.λ.

The argument in the first verses may be considered in two aspects. (1) *With reference to the main thoughts*, ver. 2 contains the major premise : the judgment of God is against those who habitually commit such sins as are charged upon the Gentiles in the first chapter ; ver. 1b.c. contains the minor premise : the person who condemns others (in the case supposed) habitually commits these sins ; ver. 1a., we must conclude, therefore, that this person, whoever he may be, will be condemned at the Divine judgment. The argument, as thus indicated, is complete and decisive ; and the conclusion must be of universal application, unless some way of escape from the general rule

¹ See especially Richter, *de anac. gr. linguas*, § 28 ; Matthiae, II. p. 937 f.

of the divine government can be discovered for the particular man in question. But is there any such way? If so, it must be either on the man's side, because of some special privilege appertaining to himself as distinguished from others, or on God's side, because of His goodness, which is so great that it will forbear to inflict the penalty. The question as to these two suppositions is raised in the following verses: the former in ver. 3, and the latter in ver. 4. To the former a negative answer is implied in the mode of presenting the question. To the latter is added a detailed proof of the negative, which extends from ver. 5 to ver. 16. The omission of a similar full statement as connected with ver. 3 is to be explained from the desire on the part of the author to defer it until after he should have applied his general reasoning to the Jews; and, accordingly, we find it set forth in vv. 25-29. (2) *With reference to the grammatical connection and the sequence of the sentences.* *δύο*, whether it is to be regarded as referring to i. 32 (with de Wette, Alford, and others), or to the main idea of i. 18-32 (with Meyer), brings the new affirmation respecting *πᾶς ὁ κρίνων* into close connection with the statements of the preceding chapter. Hence it is, that the order of thought is changed throughout; the minor premise, as given above, being introduced as a proof of this affirmation, and the major premise placed in an independent sentence. According to the grammatical connection, the thought proceeds as follows: On the foundation of what is said in the first chapter, the man who condemns another must be declared to be without excuse, for in condemning the other he condemns himself, since he does the same things; and we know that the judgment of God is against all who do these things.

XVII. Ver. 4. *ἡ—καταφρονεῖς.*

This verse—as in some other cases in Paul's writings, *e.g.* Gal. ii. 17—seems to unite two sentences (one interrogative and the other declarative), in one; here, the question and its answer. The answer is found in the word *καταφρονεῖς*, and is further developed in ver. 5. The verb of the question is suggested by the context. Dost thou rely upon, or trust to, the riches of God's goodness to set thee aside from the rules of His general administration? To do so, while continuing in the sins described, is a treating his goodness with contempt (not recognizing even its object and purpose, which is to lead to repentance, and not to further wrong-doing), and a laying up for the final day a greater measure of divine wrath.

XVIII. Ver. 6. *ὃς ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ.*

The question as to the consistency of this statement with the doctrine of salvation by faith has been unnecessarily raised by some writers. The Apostle is here speaking only of the legal system, and discussing the matter of justification by works. On the legal system men are rewarded according to their works. When they sin, therefore, there is no hope of justification. He does not return to the matter of faith until iii. 21. This verse and its context are sometimes used as an argument against the view which holds that the heathen may have a probation hereafter, on the ground that they do not have a fair opportunity of obtaining salvation in this life. The argument rests, however, upon a misapprehension as to what the view in question necessarily involves. By having a fair opportunity, in the sense in which this term is

employed, is not meant such an opportunity on the legal system. Both parties alike may admit Paul's teaching to be, that all men—the heathen nations as well as others—have light enough to make their condemnation, on that system, just. But a new system, through the mercy of God, has been introduced—one of faith and forgiveness; and it is claimed by advocates of the opinion alluded to, that the question arises, in view of this fact, whether if, in His abounding goodness, God has thus opened to sinners, who had put themselves beyond all hope from law, a new way of entrance into His kingdom, it is not, by reason of that very goodness, probable that He will give all men alike the knowledge of this wonderful way—that He will grant such knowledge and the opportunity to use it for the end in view—hereafter, in case, for wise reasons of His own, He does not grant it here. Will He not give the unenlightened and the enlightened among mankind an equal possibility under the light of the *faith-system*? To this question this section of the Epistle, having reference only to *works*, gives no answer. Arguments against this view, when thus understood, may be drawn from other N. T. passages, or from the general indications of N. T. teaching, but not from these verses.

XIX. Ver. 12. ἀνόμους—ἐν νόμῳ.

That ἀνόμους and ἐν νόμῳ refer to the Mosaic law must be regarded as altogether probable, (a) Because the immediately preceding context presents before us the division of mankind into Jews and Gentiles. The close connection of this verse with vv. 9, 10, through the γάρ which opens it and that which opens ver. 11, shows that the same division is intended here. The point of difference between the two, however, was the possession or non-possession of the Mosaic law. (b) Because τὰ τοῦ νόμου (ver. 14) clearly refers to the requirements of the law of Moses. This being so, the contrast of the verse naturally suggests the same law as intended by μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα. (c) Because the thing which the Jews rested upon (ver. 17), and gloried in (ver. 23), was not law, but the law of Moses. (d) Because, in the contrast presented in vv. 25, 27, the keeping τὸν νόμον (cf. τοῦ νόμου, ver. 26) is placed in opposition to transgression νόμου. For the force of the contrast, νόμον must be regarded as the same with τοῦ νόμου. (e) Because it is wholly unlikely that the writer meant a different thing by παραβάσεως τὸν νόμον in ver. 23 and παραβάτης [παραβάσεως] νόμον, only two verses afterward. The former expression, however, evidently refers to the Mosaic law. (f) Because circumcision, as a distinguishing mark of the Jews, was connected with the law of Moses. When therefore practising what νόμος requires is declared to be essential to the enjoyment of any advantage from this distinction, νόμος must mean this particular law. (g) Because all the kindred words throughout the entire passage, περιτομή, γράμμα, Ἰουδαίος, point to this law as in the mind of the author. (h) Because the doctrine of justification by works which Paul was here proving to be untrue was, as held by the Jewish party, connected with the law of Moses. Throughout these verses (12-29), accordingly, wherever νόμος occurs (with the possible exception of the last instance in ver. 14), it must be understood as the same with ὁ νόμος;—this word being used as a kind of proper name (cf. Winer, p. 123).

The true position with regard to this word seems to be this: that, whether with or without the article, it means the Mosaic law, in all cases in Paul's

Epistles, except a very insignificant number in which either the necessities of the sentence itself, or the unquestionable indications of the context, prove, beyond a doubt, that it does not have this meaning.

Weiss ed. Mey., Bp. Lightfoot, and some other recent writers oppose the view above stated, and hold that νόμος without the article denotes any positive law, or positive law in the abstract. Their presentation of the matter appears unsatisfactory and their arguments inconclusive; and it seems scarcely too much to say, with Meyer, that their view "opens the way for artificial and sometimes intolerable explanations." The question can be properly settled by a careful examination of all the cases where the word occurs. Such an examination, it is believed, will confirm, at every step, the position taken in this note.

XX. Ver. 15. συμμαρτυρούσης—ἀπολογουμένων.

Weiss ed. Mey.—though denying the position of Meyer, that the context shows the reference to be to the approving conscience—objects to the view against which Meyer is arguing, that such a wavering of judgment (as the application of μετ. ἀλλ. λογ. κ.τ.λ. to the process of conscience in the individual man implies), would tend rather to render doubtful, than to prove the existence of an objective rule or standard in the heart. The Apostle, however, does not speak of such a wavering of judgment, as Weiss supposes, but to the approving or condemning judgment which the particular case may call for. Weiss also holds that κατηγοούντων κ.τ.λ. is not to be joined with λογισμῶν as forming a second gen. abs. clause, but as an attributive phrase—there being but one gen. abs. clause, in which συμμαρτυρούσης is united both with συνειδ. and with λογ. Holsten takes the same view, but Godet, with reason, objects to this construction as forced. Godet, Alford, Shedd, Schaff (Pop. Comm.), Philippi, agree with de Wette and others in holding that ἀλλήλων refers to λογισμῶν. "There takes place, as it were, a dialogue between the thoughts, one accusing, the other acquitting" (Phil.). The argument for this view is, that the other parts of the description seem to be limited to the individual soul in itself, and not to refer to any relations to others. The emphatic position of μεταξύ ἀλλ., and the suggestion of contrast with αὐτῶν are the strong points favoring Meyer's explanation.

XXI. Ver. 23. ὃς ἐν νόμῳ καυχᾶσαι.

The change in the form of expression in this clause, as compared with those which precede, does not, indeed, prove Meyer's view of the verse, as a categorical answer, to be correct, but it suggests that it may be; and the sentence gains in emphasis and force, if explained in this way.

XXII. Ver. 25. περιτομή μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ.

ὠφελεῖ carries back the thought to the emphatic σύ of ver. 3, and in substance, though not in form, confirms the negative answer to the question of that verse. While admitting that there is a certain advantage connected with circumcision [to be more fully explained at a later point], provided the circumcised person fulfils the requirements of the law, the Apostle denies to the Jew, so long as the law is not fulfilled, any such favored position as he

was prone to claim with respect to the judgment and the application of the rules of the Divine administration. The *γάρ*, which opens this verse, connects it with the statement implied in ver. 23—namely, that condemnation will rest upon those who thus dishonour God, no matter how much they may glory in the law, for circumcision will avail nothing while they commit such sins.

CHAPTER III.

Ver. 2. *μὲν γάρ*] Lachm. following B D* E G, min. vss., Chrys. Aug. reads *μὲν*. The *γάρ* was easily lost in consequence of its seeming unnecessary, and of the recollection of i. 8; but is supported by 1 Cor. xi. 18.—Ver. 9. *προεχόμεθα*] D* G 31, Syr. Erp. Chrys. ms. Theodoret have *προκατέχομεν* (or *κατέχ.*) *περισσόν*, and, with several other authorities, omit *οὐ πάντως*. This *προκατ. περισσ.* is an erroneous gloss; and the omission of *οὐ πάντως* is explained by its being no longer suitable after the adoption of *τί οὖν προκατέχομεν περισσόν*; see Reiche, *Comm. crit.*—Ver. 11. In important codices the article is wanting before *συνίων* and *ἐκζητῶν*. But see LXX. Ps. xiv. 2.—Ver. 22. *καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας*] is wanting in A B C P **8***, Copt. Aeth. Arm. Erp. Clem. Or. Cyr. Aug. Deleted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8. But when we consider that a gloss on *εἰς πάντας* was quite unnecessary, and on the other hand that *καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας* was equally unnecessary to complete the sense, we may assume that the twice repeated *πάντας* may have even at a very early date occasioned the omission of *καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας*.—Ver. 25. *τῆς πίστ.*] *τῆς* is wanting in C* D* F G **8**, min., and several Fathers (A and Chrys. omit the whole *διὰ τ. πίστ.*). Suspected by Griesb., and deleted by Lachm. and Tisch. Still the omission of the article might easily occur if the copyist, as was natural, glanced back at *διὰ πίστ.*, ver. 22.—Ver. 26. *πρὸς ἐνδεῖς.*] Following A B C D* P **8**, min., we should read with Lachm. and Tisch. *πρὸς τῶν ἐνδεῖς*. The article was passed over in accordance with ver. 25.—*Ἰησοῦ* is wanting in F G 52 It.; and is expanded in other authorities (*Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, or *τοῦ κυρίου ἡμ.* *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*). Notwithstanding the preponderating testimony in its favour, it is properly deleted by Fritzsche and Tisch. 7. Supplied from looking back to ver. 22.—Ver. 28. *γάρ*] Elz. and Tisch. 7. read *οὖν*, against very preponderating testimony, by which also the arrangement *δικ. πίστ. ἄνθρωπον* (Elz.: *π. δ. ἄ.*) is confirmed. Since according to the different modes of apprehending the connection, the emendation might be *οὖν* as well as *γάρ*, external attestation only can here be regarded as decisive.—Ver. 29. The reading *μόνων* (so Tisch. 7. instead of *μόνον*) is insufficiently attested by B, min. and Fathers; and arose easily out of the context.—*οὐχὶ καὶ*] Elz.: *οὐχὶ δὲ καί*, against decisive testimony. The *δὲ* was easily introduced into the text by the contrast, whether the two questions might be taken separately, or together as one—*ἐπείπερ*] A B C D** **8**, min., Clem. Or. Cyr. Didym. Damasc.: *εἴπερ*. Recommended by Griesb.; adopted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8. But how easily may the *ἐπείπερ* only occurring here in the N. T., and therefore unfamiliar to the copyists, have been exchanged for the familiar *εἴπερ*!

Vv. 1,¹ 2. As an inference (*οὖν*) from ii. 28, 29, the objection might now be made from the Jewish standpoint against the Apostle, that he quite

¹ On chap. iii. see Matthias, *exeget. Abhandlung über vv. 1-20* (a school-pro-

gramme), Hanau 1851; and the same author's work: *das dritte Kap. d. Br. an d. Röm.*,

does away with the advantage of Judaism and the benefit of circumcision. This objection he therefore raises *in his own person*, in order to remove it himself immediately, ver. 2 ff. — τὸ περισσὸν κ.τ.λ.] [See Note XXIII. p. 146.] the *superiority*¹ of the Jew, *i.e.* what he *has as an advantage* over the Gentile, the Jewish *surplus*. The following ἢ (*or*, to express it in other words) τίς ἢ ὠφέλ. τ. περιτ. presents substantially the same question in a more specific form. — πολὺ] *Much*, namely, is the περισσὸν of the Jew or the benefit of circumcision.² The neuter comprehends the answer to both; and it must not therefore be said that it applies only to the first question, leaving the second without further notice. It is moreover clear from what precedes and follows, that Paul meant the περισσὸν not in a moral, but in a theocratic sense; comp. ix. 4 f. — κατὰ πάντα τρόπον] *in every way* (Xen. *Anab.* vi. 6, 30), in whatever light the matter may be considered.³ It is an undue anticipation to take the expression as *hyperbolic* (Reiche), since we do not know how the detailed illustration, which is only begun, would be further pursued. — πρῶτον] *first of all, firstly*, it is a prerogative of the Jew, or advantage of circumcision, that, etc. The Apostle consequently begins to illustrate the πολὺ according to its individual elements, but, just after mentioning the first point, is led away by a thought connected with it, so that all further enumeration (possibly by *et cetera*, Xen. *Mem.* iii. 6, 9) is dropped [See Note XXIV. p. 146.] and not, as Grotius strangely thinks, postponed to ix. 4. Compare on i. 8; 1 Cor. xi. 18. As the μέν was evidently meant to be followed by a corresponding δέ, it was a mere artificial explaining away of the interruption of the discourse, to render πρῶτον *præcipue* (Beza, Calvin, Toletus, Estius, Calovius, Wolf, Koppe, Glöckler, and others; compare also Hofmann: “before all things”), or to say with Th. Schott that it indicates the *basis* from which the πολὺ *follows*. — ὅτι ἐπιστ. τ. λόγια τ. Θεοῦ] *that they (the Jews) were entrusted with the utterances of God*, namely, in the holy Scriptures given to them, devoutly to preserve these λόγια as a Divine treasure, and to maintain them for all ages of God’s people as their and their children’s (comp. Acts ii. 39) possession. On the Greek form of expression πιστεύομαι τι (1 Cor. ix. 17; Gal. ii. 7), see Winer, p. 244 [E. T. 260]. — τὰ λόγια τ. Θεοῦ] *eloquia Dei*. [See Note XXV. p. 146.] That by this general expression (χρησμοὺς αὐτοῖς ἀνωθεν κατηνεχθέντας, Chrysostom), which always

ein exeg. Versuch, Cassel 1857; James Morison, *A critical exposition of the Third Chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans*, Lond. 1866.

¹ Matt. v. 47, xi. 9; Plat. *Ap. S.* p. 20 C. Lucian. *Prom.* 1; Plut. *Demosth.* 3.

² This answer is the *Apostle’s*, not the reply of a Jew asserting his περισσόν, whom Paul then interrupts in ver. 4 with μὴ γένοιτο (Baur in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1857, p. 69)—a breaking up of the text into dialogue, which is neither necessary nor in any way indicated, and which is not supported by any analogy of other passages. According to Mehring, Paul has written ver. 2, and in

fact onward to ver. 8, as the sentiments of a Jew to be summarily dealt with, who in πρῶτον had it in view to enumerate yet further advantages, but whose mouth was closed by ver. 9. The unforced exposition of the successive verses does not permit this view; and ii. 25-29 is not at variance with ver. 2, but, on the contrary, leaves sufficiently open to the Apostle the recognition of Jewish privileges, which he begins to specify; comp. ii. 25 and ix. 4 f.

³ See examples in Wetstein. The opposite: κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον, 2 Macc. xi. 31; Polyb. iv. 84, 8, viii. 27, 2.

receives its more precise definition from the context (Acts vii. 38 ; Heb. v. 12 ; 1 Pet. iv. 11),¹ Paul means here κατ' ἔξοχὴν the *Messianic prophetic utterances*, is shown by ver. 3, where the ἀπιστία of the Jews leaves no room for mistake as to the contents of the λόγια. Compare αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι, ix. 4. These λόγια τ. Θεοῦ are contained not *merely* in the prophets proper (Acts iii. 24), but even in the Pentateuch (covenant with Abraham, the promise of Moses) ; yet the law is *not* meant, nor even *jointly* included (Matthias), against which ver. 3 testifies. Just as little is there meant : *all making known of God in the history of salvation* (Hofmann), which is too general, and is extended by Hofmann even to the *New Testament* revelations.²

Ver. 3. Not an objection to the preceding [See Note XXVI. p. 147.], but a *guarantee of the* ἐπιστεύθ. τὰ λόγια τ. Θεοῦ *just mentioned*, as something that has not been cancelled and revoked through the partial unbelief of the people. "For how? what is the case?"³ If some refused the faith, will their unbelief make void the faithfulness of God?" will it produce the effect that God shall now regard the promises once committed to the Jews as void, and Himself as no longer bound to His word therein pledged? The ἠπίστησαν and the ἀπιστία are by the context necessarily referred to the λόγια τ. Θεοῦ ; the unbelief of a part of the Jews in the promises manifested itself, namely, by their rejecting the Messiah who had appeared according to the promise. So in substance also Matthias, who nevertheless apprehends the notion of ἀπιστ. as *unfaithfulness* towards what was entrusted to them, which the τίτνες did not use for the purpose of letting themselves be led thereby to Christ. But ἀπιστεῖν and ἀπιστία (even in 2 Tim. ii. 13) mean specifically throughout the N. T. (see in this Epistle iv. 20, xi. 20, 23 ; compare Morison, p. 23) *unbelief* not *unfaithfulness*, although Hofmann also ultimately comes to adopt this notion. This remark also applies against the supposition of Köllner, de Wette, Mehring, and older writers, that Paul meant the *unfaithfulness* (the *disobedience*) of the Jews in the times before Christ.⁴ Such a view is opposed to the context ; and must not the idea, that the earlier breaches of covenant on the part of the Jews might possibly annul the λόγια, have been wholly strange to Paul and his Jewish readers, since they knew from experience that, even when the Jews had heaped unfaithfulness upon unfaithfulness, God always committed to them anew, through His prophets, the promises of the Messiah? In the mind of the Apostle the idea of the πάρεσις τῶν

¹ Compare the passages from the Septuagint in Schleusner, *Theo.* III. p. 464, from Philo in Loesner, p. 248 ; and see especially Bleek on *Heb.* II. 2, p. 114 f.

² Regarding the classic use of λόγια, *prophesies*, see Krüger on Thuc. ii. 8, 2, and generally Locella, *ad Xen. Eph.* p. 152 f. The word is not a *diminutive form* (Philippi, who finds in it the usual *brevity* of oracular utterances), but the neuter form of λόγος. The diminutive conception, *little utterances*, is expressed not by λόγια, but by λογιδιον Plat. *Eryx.* p. 401 E. This applies also in opposition to Morison.

³ τί γάρ ; compare Phil. i. 18. Elz., Bengel, and Lachm. place the sign of interrogation after τίτνες. Van Hengel follows them, also Th. Schott and Hofmann. It is impossible to decide the question. Still even in classic authors, the τί γάρ ; standing alone is frequent, "ubi quis cum alacritate quadam ad novam sententiam transgreditur," Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 6, 2 ; Jacobs, *ad Del. epigr.* vi. 60 ; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 73 f.

⁴ Especially would τίτνες be quite unsuitable, because it would be absolutely untrue. All were disobedient and unfaithful. See ver. 9 ff.

προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων was fixed (ver. 25 ; Acts xvii. 30). Therefore we cannot understand (with Philippi) unbelief in the promises shown in the period *before Christ* to be here referred to. But according to the doctrine of faith in the promised One who had come, as the condition of the Messianic salvation, the doubt might very easily arise : May not the partial *unbelief* of the Jews *since the appearance of Christ*, to whom the λόγια referred, possibly cancel the divine utterances of promise committed to the nation ? Notwithstanding the simple and definite conception of ἀπιστεῖν throughout the N. T., Hofmann here multiplies the ideas embraced so as to include as well disobedience to the law as unbelief towards the Gospel and unbelief towards the prophetic word of promise—a grouping together of very different significations, which is the consequence of the erroneous and far too wide sense assigned to the λόγια τ. Θεοῦ. — τὴν πίστιν τ. Θεοῦ] The genitive is necessarily determined to be the genitive of the subject, partly by ἡ ἀπιστία αὐτῶν, partly by ver. 4, and partly by Θεοῦ δικαιοσ. in ver. 5. Therefore : the *fides Dei* in keeping the λόγια, *keeping His word*, in virtue of which He does not abandon His promises to His people.¹ Compare 2 Tim. ii. 13, and the frequent πιστὸς ὁ Θεός, 1 Cor. i. 9, x. 13 ; 2 Cor. i. 18 *al.*—Observe further that Paul designates the unbelievers only by *τινές*, *some*, which is not contemptuous or ironical (Tholuck, Philippi ; compare Bengel), nor intended as a *milder* expression (Grotius), but is rather employed *to place in a stronger light the negation of the effect* under discussion ; and, considering the relative import of *τινές*, it is not at variance with the truth, for although there were *many* (τινές καὶ πολλοὶ γε, Plat. *Phaed.* p. 58 D), still they were not *all*. Compare xi. 17, and on 1 Cor. x. 7 ; Krüger, § 51, 16, 14.

Ver. 4. [See Note XXVII. p. 147.] *Let it not be (far be it) ! but God is to be truthful, i.e.* His truthfulness is to be the actual result produced (namely, in the carrying out of His Messianic plan of salvation), *and every man a liar.* To this it *shall* come ; the development of the holy divine economy to this final state of the relation between God and men, is what Paul knows and *wishes*. — μὴ γένοιτο] The familiar formula of negation by which the thing asked is repelled with abhorrence, corresponding to the הֲלִיךָ (Gen. xliv. 17 ; Josh. xxii. 29 ; 1 Sam. xx. 2), is used by Paul particularly often in our Epistle, elsewhere in Gal. ii. 17, iii. 21, 1 Cor. vi. 15, always in a dialectic discussion. In the other writings of the N. T. it occurs only at Luke xx. 16, but is current in later Greek authors.² — γινέσθω] not equivalent to φανεροῦσθω, ἀποδεικνύσθω (Theophylact), but *the historical result which shall come to pass*, the *actual Theodicee* that shall take place. This indeed in reality amounts to a φανεροῦσθαι, but it is expressed by γιν-

¹ It is the *fides, qua Deus promissis stat*, not in reality different from the idea of the ἀληθής in ver. 4. The word *πίστις*, however, is selected as the correlative of ἀπιστία. Despite the Jewish ἀπιστία it continues the case, not that God *has been πιστός* (in that, namely, He has spoken among the people, Hofmann thinks), but that He *is πιστός*, in that, namely, He does not allow Himself to

be moved by that ἀπιστία *τινων* to become likewise ἀπίστος, which He would be if He left His own λόγια committed to the Jews unfulfilled. He will not allow this case of the annulling of His *πίστις* to occur. Compare 2 Tim. ii. 13.

² Raphael, *Arrian. in loc.* ; Sturz, *de dial. Al.* p. 204.

ἔσθω, according to its objective reality, which demonstrates itself. In that which God (and man) does, He *becomes actually* what according to His nature He is. — πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρ. ψεύσθ.] By no means unessential (Rückert), or merely a concomitant circumstance (Th. Schott), is designed, and that all the more forcibly without a preceding μέν, to appropriate the ἀλήθεια exclusively to God, in contrast to ἡπίστ. τινες, ver. 3, outbidding this τινές by πᾶς. Every man is a liar, if he does not perform the service to which he has become bound, as is brought to light in the case of the τινές by their ἀπιστία, since as members of the people of God they had bound themselves to faith in the divine promises. That Paul had Ps. cxvi. 11 in view (Calvin, Wolf, and many others) is the more doubtful, seeing that he immediately quotes another passage. — ὅπως ἂν δικ. κ.τ.λ.] Ps. li. 6 exactly after the LXX. Independently of the more immediate connection and sense of the original text, Paul seizes on the type of the relation discussed by him, which is involved in the words of the Psalm, in the form in which they are reproduced by the LXX.¹ and that in the sense : *that thou mayest be justified, i.e. acknowledged as faultless and upright, in thy words, and prevail* (in substance the same as the previous δικαιωθῆς) *when thou disputest, namely, with men against whom thou defendest and followest out thy right.* From this second clause results that πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρ. ψεύσθης. The exact appropriateness of this view in the connection is decisive against the explanation commonly adopted formerly after the Vulgate and Luther, and again preferred by Mehring, which takes κρίνεσθαι as passive (*when thou art subjected to judgment*).² — ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου] i.e. *in that which thou hast spoken.* And that is the category to which those λόγια belong, as to which the Apostle has just repelled the idea that God will not keep them on account of the ἀπιστία of the τινές and will thereby prove untrue. The sense “*in sententia ferenda*,” when thou passest a sentence (Philippi), cannot be taken out of ἐν τ. λόγ. σου, since God is not represented as judge, but as litigant, over whom the justifying judicial decision is pronounced. The view of Hofmann is also erroneous : that it denotes the accusations, which God may bring against men. For the text represents God indeed as the party gaining the verdict and prevailing, but not as the accuser preferring charges ; and the λόγοι, in respect of which He is declared justified, point back so directly to the λόγια in ver. 2, that this very correlation has occasioned the selection of the particular passage from Ps. li. — νικᾶν, like vincere, used of prevailing in a process ; compare Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 17 ; Dem. 1436, 18 al. The opposite : ἡττᾶσθαι. — On ὅπως (here *in order that in the event of decision*) see Hartung, Partikell. II. p. 286, 289 ; Klotz, ad Devar. p. 685.

¹ The inaccuracies in the translation of the LXX. must be candidly acknowledged ; still they do not yield any essential difference of sense from the idea of the original text. These inaccuracies consist in הַפִּיִּי (insons eis) being rendered in the LXX. by νικήσης, and הַיָּדִיִּי (cum judicas) being translated ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαι σοι.

² On the use of the middle, to dispute with, compare LXX. Job ix. 3, xlii. 19, and other passages in Schleusner, Thes. III. p. 385 f. This use has been properly maintained by Beza, Bengel, and others ; also Matthias, Tholuck, Philippi, van Hengel, Ewald, Hofmann, and Morison. Compare 1 Cor. vi. 1 ; Matt. v. 40.

Vv. 5, 6. In vv. 3 and 4 it was declared that the unbelief of a part of the Jews would not make void the truthfulness of God, but that, on the contrary, the latter should be triumphantly justified. But how easily might this be misconstrued by a Jew of the common type as a pretext for his immorality : "the unrighteousness of man in fact brings out more clearly the righteousness of God, and therefore may not be righteously punished by God !" To preclude this misconception and false inference, which so abruptly run counter to his doctrine of universal human guilt, and to leave no pretext remaining (observe beforehand the *τί οὖν* ; *προεχόμεθα* in ver. 9), Paul, having in view such thoughts of an antagonist, proposes to himself and his readers the question : "*But if our unrighteousness show forth the righteousness of God, what shall we say (infer) ? Is God then unrighteous, who inflicteth wrath ?*" And he disposes of it in the first instance by the categorical answer (ver. 6) : *No, otherwise God could not be judge of the world.* The assumption, that this question is *occasioned really and seriously* by what goes before, and called forth from the Apostle himself (Hofmann), is rendered untenable by the very addition *κατὰ ἀνθρώπον λέγω. — ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν*] Quite general : our *unrighteousness*, abnormal moral condition. To this general category belongs also the *ἀπιστία*, ver. 3. Paul has regarded the possible Jewish misconception, the notion of which occasions his question, as a *general*, but for that reason all the more dangerous inference from vv. 3 and 4, in which the words *ἀδικία* and *δικαιοσύνη* are suggested by the passage from the Psalms in ver. 4. — *ἡμῶν*] is said certainly in the character of the *ἀδικοὶ in general*, and stands in relation to the *πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης* in ver. 4. But as the whole context is directed against the *Jews*, and the application to *these* is intended in the general expressions, and indeed expressly made in ver. 19, Paul speaks here also in such a way that the *Jewish* consciousness, from which, as himself a Jew, he speaks, lies at the bottom of the *general* form of his representation. — The protasis *εἰ . . . συνίστησι* is a *concessum*, which is in itself correct (ver. 4) ; but the *inference*, which the Jewish self-justification might draw from it, is rejected with horror. Observe in this protasis the emphatic juxtaposition *ἡμῶν Θεοῦ* ; and in the apodosis the accent which lies on *ἀδικος* and *τὴν ὁργήν*. — *Θεοῦ δικαιοσ. συνίστησι*] *proves God's righteousness* (comp. v. 8 ; 2 Cor. vi. 4, vii. 11 ; Gal. ii. 18 ; Susann. 61 ; frequently in Polyb., Philo, etc.) ; makes it apparent beyond doubt, that God is without fault, and such as He must be. The contrast to *ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν* requires *δικαιος.* to be taken thus generally, and forbids its being explained of a particular attribute (*truth* : Beza, Piscator, Estius, Koppe, and others ; *goodness* : Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius, Rosenmüller), as well as its being taken in the sense of i. 17 (van Hengel). — The *τί ἐροῦμεν* (3 Esr. viii. 82) is used by Paul only in the Epistle to the Romans (iv. 1, vi. 1, vii. 7, viii. 31, ix. 14, 30).¹ — *μὴ ἀδικος ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφ. τ. ὁργήν*] [See Note XXVIII. p. 147.]. This question² is so put that (as in ver. 3) a *negative* answer is expected, since Paul has floating before his mind an impious objection conceived of

¹ Compare, however, generally on such questions arousing interest and enlivening the representation, Blomfield, *Gloss. in*

Aesch. Pers. 1013, Dissen, *ad Dem. de cor. p.* 346 f.

² After *μὴ, ἐροῦμεν* is not again to be un-

κατὰ ἀνθρώπων.¹ Hence : *God is not unrighteous then, who dealeth wrath?* This in opposition to Rückert and Philippi, who make the questioner expect an *affirmative* answer, which can never be the case. In those passages in Greek authors, where an affirmative reply notwithstanding follows, it invariably does so *contrary to the expectation* of the questioner ; see Kühner, II. 2, p. 1024. ἄδικος, prefixed with emphasis, is, on account of its relation to ὁ ἐπιφ. τ. ὀργήν, to be understood in the strict judicial signification *unrighteous*, which is confirmed by vv. 6 and 7.² The *article* with the participle indicates the relation as *well-known* ; and τὴν ὀργήν (Sin.* adds αὐτοῦ) denotes the wrath definitely conceived of as *judicial*, inflicted at the judgment.³ — κατὰ ἀνθρώπων λέγω] To preclude his being misunderstood, as if he were asking εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν . . . μὴ ἄδικος κ.τ.λ. from his own enlightened Christian view, Paul remarks parenthetically that he says this *according to a human standard* ⁴ after the fashion of ordinary humanity, quite apart from his own higher standpoint of divine enlightenment, to which the idea expressed in that question would be foreign, and speaking only in accordance with mere human reason. Compare 1 Cor. ix. 8 ; Gal. iii. 15 ; Soph. *Aj.* 761 : κατ' ἀνθρώπων φρονεῖ. "I say this just as an ordinary man, not under the influence of the divine Spirit, may well say it." Respecting the expression κατὰ ἀνθρ., which is capable according to the context of great variety of meaning, compare Fritzsche *in loc.* It is wrongly inferred from κατὰ ἀνθρ. λέγω that the question μὴ ἄδικος κ.τ.λ. was meant to receive an affirmative answer, because as a negative query it would not be κατὰ ἀνθρ. (see Philippi). But this view overlooks the fact that the whole thought, which is implied in the question calculated though it is for a negative reply, — the thought of the unrighteousness of God in punishing — can in fact only be put into expression κατὰ ἀνθρώπων ; in the higher Christian insight a conception so blasphemous and deserving of abhorrence can find neither place nor utterance. The apology however, involved in κατὰ ἀνθρ. λέγω, is applicable only to *what goes before*, not to *what follows*, to which Mehring, Th. Schott and Hofmann refer it. This is the more obvious, since what immediately follows is merely a repudiating μὴ γένοιτο, and the ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ., which assigns the ground for this repudiation, is by no means an idea outside the range of revelation, the application of which to a *rational inference*, and one too so plainly right, cannot transfer it to the lower sphere of the κατὰ ἀνθρ. λέγειν. — Ver. 6. ἐπεὶ] gives the ground of the μὴ γένοιτο ; for (if the God who inflicts wrath is *unrighteous*) *how will it be possible that He shall judge the world?* The *future* is to be left in its purely *future* sense, since it refers to a future act taking place at any rate, as to which the only difficulty would be to see *how it was to be accomplished*, if, etc. On ἐπεὶ, for *otherwise*, see Butt-

derstood, and then ἄδικος κ.τ.λ. to be taken as a question ensuing *thereon* (Mangold, p. 106). A breaking up of the construction without due ground. Compare, rather, ix. 14, a passage which in form also is perfectly parallel to this one.

¹ See Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 789, 810 ;

Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 159 ; Baumlein, p. 302 f.

² For examples of ἐπιφέρειν used to express the practical infliction of wrath or punishment, see Raphel, *Polyb.* ; Kypke, II. p. 160.

³ Compare Ritschl, *de ira Dei*, p. 15.

⁴ Bernhardt, p. 241.

mann, *neut. Gr.* p. 308 [E. T. 359]. κρινεῖ has the emphasis. — τὸν κόσμον is to be taken, with most expositors, generally as meaning *all mankind* (compare ver. 19). To be judge of the world and yet, as ἐπιφέρων τ. ὄργ., to be *adikos*, is a contradiction of terms ; the certainty that God is the former would become an impossibility if He were the latter. Compare Gen. xviii. 25. Koppe, Reiche, Schrader, Olshausen, and Jatho, following older authorities, take it only of the *Gentile world* (xi. 12 ; 1 Cor. vi. 2, xi. 32): "In that case God could not punish even the Gentile world for its idolatry, since it is only in contrast therewith that the true worship of God appears in its full value" (Reiche). But, in this explanation, the very essential idea : "*since . . . appears*" has first of all to be *imported*, an expedient which, in presence of the simplicity and clearness of our view, cannot but seem arbitrary. Even the following proof, ver. 7 f., does not present a reference directly to the judgment of the *Gentiles*. The argument itself rests on the premiss that God can carry out the *judgment* of the world only as One who is *righteous* in His decreeing of wrath. The opposite would be impossible, not only subjectively, in God Himself (Th. Schott), but also objectively, as standing in contradiction to the notion of a world-judgment. See ver. 7 f. This proposition however is so perfectly *certain* to the *consciousness of faith*, out of which Paul asserts it, that there is no ground either for complaining of the *weakness* of the proof (Rückert), or for reading the thoughts that form the proof between the lines (Fritzsche and Mehring, with varying arbitrariness); the more especially as afterwards, in ver. 7, a still further *confirmation* of the ἐπεὶ . . . κόσμον follows.

Ver. 7 f. The ἐπεὶ πῶς ὁ κρινεῖ Θεὸς τ. κόσμ. receives its *illustrative confirmation* ; for as to the case of God, who would thus be *unrighteous* and nevertheless is to *judge* the world, every ground for judging man as a sinner must be superseded by the circumstance already discussed, viz. that His truth has been *glorified* by man's falsehood (ver. 4 f.) ; and (ver. 8) as to the case of man himself, there would result the principle directly worthy of condemnation, that he should do evil in order that good might come. Comp. Th. Schott, and in substance also Hofmann and Morison. The argument accordingly rests on the basis, that in the case put (ἐπεὶ from ver. 6) the relation of God to the judgment of the world would yield two absurd consequences. (See this, as early as Chrysostom.) Another view is that of Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Wolf, and many others, including Rückert, Köllner, Tholuck, Philippi, and Umbreit, that the objection of ver. 5 is here amplified. But it is quite as arbitrary and in fact impossible (hence Philippi resorts to the violent expedient of putting in a parenthesis not only κατὰ ἀνθρ. λέγω, but also μὴ γένοιτο . . . κόσμον), with the reference of γάρ, to overleap entirely ver. 6, as it is strange to make the discourse so completely abrupt and to represent the Apostle as making no reply at all to the first part of the alleged amplification of the objection (to ver. 7), and as replying to the second part (ver. 8) only by an *anathema sit!* (ὦν τ. κρ. ἐνδ. ἔ.). Against the view of Reiche, who, following Koppe, Rosenmüller, and Flatt, thinks that the *Gentile* is introduced as speaking in ver. 7 (compare Olshausen), we may decisively urge the close connection therewith of ver.

8, *where Paul includes himself also*, but does not “take speech in hand again” (Reiche). See besides on τὸν κόσμον, ver. 6. — ἀλήθεια and ψεύσματι are terms chosen in reference to ver. 4, because the question proposed in ver. 5 was in fact suggested by that verse; but they represent, as ver. 5 proves, the ideas of δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία; hence: *the moral truth, i.e. the holy righteousness of God* (see on John iii. 21; Eph. v. 9; Phil. iv. 8), and *the moral falsehood, i.e. the immorality* (Rev. xxii. 15), wickedness of man.¹ — ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς τ. δόξ. αὐτοῦ] *has abounded richly to His glory*, that is, has shown itself in superabundant measure, which redounds to His glory. The stress of this protasis lies on ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ψεύσματι. — The *aorist* denotes the result of the having abounded, which subsists at the day of judgment (realized as present by τί . . . κρίνομαι) as up to that point accomplished fact. — ἐτί] namely, after that assumed result has occurred. — κάγώ] emphasizing the contradictory relation to the contents of the protasis, according to which this ἐγώ seems actually to have *deserved* something of God: *even I* (Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 150) who have notwithstanding glorified God through my ψεύσμα. So in substance (“*just I*” according to Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 837) also Tholuck and Morison; compare Philippi: “*even I still.*” There lies in the expression something of boldness and defiance; but it is not equivalent to καὶ αὐτός, or αὐτός ἐγώ, to the meaning of which Th. Schott and Hofmann ultimately bring it (“*even personally still*”). We may add that this first person, individualizing just like the preceding one (ἐν τ. ἐμῷ ψ.), of course represents the *sinner in general* (with an intended application to the *Jews*, see on ver. 5 f.), and not *the Apostle himself*, as Schrader and Fritzsche think. Against this latter theory it is decisive that κρίνομαι after ver. 6 must indicate, not the judgment of enemies, but necessarily the *divine act of judging*. — ὡς ἁμαρ.] *as a sinner*, not “*as a Gentile*” (Reiche, Mehring, and others.) — Ver. 8. καὶ μή] Before μή we must again supply τί: *and why should we not*, etc. Respecting τί μή, *quidni*, see Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 162. Accordingly, as καὶ continues the question, only a comma is to be placed after κρίνομαι. — As regards the construction, Paul has dropped the plan of the sentence begun with καὶ μή (*and why should we not do evil, etc.*), being led away from it by the inserted remark, and has joined ὅτι ποιήσωμεν in direct address (*let us do*) to the λέγειν, so that ὅτι is *recitative*. But on account of this very blending there is no necessity either to make a parenthesis or to supply anything.² Many erroneous attempts have been made by commentators (see the various explanations in Morison) to bring out an unbroken construction, as *e.g.* the supplying of ἐροῦμεν or some such word after μή (Erasmus, Calvin, Wolf, Koppe, Benecke, and others, also van Hengel). Even the expedient of Matthias is untenable.³ The same may

¹ Those who take ver. 7 f. as spoken in the person of the *Gentile* (see especially Reiche) explain the ἀλήθεια Θεοῦ of the true religion (how entirely opposed to ver. 4!), ψεύσματι of idolatry, and ἁμαρτωλός as *Gentile*.

² For similar attractions (compare especially Xen. *Anab.* vi. 4, 18) in which the

discourse is interrupted by an intervening clause, and then continued in a regimen dependent on the latter and no longer suitable to the beginning, see Hermann *ad Viger.* p. 745, 894; Bernhardt, p. 464; Dissen, *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 346, 418; Krüger, *gramm. Unters.* p. 457 ff.

³ He brings forward the modal definition:

be said of that of Hofmann, who supplies an *ἐστίν* after *καὶ μή*, and renders: "Why does it not happen to me according to that, as (*καθὼς*) we are slandered," etc. But if it is quite gratuitous to supply *ἐστίν*, it is still more so to make this *ἐστίν* equivalent to *γίνεται μοι*. Besides the negation, which, according to our construction, harmonizes with the deliberative sense, would necessarily be not *μή* but *οὐ*, since it would negative the reality of the *εἶναι* understood (1 Cor. vi. 7; Luke xix. 23, xx. 5 *al.*). The correct view is held also by Winer and Buttmann (p. 235, 211), Philippi and Morison. — *καθὼς βλασφημ.*] as we (Christians) are calumniated, namely, as if we did evil in order that, etc. Then the following *καὶ καθὼς* *λέγειν* contains the accusation, current possibly in Rome also, that the Christians were in the habit of repeating this maxim even as a doctrinal proposition. As to the distinction between *φημί* (to assert) and *λέγω*, compare on 1 Cor. x. 15. What may have occasioned such slanders against the Christians? Certainly their non-observance of the Mosaic law, to which they ventured to deem themselves not bound, in order to gain eternal life by the grace of God through faith in the redemptive work of Christ, which was an offence to the Jews. The plural is not to be referred to *Paul alone*, which would be arbitrary on account of the preceding singular; the Christians are conceived as *Pauline* (comp. Acts xxi. 21); and on the part of Jews and Judaizers (*τινές*, *certain people*, as in 1 Cor. xv. 12) are slanderously and falsely (for see v. 20, vi. 1, 15 ff.) accused of *doing evil that good might come* (might ensue as result). Under this *general category*, namely, the calumniators reduced the bearing of the Christians, so far as the latter, without regulating their conduct by the Mosaic law, were nevertheless assured, and professed, that they should through faith in Christ obtain the divine blessings of salvation. That general accusation was an injurious abstract inference thence deduced. — *ὧν* *i.e.* of those, who follow this principle destructive of the whole moral order of God. They form the nearest logical subject. With just indignation the Apostle himself, having a deep sense of morality, makes us feel in conclusion by *ὧν τὸ κρίμα κ.τ.λ.* how *deserving of punishment* is the consequence, which, if God be regarded as an unrighteous judge of the world, must ensue for moral conduct from the premiss that God is glorified by the sin of men. The reference of *ὧν* to the *slanderers* (Theodoret, Grotius, Tholuck, Mehring, Hofmann) is unsuitable, because it separates the weighty closing sentence from the argumentation itself, and makes it merely an accessory thought. — *τὸ κρίμα*] The definite judicial

ὡς ἁμαρτωλός as the main element; then the modality of the *κρίνομαι* opposed to this is *καὶ μή καθὼς βλασφημ.* κ.τ.λ.: "Why then am even I still judged like a *sinner*, and not rather according to that, which we are slanderously reported of, and which some affirm that we say: namely, *according to this*. Let us do evil, that *good* may come?" Instead of saying: *καὶ μή ὡς ποιήσας τὰ ἀγαθὰ*, Paul, in the indignation of excited feeling, gives to the thought which he had begun the different turn which it presents in the

text. With this artificial interpretation, we must remember that Paul would have written *καὶ οὐ* instead of *καὶ μή*, since it is an objective relation that is here in question (compare Col. ii. 8 *al.*); that instead of *καθὼς* we should have expected the repetition of the *ὡς*; and that the notion of *κρίνειν*, as it prevails in the connection (compare also the following *τὸ κρίμα*), does not suit the assumed thought, *ὡς ποιήσας τὰ ἀγαθὰ*. Comp. also Morison, p. 79.

sentence, decree of punishment at the last judgment. — ἐνδίκον] *accordant with justice*, rightful. Compare Heb. ii. 2. Frequently used in classic writers.

Ver. 9. When Paul, in vv. 6–8, has defended the righteousness of God as decreeing wrath (ver. 5) in the face of the proposition, correct in itself, that human sin turns out to God's glory, he has thereby also deprived the sinner of all the *defence*, which he might derive from the misapplication of that proposition. This position of the case, as it results from vv. 6–8 (οὖν), he now expresses, and that in the lively form of an interrogation, here accompanied by a certain triumph: *What then? Are we in the position to apply a defence for ourselves?* We cannot therefore with most expositors (including Tholuck, Philippi, Bisping) assume that Paul here reverts to ver. 1. — That the punctuation should not be τί οὖν προεχόμεθα; as it is given by Oecumenius, 1, Koppe, Th. Schott) is plain from the answer, which is not οὐδὲν πάντως, but οὐ πάντως. And that in adopting the general inclusive form Paul speaks from the standpoint of the *Jewish* consciousness, and not in the person of the *Christians* (Hofmann), is apparent from the context both before (see vv. 3, 5, 7) and after (Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἑλλ., and see ver. 19). — τί οὖν] sc. ἐστὶ (Acts xxi. 22; 1 Cor. xiv. 15, 26), *what takes place then?* how is then the state of the case? Compare vi. 15, xi. 7; frequent in classical writers; comp. on vv. 3, 5. — προεχόμεθα] *Do we put forward* (anything) *in our defence?* Is it the case with us, that something serves us as a defence, that can secure us against the punitive righteousness of God? προέχειν, which in the active form means to *hold before*, to *have in advance*, to *bring forward*, and intransitively to *be prominent*, also to *excel* (see Wetstein, also Reiche, *Comment. crit.* I. p. 24), has in the middle simply the signification to *hold before oneself*, to *have before oneself*, either in the *proper* sense, e.g. of holding forth spears for defence (Hom. *Il.* xvii. 355), or of having oxen in front (*Od.* iii. 8), or of holding in front the ram's head (Herod. ii. 42), etc., or in the *ethical* sense: to *put forward*, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι, to *apply something for one's own defence*, as in Soph. *Ant.* 80: σὺ μὲν τὰδ' ἂν προῦχοι, Thuc. i. 140, 5 and Krüger *in loc.*, and also Valckenaer, *ad. fr. Cullim.* p. 227.¹ This sense of the word is therefore rightly urged by Hemsterhuis, Venema, Koppe, Bencke, Fritzsche ("utimurne praetextu?"), Krehl, Ewald, Morison; compare also Th. Schott. This explanation is the only one warranted by linguistic usage,² as well as suited to the connection (see above).

¹ More frequent in Greek writers is the form προίσχεσθαι, in this sense, as e.g. Thuc. i. 26, 2. Compare also πρόφασιν προίσχεσθαι, Herod. vi. 117, viii. 3; Herodian, iv. 14, 3; Dem. in *Schol. Hermog.* p. 106, 16: προίσχεσθαι νόμον.

² Also adopted by Valok. *Schol. in Luc.* p. 258. Still he would read προεχόμεθα and take τί οὖν προεχ. together. But the absolute position of προεχ., which has been made an objection to our explanation (Rückert, Tholuck, de Wette, Philippi, Hofmann), does not affect it, since all verbs, if the ob-

ject be self-evidently implied in the idea itself, may be used so that we can mentally supply a τί (Winer, p. 552 [E. T. 593 f.]). And the *subjunctive*, which van Hengel also regards as necessary with our view, is not required; the *indicative* makes the question more definite and precise (Winer, p. 287 [E. T. 284]). Ewald likewise reads τί οὖν προεχόμεθα (subjunctive); but expunges γάρ afterwards, and takes οὐ interrogatively, "What shall we now put forward in defence? did we not already, at the outset, prove altogether that Jews," etc. But the

The most usual rendering (adopted by Tholuck, Köllner, de Wette, Rückert, Baumgarten-Crusius, Philippi, Baur, Umbreit, Jatho and Mangold) is that of the Peshito and Vulgate (*præcellimus eos?*), and of Theophylact: ἐχομέν τι πλέον . . . καὶ εὐδοκιοῦμεν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, ὡς τὸν νόμον καὶ τὴν περιτομὴν δεξάμενοι. Compare Theodoret: τί οὖν κατέχομεν περισσόν; Philippi: "Have we any advantage for ourselves?" and now also Hofmann (who held the right view formerly in his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 501): "Do we raise ourselves above those, upon whom God decrees His judgment of wrath?" But the mere *usus loquendi*, affording not a single instance of the *middle* employed with the signification *antecellere*, *raising oneself above*, *surpassing*, or the like, decisively condemns this usual explanation in its different modifications.¹ And would not the answer οὐ πάντως, in whatever sense we take it, so long as agreeably to the context we continue to understand as the subject the *Jewish*, not the Christian *we* (as Hofmann takes it), be at variance with the answer πολλὴ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον given in ver. 2? The shifts of expositors to escape this inconsistency (the usual one being that Paul here means *subjective* advantages in respect of justification, while in ver. 2 he treats of *objective* theocratic advantages) are forced expedients, which, not at all indicated by any clause of more precise definition on the part of Paul himself, only cast suspicion on the explanation. Wetstein, Michaelis, Cramer, Storr, and recently Matthias, take προεχ. as the passive: *are surpassed*: [See Note XXIX. p. 148.] "Stand we (at all) at a disadvantage? Are we still surpassed by the Gentiles?"² But how could this question be logically *inferred* from the foregoing without the addition of other thoughts? And in what follows it is not the sinful equality of the *Gentiles* with the Jews, but that of the *Jews* with the Gentiles which is made conspicuous. See also ver. 19. Mehring, in thorough opposition to the context, since not a single hint of a transition to the Gentiles is given, makes the question (comp. Oecumenius, 2), and that in the sense "Are we at a disadvantage?" be put into the mouth even of a *Gentile*. — οὐ πάντως! Vulgate: *nequaquam*; Theophylact: οὐδαμῶς. This common rendering [compare the French *point de tout*] is, in accordance with the right explanation of προερχόμεθα, the only proper one. The expression, instead of which certainly πάντως οὐ might have been used (1 Cor. xvi. 12), is quite analogous to the οὐ πᾶν, where it means *in no wise*,³ so that the negative is not transposed, and yet it does

omission of γάρ is only supported by D*. Vān Hengel despairs of a proper explanation, and regards the text as corrupt.

¹ Reiche (and similarly Olshausen) retains the same exposition in his exegetical Commentary; but takes προεχ. as *passive*, *are preferred*, referring in support of his view to Plut. *de Stoic. contrad.* 13 (*Mor.* p. 1038 C), where, however, in τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσι ταῦτα προσήκει κατ' οὐδὲν προερχομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός, the meaning of this προερχομένοις is *becoming surpassed*. In his *Commentar. crit.* I. p. 26 ff., he has passed over to the linguistically correct rendering *prætexere*, but un-

derstands nevertheless the first person of Paul himself, and that in the sense: "*num Judæis peccandi prætextum porrigo?*" But the middle means invariably to hold something (for protection) before *oneself*; as προφασίζομαι also, by which Hesychius properly explains the word, always refers to the subject, which excuses *itself* by a pretext.

² Compare Xen. *Anab.* iii. 2, 19; Plut. *Mor.* p. 1038 C.

³ As in Xen. *Mem.* iii. 1. 11; *Anab.* i. 8. 14; Herodian, vi. 5, 11; Dem. *Ol.* iii. 21; Plat. *Lach.* p. 189 C; Lucian, *Tim.* 24 (see Har-

not cancel the idea of the adverb, but on the contrary is strengthened by the adverb. By this means the emphatic affirmation, which would have been given by the *πάντως* alone, is changed into the opposite.¹ Compare Winer, p. 515 f. [E. T. 554 f.]. The comparison with כִּלְכִּל (Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 334) [E. T. 389] is utterly foreign, since the expression is a pure Greek one.² The explanation, on which van Hengel also insists: *not altogether*, not in every respect (Grotius, Wetstein, Morus, Flatt, Köllner, Matthias, Umbreit, Mehring, and Mangold), as in 1 Cor. v. 10, fails to tally with the true explanation of *προεχόμεθα* and the unrestricted character of the following proof. — *προηγουμένως*] namely, not just from ver. 5 onward (Hofmann), but, in accordance with the following *Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἕλληνας*, in ii. 1 ff. as to the *Jews*, and in i. 18 ff. as to the *Gentiles*.³ It is therefore as in i. 5 and frequently elsewhere, the plural of the author, not: *we Christians* (Hofmann). As to the construction, *πάντας* may either be joined as an adjective to *Ἰουδ. τ. καὶ Ἕλλ.*, or as a substantive to the infinitive, in either case expressing the idea of *all collectively*, *namine excepto*. The latter mode of connection is preferable, because it gives a more marked prominence to the idea of totality, which harmonizes with the following vv. 10–12. Hence: *we have before brought the charge against Jews and Gentiles, that all*, etc. Comp. Hofmann and Morison. There is elsewhere no instance of the compound *προαιτ.*; the Greeks use *προκατηγορεῖν*. — *ἐφ' ἡμαρτ. εἶναι*] They are—while still unregenerate, a more precise definition that is self-evident—all *under sin*, an expression denoting not merely a state of sin in general, but moral dependence on the power of sin. Compare vii. 25; Gal. iii. 22. But if this be the case with *Jews* and *Gentiles* (not merely on the *Gentile* side), then the Jew, after the way of escape indicated in ver. 5 has been cut off by vv. 6–8, has no defence left to him as respects his liability to punishment any more than the *Gentile*.⁴ Accordingly the idea of *liability to punishment* is not yet expressed in *ἐφ' ἡμαρτ. εἶναι*, but is meant only to be *inferred* from it.

Vv. 10–18. Conformity with Scripture of the charge referred to, *Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἕλληνας πάντ. ἐφ' ἡμ. εἶναι*, so far (ver. 19) as this charge cuts off from the *Jews* every *προέχουσθαι* of ver. 9. — The recitative *ὅτι* introduces citations from Scripture very various in character, which after the national habit (Surenhusius, *καταλλ. thes.* 7) are arranged in immediate succession. They are taken from the LXX., though for the most part with variations, partly

tung, *Partikell.* II. p. 87). Those passages where *οὐ πάντ* negatives with a certain subtlety or ironical turn (*not quite, not just*), are not cases here in point; see Schoemann, *ad Is.* p. 276.

¹ Bengel: "Judaicus diceret πάντως, at Paulus contradicit."

² Compare Theognis, 305, Bekker: οἱ κακοὶ οὐ πάντως (by no means) κακοὶ ἐκ γαστρὸς γεγόνασιν. *Ep. ad Diogn.* 9: οὐ πάντως ἡγήσμενος. (by no means regarding) τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ἀνεχόμενος. Perfectly similar is also the Hom. *εἰς οὐ πάντων, decidedly not*; see Nägelsbach on the *Iliad*,

p. 146, ed. 3; Duncan, *Lex. Hom.* ed. Rost, p. 888. Compare οὐδὲν πάντως, Herod. v. 34, 65.

³ Paul however does not say *Gentiles and Jews*, but the converse, because here again, as in previous cases where both are grouped together (in the last instance ii. 9 f.), he has before his mind the divine historical order, which in the very point of sinfulness tells against the Jew the more seriously.

⁴ For statements of Greek writers regarding the universality, without any exception, of sin, see Spiess, *Logos spermat.* p. 220 f.

due to quotation from memory, and partly intentional, for the purpose of defining the sense more precisely. The arrangement is such that testimony is adduced for—1st, the *state* of sin generally (vv. 10-12) ; 2nd, the *practice* of sin in word (vv. 13, 14) and deed (vv. 15-17) ; and 3rd, the sinful *source* of the whole (ver. 18). More artificial schemes of arrangement are not to be sought (as e.g. in Hofmann), not even by a play on numbers.¹—οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς] *There exists not a righteous person* (who is such as he ought to be), *not even one*. Taken from Ps. xiv. 1, where the Sept. has ποιῶν χρηστότητα instead of δίκαιος ; Paul has put the latter on purpose at once, in accordance with the aim of his whole argument, prominently to characterize the ἰφ' ἀμαρτ. εἶναι as a want of δικαιοσύνη. Michaelis regards the words as the Apostle's own, "under which he comprehends all that follows." So also Eckermann, Koppe, Köllner, and Fritzsche. But it is quite at variance with the habit of the Apostle, after using the formula of quotation, to prefix to the words of Scripture a summary of their contents ; and this supposition is here the more improbable, seeing that the Apostle continues in ver. 11 in the words of the same Psalm, with the first verse of which our passage substantially agrees.²—Ver. 11 is from Ps. xiv. 2, and so quoted, that the *negative* sense which results indirectly from the text in the Hebrew and LXX. is expressed by Paul directly : *there exists not the understanding one* (the practically wise, i.e. the pious one ; see Gesenius, *Theo. s. v.* רָחֵם) : *there exists not the seeker after God* (whose thoughts and endeavors are directed towards God, Heb. xi. 6, and see Gesenius, *s. v.* רָשָׁה). The article denotes the *genus* as a definite concrete representing it. Compare Buttmann's *neut. Gr. p.* 253 f. [E. T. 295]³ — ἐκζητ.] stronger than the simple form ; compare 1 Pet. i. 10 ; very frequent in the LXX. — Ver. 12. From Ps. xiv. 3 closely after the LXX. ἐξέκλιναν, namely from the right way, denotes the demoralization (see Gesenius, *s. v.* סָיַר), as does also ἡχρεώθησαν, נֶאֱלָחוּ : they have become useless, corrupt, good for nothing, ἀχρεῖοι (Matt. xxv. 30) ; Polyb. i. 14, 6, i. 48, 9. The following ποιῶν χρηστότητα is correlative. This ἅμα (altogether) ἡχρεώθη. has still πάντες for its subject. — ἕως ἐνός] The οὐκ ἔστιν holds as far as to one (inclusively), so that therefore not one is excepted. Compare Jud. iv. 16. Hebraism, see Ewald, *Lehrb.* § 217, 3. The Latin *ad unum omnes* is similar. — Ver. 13 as far as ἐδολ. is from Ps. v. 10, and thence till αὐτῶν from Ps. cxl. 4, both closely after the LXX.⁴—τάφος ἀνεγγμ. ὁ λάρ. αὐτ.] Estius : "Sicut sepulcrum patens exhalat tetrum

¹ According to Hofmann the first and second parts consist each of seven propositions. Thus even the conclusion of ver. 12, οὐκ ἔστιν ἕως ἐνός, is to be reckoned as a separate proposition ! How all the parallelism of Hebrew poetry is mutilated by such artifices !

² Regarding οὐδὲ εἷς see on 1 Cor. vi. 5, and Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 214 D.

³ On the idea, which is also classical, of sin as *folly*, see Nägelsbach, *Hom. Theol.* VI. 2. The form *συνίων*, so accentuated by Lach-

mann ; compare Buttmann, I. p. 543, or *συνιών* (though the former is the more probable ; compare Winer, p. 77 f. [E. T. 81], also Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 768), is the usual one in the Sept. (instead of *συνίεις*, Ps. xxxiii. 15). Ps. xli. 1 ; Jer. xxx. 12 ; 2 Chron. xxxiv. 12 *et al.*

⁴ The MSS. of the LXX. which read the whole passage vv. 13-18 at Ps. xiv. 3, have been interpolated from our passage in Christian times. See Wolf, *Cur.* on ver. 10.

ac pestiferum foetorem, ita ex ore illorum impuri, pestilentes noxiique sermones exeunt." Comp. Pelagius, Bengel, Tholuck, Mehring, and Hofmann. But it is more in harmony with the further description, as well as the parallel in Jer. v. 16 (where the quiver of the Chaldeans is compared with an open grave), to find the comparison in the point that, when the godless have opened their throats for lying and corrupting discourse, it is just as if a grave stood opened (observe the *perfect*) to which the corpse ought to be consigned for decay and destruction.¹ So certainly and unavoidably corrupting is their discourse. Moreover *λάρυγξ*, which is here to be taken in its original sense (as organ of *speech*, not equivalent to *φάρυγξ*, the gullet) is more forcibly graphic than *στόμα*, representing the speech as passionate *crying*. Compare *λαρυγγίζειν*, Dem. 323, 1, and *λαρυγγισμός*, of crying lustily. — *ἑδολοῦσαν*] *they were deceiving*. The imperfect denotes what had taken place as continuing up till the present time; and on this form of the third person plural, of very frequent occurrence in the LXX., see Sturz, *Dial. Al.* p. 60; Ahrens, *Dial. II.* p. 304, I. p. 237. — *ἰδὸς ἀσπίδων*] *The poison of asps*, a figure for the insidiously corrupting.²—Ver. 14 is from Ps. x. 7, taken freely from the LXX., who however with their *πικρίας* deviate from the Hebrew כִּנְיָוִת, because they either read it otherwise or translated it erroneously. — *πικρία*, figurative designation of the *hateful nature*. Comp. Eph. iv. 31; Acts viii. 23; James iii. 14; see Wetstein.—Vv. 15–17 are from Is. lix. 7, 8, quoted freely and with abbreviations from the LXX. — *ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτῶν*] Where they go, is *desolation* (fragments *ῥῖψ*) and *misery*, which they produce. — *ὁδὸν εἰρ. οὐκ ἔχον.*] *i.e. a way on which one walks peacefully* (the opposite of the *ὁδοί*, on which is *σύντριμμα κ. ταλαιπ.*), *they have not known* (2 Cor. v. 21), it has remained strange to them.—Ver. 18 is from Ps. xxxvi. 1. *The fear of God*, which would have preserved them from such conduct and have led them to an entirely different course, is not before their eyes. "There is objectivity ascribed to a condition which is, psychologically, subjective." Morison.

Ver. 19. The preceding quotations ("in quibus magna est verborum atrocitas," Melancthon) were intended to prove that *Jews* and Gentiles are collectively under the dominion of sin (ver. 9); but how easily might it be imagined on the part of the conceited Jews³ that the above passages of Scripture (of which those in vv. 10, 11 and 12, taken from Ps. xiv., really refer originally to the Gentiles, to Babylon), however they might affect the *Gentiles*, could have no application to themselves, the *Jews*, who had no need therefore to take them to themselves, as if they also were included in the same condemnation. Such a distinction, however, which could only promote a self-exaltation and self-justification at variance with the divine purpose in those declarations of His word, they were to forego, seeing that everything that the Scripture says has its bearing for the Jews. The

¹ The metaphorical representation in classical passages, in which, *e.g.*, the Cyclops is termed *ζών τυμβος* (*Anth. Pal.* xiv. 109, 3), or the vultures *ἐμψυχοὶ ταφοὶ* (Gorgias, *ap. Longin.* 3), is not similar.

² See similar passages in Alberti, *Obs.* p. 301.

³ See especially Eisenmenger's *entdecktes Judenthum*, I. p. 568 ff.

Apostle therefore now continues, and that with very emphatic bringing out of the *ὅσα* in the first half of the verse and of the *πάν* and *πᾶς* in the second : *we know however* (as in ii. 2) *that whatsoever the law saith, it speaketh to those that are in the law*, consequently that the Jews may not except themselves from the reference of *any* saying in Scripture.—*ὅσα*] *whatsoever*, therefore also what is expressed in such condemnatory passages as the above, without exception.—*ὁ νόμος*] in accordance with its reference to vv. 10–18, is necessarily to be taken here as designation of the *O. T. generally* (comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 21; John x. 34, xii. 34, xv. 25; 2 Macc. ii. 18); not, with Hunnius, Calovius, Balduin, and Sebastian Schmid, of *the law in the dogmatic sense* (comp. Matthias); or of the *Mosaic law*, as Ammon and Glöckler, Th. Schott and Hofmann take it, confusing in various ways the connection.¹ So also van Hengel, who quite gratuitously wishes to assume an enthymeme with a minor premiss to be understood (*but the law condemns all those sinners*). The designation of the *O. T.* by *ὁ νόμος*, which forms the first, and for Israel most important, portion of it, was here occasioned by *τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ*, i.e. those who are *in the law* as their *sphere of life*.—*λέγει . . . λαλεῖ*] All that the law *says* (materially, or respecting its contents, all *λόγοι* of the law), it *speaks* (speaks out, of the outward act which makes the *λόγοι* be heard, makes known through speech) to those who, etc. Comp. on John viii. 43; Mark i. 34; 1 Cor. ix. 8, xii. 3. The dative denotes those to whom the *λαλεῖν* applies (Krüger, § 48, 7, 13). Those who have their state of life within the sphere of the law are to regard *whatsoever the law says* as addressed to *themselves*, whether it was meant primarily for Jews or Gentiles. How this solemnly emphatic *quæcunque* heaps upon the Jews the Divine sentence of “guilty,” and cuts off from them every refuge, as if this or that declaration did not apply to or concern them!—*ἵνα πάν στόμα κ.τ.λ.*] *in order that every mouth* (therefore also the *Jew*) *may be stopped* (Heb. xi. 33; Ps. cvii. 42; Job v. 16; and see Wetstein), etc. This, viz. that *no one* shall be able to bring forward anything for his justification, is represented in *ἵνα*—which is not *ita ut*—as *intended* by the speaking law, i.e. by God speaking in the law. Reiche unjustly characterizes this thought as *absurd* in every view and from every standpoint; the *ἵνα πάν κ.τ.λ.* does not announce itself as the sole and exclusive end, but on the contrary, without

¹ According to Hofmann (compare his *Schriftbeweis*, I. p. 623 f.; so too, in substance, Th. Schott) the train of thought is: after ver. 9 ff. the only further question that could be put is, whether anything is given to Christians that exempts them from the general guilt and punishment. The law possibly? No, “*they know that this law has absolutely (ὅσα) no other tenor than that which it presents to those who belong to its domain, for this purpose, that the whole world, in the same extent in which it is under sin, must in its own time (this idea being conveyed by the aorists φραγῇ and γένηται), when it comes to stand before God its Judge, be*

dumb before Him and recognize the justice of His condemning sentence.” This interpretation, obscuring with a far-fetched ingenuity the plain sense of the words, and wringing out of it a tenor of thought to which it is a stranger, is a further result of Hofmann’s having misunderstood the *προεχόμενα* in ver. 9, and having referred it, as also the subsequent *προηρισσόμενα*, to the *Christians* as subject, an error which necessarily deranged and dislocated for him the entire course of argument in vv. 9–20. At the same time it would not be even *historically true* that the law has absolutely no other tenor, etc.

negating other and higher ends, merely expresses one single and special teleological point, which is however the very point which the connection here required to be cited. The *time* to be mentally supplied for φραγῇ and γένηται is the *future* generally reckoned from the present of λαλεῖ, not that of the *final judgment*, which does not harmonize with the thought in ver. 9 to which the series of Scripture testimonies in vv. 10–18 is appended. — ὑπόδικος] *punishable*, κατὰκριτος, ἀπαρρήσιastos, Theophylact; frequently used by classic writers, but elsewhere neither in the N. T. nor in the LXX. or Apocrypha. — τῷ Θεῷ] belongs, not to φραγῇ (Matthias), but, after the manner of the more closely defining parallelism, merely to ὑπόδικ. γένηται : *to God*, as the Being to whom the penalty is to be paid.¹ — γένηται] The result which is to manifest itself, as in ver. 4. — πᾶς ὁ κόσμος] quite generally (ver. 9); comp. Eph. ii. 3. And if Paul has described² this generality (comp. also ver. 23) thus “*insigni figura et verborum emphasi*” (Melancthon), the result extending to *all humanity* is not contradicted by the virtue of *individuals*, such as the patriarchs; for from the ideal, but at the same time legally true (comp. Gal. iii. 10), standpoint of the Apostle this virtuosity is still no δικαιοσύνη (but only a minor degree of the want of it), and does not therefore form an exception from the category of the ὑπόδικον εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ. See ver. 20. Though different as respects degree, yet *all* are affected and condemned by the declarations quoted; *every one* has a share in this corruption.³

Ver. 20. [See Note XXX. p. 148.] Διότι] *propterea quod*, i. 19, not *propterea* (Beza, Rosenmüller, Morus, Tholuck), is to be divided from the preceding only by a comma, and supplies the objective reason of that ἵνα κ.τ.λ. of the law : *because the relation of righteousness will accrue to no flesh from works of the law*. For if δικαιοσύνη should come from *works of the law*, the law would in fact open up the way of righteousness, and therefore that ἵνα πάν κ.τ.λ. would not be correct.⁴ As to πᾶσα σάρξ, equivalent to πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, but conveying the idea of moral imperfection and sinfulness in presence of God, see on Acts ii. 17; 1 Cor. i. 20; and compare generally on Gal. ii. 16. That with regard to the *Gentiles* Paul is thinking of the *natural law* (ii. 14)

¹ The opposite is ἀντίτις ἀθανάτοιςιν, Hesiod, ἐργ. 825, and θεοῖς ἀναμπλάκηντος, Aesch. Agam. 352. Comp. Plat. Legg. viii. p. 816 B : ὑπόδικος ἔστω τῷ βλαφθέντι, p. 868 D, 11, p. 932; Dem. 518, 3 al.

² From the poetic tenor of the passage ἵνα πάν κ.τ.λ. Ewald conjectures that it reproduces a passage from the O. T. that is now *lost*. But how readily may it be conceived that Paul, who was himself of a deeply poetic nature, should, in the vein of higher feeling into which he had been brought by the accumulated words of psalm and prophecy, spontaneously express himself as he has done! That ὑπόδικος does not again occur in his writings, matters not; ἐνδικος also in ver. 8 is not again used.

³ Compare Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, II. p. 152 f.

⁴ According to Hofmann, in pursuance of his erroneous interpretation of ver. 19, διότι κ.τ.λ. is meant to contain the specification of the reason “*why the word of the law was published to the Jews for no other object, than that the whole world might be precluded from all objection against the condemning sentence of God.*” Compare also Th. Schott. But Paul has not at all expressed in ver. 19 the thought “*for no other object*,” he must in that case, instead of the simple ἵνα which by no means excludes other objects, have written *μόνον ἵνα*, or possibly *εἰς οὐδὲν εἰ μὴ ἵνα*, or in some other way conveyed the non-expressed thought.

cannot be admitted, seeing that in the whole connection he has to do with the law of *Moses*. But neither may the thought be imported into the passage with reference to the Gentiles: "if they should be placed under the law and should have *ἔργα νόμου*" (Rückert, comp. Philippi and Mehling), since, according to the context, it is only with reference to the *Jews* (ver. 19) that the question is dealt with as to no flesh being righteous—a general relation which, as regards the Gentiles, is perfectly self-evident, seeing that the latter are *ἄνομοι*, and have no *ἔργα νόμου* in the proper sense whatever.—Respecting *ἔργα νόμου*,¹ *works in harmony with the law* of Moses, the *ἔργα* being the prominent conception, works which are fulfilments of its precepts, comp. on ii. 15. Moreover that it is not specially the observance of the *ritual* portions of the law (Pelagius, Cornelius à Lapide, Semler, Ammon), but that of the *Mosaic law in general* which is meant, is clear partly from the expression itself, which is put without limitation, partly from the contextual relation of the clause to what goes before, and partly from the following *διὰ γὰρ νόμον κ.τ.λ.*, from which the ethical law is so far from being excluded,² that it is on the contrary precisely this aspect of the *νόμος* which is specially meant.—*οὐ δικαιοθήσ.*] See on i. 17. The *future* is to be understood either of the moral possibility, or, which is preferable on account of iii. 20, purely in the sense of time, and that of the *future generally*: "In every case in which justification (*i.e.* the being declared righteous by God) shall occur, it will not result from," etc., so that such works should be the *causa meritoria*. The reference to the future judgment (Reiche) is controverted by the fact that throughout the entire connection justification is regarded as a relation arising immediately from faith, and not as something to be decided only at the judgment. See ver. 21 ff. and chap. iv. For this reason there is immediately afterwards introduced as the counterpart of the *δικαιοσύνη*, which comes directly from faith, the *ἐπίγνωσις ἀμαρτίας*, which comes directly from the law. It is certain, moreover, that in *οὐ δικαιοθ. κ.τ.λ.* Paul had Ps. cxliii. 2 in view, but instead of *πᾶς ζῶν* he put *πᾶσα σὰρξ* as more significant for the matter in hand.—*In what sense now shall no one from works of the law become righteous before God, i.e.* such that God looks upon him as righteous?³ Not in the sense that perfect compliance with the law would be insufficient to secure justification, against which the fundamental law of the judge: *οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμον δικαιοθήσονται* (ii. 13), would be decisive; but in the sense that no man, even with an outwardly faultless observance of the law (comp. on Phil. iii. 6), is in a position to offer to it that full and right obedience, which alone would be the condition of a jus-

¹ For *ἔργων νόμου* cannot be taken as *law of works*, as Märcker uniformly wishes. Comp. on ii. 15.

² Paul always conceives the law as an undivided whole (comp. Usteri, p. 36), while he yet has in his mind sometimes more the ritual, sometimes more the moral, aspect of this one divine *νόμος*, according to his object and the connection (Ritschl, *alt-kathol. K.* p. 73). Comp. on Gal. ii. 16.

³ In opposition to Hofmann, who in his *Schriftb.* I. p. 612 urges the *ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* against the imputative sense of the passive *δικαιοῦσθαι*, see Wieseler on Gal. p. 192 f. It is quite equivalent to *παρὰ τ. Θεῷ, iudice Deo*, Gal. iii. 11. See generally the thorough defence of the *sensus forensis* of *δικαιοῦσθαι* in the N. T., also from classic authors and from the O. T. in Morison, p. 163 ff.

tification independent of extraneous intervention ; in fact, it is only through the law that man comes to a clear perception and consciousness of his moral imperfection by nature (his unrighteousness). See Luther's preface. That this was the Apostle's view, is proved by the reason which follows : *διὰ γὰρ νόμον κ.τ.λ.* See, besides, especially chs. vii. and viii. ; Gal. iii. 10. There is here no mention of the *good works of the regenerate*, which however are only the *fruits* of justification, ch. vi. viii. 2 ff. ; Eph. ii. 10 *al.* Comp. Philippi and Morison. — *διὰ γὰρ νόμον ἐπίγν. ἄμ.*] The law, when it places its demands before man, produces in the latter his first *proper recognition* of his moral incongruity with the will of God. "With these words Paul strikes at the deepest root of the matter," Ewald. Respecting γὰρ Calvin's note is sufficient : "a contrario ratiocinatur . . . quando ex eadem scatebra non prodeunt vita et mors." The propriety of the argument however rests on the fact that the law does not at the same time supply the strength to conquer sin (viii. 3), but stops short at the point of bringing to cognition the "interiorem immunditiem" which it forbids ; "hanc judicat et accusat coram Deo, non tollit," Melancthon. It is different in the case of civil laws, which are designed merely to do away with the externa scelera, and to judge the works in and for themselves, xiii. 3 ff.

Vv. 21–30. [See Note XXXI. p. 149.] Paul has hitherto been proving that all men are under sin, and guilty before God. This was the preparatory portion of the detailed illustration of the theme set forth in ch. i. 17 ; for before anything else there had to be recognized the general necessity of a δικαιοσύνη not founded on the law—as indeed such a legal righteousness has shown itself to be impossible. Now however he exhibits this δικαιοσύνη provided from another source—the righteousness of God which comes from faith to all without distinction, to believing Jews and Gentiles. Hofmann rejects this division, in consequence of his having erroneously taken ποιεῖν χάρις in ver. 9 as the utterance of the Christians. He thinks that the Apostle only now comes to the conclusion, at which he has been aiming ever since the fifth verse : as to what makes Christians, as distinguished from others, assured of salvation.

Ver. 21.¹ *Nvri* is usually interpreted here as a pure *adverb of time* ("nostris temporibus hac in parte felicissimis," Grotius). So also Tholuck, Reiche, Rückert, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Winzer, Reithmayr, Philippi, van Hengel, Mehring, Th. Schott, and others. But since what precedes was not given as a delineation of the *past*, there appears here not the contrast between two *periods*, but that between two *relations*, the relation of dependence on the law and the relation of independence on the law (*διὰ νόμον . . . χωρὶς νόμου*). Hence with Beza, Pareus, Piscator, Estius, Koppe, Fritzsche, de Wette, Matthias, and Hofmann, we render : *but in this state of the case.*² — *χωρὶς νόμου*] placed with full emphasis at the beginning as the opposite of *διὰ νόμου*, belongs to *πεφάν.* Aptly rendered by Luther : "without the ac-

¹ See Winzer, *Comm. in Rom.* iii. 21–28, *Partic. I.* and II. 1829.

² See regarding this dialectic use of the *vñv* Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 25 ; Baeuml.

Part. p. 95 ; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 181. *Comp.* vii. 17 ; I. Cor. v. 11, xii. 18, xiii. 13, *al.* ; 4 Macc. vi. 33, xiii. 3. By Greek authors *vñv* is not thus used, only *vñv*.

cessory aid of the law," i.e. so that in this revelation of the righteousness of God the law is left out of account. Reiche¹ joins it with δικαιοσ.: "the righteousness of God as being imparted to the believer without the law, without the Mosaic law helping him thereto." Compare also Winzer, Klee, Mehring. But apart from the *coactor constructio*, with which Estius already found fault, we may urge against this view the parallel of διὰ νόμου, ver. 20, which words also do not belong to ἐπίγνωσις ἡμαρτ. but to the verb to be supplied. — πεφανέρωται] *is made manifest and lies open to view*, so that it presents itself to the knowledge of every one; the present of the completed action, Heb. ix. 26. The expression itself presupposes the previous κρυπτόν (Col. iii. 3 f.; Mark iv. 22), *the having been hidden*, in accordance with which the righteousness of God has not yet been the object of experimental perception. To men it was an *unknown treasure*. The mode of the πεφανέρωται however consists in the δικαιοσ. Θεοῦ having become *actual*, having passed into historical reality, and having been made apparent, which has been accomplished without mixing up the law as a co-operative factor in the matter. — μαρτυρ. ὑπὸ τ. νομ. κ. τ. προφ.] An accompanying characteristic definition of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, so far as the latter is made manifest: *being witnessed, etc.* If it is thus the case with regard to it, that in its πεφανέρωται it is attested by the witness of the law and the prophets, then this precludes the misconception that the δικαιοσύνη revealed χωρὶς νόμου is opposed or foreign to the O. T., and consequently an innovation without a background in sacred history. Comp. xvi. 26; John v. 39. "Novum testamentum in vetere latet, vetus in novo patet," Augustine. In this case we are not to think of the *moral requirements* (Th. Schott), but of the *collective Messianic types, promises and prophecies* in the law and the prophets, in which is also necessarily comprised the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ as that which is necessary to participation in the Messianic salvation. Comp. i. 2, iii. 2; Acts x. 43, xxviii. 23; Luke xxiv. 27; from the law, the testimony of Abraham, iv. 3 ff. and the testimonies quoted in x. 6 ff. — Observe further that μαρτυροῦν. has the emphasis, in contrast to χωρὶς, not ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου (Bengel, Fritzsche and others). We may add Bengel's apt remark: "*Lex stricte (namely, in χωρὶς νόμου) et late (in ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου) dicitur.*"

Ver. 22. *A righteousness of God, however, (mediated) through faith in Jesus Christ.* On δέ, with the repetition of the same idea, to be defined now however more precisely, the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ (not merely δικαιοσύνη, as Hofmann insists contrary to the words); comp. ix. 30. See on Phil. ii. 8. — The genitive 'I. X. contains the object of faith² in accordance with prevail-

¹ Following Augustine, *de grat. Chr.* 1, 8, and *de spir. et. lit.* 9, Wolf, and others.

² This view of the genitive is justly adhered to by most expositors. It is with πίστις as with ἀγάπη, in which the object is likewise expressed as well by the genitive as by εἰς. Nevertheless, Scholten, Rauwenhoff, van Hengel, and Berlage (*de formulæ Paulinae πίστις 'I. Χριστοῦ signif.*, Lugd. B. 1856) have recently taken it to mean the

"fides, quae auctore Jesu Christo Deo habetur" (Berlage). Against this view we may decidedly urge the passages where the genitive with πίστις is a thing or an abstract idea (Phil. i. 27; 2 Thess. ii. 13; Acts iii. 16; Col. ii. 12); also the expression πίστις Θεοῦ in Mark xi. 22, where the genitive must necessarily be that of the object. Comp. the classical expressions πίστις Θεῶν and the like. See besides Lipsius, *Rechtf.*

ing usage (Mark xi. 22 ; Acts iii. 16 ; Gal. ii. 16, 20, iii. 22 ; Eph. iii. 12, iv. 13 ; Phil. iii. 9 ; James ii. 1). The article before *διὰ πίστ.* was not needed for the simple reason that *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* is without it. Therefore, and because the point at issue here was not the mode of becoming manifest, but the specific characterizing of the righteousness itself that had become manifest, neither *διὰ πίστ.* (Fritzsche, Tholuck) nor the following *εἰς πάντας κ.τ.λ.* (de Wette, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Winer, Mehring and others) is to be made dependent on *πεφανέρωται*. — *εἰς πάντας κ. ἐπὶ π. τ. πιστ.*] scil. *οὔσα*.¹ The expression is an earnest and significant bringing into prominence of the universal character of this *δικαιοσύνη διὰ πίστ.* 'I. X.: which is for all, and upon all who believe. Both prepositions denote the direction of aim, in which the *δικαιοσύνη* presents itself, though with the special modification that under the *εἰς* lies the notion of *destination* (not "the immanent influx," Reithmayr), under the *ἐπὶ* that of *extending itself* over all. On the peculiar habit, which the Apostle has, of setting forth a relation under several aspects by different prepositional definitions of a single word, see Winer, p. 390 [E. T. 418] ; compare generally Kühner II. 1, p. 475 f. While recent expositors (including Rückert, Reiche, Kollner, de Wette) have often arbitrarily disregarded the distinction in sense between the two prepositions,² and have held both merely as a *strengthening* of the idea *all* ("for all, for all without exception," Koppe), the old interpreters, on the other hand, forced upon the *εἰς* and *ἐπὶ* much that has nothing at all in common with the relation of the prepositions ; e.g. that *εἰς π.* applies to the *Jews* and *ἐπὶ π.* to the *Gentiles*.³ — *οὐ γάρ ἐστι διαστ.*] Ground assigned for the *πάντας τ. πιστ.* "For there is no distinction made, according to which another way to the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* would stand open for a portion of men, perchance for the Jews," and that just for the reason that (ver. 23) all have sinned, etc.

Ver. 23. *Ἠμαρτον*] [See Note XXXII. p. 149.] The sinning of every man is presented as an historical fact of the past, whereby the sinful state is produced. The *perfect* would designate it as a completed subsisting fact. Calvin, moreover, properly remarks that according to Paul there is nulla justitia "nisi perfecta et absoluta," and "si verum esset, nos partim operibus justificari, partim Dei gratia, non valeret hoc Pauli argumentum." Luther aptly observes : "They are altogether sinners, etc., is the main article and the central point of this Epistle and of the whole Scripture." — *καὶ ἵστερ.*] They *have* sinned, and in consequence of this they *lack*, there is *wanting* to them, etc. This very *present* expression, as well as the *present* participle

tigungsl. p. 109 f. ; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 335.

¹ See Bornemann, *ad Xen. Symp.* 4, 25.

² For in none of the similar passages are the prepositions synonymous. See iii. 20, xi. 36 ; Gal. i. 1 ; Eph. iv. 6 ; Col. i. 16. See also Matthias and Mehring *in loc.* The latter, following out his connection *πεφανέρ.*, explains : "manifested to all men and for all believers." But it is arbitrary to take *τοὺς πιστεύοντας* as defining only the second *πάντας*, as Morus and Flatt (see also Mo-

risson, p. 229 ff.) have already done. After the emphatic *δικαιοσύνη δὲ Θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως* the *πιστεύειν* is so much the specific and thorough mark of the subjects, that *τοὺς πιστεύοντας* must define the *πάντας* in both instances.

³ Thus Theodoret, Oecumenius, and many others, who have been followed by Bengel, Böhme, and Jatho (and conversely by Matthias, who explains *ἐκ* and *εἰς* in i. 17 in the same way).

δικαιοῦμενοι, ought to have kept Hofmann from understanding πάντες of all believers; for in their case that ὑστερεῖσθαι no longer applies (v. 1 f., viii. 1 *al.*), and they are not δικαιοῦμενοι but δικαιωθέντες; but, as becoming believers, they would not yet be πιστεύοντες. — τῆς δόξης τ. Θεοῦ] The genitive with ὑστερεῖσθαι (Diod. Sic. xviii. 71; Joseph. *Antt.* xv. 6, 7) determines for the latter the sense of *destitui*. See Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 237. Comp. on 1 Cor. i. 7. They lack the honour which God gives,¹ they are destitute of the being honoured by God, which would be the case, if the ἡμαρτον did not occur; in that case they would possess the good pleasure of God, and this, regarded as honour, which they would have to enjoy from God: the δόξα τοῦ Θεοῦ. Comp. ii. 29; John xii. 43, compared with v. 44. Köllner's objection to this view, which first offers itself, of τ. Θεοῦ as the genitive auctoris, which is also held by Piscator, Hammond, Grotius, Fritzsche, Reiche, de Wette, Tholuck, and others, following Chrysostom (comp. Philippi), that it is not the fault of men if they should not have an honour, which proceeds from God, is of no weight; since it certainly is the fault of men, if they render it impossible for a holy God to give them the honour which proceeds from Him. Moreover, Köllner's own explanation: honour before God (quite so also Calvin; and comp. Philippi), which is said according to the analogy of human relations, in point of fact quite coincides with the above view, since in fact honour before God, or with God (Winzer), is nothing else than the honour that accrues to us from God's judgment. Comp. Calvin: "ita nos ab humani theatri plausu ad tribunal coeleste vocat." Accordingly, the genitive is here all the less to be interpreted *coram*, since in no other passage (and especially not in δικαιοσ. Θεοῦ, see on i. 17) is there any necessity for this interpretation. This last consideration may also be urged against the interpretation of others: *gloriatio coram Deo*; "non habent, unde coram Deo gloriantur," Estius. So Erasmus, Luther, Toletus, Wolf, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Reithmayr, and others. It is decisive against this view that in all passages where Paul wished to express *gloriatio*, he knew how to employ the proper word, *καύχησις* (ver. 27; 2 Cor. vii. 14, viii. 24 *al.*). Others, again, following Oecumenius (Chrysostom and Theophylact express themselves too indefinitely, and Theodoret is altogether silent on the matter), explain the δόξα τ. Θεοῦ to mean the *glory of eternal life*, in so far as God either has destined it for man (Glöckler), or confers it upon him (Böhme, comp. Morison); or in so far as it consists in partaking in the glory of God (Beza, comp. Bengel and Baumgarten-Crusius). Mehring allows a choice between the two last definitions of the sense. But the following δικαιοῦμενοι proves that the δόξα τοῦ Θεοῦ cannot in reality be anything essentially different from the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, and cannot be merely future. Utterly erroneous, finally, is the view of Chemnitz, Flacius, Sebastian Schmid, Calovius,²

¹ The genitive τ. Θεοῦ cannot, without arbitrariness, be explained otherwise than was done in the case of δικαιοσύνη τ. Θεοῦ. In consequence of his erroneous exposition of δικαιοσ. τ. Θεοῦ (see on i. 17), Matthias understands here "glory such as is that of

God," i.e. the glory of personal holiness.

² He takes δόξα τοῦ Θεοῦ as "gloria homini a Deo concessa in creatione;" this gloria having been the divine image, which we forfeited after the fall.

Hasaeus, Alting, Carpzov, Ernesti, recently revived by Rückert, Olshausen, and Mangold, that the *δόξα τοῦ Θεοῦ* is *the image of God*; “a godlike *δόξα*,” as Rückert puts it, and thus gets rid of the objection that *δόξα* is not synonymous with *εἰκών*. But how arbitrarily is the relation of the genitive thus defined, altogether without the precedent of a similar usage (2 Cor. xi. 2 is not a case in point)! That the *idea* of the *image* of God is not suggested by anything in the *connection* is self-evident, since, as the subsequent *δικαιοῦμεν* δι κ.τ.λ. abundantly shows, it is the idea of the want of *righteousness* that is under discussion. Hofmann and Ewald have explained it in the same way as Rückert, though they take the genitive more accurately (a *δόξα* such as God Himself possesses). The latter¹ understands “the glory of God which man indeed has by creation, Ps. viii. 8, but which by sin he may lose for time and eternity, and has now lost.” Compare Hofmann: “Whatsoever is of God has a share, after the manner of a creature, in the glory of God. If this therefore be not found in man, the reason is that he has forfeited the relation to God in which he was created.” But even apart from the fact that such a participation in the glory of God has been lost already through the fall (v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 22), and not for the first time through the individual *ἡμαρτον* here meant, it is decisive against this exposition that the participation in the divine *δόξα* nowhere appears as an original blessing that has fallen into abeyance, but always as something to be conferred only at the Parousia (v. 2; 1 Thess. ii. 12); as the *συνδοξασθῆναι* with Christ (viii. 17 f.; Col. iii. 4); as the glorious *κληρονομία* of God (comp. also 2 Tim. iv. 8; 1 Pet. v. 4); and consequently as the *new* blessing of the *future αἰών* (1 Cor. ii. 9). That is also the proleptic *ἐδόξασε* in viii. 30, which however would be foreign to the present connection.

Ver. 24. *Δικαιοῦμενοι*] [See Note XXXIII. p. 149.] does not stand for the finite tense (as even Rückert and Reiche, following Erasmus, Calvin and Melancthon, think); nor is, with Ewald, ver. 23 to be treated as a parenthesis, so that the discourse from the accusative in ver. 22 should now resolve itself more freely into the nominative, which would be unnecessarily harsh. But the participle introduces the *accompanying relation*, which here comes into view with the *ὑστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τ. Θεοῦ*, namely, that of the *mode of their δικαίως*: so that, in that state of destitution, *they receive justification in the way of gift*. Bengel aptly remarks: “repente sic panditur scena amoenior.” The participle is not even to be resolved into *καὶ δικαιοῦνται* (Peshito, Luther, Fritzsche), but the relation of becoming justified is to be left in the *dependence* on the want of the *δόξα Θεοῦ*, in which it is conceived and expressed.² — *δωρεάν*] *gratuitously* (comp. v. 17, and on the *adverb* in this sense Polyb. xviii. 17, 7; 1 Macc. x. 33; Matt. x. 8; 2 Thess. iii. 8; 2 Cor. xi. 7) they are placed in the relation of righteousness, so that

¹ Similarly already Melancthon: “gloria Dei, i.e. *luce Dei fulgente in natura incorrupta*, seu *ipso Deo carent*, ostendente se et accedente ardentem dilectionem et alios motus legi congruentes sine ullo peccato.” Previously (1540) he had explained: “gloria,

quam Deus approbat.”

² Against the Osiandrian misinterpretations in their old and new forms see Melancthon, *Enarr.* on ver. 21; Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 599 ff.; and also Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, IV. 2, p. 247 ff.

this is not anyhow the result of their own performance ; comp. Eph. ii. 8 ; Tit. iii. 5. — τῇ αὐτοῦ χάρι. διὰ τῆς ἀπολ. τῆς ἐν Χ. 'Ι.] *in virtue of His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.* This redemption is that which forms the medium of the justification of man taking place gratuitously through the grace of God. By the position of the words τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, the divine grace, is, in harmony with the notion of δωρεάν, emphasized precisely as the *divine*, opposed to all *human* co-operation ; comp. Eph. ii. 8. In ἀπολύτρωσις¹ the special idea of *ransoming* (comp. on Eph. i. 7 ; 1 Cor. vi. 20 ; Gal. iii. 13) is not to be changed into the general one of the *Messianic liberation* (viii. 23 : Luke xxi. 28 ; Eph. i. 14, iv. 30 ; and see Ritschl in the *Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* 1863, p. 512) ; for the λύτρον or ἀντίλυτρον (Matt. xx. 28 ; 1 Tim. ii. 6) which Christ rendered, to procure for all believers remission of guilt and the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, was His blood, which was the atoning sacrificial blood, and so as equivalent accomplished the *forgiveness of sins*, i.e. the essence of the ἀπολύτρωσις. See ver. 25 ; Eph. i. 7 ; Col. i. 14 ; Heb. ix. 15 ; comp. on Matt. xx. 28 ; 1 Cor. vi. 20 ; Gal. iii. 13 ; 2 Cor. v. 21. *Liberation from the sin-principle* (from its dominion) is not the essence of the ἀπολύτρωσις itself,² but its *consequence* through the Spirit, if it is appropriated in faith (viii. 2). Every mode of conception, which refers redemption and the forgiveness of sins not to a real atonement through the death of Christ, but subjectively to the dying and reviving with Him guaranteed and produced by that death (Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Hofmann, and others, with various modifications), is opposed to the N. T.—a mixing up of justification and sanctification.³ — ἐν Χ. 'Ιησοῦ] i.e. contained and resting in Him, in His person that has appeared as the Messiah (hence the Χριστῷ is placed first). To what extent, is shown in ver. 25.—Observe further that justification, the causa efficiens of which is the divine grace (τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι), is here represented as obtained by means of the ἀπολύτρωσις, but in ver. 22 as obtained by means of *faith*, namely, in the one case *objectively* and in the other *subjectively* (comp. ver. 25). But even in ver. 22 the objective element was indicated in πίστι. 'Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, and in ver. 24 f. both elements are more particularly explained.

Ver. 25.⁴ — ὃν προέθετο κ.τ.λ.] *whom God has openly set forth for Himself.*⁵ This signification, familiar from the Greek usage,⁶ is decidedly to be adopted on account of the correlation with εἰς ἐνδοξιν κ.τ.λ. (Vulgate, Pelagius, Luther, Beza, Bengel and others ; also Rückert, de Wette, Philippi,

¹ Comp. Plut. *Pomp.* 24, Dem. 159, 15.

² Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 147 f.

³ Comp. on ver. 26 ; also Ernesti, *Ethik d. Ap. P.* p. 27 f.

⁴ See on ver. 25 f. Ritschl, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1863, p. 500 ff. ; Pfeiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1872, p. 177 ff. ; the critical comparison of the various explanations in Morison, p. 268 ff.

⁵ Which has been done by the crucifixion. Compare the discourse of Jesus where He compares Himself with the serpent of Moses, John iii. Christ has been thus held

up to view as *λασθήριον*. In Greek authors the word *προτίθεσθαι* is specially often used to express the exhibition of dead bodies (Krüger on *Thuc.* ii. 34, 1 ; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 115 E.). We are not to suppose however that *this* usage influenced the Apostle in his choice of the word, since he had Christ before his eyes, not as a dead body, but as shedding His blood and dying.

⁶ Herod. iii. 148, vi. 21 ; *Plat. Phaed.* p. 115 E ; Eur. *Alc.* 667 ; *Thuc.* ii. 34, 1, 64, 8 ; Dem. 1071, 1 ; Herodian, viii. 6, 5 ; also in the LXX.

Tholuck, Hofmann and Morison) ; and not the equally classic signification : *to propose to oneself*, adopted by Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Toletus, Pareus, de Dieu, Elsner, Heumann, Böhme, Flatt and Fritzsche (i. 13 ; Eph. i. 9 ; 3 Macc. ii. 27) : “quem esse voluit Deus piaculare sacrificium,” Fritzsche.¹ In that case an infinitive must have been required ; and it was with the *publicity* of the divine act before the whole world that the Apostle was here concerned, as he has already indicated by *πεφανέρωται* in ver. 21. Matthias explains it : whom He caused to be openly made known, to be preached. But the classical use of *προτίθημι*, in the active and middle, in the sense of *promulgare* is here foreign, since it refers to the summoning or proclamation of *assemblies*² or to the promulgation of *laws*. Besides the *ἐνδείξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης* of God rests, in fact, not on the *preaching* of the atoner, but on the work of *atonement itself*, which God accomplished by the *προέθετο* κ.τ.λ. — God’s own participation therein (for it was *His* ἱλαστήριον, willed and instituted by *Himself*) which is expressed by the *middle*, is placed beyond question by the *eis* ἐνδείξιν κ.τ.λ., and decisively excludes Hofmann’s conception of the death of Christ as a *befalling*. Compare on ver. 26. — ἱλαστήριον] is the neuter of the adjective ἱλαστήριος, used as a substantive, and hence means simply *expiatorium* in general, without the word itself conveying the more concrete definition of its sense. The latter is supplied by the *context*. Thus, for example, in the LXX. (in the older profane Greek the word does not occur) the lid of the ark of the covenant, the *Kapporeth*, as the *propitiatorium* operculum, is called τὸ ἱλαστήριον (see below), which designation has become technical, and in Ex. xxv. 17 and xxxvii. 6 receives its more precise definition by the addition of *ἐπίθεμα*. They also designate the ledge (choir) of the altar for burnt offerings, the קִרְיָן (Ez. xliii. 15, 17, 20) in the same way, because this place also was, through the blood of reconciliation with which it was sprinkled, and generally as an altar-place, a place of atonement. When they render קִרְיָן in Amos ix. 1 (*knob*) by ἱλαστήριον, it is probable that they read קִרְיָן. See generally Schleusner, *Thes.* III. p. 108 f. The word in the sense of *offerings* of atonement does not occur in the LXX., though it is so used by other writers, so that it may be more specially defined by *ιερόν* or *θύμα*.³ Even in our passage the context makes the notion of an atoning *sacrifice* (comp. Lev. xvii. 11) sufficiently clear by ἐν τ. αὐτοῦ αἵματι ; compare Pfeiderer *l.c.* p. 180. The interpreta-

¹ Ewald has in the translation *predestined*, but in the explanation *exhibited*. Van Hengel declares for the latter.

² Soph. *Ant.* 160, and Hermann *in loc.* ; Lucian, *Necyom.* 19, and Hemsterhuis *in loc.* ; Dion. Hal. vi. 15 *al.* ; see Schoem. *Comit.* p. 104 ; Dorvill. *ad Charit.* p. 266 f.

³ Thus in Dio Chrys. *Orat.* xi. 1, p. 355 Reiske : ἱλαστήριον Ἀχαιοὶ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ τῇ Ἰλιάδι, where a *votive gift* bears this inscription, and is thereby indicated as an offering of atonement, as indeed votive gifts generally fall under the wider idea of offerings (Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 96 ; Hermann, *gottesd.*

Alterth. § 25, 1) ; again in Nonnus, *Dionys.* xiii. p. 383 : ἱλαστήρια (the true reading instead of ἱλαστήρια) Γοργούς. 4 Macc. xvii. 22 : διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἐκείνων καὶ τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου τοῦ [The article is, critically, uncertain ; but at all events the blood is conceived as atoning *sacrifice*-blood ; comp. ver. 19.] θανάτου αὐτῶν. Hesych. : ἱλαστήριον καθάρσιον. Comp. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. ii. 487, where λωφία ἱερά is explained by ἐξἱλαστήρια ; also the corresponding expressions for sacrifices, σωτήριον (Xen. *Anab.* iii. 2, 9 ; v. 1, 1 ; LXX. Ex. xx. 24) ; καθάρσιον (Herod. i. 35 ; Aeschin. p. 4, 10) ; καθαρτήριον (Poll. i.

tion *expiatory sacrifice* is adopted by Chrysostom (who at least represents the *ἱλαστήρ*. of Christ as *the antitype of the animal offerings*), Clericus, Bos, Elsner, Kypke, and others, including Koppe, Flatt, Klee, Reiche, de Wette, Köllner, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Messner and Ewald; Weiss (*bibl. Theol.* p. 324) is in doubt between this and the following explanation.¹ Others, as Morus, Rosenmüller, Rückert, Usteri and Glöckler, keep with the Vulgate (*propitiationem*) and Castalio (*placamentum*), to the general rendering: *means of propitiation*. So also Hofmann (comp. *Schriftbew.* II. 1, p. 338 f.), comparing specially 1 John iv. 10, and *σωτήριον* in Luke ii. 30; and Rich. Schmidt, *Paul. Christol.* p. 84 ff. But this, after the *προέθετο* which points to a definite public appearance, is an abstract idea inappropriate to it (as "*propitiation*"), especially seeing that *ἐν . . . αἵματι* belongs to *προέθετο*, and seeing that the view of the death of Jesus as the concrete propitiatory offering was deeply impressed on and vividly present to the Christian consciousness (Eph. v. 2; 1 Cor. v. 7; Heb. ix. 14, 28; 1 Pet. i. 19; John i. 29, xvii. 19 *al.*). Origen, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Piscator, Pareus, Hammond, Grotius, Calovius, Wolf, Wetstein, and others,² have rendered *ἱλαστήριον* in quite a special sense, namely, as referring to the canopy-shaped cover suspended over the ark of the covenant (see Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 164 ff.), on which, as the seat of Jehovah's throne, the blood of the sacrifice was sprinkled by the high priest on the great day of atonement (Ex. xxv. 22; Num. vii. 89; Lev. xvi. 13 ff.;³ and which therefore, regarded as the vehicle of the divine grace,⁴ typified Christ as the atoner.⁵ That the Kapporeth was termed *ἱλαστήριον* is not only certain from the LXX.⁶ (Ex. xxv. 18, 19, 20, xxxi. 7 *al.*), but also from Heb. ix. 5, and Philo (*vit. Mos.* p. 668, *D* and *E*; *de profug.* p. 465 A), who expressly represents the covering of the ark as a symbol of the *ἡλεω δυνάμεις* of God. Compare also Joseph.

32); *χαριστήριον* (Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 1, 2; Polyb. xxi. 1, 2); *εὐχαριστήριον* (Polyb. v. 14, 8). Compare also such expressions as *ἐπινίκια θύειν*; and see generally Schaefer, *ad Bos. Ell.* p. 191 ff.

¹ Estius also explains *victimam* . . . *propitiatorium*, but yet takes *ἱλαστ.* as masculine. It was already taken as masculine (*propitiator*) in the Syriac (compare the reading *propitiatorem* in the Vulgate) by Thomas Aquinas and others; also Erasmus (in his translation), Melancthon and Vatablus; more recently also by Vater, Schrader, Reithmayr and van Hengel. But to this it may be objected that there is no example of *ἱλαστήριος* used with reference to persons. This remark also applies against Mehring, who interprets *powerful for atonement*. Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 584, and similarly Mangold properly retain the rendering. *expiatory offering*; and even Morison recognizes the sacrificial conception of the "*propitiatory*," although like Mehring he abides in substance by the idea of the adjective.

² Also Olshausen, Tholuck (ed. 5), Philippi,

Umbreit, Jatho, Ritschl in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1863, p. 247, and *alkathol. Kirche*, p. 85; Weber, *vom Zorne Gottes*, p. 273; Delitzsch on Heb. p. 719, and in the illustrations to his *Hebrew translation*, p. 79; Märcker, and others.

³ Keil, *Arch. I.* § 84, and generally Lund, *Jüd. Heiligth.* ed. Wolf, p. 37 ff.

⁴ See Bähr, *Symbolik*, I. p. 387 ff.; Heugstenberg, *Authent. des Pentateuches*, II. p. 642; Schulz, *alltest. Theol.* I. p. 205.

⁵ So also Funke, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1842, p. 314 f. The old writers, and before them the Fathers, have in some instances very far-fetched points of comparison. Calovius, e.g., specifies five: (1) quoad causam efficientem; (2) quoad materiam (gold and not perishable wood—divine and human nature); (3) quoad numerum (only one); (4) quoad objectum (all); (5) quoad usum et finem.

⁶ The LXX. derived the word Kapporeth, in view of the idea which it represented, from קַפַּר, *condonavit*. Comp. also the Vulgate ("*expiatorium*"),

Antt. iii. 6, 5. There is consequently nothing to be urged against this explanation, either as respects the *usus loquendi* or as respects the idea, in accordance with which Christ, the bearer of the divine glory and grace, sprinkled with His own sacrificial blood, would be regarded as the antitype of the Kapporeth. But we may urge against it : (1) that τὸ ἱλαστήριον does not stand with the article, as in the Sept. and Heb. ix. 5, although Christ was to be designated as the realized idea of the definite and in fact singly existing כפרת (τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἱλαστήριον, Theodoret) ; (2) that even though the term ἱλαστήριον, as applied to the cover of the ark, was certainly familiar to the readers from its use by the LXX., nevertheless this name, in its application to Christ, would come in here quite *abruptly*, without anything in the context preparing the way for it or leading to it ; (3) that προέθετο would in that case be inappropriate, because the ark of the covenant, in the Holy of Holies, was removed from the view of the people ; (4) that, if Christ were really thought of here as כפרת, the following εἰς ἐνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ would be inappropriate, since the כפרת must have appeared rather as the ἐνδειξις of the divine *grace* (comp. Heb. iv. 16) ; (5) and lastly, that the conception of Christ as the antitype of the cover of the ark is found nowhere else in the whole N. T., although there was frequent opportunity for such expression ; and it is therefore to be assumed that it did not belong to the apostolic modes of viewing and describing the atoning work of Christ. Moreover, if it is objected that this interpretation is unsuitable, because Christ, who shed His own blood, could not be the cover of the ark sprinkled with foreign blood, it is on the other hand to be remembered that the Crucified One sprinkled with His own blood might be regarded as the cover of the ark with the same propriety as Christ offering His own blood is regarded in the Epistle to the Hebrews as High Priest. If, on the other side, it is objected to the interpretation *expiatory offering* (see Philippi), that it does not suit προέθετο because Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice to God, but God did not present Him as such to humanity, the objection is untenable, since the idea that God has given Christ to death pervades the whole N. T.—not that God has thereby *offered* Christ as a sacrifice, which is nowhere asserted, but that He *has set forth* before the eyes of the universe Him who is surrendered to the world by the very fact of His offering Himself as a sacrifice in obedience to the Father's counsel, as such actually and publicly, namely, on the cross. An exhibition *through preaching* (as Philippi objects) is not to be thought of, but rather the divine *act of redemption* which took place through the sacrificial death on Golgotha. — διὰ τῆς πίστεως] may be connected either with προέθετο (Philippi, following older writers) or with ἱλαστήριον (Rückert, Matthias, Ewald, Hofmann, Morison, and older expositors). The latter is the right construction, since faith, as laying hold of the propitiation, is the very thing by which the ἱλαστήριον set forth becomes *subjectively effective* ; but not that whereby the *setting forth itself*, which was an *objective fact* independent of faith, has been accomplished.¹ Hence : *as a sacrifice pro-*

¹ Even had no one believed on the Crucified One—a contingency indeed, which in

view of the divine πρόγνωσις could not really occur—He would still have been set

ducing the ἱλάσκεσθαι through faith. Without faith the ἱλαστήριον would not be actually and in result, what it is in itself ; for it does not reconcile the unbeliever. — ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι] belongs to προέθετο κ.τ.λ. God has set forth Christ as an effectual expiatory offering through faith *by means of His blood* ; i.e. in that He caused Him to shed His blood, in which lay *objectively* the strength of the atonement.¹ Observe the position of αὐτοῦ : “*quem proposuit ipsius sanguine.*” Krüger, § 47, 9, 12. Comp. xi. 11 ; Tit. iii. 5 ; 1 Thess. ii. 19 ; Heb. ii. 4 *al.* Comp. ver. 24. Still ἐν τ. αὐτ. αἵμ. is not to be joined with ἱλαστήριον in such a way as to make it the parallel of διὰ τ. πίστ. (Wolf, Schrader, Köllner, Reithmayr, Matthias, Mehring, Hofmann, Mangold, and others) ; for εἰς ἐνδειξιν κ.τ.λ. requires that ἐν τ. αὐτ. αἵμ. shall be the element defining more closely *the divine act of the* προέθετο κ.τ.λ., by which the divine righteousness is apparent ; wherefore also ἐν τ. αὐτ. αἵμ. is placed immediately before εἰς ἐνδειξιν κ.τ.λ., and not before ἱλαστήριον (against Hofmann’s objection). Other writers again erroneously make ἐν . . . αἵματι dependent on πιστεως (Luther, Calvin, Beza, Seb. Schmid, and others ; also Koppe, Klee, Platt, Olshausen, Tholuck, Winzer, and Morison), joining διὰ τ. πίστ. likewise to ἱλαστήριον : *through faith on His blood.* In that case ἐν would not be equivalent to εἰς, but would indicate the *basis* of faith (see on Gal. iii. 26) ; nor can the absence of the article after πίστ. be urged against this rendering (see on Gal. *l.c.*) : but the ἐν τῷ αὐτ. αἵμ. becomes in this connection much too subordinate a point. Just *by means of the shedding of His blood* was the setting forth of Christ for a propitiatory offering accomplished ; in order that through this utmost, highest, and holiest sacrifice offered for the satisfaction of the divine justice—through the blood of Christ—that justice might be brought to light and demonstrated. From *this* connection also we may easily understand why ἐν τῷ αὐτ. αἵμ., which moreover, following ἱλαστήριον, was a matter of course, is added at all ; though in itself unnecessary and self-evident, it is added with all the more weight, and in fact with solemn emphasis. For just in the blood of Christ, which God has not spared, lies the proof of His righteousness, which He has exhibited through the setting forth of Christ as an expiatory sacrifice ; that shed blood has at once satisfied His justice, and demonstrated it before the whole world. On the *atonement*, actually *su-effacing* power of the blood of Christ, according to the fundamental idea of Lev. xvii. 11 (compare Heb. ix. 22), see v. 9 ; Matt. xxvi. 28 ; Acts xx. 28 ; Eph. i. 7 ; Col. i. 14 ; Rev. v. 9 *al.* ; 2 Cor. v. 14, 21 ; Gal. iii. 13 *al.* Comp. Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 270 ff., 584 f. Reiche considers that διὰ τῆς πίστ. should be coupled with δικαϊσμός, and ὅν . . . ἱλαστ. should be a parenthesis, whilst ἐν τ. αὐτ. αἵμ. is to be co-

forth as a propitiatory offering, though this offering would not have subjectively benefited any one.

¹ This ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι secures at all events to the Apostle’s utterance the conception of a *sacrifice* atoning, i.e. doing away the guilt, whichever of the existing explanations of the word ἱλαστήριον we may adopt. This also applies against Rich.

Schmidt *l.c.*, according to whom (comp. Sabatier, p. 262 f.) the establishment of the ἱλαστήριον consisted in God actually passing sentence on sin itself in the flesh of His Son, and wholly abolishing it as an objective power exercising dominion over humanity—consequently in the destruction of the sin principle. Regarding viii. 3 see on that passage.

ordinated with the $\delta\alpha\tau$. $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau$. But by this expedient the discourse is only rendered clumsy and overladen. — $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$. τ . $\delta\iota\kappa$. $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$] purpose of God in the $\pi\rho\acute{o}\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\tau\omicron$. . . : $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\mu\alpha\tau\iota$. The $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\upsilon\eta$ is *righteousness*, as is required by the context ($\delta\iota\alpha$ τ . $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\upsilon$. . . $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\tau\eta$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\chi\eta$ τ . $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$), not : *truth* (Ambrosiaster, Beza, Turretin, Hammond, Locke, Böhme), or *goodness* (Theodoret, Grotius, Semler, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Morus, Reiche, also Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 185)—significations which the word never bears. It does not even indicate the *holiness* (Fritzsche, Reithmayr, Klaiber, Neander, Gurlitt in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1840, p. 975 ; Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 146 ff.) ; or the righteousness, *including grace* (Ritschl) ; or generally the *Divine moral order of justice* (Morison) ; or the *self-equality of God* in His bearing (Hofmann) ; but in the strict sense the opposite of $\acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ in ver. 5, the *judicial* (more precisely, the *punitive*) *righteousness* (comp. Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde.* I. p. 169 ff.), which had to find its holy satisfaction, but received that satisfaction in the propitiatory offering of Christ, and is thereby practically demonstrated and exhibited. On $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, in the sense of *practical proof*, comp. 2 Cor. viii. 24, and on $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ Eph. ii. 7 : $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\eta\tau\alpha\iota$. Following ver. 26, Chrysostom and others, including Krehl and Baumgarten-Crusius, take it unsatisfactorily as *justifying* righteousness. Anselm, Luther, Elsner, Wolf, and others, also Usteri, Winzer, van Hengel, and Mangold, hold that it is, as in ver. 21, the *righteousness, that God gives*. On the other hand, see the immediately following $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$. . . $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\nu$. — $\delta\iota\alpha$ $\tau\eta\eta$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\upsilon$ $\kappa\tau\lambda$.] *on account of the passing by of sins that had previously taken place, i.e. because He had allowed the pre-Christian sins to go without punishment*, whereby His righteousness had been lost sight of and obscured,¹ and therefore came to need an $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ for men.² Thus the atonement accomplished in Christ became the “divine Theodicée for the past history of the world” (Tholuck), and, in view of this $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, that $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ceases to be an enigma. — $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, which occurs only here in the N. T.³ ; erroneously explained by Chrysostom as equivalent to $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\rho\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$, is distinguished from $\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ in so far as the omission of punishment is conceived in $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ as a *letting pass* ($\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\pi\iota\delta\acute{\omega}\nu$, Acts xvii. 30 ; comp. xiv. 16), in $\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (Eph. i. 7 ; Col. i. 14) as a *letting free*. Since Paul, according to Acts *l.c.*, regarded the non-punishment of pre-Christian sins as an “overlooking” (comp. Wisd. xi. 23), we must consider the peculiar expression, $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, here as *purposely chosen*. Comp. $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\alpha\iota$, Ecclus. xxiii. 2. If he had written $\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, the idea would be, that God, instead of retaining those sins in their category of guilt (comp. John xx. 23), had *let them free, i.e. had forgiven them*.⁴ He has not forgiven

¹ Compare J. Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, 1. p. 352, ed. 5.

² The explanation that “ $\delta\iota\alpha$ here indicates that, whereby the $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\upsilon\eta$ manifests itself” (Reiche ; so also Benecke, Koppe, and older expositors) is incorrect, just because Paul in all cases (even in viii. 11 and Gal. iv. 13) makes a sharp distinction between $\delta\iota\alpha$ with the accusative and with the genitive. This interpretation has arisen from the er-

roneous conception of $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\upsilon\eta$ (as *goodness or truth*).

³ See however Dionys. Hal. vii. 37 ; Phalar. *Epist.* 114 ; Xen. *de praeſ.* eq. 7, 10 ; and Fritzsche *in loc.* ; Loesner, p. 249.

⁴ In $\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ the guilt and punishment are cancelled ; in $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ both are tacitly or expressly left undealt with, but in their case it may be said that “*omittance is not acquittance*.” For the idea of *forgiveness* $\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$

them, however, but only *let them go unpunished* (comp. 2 Sam. xxiv. 10), *neglexit*. The wrath of God, which nevertheless frequently burst forth (comp. i. 17 ff.) in the ages before Christ over Jews and Gentiles (for Paul, in his perfectly general expressions, has not merely the former in view), was not an adequate recompense counterbalancing the sin, and even increased it (i. 24 ff.) ; so that God's attitude to the sin of the time before Christ, so long as it was not *deleted* either by an adequate punishment, or by atonement, appears *on the whole* as a *letting pass* (comp. Acts xiv. 16) and overlooking. As the correlative of *πάρεσις*, there is afterwards appropriately named *ἀνοχή* (comp. ii. 4), not *χάρις*, for the latter would correspond to *ἀφεσις*, Eph. i. 7. — The *pre-Christian sins* are not those of individuals prior to their conversion (Mehring and earlier expositors), but the sum of the sins of *the world before Christ*. The *ἰλαστήριον* of Christ is the epoch and turning-point in the world's history (comp. Acts xvii. 30, xiv. 16.) — *ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τ. Θεοῦ* in *virtue of the forbearance* (tolerance, comp. ii. 4) *of God*,¹ contains the ground which is the motive of the *πάρεσις*. It is not to be attached to *προγεγ.* (Oecumenius, Luther, and many others ; also Rückert, Gurlitt, Ewald, van Hengel, Ritschl, and Hofmann), which would yield the sense *with* or "*during* the forbearance of God." Against this view we may urge the very circumstance that the *time* when the sins referred to took place is already specified by *προγεγονότων*, and expressed in a way simply and fully corresponding with the contrast of the *νῦν καιρός* that follows, as well as the special pertinent reason, that our mode of connecting *ἐν τ. ἀνοχῇ τ. Θεοῦ* with *διὰ τ. πάρεσιν κ.τ.λ.* brings out more palpably the antithetical relation of this *πάρεσις* to the divine *δικαιοσύνη*. Moreover, as *ἀνοχή* is a moral attribute, the *temporal* conception of *ἐν* is neither indicated nor appropriate. What is indicated and appropriate is simply the use, so common, of *ἐν* in the sense of the ethical ground. Reiche connects *ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τ. Θεοῦ* with *εἰς ἐνδ. τ. δικ. αὐτ.*, making it co-ordinate with the *διὰ . . . ἁμαρτ.* : "the *δικαιοσύνη* showed itself positively in the forgiveness of sins, negatively in the postponement of judgment." Incorrect, on account of the erroneous explanation of *διὰ* and *δικαιουσ.* thus necessitated.—Our whole interpretation of the passage from *διὰ τ. πάρεσιν* to *Θεοῦ* is not at variance (as Usteri thinks) with Heb. ix. 15 ; for, if God has allowed pre-Christian sins to pass, and then has exhibited the atoning sacrifice of Christ in proof of His righteousness, the death of Christ must necessarily be the *λύτρον* for the transgressions committed under the old covenant, but passed over for the time being. But there is nothing in our passage to warrant the reference to the sins of the people of *Israel*, as in Heb. *l.c.* (in opposition to Philippi).

and *ἀφέναι* alone form the standing mode of expression in the N. T. And beyond doubt (in opposition to the view of Luther and others, and recently Mangold) Paul would here have used this form, had he intended to convey that idea. The *πάρεσις* is intermediate between pardon and punishment. Compare Ritschl in the *Jahrb. f. D. Th.* 1863, p. 501.

¹ Paul writes *Θεοῦ*, not again *αὐτοῦ*, because he utters the *διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν . . . Θεοῦ* from *his own* standpoint, so that the subject is presented *objectively*. Comp. Xen. *Anab.* i. 9, 15. But even apart from this the repetition of the noun instead of the pronoun is of very frequent occurrence in all Greek authors, and also in the N. T. (Winer, p. 136 [E. T. 144]).

Ver. 26. *Πρὸς τὴν ἐνδειξιν*] Resumption of the *εἰς ἐνδειξιν* in ver. 25, and that without the *δέ*, ver. 22 (comp. on Luke i. 71); while *εἰς* is exchanged for the equivalent *πρὸς* unintentionally, as Paul in ver. 30, and also frequently elsewhere (comp. on Eph. i. 7 and Gal. ii. 16) changes the prepositions.¹ The article, however (see the critical notes), serves to set forth the *definite*, historically *given* *ἐνδειξις*, which is in accord with the *progress* of the representation; for Paul desires to add now with corresponding emphasis the *historical* element *ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ* not previously mentioned. The resumption is in itself so obvious, and also in such entire harmony with the emphasis laid upon the *ἐνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ* as the chief point, that for this very reason the interpretation of Rückert and Gurlitt (comp. Beza), which joins *πρὸς τὴν ἐνδειξιν κ.τ.λ.* with *διὰ τ. πάρεσιν . . . Θεοῦ*, and takes it as the aim of the *πάρεσις* or the *ἀνοχή* (Baumgarten-Crusius; comp. Hofmann and Th. Schott), at once falls to the ground. Mehring, rendering *πρὸς* in reference to or in view of, understands the *δικαιοσύνη* in ver. 26 to mean *imputed* righteousness, and finds the *ἐνδειξις* of the latter, ver. 26, in the *resurrection* of Jesus; but a decisive objection to his view is that Paul throughout gives no hint whatever that his expressions in ver. 26 are to be taken in any other sense than in ver. 25; and a reference to the resurrection in particular is here quite out of place; the passage goes not beyond the atoning *death* of Christ. — *εἰς τὸ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* cannot stand in an exegetical relation to the previous *εἰς ἐνδειξιν κ.τ.λ.* because that *ἐνδειξις* has in fact already been doubly expressed, but now the *further* element *καὶ δικαιοῦντα κ.τ.λ.* is added, which first brings into full view the teleology of the *ἰλαστήριον*. *εἰς τὸ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* is therefore the definition presenting the final aim of the whole affirmation from *ὃν προέθετο καὶ καιρῷ*. It is its keystone: *that He may be just and justifying the believers*, which is to be taken as the intended *result* (comp. on ver. 4): in order that, through the *ἰλαστήριον* of Christ, arranged in this way and for this *ἐνδειξις*, He may manifest Himself as One who is Himself righteous, and who makes the believer righteous (comp. *ἰλαστήρ. διὰ τ. πίστεως*, ver. 25). He desires to be *both*, the one not without the other. The *εἶναι* however is the *being* in the *appearance* corresponding to it. The "*estimation of the moral public*" (Morison) only ensues as the *consequence* of this. Regarding *τὸν ἐκ πίστ.* comp. on *οἱ ἐξ ἐριθείας*, ii. 8. The *αὐτὸν* however has not the force of *ipse* or even *alone* (Luther), seeing it is the subject of the two predications *δικαιον κ. δικαιοῦντα*; but it is the simple pronoun of the third person. Were we to render with Matthias and Mehring² *καὶ δικαιοῦντα*: *even when He justifies*, the *καί* would be very superfluous and weakening; Paul would have said *δικαιον δικαιοῦντα*, or would have perhaps expressed himself pointedly by *δικαιον κ. δικαιοῦντα ἄδικους ἐν πίστει* 'I. Observe further that the *justus et justificans*, in which lies the *summum paradoxon evangelicium* as opposed to the O. T. *justus et condemnans* (according to Bengel), finds its solution and its harmony with the O. T. in *τὸν ἐκ πίστεως* (see chap. iv., i. 17). The Roman Catholic explanation of *inherent* righteousness (see especially Reithmayr) is here the more inept. It is also to be remarked that according to vv. 24–26

¹ Comp. Kühner, II. 1, p. 475 f.² They are joined by Ernesti, *Ethik-d. Ap. P.* p. 32.

grace was the *determining ground* in God, that prompted Him to permit the atonement. He purposed thereby indeed the revelation of His *righteousness*; but to the carrying out of that revelation just *thus*, and not otherwise, namely, *through the ἱλαστήριον of Christ*, He was moved by His own χάρις. Moreover the ἐνδειξις of the divine *righteousness* which took place through the atoning death of Christ necessarily presupposes the *satisfactio vicaria* of the ἱλαστήριον. Hofmann's doctrine of atonement (compensation)¹ does not permit the simple and—on the basis of the O. T. conception of atoning sacrifice—*historically definite* ideas of vv. 25, 26, as well as the unbiassed and clear representation of the ἀπολύτρωσις in ver. 24 (comp. the λύτρον ἀντί, Matt. xx. 28, and ἀντίλυτρον, 1 Tim. ii. 6) to subsist alone with it. On the other hand these ideas and conceptions *given* in and homogeneously pervading the entire N. T., and whose meaning can by no means be evaded, exclude the theory of Hofmann, not merely in form but also in substance, as a deviation evading and explaining away the N. T. type of doctrine, with which the point of view of a "*befalling*," the category in which Hofmann invariably places the death of Jesus, is especially at variance. And *Faith* in the atoning death has not justification merely "*in its train*" (Hofmann *in loc.*), but justification takes place *subjectively through faith* (vv. 22, 25), and indeed in such a way that the latter is *reckoned* for righteousness, iv. 5, consequently *immediately* (ἐξαίφνης, Chrysostom).

Ver. 27. Paul now infers (οὖν) from vv. 21–26—in lively interchange of question and answer, like a victor who has kept the field—that Jewish boasting (not human boasting generally, Fritzsche, Krehl, Th. Schott) is excluded.² [See Note XXXIV. p. 149.] The *article* indicates that which

¹ "In consequence of man's having allowed himself to be induced through the working of Satan to sin, which made him the object of divine wrath, the Triune God, in order that He might perfect the relation constituted by the act of creation between Himself and humanity into a complete fellowship of love, has had recourse to the most extreme antithesis of Father and Son, which was possible without self-negation on the part of God, namely, the antithesis of the Father angry at humanity on account of sin, and of the Son belonging in sinlessness to that humanity, but approving Himself under all the consequences of its sin even unto the transgressor's death that befell Him through Satan's agency; so that, after Satan had done on Him the utmost which he was able to do to the sinless One in consequence of sin, without obtaining any other result than His final standing the test, the relation of the Father to the Son was now a relation of God to the humanity beginning anew in the Son—a relation no longer determined by the sin of the race springing from Adam, but by the righteousness of the Son." Hofmann in the *Erl. Zeitschr.* 1856, p. 179 f. Subsequently (see espec.

Schriftb. II. 1, p. 186 ff.) Hofmann has substantially adhered to his position. See the literature of the entire controversy carried on against him, especially by Philippi, Thomasius, Ebrard, Delitzsch, Schneider, Weber, given by the latter, *vom Zorne Gottes*, p. xlii. ff.; Weizsäcker in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1858, p. 154 ff. It is not to the ecclesiastical doctrine, but to Schleiermacher's, and partially also Mencken's subjective representation of it, that Hofmann's theory, although in another form, stands most nearly related. Comp. on ver. 24: and for a more detailed account Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 1870, I. p. 569 ff., along with his counter-remarks against Hofmann at p. 575 ff. As to keeping the Scriptural notion of imputed righteousness clear of all admixture with the moral change of the justified, see also Köstlin in the *Jahrb. für Deutsche Theol.* 1856, p. 105 ff., 118 ff., Gess, in the same, 1857, p. 679 ff., 1858, p. 713 ff., 1859, p. 467 ff.; compared however with the observations of Philippi in his *Glaubenslehre*, iv. 2, p. 237 ff., 2nd edition.

² Hofmann's misconception of ver. 9 still affects him, so as to make him think here

is known, and has been before mentioned (ii. 17 ff.), looking back to vv. 9 and 1. — ποῦ] As it were, seeking that which has vanished from the sphere of vision, Luke viii. 25; 1 Cor. i. 20, xv. 55; 1 Pet. iv. 18; 2 Pet. iii. 4; also frequently used thus by classic writers. — The καύχῃσις is not *the object of boasting* (Reiche), which would be καύχημα, but the *vaunting itself*, which is presented with vivid clearness as that which no longer exists. — ἐξεκλείσθη] οὐκ ἔτι χάραν ἔχει, Theodoret. — διὰ ποίου νόμου;] scil. ἐξεκλείσθη, not δικαιούμεθα, which Mehring, following Michaelis, wholly without logical ground wishes to be supplied. The exclusion, namely, must necessarily have ensued through a law no longer allowing the καύχῃσις; but *through what sort of a law?* of what nature is it? Is it one that demands *works*? No, but a law of *faith*. In these *attributes* lies the ποιότης of the law, which is the subject of inquiry. This cannot have the quality of the Mosaic law, which insists upon *works*, but thereby fosters and promotes the parade of work-righteousness (ii. 17); it must, on the contrary, be a law that requires *faith*, as is done by the Christian plan of salvation, which prescribes the renunciation of all merit through works, and requires us to trust solely in the grace of God in Christ. The Christian plan of salvation *might* be included under the conception of a νόμος, because *the will of God* is given in it by means of the Gospel (comp. 1 John iii. 23), just as in the O. T. revelation by means of the Mosaic law. And the expression was *necessary* in the connection, because the question διὰ ποίου νόμου; required both the old and new forms of the religious life to be brought under the one conception of νόμος. Therefore the literal sense of νόμος remains unchanged, and it is neither *doctrine* (Melancthon and many others) nor *religious economy*. Comp. ix. 31.

Ver. 28 gives the ground of the οὐχί κ.τ.λ. — λογιζόμεθα] οὐκ ἐπὶ ἀμφιβολίας λέγεται (Theodore of Mopsuestia): *censemus*, we *deem*, as in ii. 3, viii. 18; 2 Cor. xi. 5. The matter is set down as something that has now been brought between Paul and his readers to a common ultimate judgment, whereby the victorious tone of ver. 27 is not *damped* (as Hofmann objects), but is on the contrary confidently *sealed*. — πιστεῖ] On this, and not on δικαιῶσθαι (Th. Schott, Hofmann), lies the emphasis in accordance with the entire connection; χωρὶς ἔργ. νόμου is correlative. Paul has conceived λογ. γ. δικ. *together*, and then placed first the word which has the *stress*; compare the critical observations. The dative denotes the procuring cause or medium, just like διὰ πίστεως. Bernhardt, p. 101 f. The word "*alone*," added by Luther—formerly an apple of discord between Catholics and Lutherans (see the literature in Wolf)—did not belong to the *translation* as such,¹ but is in *explanation* justified by the context, which in the way of dilemma "*cuts off all works utterly*" (Luther), and by the connection of the Pauline doctrinal system generally, which excludes also the *fides formata*.² All fruit of faith follows justification by faith; and there are no degrees in justifica-

of Christian καύχῃσις. Comp., for the right view, especially Chrysostom.

¹ Luther has not added it in Gal. ii. 16, where the Nürnberg Bible of 1483 reads

"only through faith."

² See *Form. Conc.* p. 585 f., 691. Comp. on Gal. ii. 16, Osiander in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1863, p. 703 f.; Morison in *loc.*

tion.¹—*χωρὶς ἔργ. νόμου*] Without the co-operation therein of works of the law (ver. 20), which, on the contrary, remain apart from all connection with it. Comp. ver. 21.—On the quite general *ἄνθρωπον*, a man, comp. Chrysostom : *τῇ οἰκουμένη τὰς θύρας ἀνοίξας τῆς σωτηρίας, φησὶν, ἄνθρωπον, τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα θεός*. See afterwards *περιτομὴν . . . καὶ ἄκροβυστ.*, ver. 30. Comp. Gal. ii. 16.

Ver. 29. *Or*—in case what has just been asserted in ver. 28 might still be doubted—is it only *Jews* to whom God belongs? and not also *Gentiles*? He must, indeed, have only been a God for the Jews, if He had made justification conditional on works of the law, for in that case it could only be destined for Jews,² insomuch as they only are the possessors of the law. Consequently vv. 29, 30 contain a further closing thought, crowning the undoubted accuracy of the confidently expressed *λογιζόμεθα κ.τ.λ.* in ver. 28. The supplying of a predicative *θεός* (Hofmann, Morison, and earlier expositors) is superfluous, since the prevailing usage of *εἶναι τινος* is amply sufficient to make it intelligible, and it is quite as clear from the context that the relationship which is meant is that of being God to the persons in question.—How much the *ναὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν*, said without any limitation whatever—in their case, as with *Ἰουδαίων*, God is conceived as protecting them, and guiding to salvation—run counter to the degenerate theocratic exclusiveness.³ But Paul speaks in the certain assurance, which had been already given by the prophetic announcement of Messianic bliss for the Gentiles, but which he himself had received by revelation (Gal. i. 16), and which the Roman church, a Pauline church, itself regarded as beyond doubt.

Ver. 30 is to be divided from the previous one merely by a comma. Regarding *ἐπεὶπερ*, *whereas* (in the N. T. only here) introducing something undoubted, see Hermann, *ad Viger*. p. 786; Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 342 f.; Baumlein, p. 204.—The *unity* of God implies that He is God, not merely of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles; for otherwise another special Deity must rule over the Gentiles, which would do away with monotheism.—*ὃς δικαιοῦται*] *who shall* (therefore) *justify*. This exposition contains that which necessarily follows from the unity of God, in so far as it conditions for *both* parties *one* mode of justification (which however must be *χωρὶς ἔργων*, ver. 28). For Jews as well as for Gentiles He must have destined the way of righteousness *by faith* as the way of salvation. The *future* is neither put for *δικαιοῖ* (Grotius, and many others), nor to be referred with Beza and Fritzsche to the time of the final judgment, nor to be taken as the future of *inference* (Rückert, Mehring, Hofmann), but is to be understood as in ver. 20 of *every case of justification to be accomplished*. Erasmus rightly says, “*Respexit enim ad eos, qui adhuc essent in Judaismo seu paganismo.*”—The exchange of *ἐκ* and *διὰ* is to be viewed as accidental, without real difference, but also without the purpose of avoiding misconception (Mehring). Comp. Gal. ii. 16, iii. 8; Eph. ii. 8. Unsuitable, especially for the impor-

¹ Comp. Riggensbach (against Romang) in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1868, p. 227 ff.

² Not for the Gentiles also, unless they become proselytes to Judaism, whereby

they would cease to be Gentiles.

³ See on Matt. iii. 9, and in Eisenmenger's *entdeckt. Judenth.* I. p. 587 f.

tant closing thought, is the view of Calvin, followed by Jatho, that there is an irony in the difference: "Si quis vult habere differentiam gentilis a Judæo, hanc habeat, quod ille *per fidem*, hic vero *ex fide* justitiam consequitur." Theodore of Mopsuestia, Wetstein, Bengel, Hofmann, and others explain it by various other gratuitous suggestions; ¹ van Hengel is doubtful—The interchange of πίστει and τῆς πίστ. (*from faith through the faith*), in which the *qualitative* expression advances to the *concrete with the article*, is also without special design, as similar accidental interchanges often occur in parallel clauses (Winer, p. 110 [E. T. 116]).

Ver. 31—iv. 24. *The harmony of the doctrine of justification by faith with the law, illustrated by what is said in the law regarding the justification of Abraham.*—The new chapter should have begun with ver. 31, since that verse contains the theme of the following discussion. If we should, with Augustine, Beza, Calvin, Melancthon, Bengel, and many others, including Flatt, Tholuck, Köllner, Rückert, Philippi, van Hengel, Umbreit, and Mehring, assume that at iv. 1 there is again introduced something new, so that Paul does not carry further the νόμον ἰστώμεν, v. 31, but in iv. 1 ff. treats of a new objection that has occurred to him at the moment, we should then have the extraordinary phenomenon of Paul as it were dictatorially dismissing an objection so extremely important and in fact so very naturally suggesting itself, as νόμον οὖν καταργούμεν κ.τ.λ., merely by an opposite assertion, and then immediately, like one who has not a clear case, leaping away to something else. The more paradoxical in fact after the foregoing, and especially after the apparently antinomistic concluding idea in ver. 30, the assertion νόμον ἰστώμεν must have sounded, the more difficult becomes the assumption that it is merely an anticipatory declaration abruptly interposed (see especially Philippi, who thinks it is enlarged on at viii. 1 ff.); and the less can ver. 20, διὰ γ. νόμον ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτ. be urged as analogous, since that proposition had really its justification there in what preceded. According to Th. Schott, νόμος is not meant to apply to the Mosaic law at all, but

¹ Bengel: "Judæi pridem in fide fuerant; gentiles fidem ab illis recens nacti erant." Comp. Origen. Similarly Matthias: in the case of the circumcised faith appears as the *ground*, in that of the uncircumcised as the *means* of justification; ἐκ πίστ. signifies: *because they believe*, διὰ τ. πίστ.: *if they believe*. In the case of the circumcised faith is presupposed as covenant-faithfulness. Comp. also Bisping. According to Hofmann, Paul is supposed to have said in the case of the circumcised *in consequence of faith*, because these wish to become righteous in consequence of legal works; but in the case of the uncircumcised *by means of faith*, because with the latter no other possible way of becoming righteous was conceivable. In the former instance faith is the preceding condition; in the latter the faith existing for the purpose of justification (therefore accompanied by the article) is

the means, by which God, who works it, helps to righteousness. This amounts to a subjective invention of subtleties which are equally incapable of proof as of refutation, but which are all the more groundless, seeing that Paul is fond of such interchanges of prepositions in setting forth the same relation (comp. ver. 25 f., and on 2 Cor. iii. 11, and Eph. i. 7). How frequent are similar interchanges also in classic authors! Moreover, in our passage the stress is by no means on the prepositions (Hofmann), but on περιτομήν and ἀκροβυστίαν. And as to the variation of the prepositions, Augustine has properly observed (*de Spir. et lit.* 29) that this interchange serves *non ad aliquam differentiam*, but *ad varietatem locutionis*. Comp. on ἐκ πίστει δικαιοῦν (here said of *Jews*) also of *Gentiles*, Gal. iii. 8; Rom. ix. 30, and generally i. 17.

to the fact that, according to ver. 27, *faith* is a νόμος, in accordance with which therefore Paul, when making faith a condition of righteousness, ascribes to himself not abrogation of the law, but rather an establishment of it, setting up merely what God Himself had appointed as the method of salvation. The discourse would thus certainly have a conclusion, but by a jugglery¹ with a word (νόμος) which no reader could, after ver. 28, understand in any other sense than as the Mosaic law. Hofmann explains substantially in the same way as Schott. He thinks that Paul conceives to himself the objection that in the doctrine of faith there might be found a doing away *generally of all law*, and now in opposition thereto declares that that doctrine does not exclude, but includes, the fact that *there is a divine order of human life* (?).

Ver. 31. (See Note XXXV. p. 150.) οὖν] The Apostle infers for himself from his doctrine of justification ἐκ πίστεως . . . χωρὶς ἔργων νόμον—just discussed—a possible objection and reproach: *Do we then make away with the law (render it invalid) through faith?* — νόμον] emphatically put first, and here also to be understood neither of the moral law, nor of every law in general, nor of the entire O. T., but, as is proved by the antithesis between νόμος and πίστις and the reference as bearing on ver. 28, of the *Mosaic law*. Comp. Acts xxi. 28, Gal. iv. 21 f. — διὰ τῆς πίστεως.] i.e. *thereby*, that we assert *faith* as the condition of justification. — νόμον ἱστώμεν] Not: *we let the law stand* (Matthias), but: *we make it stand*, we produce the result *that it*, so far from being ready to fall, in reality *stands upright* (βεβαιούμεν, Theodoret) in its authority, force, and obligation. Comp. 1 Macc. xiv. 29, ii. 27; Eccles. xlv. 20–22. This ἱστάνειν of the law, whereby there is secured to it stability and authority instead of the καταργεῖσθαι, takes place by means of (see ch. iv.) the Pauline doctrine demonstrating and making good the fact that, and the mode in which, justification by the grace of God through faith is already taught in the law, so that Paul and his fellow teachers do not come into antagonism with the law, as if they desired to abolish and invalidate it by a new teaching, but, on the contrary, by their agreement with it, and by proving their doctrine from it, secure and confirm it in its position and essential character.²—The νόμον ἱστώμεν, however, is so little at variance with the *abrogation of the law as an institute of works obligatory in order to the becoming righteous*, which has taken place through Christianity (x. 4; 2 Cor. iii. 7; Gal. iii.; Rom. vii. 4; Gal. ii. 19; Col. ii. 14), that, on the contrary, the law *had to fall* in this aspect, in order that, in another aspect, the same law, so far as it teaches *faith* as the condition of the δικαιοσύνη, might be by the gospel imperishably *confirmed* in its authority, and even, according to Matth. v. 17, *fulfilled*. For in respect of this assertion of the value of faith the law and the gospel appear one. — If the νόμον ἱστώμεν and its relation to the abrogation of the law be defined to mean that “from faith proceeds the *new obedience*, and the *love* develops itself, which is the πλήρωμα νόμου, xiii. 10” (Philippi; comp. Rückert, Krehl, Umbreit, Morison), as August-

¹ This objection in no way affects the question διὰ ποῖον νόμου, ver. 27 (in opposition to Hofmann's objection), where the

very ποῖον placed along with it requires the general notion of νόμου.

² Comp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.* p. 333.

time, Melancthon, who nevertheless mixes up with it very various elements, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Vatablus, Calovius, and others assumed (comp. also *Apol. C. A.* p. 83, 223), the further detailed illustration of ch. iv. is quite as much opposed to this view, as it is to the interpretations which conceive the law as *pedagogically* leading to Christ (Grotius, Olshausen), or as *fulfilled* in respect of its *object*, which is *justification* by faith (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, and others.¹) In the case of the two latter views, faith appears as something *added* to the law, which is just what Paul *combats* in ch. iv. On the form *ιστῶμεν*, from *ιστάω*, see Matthiae, p. 482, Winer, p. 75 [E. T. 78]. Still the *ιστάνομεν*, recommended by Griesbach and adopted by Lachmann and Tischendorf, has preponderant attestation (so also *κ**; but *κ*** has *ιστῶμεν*), which is here decisive (in opposition to Fritzsche), especially when we take into account the multitude of other forms in MSS. (*στάνομεν*, *ισταμεν*, *συνιστῶμεν*, *συνιστάνομεν* et al.).

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

XXIII. Ver. 1. τὸ περισσόν.

τὸ περισσόν is the superiority of the Jew over the Gentile, which was connected with the old covenant, and ἡ ὠφέλεια the advantage which circumcision gave, as the sign of this superiority. To the Judaistic party of the Apostle's day the position taken in ii. 25-29 would naturally seem to deny any superiority whatever; and thus the objection was sure to arise, at this point, which the Apostle now proceeds to meet. He explains that the Jew stands at an advantage in many points, which are summed up, indeed, in the possession of the O. T. Scriptures—and that this is the true meaning of that in which they gloried; but that, in the matter of justification by works before God, they were on the same level with the Gentiles. All alike must fail of such justification, because all alike had sinned.

XXIV. Ver. 2. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

The explanation given by Meyer of the omission of other points which would naturally follow the first is undoubtedly correct—that the writer was led away from his original intention by the question of ver. 3. We may believe, however, that he did not return to the plan of enumerating the other advantages, after concluding the line of thought in vv. 3-8, because he felt that the one mentioned really involved in itself all the rest.

XXV. Ver. 2. τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ.

The oracles of God, in the sense here intended, are the O. T. Scriptures, viewed as containing the covenant of God with its law and promises, and not merely the Messianic prophetic utterances. The argument for the latter reference, which is founded on a supposed necessity of giving to ἀπιστία and

¹Ο γὰρ ἡθέλει ὁ νόμος, τουτέστι τὸ δικαιῶσαι ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἴσχυσε δὲ ποιῆσαι, τοῦτο ἡ πίστις

τελειοί· ὁμοῦ γὰρ τῷ πιστεῦσαι τίνα δικαιοῦται, Theophylact.

ἀπιστεῖν the sense of *unbelief*, is, as Weiss also intimates, *unsound*; the contrary, being proved, as he says, by 2 Tim. ii. 13. The entire view of Meyer with regard to these words in this and the following verse is, as de Wette well remarks, altogether opposed to the Apostle's standpoint in these verses, which is outside of the Christian system, and to the connection with the preceding and following context, in which the transgressions of the law on the part of the Jews, and the judgment of God on purely legal principles, are under discussion.

XXVI. Ver. 3. τί γὰρ εἰ ἡπίστησάν τινες;

The more probable view of this verse is, that the Apostle anticipates a question which might be pressed by an opponent in the discussion—namely, does not this statement, that the Jews have the O. T., involve the admission of all that they claim (cf. σύ, ii. 3), for, surely, the want of faithfulness to the covenant on the part of some will not destroy God's fidelity to His promise. To this latter point (ver. 3) he replies by the emphatic μὴ γένοιτο, which involves two elements—a negative answer to the question, and an utter rejection of the thought as abhorrent to right feeling. It is to the *second* of these two elements that ver. 4, with its Psalm-quotation, attaches itself. In a similar way, at ver. 5, he again supposes a question suggesting itself from the other party: If, as is implied in ver. 4, God's righteousness is even rendered conspicuous by their unrighteousness, does it not show injustice in God to inflict a penalty on those who thus contribute to His glory? To this question he replies with the same emphatic phrase, and attaches to the *first* of its two elements (see above), the following verses, which contain a confirmation of the negative. Such a position would do away with all Divine judgment, and would lead to the pernicious and untenable doctrine, that we may do evil that good may come.

XXVII. Vv. 5, 6. μὴ γένοιτο. — κατὰ ἄνθρωπον.

μὴ γένοιτο is used by Paul only in the Epistles of the same section and class to which this Ep. belongs (Rom., Gal., Cor.). It always has the meaning given in the preceding note, and the connection of the following words with it may vary in different cases, as it does in this context. κατὰ ἄνθρωπον also occurs only in these Epistles—everywhere meaning, *after the manner of a man outside of the Divine sphere*. The particular signification, within the limits of this general sense, is determined in each instance by the context.

XXVIII. Ver. 5. μὴ ἄδικος ὁ Θεός.

The Apostle is not to be regarded, in this passage (vv. 1-8), as introducing an opponent into his discourse, as if in a dialogue, or directly quoting his language. The form of the question in ver. 5, μὴ ἄδικος κ.τ.λ. is clear evidence of this, for the objector would have put the inquiry in the form which looks for an affirmative answer, and not, as here, for a negative one. On the other hand, he carries forward his entire argument in his own person, and formulates for himself the objections, difficulties, or questions which, as he conceives, might be presented.

XXIX. Ver. 9. προεχόμεθα.

The explanation of *προεχόμεθα*, to which Meyer here refers, has in its favor the fact that the passage from Plutarch may be cited as justifying it, while no passage is found sustaining the interpretation given by Tholuck, de Wette, and others, or, where the verb stands without an obj. accusative, that given by Meyer himself. Every other argument which the case affords, however, seems to bear against this explanation--are we surpassed. (a) There is nothing in the preceding context, or in the position which Paul maintains anywhere, to suggest such a question. (b) His entire course of reasoning from ii. 1 onward is intended to show that the Jew is on a level with the Gentile in respect to justification by works, not that he stands on a lower position. (c) The following verses do not harmonize with this view of the word. They do not set forth the proof that the Gentiles are not better than the Jews, but that the Jews are not better than the Gentiles. (d) Such a question would not readily come from the Jewish side. (e) Ver. 19 shows that in vv. 10-18 he had special reference to the Jews, and that his object in this passage is the same as that which he had in view in the previous chapter. This explanation, which is adopted in R. V. by the English revisers, must, accordingly, be rejected. The view of Meyer must also be set aside. It has no greater support from usage than that of de Wette and A. V. Indeed, it is less difficult to suppose that the writer uses the middle voice of this verb, after the analogy of many other verbs, in the simple active sense, or, with Grimm and Philippi, as meaning *have we an advantage for ourselves*, than that he fails to insert *τι*, which is called for by Meyer's view, and could so easily have been expressed. Moreover, the following context is not suited to the question, *Do we put forward anything in our defence* (as Weiss ed. Mey. also agrees), while it is precisely adapted to the question, *Have we any advantage or superiority?* The American revisers have rightly favored this latter explanation (R. V., Appendix). The objection made by Meyer to this view of the word, that it is at variance with ver. 2, is without force, since, after showing that the possession of the O. T., though giving the Jews a superiority to the Gentiles in a certain degree, did not place them at any advantage in respect to the matter in discussion (i.e. the escaping the divine condemnation), it was most natural that the question should be renewed, *Do the Jews have any real advantage in this vital point?* The view of Godet, that the verb means *are we sheltered*, seems to accord neither with usage nor with the context.

XXX. Ver. 20. διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, κ.τ.λ.

This verse is grammatically connected with the preceding, as Meyer explains. At the same time, the first part of the verse contains what is, in substance, a statement of the result of the foregoing argument, i. 18-iii. 19--namely, that from works of the law there is no justification for any one. This negative result being reached, the positive conclusion follows without proof (see note on i. 17 above) in ver. 21 ff. The second part of the verse adds a confirmation of this negative statement, by pointing to the fact that the law leads to a full knowledge of sin--thus, to a very different end from justification. The author does not dwell on this latter point, as it is outside of the line of his present thought to do so. His purpose is answered here by the mere presentation of it.

XXXI. Ver. 21. *ὡνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμον δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.*

In vv. 21, 22, the proposition of i. 17 is repeated, as now established. γάρ of the last clause of ver. 22 introduces this clause as connected with πάντας τοὺς πιστ.—all, for there is no distinction, and then ver. 23 is added in immediate connection with this; there is no distinction, for (γάρ, ver. 23) all sinned, etc. These clauses, in their relation to each other and to the entire preceding argument, clearly show, that the distinction referred to is that between Jews and Gentiles, and that all means *Jews as well as Gentiles*, as opposed to *Gentiles only*. Vv. 23–26 are subordinate to vv. 21, 22 through these two particles (γάρ); nevertheless, in these verses the writer incidentally and easily passes to a more full statement—almost a definition—of justification by faith. They constitute in one aspect, therefore, a very important part of this passage in which the original proposition is repeated.

XXXII. Ver. 23. *πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον.*

This verb is translated in A. V. and R. V. *have sinned*. The aor. is to be explained from the standpoint taken by the author:—the sinning is a thing definitely past when the question of their present position before God is raised. Dr. Charles Hodge says on this word, as here used, “The idea that all men now stand in the posture of sinners before God might be expressed either by saying all have sinned (and are sinners), or all sinned. The latter is the form adopted by the Apostle.” Cf., however, his view of the same verb and tense in v. 12.

XXXIII. Ver. 24. *δικαιούμενοι κ.τ.λ.*

δικαιούμενοι is, *viewed grammatically*, a circumstantial participle connected with ὑπεροῦνται. According to the *underlying thought*, this word, with the following context, brings out the only method of justification for all who have sinned. In the explanation of the method thus given, we find (a) the gratuitous character of the justification, δωρεάν; (b) the origin of it (here expressed, indeed, by the dat. instrum.) τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι; (c) the objective means, διὰ τῆς ἀπολ.; (d) the subjective means, διὰ πίστεως; (e) the relation to it of Christ's sacrifice, προσέθετο ἱλαστήριον ἐν τῷ αὐτ. αἵματι; (f) the reason for this sacrifice, εἰς ἐνδοξιν τῆς δικ. κ.τ.λ.; (g) the final purpose, εἰς τὸ εἶναι—Ἰησοῦ.

XXXIV. Ver. 27. *ποῦ οὖν ἡ καύχησις.*

Two points should be noticed here. (1) The glorying alluded to in the previous part of the Epistle is that of the Jews concerning the advantageous position which they claimed for themselves as related to the judgment of God. This glorying, therefore, must be that which is intended by ἡ καύχησις of this verse. (2) The question which is raised and answered respecting this glorying is introduced by the particle οὖν. It is, accordingly, suggested to the writer's mind as a natural result of the immediately preceding verses (21–26). In view of these points, we must hold that Meyer's understanding of this verse and those which follow (28–30) is correct, and that we have here an inference or corollary from the proposition, vv. 21, 22. This proposition, being established, carries with it the exclusion of all such Jewish boasting. Godet's explanation, which makes vv. 27–31 a proof of the harmony of justification by

faith with the true meaning of the law (vv. 27, 28 showing that the *gospel* excludes justification by works, as vv. 9-20 had already shown that the *law* excluded it), is contrary to the indications of the passage as stated above, and is so artificial as to render it improbable. Weiss ed. Mey. agrees with Fritzsche and Schott in referring the *καύχησις* to "human glorying in general." But this view is at variance with the points indicated above.

XXXV. Ver. 31. νόμον οὐκ καταργούμεν κ.τ.λ.

We may determine the meaning and connection of this verse by the observation of certain facts in the case. (1) *νόμον*, as here found, immediately follows *νόμον* of ver. 28 (vv. 29, 30 being merely a proof of the statement of ver. 28). The reference in the two cases must, therefore, be to the same law. In the former verse, however, inasmuch as it is connected with *ἐργων* and contrasted with *πίστει*, *νόμον* means the Mosaic law. The view of Hofmann, therefore (with whom, on this point, Weiss ed. Mey. apparently agrees), that the reference in ver. 31 is to "a divine order in human life," must be rejected. Hofmann argues for his view from *νόμον* of ver. 27, but the word is evidently there used in a peculiar sense, for the special purposes of that verse. Moreover, as *νόμον* has there a connection with faith as well as with works (the one economy or system being contrasted with the other), the question of ver. 31, had this sense been intended, would hardly have been presented with *νόμον* only; it would have asked as to the doing away with *any* divine ordering, or all idea of divine ordering. (2) The next chapter discusses the case of Abraham; that is, it presents the proof of justification by faith which is derived from the fact that this was the system involved in the covenant with the father of the Jewish people. This is the same argument for the Pauline doctrine which is brought forward in the Epistle to the Galatians, chap. iii. vv. 6-10. The first half of this fourth chapter (vv. 3-12) corresponds very closely with Gal. iii. 6, 7, and the second half, ver. 13 ff. with Gal. iii. 8-10. Following the more general argument (i. 18-iii. 30) we have, therefore, that which comes from the older Scriptures; and between the two this verse is inserted. This position of the new question and its answer indicates that they are designed by the writer to be in the direct line of his argument, and thus that they open the way for the fourth chapter. The view of Shedd, Hodge, Philippi, Morison, and others, that the question has reference to a nullification of the law in its moral obligation, or that the Apostle's reply defends the faith-system from the charge of having an antinomian tendency, is accordingly excluded. This view of these writers is also rendered improbable by the fact alluded to by Meyer, that, if it be adopted, we must regard the Apostle as having raised an objection of a very serious character, which he dictatorially dismisses with no proof of his negative answer.

CHAPTER IV.

Ver. 1. Ἀβραὰμ . . . εὐρηκέναι] Lachm. and Tisch. (8) read εὐρηκ. Ἀβρ. τὸν προπάτορα ἡμῶν, which Griesb. also approved. This position of the words has indeed preponderant attestation (A C D E F G 8, min., Copt. Arm. Vulg. It. and several Fathers), but may be suspected of being a *transposition* intended to connect κατὰ σάρκα with τὸν πατέρα ἡμ., as in fact this construction was prevalent among the ancients. προπάτορα (Lachm.) though attested by A B C* 8, 5, 10, 21, 137, Syr. Copt. Arm. Aeth. and Fathers, appears all the more probably a gloss, since πατέρα here is not used in a spiritual sense as it is afterwards in vv. 11, 12, 17, 18. — Ver. 11. περιτομῆς] Griesb. recommended περιτομήν, which however is only attested by A. C*, min., Syr. utr. Arm. and some Fathers; and on account of the adjoining accusatives very easily slipped in, especially in the position after ἔλαβε, — καὶ αὐτοῖς] καὶ is wanting in A B 8*, min. Ar. pol. Vulg. ms. Orig. in schol. Cyr. Damasc. Condemned by Mill and Griesb., omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. (8). But after the final syllable *NAI* the καί, not indispensable for the sense, was very easily overlooked. On the other hand the ground assumed for its addition, by Reiche, that “the copyists would not have the Jews altogether excluded,” cannot be admitted as valid, because in fact the Jews are immediately after, ver. 12, expressly included. — The article before δικαιосύνην, which Tisch. (8) has omitted, has preponderant attestation. Its omission is connected with the old reading (A) εἰς δικαιοσύνην (comp. ver. 9, v. 3). Ver. 12. τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβ. πίστ.]. The reading τῆς πίστ. τῆς ἐν τ. ἀκροβ., recommended by Griesb. and adopted by Scholz, lacks the authority of most and the best uncials, and seems a mechanical alteration after ver. 11. The article τῇ however is, with Tisch. in accordance with decisive testimony, to be deleted, and to be regarded as having been likewise introduced from ver. 11 (not as omitted after ver. 10, as Fritzsche thinks). — Ver. 15. οὐ γάρ] A B C 8*, min., Copt. Syr. p. (in margin), Theodoret, Theophyl. Ambr. Ruf. read οὐ δέ. Recommended by Griesb. and adopted by Lachm. Fritzsche, Tisch. (8). An alteration, occasioned by the contrast on failing to perceive the appropriateness of meaning in the γάρ. — Ver. 17. ἐπίστευσεν] F G and some vss. and Fathers read ἐπίστευσας (so Luther). The κατέναντι οὐ κ.τ.λ. was still regarded as belonging to the passage of Scripture. — Ver. 19. οὐ] Wanting in A B C 8, 67**, 93, 137, Syr. Erp. Copt. Chrys. Damasc. Julian. Condemned by Griesb. and deleted by Lachm. and Tisch. (8). But this omission of the οὐ, as well as the very weakly attested ὡς and licet, manifestly arose from incorrectly having regard here to Gen. xvii. 17 (as is done even by Buttmann, *neud. Gr.* p. 305 f. [E. T. 355 f.] and Hofmann). See the exegetical remarks. — ἡδὲ] Wanting in B F G 47 *et. al.* and several vss. and Fathers. Bracketed by Lachm. deleted by Fritzsche and Tisch. It is to be regarded as an addition, which suggested itself very easily, whereas there would have been no reason for its omission.

Ver. 1. οὖν] *Accordingly*, in consequence of the fact that we do not abrogate the law through faith, but on the contrary establish it.¹ This οὖν brings in the *proof* to be adduced from the history of Abraham ("confirmatio ab exemplo." Calvin), for the νόμον ἱστώμεν just asserted (iii. 31), in the form of an *inference*. For if we should have to say that Abraham our father has attained anything (namely, righteousness) κατὰ σάρκα, that would *presuppose* that the law, which attests Abraham's justification, in nowise receives establishment διὰ τῆς πίστεως (iii. 31). Hence we have not here an objection, but a question proposed in the way of inference by Paul himself, the answer to which is meant to bring to light, by the example of Abraham, the correctness of his νόμον ἱστ. [See Note XXXVI. p. 173.] His object is not to let the matter rest with the short and concise dismissal of the question in iii. 31, but to enter into the subject more closely; and this he does now by attaching what he has further to say to the authoritatively asserted, and in his own view established, νόμον ἱστώνομεν in the form of an *inference*. Moreover, the whole is to be taken as *one* question, not to be divided into two by a note of interrogation after ἐροῦμεν; in which case there is harshly and arbitrarily supplied to εὐρηκέναι (by Grotius, Hammond, Clericus, Weststein, and Michaelis) δικαιοσύνην, or at least (van Hengel) the pronoun *it* representing that word, which however ought to have been immediately suggested by the context, as in Phil. iii. 12.² In the affirmation itself Ἀβρ. is the *subject* (quid dicemus Abrahamum nactum esse?). Th. Schott, by an unhappy distortion of the passage, makes him the *object* ("why should we then say that we have gained Abraham in a fleshly, natural sense for our ancestor?") This misconception should have been precluded by attending to the simple fact, that in no passage in our Epistle (and in other Epistles the form of expression does not occur) does the τί in τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν mean *why*. Hofmann, who had formerly (*Schriftb.* II. 2, p. 76 ff.) apprehended it in substance much more correctly, now agrees with Schott in so far that he takes τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν as a question by itself, but then explains Ἀβραάμ likewise as the object, so that the question would be, *whether the Christians think that they have found Abraham as their forefather after the flesh?* "The origin of the church of God, to which Christians belong, goes back to Abraham. *In fleshly fashion* he is their ancestor, if the event through which he became such (namely, the begetting of Isaac) lie within the sphere of the natural human life; *in spiritual fashion*, on the other hand, if that event belong to the sphere of the history of salvation and its miraculous character, which according to the Scripture (comp. Gal. iv. 23) is the case." This exposition cannot be disputed on linguistic grounds, especially if, with Hofmann, we follow Lachmann's reading. But it is, viewed in reference to the context, erroneous. For the context, as vv. 2, 3 clearly show, treats not of the contrast

¹ Observe, in reference to ch. iv. (with iii. 31), of what fundamental and profound importance, and how largely subject to controversy, the relation of Christianity to Judaism was in the Apostolic age, particularly in the case of mixed churches. The

minute discussion of this relation, therefore, in a doctrinal Epistle so detailed, cannot warrant the assumption that the church was composed mainly of *Jews*, or at least (Beyschlag) of *proselytes*.

² Comp. Nägelsbach on II. 1, 76, 302, ed. 3.

between the fleshly and the spiritual *fatherhood* of Abraham in the case of Christians, but of the *justification* of the ancestor, as to whether it took place *κατὰ σάρκα* or by faith. Moreover, if Ἀβρ. was intended to be the object, Paul would have expressed himself as unintelligibly as possible, since in vv. 2, 3 he in the most definite manner represents him as the *subject*, whose action is spoken of. If we take Hofmann's view, in which case we do not at all see why the Apostle should have expressed himself by *εὐρηκέναι*, he would have written more intelligibly by substituting for this the simple *εἶναι*, so that Ἀβρ. would have been the subject in the question, as well as in what follows. Finally the proposition that Abraham, as the forefather of *believers as such*, was so not *κατὰ σάρκα*, was so perfectly self-evident, both with reference to the Jewish and the Gentile portion of the Ἰσραὴλ Θεοῦ, that Paul would hardly have subjected it to discussion as the theme of so earnest a question, while yet no reader would have known that in *κατὰ σάρκα* he was to think of the *miraculous begetting of Isaac*. For even without the latter Abraham would be the *προπάτωρ* of believers *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, namely, through his *justification by faith*, ver. 9 ff. — τ. πατέρα ἡμ.] "fundamentum consequentiae ab Abrahamo ad nos," Bengel. Comp. ver. 11 f. ἡμῶν however (comp. James ii. 21) is said from the *Jewish* standpoint, not designating Abraham as the *spiritual* father of the *Christians* (Reiche, Hofmann, Th. Schott), a point that is still for the present (see ver. 11) quite out of view. — *κατὰ σάρκα*] [See Note XXXVII. p. 174] is, following the Peshito, with most expositors to be necessarily joined to *εὐρηκ.*; not, with Origen, Ambrosiaster, Chrysostom, Photius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Castalio, Toletus, Calvin, whom Hofmann, Th. Schott, Reithmayr, Volkmar in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1862, p. 221 ff., follow, to τ. πατέρα ἡμ. (not even although Lachmann's reading were the original one); for the former, and not the latter, needed the definition. Abraham has really attained righteousness, only not *κατὰ σάρκα*, and ἐξ ἔργων in ver. 2 corresponds to the *κατὰ σάρκα*. Besides with our reading the latter connection is impossible. — The *σάρξ* on its ethical side¹ is the material-psychic human nature as the life-sphere of moral weakness and of sinful power in man, partly as contrasted with the higher intellectual and moral nature of *the man himself*, which is his *πνεῦμα* along with the *νοῦς* (i. 9, vii. 18, 25, and see on Eph. iv. 23), and partly as opposed to the superhuman *divine* life-sphere and its operation, as here; see the sequel. Hence *κατὰ σάρκα* is: *conformably to the bodily nature of man in accordance with its natural power*, in contrast to the working of divine grace, by virtue of which the *εὐρηκέναι* would not be *κατὰ σάρκα*, but *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, because taking place through the Spirit of God. Comp. on John iii. 6.

¹ The most recent literature on this subject: Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 71 ff.; Tholuck in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1855, 3; Hahn, *Theol. d. N. Test.* I. p. 426 ff.; Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 374 ff.; Holsten, *Bedeutung des Wortes σάρξ im N. Test.* 1855, and *Ev. d. Paul.* u. *Petr.* p. 365 ff.; Baur in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1857, p. 96 ff.; and *Neut. Theol.* p. 142 f.; Wieseler on *Gal.* p. 443 ff.; Beck, *Lehrwiss.*

§ 22; Kling in Herzog's *Encykl.* IV. p. 419 ff.; Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 557 ff.; Weber, *vom Zorne Gottes*, p. 80 ff.; also Ritschl, *altkath. Kirche*, p. 66 ff.; Luthardt, *vom freien Willen*, p. 394 ff.; Rich. Schmidt, *Paulin. Christol.* 1870, p. 8 ff.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* § 93; Philippi, *Glaubensl.* III. p. 207 ff., and the excursus thereon, p. 231 ff., ed. 2. For the earlier literature see Ernesti, p. 50.

Since the *εργα* are products of the human phenomenal nature and conditioned by its ethical determination, not originating from the divine life-element, they belong indeed to the *category* of the *κατὰ σάρκα*, and *ἐξ ἔργων* is the correlative of *κατὰ σάρκα* (wherefore also Paul continues, ver. 2. εἰ γὰρ Ἀβρ. ἐξ ἔργων κτλ.), but they do not exhaust the whole idea of it, as has often been assumed, following Theodoret (*κατὰ σάρκα τὴν ἐν ἔργοις, λέγει, ἐπειδήπερ διὰ τῶν σωματικῶν ἐκτελεσθῶσιν τὰ ἔργα*), and is still assumed by Reiche. Köllner, limiting it by anticipation from ver. 4, holds that it refers to the human mode of *earning wages by labour*. Entirely opposed to the context, and also to the historical reference of ver. 3, is the explanation of *circumcision* (Pelagius, Ambrosiaster, Vatablus, Estius, and others : including Koppe, Flatt, Baur, and Mehring) which Rückert also mixes up, at the same time that he explains it of the *ἔργα*. Philippi also refers it to both. — On *εἰρηκ.*, *adep-tum esse*, comp. *εἰρὴν κέρδος*, Soph. *El.* 1297, ἀρχήν, Dem. 69, 1. The middle is still more expressive, and more usual : see Krüger, § 52, 10, 1, Xen. ii. 1, 8, and Kühner *in loc.* The perfect infinitive is used, because Abraham is realized as present ; see ver. 2.

Ver. 2. The question in ver. 1 contained the negative sense, which had therefore necessarily to be limited by *κατὰ σάρκα* : “ We may not assert that Abraham has obtained anything according to the flesh.” The reason for this is now assigned (*γάρ*) : “ For, assuming that Abraham has been justified by works” (as was the Jewish opinion),¹ “ he has cause for boasting,” namely, that he has attained righteousness through his actions, but he has not this ground of boasting with respect to God (as if his justification were the divine act), since, namely, in the case supposed it is not God to whom he owes the justification, but on the contrary he has himself earned it, and God would simply have to acknowledge it as a human self-acquirement. God has not, in that supposed case, done anything for him, on account of which he might thus boast with regard to God as his justifier ; for ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων πλήρωσις αὐτοὺς στεφανοῖ τοὺς ἐργαζομένους, τὴν δὲ τ. Θεοῦ φιλιανθρωπίαν οὐ δείκνυσιν, Theodoret. Comp. also Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and Theophylact. Thus for the proper understanding of this difficult passage (Chrysostom : ἀσαφὲς τὸ εἰρημένον) we must go back to the explanation of the Greek expositors, which is quite faithful both to the words and the context. Comp. on vv. 3, 4. This interpretation, now adopted also by Tholuck (comp. Reithmayr and Th. Schott), has especially this advantage, that *ἐδικαιώθη* is not taken otherwise than in the entire development of the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, not therefore as somewhat indefinite and general (“justus apparuit,” Grotius), in which case it would remain a question by whom Abraham was found righteous (Rückert, Philippi ; comp. Beza and others ; also Grotius and Koppe, and, with trifling variation, de Wette, likewise Spohn in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1843, p. 429 ff., Volkmar, and others. That Abraham was justified with God was known to no Jew other-

¹ In the Talmud it is even inferred from Gen. xxvi. 5 that Abraham kept the whole law of Moses. *Kiddusch* f. 82, 1 ; *Joma* f. 28,

2 ; *Beresch. rabba* f. 57, 4. Comp. the passages from Philo quoted by Schneckenburger in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1833, p. 135.

wise,¹ and no reader could in accordance with the entire context understand ἐδικαιώθη otherwise, than in this definite sense, consequently in the solemn absolute sense of the Apostle (in opposition to Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 35). The only question was, *whether ἐξ ἔργων or ἐκ πίστεως*. If we suppose the *former* case, it is indeed for Abraham worthy of all honour, and he may boast of that which he has himself achieved, but with *reference to God*, as if *He* had justified him, he has no ground for boasting.² Observe besides, that πρὸς is used not in the sense of ἐνώπιον, *coram* (Hofmann : *over against*), or *apud* (Vulgate), but in accordance with the quite common usage of ἔχειν with the object of the thing (to have something to do, to say, to boast, to ask, to censure, etc.), and with specification of the relation of reference to some one through πρὸς τινα. The opposite of ἔχειν καύχημα πρὸς is ἔχειν μομφὴν πρὸς, Col. iii. 13. The *special mode* of the reference is invariably furnished by the context, which here, in accordance with the idea of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, suggests the notion that God is the *bestower* of the blessing meant by καύχημα. To that the ἔχειν καύχημα of Abraham does not refer, if he was justified by works. In the latter case he cannot boast of himself : ὁ Θεὸς με ἐδικαίωσε, Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον. Reiche and Fritzsche, following Calvin, Calovius, and many others, have discovered here an *incomplete syllogism*. [See Note XXXVIII. p. 174], in which ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τ. Θεόν is the minor premiss, and the conclusion is wanting, to this effect : "Si suis bene factis Dei favore nactus est, habet quod apud Deum gloriatur . . . ; sed non habet, quod apud Deum gloriatur, quum libri s. propter fidem, non propter pulchre facta eum Deo probatum esse doceant (ver. 3) . . . ; non est igitur Abr. ob bene facta Deo probatus," Fritzsche.³ Forced, and even contrary to the verbal sense ; for through the very *contrast* ἀλλ' οὐ π. τ. Θ. the simple καύχημα is distinguished from the καύχημα πρὸς τ. Θεόν, as one that takes place *not* πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Paul must have written : ἔχει καύχημα πρὸς τὸν Θεόν· ἀλλ' (or ἀλλὰ μὴν) οὐκ ἔχει. Mehring takes ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν as a *question* : "If Abraham has become righteous by works, he has glory, *but has he it not before God?*" But in what follows it is the very opposite of the affirmation, which this question would imply, that is proved. If the words were interrogative, ἀλλὰ μὴ must have been used instead of ἀλλ' οὐ (*but yet not before God?*) Hofmann, in consequence of his erroneous exposition of ver. 1, supposes that Paul wishes to explain how he came to propose the question in ver. 1, and to regard an answer to it as necessary. What is here involved, namely, is nothing less than a contradiction between *what Christians say of themselves* (when they deny all possibility of becoming righteous

¹ Comp. Eccles. xlv. 19 ff.; Manass. 8; Joseph. *Antt.* xi. 5, 7; Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenth.* I. p. 322, 343.

² Van Hengel places a point after καύχ., and takes ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τ. Θεόν as an independent sentence, in which he supplies *secundum litteras sacras*, making the sense : "Atqui gloriam materiam Deum Abrahamo denegare videmus in libris sacris." But that is, in fact, not there. Against my

own interpretation in the 1st ed. (making εἰ . . . ἐδικαίωθη the *question*, and then ἔχει . . . Θεόν the *answer* negating it) see Philippi. The εἰ must be the dialectic *if*.

³ So in substance also Kraussold in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1842, p. 783; Baur in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1857, p. 71; Köstlin in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1856, p. 92.

by their own actions), and *what holds good of "an Abraham," the father of the people of God*. If the latter has become righteous through his own action, he has glory, and *by this very circumstance his ancestorship is distinguished from that of all others*. But then the Scripture teaches that what God counted worthy in Abraham was his faith, and it is therefore clear that the glory which he has, if he has become righteous by works, is no glory in presence of God, and consequently *is not fitted to be the basis of his position in sacred history*. This is a chain of ideas imported into the passage; instead of which it was the object of the Apostle himself merely to set forth the simple proposition that Abraham was not justified by works, and not at all to speak of the mode in which the Christian ancestorship of the patriarch came to subsist. — *καύχημα* (comp. on Phil. i. 26, ii. 16) is throughout the N. T. *materies gloriandi*; as also in the LXX. and Apocrypha; although in classic authors¹ it also occurs as the equivalent of *καύχησις, gloriatio*. In Gal. vi. 4, also, it is joined with *ἔχειν*.

Ver. 3. I am right in saying: *οὐ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*, for Scripture expressly derives the justification of Abraham from his *faith*, not from his *works*, and indeed as something received through *imputation*; so that he consequently possesses, not the previously supposed righteousness of works, but the righteousness of faith as a favour of God, and has ground for boasting of his righteousness *in reference to God*. That righteousness by *works* he would have *earned himself*. Comp. ver. 4. The emphasis lies on *ἐπίστευσε* and *ἐλογίσθη*, not on *τῷ Θεῷ* (Mehring). See ver. 4 f. The passage quoted is Gen. xv. 6, according to the LXX., which renders the active *יִחְשַׁבְנִי* by the passive *κ. ἐλογίσθη*. In the Hebrew what is spoken of is *the faith which Abraham placed in the divine promise of a numerous posterity, and which God put to his account as righteousness, יִחְשַׁבְנִי, i.e. as full compliance with the divine will in act and life; comp. on Gal. iii. 6. Paul however has not made an unwarrantable use of the passage for his purpose* (Rückert), but has really understood *δικαιοσύνη* in the dogmatic sense, which he was justified in doing since the imputation of faith as *יִחְשַׁבְנִי* was essentially the same judicial act which takes place at the justification of Christians. This divine act *began with Abraham, the father of the faithful, and was not essentially different in the case of later believers*. Even in the *πιστεύειν τῷ Θεῷ* on the part of Abraham Paul has rightly discerned nothing substantially different from the *Christian πίστις* (compare Delitzsch on Gen. l.c.), since Abraham's faith had reference to the divine *promise*, and indeed to the promise which he, the man trusted by God and enlightened by God, recognized as that which embraced in it the future *Messiah* (John viii. 56). Tholuck, because the promise was a promise of grace, comes merely to the unsatisfactory view of "a virtual parallel also with the object of the justifying faith of Christians." Still less (in opposition to Neander and others) can the explanation of the subjective nature of faith in general, without the addition of its specific *object* (Christ), suffice for the conception of Abraham as the father of all believing in *Christ*; since in that case there would only have been present

¹ Pind. *Isthm.* v. 65; Plut. *Ages.* 31.

in him a pre-formation of faith as respects its psychological quality generally, and not also in respect of its *subject-matter*, which is nevertheless the specific and distinguishing point in the case of justifying faith. — We may add that our passage, since it expresses not a (mediate) *issuing* of righteousness from faith, but the *imputation* of the latter, serves as a proof of justification being an *actus forensis*; and what the Catholic expositors (including even Reithmayr and Maier) advance to the contrary is a pure subjective addition to the text.¹ It is well said by Erasmus: that is *imputat*, “quod re persolutum non est, sed tamen *ex imputantis benignitate* pro soluto *habetur*.”² Instead of the *καί* in the LXX., Paul, in order to put the *ἐπίστ.* with all weight in the foreground, has used *δέ*, which does not otherwise belong to the connection of our passage. — *εἰς δίκ.*] Comp. ii. 26. [See Note XXXIX. p. 174.] — On the passive *ἐλογίσθη* see Bernhardt, p. 341; Kühner, II. 1, p. 105.

Vv. 4, 5. These verses now supply an illustration of ver. 3 in two *general* contrasted relations, from the application of which—left to the reader—to the case of Abraham the non-co-operation of works (the *χωρὶς ἔργων*, ver. 6) in the case of the latter's justification could not but be clear. — *δέ*] is the simple *μεταβατικόν*. — τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ] *to the worker*, here, as the contrast shows, with the pregnant sense: *to him who is active in works*, of whom the *ἔργα* are *characteristic*. Luther aptly says: “who deals in works.” — *ὁ μισθός*] *i.e.* the *corresponding wages* (comp. ii. 29), *justa merces*. The opposite: *ἡ δίκη*, *merita poena*; see Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 3, 20. — οὐ λογίζ. κατὰ χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ὀφείλημα] [See Note XL. p. 175.] Comp. Thuc. ii. 40, 4: οὐκ ἐς χάριν ἀλλ’ ἐς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσω. The stress of the contrast lies on *κ. χάρ.* and *κ. ὀφείλ.*, not in the first part on *λογίζεται* (Hofmann), which is merely the verb of the Scripture quotation in ver. 3, repeated for the purpose of annexing to it the contrast that serves for its illustration. Not *grace* but *debt* is the regulative standard, according to which his wages are awarded to such an one; the latter are not *merces gratiae*, but *merces debiti*. As in Abraham's case an imputation κατὰ χάριν took place (which Paul assumes as self-evident from ver. 3) he could not be on *ἐργαζόμενος*; the case of imputation which occurred in relation to him is, on the contrary, to be referred to the opposite category which follows: *but to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him who justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reckoned as righteousness*. Looking to the exact parallel of vv. 4 and 5, the unity of the category of both propositions must be maintained; and ver. 5 is not to be regarded as an application of ver. 4 to the case of Abraham (Reiche), but as likewise a *locus communis*, under which it is left to the reader to classify the case of Abraham in accordance with the above testimony of Scripture. Hence we cannot say with Reiche: “the *μὴ ἐργαζόμενος* and *ἀσεβής* is Abraham.”³ On the contrary, both are to be kept perfectly general, and *ἀσεβής*

¹ Not even with the exception of Döllinger (*Christenth u. K.* p. 188, ed. 2), who says that God accounts the principle of the new free obedience (the faith) as already the whole service to be rendered, as the finished righteous-

ness. Comp. however on i. 17, note.

² Comp. also Philippi *in loc.*, and Hoelemann, *de justitiae ex fide ambabus in V. II sedibus*, 1867, p. 8 ff.

³ *ἀσεβής* in his view is an allusion to the

is not even to be weakened as equivalent to *ἀδικος*, but has been *purposely selected* (comp v. 6), in order to set forth the saving power of faith¹ by as strong a contrast as possible to *δικαιοῦντα*. — On *πιστεῖν ἐπὶ τινι*, expressing faith in *its direction towards some one*, comp. ver. 24; Acts ix. 42, xi. 17; Wisd. xii. 2.

Vv. 6-8. Accordance (*καθάπερ*) of ver. 5 with an assertion of *David*, that great and revered Messianic authority. That it is only what is said in ver. 5 that is to be vouched by David's testimony, and consequently that the quotation forms only an accessory element in the argument, appears from its being annexed by *καθάπερ*, from the clear intended relation in which *ὁ θεὸς λογ. δικ.* appears to *λογ. ἡ. πίστ. αὐτ. εἰς δικ.* ver. 5, as well as *χωρὶς ἔργων* to *τῷ μὴ ἔργαζ.* in the same verse, and from the fact that Paul immediately, in ver. 9, returns to Abraham. Vv. 6-8 cannot therefore be regarded as a second example of justification from the O. T. (Reiche and many others), or even as the starting-point of the reply to the question of ver. 1 (Hofmann). This is forbidden by the proper conception of *νόμος* in iii. 31, in accordance with which Paul could only employ an example from the *law*: and such an example was that of *Abraham*, Gen. xv., but not that of *David*. — *λέγει τ. μακαρ.*] asserts the *congratulation*; *μακαρισμός* does not mean *blessedness*, not even in Gal. iv. 15, see *in loc.*² — *λογίζεται δικαιοσύνην*] Here *δικαιοσύνην* is conceived directly as that, which God reckons to man as his moral status. The expression *λογισθῆναι τινὶ ἁμαρτίαν* is perfectly analogous. In the classics *λογισθῆναι τινὶ τι* is also frequently met with. — *χωρὶς ἔργων*] belongs to *λογίζεται*. For, as David represents the *λογισθῆναι δικαιοσύνην* as the forgiveness of sins, it *must* be conceived by him as ensuving *without any participation* (iii. 21) of *meritorious works*. — *μακάριοι κ.τ.λ.*] Ps. xxxii. 1, 2 exactly after the LXX. — *ἐπεκαλύφθ.*] The *amnesty* under the figure of the covering over of sin. Comp. Augustine on Ps. l.c., "Si textit Deus peccata, noluit animadvertere; si noluit animadvertere, noluit punire." Comp. 1 Pet. iv. 8. — *οὐ μὴ λογίσηται*] *will certainly not impute*. It refers to the future generally, without more precise definition,³ not specially to the *final judgment* (de Wette).

Vv. 9, 10. From the connection (*καθάπερ*, ver. 6) of this Davidic *μακαρισμός* with what had previously been adduced, vv. 3-5, regarding Abraham,

earlier idolatry of Abraham, reported by Philo, Josephus, and Maimonides, on the ground of Joshua xxiv. 2. This was also the view of Grotius, Wetstein, Cramer, Michaelis, Rosenmüller, and Koppe; comp. also Döllinger, *Christenth u. K.* p. 197, ed. 2. The rabbins have a different tradition, to the effect that Abraham *demolished* the idols of his father Terah, etc.; see Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenth.* I. p. 490 ff., 941.

¹ Consequently *subjective faith* is meant, not its *objective ground*, the righteousness of Christ, i.e. according to the *Form. Conc.* p. 884 f., the active and passive obedience of Christ, which is "applied and appropriated" to us through faith. The merit of Christ al-

ways remains the *causa meritoria*, to which we are indebted for the imputation of our faith. But the *apprehensio Christi*, which is the essence of justifying faith, must not be made equivalent to the *apprehensio Christus* (Calovius; comp. Philippi). The former is the subjective, *which* is imputed; the latter the objective, *on account of which* the imputation by God takes place. The *Formula Concordiæ* in this point goes *ultra quod scriptum est*.

² Comp. Plat. *Rep.* p. 591 D; Aristot. *Rhet.* I. 9, 4.

³ Hermann, *ad Soph. Oed. C.* 853; Hartung, *Partikell.* II, p. 156 f.

it is now inferred (οὖν) that this declaration of blessedness affects, not the circumcised as such, but *also the uncircumcised* [See Note XLI. p. 175] ; for Abraham in fact, as an *uncircumcised* person, was included among those pronounced blessed by David. — ἐπὶ τ. περιτ.] The verb obviously to be supplied is most simply conceived as ἐστὶ (the μακαρισμός extends to etc. ; comp. ii. 9 ; Acts iv. 33 *et al.*). Less natural is λέγεται from ver. 6 (Fritzsche) ; and πίπτει (Theophylact, Bos) is arbitrary, as is also ἤλθεν (Oecumenius), and ἔρχεται (Olshausen). Comp. ver. 13, and see Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 120 f. [E. T. 136 f.]. — ἐπὶ τ. περιτ. κ.τ.λ.] *to the circumcised, or also to the uncircumcised ?* The καὶ shows that the previous ἐπὶ τ. περιτ. is conceived as *exclusive*, consequently without a μόνον. — λέγομεν γάρ κ.τ.λ.] In saying this, Paul cannot wish first to explain, quite superfluously, *how he comes to put such questions* (Hofmann), but, as is indicated by λέγομεν, which lays down a proposition as premiss to the argument that follows, he enters on the *proof* (γάρ) from the history of Abraham for the καὶ ἐπὶ τ. ἀκροβ. which is conceived as affirmed. The *present* denotes the assertion pointing back to ver. 3 as continuing : *for our assertion, our proposition is*, etc. The *plural* assumes the assent of the readers. The emphasis however is not on τῷ Ἀβρ. (Fritzsche, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Maier, Philippi, and others), which Paul would have made apparent by the position of the words οὗτις τῷ Ἀβρ. ἐλογίσθη ; nor on ἐλογίσθη, which in that case would necessarily have a pregnant meaning not indicated in the whole connection (as a pure act of grace, independent of external conditions) ; but on ἡ πίστις εἰς δικαιοσύνην (and thus primarily on πίστις brought together at the end, by which the import of ver. 3, ἐπίστευσε δικαιοσύνην, is recapitulated. — πῶς οὖν ἐλογίσθη] The proposition, *that to Abraham, etc., is certain* ; consequently the point at issue is the question *quomodo*, viz. under what *circumstances as to status* (whether in his circumcision, or whilst he was still uncircumcised) that imputation of his faith to him for righteousness took place.¹ Hofmann places the first mark of interrogation after πῶς οὖν, so that the second question is supposed to begin with ἐλογίσθη. But without sufficient ground, and contrary to the usage elsewhere of the interrogative πῶς by Paul, who has often put τί οὖν thus without a verb, but never πῶς οὖν. We should in such case have to understand ἐλογίσθη ; but this word, according to the usual punctuation, is already *present*, and does not therefore need to be supplied. — οὐκ ἐν περιτομῇ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀκροβ.] scil. *δντι*. The imputation in question took place as early as Gen. xv. ; circumcision not till Gen. xvii. ; the former at least fourteen years earlier.

Ver. 11. [See Note XLII. p. 176.] An amplification of the οὐκ ἐν περιτ., ἀλλ' ἐν ἀκροβ. viewed as to its historical bearings, showing namely the relation of Abraham's circumcision to his δικαιοσύνη, and therefore only to be separated by a comma from ver. 10. “ *And he received a sign of circumcision as seal* (external confirmation, 1 Cor. ix. 2, and see on John iii. 33) *of the righteousness of faith* (obtained through faith, vv. 3, 5), *which he had in un-*

¹ Respecting the form of the discourse, Erasmus aptly observes : “ Praeter interrogationis gratiam multum lucis addit dilem-

ma, cujus altera parte rejecta alteram evincit. Nullum enim argumentandi genus vel apertius vel violentius.”

circumcision." That τῆς ἐν τ. ἀκροβ. is not to be connected with δικαιοσ. (Rückert, Reiche) is plain from the following context (πιστευνόντων δι' ἀκροβυστίας ver. 11, and τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβ. πίστεως ver. 12). The genitive περιτομῆς is usually taken as that of apposition: the sign consisting in circumcision. But in that case the article could not be omitted before σημεῖον (the absence of it drove van Hengel to the reading περιτομήν, which Hofmann also prefers),¹ since the concrete, historically definite sign would here be meant (compare 2 Cor. v. 5; Eph. ii. 14 *et al.*). It is therefore to be rendered: And a sign, which took place through circumcision, a signature which was given to him in the fact that he was circumcised, he received as seal, etc. The genitive is thus to be taken simply as completing the notion of σημεῖον, i.e. as defining it more precisely as respects its modal expression. Observe at the same time the dislocation in the order of the words, which brings into emphatic relief the idea of the σημεῖον. According to Gen. xi. 17 circumcision was the sign of the covenant² which God made with Abraham. But with correct dogmatic consistency Paul represents it as the significant mark which had been the seal of the righteousness by faith, since in that covenant what God promised was the Messianic κληρονομία (Gen. xv. 5, 18), and Abraham on his part rendered the faith (Gen. xv. 6) which God imputed to him for righteousness. — εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ.] in order that he might be, etc., contains the divinely appointed aim of the σημεῖον ἔλαβε περιτ. κ.τ.λ. This *telic* rendering is grammatically necessary (see on i. 20), as more in keeping with the biblical view³ and with the importance of the matter, than the *ecbatic* explanation καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο πατήρ, which has been justly abandoned of late. — πατέρα πάντων τῶν πίστ. δι' ἀκροβ.] The essence of this spiritual fatherhood is the identity of the relation forming the basis of the sacred historical connection of all believers with the patriarch without intervention of circumcision—a relation which began with Abraham justified through faith whilst still uncircumcised. Thus the Jewish conception of the national-theocratic childship of Abraham is elevated and enlarged by Paul (comp. Matt. iii. 9; John viii. 37, 39), into the idea of the purely spiritual-theocratic childship, which embraces, not Jews and proselytes as such, but the believers as such—all uncircumcised who believe, and (ver. 12) the believing circumcised. For Abraham's righteousness through faith was attained, when as yet there was no distinction between circumcised and uncircumcised; and to this mode of becoming just before God, independent of external conditions, Christianity by its δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως leads back

¹ Hofmann explains: and as a sign he received circumcision, as seal (apposition to σημ.) In that case περιτομήν must have had the article (John vii. 22; otherwise in ver. 23). For to take λαμβάνειν περιτομήν as equivalent to περιτέμνεσθαι is forbidden by σημεῖον, with which the περιτομή can be correlative only as a substantive conception.

² In the Talmud also it is presented as the sign and seal of the covenant. See Schoettgen and Wetstein. To the formula-

ry of circumcision belonged the words: "Benedictus sit, qui sanctificat dilectum ab utero, et signum (ἸΝ) posuit in arne, et filios suos sigillavit (ἸΛΗ) signo foederis sancti." Berachoth f. 13, 1.

³ ὁ γὰρ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς προειδὺς ὡς θεὸς, ὡς ἕνα λαὸν ἐξ ἔθνων καὶ Ἰουδαίων ἀθροίσει καὶ διὰ πίστεως αὐτοῖς τὴν σωτηρίαν παρέξει, ἐν τῇ πατριάρχῃ Ἀβρ. ἀμφοτέρα προδιέγραψε, Theodoret.

again, and continues it. — δι' ἄκροβ.] *with foreskin*, although they are uncircumcised.¹ — εἰς τὸ λογισθῆναι κ.τ.λ.] is taken by many, including Tholuck and Philippi, as a parenthetical illustration of εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πατέρα κ.τ.λ. But as we can attach εἰς τὸ λογισθῆναι κ.τ.λ. without violence or obscurity to πιστευόντων, there is no necessity for the assumption of a parenthesis (which is rejected by Lachmann, Tischendorf, van Hengel, Ewald, Mehring, and Hofmann). Nevertheless εἰς τὸ λογισθ. is not : who believe *on the fact*, that to them also will be imputed (Hofmann), for the object of faith is never expressed by εἰς with a substantival infinitive ;² but, quite in accordance with the *telic* sense of this form of expression (as in the εἰς τὸ εἶναι previously) : who believe (on Christ) *in order that* (according to the divine final purpose ruling therein) *to them also*, etc. — καὶ αὐτοῖς] *to them also*, as to Abraham himself ; τὴν δικαιοσύνην expresses the righteousness which is under discussion, that of faith.

Ver. 12. The construction carries onward the foregoing πατέρα πάντων κ.τ.λ. : *and father of circumcision, i.e. father of circumcised persons* (not of all circumcised, hence without the article). And in order to express to *what* circumcised persons this spiritual fatherhood of Abraham belongs, Paul adds, by way of more precise definition : *for those* (*dativus commodi*, comp. Rev. xxi. 7 ; Luke vii. 12) *who are not merely circumcised* (comp. ii. 8), *but also walk in the footsteps*, etc. With this rendering (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Ambrosiaster, Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Estius, and others ; including Ammon, Böhme, Tholuck, Klee, Rückert, Benecke, Reiche, Glöckler, Köllner, de Wette, Philippi, and Winer) it *must* be admitted (against Reiche and Köllner, whose observations do not justify the article) that τοῖς is *erroneously* repeated before στοιχοῦσι. [See Note XLIII. p. 176.] Paul *unsuitably* continues with ἀλλὰ καί, just as if he had previously written an οὐ μόνον τοῖς. As any other rendering is wholly inadmissible, and as καὶ τοῖς cannot be an inversion for τοῖς καί (Mehring), we are driven to the assumption of that erroneous insertion of the article, as a negligence of expression. The expression in Phil. i. 29 (in opposition to Fritzsche) would be of the same nature only in the event of Paul having written τοῖς . . . οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἐκ περιτομῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . τοῖς στοιχοῦσι κ.τ.λ. Others take τοῖς οὐκ for οὐ τοῖς (as 37, 80, Syr. Arr. Vulg. Slav. and several Fathers read as an emendation), thus making a distinction to be drawn here not between merely circumcised and unbelieving *Jews*, but between *Jews* and *Gentiles* (ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς κ.τ.λ.). So Theodoret, Luther, Castalio, Koppe, Storr, Flatt, Schrader (Grotius is doubtful). But such an inversion is as unnatural (comp. ver. 16) as it is unprecedented (it is an error to refer to ii. 27 ; 1 Thess. i. 8) ; and how strange it would be, if Paul should have once more brought forward the fatherhood

¹ Comp. on ii. 27, Barnab. Ep. 13 : τέθεικα σε πατέρα ἐθνῶν τῶν πιστευόντων δι' ἄκροβυστίας τῷ κυρίῳ.

² Not even in ver. 18. And Acts xv. 11, to which Hofmann appeals as an analogous passage, tells directly *against* him, because there the construction of the *infinitive* obtains in the usual way, that the *subject of the*

governing verb is understood, as a matter of course, with the infinitive. Comp. Hofmann himself above on ver. 1 ; Krüger, § 55, 4, 1. Besides the result, according to Hofmann's interpretation, would be an awkward thought, not in keeping with the faith of Abraham.

as to the believing Gentiles, but should have left that relating to the Jews altogether without conditioning definition ! Hofmann (comp. also his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 82) understands περιτομῆς, after the analogy of ὁ θεὸς τῆς δόξης κ.τ.λ., as the genitive of *quality* ("a father, whose fatherhood is to be designated according to circumcisedness ;" as a circumcised person he has begotten Isaac, etc.) ; then assumes in the case of τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον the suppressed antithesis to complete it, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ πίστεως ; and finally explains ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχ. as a supplementary addition, while he takes ἀλλὰ καὶ to mean not *but also*, but *also however*. A hopeless misinterpretation ! For, as genitive of *quality*, περιτομῆς must have had the article (comp. Acts vii. 2 ; 2 Cor. i. 3 ; Eph. i. 17 *al.*), and every reader must have understood περιτομῆς in conformity with πάντων κ.τ.λ., ver. 11, as a specification *whose father* Abraham further is. The reader could all the less mentally supply after τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτ. a suppressed contrast, since the expressed contrast follows immediately with ἀλλὰ καὶ ; and for *that reason*, again, it could occur to no one to understand this ἀλλὰ καὶ in any other sense than elsewhere after negations, namely, *but also*, not *also however*. (How inappropriate is Hofmann's citation of Luke xxiv. 22, where no negation at all precedes !) Wieseler's attempt (in Herzog's *Encyklop.* XX. p. 592) is also untenable, since he imports into τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτ. μόνον the sense : "*who do not make circumcision the exclusive condition of salvation,*" and likewise renders ἀλλὰ καὶ *also however* ; thus making Paul indicate (1) the Jewish Christians who were not rigid partisans of the law (such as were to be found in Palestine especially), and (2) the Pauline Jewish Christians. — τοῖς ἰχνεσι κ.τ.λ.] who so walk (see on Gal. v. 25) that they *follow the footsteps* which Abraham has left behind through his faith manifested in his uncircumcised condition, *i.e.* who are believers after the type of the uncircumcised Abraham. The *dative*, commonly taken as *local*, is more correctly, in keeping with the other passages in which Paul uses the dative with στοιχεῖν (Gal. v. 16, 25, vi. 16 ; Phil. iii. 16), interpreted in the sense of the *norm*.

Ver. 13. Ground assigned for the foregoing, from εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πατέρα onwards. "The father of all believing Gentiles and Jews ;" *for it was not the law, but the righteousness of faith, that procured for Abraham or his seed the promise of possessing the world.* [See Note XLIV. p. 177.] Had the law been the agent in procuring that promise, then the *Jews*, as possessors of the law, would be the children of Abraham who should receive what was promised ; as it is, however, it must be the *believers*, no matter whether Jews or Gentiles, since not the law has been at work, but on the contrary the *righteousness of faith*. — διὰ νόμον] [See Note XLV. p. 177] *through the agency of the law*, is not to be arbitrarily limited (Piscator, Calovius, and others : *per iustitiam legis* ; Pareus and others : *per opera legis*) ; for, as the Mosaic law¹ was not yet even in existence, it could in *no way* procure the promise. Hence it is not to be rendered with Grotius : "*sub conditione observandi legem Mosis,*" because διὰ δικαιοσ. πίστ. does not admit of a cor-

¹ For to this διὰ νόμον must be referred (see ver. 14 ff.) not to *circumcision*, which is

brought under the wider conception of the law (Mehring).

responding interpretation. — ἡ ἐπαγγελία] scil. ἐστὶ. The supplying of this (usually : ἐγένετο) is quite sufficient ; comp. on ver. 9. The relation is realized as present. — ἡ τῷ σπέρμ. αὐτοῦ] *neither to Abraham nor to his seed, etc.* With ἡ τῷ σπέρμ. αὐτ. Paul takes for granted that the history of the promise in question is known ; and *who* are meant by the σπέρμα under the Messianic reference of the promise cannot, according to the context (see especially ver. 11), be doubtful, namely the *believers*, who are the *spiritual* posterity of Abraham (ix. 6 ff. ; Gal. iv. 22 ff.) ; not *Christ* according to Gal. iii. 16 (Estius, Cornelius à Lapide, Olshausen) ; but also not the *descendants of Abraham proper* (van Hengel). — τὸ κληρ. αὐτ. εἶναι κόσμον] Epexegetis of ἡ ἐπαγγελία.¹ The αὐτόν, referring to Abraham, is so put not because ἡ τ. σπ. αὐτοῦ is only incidentally introduced (Rückert), but because Abraham is regarded as at once the father and representative of his σπέρμα, included with him in the promise. — κόσμον] The inheritance of the land of Canaan, which God promised to Abraham for himself and his posterity (Gen. xii. 7, xiii. 14, 15, xv. 18, xvii. 8, xxii. 17 ; comp. xxvi. 3 ; Ex. vi. 4), was in the Jewish Christology taken to mean *the universal dominion of the Messianic theocracy*, which was typically pointed at in these passages from Genesis.² The idea of *Messianic sovereignty over the world*, however, which lies at the bottom of this Jewish particularistic conception, and which the prophets invested with a halo of glory,³ is in the N. T. not done away, but divested of its Judaistic conception, and raised into a Christological truth, already presented by Christ Himself (comp. Matt. v. 5) though in allegoric form (Matth. xix. 28 ff. ; Luke xxii. 30 ; Matt. xxv. 21). Its necessity lies in the universal dominion to which Christ Himself is exalted (Matt. xxviii. 18 ; John xvii. 5 ; Phil. ii. 9 ff. ; Eph. iv. 10 *al.*), and in the glorious fellowship of His believers with Him. Now as the idea of this government of the world, which Christ exercises, and in which His believers (the spiritual children of Abraham) are one day to participate, was undeniably also the ideal of Paul (viii. 17 ; 1 Cor. vi. 2 ; comp. 2 Tim. ii. 12), it is arbitrary to take κόσμον here otherwise than *generally*, and either to limit it to *the sphere of earth* (Koppe, Köllner, Maier), or to explain it as relating to the dominion of the Jews over the *Gentile world* (van Hengel), or the reception of all peoples into the Messianic kingdom (Beza, Estius, and others) or *Messianic bliss* generally (Wetstein, Flatt, comp. Benecke and Glöckler), or the *spiritual* dominion of the world (Baumgarten-Crusius), as even Hengstenberg does : “the world is spiritually conquered by Abraham and his seed” (*Christol.* I. p. 49). The interpretation which takes it to mean the extension of the *spiritual fatherhood over all nations* (Mehring) would only be possible in the absence of ἡ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ, and would likewise be set aside by the firmly established historical notion of the נחלה. The κληρονομέω εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου of believers is realized in the new glorious world (ἐν τῇ παλιγγενεσίᾳ, Matt. xix. 28, comp. Rom. viii. 18, 2 Pet. iii. 13) after the Parousia ; hence the Messianic kingdom itself and all its δόξα, as the completed possession of

¹ See Kühner, II. 1, p. 518, and *ad Xen. Anab.* II. 5, 22.

² “Abrahamo patri meo Deus possiden-

dum dedit coelum et terram,” Tanchuma, p. 165, 1, and see Wetstein.

³ Comp. Schultz, *attest. Theol.* I. p. 225 ff.

salvation promised to believers, is designated by the theocratic technical term *κληρονομία* (see on Gal. iii. 18). — *διὰ δικ. πίστ.*] Since the νόμος was not the procurer of the promise, but Abraham was righteous through faith (ver. 3), the *δικαιοσύνη πίστεως* must necessarily have been that which procured the promise (moved God to grant it). See ver. 14. It is true that the promise in question was given to Abraham *prior* to his justification by faith (Gen. xii. 7, xiii. 14 f.); but it was *renewed* to him *subsequently* (xv. 18, xvii. 8); hence we must assume that here Paul had only these latter passages in view.

Vv. 14–17. Proof of the antithesis *οὐ διὰ νόμον . . . ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.* in ver. 13, conducted not historically (as in Gal. iii. 13 ff.), but dogmatically, *a priori*, from the *nature of the law*, from which results the opposite of the latter, the *πίστις*, as cause of the *κληρονομία*.

Ver. 14. Here also νόμος is not (as Flatt and others take it) the moral law (to which however the saying may certainly be *applied*), but the *law of Moses*, viewed in *excluding* antithesis to the *πίστις*. By *οἱ ἐκ νόμου*, “those of the law” (Luther), are meant those who belong to the law, are *as such* subjected to it; consequently the *Jews* at all events, but just so far as they are *not believers*, not belonging to the Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ Θεοῦ (Gal. vi. 16). The opposite: *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως*, iii. 26, Gal. iii. 7. That they *wish to attain to the κληρονομία* by the way of the law, is true in itself, but is not expressed in the mere *οἱ ἐκ νόμου* (in opposition to Hofmann). — *κεκένωται ἡ πίστις κ.τ.λ.*] *then faith is made void and the promise done away, i.e.* faith is thereby rendered inoperative and the promise of no effect. If it be true that to be subject to the law is the condition of obtaining the possession of the world, nothing further can be said either of a saving power of faith (comp. 1 Cor. i. 17), or of the validity of the promise (comp. iii. 31, Gal. iii. 17). And why not? Because (ver. 15) the law, to which in accordance with that protasis the *κληρονομία* would be appended, has an operation so entirely opposed to the essence of faith (which trusts in the divine χάρις) and of the promise (which is an emanation from this χάρις), (comp. ver. 16), that it brings about the divine *wrath*, since its result is *transgression*. On this ground (*διὰ τοῦτο*, ver. 16) because the law *worketh wrath*, its relation to the *κληρονομία*, laid down in ver. 14, cannot exist; but on the contrary the latter must proceed *from faith* that it may be *according to grace*, etc., ver. 16. — The *πίστις* is the Christian saving faith, of which Abraham’s faith was the beginning and type, and the *ἐπαγγελία* is the Divine promise of the *κληρονομία*, given to Abraham and his seed, ver. 13.

Ver. 15. On the connection see above. The *assigning of a reason* (γάρ) has reference to the previous *κεκένωται ἡ πίστις κ. κατήργ. ἡ ἐπαγγ.*, which are closely connected (see ver. 16), and not merely to the *κατήργ. ἡ ἐπαγγ.* (Chrysostom, Fritzsche, Mehring, and others). *The law produces wrath*. It is the *divine wrath* that is meant, not any sort of *human wrath* (against the judgment of God, as Melancthon thought). Unpropitiated, it issues forth on the day of judgment, ii. 5 ff., iii. 5, ix. 22; Eph. ii. 3, v. 6; Col. iii. 6 *al.*; Ritschl, *de ira Dei*, p. 16; Weber, *vom Zorne Gottes*, p. 326 f. — *οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ νόμος κ.τ.λ.*] [See Note XLVI. p. 177.] Proof of the proposition that the law worketh wrath: *for where the law is not, there is not even (οὐδέ)*

transgression, namely, which excites the wrath of God (the Lawgiver). This short, terse and striking *proof*—which is not, any more than the three previous propositions introduced by γάρ, to be reduced to a “justifying explanation” (Hofmann), or to be weakened by taking οὐδέ to mean “just as little” (Hofmann)—proceeds *a causa ad effectum*; where the *cause* is wanting (namely, παράβασις), there can be no mention of the effect (ὀργή). This negative form of the probative proposition includes—in accordance with the doctrine of the Apostle elsewhere regarding the relation of the law to the human ἐπιθυμία (Rom. vii. 7 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 56; Gal. iii. 19 *al.*), which is kindled on occasion of the law by the power of sin which exists in man—the positive counterpart, that, *where the law is, there is also transgression*. Paul however expresses himself *negatively*, because in his mind the negative thought that the fulfilment of the promise is not dependent on the law still preponderates; and he will not enter into closer analysis of the positive side of it—viz., that faith is the condition—until the sequel, ver. 16 ff. Observe moreover that he has not written οὐδέ ἀμαρτία, which he could not assert (ver. 13), but οὐδέ παράβασις, as the specific designation of the ἀμαρτία in relation to the law, which was the precise point here in question. Comp. ii. 23, 25, 27, v. 14; Gal. ii. 18, iii. 19. Sins *without* positive law (ver. 13) are likewise, and indeed on account of the natural law, ii. 14, objects of the divine wrath (see i. 18 ff.; Eph. ii. 3); but sins *against* a given law are, in virtue of their thereby definite quality of *transgression*, so specifically and specially provocative of wrath in God, that Paul could relatively even deny the imputation of sin when the law was non-existent. See on ver. 13.

Ver. 16 f. Διὰ τοῦτο] Inference from ver. 15, consequently from the wrath-operating nature of the law, on account of which it is so utterly incapable of being the condition of the κληρονομία, that the latter must on the contrary result from the opposite of the law—from faith, etc. Comp. on ver. 14 f. This conclusion is so evident and pertinent that it required only the incomplete, but thus all the more striking expression: “*therefore of faith, in order that according to grace,*” to the end that, etc. — ἐκ πίστεως] scil. οἱ κληρονόμοι εἰσὶ, according to ver. 14. The supplying, by Fritzsche and others, of ἡ ἐπαγγελία γίνεται or ἐγένετο from ver. 13 is forbidden by the contrast in which ἐκ πίστ. stands to ἐκ νόμου, ver. 14. — ἵνα κατὰ χάριν] The purpose of God in ἐκ πίστεως: “*in order that they might be so by way of grace,*” not by way of merit. Comp. ver. 4 and δωρεάν iii. 24. — εἰς τὸ εἶναι βεβαίαν κ.τ.λ.] contains now in turn the divine purpose,¹ which prevails in the κατὰ χάριν. They shall be heirs *by way of grace*; and *why* by way of grace? *In order that the promise may be sure*, i.e. may subsist in active validity as one to be realized (the opposite of κατήργηται, ver. 14) *for the collective posterity* (i.e. for all believers, see v. 11, 13), *not for those alone, who are such out of the law* (not solely for believers who have become so out of the legal bond of Judaism), *but also for those who are such out of the faith of Abraham,*² i.e.

¹ Here also the peculiar deeper scope of the view given is often left unnoticed, and εἰς τὸ εἶναι is taken as *inference*: so that, etc. See on the other hand on i. 20.

² ἐν πίστ. Ἀβραάμ goes together (in opposition to Fritzsche, who has conceived the σπέρματι to be supplied as *before* Ἀβρ., and made the genitive Ἀβραάμ dependent on it),

whose Abrahamic kinship is based on Abraham's faith, the uncircumcised believers.¹ If anything else than χάρις (such as ὀφείλημα) were the reason determining God to confer the κληρονομία, then both halves of the σπέρμα, in their legal imperfection, would be unsecured with respect to the promise. As it is, however, believing Jews as also believing Gentiles have in the divine χάρις the same guarantee that the κληρονομία shall be imparted to them ἐκ πίστεως. — ὅς ἐστι πατ. πάντ. ἡμῶν] reiterated (comp. vv. 11, 12) solemn setting forth of the fatherhood of Abraham for *all* (πάντων) believers (ἡμῶν), which was indeed the pith and fundamental idea of the entire argument (since ver. 9) ; there is therefore no new point raised here (Hofmann), but this fatherhood of the patriarch in the history of salvation, already clearly laid down, is summarily expressed afresh, in order (ver. 17), after the insertion of a testimony from Scripture, to present it, by means of κατέναντι οὐ κ.τ.λ., in its holy, divine guarantee and dignity. — ὅτι πατέρα πολλῶν κ.τ.λ.] Gen. xvii. 5, closely after the LXX. ; therefore ὅτι, *for*, which in the original text specifies the reason of the name Abraham, is repeated by Paul without any special bearing on his connection, simply as forming part of the words of Scripture. — πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθν.] Aptly explained, in the sense of the Apostle, by Chrysostom and Theophylact : οὐ κατὰ φυσικὴν συγγένειαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' οἰκειώσιν πίστεως. In this spiritual sense—which the passage of Scripture expresses typically—he is constituted by God as father of many nations (in so far, namely, as all believers from among the Jews and all Gentile peoples are to be, in the history of salvation, his spiritual σπέρμα), *i.e.* appointed, and thus made so.² Even the original text cannot have meant by יִשְׂרָאֵל merely the twelve tribes of Israel (Hofmann). It means the posterity of Abraham, in so far as Gentile peoples also shall be subjected to it. The Israelite tribes would be יִשְׂרָאֵל. — κατέναντι οὐ ἐπίστ. Θεοῦ] is connected, after the parenthesis (καθὼς . . . σε), with ὅς ἐστι πατὴρ πάντ. ἡμῶν. To get rid of the parenthesis by supposing a suppressed *intervening thought* (Philippi), or an *asyndeton*, as if it were καὶ κατέναντι κ.τ.λ. (van Hengel), is a harsh and arbitrary course ; while it is impossible to regard κατέναντι κ.τ.λ. as *explanation* of the καθὼς γέγραπται (Hofmann), because καθὼς γέγρ. can only be taken as the quite common (occurring thirteen times in our Epistle) simple formula for quoting a Scripture proof, and not as : “*in harmony with the Scripture passage.*” — κατέναντι, equivalent to the classical κατεναντίον, means *over against* (Mark xi. 2, xii. 41 ; Luke xix. 30), *i.e.* here : *in presence of* (κατενώπιον), *coram*, as after the Heb. frequently in the LXX. and Apocrypha.³ The attraction is to be resolved into : κατέναντι τοῦ Θεοῦ, κατέναντι οὐ ἐπίστευσε : *coram Deo, coram quo credidit.*⁴ Quite anal-

since it is not *Jews and Christians*, but *Jewish and Gentile believers* who are placed side by side, and in the latter the faith of Abraham (comp. ver. 10) is the characteristic.

¹ Theophylact : παντὶ τῷ σπέρματι, τοῦτόστι πᾶσι τοῖς πιστεύουσιν· οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἐκ νόμου, τοῦτόστι τοῖς ἐμπεριτόμοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀκροβυστοῖς, οἵτινές εἰσι σπέρμα Ἀβραὰμ ἐκ πίστεως αὐτῷ γενηθέντες.

² Compare Heb. i. 2 ; 1 Macc. x. 65, xiv. 34 ; Hom. *Od.* xv. 253, *Il.* vi. 300 ; Plat. *Theæt.* p. 169 E ; Pind. *Ol.* xiii. 21.

³ See Biel and Schleusner.

⁴ The *coram*, in *presence of*, is neither to be explained *ad exemplum* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact and others), nor “according to the will” (Reiche, Krehl and others), nor “according to the judgment”

ogous are such passages as Luke i. 4, *περὶ ὧν κατηχήθης λόγων*, instead of *περὶ τῶν λόγων περὶ ὧν κατήχ.*, Matt. vii. 2 *al.*¹ So also rightly Philippi and Hofmann;² comp. Märcker. The mode of resolving it adopted by most commentators (Thomas Aquinas, Castalio, Calvin, Beza, Er. Schmid, Grotius, Estius, and others; also Tholuck, Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche, Ewald, van Hengel, Buttman): *κατέναντι Θεοῦ ᾧ ἐπίστευσε*, is at least at variance with the *usual* mode of attraction, since the attraction of the relative, which, not attracted, would stand in the dative, has no precedent in the N. T., and even in Greek authors very seldom occurs.³ Finally, the explanation which takes *κατέναντι οὐ* as equivalent to *κατέναντι τούτου, ὅτι*, and the latter as equivalent to *ἀνθ' οὗ, propterea quod*, and in accordance with which Θεοῦ κ.τ.λ. is then taken as *genitive absolute* ("whilst God, who quickeneth the dead, calleth also to that which is not, as though it were present," Mehring), is wrong just because *κατέναντι* has not the sense supposed. — τοῦ ζωοπ. τ. νεκρῶς, καὶ κ.τ.λ.] Distinguishing quality of God as the Almighty, selected with practical reference to the circumstances of Abraham (vv. 18–21): "*who quickeneth the dead and calleth the non-existent as though it were*," and certainly, therefore, can quicken the decayed powers of procreation, and dispose of generations not yet in existence. A reference to the *offering of Isaac*, whom God could make alive again (Erasmus, Grotius, Baumgarten-Crusius, and Mangold), is so foreign to the connection that it would have required definite indication. The ζωοποιεῖν τοὺς νεκρούς is a formal attribute of the almighty God. 1 Sam. ii. 6; Wisd. xvi. 13; Tob. xiii. 2; comp. Deut. xxxii. 9. See also John v. 21; 2 Cor. i. 9; 1 Tim. vi. 13. Origen, Ambrosiaster, Anselm, erroneously hold that the νεκροί are *spiritually* dead, a view which the context must have rendered necessary; comp. Olshausen, who holds that ζωοπ. and καλ. indicate typically the spiritual awakening and the new birth; also Ewald, who will have the application made to the revivifying of the dead Gentiles into true Christians. — καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα] *i.e.* "*who utters His disposing decree over that*

(Rückert, Köllner, Fritzsche, Maier, Umbreit and others), nor "*vi atque potestate divina*," (Koppe), nor "*before the omniscience of God*" (Olshausen), but is to be left without any modifying explanation. Abraham is realized as present, just as he stands, πατήρ πάντων ἡμῶν *face to face* with the God who had appeared to him, and has become a believer *in conspectu Dei*. This vivid realization of the believing patriarch, as if he were standing there as father of us all before the face of God, just as formerly in that sacred moment of history, is a plastic form of presentation which, inaptly condemned by Hofmann, quite accords with the elevated and almost poetic strain of the following words. It also fully warrants the coupling of *κατέναντι κ.τ.λ.* with ὅς ἐστι πατήρ πάντων ἡμῶν; it is unnecessary to seek a connection with ὅτι πατέρα . . . τέθεικά σε, either with Bengel, who compares Matt.

ix. 6, or with Philippi, who, thereby getting rid of the parenthesis, inserts after τέθεικά σε the thought: "*and as such he has been appointed.*"

¹ See Bornemann, *Schol. in Luc.* p. 177; Schmid in the *Tüb. Zeitschr. f. Theol.* 1831, 2, p. 137 ff.; Winer, p. 155 f. [E. T. 164]; comp. on Acts xxi. 16.

² Who, nevertheless, in consequence of his incorrect view of καθὼς γέγραπται, professes to illustrate the κατέναντι thus: "*At that time, when he believed, he stood face to face with God as Him who quickeneth the dead, etc.; and by the fact, that God has shown Himself to be just the same as Him before whom he then stood, it has so come to pass, that he is now before Him, the father of us all.*"

³ Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 2, 5, *Gramm.* II. 2, p. 914.

which does not exist, equally as over the existing." What a lofty expression of all-commanding power! And how thoroughly in harmony with the then position of Abraham! For as he stood before God and believed (Gen. xv. 6), God had just showed to him the stars of heaven, with the promise *οὕτως ἔσται τὸ σπέρμα σου!* So that God hereby issued his potent summons (*so shall it be!*) to something that was not (the σπέρμα of Abraham) as though it had been. This explanation (followed also by Rückert and Philippi) is perfectly faithful to the sense of the words, and as much in harmony with the vividly realized situation of Abraham, as it is appropriate to the parallelism; for the latter is *climactic*, leading from the νεκροῖς to the τὰ μὴ ὄντα. καλεῖν like *קָרָא*, does not here mean to name Hofmann, (comp. Loesner and Benecke), which would refer to the name of father pronounced by God, and have in view the divine knowledge, but on the contrary, correlative with the mighty ζωοποιεῖν τ. νεκρ. (comp. δυνατός ver. 21), it denotes the call of the Ruler, which He issues to that which is subject to His power. Comp. Ps. l. 1; Is. xl. 26;¹ ὥς is the simple *as* of comparison. Parallels in point are found in Philo, *de Jos.* p. 544 C, where it is said of the force of imagination, that it pictures τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὥς ὄντα; and Artemidor. i. 53, p. 46, ed. Rigalt. where it is said of the painter, that he represents τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὥς ὄντα. Paul could also have, like Clement, *Cor.* II. 1, used τὰ οὐκ ὄντα (the non-existent, Xen. *Mem.* ii. 2, 3), as the contradictory antithesis of τὰ ὄντα (comp. also Plat. *Rep.* p. 476 E); but the negation is conceived subjectively, from the standpoint of the subject who calls: he calls the things, which he knows as non-existent, as if they were.² Still what Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 37 f., deduces from τὰ μὴ ὄντα—that that which enters into historical existence was not previously an absolute nothing, but an object of divine knowledge—is based on the common conception of καλεῖν in the sense of *creative* activity, which is erroneous. No doubt καλεῖν, as is well known, often denotes the *creating* call of God (Isa. xxii. 12, xli. 4, xlviii. 13; 2 Kings viii. 1; Wisd. xi. 25; Philo, *de creat. princ.* p. 728 B, where τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλεισεν is further defined by εἰς τὸ εἶναι; comp. *de Opif.* p. 13 E). In this case we should have to think by no means of the historical *act of creation out of nothing* (Piscator, Estius and others), but rather, on account of the *present* participle, either of the *continuous* creative activity (Köllner), or (better still on account of the parallel of ζωοπ.) of an *abiding* characteristic of God generally, from which no time is excluded. But this whole interpretation of καλεῖν is set aside here by ὥς ὄντα. For ὥς cannot be taken for εἰς (Luther, Wolf, and others), because an use so utterly isolated in the N. T. is in itself very improbable, and because, where ὥς stands in classic authors in the sense of εἰς, it

¹ Quite contrary to the context Erasmus, Ch. Schmid, Koppe and Böhme take καλεῖν in the *dogmatic* sense. And yet even Fritzsche and Mangold have gone over to this explanation: "homines nondum in lucem editos ad vitam aeternam invitat." Van Hengel takes καλεῖν as *arcessere*, and τὰ μὴ ὄντα that which is of no account (see on 1 Cor. i. 28), so that the sense would be: "quaecunque nul-

lius numeri sunt arcessivt (to the childship of Abraham), quasi sint in pretio." But this peculiar interpretation of μὴ ὄντα and ὄντα must have been specifically suggested by the context, especially as it strips off the whole poetical beauty of the expression.

² Comp. Xen. *Anab.* iv. 4, 15, and Kühnert *in loc.*; Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 278.

is only so used in reference to *persons*,¹ or, at the most, where what is personal is represented by neuter objects.² Some desire *ὡς ὄντα* to be taken for *ὡς ἐσόμενα* (de Wette), or as a summary expression for *εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὡς ὄντα* (Reiche, Köllner, Tholuck, de Wette, Bisping), but these expedients are arbitrary in themselves, and, in the case of the latter especially—seeing that *ὄντα* would have to be taken in the sense of the result, as only adjectives are elsewhere used (see on Matt. xii. 43, and Breitenbach, *ad. Xen. Oec.* 4, 7)—*ὡς* would only be superfluous and confusing.

Vv. 18-21. More particular setting forth of this faith of Abraham, according to its lofty power and strength. *Εἶδες πῶς τίθησι καὶ τὰ κωλύματα καὶ τὴν ὑψηλὴν τοῦ δικαίου γνώμην πάντα ὑπερβαίνουσιν*, Chrysostom.

Ver. 18. *Ὅς*] Parallel to the *ὅς ἐστι* κ.τ.λ. ver. 16 ; therefore only a comma or a colon need be put after *ὡς ὄντα*. — *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι*] *on hope*, is the basis of the *ἐπίστ.* Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 10 ; frequent in Greek authors. See also Tit. i. 2. Abraham's faith was *opposed to hope* (*παρ' ἐλπίδα*, frequent in classical writers) in its *objective* reference, and yet not *ἀνέλπιστος*, but rather *based on hope* in its *subjective* reference,—a significant oxymoron. — *εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι* κ.τ.λ.] Rightly Luther : *in order that he might be*. Comp. Rückert, Tholuck, Philippi. It contains the *end*, ordained by God, of the *ἐπίστ.*, thus exhibiting Abraham's faith in its teleological connection with the divine decree, and that in reference to the word of God, ver. 17 ; hence, it is less in harmony with the context to take *εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι* κ.τ.λ. as the purpose of *Abraham*. Ver. 11, *εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν* κ.τ.λ. is quite analogous. Following Beza, many writers (including even Reiche, Köllner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Krehl, Mehring, Hofmann, take *εἰς τὸ γεν.* as the object of *ἐπίστ.* ; quite contrary to the usage of the N. T. ; see on ver. 11. Here, as in every case previously, the object of faith (the divine promise) is quite self-evident. The view which explains it of the *consequence* (Böhme, Flatt, Fritzsche, following older writers) for *καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο*, is linguistically erroneous (see on i. 20), and quite at variance with the tenor of the discourse ; for in vv. 19-21 the *delineation of the faith itself* is still continued, so that at this stage the *result* (it is introduced in ver. 22) would be quite out of place. — *κατὰ τὸ εἶρημ.*] belonging to *γενέσθαι* κ.τ.λ., not to *ἐπίστευσε* (Hofmann, in accordance with his incorrect view of *εἰς τὸ* κ.τ.λ.). — *οὕτως*] What is *meant* by this, Paul assumes to be familiar to his readers ; and therefore the corresponding part is by no means wanting. F G and several Fathers (also Vulg. ms.) have after *σου* the addition : *ὡς οἱ ἀστέρες τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἡ ἄμμος τῆς θαλάσσης*. The first half only is a *proper* gloss ; the *καὶ ἡ ἄμ. τ. θαλ.* does not lie in the *οὕτως*, Gen. xv. 5, but is imported from Gen. xii. 16.

Vv. 19-21 are still dependent on *ὅς*, completing the description of the believing Abraham : *and (who), because he was not weak in faith, regarded not his own dead body*.³ Theophylact has properly expressed the *meiosis* in *μὴ ἀσθ.* : *μὴ ἀσθενήσας τῇ πίστει, ἀλλ' ἰσχυρὰν αὐτὴν ἔχων*. By *μὴ* the *ἀσθεν.* is neg-

¹ Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 853 ; Poppo, *ad Thuc.* III. 1, p. 318 ff.

² See Döderlein, *philolog. Beitr.* p. 303 ff.

³ i.e. his own body : *which was one already*

dead. Therefore *νεκρ.* without the article. Comp. Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* iv. 6, 1 ; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 573 A.

atived from the point of view of the subject. Comp. on ver. 17. — οὐ κατενόησε] [See Note XLVII. p. 178.] *he did not fix his attention thereon.* Comp. Heb. iii. 1, x. 24 ; Luke xii. 24 ; Judith x. 14. This remark is no historical blunder inconsistent with Gen. xvii. 17 (de Wette ; comp. Rückert), but is quite in harmony with the account given in Gen. xv. 5, 6, where, immediately after the divine promise οὕτως ἔσται τὸ σπέρμα σου it is said : καὶ ἐπίστευσεν Ἀβρ. τῷ Θεῷ. This (and not what is related in Gen. xvii. 17) is the fact which Paul here exhibits in greater detail, inasmuch as he depicts the καὶ ἐπίστευσε of Gen. *l.c.*, in its strength at first negatively (in the non-consideration of bodily obstacles) and then positively. The *immediately decided* faith of Abraham in Gen. xv., to which Paul here refers, is not inconsistent with the subsequent hesitation, Gen. xvii. (the account of which, moreover, belongs to another author) ; the latter is a wavering which may easily be understood from a psychological point of view. Comp. the doubt of the Baptist as to the Messiahship of Jesus, Matt. xi. 2 ff. — νεκρωμένον and νέκρωσις conveying the idea of decrepitude with reference to the powers of procreation and of conception respectively. Comp. Heb. xi. 12 ; Kypke, II. p. 164. — ἑκατονταέτης κ.τ.λ.] *although* so advanced in years that he might naturally have regarded, etc., yet he did not do so. The *πou* is the *circiter* in *approximate statements of number* ; Herod. i. 119 ; vii. 5 ; Diog. L. viii. 86. Comp. Xen. Oec. 17, 3. Not used by Paul elsewhere. Abraham was then ninety-nine years old. See Gen. xvii. 1, 17, xxi. 5. "Post Semum nemo centum annorum generasse Gen. xi. legitur," Bengel.¹ — Observe, as to καὶ τ. νέκ., that the negation οὐ κατενόησε extends to both the objects of the sentence. Hofmann's objection to our reading,² and his declaration that instead of καὶ we should expect οἷόςδε are erroneous.³ The νέκρωσις is the *deadness* of the womb attested as having already set in at Gen. xviii. 11. Was Sarah still to become a mother ἐκ πολλῆς γαστρὸς (Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 98) ! — εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν κ.τ.λ.] [See Note XLVIII. p. 178.] The negative proposition in ver. 19 is, in the first place, still more specially *elucidated*, likewise negatively, by εἰς . . . ἀπιστία (δέ, the *exegetical autem*), and then the *positive opposite* relation is subjoined to it by ἀλλ' ἐνεδυν. κ.τ.λ. In the former negative illustrative clause the chief element giving the *information* is εἰς τ. ἐπαγγ. τ. Θεοῦ, which is therefore placed first with great emphasis : "but with regard to the promise of God he wavered not incredulously, but waxed strong in faith," etc.

¹ With regard to the children subsequently begotten with Keturah, Gen. xxv. 1 ff., the traditional explanation, already lying at the foundation of Augustine, *de Civ. D.* xvi. 28, is sufficient, viz. that the power of begetting, received from God, continued after the death of Sarah.—On ἑκατονταέτης comp. Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 503. According to the uncertain canon of the old grammarians (see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 406 f.) it ought to have been written here as an oxytone (so Lachmann) because it is the predicate of a person. Comp. Kühner, I. p. 420.

² With the reading *without* οὐ (see the crit. remarks) the thought conveyed is : *and without having been weak in faith he regarded, etc., but did not become doubtful in respect to the promise of God, etc.* Comp. Hofmann. But μὴ ἀσθ. τ. πίστ. would thus be superfluous, and even logically unsuitable in relation to ver. 20. Simply and clearly Paul would only have written : καὶ κατενόησε μὲν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σώμα κ.τ.λ. εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαγγ. κ.τ.λ.

³ See Winer, p. 460 [E. T. 493 f.] ; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 315 [E. T. 368 f.]. Comp. also Jacobs, *ad Del. epigr.* vi. 10, *not. crit.*

Since in this way the discourse runs on very simply and suitably to the sense, it is unnecessary to resort to the more awkward suggestion, that Paul already begins the antithetic statement with *δέ* (*however*, see Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 171), to which nevertheless he has again given the emphasis of contrast through the negative and positive forms (Philippi, who, however, admits our view also; comp. Tholuck and others). In no case, however, can it be said, with Rückert, that Paul wished to write *εἰς δὲ τ. ἐπαγγ. τ. Θεοῦ ἐπίστ. μηδὲν διακρινόμενος*, but that his love for antitheses induced him to divide the idea of *ἐπίστ.* into its negative and positive elements, and that therefore *εἰς* should be referred to the *ἐπίστ.* at first thought of. De Wette (comp. Krehl) conjectures that, according to the analogy of *πιστεύειν εἰς*, *εἰς* is the object of *διακρ.* It is the quite usual *in regard to, as respects*; see Winer, p. 371 [E. T. 397]. — *διακρίνεσθαι*] *To waver*, the idea being that of a mental struggle into which one enters, xiv. 23; Matt. xxi. 21; Acts x. 20; see Huther on James i. 6. This usage is so certain in the N. T., that there is no need to translate, with van Hengel: *non contradixit*, referring to Gen. xvii. 17 ff., in which case *τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ* is supposed to mean: “*quanquam in animo volvebat, quae diffidentiam inspirarent.*” Such a thought is foreign to the connection, in which everything gives prominence to *faith* only, and not to a mere resignation. — *τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ*, is *instrumental*, in the sense of the producing cause, but *τῇ πίστει*, on account of the correlation with *ἀσθεν.* *τῇ πίστει* in ver. 19, is to be taken as the dative of *more precise definition*, consequently: he wavered not *by means of the unbelief* (which in such a case he would have had), but became strong *as respects the faith* (which he had). Hofmann’s explanation is erroneous, because not in keeping with the *ἀσθεν. τ. πίστ.* above. He takes *τῇ πίστει* as causal: *by faith* Abraham was strengthened “*to an action in harmony with the promise and requisite for its realization.*” This addition, which can hardly fail to convey a very indelicate idea, is a purely gratuitous importation. — *ἐνεδυναμώθη*] *became strong*, heroic in faith; passive. Comp. Aq. Gen. vii. 20: *ἐνεδυναμώθη τό ὕδωρ*. Heb. xi. 34; Acts ix. 32; Eph. vi. 10; LXX. Ps. lii. 7: *ἐνεδυναμώθη ἐπὶ τῇ ματαιότητι αὐτοῦ*. In Greek authors the word does not occur. — *δοὺς δόξαν τῷ Θεῷ*] *while he gave God glory, and¹ was fully persuaded* (xiv. 5; Col. iv. 12) *that, etc.* The aorist participles put the *διδόναι δόξαν κ.τ.λ.* not as *preceding* the *ἐνεδυναμώθη*, or as *presupposed* in it, but as *completed simultaneously with it* (comp. on Eph. i. 5). — *διδόναι δόξαν* (דָּבַר אֱלֹהִים) *τῷ Θεῷ* denotes generally every act (thinking, speaking or doing) that tends to the glory of God (Josh. vii. 19; Jer. xiii. 16; Esr. x. 11; Luke xvii. 18; John ix. 24; Acts xii. 23); and the context supplies the special reference of its meaning. Here: by recognition of the divine omnipotence (not *circumcisione subeunda*, as van Hengel thinks), as is shown by what follows, which is added epexegetically. “*Insigne praeconium fidei est, gloriam Deo tribuere.*” Melanchthon. The opposite: 1 John v. 10. — *ἐπήγγελλται*] in a middle sense. Winer, p. 246 [E. T. 262].

¹ The evidence against *καί* is too weak. Without it *πληροφ.* would be *subordinated* to

the *δοὺς δόξ.* τ. Θεοῦ. Oecumenius has aptly remarked on *πληροφ.*: οὐκ εἶπε πιστεύσας

Ver. 22. Result of the whole disquisition, emphatically pointing back to ver. 3 (ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην). — διὰ καὶ] *on which account also* (i. 24), namely because Abraham believed so strongly as is described in vv. 18–21. — The *subject* of ἐλογίσθη (*it was reckoned*) is self-evident, viz. the *believing*. Comp. Nägelsbach, *zur Ilias*, p. 60, ed. 3.

Vv. 23–25. Relation of the Scripture testimony as to Abraham's justification to the justification of Christians by faith; with which the proof for the νόμον ἱστώμεν διὰ τῆς πίστεως (iii. 31) is completed. — δι' αὐτόν] *on his account*, in order to set forth the mode of *his* justification. Then, corresponding thereto : δι' ἡμᾶς. Comp. Beresch R. 40, 8 : "Quicquid scriptum est de Abrahamo, scriptum est de filiis ejus." On the idea generally comp. xiv. 4 ; 1 Cor. ix. 10, x. 6, 11 ; Gal. iii. 8. — μέλλει λογιζεσθαι] namely the πιστεύειν, which, in accordance with the divine ordination, is to be reckoned to us Christians (μέλλει),—to us, as those who believe on Him that raised up Jesus. μέλλει (comp. on viii. 13) is therefore not to be taken for ἐμέλλε, (Böhme, comp. Olshausen), but contains what God has willed, which shall accomplish itself *continuously* as to *each* concrete case (not for the first time at the judgment, as Fritzsche thinks) where Christ is believed on. The ἡμεῖς, i.e. the community of believers (not however conceived as *becoming* such, as Hofmann supposes), are the constant recipients of the fulfilment of that which was once written not merely for Abraham's sake but also for theirs. — τοῖς πιστεύουσιν] not : who from time to time *become believing* (Hofmann), which is not consistent with ἡμᾶς, but : quippe *qui credunt*. The ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγεῖραντα κ.τ.λ. that is added then points out the *specific contents*, which is implied in the μέλλει λογιζεσθαι, for the πιστεύειν that has not yet been more precisely defined. In and with this faith we have constantly the blessing of the λογιζεσθαι divinely annexed to it. Comp. viii. 1. And the ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγεῖραντα κ.τ.λ. (comp. x. 9) is *purposely chosen* to express the character of the faith, partly on account of the necessary analogy with ver. 17,¹ and partly because the divine omnipotence, which raised up Jesus, was at the same time the strongest proof of divine grace (ver. 25). Regarding ἐπί, comp. on ver. 5. — παρεδόθη] standing designation for the divine surrender of Christ, surrender *unto death* (viii. 32), perhaps after Is. liii. 12. It is at the same time *self-surrender* (Gal. ii. 20 ; Eph. v. 2), since Christ was obedient to his Father. — διὰ τὰ παραπτ. ἡμῶν] *on account of our sins*, namely, that they might be atoned for by the ἰλαστήριον of Jesus, iii. 24 f., v. 8 f. — διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν] *on account of our justification*, in order to accomplish on us the judicial act of transference into the relation of δικαιοσύνη. Comp. v. 18. For this object God raised Jesus from the dead ;² for the resurrection of

ἀλλ' ἐμφατικώτερον. It corresponds with the *full victory* of the trial of the patriarch's faith at the close of its delineation.

¹ But in point of fact to "believe on Christ" and to "believe on God who raised Christ," are identical, because in both cases Christ is the *specific object*.

² Compare Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 329. For the view which the older Reformed theologians

(comp. also Gerhard in Calovius) took of the state of the case as an *acquittal from our sins*, which was accorded to Christ and to us with Him through His resurrection, see Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, I. p. 283 f. According to Beza, Christ could not have furnished the atonement of our sins, if He had not, as the risen victor, vanquished death. But the case is rather

the sacrificed One was required to produce in men *the faith*, through which alone the objective fact of the atoning offering of Jesus could have the effect of *δικαίωσις* *subjectively*, because Christ is the *ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως*, iii. 25. *Without* His resurrection therefore the atoning work of His death would have remained without subjective appropriation; His surrender *διὰ τὰ παραπτ. ἡμῶν* would not have attained its end, our justification. Comp. especially 1 Cor. xv. 17; 2 Cor. v. 20 f., xv.; 1 Pet. i. 21. Moreover the two definitions by *διὰ* are not two *different* things, but only the two aspects of *the same* exhibition of grace, the negative and the positive; of which, however, the former by means of the parallelism, in which both are put in juxtaposition, is aptly attributed to the death as the *objective ἱλαστήριον*, and the latter to the resurrection, as the divine act that is the means of its *appropriation*.¹ Melancthon has well said: "Quamquam enim *præcessit* meritum, tamen *ita ordinatum* fuit ab initio, ut tunc singulis *applicaretur* cum fide acciperent." The latter was to be effected by the *resurrection* of Jesus; the *meritum* lay in His *death*, but the *raising Him up* took place for the *δικαίωσις*, in which His *meritum* was to be realized in the faithful. Comp. viii. 34. Against the Catholic theologians, who referred *δικ.* to *sanctification* (as Maier, Bisping, Döllinger, and Reithmayr still do), see Calovius. Nor is *intercession* even (viii. 34) to be introduced into *διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν* (Calvin and others; also Tholuck and Philippi), since that does not take place to produce the *δικαιοσύνη*, but has reference to those who are already justified, with a view to *preserve* them in the state of salvation; consequently the *δικαίωσις* of the subjects concerned *precedes* it.

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

XXXVI. Ver. 1. *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν εὐρηκεῖν Ἀβραὰμ κατὰ σάρκα;*

It seems better to regard this question as involving an objection or difficulty anticipated by the Apostle as arising from the other side. If the doctrine of faith establishes the law in its truest meaning and follows out the line of the O. T., it was natural to ask from the Judaistic standpoint, What can we hold that Abraham gained according to the flesh, *i.e.* in the sphere to which works belong? To this question, as taken up into the Apostle's discourse and presented in his own language, the answer is, Nothing—nothing, that is, in respect to the great matter under consideration. The question implies this answer, and the following verses confirm it. Weiss ed. Mey., indeed, declares this to be an arbitrary assumption, and maintains that a question involving such a negative

conceived as the converse: Christ could not have risen, if His death had not expiated our sins. In this way Christ has not merely died *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, but has also been raised again (2 Cor. v. 15); without His saving power, however, having been in itself conditioned only by the resurrection (to which, in the main, the views of Öttinger and Menken ultimately come).

¹ The reference to the fellowship with the

death of Christ, whereby believers have died to their former life, and with His resurrection as an entrance into a new state of life no longer conditioned by the flesh (see Rich. Schmidt, *Paulin. Christol.* p. 74), is inadmissible; because it does not correspond to the prototype of Abraham, which determines the entire representation of justification in this chapter.

could not be derived from iii. 31, because in that verse there is no indication of anything calling for it. But is an assumption arbitrary which enables us to connect with this verse the following context in a natural and a simple way, and saves the necessity of giving to γάρ, as Weiss does, the sense (very uncommon, if ever found in the N. T. in such sentences) of *namely*, or *indeed*? And as for iii. 31, there was surely, to the Jewish mind, if not to the mind of the modern commentator, a suggestion in the claim of that verse of a depreciation of the glory of Abraham, and just such a suggestion as might call for and occasion the entire course of reasoning which fills this fourth chapter.

XXXVII. Ver. 1. κατὰ σάρκα.

The words κατὰ σάρκα, whether we read εὐηκέναι after ἡμῶν, with T. R. Meyer, Godet, etc., or after ἐροῦμεν, with Tisch., Weiss, etc., are probably to be connected with that verb (so Meyer, Weiss). The question considered in the next verses is, not whether he gained anything, but whether he gained anything κατὰ σάρκα. R. V. text makes *according to the flesh* qualify *forefather*. A. R. V. joins the phrase with the verb. The text of Westcott and Hort omits εὐηκέναι altogether, with B and 47. The meaning, then, is, What shall we say of Abraham our forefather according to the flesh? This text is recognized in R. V. marg.

XXXVIII. Ver. 2. εἰ γάρ Ἀβραὰμ κ.τ.λ.

After all the discussion of this verse, and the various attempts made to explain it, the view of Calvin, Hodge, etc. seems to be the most satisfactory that can be offered. The only serious objection to it is that which Meyer suggests—that the words πρὸς θεόν occur only after ἀλλ' οὐ, instead of being inserted after ἔχει καύχημα of the preceding clause. But when we consider that, if this view be adopted, we have a simple and complete proof of the negative answer which is suggested by ver. 1; that we have the O. T. argument for the Pauline doctrine introduced, in a most natural way, as starting from the question of that verse; and that the writer may have placed the words πρὸς θεόν where they are, because the following verses were to direct attention to God's accounting of faith as righteousness,—while they would easily be carried back by the reader's mind to the previous clause also, inasmuch as glorying before God is manifestly in the line of thought,—this objection loses much of its force, and must be regarded as overbalanced by the other considerations.

XXXIX. Ver. 3. ἐλογίσθη εἰς δικαιοσύνην.

The meaning of the phrase ἐλογίσθη εἰς δικαιοσύνην is rendered clear, (a) by the passages in which Paul uses this verb (with εἰς) with reference to other subjects than the one here under consideration, Rom. ii. 26, ix. 8 (cf. Acts xix. 27); (b) by the passages in which he uses the same verb with ὡς, Rom. viii. 36; 1 Cor. iv. 1. (cf. Rom. vi. 11, a kindred passage, although ὡς is omitted); (c) by the passages in which the verb occurs, with either of the two prepositions, in the LXX. (εἰς, 1 Kings i. 13; Job xli. 23; Ps. cv. 31; Isa. xxix. 17; xxxii. 15; xl. 17; Lam. iv. 2; Hos. viii. 12—ὡς, Gen. xxxi. 15; Job xli. 20; Ps. xliii. 22; Isa. v. 28, xxix. 16, xl. 15; Dan. iv. 32; Amos vi. 5); (d) by kindred passages in the Apoc. books (with εἰς, Wisdom of Sol. ii. 16, ix. 6; 1 Macc. ii. 52—with ὡς, Eccl. xxix. 6). The comparison of these passages

proves, beyond reasonable doubt, that the phrases *ἐλογίσθη εἰς* and *ἐλ. ὡς* are substantially equivalent to each other. They differ only as our expressions : to count a person *for* a wise man, and to count him *as* a wise man. To urge, as some have done, that *εἰς σωτηρίαν, εἰς μετάνοιαν*, etc., sometimes, in other connections, mean, *that they might be saved*, etc., has no force. We have here a peculiar phrase, used by many of the Scripture writers. They all employ it with a single and definite meaning. They never, when using it, give the telic sense to the preposition. If they do not give it this sense, where there is no reference to the case of Abraham, the conclusion is irresistible that they do not where there is such a reference. When Abraham believed, therefore—such is the Apostle's statement—his faith was reckoned to him by God for, *i.e.* as if it were, actual righteousness. Faith is not actual righteousness, but, in view of the provision made by the grace of God for the forgiveness of sins, it is accounted as if it were : compare ii. 26, where the uncircumcision of the Gentile, in the supposed case, is reckoned as circumcision, though actually it is not circumcision. Faith, in the Christian system, is thus accepted of God in the place of the perfect righteousness which, on the legal method, was required for justification ; and the man who believes is declared right before the Divine tribunal—all obstacles on the governmental side having been removed by the sacrifice of Christ (cf. iii. 24–26). It may be noticed, also, that in no passage in Paul's writings, or in other parts of the N. T. where *λογίζεσθαι εἰς*, or the verb alone, is used, is there a declaration that anything belonging to one person is imputed, accounted, or reckoned to another (the use of the kindred verb *ἐλλόγα* (Philem. 18) constituting no proper exception), or a formal statement that Christ's righteousness is imputed to believers. It is the believer's own faith—as it was in the case of Abraham—which is reckoned to him.

XL. Ver. 5. *λογίζεται—εἰς δικαιοσύνην.*

The parallelism of vv. 4 and 5 would call for the words *οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ ὄφελος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ χάριν* at the end of verse 5, instead of those which are found there. The substitution of these latter words is easily accounted for as arising from the inserted *πιστεύοντι κ.τ.λ.*, and also as designed to meet the thought of the following verse ; and even more easily, on account of the fact that the substituted words carry with them, also, the idea of those whose place they fill.

XLI. Ver. 9. *ὁ μακαρισμὸς οὗν οὗτος κ.τ.λ.*

The question suggested here is the one which naturally follows after the preceding context. If justification is shown in the O. T. to be by faith, because Abraham was thus justified, how far does it extend? Is it limited to the circumcision, or does it reach out to the uncircumcision also? The question is suitably put in this form, because Abraham was, in the course of his life, in both conditions ; and it can be readily answered by noticing the fact, that he is spoken of in the history as having had his faith accounted to him for righteousness while he was yet uncircumcised.

In the manner of introducing the question of this verse, a peculiarity of Paul's style may be observed. The allusion to David is not for the purpose of bringing forward a second example, but only (as Meyer also says) to give a confirmation from David's words of what is established by the single example

of Abraham. This passage concerning David's macarism, therefore, is parenthetical as related to the main line of thought. But here, as in other places in his epistles, when the Apostle returns, at the end of the parenthesis, to the direct course of the argument, he remains, in his phraseology, under the influence of what he has just before been saying. A striking instance of this may be seen in v. 18, 19, comp. with v. 15-17. Here it may be noticed in the words *μακαρισμὸς οὖν οὗτος*.

XLII. Ver. 11. *εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πατέρα, κ.τ.λ.*

In vv. 11, 12 we find a correspondence with Gal. iii. 7. The grammatical connection with the immediately preceding context is different, indeed, in the two passages, and consequently the presentation of the thought in its details is also different. But the central point in relation to the reasoning is the same. In both cases we have—in substance here, and formally in Gal.—the conclusion which follows from the fact that Abraham was justified by faith. If he received his justification by this means, all believers (whether Gentiles or Jews) may likewise receive it. In Gal. this thought is expressed by saying that those who have faith (and they only) are sons of Abraham; in these verses, by saying, that Abraham is the father of all who have faith.

XLIII. Ver. 12. *ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσιν.*

Westcott and Hort suppose *τοῖς* to be a "primitive error [the original reading not having been rightly preserved in any existing document] for *αὐτοῖς*." Alford says, "The inversion of the article appears to be in order to bring out more markedly" the two ideas—"who are not only *οἱ ἐκ περιτ.*, but also *οἱ στοιχ.*" Shedd, with a similar thought apparently, regards the second article as employed for the purpose of more emphatically calling attention to the added characteristic. Godet considers the first *τοῖς* as a pronoun, but the second as a simple definite article: "*those who* are not only of the circumcision, but, at the same time, *the* (individuals) walking, etc." Weiss ed. Mey. suggests that the true explanation may be in the fact, that here also, as in ver. 11, the essential condition to a sharing in what Abraham had is a similar faith to his—to those who are not only circumcised, but—also in this case, only to those who walk, etc. Philippi says, "It is to be borne in mind that negligences of expression occur in the most practised and correct writers." Gifford supposes that the Apostle himself, or his amanuensis, or one of the earliest transcribers of the Epistle, inserted a superfluous article. The explanation of Godet appears fanciful, and is contrary to all the probabilities of the case. That of Weiss involves, to say the least, a very unusual form of expressing the supposed idea. That of Alford and Shedd assumes an emphasis which can hardly be proved to inhere in the repeated article. The Greeks did not, apparently, adopt this course to secure emphasis, and it is doubtful whether any such design on the part of the writer would have been suggested to the reader's mind by the repetition. The textual conjecture of Dr. Hort (W. & H.) may be an ingenious one, but has no external support. It seems better to hold, with Meyer, de Wette, etc., that the article is erroneously repeated, or, as Winer and Philippi say, that there is here an instance of negligence of style. The irregularity may, very probably, be explained in connection with the fact that Paul was not writing, but dictating.

XLIV. Ver. 13. οὐ γὰρ διὰ νόμον ἡ ἐπαγγελία κ.τ.λ.

At ver. 13 the thought—although, here again, the grammatical connection and the manner of introducing the new point are different—turns to what in the Epistle to the Galatians is presented in iii. 8-10. The O. T. proof for justification by faith, as founded on the case of Abraham, rests not only upon the fact that he was justified in this way, but also upon the peculiarity of the promise which was given to him. The argument in Galatians is this : The promise was a promise of blessing ; those who are of the law are under a curse, and hence cannot be sharers in the blessing ; consequently the men who receive the fulfilment of the promise must be believers, and only believers. In the passage before us, it is changed somewhat by reason of the exigencies of the context, but, in substance, it is the same. The promise is here described in its relation to Abraham—that he should be heir of the world ; in Galatians, in its relation to his believing successors—that all the nations should be blessed in him. Of this promise it is said that it did not come to Abraham through the law, but through faith, and the proof presented is (like that in Galatians), that the law works toward a result opposite to the one indicated in the promise—namely, toward wrath, and not blessing. The experience of the fulfilment of the promise, therefore, could not be secured to any—much less to all the true seed of Abraham (both Jews and Gentiles), if it were attainable only through the law. On the other hand, it is and can be made sure only through faith.

XLV. Ver. 13. διὰ νόμον.

That νόμος, in vv. 13, 14, means the Mosaic law is evidenced, (a) by the fact that, when the Apostle presents in ver. 15 the proof of the statement which he makes respecting νόμος in ver. 14, he uses the words ὁ νόμος. In order to the completeness of this proof, the two expressions must refer to the same thing ; (b) by the parallelism, in its main thought, of this passage with Gal. iii. 8-10. The proof there offered (ver. 10) requires the same correspondence between the two which is demanded here ; (c) by the contrast, in the verses which immediately follow, both here and in Galatians, between faith and the law—where the reference is clearly to the law of Moses ; (d) by the fact that in Gal. iii. 18—where a similar statement is found to that of ver. 14 here, and νόμον is used—the preceding verse to which this statement is subordinate has ὁ νόμος, and is in the midst of a surrounding context which deals especially with the position and effect of that particular law which the Jews knew. Meyer holds that νόμος of the last clause of ver. 15 also means the Mosaic law—where the law is not, etc.—and this is very probably, though not certainly, the true explanation. If, however, this be not the meaning, the peculiar form of expression—with the negative—must be regarded as indicating the more universal sense, where there is no law.

XLVI. Ver. 15. οὐδὲ παράβασις.

παράβασις, παραβάτης, and παραβαίω, refer to that particular sort of sin or wrong which consists in transgression of positive or revealed or written law. The use of the first of these words here, therefore, shows that Paul certainly did not mean by νόμος of this verse any law whatever, whether revealed law or the law of nature. This view of the meaning has been held by some writers, but

is quite indefensible. "Transgression," in the Pauline language, always presupposes the existence of revealed or positive law. The evidence respecting the use of these words may be seen by examining the passages in which they occur: παραβαίνω, Matt. xv. 2, 3; Acts i. 25; 2 John 9 (T. R.); παραβάτης, Rom. ii. 25, 27; Gal. ii. 18; James ii. 9, 11; παράβασις, Rom. ii. 23, iv. 15, v. 14; Gal. iii. 19; 1 Tim. ii. 14; Heb. ii. 2, ix. 15.

XLVII. Ver. 19. οὐ κατενόησεν.

In opposition to the view of Meyer, who adopts οὐ, T. R. (see his critical remarks at the beginning of the chapter), W. & H., Tisch., Treg., Weiss, Godet, and others, omit it. Weiss ed. Mey. claims that Meyer's explanation of the negative μή before ἀσθενήσας, as being from the point of view of the subject, is to be rejected because Abraham cannot be regarded as reflecting on the character of his faith, and that a rhetorical meiosis, such as is supposed by Mey., Philippi, and others (following Theophylact), would certainly have been expressed with οὐκ. The μή, he thinks, can only deny such an ἀσθενεῖν as apparently would be necessarily united with κατενόησεν; and hence he holds that the οὐ before the last mentioned verb cannot have been in the original text. As against Meyer's view respecting μή Weiss seems to be correct, but it is doubtful whether his own positive position can be maintained. Can we not, with Winer, p. 486, account for μή (if we read οὐ κατενόησεν), as introducing a supposition or conception which is to be denied? Philippi claims, on the other hand, that the οὐ cannot be dispensed with, because the subjoined δέ (ver. 20) would, in that case, have required the insertion of μέν after κατενόησεν. Buttm. (p. 356), however, shows that while μέν would be demanded in a classical writer, there is more looseness of usage in the case of Paul and the other N. T. authors. The attempt to determine on absolute grounds that the one or the other reading must, of necessity, be adopted seems to be vain, and the question must be decided according to the probabilities of the case, both external and internal. The external evidence undoubtedly favors the omission of οὐ. The internal argument is more evenly balanced, but the connection with ver. 18, in which Abraham is represented as resting his belief upon hope in God, where there seemed to be no ground for hope on the human side, and the fact that Gen. xvii. 17 is the passage in the O. T. narrative to which the language of the verse is most nearly conformed, may be regarded as, on the whole, confirming the evidence of the oldest mss. If οὐ is omitted, μή ἀσθενήσας may be translated, with R. V. and Weiss, *without being weakened* [or *weak*] *in faith*, or, perhaps better, with Buttm. (cf. Godet), *not being weak*, etc.—the clause, as Godet expresses it, "controlling all that follows," as if a sort of negative cause. The former rendering is exposed, in some degree, to the objection presented by Meyer, that the clause thus becomes superfluous. He holds, however (see his note), that this is the true rendering of the text, if read without οὐ, and presents the objection as an argument against that text.

XLVIII. Ver. 20. εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν.

If οὐ is omitted before κατενόησεν, δέ is to be explained as equivalent to *on the other hand*, or *yet*; although he considered the facts which made the result promised seem impossible, he *yet* was so far from wavering through unbelief, that he was even strengthened, etc.

CHAPTER V.

Ver. 1. ἐχωμεν] Lachm. (in the margin), Scholz, Fritzsche, and Tisch. (8) read ἐχωμεν, following A B* C D K L N*, min., several vss. (including Syr. Vulg. It.) and Fathers. But this reading, though very strongly attested, yields a sense (*let us maintain peace* with God) that is here utterly unsuitable; because the writer now enters on a new and important *doctrinal topic*, and an exhortation at the very outset, especially regarding a subject not yet expressly spoken of, would at this stage be *out of place*.¹ Hence the ἐχωμεν, sufficiently attested by B** N** F G, most min., Syr. p. and some Fathers, is to be retained; and the subjunctive must be regarded as having arisen from misunderstanding, or from the hortatory *use* of the passage. — Ver. 2. τῇ πίστει] wanting in B D E F G, Aeth. It.; omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. (7), as also by Ewald. Following ver. 1, it is altogether superfluous; but this very reason accounts for its omission, which secured the direct reference of εἰς τ. χάρ. ταύτ. to προσαγ. The genuineness of τῇ πίστει is also attested by the reading ἐν τῇ πίστει (so Fritzsche) in A N** 93, and several Fathers, which points to a repetition of the final letters of ἐσχήκαμεν. — Ver. 6. After ἀσθενῶν preponderating witnesses have ἔτι, which Griesb. Lachm. and Tisch. (8) have adopted. A misplacement of the ἔτι before γάρ, because it was construed with ἀσθενῶν, along with which it came to be written. Thus ἔτι came in twice, and the first was either mechanically allowed to remain (A C D* N), or there was substituted for it εἰγε (B), or εἰς τί (F G), or εἰ γάρ. The misplacement of the ἔτι came to predominate, because a Church-lesson began with Χριστός. — Ver. 8. ὁ Θεός, which a considerable number of witnesses have before εἰς ἡμᾶς (so Tisch. 7) is wanting in B. But as the love of *Christ*, not that of God, appeared from ver. 7 to be the subject of the discourse, ὁ Θεός was omitted. — Ver. 11. καυχώμενοι] F G read καυχῶμεν; L, min., and several Fathers καυχώμεθα. Also Vulg. It. Arm. Slav. express *gloriamur*. An erroneous interpretation. See the exegetical remarks. — Ver. 12. The second ὁ θάνατος is wanting in D E F G 62, It. Syr. p. Aeth. and most Fathers, also Aug. In Syr. with an asterisk; Arm. Chrys. Theodoret place it after διήλθεν. Tisch. (7) had omitted it. But as the word has preponderant testimony in its favour, and as in order to the definiteness of the otherwise very definitely expressed sentence it cannot be dispensed with, if in both halves of ver. 12 the relation of *sin* and *death* is, as is manifestly the design, to be expressly put forward, ὁ θάνατος, omitted by Tisch., must be defended. Its omission may have arisen from its apparent superfluity, or from the similarity between the final syllables of ἀνθρώπου and θάνατος. — Ver. 14. μή] is wanting in 62, 63, 67**, Or. and others, codd. in Ruf. and Aug., and is declared by Ambrosiaster

¹ This even, in opposition to the opinion of Tisch. (8), that on account of the weighty testimony in its favour ἐχωμεν cannot be rejected, "*nisi prorsus ineptum sit; ineptum*

vero non videtur." Hofmann also has not been able suitably to explain the ἐχωμεν which he defends. See the exegetical remarks.

to be an interpolation. But it is certified partly by decisive testimony in its favour; partly by the undoubted genuineness of the *καί*; and partly because the *μή* apparently contradicts the erroneously understood *ἐφ' ᾧ* (*in quo*) πάντες ἡμῶν in ver. 12. See Reiche, *Commentar. crit.* I, p. 39 ff. — Ver. 16. ἀμαρτήσαντος] D E F G, 26, 80, and several vss. and Fathers read ἀμαρτήματος, which Griesb. recommended. A gloss occasioned by the antithesis ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων. — Ver. 17. τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι] So also Lachm. and Tisch. (8) following B C K L P 8, vss., and Fathers. But A F G read ἐν ἐνὶ παραπτ., D E ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ παραπτ. 47, Or. ἐν ἐνὸς παραπτ. The original reading was most probably the simplest, ἐν ἐνὶ παραπτ., which, though not most strongly, is nevertheless sufficiently attested (also recommended by Griesb. and adopted by Tisch. (7), because from it the rise of the other variations can be very naturally explained. By way of more specific indication in some cases, the article was added (D E), in others ἐνὶ was changed into ἐνός (47, Or.). But, seeing that in any case the sense was quite the same as in the τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτ. read in ver. 15, this was at first written alongside as a parallel, and then taken into the text.

CONTENTS.—Paul has hitherto described the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως in respect of its necessity (i. 18–iii. 21); of its nature (iii. 21–30); and of its relation to the law (iii. 31–iv. 25). *He now discusses the blessed assurance of salvation secured for the present and the future to the δικαιωθέντες ἐκ πίστεως* (ver. 1–11); and then—in order clearly to exhibit the greatness and certainty of salvation in Christ, more especially in its *divine world-wide* significance as the blissful epoch-forming counterpart of the *Adamite* ruin—he presents us with a detailed parallel between this salvation and the misery which once came through Adam (vv. 12–19), and was necessarily augmented through the law (vv. 20, 21).

Ver. 1.¹ Οὖν draws an inference from the whole of the preceding section, iii. 21–iv. 25, and develops the argument in such a form that δικαιωθέντες, following at once on διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμ., heads the sentence with triumphant emphasis. What a *blessed assurance of salvation* is enjoyed by believers in virtue of their justification which has taken place through faith, is now to be more particularly set forth; not however in the form of an *exhortation* (Hofmann, in accordance with the reading ἐχωμεν) “to let our relation to God be one of peace” (through a *life of faith*), in which case the emphasis, that obviously rests in the first instance on δικαιοθ. and then on εἰρήνην, is taken to lie on διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμ. ’Ι. Χ. — εἰρήνην ἐχ. π. τ. Θεόν] [See Note XLIX. p. 220.] He who is justified is no longer in the position of one to whom God must be and is hostile (ἐχθρὸς Θεοῦ, ver. 9 f.), but on the contrary he has *peace* (not in a general sense *contentment*, satisfaction, as Th. Schott thinks) in his relation to God. This is the *peace* which consists in the known objective state of reconciliation, the opposite of the state in which one is subject to the divine *wrath* and the *sensus irae*. With justification this peace ensues as its immediate and abiding result.² Hence δικαιωθέντες . . . ἐχωμεν (comp. Acts ix. 31; John xvi. 33). And through Christ (διὰ

¹ On vv. 1–8 see Winzer, *Commentat. Lips.* 1832. On the entire chapter Stöltzing, *Beiträge z. Exegese d. Paul. Briefe*, Göttingen,

1869, p. 3 ff.

² Comp. Dörner, *die Rechtfert. durch den Glauben*, p. 12 f.

τοῦ κυρίου κ.τ.λ.) as the *εἰρηνοποιός* is this *pacem obtinere* (Bremi, *ad Isocr. Archid.* p. 111) procured; a truth obvious indeed in itself, but which, in consonance with the strength and fulness of the Apostle's own believing experience, is very naturally again brought into special prominence here, in order to connect, as it were, triumphantly with this objective cause of the state of peace what we owe to it respecting the point in question, ver. 2. There is thus the less necessity for joining διὰ τοῦ κυρίου κ.τ.λ. with εἰρήνην (Stöltzing); it belongs, like πρὸς τ. Θεόν, in accordance with the position of ἐχομεν, to the latter word. — πρὸς (of the ethical relation, Bernhardy, p. 265), as in Acts ii. 47, xxiv. 16.¹ It is not to be confounded with the divinely wrought inward state of *mental* peace, which is denoted by εἰρήνη τοῦ Θεοῦ in Phil. iv. 7; comp. Col. iii. 15. The latter is the subjective correlate of the objective relation of the εἰρήνη, which we have πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, although inseparably combined with the latter.

Ver. 2. Δι' οὗ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] Confirmation and more precise definition of the preceding διὰ . . . Ἰησοῦ Χ. The καὶ does not merely append (Stöltzing), but is rather the "also" of *corresponding relation*, giving prominence precisely to what had here an important practical bearing *i.e.* as proving the previous διὰ κυρίου κ.τ.λ. Comp. ix. 24; 1 Cor. iv. 5; Phil. iv. 10. The *climactic* interpretation here (Köllner: "a heightened form of stating the merit of Christ;" comp. Rückert) is open to the objection that the προσαγωγή εἰς τ. χάρι. is not something added to or higher than the εἰρήνη, but, on the contrary, the *foundation* of it. If we were to take καὶ . . . καὶ in the sense "as well . . . as" (Th. Schott, Hofmann), the two sentences, which are not to be placed in special relation to iii. 23 would be made co-ordinate, although the second is the *consequence* of that which is affirmed in the first. — τὴν προσαγωγήν] the introduction,² Xen. *Cyrop.* vii. 5, 45; Thuc. i. 82, 2; Plut. *Mor.* p. 1097 E, Lucian, *Zeux.* 6; and see also on Eph. ii. 18. *Through Christ* we have had our introduction to the grace, etc., inasmuch as He Himself (comp. 1 Pet. iii. 18) in virtue of His atoning sacrifice which removes the wrath of God, has become our προσαγωγέας, or, as Chrysostom aptly expresses it, μακρὰν ὄντας προσήγαγε. In this case the preposition διὰ, which corresponds with the διὰ in ver. 1, is fully warranted, because Christ has brought us to grace in His capacity as the divinely appointed and divinely given *Mediator*. Comp. Winer, p. 354 f. [E. T. 378 f.]. — Το τ. προσαγ. ἐσχέκ. belongs εἰς τ. χάριν ταύτην; and τῇ πίστει, *by means of faith*, denotes the

¹ Comp. Herodian, viii. 7, 8: ἀντὶ πολέμου μὲν εἰρήνην ἔχοντες πρὸς θεούς. Plat. *Pol.* v. p. 465 B; εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄνδρες ἄξουσιν; Legg. xii. p. 955 B; *Alc.* I. p. 107, D; Xenoph. and others.

² Προσαγωγή ought not to be explained as *access* (Vulg. *accessum*, and so most interpreters), but as *leading towards*, the meaning which the word *always* has (even in Eph. ii. 18, iii. 12). See Xen. *l.c.*: τοὺς ἐμοὺς φίλους δεομένους προσαγωγῆς. Polybius uses it to express the bringing up of engines against a besieged town, ix. 41, 1, xiv. 10,

9; comp. i. 48, 2; the bringing up of ships to the shore, x. i. 6; the bringing of cattle into the stall, xii. 4, 10. In Herod. ii. 58 also the literal meaning is: a *leading up, carrying up* in solemn procession. Tholuck and van Hengel have rightly adopted the active meaning in this verse (comp. Weber, *vom Zorne Gottes*, p. 316); whilst Philippi, Umbreit, Ewald, Hofmann (comp. Mehring) abide by the rendering "*access*." Chrysostom aptly observes on Eph. ii. 18: οὐ γὰρ ἀφ' ἐαυτῶν προσήλθομεν, ἀλλ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προσήχθημεν.

subjective medium of τ. προσαγ. ἐσχήκαμεν. On the other hand, Occumenius, Bos, Wetstein, Michaelis, Reiche, Baumgarten-Crusius take τ. προσαγωγ. absolutely, in the sense of *access to God* (according to Reiche as a figurative mode of expressing the *beginning* of grace), and εἰς τὴν χάρ. ταύτ. as belonging to τῇ πίστει. In that case we *must* supply after προσαγ. the words πρὸς τ. Θεόν from ver. 1 (Eph. ii. 18, iii. 12); and we *may* with Bos and Michaelis explain προσαγωγή by the usage of courts, in accordance with which access to the king was obtained through a προσαγωγὴς, *sequester* (Lamprid. in *Alex. Sev.* 4). But the whole of this reading is liable to the objection that πίστις εἰς τὴν χάριν would be an expression without analogy in the N. T. — ἐσχήκαμεν] Not: *habemus* (Luther and many others), nor *nacti sumus et habemus* (most modern interpreters, including Tholuck, Rückert, Winzer, Ewald), but *habuimus*, namely, *when we became Christians*. So also de Wette, Philippi, Maier, van Hengel, Hofmann. Comp. 2 Cor. i. 9, ii. 13, vii. 5. The perfect *realizes as present* the possession formerly obtained, as in Plat. *Apol.* p. 20 D, and see Bernhardt, p. 379. — εἰς τὴν χάρ. ταύτ.] The divine grace of which the justified are partakers¹ is conceived as a *field of space*, into which they *have had* (ἐσχήκαμεν) introduction through Christ by means of faith, and in which they now *have* (ἐχομεν) peace with God. — ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν] does not refer to τῇ πίστει (Grotius), but to the nearest antecedent, τὴν χάριν, which is also accompanied by the demonstrative: *in which we stand*. The joyful consciousness of the present, that the possession of grace once entered upon is *permanent*, suggested the word to the Apostle. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 1; 1 Pet. v. 12. — καὶ καυχώμεθα] [See Note L. p. 221.] may be regarded as a continuation either of the last relative sentence (ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκ., so van Hengel, Ewald, Mehring, Stölting), or of the previous one (ὅτι οὐ καὶ κ.τ.λ.), or of the principal sentence (εἰρήν. ἐχομεν). The last alone is suggested by the context, because, as ver. 3 shows, a new and independent element in the description of the blessed condition is introduced with καὶ καυχώμεθα. — καυχᾶσθαι expresses not merely the idea of *rejoicing*, not merely “the inward elevating *consciousness*, to which outward expression is not forbidden” (Reiche), but rather the actual *glorying*, by which we praise ourselves as privileged (“what the heart is full of, the mouth will utter”). Such is its meaning in all cases. — On ἐπὶ, *on the ground of*, i.e. *over*, joined with καυχ., comp. Ps. xlviii. 6; Prov. xxv. 14; Wisd. xvii. 7; Eccus. xxx. 2. No further example of this use is found in the N. T.² It is therefore unnecessary to isolate καυχώμεθα, so as to make ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι independent of it (iv. 18; so van Hengel). Comp. on the contrary, the σμύνεσθαι ἐπὶ τινι frequent in Greek authors. The variation of the prepositions, ἐπὶ and in ver. 3 ἐν, is

¹ For to nothing else than the grace experienced in *justification* can εἰς τ. χάρ. τ. be referred in accordance with the context (δικαιωθέντες)—not to the *blessings of Christianity generally* (Chrysostom and others, including Flatt and Winzer; comp. Rückert and Köllner); not to the *Gospel* (Fritzsche); and not to the *εἰρήν* (Mehring, Stölting), which would yield a tame tautol-

ogy.—The demonstrative ταύτην implies something of triumph. Compare Photius. The joyful consciousness of the Apostle is still full of the high blessing of grace, which he has just expressed in the terms δικαιωσις and δικαιωθέντες.

² But see Lycurgus in Beck. *Anecd.* 275, 4; Diod. S. xvi. 70; and Kühner, II. 1, p. 436.

not to be imputed to any set purpose ; comp. on iii. 20 ; iii. 25 f. *al.* — The *δόξα τ. Θεοῦ* is the glory of God, in which the members of the Messiah's kingdom shall hereafter participate. Comp. 1 Thess. ii. 12 ; John xvii. 22, also viii. 17 ; Rev. xxi. 11 ; 1 John iii. 2 ; and see Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 376. The reading of the Vulg. : *gloriae filiorum Dei*, is a gloss that hits the right sense. Reiche and Maier, following Luther and Grotius, take the genitive as a *genit. auctoris*. But that God is the giver of the *δόξα*, is self-evident and does not *distinctively* characterize it. Rückert urges here also his exposition of iii. 23 ; comp. Ewald. But see on that passage. Flatt takes it as the *approval of God* (iii. 23), but the *ἐλπίδι*, pointing solely to the glorious future, is decisive against this view. It is aptly explained by Melanchthon : “ quod Deus sit nos gloria sua aeterna ornaturus, i.e. vita aeterna et communicatione sui ipsius.”

V. 3, 4.¹ Οὐ μόνον δέ] scil. *καυχώμεθα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τ. Θεοῦ.*² — ἐν ταῖς θλίψ.] *of the tribulations* (affecting us), as commonly in the N. T. ἐν is connected with *καυχᾶσθαι* (ver. 11 ; 2 Cor. x. 15 ; Gal. vi. 13). Comp. Senec. *de prov.* iv. 4 : “gaudent magni viri rebus adversis non aliter quam fortes milites bellis triumphant.” As to the ground of this *Christian καύχησις*, see the sequel. On the *thing* itself, in which the believer's victory over the world makes itself apparent (viii. 35 ff.), comp. 2 Cor. xi. 30, xii. 9 ; Matt. v. 10, 12 ; Acts v. 41 ; 1 Pet. iv. 12 f. Observe further, how with the joyful assurance of ample experience the triumphant discourse proceeds from the *ἐλπίς τῆς δόξης*, as subject-matter of the *καυχᾶσθαι*, to the direct *opposite* (ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσιν), which may be likewise matter of glorying. Others (Glöckler, Baumgarten-Crusius, Stölting) erroneously render ἐν as *in*, which the contrast, requiring the *object*, does not permit, since ἐν τ. θλ. is not opposed to the ἐν ᾗ in ver. 2. — *ὑπομονήν*] *endurance*,³ namely, in the Christian faith and life. Comp. ii. 7 ; Matt. x. 22, xxiv. 13. Paul lays down the ἡ θλίψις ὑπομ. *κατεργάζ. unconditionally*, because he is speaking of those who have been justified ἐκ πίστεως, in whose case the reverse cannot take place without sacrifice of their faith. — *δοκιμήν*] *triedness*, 2 Cor. ii. 9, viii. 2, ix. 13 ; Phil. ii. 22, “quae ostendit fidem non esse simulatam, sed veram, vivam et ardentem,” Melanchthon. *Triedness* is *produced* through endurance (not *maile known*, as Reiche thinks) ; for whosoever does not endure thereby becomes ἀδόκιμος. There is here no inconsistency with James i. 3. See Huther. — *ἐλπίδα*] namely, *τῆς δόξης τ. Θεοῦ*, as is self-evident after ver. 2. The hope, it is true, already exists before the *δοκιμή* ; nevertheless, the more the Christian has become *tried*, the *more* also will hope (which the ἀδόκιμος loses) con-

¹ See a climax of description, similar in point of form in the Tractat. פתח 9, 15 (see Surenh. III. 309) : “Providentia parit alacritatem, alacritas, innocentiam, innocentia puritatem, puritas abstinentiam, abstinentia sanctitatem, sanctitas modestiam, modestia timorem, timor sceleris pietatem, pietas spiritum sanctum, et spiritus sanctus resurrectionem mortuorum.” In contrast with this, how fervent, succinct,

and full of life is the climax in our passage ! For other chains of climactic succession, see viii. 29 ff., x. 14 ff. ; 2 Pet. i. 5 ff.

² Examples of the usage (ver. 11, viii. 23, ix. 10 ; 2 Cor. viii. 19) may be seen in Kypke, II. p. 165 ; Vigerus, ed. *Herm.* p. 543 ; Heind. and Stallb. *ad Phaed.* p. 107 B. Comp. *Legg.* vi. p. 752 A ; *Men.* p. 71 B.

³ “In ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio,” Cic. *de inv.* li. 54.

sciously possess him. Comp. James i. 12. Hope is therefore present, and yet without is *produced* by the emergence of the *locus*, just as faith may be present, and yet be still further produced through something emerging (John ii. 11).¹ — Observe further, how widely removed from all fanatical pride in suffering is the reason assigned with conscious clearness for the Christian *asyrtos* *τοῦ τοῦ θανάτου* in our passage. In it the *σῶμα* is uniformly meant and designated as the highest subjective *blessing* of the justified person, who is assured of the glorious consummation (not in ver. 3 f. as *condict* and only in ver. 2 as *blessing*, as Hofmann thinks).²

Ver. 5. "H is *ἐλπίς* not, "the hope thus established" (Oecumenius, Olshausen, Stöltzing), but, in accordance with the analogy of the preceding elements, and without any excluding limitation, the hope of glory, as such, consequently the Christian hope. This deceives no one who has it. It is self-evident, and the proof that follows gives information as to the fact, that this is uttered in the consciousness and out of the inward assurance of real living justification by faith.³ — *ἡ ἀσφαλισμένη ἐλπίς* not *ἐλπίς*, i. e. "habet certissimum salutis of the thing hoped for *exitum*," Calvin, as will be shown at the judgment. "Spe erit res," Bengel. "Comp. ix. 33; Eccus. ii. 10; Bar. vi. 39; Ps. xvii. 6. Comp. also Plat. *Quæ*. p. 183 E, *ἐλπίς καὶ ἀσφαλισμένη ἐλπίς*, *Phil.* p. 268 D; Dem. 314. 9. The expression of triumphant certainty in the present is not to be removed by changing it into the *future*. Hofmann, who would read *ἐλπίς* *ἐλπίς*. — *ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος*. The divine love, 'effectually present in the heart through the Holy Spirit, is to the Christian consciousness of faith the sure pledge that we do not hope in vain and so as to be put to shame at last, but that God will on the contrary fulfil our hope. Θεοῦ is the genitive of the subject: *the love of God to us* (so most expositors following Origen, Chrysostom, and Luther), not of the object: *love to God* (Theodoret, Augustine, Anselm, and others; including Klee, Glöckler, Umbreit, Hofmann, Stöltzing), which appears from ver. 8, as incorrect.⁴ Comp. viii. 39; 2 Cor. xiii. 13. As respects the justified, the wrath of God has given place to His *love*, which has its presence in them through the Spirit, its dwelling and sphere of action in believing hearts: and thus it is to them, like the Spirit Himself, *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλπίς* of the hoped-for *δόξα*, 2 Cor. i. 22. v. 5. — *ἐκκένανται*] Figure for abundant, living effective communication (Acts ii. 17, x. 45). The idea of *abundance* is already implied in the sensuous image of outpouring, but may also, as in Tit. iii. 6, be specially expressed.⁵ — *ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις*] denotes, in accordance with the expression of the completed fact, the being spread abroad *in the heart* (*motus in loco*). Comp. LXX. Ps. xlv. 2. — *διὰ πνεύματος καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου*.] Through the agency of the Spirit bestowed on us,

¹ Comp. Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.*, p. 207 f.

² Comp. the *ἡδὲ ἐλπίς*, which *ἀεὶ πάρεστι*, in contrast to the *ἐν μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος* in Plato, *Rep.* p. 331 A.

³ Comp. Disterdieck in the *Jahrb. f. D. Th.* 1870, p. 668 ff.

⁴ As is well said by Calovius: "quæ charitas effusa in nobis non qua *inhabitionem*

subjectivam, sed qua *manifestationem* et qua *effectum* vel *sensum* ejusdem in cordibus nostris effusum." Comp. Melancthon (against Osiander).

⁵ Among Catholics this explanation of *active* love was favoured by the doctrine of the *justitia infusa*.

⁶ Comp. generally Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 1075.

who is the principle of the real self-communication of God, the divine love is also poured out in our hearts ; see viii. 15, 16 ; Gal. iv. 6.

Ver. 6. Objective actual proof of this ἀγάπη τ. Θεοῦ, which through the Spirit fills our heart. Comp. as to the argument viii. 39. “*For Christ, when we were yet weak, at the right time died for the ungodly.*” — ἐτι] can in no case belong to ἀπέθανε (Stölting), but neither does it give occasion for any conjecture (Fritzsche : ἡ τι). Paul should perhaps have written : ἐτι γὰρ ὄντων ἡμ. ἀσθενῶν Χριστὸς κ.τ.λ., or : Χριστὸς γὰρ ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν ἐτι κ.τ.λ. (hence the second ἐτι in Lachmann) ; but amidst the collision of emphasis between ἐτι and the subject both present to his mind, he has expressed himself inexactly, so that now ἐτι seems to belong to Χριστὸς, and yet in sense necessarily belongs, as in ver. 8, to ὄντων κ.τ.λ.¹ To get rid of this irregularity, Seb. Schmid, Oeder, Koppe, and Flatt have taken ἐτι as *insuper*, and that either in the sense of *adeo* (Koppe, also Schrader), which however it never means, not even in Luke xiv. 26 ; or so that a “*for further, for moreover*” (see Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 119) introduces a *second* argument for ἡ δὲ ἐλπίς οὐ κατασχ. (Flatt, also Baumgarten-Crusius). Against this latter construction ver. 8 is decisive, from which it is clear that vv. 6–8 are meant to be nothing else than the proof of the ἀγάπη τ. Θεοῦ. On ἐτι itself, with the imperfect participate in the sense of *tunc adhuc*, comp. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 693. It indicates the continued existence, which the earlier condition still had.² — ὄντων ἡμ. ἀσθενῶν] *when we were still (ἐτι) without strength*, still had not the forces of the true spiritual life, which we could only receive through the Holy Ghost. The sinfulness is purposely described as *weakness*

¹ Comp. Plat. *Rep.* p. 503 E : ἐτι δὲ ὁ τότε παρῆμεν νῦν λέγομεν ; p. 363 D : οἱ δ' ἐτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτεινόνσι μισθοὺς (where ἐτι ought to stand before μακρ.). Achill. Tat. v. 18 : ἐγὼ δὲ ἐτι σοὶ ταῦτα γράφω παρόντος, and see Winer, p. 515 [E. T. 553]. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 333 f. [E. T. 389] ; and Fritzsche *in loc.* Van Hengel decides in favour of the reading with the double ἐτι (Griesbach, Lachmann, see the critical remarks) ; he thinks that Paul had merely wished to say : ἐτι γὰρ Χ. κατὰ καιρ. ὑπ. ἀσεβ. ἀπέθ., but had in dictation for the sake of clearness inserted after Χριστὸς the words ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθ. ἐτι. Mehring also follows Lachmann's reading. He thinks that Paul intended to write, with emphatic repetition of the ἐτι : ἐτι γὰρ Χριστὸς, ἐτι ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀπέθανε, but interrupted the sentence by the insertion of ὄντων ἡμ. ἀσθ. Ewald, holding εἰ γὰρ or εἴγε to be the original (see critical remarks) and then reading ἐτι after ἀσθενῶν, finds in ver. 9 the apodosis of ver. 6, and takes vv. 7, 8 as a parenthesis. Comp. also Usteri, *Lehrbegr.* p. 119. Th. Schott also follows the reading εἰ γὰρ (and after ἀσθ : ἐτι), but finds the apodosis so early as ver. 6, by supplying after ἀσθ. ἐτι : ἀπέθανε ; whereas

Hofmann (in his *Schriftbew.* II. p. 347), following the same reading, like Ewald, made ver. 9 fill the place of the apodosis, but now prefers to read ἐτι at the beginning as well as also after ἀσθενῶν, and to punctuate thus : ἐτι γ. Χριστὸς ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν, ἐτι κατὰ καιρὸν ὑπ. ἀσεβ. ἀπέθ. With this reading Hofmann thinks that the second ἐτι begins the sentence anew, so that with Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν an ἐτι stands twice, the first referring to ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν, and the second to ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν. But it is self-evident that thus the difficulty is only doubled, because ἐτι would both times be erroneously placed, which would yield, especially in the case of the second ἐτι, a strange and in fact intolerable confusion, since there would stand just beside it a *definition of time* (κατὰ καιρὸν), to which nevertheless the word elsewhere, so frequently used with definitions of time, is *not* intended to apply—a fact which is not to be disguised by subtleties. Märcker also would read ἐτι twice, but render the first ἐτι “*moreover*,” which, however, would be without reference in the text.

² Baumelein, p. 118 ; Schneider, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 449 C.

(need of help), in order to characterize it as the motive for the *love of God* interfering to save. The idea of *disease* (Theodoret : τῆς ἀσθείας περικειμένων τὴν νόσον ; comp. Theophylact, Umbreit, and others), or that of *minority* (van Hengel), is not suggested by anything in the context. — κατὰ καιρόν] may either (1) be rendered *according to the time*, according to the nature of the time, so that with Erasmus, Luther, Flacius, Castalio, Pareus, Seb. Schmid, also Schrader and Th. Schott, it would have to be connected with ἀσθ.¹ ; or (2) it may belong to ὑπὲρ ἀσεβ. ἀπέθανε, and mean, in accordance with the context, either *at the appointed time* (Gal. iv. 4), as it is here taken usually, also by de Wette, Tholuck, Philippi, Maier, Baumgarten-Crusius ; or (3) *at the proper time* (see Kypke)² ; the same as ἐν καιρῷ, ἐς καιρόν, ἐπὶ καιροῦ ; Phavorinus : κατὰ τὸν εὐκαιρον κ. προσήκοντα καιρόν ; and so the bare καιρόν (Bernhardy, p. 117), equivalent to καιρίως, the opposite of ἀπὸ καιροῦ and παρὰ καιρόν. In the *first* case, however, κ. κ. would either assign to the ἀσθ. an inappropriate excuse, which would not even be true, since the ἀσθένεια has always obtained since the fall (ver. 13) ; or, if it was meant directly to disparage the *pre-Christian age* (Flacius, “ante omnem nostram pietatem,” comp. Stöltzing and Hofmann), it would characterize it much too weakly. In the *second* case an element not directly occasioned by the connection (proof of God's love) would present itself. Therefore the *third* interpretation alone : *at the right time* (so Ewald and van Hengel) is to be retained. The death of Jesus for the ungodly took place *at the proper season*, because, had it not taken place then, they would, instead of the divine grace, have experienced the final righteous outbreak of divine *wrath*, seeing that the time of the πάρεσις, iii. 25, and of the ἀνοχή of God had come to an end. Comp. the idea of the πλήρωμα τῶν καιρῶν, Eph. i. 10 ; Gal. iv. 4. Now or never was the time for saving the ἀσεβεῖς ; now or never was the καιρὸς δεκτός, 2 Cor. vi. 2 ; and God's love did not suffer the right time for their salvation to elapse, but sent Christ to die for them the sacrificial death of atonement.³ — ὑπὲρ] *for, for the benefit of*.⁴ So in all passages where there is mention of the object of Christ's death. Luke xxii. 19, 20 ; Rom. viii. 32, xiv. 15 ; 1

¹ Comp. Stöltzing : “conformably to the time,” i.e. as it was *suitable* for the time, namely, the time of ungodliness. Similarly Hofmann, “in consideration of the time,” which was a time of godlessness, “without the fear of God on the part of individuals making any change thereon.”

² Comp. Pind. *Isthm.* ii. 32 ; Herod. i. 30 ; Lucian, *Philops.* 21 ; LXX. Is. lx. 22 ; Job v. 16 ; xxxix. 18 ; Jer. v. 24.

³ According to my former explanation of the passage the meaning would be, that, if Christ had appeared and died *later*, they would have perished unredeemed in their ἀσθένεια, and would have had no share in the act of atonement. But this view is untenable ; because Paul cannot have looked on the divine proof of love, given in the redeeming death of Christ, otherwise than in

a quite general light, i.e. as given to all mankind, as it appears everywhere in the N. T. since John iii. 16. Comp. Philippi, with whose view I now in substance concur, although in κατὰ καιρόν, by explaining it as “seasonably,” I find more directly an element of the *love*, which the context proposes to exhibit.

⁴ Comp. Eur. *Alc.* 701 : μὴ θυῆσκ' ὑπὲρ τοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς οὐδ' ἐγὼ πρὸ σοῦ, *Iph.* A. 1389 ; Soph. *Trach.* 705 ; *Aj.* 1290 ; Plat. *Conv.* p. 179 B : ἐδελέσασα μόνῃ ὑπὲρ τοῦ αὐτῆς ἀνδρὸς ἀποθανεῖν ; Dem. 690, 18 ; Xen. *Oyr.* vii. 4, 9 f. ; Isocr. iv. 77 ; Dio. Cass. lxi. 13 ; Ecclus. xxix. 15 : ἔδωκε γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ; 2 Macc. vi. 28, vii. 9, viii. 21 ; comp. also Ignatius, *ad Rom.* 4 : ὑπὲρ Θεοῦ ἀποδύσκει. Comp. the compound υπερδύσκειν with genit., so frequent especially in Euripides.

Cor. i. 13 ; 2 Cor. v. 14 ; Gal. iii. 13 ; Eph. v. 1 ; 1 Thess. v. 9, 10 ; 1 Tim. ii. 6 ; Tit. ii. 14.¹ That Paul did not intend by *ὑπέρ* to convey the meaning *instead of*, is shown partly by the fact, that while he indeed sometimes exchanges it for the synonymous ² *περί* (Gal. i. 4, like Matt. xxvi. 20 ; Mark xiv. 25), he does not once use *instead of* the unambiguous *ἀντί* (Matt. xx. 28), which must nevertheless have suggested itself to him most naturally ; and partly by the fact, that with *ὑπέρ* as well as with *περί* he puts not invariably the genitive of the person, but sometimes that of the *thing* (*ἀμαρτιῶν*), in which case it would be impossible to explain the preposition by *instead of* (viii. 3 ; 1 Cor. xv. 3). It is true that he has certainly regarded the death of Jesus as an act furnishing the satisfactio vicaria, as is clear from the fact that this bloody death was accounted by him as an expiatory sacrifice (iii. 25 ; Eph. v. 2 ; Steiger on 1 Pet. p. 342 f.), comp. *ἀντίλυτρον* in 1 Tim. ii. 6 ; but *in no passage* has he expressed the substitutionary relation *through the preposition*. On the contrary his constant conception is this : the sacrificial death of Jesus, taking the place of the punishment of men, and satisfying divine justice, took place as such *in commodum* (*ὑπέρ*, *περί*) *of men*, or—which is the same thing—*on account of their sins* (*in gratiam*), in order to expiate them (*περί* or *ὑπέρ* *ἀμαρτιῶν*). This we hold against Flatt, Olshausen, Winzer, Reithmayr, Bisping, who take *ὑπέρ* as *loco*. That *ὑπέρ* must at least be understood as *loco* in Gal. iii. 13 ; 2 Cor. v. 14 (notwithstanding ver. 15) ; 1 Pet. iii. 18 (Rückert, Fritzsche, Philippi), is not correct. See on Gal. *l.c.* and 2 Cor. *l.c.* ; Philem. 13 is not *here* a case in point. — *ἀσθενῶν* Paul did not write *ἡμῶν*, in order that after the need of help (*ἀσθενῶν*) the *unworthiness* might also be made apparent ; *ἀσθενῶν* is the *category*, to which the *ἡμεῖς* have belonged, and the *strong* expression (comp. iv. 5) is *selected*, in order now, through the contrast, to set forth the more prominently the divine love in its very *strength*.

Vv. 7, 8. Illustrative description (*γάρ*) of this dying *ὑπέρ* *ἀσθενῶν* as the practical demonstration of the divine love (ver. 8). Observe the syllogistic relation of ver. 8 to ver. 7 ; which is apparent through the emphatic *ἐαυτοῦ*. — *Scarce, namely, for a righteous man* (not to mention for *ἀσβεῖς*) *will any one die*. This very contrast to the *ἀσβεῖς* completely shuts out the *neuter* interpretation of *δικαίον* (“pro re justa,” Melancthon, comp. Olshausen, Jerome, Erasmus, *Annot.*, Luther). On account of the same contrast, consequently because of the parallel between *ὑπέρ* *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* and *ὑπέρ* *δικαίου*, and because the context generally has to do only with the dying for *persons*, *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* also is to be taken not as *neuter*,³ but as *masculine* ; and the article denotes the *definite ἀγαθός who is in question* in the case concerned. Since, moreover, an essential distinction between *δίκαιος* and *ἀγαθός*⁴ is neither implied in the

¹ See also Ritschl in the *Jahrb. für*

Dremsche Theol. 1863, p. 242.

² Bremi *ad Dem. Ol.* iii. 5, p. 188, Goth.

³ Köster also in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1854, p. 312, has taken both words as *neuter*: “hardly does one die for others for the sake of their (mere) right ; sooner at all events for the sake of the manifestly good,

which they have.”

⁴ Comp. on the contrary Matt. v. 45 ; further, *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός κ. δίκαιος* in Luke xxiii. 50 ; ἡ ἐντολή *ἀγία κ. δίκαια κ. ἀγαθή* in Rom. vii. 12 ; ὁ *δίκαιος* ἡμῶν *ἀναπέφανται ὡν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός*, Aesch. *Sept.* 576 ; Eur. *Hipp.* 427 ; *Thes. fr.* viii. 2.

context, where on the contrary the contrast to both is ἀσεβῶν and ἁμαρτωλῶν, nor is in the least hinted at by Paul, no explanation is admissible that is based on an essential difference of idea in the two words ; such as that τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ should be held to express something *different from* or *higher than* δικαίου. Therefore the following is the only explanation that presents itself as conformable to the words and context : After Paul has said that one will hardly die for a righteous man, he wishes to add, by way of confirmation (γάρ), *that cases of the undertaking such a death might possibly occur*, and expresses this in the form : *for perhaps for the good man one even takes it upon him to die*. Thus the previously asserted ἐπὲρ δικαίου τις ἀποθανεῖται, although one assents to it *vix et aegre*, is yet said *with reason*,—*it may perhaps occur*. Paul has not however written τοῦ δικαίου in the second clause of the verse, as he might have done, but introduces τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, and prefixes it, in order now to make still more apparent, in the interest of the contrast, the category of the *quality* of the person for whom one may perhaps venture this self-sacrifice. This is substantially the view arrived at by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, in the *Paraphr.*, Beza, Calvin (“rarissimum sane inter homines exemplum exstat, ut pro justo mori quis sustineat *quamquam illud nonnunquam accidere possit*”), Castalio, Calovius, and others ; recently again by Fritzsche (also Oltramare and Reithmayr) ; formerly also by Hofmann (in his *Schriftbew.* II. 1, p. 348). It has been wrongly alleged that it makes the second half of the verse superfluous (de Wette) and weakening (Köllner and Rückert) ; on the contrary, in granting what may certainly now and again occur, it the more emphatically paves the way for the contrast which is to follow, that God has caused Christ to die for quite other persons than the δικαίους and ἀγαθοὺς—for us *sinners*. Groundless also is the objection (of van Hengel), that in Paul's writings the repeated τις always denotes *different* subjects ; the indefinite τις, *one, any one*, may indeed even here represent in the concrete application *different* subjects or the *same*. Comp. 2 Cor. xi. 20. And, even if δικαίου and τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ be regarded as two distinct conceptions, may not the second τις be the *same* with the first ? But the perfect accordance with the words and context, which is only found in the exposition offered, shuts out every other. Among the explanations thus excluded, are : (1) Those which take τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ as *neuter*, like the rendering of Jerome, Erasmus, *Annot.* (“bonitatem”), Luther, Melancthon (“pro bona et suavi re, i.e. incitati cupiditate aut opinione magnae utilitatis”), and more recently Rückert (“for the good, i.e. for what he calls his highest good”), Mehring (“for for his own advantage some one perhaps risks even life”) ; now also Hofmann (“what is in itself and really good . . . a moral value, for which, when it is endangered, one sacrifices life, in order not to let it perish”). — (2) Those explanations which indeed take τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ properly as *masculine*, but yet give self-invented *distinctions of idea* in reference to δικαίου : namely (a), the exposition, that ὁ ἀγαθός means *the benefactor* : *hardly does any one die for a righteous man* (who stands in no closer relation to him) ; *for for his benefactor one dares perchance* (out of gratitude) *to die*. So Flacius,¹

¹ *Clav.* I. p. 693. “Vix accedit, ut quis suam vitam profundat pro justissimis ; pro

eo tamen, qui alicui valde est utilis, forsitan mori non recuset,”

Knatchbull, Estius, Hammond, Clericus, Heumann, Wolf, and others; including Koppe, Tholuck, Winer, Benecke, Reiche, Glöckler, Krehl, Maier, Umbreit, Bisping, Lechler, and Jatho. They take the article with ἀγαθὸν as: the benefactor *whom he has*, against which nothing can be objected (Bernhardy, p. 315). But we may object that we cannot at all see why Paul should not have expressed *benefactor* by the very current and definite term εὐεργέτης; and that ἀγαθός must have obtained the specific sense of *beneficence* (as in Matt. xx. 15; Xen. Cyr. iii. 3, 4, *al. ap.* Dorvill. *ad Charit.* p. 722; and Tholuck *in loc.* from the context—a want, which the mere article cannot supply (in opposition to Reiche). Hence, in order to gain for ἀγαθός the sense *beneficent* in keeping with the context, δίκαιος would have to be taken in the narrower sense as *just* (with Wetstein and Olshausen), so as to yield a climax from the *just* man to the *benevolent* (who renders more than the mere obligation of right binds him to do).¹ But in ver. 8 there is no reference to ἀγαθός in the sense assumed; and the *narrower* sense of δίκαιος is at variance with the contrasting ἀμαρτωλῶν in ver. 8, which demands for δίκ precisely the *wider* meaning (righteous). Besides the prominence which Paul intends to give to the love of God, which caused Christ to die for *sinners*, while a man hardly dies for a δίκαιος, is weakened just in proportion as the sense of δίκαιος is narrowed. The whole interpretation is a forced one, inconsistent with the undefined τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ itself as well as with the entire context. — (b) No better are the explanations which find in τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ a greater degree of morality than in δίκαιον, consequently a man more worthy of having life sacrificed for him. So, but with what varied distinctions! especially Ambrosiaster (the δίκαιος is such *exercitio*, the ἀγαθός *natura*), Bengel (δίκ. homo *innoxius*, ὁ ἀγαθός, *omnibus pietatis numeris absolutus*. . . v. g. *pater patriae*), Michaelis, Olshausen, Köllner (δίκ.: legally just, ἀγαθ.: perfectly good and upright), de Wette δίκ.: *irreproachable*, ἀγαθ.: the noble), Philippi and Th. Schott (both substantially agreeing with de Wette), also van Hengel (δίκ.: *probus coram Deo*, i.e. *venerabilis*, ἀγαθ.: *bonus in hominum oculis*, i.e. *amabilis*), and Ewald, according to whom δίκ. is he “who, in a definite case accused unto death, is nevertheless innocent in that particular case,” while the ἀγαθός is “he, who not only in one such individual suit, but predominantly in his whole life, is purely useful to others and guiltless in himself;”² comp. Stölting, who finds in δίκ. the honest upright man, and in ἀγαθός him whom we *personally esteem and love*. But all these distinctions of idea are artificially created and brought in without any hint from the context.³ — On τάχα, *fortasse, perhaps indeed*, expressing possi-

¹ An apt illustration of this would be Cicero, *de off.* iii. 15: “Si vir bonus is est, qui prodest quibus potest, nocet nemini, recte *justum* virum, *bonum* non facile reperiemus.”

² Ewald supposes an allusion to cases like these in 1 Sam. xiv. 45, xx. 17; but that it is also possible, that Paul might have in view Gentile examples that were known to himself and the readers.

³ Kunze, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1850, p. 407

ff., also rightly recognizes this; but explains the second half, contrary to the words, as if the proposition were expressed conditionally (εἰ καὶ), “for if even some one lightly ventures to die for the good man, still however God proves his love,” etc. Comp. Erasmus. *Paraphr.*—Märcker explains it in the sense of *one friend dying for another*; and suggests that Paul was thinking of the example of Damon and Pythias.

bility not without doubt, comp. Xen. *Anab.* v. 2, 17 ; Philem. 15 ; Wisd. xiii. 6, xiv. 19. In classic authors most frequently *τάχ' ἄν. — καὶ τολμῇ*] *etiam sustinet, he has even the courage,*¹ can prevail upon himself, *audet*. The *καὶ* is the *also* of the corresponding relation. In presence of the good man, *he ventures also* to die for him. — We may add, that the words from *ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* down to *ἀποθανεῖν* are not to be put (with Lachmann) in a *parenthesis*, since, though they form only a subordinate confirmatory clause, they cause no interruption in the construction. — Ver. 8. *δέ*] Not antithetical (“such are *men*, but such is *God*,” Mehring), as if the sentence began with *ὁ δὲ Θεός*, but rather *carrying it onward*, namely, to the middle term of the syllogism (the minor proposition), from which then the conclusion, ver. 9, is designed to result. — *συνίστησι*] *proves*, as in iii. 5. The accomplished fact of the atoning death is conceived according to its *abiding* effect of setting forth clearly the divine love ; hence the *present*. The *emphasis* indeed lies in the first instance on *συνίστησι* (for from this proof as such a further inference is then to be drawn), but passes on strengthened to *τὴν ἑαυτοῦ* because it must be God's *own* love, authenticating itself in the death of *Christ*, that gives us the assurance to be expressed in ver. 9. *God Himself*, out of His love for men, has given Christ to a death of atonement ; iii. 24, viii. 32 ; Eph. ii. 4 ; 2 Thess. ii. 16 ; John iii. 16 ; 1 John iv. 10 *et al.* To find in *τ. ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαπ.* the contrast to *our* love towards *God* (Hofmann ; comp. on ver. 5) is quite opposed to the context, which exhibits the *divine* demonstration of love in *Christ's* deed of love. That is the clear relation of ver. 8 to ver. 6 f., from which then the blessed inference is drawn in ver. 9. Hence we are not to begin a *new* connection with *συνίστησι δέ κ.τ.λ.* (Hofmann, “God lets us know, and gives us to experience that He loves us ; and this He does, *because* Christ,” etc.). The *ὅτι* cannot be the *motive* of God for His *συνίστησι* κ.τ.λ., since He has already *given Christ* out of love ; it is meant on the contrary to specify the *actual ground of the knowledge* of the divine proof of love (= *εἰς ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι*, comp. on 2 Cor. i. 18 ; John ii. 18). — *εἰς ἡμᾶς*] belongs to *συνίστ.* — *ἔτι ἁμαρτ. ὄντ. ἡμ.*] For only through the atoning death of Christ have we become *δικαιωθέντες*. See ver. 9.

Ver. 9. To prove that hope maketh not ashamed (ver. 5), Paul had laid stress on the possession of the divine love in the heart (ver. 5) ; then he had proved and characterized this divine love itself from the death of Christ (vv. 6–8) ; and he now again *infers*, from this divine display of love, from the death of Christ, that the hoped-for eternal salvation is all the more assured to us. — *πολλῷ ὢν μᾶλλον*] The conclusion does not proceed *a minori ad majus* (Estius and many, including Mehring), but, since the point now turns on the carrying out of the divine act of atonement, *a majori* (vv. 6–8) *ad minus* (ver. 9). — *πολλῷ μᾶλλον*] expresses the enhancement of certainty, as in vv. 15–17 : *much less therefore can it be doubted that*, etc. ; *νῦν* stands in reference to *ἔτι ἁμαρτωλῶν ὄντων ἡμῶν* in ver. 8. — *σωθησόμεθα ἀπὸ τ. ὀργῆς*] *we shall be rescued from the divine wrath* (1 Thess. i. 10 ; comp. Matt. iii. 7),

¹ Respecting *τολμῇ* see Wetstein, who properly defines it : “quidpiam grave in animum inducere et sibi imperare.” Comp.

Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 360 B ; Monk, *ad Eur. Alc.* 284 ; Jacobs in *Addit. ad Athen.* p. 309 f.

so that the latter, which issues forth at the last judgment (ii. 5, iii. 5), does not affect us. Comp. Winer, p. 577 [E. T. 621] ; Acts ii. 40. This *negative* expression for the attainment of the hoped-for *δόξα* renders the inference more obvious and convincing. For the positive expression see 2 Tim. iv. 18. — *δὲ αὐτοῦ*] *i.e.* through the operation of the *exalted* Christ, *ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ*, ver. 10. — Faith, as the *ληπτικόν* of justification, is understood as a matter of course (ver. 1), but is not mentioned here, because only what has been accomplished by *God* through *Christ* is taken into consideration. If faith were in the judgment of God the anticipation of moral perfection (but see note on i. 17), least of all could it have been left unmentioned. Observe also how Paul has justification in view as a *unity*, without different degrees or stages.

Ver. 10. More special development (*γάρ*, *namely*) of ver. 9. — *ἐχθροί*] *namely, of God*, as is clear from *κατηλλ. τῷ Θεῷ*. But it is not to be taken in an *active* sense (hostile to God, as by Rückert, Baur, Reithmayr, van Hengel, Mehring, Ritschl in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1863, p. 515 f. ; Weber, *vom Zorne Gottes*, p. 293, and others ; for Christ's death did not remove the enmity of men against God, but, as that which procured their pardon on the part of God, it did away with the *enmity of God against men*, and thereupon the cessation of the enmity of men towards God ensued as the moral consequence brought about by faith. And, with that active conception, how could Paul properly have inferred his *πολλῷ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.*, since in point of fact the certainty of the *σωθησόμεθα* is based on our standing in friendship (grace) with God, and not on our being friendly towards God ? Hence the *passive* explanation alone is correct (Calvin and others, including Reiche, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Philippi, Hofmann : *enemies of God*, *i.e.* those against whom the holy *θεοσεχθρία*, the *ὀργή* of God on account of sin, is directed ; *θεοστρυγεῖς*, i. 30 ; *τέκνα ὀργῆς*, Eph. ii. 3. Comp. xi. 28 ; and see on Col. i. 21.¹ This does not contradict the *ἀγάπη* Θεοῦ praised in ver. 8 (as Rückert objects), since the very arrangement, which God made by the death of Jesus for abandoning His enmity against sinful men without detriment to His holiness, was the highest proof of His *love* for us (not for our sins). — Consequently *κατηλλάγημεν* and *καταλλάγντες* must also be taken not actively, but *passively* : *reconciled with God*, so that He is no longer hostile towards us, but has on the contrary, on account of the death of His (beloved) Son, abandoned His wrath against us, and we, on the other hand, have become partakers in His grace and favour ; for the positive assertion (comp. ver. 1 f.), which is applicable to all believing individuals (ver. 8), must not be weakened into the negative and general conception "that *Christians have not God against them*" (Hofmann). See on Col. i. 21 and on 2 Cor. v. 18. Tittmann's distinction between *διαλλάττειν* and *καταλλάττειν* (see on Matt. v. 24) is as arbitrary as that of Mehring, who makes the former denote the *outward* and the latter the *inward* reconciliation.² — *ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ*] *by His life* ; more precise specification

¹ Comp. Pfeiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1872, p. 182.

² Against this view, comp. also Philippi's *Glaubenslehre*, II. 2, p. 270 ff.

of the import of *δι' αὐτοῦ* in ver. 9 ; therefore not "cum vitae ejus simus participes" (van Hengel, comp. Ewald). The *death* of Jesus effected our reconciliation ; all the less can His exalted *life* leave our deliverance unfinished. The *living* Christ cannot leave what His *death* effected without final success. This however is accomplished not merely through His *intercession*, viii. 34 (Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius), but also through His whole working in His kingly office for His believers up to the completion of His work and kingdom, 1 Cor. xv. 22 ff.

Ver. 11. *Ὁὐ μόνον δέ*] Since *καυχόμενοι* cannot stand for the finite tense (as, following Luther, Beza, and others, Tholuck and Philippi still would have it) *Ὁὐ μόνον δέ* cannot be supplemented by *σωθησόμεθα* (Fritzsche, Krehl, Reithmayr, Winer, p. 329, 543 [E. T. 351, 583], following Chrysostom), so as to make Paul say : we shall be not only *saved* (actually in itself), but also *saved in such a way* that we glory, etc. Moreover, the present *καυχᾶσθαι* could not supply any modal definition at all of the future *σωθησόμεθα*. No, the participle *καυχώμ.* compels us to conceive as supplied to the elliptical *Ὁὐ μόνον δέ* (comp. on ver. 3) the previous participle *καταλλαγέντες* (Köllner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hofmann ; formerly also Fritzsche) ; every other expedient is arbitrary.¹ This supplement however, according to which the two *participles* answer to each other, is confirmed by the concluding refrain : *δι' οὗ νῦν τ. καταλλ. ἐλάβ.*, which is an echo of the *καταλλαγέντες* understood with *Ὁὐ μόνον δέ*. Accordingly we must render : *not merely however as reconciled, but also as those who glory*, etc. Thus the meaning is brought out, that the certainty of the *σωθῆσθαι ἐν τ. ζωῇ αὐτοῦ* (ver. 10) is not only based on the objective ground of the accomplished reconciliation, but has also subjectively its corresponding vital expression in the *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν τῷ θεῷ κ.τ.λ.*, in which the lofty feeling of the Christian's salvation reveals itself. — *ἐν τῷ θεῷ*] Luther's gloss is apt : "that God is ours, and we are His, and that we have in all confidence all blessings in common from Him and with Him." That is the bold and joyful *triumph* of those sure of salvation. — *διὰ τ. κυρίου κ.τ.λ.*] This *glorying is brought about through Christ*, because He is the author of our new relation to God ; hence : *δι' οὗ νῦν τ. καταλλ. ἐλάβ.* The latter is that *κατηλλάγημεν* of ver. 10 in its subjective reception which has taken place by faith. — *νῦν* is to be taken here (differently from ver. 9) in contrast, not to pre-Christian times (Stöltzing), but to the future glory, in reference to which the reconciliation received in the present time (continuing from the conversion of the subjects of it to Christ) is conceived as its actual ground of certainty.

V. 12–19. *Parallel drawn between the salvation in Christ and the ruin that has come through Adam.* [See Note LI. p. 221.] — *Εἰπὼν, ὅτι ἐδικαίωσεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Χριστός, ἀνατρεῖ χει ἐπὶ τὴν ῥίζαν τοῦ κακοῦ, τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ τὸν θάνα-*

¹ Most arbitrary of all is the view of Mehring, that *Ὁὐ μόνον δέ* refers back to *ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ* ; and that Paul would say : not merely on the *life* of Christ do we place our hope, but also on the fact that we now glory in our *unity* with God(?). Th. Schott

refers it to *σωθησόμεθα*, but seeks to make *καυχόμενοι* suitable by referring it to the entire time, in which the salvation is still future, as if therefore Paul had written : *Ὁὐ μόνον δέ σωθησόμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν, ὅρ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ καυχόμεθα.*

τον, καὶ δείκνυσιν ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ δύο δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ Ἀδὰμ, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον. . . . καὶ αὐτὸ δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ Χριστοῦ, Theophylact ; comp. Chrysostom, who compares the Apostle here with the *physician* who penetrates to the *source* of the evil. Thus the perfect objectivity of the salvation, which man has simply to receive, but in no way to earn, and of which the Apostle has been treating since chap. i. 17, is, by way of a grand conclusion for the section, set forth afresh in fullest light, and represented in its deepest and most comprehensive connection with the history of the world. The whole *μυστήριον* of the divine plan of salvation and its history is still to be unfolded before the eyes of the reader ere the moral results that are associated with it are developed in chap. vi.

Ver. 12.¹ *Διὰ τοῦτο*] *Therefore*, because, namely, we have received through Christ the *καταλλαγή* and the assurance of eternal salvation, ver. 11. The assumption that it refers back to the whole discussion from chap. i. 17 (held by many, including Tholuck, Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, Holsten, Picard) is the more unnecessary, the more naturally the idea of the *καταλλαγή* itself, just treated of, served to suggest the parallel between Adam and Christ, and the δι' οὗ τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν in point of fact contains the summary of the whole doctrine of righteousness and salvation from i. 17 onward ; consequently there is no ground whatever for departing, as to διὰ τοῦτο, from the connection with what immediately precedes.² This remark also applies in opposition to Hofmann (comp. Stölting and Dietzsch), who refers it back to the entire train of ideas embraced in vv. 2-11. A recapitulation of this is indeed given in the grand concluding thought of ver. 11, that it is Christ to whom we owe the reconciliation. But Hofmann quite arbitrarily supposes Paul in διὰ τοῦτο to have had in view an *exhortation* to think of Christ conformably to the comparison with Adam, but to have got no further than this *comparison*. — ὥσπερ] There is here an *ἀνταπόδοτον* as in Matt. xxv. 14 ; and 1 Tim. i. 3. The comparison alone is expressed, but not the thing compared, which was to have followed in an apodosis corresponding to the ὥσπερ. The illustration, namely, introduced in vv. 13, 14 of the ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον now rendered it impossible to add the second half of the comparison *syntactically* belonging to the ὥσπερ, and

¹ See Schott (on vv. 12-14) in his *Opusc. I.* p. 313 ff. ; Borg, *Diss.* 1839 ; Finkh in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1830, I, p. 126 ff. ; Schmid in the same, 4, p. 161 ff. ; Rothe, *neuer Versuch e. Auslegung d. paul. Stelle Rom. v. 12-21*, Wittemb. 1836 ; J. Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, II. p. 481, ed. 5 ; Aberle in the *theol. Quartalschr.* 1854, p. 455 ff. ; Ewald, *Adam u. Christus Rom. v. 12-21*, in the *Jahrb. f. bibl. Wissensch.* II. p. 166 ff. ; Picard, *Essai exégét. sur Rom. v. 12 ff.* Strassb. 1861 ; Hofmann, *Schriftbew. I.* p. 526 ff. ; Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, II. p. 184 ff. ; Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 412 ff. ; Stölting, *l.c.* p. 19 ff. ; Klöpfer in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1869, p. 496 ff. ; Dietzsch, *Adam u. Christus Rom. v. 12 ff.*, Bonn 1871. Compare also Lechler's *apost.*

Zeit. p. 102 ff.

² The close junction with ver. 11 is maintained also by Klöpfer, who unsuitably however defines the aim of the section, vv. 12-21, to be, to guard the readers against a timid littleness of faith, as though, notwithstanding justification, they were still with reference to the future of judgment not sure and certain of escaping the divine wrath ; a timid mind might see in the tribulations anticipations of that wrath, etc. But how far does the entire confession of vv. 1-11 stand elevated above all such littleness of faith ! In the whole connection this finds no place whatever, and receives therefore in vv. 12-21 not the slightest mention or reference.

therefore the Apostle, driven on by the rushing flow of ideas to this point, from which he can no longer revert to the construction with which he started, has no hesitation in dropping the latter (comp. generally Buttmann's *neut. Gr.* p. 331 [E. T. 386] ; Kühner, II. 2, p. 1097), and in subsequently bringing in *merely* the main tenor of what is wanting by the relative clause attached to Ἀδάμ : ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος in ver. 14. This ὅς . . . μέλλ. is consequently the *substitute* for the omitted apodosis, which, had it not been supplanted by vv. 13, 14, would have run somewhat thus : *so also through one man has come righteousness, and through righteousness life, and so life has come to all.* Calvin, Flacius, Tholuck, Köllner, Baur, Philippi, Stölting, Mangold, Rothe (who however without due ground regards the breaking off as intended from the outset, in order to avoid sanctioning the Apokatastasis) find in ὅς ἐστι τύπος τ. μέλλ., in ver. 14, the resumption and closing of the comparison,¹ not of course in form, but in substance ; compare also Melancthon. According to Rückert, Fritzsche (in his commentary), and de Wette, Paul has come, after vv. 13, 14, to reflect that the comparison begun involved not merely *agreement* but also *discrepancy*, and has accordingly turned aside from the apodosis, which must necessarily have expressed the equivalence, and inserted instead of it the opposition in ver. 15. This view is at variance with the entire character of the section, which indeed bears quite especially the stamp of most careful and acute premeditation, but shows no signs of Paul's having been led in the progress of his thought to the opposite of what he had started with. According to Mehring, ver. 15, following vv. 13, 14 (which he parentheses) is meant to complete the comparison introduced in ver. 12, ver. 15 being thus taken interrogatively. Against this view, even apart from the inappropriateness of taking it as a question, the ἀλλ' in ver. 15 is decisive. Winer, p. 503 [E. T. 570] (comp. Fritzsche's *Conject.* p. 49), finds the epanorthosis in πολλὰς μάλλον, ver. 15, which is inadmissible, because with ἀλλ' οὐχ in ver. 15 there is introduced the *antithetical* element, consequently something *else* than the *affirmative* parallel begun in ver. 12. Others have thought that vv. 13-17 form a parenthesis, so that in ver. 18 the first half of the comparison is resumed, and the second now at length added (Cajetan, Erasmus, Schmid, Grotius, Bengel, Wetstein, Heumann, Ch. Schmid, Flatt, and Reiche). Against this view may be urged not only the unprecedented length, but still more the contents of the supposed parenthesis, which in fact already comprehends in itself the parallel under every aspect. In ver. 18 f. we have *recapitulation*, but not *resumption*. This much applies also against Olshausen and Ewald. Others again have held that ver. 12 contains the protasis and the apodosis completely, taking the latter to begin *either* with καὶ οὕτως (Clericus, Wolf, Glöckler), or even with καὶ διὰ (Erasmus, Beza, Benecke), both of which views however are at variance with the parallel between Adam and Christ which rules the whole of what follows, and

¹ The objection of Dietzsch, p. 43, that τύπος asserts nothing real regarding the second member of the comparison, is unsatisfactory, since Paul is just intending to

bring forward a very definite special statement regarding the typical relation which he now merely expresses in general terms

are thus in the light of the connection erroneous, although the former by no means required a trajection (καὶ οὕτως for οὕτω καί). While all the expositors hitherto quoted have taken ὥσπερ as the beginning of the first member of the parallel, others again have thought that it *introduces the second half of the comparison*. So, following Elsner and others, Koppe, who after διὰ τοῦτο conceives ἐλάβομεν καταλλαγὴν δι' αὐτοῦ supplied from ver. 11; so also Umbreit and Th. Schott (for this reason, because we σωθόμεθα ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ, Christ comes by way of contrast to stand just as did Adam). Similarly Mäcker, who attaches διὰ τοῦτο to ver. 11. These expositions are incorrect, because the *universality* of the Adamite ruin, brought out by ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., has no point of comparison in the supplied protasis (the explanation is *illogical*); in Gal. iii. 6 the case is different. Notwithstanding van Hengel (comp. Jatho) thinks that he removes all difficulty by supplying ἐστὶ after διὰ τοῦτο; while Dietzsch, anticipating what follows, suggests the supplying after διὰ τοῦτο: *through one man life has come into the world*. — δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου] *through one man*, that is, δι' ἐνὸς ἀμαρτήσαντος, ver. 16. A single man brought upon all sin and death; a single man also righteousness and life. The *causal* relation is based on the fact that sin, which previously had no existence whatever in the world, only began to exist in the world (on earth) by means of the first fall.¹ Eve, so far as the matter itself is concerned (Ecclus. xxv. 14; 2 Cor. xi. 3; 1 Tim. ii. 14; Barnab. Ep. 12), might as well as Adam be regarded as the εἰς ἄνθρ.; the latter, because he sinned as the first man, the former, of whom Pelagius explained it, because she committed the first transgression. Here however, because Paul's object is to compare the One man, who as the bringer of salvation has become the *beginner of the new* humanity, with the One man who as *beginner of the old* humanity became so destructive, in which *collective* reference (comp. Hofmann's *Schriftbew.* I. p. 474) the woman *recedes into the background*, he has to derive the entrance of sin into the world from Adam, whom he has in view in δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 21 f., 45 f. This is also the common form of Rabbinical teaching.² — ἡ ἀμαρτία] not: *sinfulness, habitus peccandi* (Koppe, Schott, Flatt, Usteri, Olshausen), which the word never means; not *original sin* (Calvin, Flacius, and others following Augustine); but also not merely *actual sin in abstracto* (Fritzsche: "nam ante primum facinus patratum nullum erat facinus"), but rather what sin is according to its idea and essence (comp. Hofmann and Stölting), consequently *the determination of the conduct in antagonism to God*, conceived however as a *force*, as a real power working and manifesting itself—exercising its dominion—in all cases of concrete sin (comp. ver. 21, vi. 12, 14, vii. 8, 9, 17 *al.*). This moral mode of being in antagonism to God became existent in the human world through the fall of Adam, produced death, and spread death over all. Thus our verse itself describes the ἀμαρτία as a real objective *power*, and in so doing admits only of *this* explanation. Compare the not substantially different explanation of Philippi, according to which the

¹ Not merely *came to light as known sin* (Schleiermacher, Usteri). See Lechler, p. 104.

² See Eisenmenger's *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. p. 81 f.

actual sin of the world is meant as having come into the world *potentialiter* through Adam ; also Rothe, who conceives it to refer to sin as a *principle*, but as active ; and Dietzsch. — On εἰς τ. κόσμον, which applies to the *earth* as the dwelling-place of mankind (for in the universe generally sin, the devil, was already in existence), comp. Wisd. ii. 24, xiv. 14 ; 2 John 7 ; Clem. Cor. I. 3 ; Heb. x. 5. Undoubtedly sin by its entrance into the world came into human nature (Rothe), but this is not asserted here, however decisively our passage stands opposed to the error of Flacius, that man is in any way as respects his essential nature ἀμαρτία.¹ — The mode in which the fall took place (through the devil, John viii. 44 ; 2 Cor. xi. 3) did not here concern the Apostle, who has only to do with the mischievous effect of it, namely, that it brought ἀμαρτία into the world, etc. — καὶ διὰ τ. ἀμαρ. ὁ θάνατος] scil. εἰς τ. κόσμον εἰσῆλθε. The θάνατος is *physical death* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Augustine, Calovius, Reiche, Fritzsche, Maier, van Hengel, Klöpper, Weiss, and many others), viewed as the separation of the soul from the body and its transference to Hades (not as “citation before God’s judgment,” Mehring), with which however the conception of the φθορά and ματαιότης of the κρίσις in ch. viii., very different from the θάνατος of men, must not be mixed up (as by Dietzsch), which would involve a blending of dissimilar ideas. The interpretation of bodily death is rendered certain by ver. 14 as well as by the considerations, that the text gives no hint of departure from the primary sense of the word ; that the reference to Gen. ii. 17, iii. 19 could not be mistaken by any reader ; and that on the basis of Genesis it was a universal and undoubted assumption both in the Jewish and Christian consciousness, that mortality was caused by Adam’s sin.² Had Paul taken θάνατος in *another* sense therefore, he must of necessity have definitely indicated it, in order to be understood.³ This is decisive not only against the Pelagian interpretation of *spiritual* death, which Picard has repeated, but also against every combination whatever—whether complete (see especially Philippi and Stöltzing), or partial—of *bodily, moral* (comp. νεκρός, Matt. viii. 22), and *eternal* death (Schmid, Tholuck, Köllner, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Olshausen, Reithmayr ; Rückert undecidedly) ; or the *whole collective evil*, which is the consequence of sin, as Umbreit and Ewald explain it ; compare Hofmann : “all that runs counter to the life that proceeds from God, whether as an occurrence, which puts an end to the life wrought by God, or as a *mode of existence* setting in with such occurrence.” As regards especially the inclusion of the idea of

¹ Compare Holsten, *zum Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 418 : who thinks that the unholiness lying dormant in human nature first entered *actually* into the visible world as a reality in the transgression of Adam ; also Baur, *neut. Theol.* p. 191, according to whom the principle of sin, that from the beginning had been immanent in man, only came forth *actually* in the παράβασις of the first parent. In this way sin would not have come into the world, but must have been in the world al-

ready before the fall, only not having yet attained to objective manifestation.

² See Wisd. ii. 24 ; John viii. 44 ; 1 Cor. xv. 21 ; Wetstein and Schoettgen, *in loc.* ; and Eisenmenger’s *entdeckt. Judenthum*, II. p. 81 f. Compare respecting Eve, Ecclus. xxv. 24.

³ This remark holds also against Mau in Pelt’s *theol. Mitarb.* 1838, 2, who understands the form of life *after* the dissolution of the earthly life.

moral death (the opposite of the spiritual ζωή), the words θάνατος and ἀποθνήσκειν are never used by Paul in this sense; not even in vii. 10 (see in loc.), or in 2 Cor. ii. 16, vii. 10, where he is speaking of eternal death.¹ The reference to spiritual death is by no means rendered necessary by the contrast of δικαιοσ. ζωής in ver. 18, comp. ver. 21; since in fact the death brought into the world by Adam, although physical, might be contrasted not merely in a Rabbinical fashion, but also generally in itself, with the ζωή that has come through Christ; for to this ζωή belongs also the life of the glorified body, and it is a life not again subject to death. — καὶ οὕτως] and in such manner, i.e. in symmetrical correspondence with this connection between the sin that entered by one man and the death occasioned by it. Fuller explanation is then given, by the ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον, respecting the emphatically prefixed εἰς πάντας, to whom death, as the effect of that first sin of the One, had penetrated. Since οὕτως sums up the state of the case previously expressed (comp. e.g. 1 Cor. xiv. 25; 1 Thess. iv. 17) any further generalization of its reference can only be arbitrary (Stölting: "through sin"). Even the explanation: "in virtue of the causal connection between sin and death" (Philippi and many others) is too general. The οὕτως, in fact, recapitulates the historical state of the case just presented, so far as it specifies the mode in which death has come to all, namely, in this way, that the One sinned and thereby brought into the world the death, which consequently became the lot of all. — διήλθεν] came throughout (Luke v. 15). This is the progress of the εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε in its extension to all individuals, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπ. [see Note LII. p. 222], which in contrast to the δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρ. is put forward with emphasis as the main element of the further description, wherein moreover διήλθεν, correlative to the εἰσῆλθε, has likewise emphasis. On διέρχεσθαι εἰς τινα comp. Plut. Alcib. 2. Compare also ἐπὶ τινα in Ez. v. 17 and Ps. lxxxvii. 17. More frequent in classic authors with the simple accusative, as in Luke xix. 1. — ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον]² [see Note LIII. p. 222], on the ground of the fact that, i.e. because, all sinned, namely (and for this the momentary sense of the aorist is appropriate³) when through the One sin entered into the world. Because, when Adam sinned, all men sinned in and with him, the representative of entire humanity (not: "exemplo Adami," Pelagius; comp. Erasmus, Paraphr.), death, which came into the world

¹ In 2 Tim. i. 10 θάνατος is used in the sense of eternal death, which Christ (by His work of atonement) has done away; the opposite of it is ζωὴ καὶ ἀφθαρσία, which He has brought to light by His Gospel. Not less is Eph. ii. 1 to be explained as meaning eternal death.

² The most complete critical comparison of the various expositions of these words may be seen in Dietzsch, p. 50 ff.

³ Hofmann erroneously holds (Schriftbew. I.c.) that the imperfect must have been used. What is meant is in fact the same act, which in Adam's sin is done by all, not another contemporaneous act. Comp. 2 Cor.

v. 15. It is mere empty arbitrariness in Thomasius l.c. p. 316, to say that our explanation is grammatically unjustifiable. Why so? Stölting (comp. Dietzsch) objects to it that then ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν must also be taken in the momentary sense. But this by no means follows, since ἐφ' ᾧ πάντ. ἡμ. is a special relative clause. Nevertheless even that ὁ θάνατ. διήλθ. is not something gradually developing itself, but a thing done in and with the sin of the One man. This One has sinned and has become liable to death, and thereby all have become mortal, because Adam's sin was the sin of all.

through the sin that had come into it, has been extended to *all* in virtue of this causal connection between the sin that had come into existence through Adam and death. *All* became mortal through Adam's fall, because this having sinned on the part of Adam was a having sinned on the part of *all*; consequently τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον, ver. 15. Thus it is certainly on the ground of Adam that all die (ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν, 1 Cor. xv. 22), because, namely, when Adam sinned, all sinned, all as ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν (ver. 19), and consequently the death that came in through his sin can spare none. But it is in a linguistic point of view erroneous, according to the traditional Catholic interpretation after the example of Origen, the Vulgate, and Augustine (Estius, Cornelius à Lapide, Klee; not Stengel, Reithmayr, Bisping, and Maier; but revived by Aberle), to take ἐφ' ᾧ as equivalent to ἐν ᾧ, *in quo* scil. *Adamo*, as also Beza, Erasmus Schmid, and others do; compare Irenaeus, *Haer.* v. 16, 3. The *thought* which this exposition yields ("omnes ille unus homo fuerunt," Augustine) is essentially correct, but it was an error to derive it from ἐφ' ᾧ, since it is rather to be derived from πάντες ἡμαρτον, and hence also it is but arbitrarily explained by the sensuous notion of all men having been *in the loins* (Heb. vii. 9, 10) of Adam (Origen, Ambrosiaster, Augustine). Chrysostom gives in general the proper sense, though without definitely indicating how he took the ἐφ' ᾧ: "τί δέ ἐστιν ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον; ἐκείνον πεσόντος καὶ οἱ μὴ φαγόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου γερόνασιν ἐξ ἐκείνου πάντες θνητοί." So also substantially Theophylact, though explaining, with Photius, ἐφ' ᾧ as equivalent to ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀδὰμ. The right view is taken by Bengel ("quia omnes peccarunt . . . *Adamo peccante*"); Koppe ("ipso actu, quo peccavit Adamus"), Olshausen, Philippi, Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 126, 369, and Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 590, III. p. 308 f.; comp. also Klöpffer.¹ The objection that in this way the essential definition is arbitrarily supplied (Tholuck, Hofmann, Stölting, Dietzsch, and others) is incorrect; for what is maintained is simply that more precise definition of ἡμαρτον, for which the immediate connection has necessarily prepared the way, and therefore no person, from an unprejudiced point of view, can speak of "an abortive product of perplexity impelling to arbitrariness" (Hofmann). Nor is our view at variance with the meaning of οὕτως (as Ernesti objects), since from the point of view of death having been occasioned by Adam's sin (οὕτως) the *universality* of death finds its explanation *in the very fact*, that Adam's sin was the sin of *all*. Aptly (as against Dietzsch) Bengel compares 2 Cor. v. 14: εἰ εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανε, ἅρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον (namely, *Christo moriente*); see on that passage. Others, and indeed most modern expositors (including Reiche, Rückert, Tholuck, Fritzsche, de Wette, Maier, Baur, Ewald, Umbreit, van Hengel, Mehring, Hofmann, Stölting, Thomasius, Mangold, and others), have interpreted ἡμαρτον of *individual* sins, following Theodoret: οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν τοῦ προπάτορος

¹ Who, although avoiding the direct expression of our interpretation, nevertheless in substance arrives at the same meaning, p. 505: "All however sinned, because Adam's sin penetrated to them, inasmuch

as God punished the fault of Adam so thoroughly that his sin became shared by all his descendants." For Klöpffer properly explains the ἐφ' ᾧ defining the relation as *imputation* of Adam's sin to all.

ἀμαρτίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕκαστος δέχεται τοῦ θανάτου τὸν ὅρον. [See Note LIV. p. 224.] Compare Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 263 ; Märcker *l.c.* p. 19. But the taking the words thus of the universal having actually sinned as cause of the universal death (see other variations further on) must be rejected for the simple reason, that the proposition would not even be true ;¹ and because the view, that the death of individuals is the consequence of their own actual sins, would be inappropriate to the entire parallel between Adam and Christ, nay even contradictory to it. For as *the sin of Adam* brought death to all (consequently not their own self-committed sin), so did the *obedience of Christ* (not their own virtue) bring *life* to all. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 22. This objective relation corresponding to the comparison remains undisturbed in the case of our exposition alone, inasmuch as ἐφ' ᾧ πάντ. ἡμαρτ. shows *how* the sin of *Adam* necessarily brought death to *all*. To explain ἡμαρτον again, as is done by many, and still by Picard and Aberle : *they were sinful*, by which is meant *original sin* (Calvin, Flacius, Melancthon in the *Enarr.* : “omnes habent peccatum, scilicet pravitatem propagatam et reatum”), or to import even the idea *poenam luere* (Grotius), is to disregard linguistic usage ; for ἡμαρτον means *they have sinned*, and nothing more. This is acknowledged by Julius Müller (v. d. Sünde, II. p. 416 ff. ed. 5), who however professes to find in ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἡμ. only an *accessory reason* for the preceding, and that in the sense : “*as then*” *all would besides have well deserved this severe fate for themselves by their actual sins*. Incorrectly, because ἐφ' ᾧ does not mean “*as then*” or “*as then also*” (i.e. ὡς καὶ) ; because the statement of the reason is by no means made apparent as in any way merely *secondary* and *subjective*, as Neander and Messner have rationalised it, but on the contrary is set down as the single, complete and objective ground ; because its alleged purport would exercise an alien and disturbing effect on the whole development of doctrine in the passage ; and because the sense assigned to the simple ἡμαρτον (*this severe fate they would have all moreover well merited*) is purely fanciful. Ernesti takes ἐφ' ᾧ not of the objective ground, but as specifying the *ground of thinking so*, i.e. the subjective ground of *cognition* : “*about which there can be no doubt, in so far as all have in point of fact sinned* ;” this he holds to be the logical

¹ Namely, in respect to the many millions of children who have not yet sinned. The reply made to this, that Paul has had in view only *those capable of sin* (Castalio, Wetstein, Fritzsche, and others) is least of all applicable in the very case of this Apostle and of the present acutely and thoroughly considered disquisition, and just as little is an appeal to the *disposition* to sin (Tholuck) which children have (Paul says plainly ἡμαρτον.) This way out of the difficulty issues in an exegetical self-deception.—He who seeks to get rid of the question regarding children must declare that it is not here raised, since the passage treats of the human race *as a whole* (comp. Ewald, *Jahrb.* VI. p. 132, also Mangold, p. 118 f.) This

would suffice, were the question merely of universal *sinfulness* ; for in such a case Paul could just as properly have said πάντες ἡμαρτον here, with self-evident reference to all capable of sin, as in iii. 23. But the question here is the connection between the *sin* of all and the *dying* of all, in which case there emerges *no* self-evident limitation, because *all*, even those still incapable of peccatum actuale, must die. Thus the question as to children still remains, and is only disposed of by *not* taking ἡμαρτον in the sense of having individually sinned ; comp. Dietzsch, p. 57 f. This also applies against Stölting, according to whom Paul wishes to show that sin works death *in the case of all sinners* without exception,

ground for the οὕτως κ.τ.λ. But, as there is no precedent of usage for this interpretation of ἐφ' ᾧ (Phil. iii. 12 is unjustifiably adduced), Ernesti is compelled to unite with ἐφ' ᾧ vv. 13 and 14 in an untenable way. See on ver. 13 f., remark 1, and Philippi, *Glaubensl.* III. p. 222 ff. ed. 2. — Respecting ἐφ' ᾧ, which is quite identical with ἐφ' οἷς, we have next to observe as follows: It is equivalent to ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὅτι, and means *on the ground of the fact that*, consequently in real sense *propterea quod*,¹ *because* (*dieceil*, Luther), of the *causa antegressa* (not *finalis*), as also Thomas Magister and Favorinus have explained it as equivalent to διότι. So in the N. T. at 2 Cor. v. 4 and Phil. iii. 12.² Rothe (followed by Schmid, *bibl. Theol.* p. 260) has taken it as: “*under the more definite condition, that*” (ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὥστε), so that individual sins are the consequence of the diffusion of death through Adam’s sin over mankind. But this view is wholly without precedent in the *usus loquendi*, for the very frequent use of ἐφ' ᾧ, *under the condition, that* (usually with the infinitive or future indicative), is both in idea and in practice something quite different; see Kühner, II. 2, p. 1006.³ Ewald formerly (*Jahrb.* II. p. 171), rejecting the second ὁ θάνατος, explained: “*and thus there penetrated to all men that, whereunto all sinned*,” namely death, which, according to Gen. ii. 17, was imposed as punishment on sin, so that whosoever sinned, sinned so that he had to die, a fate which he might know beforehand. In this way the ἐφ' ᾧ would (with Schmid and Glöckler, also Umbreit) be taken of the *causa finalis*⁴ and the subject of διήλθεν (τούτῳ) would be implied in it. But, apart from the genuineness of ὁ θάνατος, which must be defended, there still remains, even with the explanation of ἐφ' ᾧ as final, so long as ἡμαρτον is explained of individual actual sins, the question behind as to the *truth* of

¹ Baur also, II. p. 202 (comp. his *neutest. Theol.* p. 138), approves the rendering *because*, but foists on this *because* the sense: “*which has as its presupposition*.” Thus it should be understood, he thinks, also in 2 Cor. v. 4 and Phil. iii. 12; and thus Paul proves from the universality of death the universality of sin. See, in opposition to this logical inversion, Ernesti, p. 212 ff.

² Comp. Theophilus, *ad Autol.* ii. 40, ed. Wolf: ἐφ' ᾧ οὐκ ἴσχυσε θανατῶσαι αὐτούς (*because* he was unable to put them to death), Diod. Sic. xix. 98: ἐφ' ᾧ . . . τὸ μὲν μείζον καλοῦσι ταῦρον, τὸ δὲ ἑλασσον μόσχον (*because* they call the greater a bull, etc.); just so ἐφ' οἷς, Plut. *de Pyth. orac.* 29. Favorinus quotes the examples: ἐφ' ᾧ τὴν κλοπὴν εἰργάσα, and ἐφ' οἷς τὸν νόμον οὐ τηρεῖς, κολασθήσῃ, Thomas Magister cites the example from Synesius *ep.* 73: ἐφ' ᾧ Γεννάδιον ἐγραμην (*propterea quod* Gennadius accusasset, comp. Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 710). Another example from Synesius (in Devarius, ed. Klotz, p. 88) is: ἐφ' οἷς γὰρ Σεκούδον εὖ ἐποίησας (*on the ground of this, that*, i.e. *because* thou hast done well to Secundus) ἡμᾶς ἐτίμησας, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὕτω γράφων τιμᾶς,

ἐξηγήσῃ σου αὐτοῦ κ. ἐποίησας εἶναι σοῦς. See further Josephus, *Antt.* i. 1, 4: ὁ ὀφίς συνδιαιωμένον τῷ τε Ἀδάμ καὶ τῇ γυναίκὶ φθονερῶς εἶχεν, ἐφ' οἷς (*propterea quod*) αὐτοὺς εὐδαιμονήσκειν ὥτεω πεπεισμένους τοῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ παραγγέλμασι. *Antt.* xvi. 8, 2: καὶ τὸ δικαίως αὐτοὶ παθεῖν, ἐφ' οἷς ἀλλήλους ἡδίκησαν, προλαμβάνοντες μόνον.

³ Of a similar nature are rather such passages as Dem. 518, 26: ἐν γὰρ μηδὲν ἐστιν, ἐφ' ᾧ τῶν πεπραγμένων οὐ δίκαιος ὢν ἀπολωλέναι φανήσεται [*upon the ground of which* he will not seem worthy, etc.]; *de cor.* 114 (twice); as well as the very current use of ἐπὶ τούτῳ, *propterea* (Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 61) of ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ, *for this very reason* (Dem. 578, 26; Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 3, 10), etc.; and further, such expressions as ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ ποτε δίκη πληγῆς ἔλαβον (Xen. *Cyr.* i. 3, 16), where ἐπὶ with the dative specifies the *ground* (Kühner, II. 1, p. 436).

⁴ Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 8, 24: οὐδὲ γε δρεπανηφόροις ἐτι χρώνται, ἐφ' ᾧ Κύρος αὐτὰ ἐποίησατο, iii. 3, 36, ὑπομνησκῃ, ἐφ' οἷς τε ἐτρεφέμεθα, Thuc. i. 134, 1, *al.*; and see especially Wids. ii. 23.

the proposition, since not *all*, who die, have actually sinned; and indeed the view of the death of all having been caused by the actual sins of all is incompatible with what follows.¹ See also Ernesti, p. 192 ff.; comp. his *Ethik. d. Ap. P.* p. 16 f. Moreover the *telic* form of expression itself would have to be taken only in an improper sense, instead of that of the necessary, but on the part of the subjects not intended, *result*, somewhat after the idea of fate, as in Herod. i. 68: ἐπὶ κακῷ ἀνθρώπων σίδηρος ἀνεύρηται. Subsequently (in his *Sendschr. d. Ap. P.*) Ewald, retaining the second ὁ θάνατος, has assumed for ἐφ' ᾧ the signification, *so far as* (so also Tholuck and van Hengel); holding that by the limiting phrase "*so far as they all sinned*," death is thus set forth the more definitely as the result of sin, so that ἐφ' ᾧ corresponds to the previous οὕτως. But even granting the not proved limiting signification of ἐφ' ᾧ (which ἐφ' ὅσον elsewhere has, xi. 13), there still remain with this interpretation also the insurmountable difficulties as to the sense, which present themselves against the reference of ἡμαρτον to the individual sins. Hofmann (comp. also his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 529 f.) refers ἐφ' ᾧ to ὁ θάνατος, so that it is equivalent to οὐ παρόντος: *amidst the presence of death*; making the emphasis to lie on the preposition, and the sense to be: "*death was present at the sinning of all those to whom it has penetrated; and it has not been invariably brought about and introduced only through their sinning, nor always only for each individual who sinned.*" Thus ἐπὶ might be justified, not indeed in a temporal sense (which it has among poets and later prose writers only in proper statements of time, as in Homer, *Il.* viii. 529, ἐπὶ νυκτὶ), but perhaps in the sense of the *prevailing circumstance*, like the German "*bei*" [with, amidst² (see Kühner, II. 1, p. 434). But apart from the special tenor of the thought, which we are expected to extract from the bare ἐφ' ᾧ, and which Paul might so easily have conveyed more precisely (possibly by ἐφ' ᾧ ἡδὴ παρόντι or οὐ ἡδὴ παρόντος), this artificial exposition has decidedly against it the fact that the words ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον must necessarily contain the argumentative *modal information* concerning the preceding proposition κ. οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν, which they in fact contain only when our view is taken.³ They must solve the enigma which is involved in the mo-

¹ Along with which it may be observed that there is the less warrant for mentally supplying, in the contrasted propositions on the side of salvation, a condition corresponding to the ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἡμαρτ. (Mangold: εἰς πάντας πιστεύσωσιν, which is implicitly involved in λαμβάνοντες, ver. 17), the more essential this antitypical element would be.

² So also Dietzsch has taken it, in substantial harmony with Hofmann, less artificially, but not more tenably: *amidst the presence of death*. He thinks that the Apostle desires to emphasize the view that death, originating from the One, is and prevails in the world, quite apart from the sinning of individuals; that independently of this, and prior to it, the universal dominion of death springing from Adam is already in existence. But with what

strange obscurity would Paul in that case have expressed this simple and clear idea! How unwarranted it is to attach to his positive expression the negative signification (*apart from, independently of*)! With just as little warrant we should have to attach to the πάντες, since in no case could it include the children who have not yet sinned, a limitation of meaning, which yet it is utterly incapable of bearing after the εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους just said. The exposition of Dietzsch, no less than that of Hofmann, is a laboriously far-fetched and mistaken evasion of the proposition clearly laid down by Paul: "*because they all sinned*," namely, when through one man sin came into the world and death through sin.

³ This applies equally against the similar exposition of Thomasius (*Chr. Pers. u.*

mentous *οὗτος* of that clause ; and this enigma is solved only by the statement of the reason : *because all sinned*, so that the *θανάσιμος ἀμαρτία* of Adam was the sin *of all*. Against Hofmann, compare Philippi's *Glaubensl.* III. p. 221 f. ed. 2.

REMARK 1. The Rabbinical writers also derived universal mortality from the fall of Adam, who represented the entire race in such a way that, when Adam sinned, all sinned. See the passages in Ammon, *Opusc. nov.* p. 72 ff. Even perfectly righteous persons are "*comprehensi sub pœna mortis*" (R. Bechai in *Cadhackemach* f. 5, 4). It may reasonably be assumed therefore that the doctrine of the Apostle had, in the first instance, its historical roots in his Jewish (comp. *Ecclus.* xxv. 23 ; *Wisd.* ii. 23 f. ; xiv. 14) and especially his Rabbinical training, and was held by him even prior to his conversion ; and that in his Christian enlightenment he saw no reason for abandoning the proposition, which on the contrary he adopted into the system of his Christian views, and justified by continuing to assert for it in the development of the divine plan of redemption the place which is here assigned to it, as even Christ Himself traces death back to the fall (John viii. 44). Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 22 : *ἐν τῷ Ἀδᾶμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν*, on which our passage affords the authentic commentary. We may add that, when Maimonides is combating (*More Nevoch.* iii. 24) the illusion that God arbitrarily decrees punishments, there has been wrongly found in the dogmatic proposition adduced by him, "*non est mors sine peccato, neque castigatio sine iniquitate*," the *reverse* of the above doctrine (see especially Fritzsche, p. 294). The latter is on the contrary *presupposed* by it.

REMARK 2. That Adam was *created* immortal, our passage does not affirm, and 1 Cor. xv. 47 contains the opposite. But not as if Paul had conceived the first man as *by his nature* sinful, and had represented to himself sin as a *necessary natural quality of the σὰρξ* (so anew Hausrath, *neut. Zeitgesch.* II. p. 470), but thus : if Adam had not sinned in consequence of his self-determination of antagonism to God, he would have *become* immortal through eating of the tree of life in Paradise (Gen. iii. 22). As he has sinned, however, the consequence thereof necessarily was *death*, not only for himself, seeing that he had to leave Paradise, but for all his posterity likewise.¹ From this consequence, which the sin of Adam had for *all*, it results, in virtue of the necessary causal connection primevally ordained by God between sin and death, by reasoning back *ab effectu ad causam*, that the fall of Adam was the collective fall of the entire race, in so far as in fact all forfeited Paradise and therewith incurred death. — If *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* be explained in the sense of *individual actual sins*, and at the same time the untenableness of the explanation of Hofmann and Dietzsch be recognized, it becomes impossible by any expedients, such as that of Rothe, I. p. 314, ed. Schenkel, to harmonize the view in our passage with that expressed in 1 Cor. xv. 47 ; but, if it be referred to the *fall of Adam*, every semblance of contradiction vanishes.

Ver. 13 f. *Demonstration*, that the death of all has its ground in the sin of

Werk. I. p. 316 f.), amidst the presence of which relation (ᾧ as neuter). As if previously a "relation" had been expressed, and not a *concrete historical fact*! Weisse took ἐφ' ᾧ even as *although*,—a linguistic

impossibility, which Finckh also presents.

¹ Comp. Jul. Müller, *dogmat. Abhandl.* 1870, p. 89 f. Schultz, *alttest. Theol.* I. p. 394.

Adam and the causal connection of that sin with death. This argument, conducted with great conciseness, *sets out* from the undoubted historical certainty (it is already sufficiently attested in Gen. iv.—vi.) that during the entire period prior to the law (*ἄχρι νόμου* = ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ μέχρι Μωϋσέως, ver. 14) there was sin in humanity; *then further argues* that the death of individuals, which yet has affected those who also have not like Adam sinned against a positive command, cannot be derived from that sin prior to the law, because in the non-existence of law there is no imputation; *and allows it to be thence inferred* that consequently the death of all has been caused (*ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*) by the sin of Adam (not by their individual sins). Paul however leaves this *inference* to the reader himself; he does not expressly declare it, but instead of doing so he says, returning to the comparison begun in ver. 12: *ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος*, for in that death-working operation of Adam's sin for all lay, in fact, the very ground of the typical relation to Christ. Chrysostom aptly says: *εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος τὴν ρίζαν ἔσχε, νόμον δὲ οὐκ ὄντος ἡ ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται, πῶς ὁ θάνατος ἐκράτει; ὅθεν ὀηλον ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἡ τῆς τοῦ νόμου παραβάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη τῆς τοῦ Ἀδὰμ παρακοῆς, αὕτη ἦν ἡ πάντα λυμαινομένη. Καὶ τίς ἡ τοῦτον ἀπόδειξις; τὸ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νόμου πάντας ἀποθνῆσκειν' ἐβασίλευσε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Compare Oecumenius. — *ἄχρι νόμου* [See Note LV. p. 224] *i.e.* in the period previous to the giving of the law, comp. ver. 14; consequently not during the period of the law, *ἕως ὁ νόμος ἐκράτει*,¹ Theodoret; comp. Origen, Chrysostom, and Theodore of Mopsuestia. — *ἐλλογεῖται*] preserved nowhere else except in Boeckh, *Inscript.* I. p. 850 A, 35, and Phil. 18 (text rec.), but undoubtedly meaning: *is put to account* (consequently equivalent to *λογίζεται*, iv. 4), namely, here, according to the context, *for punishment*, and that *on the part of God*; for in the whole connection the subject spoken of is the divine dealings in consequence of the fall. Hence we are neither to understand *ab judice* (Fritzsche), nor: *by the person sinning*; so Augustine, Ambrosiaster, Luther, ("then one does not regard the sin") Melancthon ("non accusatur in nobis ipsis,") Calvin, Beza, and others, including Usteri, Rückert, J. Müller, Lipsius, Mangold, and Stöltzing ("there the sinner recognizes not his sin as guilt"), whereby a thought quite irrelevant to the argument is introduced. — *μὴ ὄντος νόμου*] *without the existence of the law*; *νόμος*, as previously *ἄχρι νόμου*, meaning the *Mosaic law*, and not any law generally (Theodore of Mopsuestia, and many others, including Hofmann), as *ἁμαρτία* already points to the *divine law*. Comp. iv. 15. The proposition itself: "*Sin is not imputed, if the law is absent*," is set down as something universally *conceded*, as an *axiom*; therefore with repetition of the subject (in opposition to Hofmann, who on account of this repetition separates *ἁμαρτία* δὲ κ.τ.λ. from the first half of the verse and attaches it to what follows), and with the verb in the *present*. The proposition itself, inserted as an intervening link in the argument with the metabatic *δέ*, without requiring a preceding *μέν*, which Hofmann is wrong

¹ As is well known, Peyrerius (*Praeadamitae s. exercitat. ezeq. in Rom.* v. 12-14, Amst. 1655) referred the *νόμου* here to the

law given to Adam in Paradise; and found thus a proof for his *Preadamites*.

in missing (see Dietzsch and Kühner, II. 2, p. 814), has its truth as well as its more precise application in the fact, that in the absence of law the action, which in and by itself is unlawful, is no *transgression of the law* (iv. 15), and cannot therefore be brought into account *as such*. That Paul regarded the matter in this light, and had not, as Hofmann thinks, sinning generally, "as it was one and the same thing in the case of all," in view apart from the sins of individuals, is plain also from καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτ. ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσ. Ἀδάμ, in ver. 14. His thought is : If the death of men after Adam had been caused by their own sin, then in the case of all those who have died during the period from Adam till the law, the sin which they have committed must have been already reckoned to them as transgression of the law, just as Adam's sin was the transgression of the positive divine command, and as such brought upon him death ; but this is inconceivable, because the law was not in existence. In this Paul leaves out of consideration the Noachian commands (Gen. ix.), as well as other declarations of God as to His will given before the law, and likewise individual punitive judgments, such as in the case of Sodom, just because he has only the strict idea of real and formal legislation before his mind, and this suggests to him simply the great epochs of the Paradisaic and Sinaitic legislations. A view, which does not subvert the truth of his demonstration, because mankind in general were without law from Adam until Moses, the natural law, because not given *positively*, remaining out of the account ; it makes the act at variance with it appear as *sin* (ἁμαρτία), but not as παράβασις νόμου, which as such ἐλλογείται. — Ver. 14. ἀλλ' at, yet, although sin is not put to account in the absence of the law. It introduces an apparently contradictory phenomenon, confronting the ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἐλλογείται κ.τ.λ. ; one, however, which just proves that men have died, not through their own special sin, but through the sin of Adam, which was put to their account. — ἐβασίλευσεν] prefixed with emphasis : death has not perchance been powerless, no, it has *reigned*, i.e. has exercised its power which deprives of life (comp. vv. 17-21). Hofmann (comp. also Holsten, Aberle, and Dietzsch) finds in the emphatic ἐβασ. the *absolute* and *abiding* dominion, which death has exercised independently of the imputation of sins (ἀλλὰ being taken as the simple *but*). "just as a king, one by virtue of his *personal* position *once and for all* entitled to do so, exercises dominion over those who, in virtue of their belonging to his domain, are *from the outset* subject to him." But no reader could educe this qualitative definite sense of the βασιλεύειν, with the highly essential characteristic elements ascribed to it, from the mere verb itself ; nor could it be gathered from the position of the word at the head of the sentence ; on the contrary, it must unquestionably have been *expressed* (by ἐτυράννευσεν possibly, or τυραννικῶς ἐβασίλευσεν) seeing that the subsequent καὶ (*even* over those, etc.) does not indicate a *mode* of the power of the (personified) death, but only appends the fact of its dominion being without exception. — μέχρι Μωϋσ.] equivalent to ἄχρι νόμου in ver. 13. A distinction of sense between μέχρι and ἄχρι is (contrary to the opinion of Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 33 f.) purely fanciful. See Fritzsche, p. 308 ff. and van Hengel *in loc.* — καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας

κ.τ.λ.] even over those¹ who have not sinned like Adam, that is, have not like him transgressed a positive divine command. [See Note LVI. p. 224.] Even these it did not spare. It is erroneous with Chrysostom (but not Theodoret and Theophylact) to connect ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι κ.τ.λ. with ἐβασίλ.² Erroneous for this reason, that Paul, apart from the little children or those otherwise incapable of having sin imputed, whom however he must have indicated more precisely, could not conceive at all (iii. 23) of persons who had not sinned (μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντες without any modal addition more precisely defining it), and a limitation *mentally supplied* (*sine lege* peccarunt, Bengel) is purely fanciful. The καί, *even*, refers to the fact that in the period extending from Adam till Moses, excluding the latter, positively given divine commands were certainly transgressed by individuals to whom they were given, but it was not *these merely* who died (as must have been the case, had death been brought on by their own particular sins); it was *also those*,³ who etc. *Their* sin was not ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοίωμ. τῆς παραβ. Ἀδάμ (ἐπὶ used of the *form*, in which anything occurs, see Bernhardt, p. 250); they did not sin in such a way, *that their action was of like shape with the transgression of Adam*, "quia non habebant ut ille *revelatam certo oraculo* Dei voluntatem," Calvin. For other definitions of the sense see Fritzsche, p. 316, and Reiche, *Commentar. crit.* I. p. 45 ff. Reiche himself explains it of those who have transgressed no command *expressly threatening death*. So also Tholuck. But this peculiar limitation is not suggested by the context, in which, on the contrary, it is merely the previous μὴ ὄντος νόμου which supplies a standard for determining the sense of the similarity. According to Hofmann καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς down to Ἀδάμ is meant to be one and the same with the previous ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ μέχρι Μωϋσέως, inasmuch as a transgression similar to that of Adam could only then have occurred, "*when God placed a people in the same position in which Adam found himself, when he received a divine command on the observance or transgression of which his life or death depended.*" This misconception, springing from the erroneous interpretation of ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον, is already excluded by καί,⁴ as well as, pursuant to the tenor of thought, by the fact that in the *pre-legal* period in question all those, who transgressed a command divinely given to them by way of revelation, sinned like Adam. Their sin had thereby the same moral form as the act of Adam; but not only had *they* to die, but also (καί) those who had *not* been in *that* condition of sinning. Death reigned over the latter also.—The *genitive* with ὁμοίωμ. is not that of the *subject* (Hofmann), but of the *object*, as in i. 23, vi. 5, viii. 3; the sins meant are not so conceived of, that the παράβασις of Adam is homo-

¹ βασιλεύειν with ἐπὶ is a Hebraism (לְ). Compare Luke i. 33, xix. 14; 1 Sam. viii. 9, 11; 1 Macc. i. 16.

² So Finckh again does, following Castallo and Bengel: "quia illorum eadem atque Adami transgressientis ratio fuit . . . i.e. *propter reatum ab Adam contractum.*"

³ Consequently the two classes, formed by Paul, are not to be so distinguished that the one shall embrace men before Noah, and the other the Noachian race (van

Hengel). Both classes are included in the whole period from Adam till Moses.

⁴ Which necessarily assumes a class of sinners in the pre-legal period, whose sin was homogeneous with that of Adam. This also, in opposition to Mangold, p. 121, and Dietzsch, p. 98; according to whose and Hofmann's definition of the sense, Paul ought either to have omitted the καί altogether, or to have inserted it before ἀπὸ Ἀδάμ.

geneously repeated in them, but so that they are, as to their specific nature, of similar fashion with it, and consequently belong to the same ethical category. They have morally just the same character. As to *ὁμοίωμα* see on i. 23. — *ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος*] *who*—to educe now from vv. 13, 14 the result introduced in ver. 12, and so to return to the comparison there begun—*is type of the future* (Adam). Theophylact correctly paraphrases: *ὡς γὰρ ὁ παλαιὸς Ἀδὰμ πάντας ὑποδίκους ἐποίησε τῷ οἰκεῖῳ πταίσματι* (by bringing upon them death), *καίτοι μὴ πταίσαντας, οὕτως ὁ Χριστὸς ἐδικαίωσε πάντας, καίτοι μὴ δικαίωσης ἄξια ποιήσαντας*. Compare 1 Cor. xv. 45. Koppe, following Bengel, takes *μέλλ.* as *neuter* (*of that, which should one day take place*), and *ὅς* for *ὁ*. This agreement of the relative with the following substantive would perhaps be grammatically tenable;¹ but seeing that *Ἀδὰμ* immediately precedes it, and that the idea of Christ being *ὁ ἐσχάτος Ἀδὰμ* is a Pauline idea (1 Cor. *l.c.*), it is quite unjustifiable to depart from the reference of the *ὅς* to Adam; and equally so to deny to the *μέλλων* its supplement from the immediately preceding *Ἀδὰμ*, and to take it as “*the man of the future*” (Hofmann), which would nevertheless yield in substance the same meaning. — *τύπος*] *type*, so that the *μέλλων* is the *anti-type* (1 Pet. iii. 21). The type is always something historical (a person, thing, saying), which is destined, in accordance with the divine plan, to prefigure something corresponding to it in the future,—in the connected scheme of sacred historical teleology, which is to be discerned from the standpoint of the antitype. Typical historical parallels between Adam and the Messiah (so that the latter is even expressly termed the last Adam) are found also in Rabbinical authors,² and are based in them on the doctrine of the *ἀποκατάστασις πάντων*.³ Paul based this typology of his on the *atoning work of Christ* and its results, as the whole discussion shows; hence in his present view Christ as the *μέλλων Ἀδὰμ* is not *still* to come, but is already historical.⁴ For this reason however *ὁ μέλλων* may not, with Fritzsche and de Wette, be referred to the last coming of Christ; but must be dated from the time of Adam, in so far, namely, as in looking back to the historical appearance of Adam, Christ, as its antitype, *is the future Adam* (comp. *ὁ ἐρχόμενος*).

REMARK 1. Those who refer *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* to the proper sins of individuals, or even to the principle of the *ἁμαρτία* dwelling in them, ought not to find, as Baumgarten-Crusius, Umbreit, and Baur still do, the proof for the *πάντες ἥμαρτον* in ver. 13 f. for how in the connection of the passage could any proof for the universality of sin be still required? Certainly just as little as in particular for the fact, that, with death already existing in the world (Dietzsch), all individuals have sinned. Consistently with that reference of the *ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἥμαρτον* there must rather have been read from ver. 13 f. the proof for this, that the

¹ Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 708; Heind. *ad Phaedr.* p. 279.

² E.g. *Nere Schalom* f. 160, 2: “*Quemadmodum homo primus fuit primus in peccato, sic Messias erit ultimus ad auferendum peccatum penitus*.” *Nere Schalom* 9, 9: *Adamus postremus est Messias.*”

³ Compare the passages in Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenlh.* II. p. 819, 823 ff.

⁴ Comp. Chrysostom; also Theodore of Mopsuestia: *ὥσπερ δι' ἐκείνου* (Adam) *τῶν χειρόνων ἡ πάροδος ἐγένετο, οὕτω διὰ τούτου τῆς τῶν κρείττωνων ἀπολαύσεως τὴν ἀφορμὴν ἐδεξάμεθα.*

death of all results from the proper sins of all. But how variously has this demonstration been evolved ! Either : *although sin has not until Moses been imputable according to positive law, yet each one has brought death upon himself by his sin* (ver. 14), which proves the relative imputation thereof. So de Wette. Or : *although sin, which even from Adam till Moses was not lacking, be not imputed by a human judge in the absence of positive law, yet the reign of death* (ver. 14) *shows that God has imputed the pre-Mosaic sins.* So Fritzsche. Or : in order to show "*in Adamo causam quaerendam esse, cur hominum peccata mors secuta sit,*" Paul declares that death has reigned over all from Adam till Moses, whether they sinned like Adam, or differently. So van Hengel ; comp. also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 264. Or : *not even in the period from Adam till Moses was sin absent ; but the clear proof to the contrary is the dominion of death in this period.* So Baur, and with a substantially similar view of the mode of inference *ab effectu ad causam*,¹ Rothe also. But however it may be turned, the probative element has first of all to be read into the passage ; and even then the alleged proof (ver. 14) would only be a reasoning backwards from the historical *phenomenon* in ver. 14 to the *cause* asserted by ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἡμαρτ., and consequently a mere clumsy argument in a circle, which again assumes the assertion to be proved—*id quod erat demonstrandum*—in the phenomenon brought forward in ver. 14 ; and moreover utterly breaks down through the proposition that sin is not imputed in the absence of law. Ewald, in his former view (*Jahrb.* II.), rightly deduces from ver. 14 : *consequently it only appears the more certain, that death propagated itself to them only by means of Adam's,*" but attributes to this inference, consistently with his view of ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἡμ., the sense : "*that they all sinned unto death just in the same way as, and because, Adam had sinned unto it.*" In his latter view (*Sendschr. d. Ap. P.*) he supposes that in connection with ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον the possible doubt may have arisen, *whether it was so certain that death had come upon those oldest men from Adam till Moses in consequence of their sins ?* which doubt Paul properly answers in ver. 13 f., thereby all the more corroborating the truth. But the emergence of a doubt is indicated by nothing in the text ; and that doubt indeed would have been dissipated by the very fact that those men were dead, which does not prove however that they died on account of their sins. Thus also the matter would amount to a reasoning in a circle. According to Tholuck the argument is : *that death has passed upon all through the disposition to death (?) introduced in Adam, and not through their own sins, is plain from the fact, that pre-Mosaic sin, through not positively threatened with death, as in the case of Adam and in the law, was nevertheless placed under its dominion.*" Only thus, he holds, is the logical relation between the clauses apparent. In general this is right ; but by this very circumstance Tholuck just attests the correctness of our explanation of ἡμαρτον, namely, that it is *not* meant of individual sin. The caution which he inserts against this inference, namely, that Paul regards the actual sins "*only as the relatively free manifestations of the hereditary sinful substance,*" is of no avail, seeing that they remain always acts of individual freedom, even though the latter be only relative, while the argument in our passage is such that the individual's own sins, as cause of death, are *excluded*. Ernesti joins ἀμαρτία δὲ κ.τ.λ. with ἐφ' ᾧ κ.τ.λ. : "*since indeed all have sinned, but sin is not placed to account,*" etc. The ἄχρι . . . κόσμῳ standing in the way, he encloses in a parenthesis. But why this parenthesis ? The πάντες

¹ According to the correlation of the ideas *sin* and *death*, comp. Baur, *neut. Theol.* p. 138.

ἡμαρτον, in the sense of iii. 23, needed no proof; and it could not occur to any one to date sin only from the epoch of the law. The ἄχρι . . . κόσμῳ acquires its pertinent significance when, as an essential element in the syllogistic deduction, it is closely united with the axiom ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἔλλογ, κ.τ.λ. attached to it, and is not set aside in a parenthesis as if it might equally well have been omitted. According to Holsten the argument turns on the fact that *objective* sin entered the world through Adam, and death along with it; thus death has passed upon *all* because *all* were sinners (in the *objective* sense)—a diffusion by means of one over the whole, which is illustrated by the thought that, while sin was in the world until the law, this sin could not, in the absence of law, be imputed as *subjective* guilt; but death became ruler, in accordance with the objective divine law of the universe, with a tyrannical power not conditioned by the subjects of its rule, even over those who were indeed (*objectively*) sinners, but not (*subjectively*) transgressors like Adam. Holsten has certainly in this way avoided the error of making universal death conditioned by the subjective sin of the individuals; but he has done so by means of a distinction between objective and subjective sins, which is so far from being suggested by the text, that it was just through Adam that the *subjective* sin, joined with the *consciousness of guilt*, entered the world, and therefore the divine action, in decreeing death upon sin, could not be conceived as indifferent to the subjectivity. Hofmann—who sees in ἄχρι . . . κόσμῳ a [very unnecessary] ground assigned for the ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἡμαρτον, upon which there follows in ἁμαρτία δὲ κ.τ.λ. a declaration regarding death in the pre-legal period, according to which this could not have been caused by the sinning of that period, seeing that on the contrary the latter took place when death was already present—confuses the entire exposition of the passage, and by his artificial rendering of ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον makes the understanding of it *impossible*. In general the entire history of the interpretation of our passage shows that when once the old ecclesiastical explanation of ἐφ' ᾧ (this however taken as *propterea quod*) πάντες ἡμαρτον is regarded as the *Charybdis* to be shunned at all hazards, the falling into the *Scylla* becomes unavoidable. Even Klöpffer, in attributing to πάντες ἡμαρτον the underlying thought that Adam's sin penetrated to all, and Dietzsch, by his simplifying and modification of Hofmann's exposition, have not escaped this danger.

REMARK 2. Since Paul shows from the absence of *imputation* (ἐλλογεῖται) in the absence of law, that the death of men after Adam cannot have been occasioned by their own individual sins, but only by Adam's, in which all were partakers in virtue of their connection with him as their progenitor, he must have conceived that Adam's sin brought death not merely to himself but also at the same time to all *by way of imputation*; and therefore the *imputatio peccati Adamitici* in reference to the *death*, to which all are subjected, certainly results from our passage as a Pauline doctrine. But as to *original sin* (not however as to its condemnableness in itself), the testimony of our passage is only indirect, in so far, namely, as the ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον, according to its proper explanation and confirmation in ver. 13 f., necessarily presupposes in respect to Adam's posterity the habitual want of *justitia originalis* and the possession of *concupiscence*.

REMARK 3. The view of Julius Müller as to an original estate and original fall of man in an extra-temporal sphere (comp. the monstrous opinion of

Benecke, p. 109 ff., and in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1832, p. 616 ff.) cannot be reconciled with our passage and its reference to Gen. iii.¹ See Ernesti, p. 247 ff., and among dogmatic theologians, especially Philippi, III. p. 92 ff.; and (against Schelling and Steffens) Martensen, § 93, p. 202 ff. ed. 2.

Ver. 15. *But not as is the trespass, so also is the gift of grace.* (See Note LVII. p. 225.) Although Adam and Christ as the heads of the old and new humanity are typical parallels, how *different* nevertheless are the two *facts*, by which the former and the latter stand to one another in the relation of type and antitype (on the one side the παράπτωμα, on the other the χάρισμα) —different, namely (εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.), by the opposite *effects*² issuing from those two facts, on which that typical character is based. The question is not as to the different *measure* of efficacious power, for this extends alike in both cases from *one* to *all*; but as to the different specific *kind* of effect; there death, here the rich grace of God—the latter the more undoubted and certain (πολλῷ μᾶλλον), as coming after that deadly effect, which the παράπτωμα had. “*For if (εἰ purely hypotheticalal) through the trespass of one the many died, much more has the grace of God and the gift by grace of the one man Jesus Christ become abundant to the many.*” On τὸ παράπτωμα comp. Wisd. x. 1. The contrast is τὸ χάρισμα, the *work of grace*, i.e. the atoning and justifying act of the divine grace in Christ,³ comp. ver. 17 ff. —οἱ πολλοί] the many, namely, according to ver. 12 (comp. ver. 18), the collective posterity of Adam. It is *in substance* certainly identical with πάντες, to which Mehring reverts; but the *contrast to the εἰς* becomes more palpable and stronger by the designation of the collective mass as οἱ πολλοί. Grotius erroneously says: “*fere omnes, excepto Enocho,*” which is against vv. 12, 18. Such a unique, miraculous exception is not taken into consideration at all in this mode of looking at humanity as such on a great scale. Erroneous also is the view of Dietzsch, following Beck, that οἱ πολλοί and then τοὺς πολλοὺς divide mankind into *two classes*, of which the one continues in Adamite corruption (?) while the other is in Christ raised above sin and death. This theory breaks down even on the historical aorist ἀπέθανον and its, according to ver. 12, necessary reference to the *physical* death which was given with Adam’s death-bringing fall for *all*, so that they *collectively* (including also the subsequent believers) became liable to death through this παράπτωμα. See on ver. 12. It is moreover clear from our passage that for the explanation of the death of men Paul did not regard their *individual* sin as

¹ Nor with the N. T. generally, which teaches an extra-temporal mode of existence *only in the case of Christ*. The extra-temporal condition and fall supposed by Müller are not only *outside of Scripture*, but *at variance with it*.

² This contrast forbids the taking ἀλλ’ οὐκ . . . χάρισμα *interrogatively* (Mehring and earlier expositors), and so getting rid of the negation.

³ The unhappy and happy *consequences* respectively of the παράπτωμα and the

χάρισμα are not included in these conceptions themselves (in opposition to Dietzsch). Nor is παράπτωμα to be so distinguished from παράβασις, that the former *connotes* the unhappy consequences (Grotius, Dietzsch). On the contrary, the expressions are popular synonyms, only according to different *figures*, like *fall* (not *falling away*) and *trespass*. Comp. on παράπτ. Ez. xiv. 18, xv. 8, xviii. 24, 26, iii. 20; Rom. iv. 25, xi. 11; 2 Cor. v. 19; Gal. vi. 1; Eph. ii. 1 *et al.*

the *causa efficiens*, or even as merely *medians*; and it is a meaning gratuitously introduced, when it is explained: "the many *sinned* and found death, *like* the one Adam," (Ewald, *Jahrb.* II., van Hengel and others). — πολλῶ μαλλον] as in ver. 9, of the *logical plus*, *i.e.* of the degree of the evidence as enhanced through the contents of the protasis, *multo potius*. "If Adam's fall has had so bad a universal consequence, much less can it be doubted that," etc. For God far rather allows His goodness to prevail than His severity; this is the presupposition on which the conclusion rests. Chrysostom has correctly interpreted π. μάλλ. in the logical sense (πολλῶ γὰρ τοῦτο εἰλογώτερον), as does also Theodoret, and recently Fritzsche, Philippi, Tholuck (who however takes in the *quantitative plus* as well), van Hengel, Mangold, and Klöpper. The *quantitative view* (Theophylact: οὐ τοσούτον μόνον, φησὶν, ὠφέλησεν ὁ Χριστὸς, ὅσον ἐβλάψεν ὁ Ἀδάμ; also Erasmus, Calvin, Beza, Calovius and others; and in modern times Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, Rothe, Nielsen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Maier, Hofmann, and Dietzsch) is opposed to the analogy of vv. 17, 18; and has also against it the consideration, that the measure of *punishment* of the παράπτωμα (*viz.* the death of all) was already quantitatively the greatest possible, was absolute, and therefore the measure of the *grace*, while just as absolute (εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς), is not greater still than that measure of punishment, but only stands out against the dark background of the latter all the more *evidently* in its rich fulness.¹ — ἡ χάρις τ. Θεοῦ κ. ἡ δωρεά] the former, *the grace of God*, richly turned towards the many, is the principle of the latter (ἡ δωρεά = τὸ χάρισμα in ver. 15, the gift of justification). The δωρεά is to be understood κατ' ἐξοχὴν, without supplying τοῦ Θεοῦ; but the discourse keeps apart with solemn emphasis what is cause and what is effect. — ἐν χάριτι . . . Χριστοῦ is not with many expositors (including Rothe, Tholuck, Baumgarten-Crusius, Philippi, Mehring, Hofmann, and Dietzsch) to be joined with ἡ δωρεά (the gift, which is procured through the grace of Christ), but with Fritzsche, Rückert, Ewald, van Hengel, and others, to be connected with ἐπερίσσευσε (*has become abundant through the grace of Christ*)—a construction which is decisively supported, not indeed by the absence of the article, since ἡ δωρεά ἐν χάριτι might be conjoined so as to form one idea, but by the reason, that only with this connection the τῶ . . . παραπτώματι in the protasis has its necessary, strictly correspondent, correlative in the apodosis. The divine grace and the gift have abounded to the many *through the grace of Christ*, just as the many died *through the fall*

¹ The way would have been logically prepared for the *quantitative plus* by the hypothetical protasis only in the event of that which was predicated being in the two clauses of a *similar* (not opposite) kind; in the event therefore of its having been possible to affirm a salutariness of the παράπτωμα in the protasis. Comp. xi. 12; 2 Cor. iii. 9, 11; Heb. ix. 13 f., xii. 9, 25. The main objection which Dietzsch (following Rothe) raises against the interpretation of the *logical plus*, on the ground that we have here two *historical realities* before us, is by no

means tenable. For even in the case of two facts which have taken place, the one may be corroborated and inferred from the other, namely, *as respects its certainty and necessity*. If the one has taken place, it is by so much the more evident that the other also has taken place. The historical reality of the one leaves all the less room for doubt as to that of the other. The second does not in this case require to be something still *future*, especially if it be an occurrence, which does not fall within the range of *sensuous perception*.

of *Adam*. The χάρις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is—as the genitive-relation naturally suggests of itself, and as is rendered obviously certain by the analogy of ἡ χάρις τ. Θεοῦ—the *grace of Jesus Christ*, in virtue of which He found Himself moved to accomplish the ἰλαστήριον, in accordance with the Father's decree, and thereby to procure for men the *divine grace* and the δωρεά. It is not therefore the *favour in which Christ stood with God* (Luther, 1545) ; nor the *grace of God received in the fellowship of Christ* (van Hengel) ; nor is it the steadily continued, earthly and heavenly, redeeming efficacy of *Christ's grace* (Rothe, Dietzsch). Comp. Acts xv. 11 ; 2 Cor. viii. 9 ; Gal. i. 6 ; Tit. iii. 6 ; 2 Cor. xii. 8, xiii. 13. The designation of Christ : τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰ. Χ., is occasioned by the contrast with the one man Adam. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 21 ; 1 Tim. ii. 5. To describe the divine glory of this One man (Col. i. 19) did not fall within the Apostle's present purpose ; but it was known to the reader, and is presupposed in His χάρις (John i. 64). — τῇ τοῦ “artificuli nervosissimi,” Bengel. — εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς] belongs to ἐπερίσσεια. The πολλοί are likewise here, just as previously, *all mankind* (comp. πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ver. 18). To this multitude has the grace of God, etc., *been plentifully imparted* (εἰς τ. π. ἐπερίσσεια, comp. 2 Cor. i. 5), namely, from the *objective* point of view, in so far as Christ's act of redemption has acquired for all the divine grace and gift, although the subjective reception of it is conditioned by faith. See on ver. 18. The expression ἐπερίσσεια (he does not say merely ἐγένετο, or some such word) is the echo of his own blessed experience.

Ver. 16. Continuation of the difference between the gift of grace and the consequence of the fall, and that with reference to the *causal origination* on either side in a *numerical aspect*.¹ — *And not as through one, who has sinned, so is the gift, i.e. it is not so in its case—the state of the case there is the very reverse—as if it were occasioned δι' ἐνὸς ἀμαρτήσ.* (like death through Adam). The δι' ἐνὸς ἀμαρτήσ. indicates the unity of the person and of the accomplished sinful act ; comp. Stölting. Beyond the simple ἐστὶ after δώρημα nothing is to be supplied (so also Mangold), because the words without supplement are quite in accordance with the Greek use of ὥς,² and yield an appropriate sense, whereas none of the supplements that have been attempted are suggested by the context. It has been proposed, *e.g.* after ἀμαρτ. to supply θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν (Grotius, Estius, Koppe), or τὸ κρίμα or κατὰ κρίμα (Bengel, Klee, Reiche, Köllner) ; or after ὥς : τὸ (Beza), which is indeed impossible, but is nevertheless resorted to even by de Wette : “and not like *that which originated through one* that sinned, so is the gift,” and Tholuck : “the gift has a different character from *that which has come through the one man sinning*.” Comp. Philippi, who like Rückert and Dietzsch supplies merely ἐγένετο after ἀμαρτ. (and then after δωρ. : ἐστὶ),—which however still yields

¹ Dietzsch takes it differently, finding the progress of the argument in this, that at the end a *state of life adequate to the divine law* may be established. This view however rests on an erroneous exposition of δικαίωμα (see below), and generally on an erroneous mixing up of sanctification with

justification—an intermingling to be avoided throughout the entire train of thought in our passage ; comp. Pfeiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1872, p. 167.

² Bernhardt, p. 352, Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Sympos.* p. 179 E.

no complete sentence, since the ἐγένετο is without a subject. The correct view in substance is taken by Rothe, Ewald, and van Hengel; while Fritzsche still calls in the aid of a supplement after ἁμαρτ. (τὸ παράπτωμα ἐγένετο); and Hofmann even wishes mentally to supply to καὶ. . . δῶρημα from what precedes, to which it is attached, εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσευσεν as predicate;¹ whereas Mehring puts his rendering, which erroneously makes it a question (comp. on ver. 15), in this form: "*And ought not the gift to be, as it was through one that sinned?*" — τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίμα κ.τ.λ.] sc. ἐστὶ; explanation of the point of difference previously specified: *For the judicial sentence redounds from a single one to a sentence of condemnation, but the gift of grace from many trespasses to a sentence of justification.* — τὸ κρίμα] quite general: *the sentence which God pronounces as judge*; comp. 1 Cor. vi. 7. For the kind of sentence, which this shall prove to be in the concrete result, is indicated only by the following εἰς κατάκριμα. The explanation which refers it to the *divine announcement contained in Gen. ii. 17* (Fritzsche, Dietzsch) is erroneous, because the latter is a threat, and not a κρίμα; and because the act of Adam must have already preceded the κρίμα. Others understand by it the *sentence of punishment pronounced against Adam*, which has become a sentence of punishment (sentence of death) against his posterity (κατάκριμα) (Reiche, Rückert, Nielsen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Krehl, de Wette, Maier, Hofmann); but wrongly, because they thus neglect the pointed interchange of κρίμα and κατάκριμα, and in εἰς κατάκριμα place the stress on the condemned subject, which however is not even mentioned. Linguistically erroneous is the view of Beza, Calixtus, Wolf, and others, that τ. κρίμα is the *guilt*. Nor does it mean the *state of being finally adjudged* (Stölting). Philippi, Tholuck, Ewald, and van Hengel hold the right view; while Rothe, with unnecessary refining and gratuitous importation, takes τὸ μὲν and τὸ δέ by themselves as subject, κρίμα and χάρισμα as predicates ("the one effect is a righteous judgment. . . the other on the contrary a gift"). Dietzsch still more breaks up the sentence, making κρίμα and χάρισμα appositions, the former to τὸ μὲν, and the latter to τὸ δέ. — ἐξ ἐνός] has, like ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτ. afterwards, the chief emphasis; ἐνός is masculine on account of the previous δι' ἐνός ἁμαρτήσ., not neuter (παραπτώματος), as Rothe, Mehring, Dietzsch, Stölting and others think. This masculine however does not necessitate our taking πολλῶν also as *masculine* (Hofmann), which would in itself be allowable (comp. on 2 Cor. i. 11), but is here opposed by the consideration that Paul would have expressed the *personal* contrast to ἐξ ἐνός more symmetrically and thoughtfully by the bare ἐκ πολλῶν. The Vulgate gives the right sense: "*ex multis delictis.*" — ἐξ] points to the motive cause, producing the event from itself: *forth from one*; see Kühner, II. 1, p. 399. Just in the same way the second ἐκ. — εἰς κατάκριμα] sc. ἐστὶ, as in the first half of the verse,²

¹ It would run thus: "*The gift has not so accrued abundantly to the many and passed over to them, as was the case when such a delictual ensued through one that sinned.*" This supplement is already guarded against by the fact that κ. οὐχ down to δῶρημα is the obvious parallel of οὐχ ὡς τ. παραπτ. down

to χάρισμα, and hence, like the latter, may not be supplemented further than by ἐστὶ. Any other course is arbitrary and artificial. ² In consequence of the way in which Hofmann has supplemented the first half of the verse, we should now take, in the one instance, ἐξ ἐνός εἰς κατάκριμα εἰς τοὺς

"ut una cum praesentibus praeterita tamquam eadem in tabella repraesentet," van Hengel. *One* was the cause (moving the divine righteousness) that the judgment of God presents itself in the result as a punitive judgment (namely, that on account of the sin of one all should die, ver. 12) ; *many* sins [see Note LVIII. p. 225], on the other hand, were the cause (moving the divine compassion) that the gift of grace results *in concreto* as a judgment of justification. In the one case an *unity*, in the other a *multiplicity*, was the occasioning cause. In the second clause also, following the analogy of κρίμα in the first, τὸ χάρισμα is conceived of generally and abstractly ; the χάρισμα redounds in the concrete case εἰς δικάϊωμα, when God, namely, forgives the many sins and declares their subjects as righteous. δικάϊωμα, which is not, with Dietzsch, to be understood in the sense of *the right framing of life* through sanctification of the Spirit—a view contrary to linguistic usage and the context—is here also (comp. i. 32, ii. 26, viii. 4 ; Luke i. 6 ; Heb. ix. 1, 10 ; Rev. xv. 4 ; frequently in LXX. and Apocr., see Schleusner, *Theo.* II. p. 167 f.), according to its literal signification, in itself nothing else than *judicial determination, judicial sentence* ; but it is to be taken here in the Pauline sense of the divine δικαιοῦν, hence : the *sentence defining righteousness*, the ordinance of God in which He completes the δικαίωσις as *actus judicialis*, the opposite of κατὰκριμα. *Condition of righteousness* (Luther and others), "*the actual status of being righteous*" (Hofmann), would be represented by δικαιοσύνη ; *satisfaction of justice*, compensation of justice (Rothe, Mehring following Calovius, and Wolf), in accordance with which idea it may even designate *punishment* in classical usage (Plat. *Legg.* ix. p. 864 E), it *might* mean (Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* v. 7, 17 : ἐπ' ἀνόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος), but never does so in Biblical usage, to which this special definition of the sense is foreign. Paul could convey the sense *declaration as righteous, verdict of justification*, the more appropriately by δικάϊωμα, since in Bar. ii. 17 the word is also substantially thus used (δώσουσι δόξαν κ. δικάϊωμα τῷ κυρίῳ, in Hades they shall not praise God and *declare Him righteous*). Compare also 2 Sam. xix. 28 ; Jer. xi. 20 ; Prov. viii. 20 ; Rev. xv. 4, and xix. 8.¹ The right view is taken by Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, Krehl, Philippi, Tholuck, Ewald, van Hengel, Holsten, Klöpffer, and Pfeiderer ; Rückert (also Maier) abides by *means* of justification, following merely the form of the word without empirical proof, while de Wette is undecided, and Stölting, without precedent from linguistic usage (comp. above Luther and Hofmann), understands the *state* of justification into which the *state of grace* (the χάρισμα) has passed. These two conceptions however exclude any idea of succession, and are concurrent. — The addition ζωῆς in D. Vulg. is a correct gloss ; comp. ver. 18.

Ver. 17. The τὸ δὲ χάρισμα ἐκ πολλ. παραπτ. εἰς δικάϊωμα, just asserted in contrast to the κατὰκριμα proceeding from *One*, has now the seal of *confirma-*

πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσευσεν as predicate to τὸ κρίμα ; and in the other instance, ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων εἰς δικάϊωμα εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσευσεν as predicate to τὸ χάρισμα,—notwithstanding that in both cases a definition with εἰς is already given by Paul himself. How enigmatically and

misleadingly he would have written !

¹ Where τὰ δικάϊωματα τῶν ἁγίων are the divine verdicts of justification, which the saints have received. The pure byssus is their symbol. Compare Ewald, *Joh. Schr. in loc.* p. 330. Düsterdieck understands it otherwise (righteous acts).

tion (γάρ) impressed on it through the triumphant certainty of the *reign of life*, which must belong to the recipients of the δικαίωμα in the approaching completion of the kingdom through the One Jesus Christ all *the more undoubtedly*, since the παράπτωμα of the One Adam brought death to reign. The effect of the second One (the Adam μέλλον) in the direction of salvation cannot in fact remain behind the effect which proceeded from the first One in the direction of destruction. On this rests the *evidence* of the blissful assurance, which with πολλῶ μᾶλλον stands forth as it were from the gloom of the death previously described (comp. vv. 15, 9). The view that ver. 17 adduces the *proof* of the first half of ver. 16 being *really proved* by its second half (Hofmann), is to be rejected for this very reason, that the demonstration in ver. 16 is so full and clear in itself, especially after ver. 15, that there is no longer any necessity for receiving *proof of its probative power*, and no reader could expect this. It is quite arbitrary in Rothe, especially looking to the regular continuation by γάρ, to take ver. 16 as a parenthesis, and to attach ver. 17 to ver. 15. For other views of the connection see Dietzsch, who, in accordance with his own unsuitable rendering of δικαίωμα, finds here the inner righteous condition of life verified by the final reign of life as its outward manifestation. — δὲ τοῦ ἐνός] *through the medium of the One*, is added, although ἐν ἐνὶ παραπτώματι had been already said (see the critical remarks), in order to prepare the way with due emphasis for the διὰ τοῦ ἐνός Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ of the apodosis. Comp. on 2 Cor. xii. 7. — πολλῶ μᾶλλον] Here also, as in ver. 15, the *logical plus*, the far greater certainty and evidence. — οἱ λαμβάνοντες] not those who believingly *accept* (Bengel, Rothe, van Hengel, and others), but simply the *recipients*. [See Note LIX. p. 226.] The present participle denotes the presence of the time of grace introduced by Christ, which stands in the middle between the former reign of death and the reign of life in the blissful future and determines the subjects of the latter; comp. ver. 11. — τὴν περισσεῖαν] *the abundant fulness* (comp. ii. 4) of grace, referring to ἐπερίσσευσε in ver. 15. — τῆς χάρις κ. τ. δωρεᾶς] distinguished, as in ver. 15. But the emphasis of the description, climactic in the enthusiasm of victory, lies in the first instance on χάριτος, and then, as it advances, on δικαιοσύνης, in contrast to the former tragic παράπτωμα. — τῆς δικαιοσύ.] is that, in which the δωρεά consists. The whole characteristic description of the subjects by οἱ . . . λαμβάνοντες already implies the certainty with which one may reckon in the case of those, who are honoured to receive such abundance, on the final βασιλεῦεν ἐν ζωῇ through Christ. — ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύουσιν] The word βασιλ. itself, and more especially the *future*, renders it certain that the *future* Messianic ζωή is here meant; in which, as the opposite of the θάνατος, the pardoned and justified shall have the joint-dominion of the new world (viii. 21), the κληρονομία and its δόξα (viii. 17), under Christ the Head (1 Cor. iv. 8, vi. 2; 2 Tim. ii. 12), in whose final manifestation their life shall be gloriously manifested (Col. iii. 3 f.). Observe, further, that in the apodosis Paul does not say ἡ ζωὴ βασιλεύσει ἐπὶ τοὺς . . . λαμβάνοντας in accordance with the protasis, but appropriately, and in harmony with the active nature of the relation, *i.e.* of the future glorious liberty of the children of God, places the subjects actively in the foreground, and

affirms of *them* the reigning *in* life. — The Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is added *as if in triumph*, in contradistinction to the unnamed but well-known εἰς, who occasioned the dominion of death. Finally, we should not fail to notice how in this passage the glance proceeds from the status *gratiæ* (λαμβάνοντες) backward to the status *iræ* (ἐβασίλευσε), and forward to the status *gloriæ* (βασίλειουσιν).

Ver. 18 f. Summary recapitulation of the whole parallel treated of from ver. 12 onwards, so that the elements of likeness and unlikeness contained in it are now comprehended in one utterance. Συλλογίζεται ἐνταῦθα τὸ πᾶν, Theodore of Mopsuestia. The emergence of the ἀρα οὖν now ushering in the conclusion, as well as the corresponding relation of the contents of ver. 18 f. to the indication given by ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος in ver. 14, carries us back to ver. 12; not merely to ver. 16 f. (de Wette, Fritzsche); or merely to vv. 15–17 (Hofmann, Dietzsch). The right view is taken by Philippi, Ewald, Holsten. — ἀρα οὖν] conclusive: *accordingly then*,¹ in very frequent use by the Apostle (vii. 3, 25, viii. 12, ix. 16, 18, xiv. 12, 19; Gal. vi. 10; Eph. ii. 19 *et al.*), and that, contrary to the classical usage,² at the beginning of the sentence. For the *necessary* (contrary to Mehring's view) *completion* of the two sentences, which are in the sharpest and briefest manner compressed as it were into a mere exclamation (Ewald), it is sufficient simply to supply: *res cessit, it has come*, ἀπέβη (Winer, p. 546 [E. T. 587]), or ἐγένετο (Grotius). See Buttmann's *neut. Gr.* p. 338 [E. T. 394]. *As it therefore has come to a sentence of condemnation for all men through One trespass, so also it has come to justification of life* (which has for its consequence the possession of the future Messianic life, comp. ver. 21; John v. 28, 29) *for all men through One justifying judgment*. The supplying of τὸ κρίμα ἐγένετο to the first, and τὸ χάρισμα ἐγένετο to the second half (so Fritzsche and Rückert), considering the opposite sense of the two subjects, renders the very compressed discourse somewhat singular. — δι' ἐνὸς δικ.] *through one judicial verdict* (see on vv. 16, 19), namely, that which was pronounced by God on account of the obedience of Christ rendered through His death. In strict logic indeed the δικαίωμα, which is properly the antithesis of κατὰ κρίμα (as in ver. 16), should not be opposed to παράπτωμα; but this incongruity of a lively interchange of conceptions is not un-Pauline (comp. ver. 15). And it is thoroughly unwarranted to assign to δικαίωμα here also, as in ver. 16, significations which it has not; such as *actual status of being righteous* (Hofmann, Stölting), *fulfilment of right* (Philippi, Mangold), *making amends* (Rothe), *righteous deed* (Holsten), *righteous life-condition of Christ* (Dietzsch), with which a new humanity begins, *act of justification* (Tholuck), *virtuousness* (Baumgarten-Crusius), *obedience* (de Wette), and the like—definitions, in which for the most part regard is had to the act of the death of Jesus partly with and partly without the addition of the *obedientia activa* (comp. also Klöpffer), while Fritzsche explains it of the incarnation and humilia-

¹ Ἄρα, "ad internam potius causam spectat," οὖν, "magis ad externam," Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 177. Comp. p. 173. The ἀρα serves specifically for *dialectic accura-*

cy; Baeumlein, p. 35; comp. Kühner, II. p. 857.

² Herm. *ad Antig.* 628, *ad Viger.* p. 823.

tion of Christ (Phil. ii. 5, 8) as His *recte factum*. Ewald interprets rightly : "through One righteous sentence ;" so also van Hengel and Umbreit. This alone is permitted by ver. 16. It is the One declaration of what is now of right, that is, the judicial verdict of the being reconciled, which took place on the part of God, on the ground of Christ's sacrificial death—the *consequence therefore*, of His *ὑπακοή* rendered in death—and which so far may appear as the antithesis to the fall of Adam with the same right as in ver. 15 the grace and gift were adduced as the contrast to that fall. To take the *ἐνός* as masculine (Vulgate, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, and many others, including Tholuck, Fritzsche, Nielsen, Picard, Klöpper, Philippi, and Hofmann), is, seeing that no article is annexed, unwarranted according to the analogy of the immediate context, vv. 17, 19 ; or Paul would have only expressed himself in a way liable to be misunderstood (how differently in ver. 16 !). Equally unwarranted is it to conceive the verb to be supplied in the apodosis as *in the future* (Philippi, Dietzsch). The judicial verdict *is given* and *has redounded* once and for ever to justification of eternal life for all ; that is the great historical fact of salvation, which Paul has in view and sets forth as a concrete event (not under the point of view of a timeless abstraction, as Rothe thought) without considering how far it is now or in the future appropriated through faith by the subjects.—In both halves of the verse πάντες ἄνθρωποι is simply *all men*, as in ver. 12. At the same time it must be noted that in the second half the relation is conceived in its *objectivity*. On the part of God it has come to justification for *all* ; thus the case stands *objectively* ; the *subjective attainment* of this universal justification, the realization of it for the *individuals*, depends upon whether the latter believingly apprehend the *δικαίωμα* for their own subjective *δικαίωσις*, or unbelievingly reject it. This dependence on a subjective condition, however, did not belong to the scope of our passage, in which the only object was to set forth the all-embracing blessed objective consequence of the *ἐν δικαίωμα*, in contrast to the all-destructive objective consequence of the *ἐν παράπτωμα*. Hence just as little can anything be deduced from our passage as from xi. 32 in favour of a final ἀποκατάστασις. The distinction imported by Hofmann and Lechler : that πάντες ἄνθρωποι means *all without distinction*, and πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι, on the other hand, *all without exception*, the *sum total* of mankind, is purely fanciful ; πάντες means *omnes, nemine excepto*, alike whether the substantive belonging to it, in accordance with the connection, has or has not the article ("articulus, cum sensus fert additus vel omissus, discrimen sententiae non facit," Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 519). Only when the article stands *before* πάντες (consequently οἱ πάντες ἄνθ.) does the distinction emerge, that we have to think of "*cunctos sive universos, i.e. singulos in unum corpus colligatos*" (Ellendt, p. 521) ; comp. Krüger, § 50, 11, 12 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 545.

Ver. 19. This final sentence, assigning a reason, now formally by the recurrence of the ὥστερ points back to ver. 12, with which the whole chain of discourse that here runs to an end had begun. [See Note LX. p. 226.] But *that which* is to be established by γάρ is not the *how* of the parallel com-

parison, which is set forth repeatedly with clearness (in opposition to Rothe), but the blissful conclusion of that comparison in ver. 18 : *εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς*, upon which what is now expressed in ver. 19 impresses the *seal of certainty*. Dietzsch thinks that the purport, which is kept general, of ver. 18 is now to be established from the *personal life*. But the right interpretation of *δικαίωμα* and of *δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται* is opposed to this view. — *ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθ. οἱ πολλοί* [See Note LXI. p. 227.] *The many were set down as sinners*; for according to ver. 12 ff. they were indeed, through the disobedience of Adam, put actually into the category of sinners, because, namely, they sinned in and with the fall of Adam. Thus through the disobedience of the one man, because all had part in it, has the position of all become that of sinners. The consequence of this, that they were subjected to punishment (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact and others), were treated as sinners (Grotius, Flatt, Böhme, Krehl and others), and the like, is not here expressly included, but after the foregoing is obvious of itself. Fritzsche (comp. Koppe and Reiche) has : through their death they appeared as sinners.¹ On the one hand this gratuitously imports something (through their death), and on the other it does violence to the expression *κατεστάθ.*, which denotes the real putting into the position of sinners, whereby they *de facto* came to stand as sinners,² *peccatores constituti sunt* (James iv. 4 ; 2 Pet. i. 8 ; Heb. v. 1, viii. 3 ; 2 Macc. xv. 2 ; 3 Macc. i. 7 ; Plat. Rep. p. 564 A ; Conv. p. 222 B ; examples from Xenophon in Sturz, II. p. 610), as is required by the ruling normal clause *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* in ver. 12. The Apostle might have written *ἐγενήθησαν* (as Dietzsch explains the *κατεστ.*), but he has already in view the antithesis *δίκαιοι καταστ.*, and expresses himself in conformity to it : hence also he does not put *πάντες* (which might have stood in the first clause), but *οἱ πολλοί*. — *διὰ ὑπακοῆς* through obedience. The death of Jesus was *κατ' ἐξοχήν* His obedience to the will of the Father, Phil. ii. 8 ; Heb. v. 8. But this designation is selected as the antithesis to the *παρακοή* of Adam, and all the more certainly therefore it does not here mean "the collective life-obedience" (Lechler, comp. Hofmann, Dietzsch and others), but must be understood as the deed of atonement willed by God (ver. 8 ff.), to which we owe justification, and the ethical premiss of which on Christ's side is righteousness of life, although Hofmann improperly rejects this view as a *groundless fancy*. — *δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται* shall be placed in the category of righteous. The future refers³ to the future revelation of

¹ So also Julius Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, II. p. 485, ed. 5, evading the literal sense : "the many have become declared (as it were before the divine judgment-seat) as sinners through the disobedience of the one man (as the determining initial point of sinful development), by the fact, that they have been subjected to death." See on the other hand Hofmann, who properly urges that they did not become sinners only along with their dying, but immediately through Adam's disobedience. But the *how* of their doing so is in fact just the *ἐφ'*

ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, according to our conception of these words.

² Dietzsch should not have raised the objection that it ought to have been *εἰς ἁμαρτωλοὺς*, or *ἐν ἁμαρτωλοῖς*. See generally Kühner, II. 1, p. 274.

³ Corresponding to the *βασιλεύσουσι* in ver. 17, and hence not to be explained in a mere general way of the certain expectation or conviction (Mehring), as Hofmann also takes it in the sense of *μέλλει λογίζεσθαι*, iv. 24. Comp. on the other hand ii. 13, 16 ; and see on Gal. v. 5.

glory after the resurrection (Reiche, Fritzsche, Klöpper) ; not to the fact that the multitude of believers is conceived of as not yet completed, and consequently the justifying of them is chiefly regarded as a succession of cases *to come* (comp. iii. 20, 30). The *how* of the *δίκαιοι κατασταθ.* cannot be found in an *actual becoming righteous*, as result of the divine work of grace, at the close of the saving process (Dietzsch), which would offend against the whole context since ver. 12, and anticipate the contents of ch. vi. In truth the mode which Paul had in view is beyond doubt, after the development of the doctrine of justification in chs. iii. iv. God has forgiven believers on account of the death of Christ, and counted their faith as righteousness. Thus the obedience of the One has caused that at the judgment the *πολλοί* shall by God's sentence enter into the category of the righteous,¹ as the disobedience of the One had caused the *πολλοί* to enter the opposite. In both cases the *causa meritoria* is the objective act of the two heads of the race (the sin of Adam—the death of Christ), to whom belong the *πολλοί* on both sides ; while the *subjective mediating* cause is the individual relation to those acts (communion in Adam's fall—faith). It is a mistake therefore to quote this passage against the Protestant doctrine of justification (Reithmayr and Bisping), as if the making righteous were designated as sanctification. But we are not entitled to carry the comparison between Adam and Christ further than Paul himself has done.

Vv. 20, 21. The comparison between Adam and Christ is closed. But in the middle between the two stood the *law* ! [See Note LXII. p. 227.] How therefore could Paul leave unnoticed the *relation of the law to both*, the relation of this essential intervening element in the divine plan of salvation, the continuity of which was not to be hindered by the law, but, on the contrary, advanced to its blissful goal ? The mention of it presented itself necessarily to him, especially after the utterance already contained in ver. 13, even without our thinking of an opponent's objection,² or, at least, of persons who fancied that they must themselves furnish something in order to secure for themselves eternal life (Hofmann) ; but it cannot be regarded as the proper *goal* of the entire discussion (Th. Schott), which would not at all correspond to so succinct an indication. — *παρεισήλθεν*] *there came in alongside* (of the *ἀμαρτία*, which had already come in, ver. 12) into the world.³ The notion of *secrecy* (Vulgate : *subintravit*, comp. Erasmus, *Annot.*, Send.) is not implied in *παρά* *in itself*, but would require to be suggested by the *context*, as in Gal. ii. 4 ; Pol. i. 7, 3 ; i. 8, 4 ; ii. 55, 3 (where *λάβρα* stands along with it) ; comp. *παρεισάγω, παρεισδύω, παρεισφέρω* κ.τ.λ., which likewise receive the idea of secrecy only from the context. But this

¹ Consequently not through any internal communication or infusion of the moral quality of righteousness ; comp. Döllinger, *Christenthum u. K.* p. 200 f. 190, ed. 2. See on the other hand Köstlin in the *Jahrb. f. D. Theol.* 1856, p. 95. Döllinger erroneously explains *καταστάθ.* : “ *established in righteousness.* ”

² So even Cyril and Grotius ; compare

Mangold. The latter finds here a proof of the preponderantly *Jewish-Christian* character of the readers. But with as little right as it might be found in Gal. iii.

³ See Vigerus, ed. Herm. p. 651 ; and van Hengel *in loc.* Comp. Philo in Loesner, p. 252, especially *de temul.* p. 263 C, where *παρεισελθεῖν ἑώρα* means *juxta se intrare sinens*. On the idea comp. Gal. iii. 19.

is *not* at all the case here, because this idea would be at variance with the solemn giving of the law (Gal. iii. 19 ; Acts vii. 53), and the reverence of the Apostle for it (Rom. vii. 12 ff.). Reiche, Rothe, Tholuck, Rückert, and Philippi import the idea that the law is designated as an *accessory* institution, or its coming in as of *subordinate* importance in comparison with that of sin (Hofmann), as an element *not making an epoch* (Weiss, Dietzsch). It *was* not such, Gal. iv. 24, nor is this sense implied in the word itself. Linguistically incorrect (for *παρεισέρχ.* does not mean coming in *between*, but coming in *alongside*) is the view of others : that it came in the *middle* between Adam (according to Theodoret and Reithmayr, Abraham) and Christ (Calvin, Grotius, Estius, Baumgarten-Crusius, Usteri, Ewald; Bising, and others). Nor does *παρεισῆλθεν* mean : it came in *in opposition thereto*, *i.e.* in opposition to *sin* (Mehring). Such a reference must necessarily have been implied, as in Gal. ii. 4, in the context, but would be out of place here on account of the following *ἵνα κ.τ.λ.*, which Mehring inappropriately takes as painful *irony*. Finally that *παρά* means *obiter, ad tempus* (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Cornelius à Lapide) is a pure fancy. — *ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτ.*] *in order that the transgression might be increased.* [See Note LXIII. p. 227.] The *παράπτωμα* can only be intended in the sense in which the reader must have understood it in virtue of the preceding text, ver. 15 ff., therefore of the *Adamite* transgression. This was the concrete destructive evil, which existed in the world as the beginning of sin and the cause of universal death. By the law, however, it was not to be abolished or annulled, but on the contrary (observe the prefixing of *πλεονάσῃ*) it was to be *increased*, *i.e.* to obtain accession in more and more *παρὰπτώμασι*. If therefore τὸ παράπτωμα is not to be taken collectively (Fritzsche, de Wette, van Hengel, and others) just as little is *ἵνα πλεονάσῃ* to be rationalized so that it may be interpreted *logice*, of greater *acknowledgment* of sin (Grotius, Wolf, Nielsen, Baur), or of the *consciousness of sin* (J. Müller), since the corresponding *ὑπερεπερίσ.* cannot be so taken ; nor so, that *ἵνα* is to be explained as ecclastic (Chrysostom, and several Fathers quoted by Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 1454, Koppe, Reiche), which is *never* correct, and is not justified by the groundless fear of a blasphemous and un-Pauline idea (Reiche). Comp. Gal. iii. 19 ; 1 Cor. xv. 56 ; and generally on i. 24. Augustine (in Ps. cii. c. 15) rightly says by way of describing the *intervening* aim referred to : “non crudeliter hoc fecit Deus, sed consilio medicinae ; . . . augetur morbus, crescit malitia, quaeritur medicus et totum sanatur.” — *παράπτωμα* and *ἁμαρτία* are not certainly distinguished as Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 47, defines ; nor yet, as Reiche thinks, simply thus, that both words indicate the same idea only under different figures (this would be true of *παράπτωμα* and *ἁμαρτήμα*) ; but in this way, that τὸ παράπτωμα invariably indicates only the concrete sin, the sinful deed ; while ἡ ἁμαρτία may have as well the concrete (as always when it stands in the plural, comp. on Eph. ii. 1) as the abstract sense. It has the latter sense in our passage, and it appears *purposely chosen*. For if the Adamite transgression, which was present in the world of men as a fact and with its baneful effect, received accession through the law, so that this evil actually existing in humanity since the fall increased,

the sum total of sin *in abstracto*, which was among men, was thereby enlarged ; the *dominion* of sin became greater, both extensively and intensively (comp. Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 73). Therefore the discourse *progresses* thus : οὐ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, and then ἐβασίλ. ἡ ἁμαρτία. — οὐ] *where, local, of the domain, where etc.* This *field* is generally *the world of men*, in which, however, the increase in sin here meant came from the people of the law, from Israel ; but without the sphere of the οὐ being limited to the latter, since immediately, in ver. 21, he brings forward the *universal* point of view as it prevails throughout the section (in opposition to Hofmann). The *temporal* rendering : *when* (Grotius, de Wette, Fritzsche, Stölting) is likewise linguistically correct (time being represented *under the aspect of space*, comp. ἀφ' οὐ and the like), but less in harmony with the analogous passages, iv. 15 ; 2 Cor. iii. 17 (οὐ . . . ἐκεῖ). — ὑπερεπερίσσο.] *it became over-great*, *supra modum redundavit*. The ἐπλεόνασεν had to be *surpassed*. Comp. 2 Cor. vii. 4 ; 1 Tim. i. 14 ; Mark vii. 37 ; 2 Thess. i. 3. But that it had surpassed *itself* (Hofmann), is a definite reference gratuitously introduced. The two correlative verbs are related simply as *comparative* and *superlative*. — ἵνα ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ.] *in order that, just as (formerly) sin reigned in virtue of death, so also (divine) grace should reign by means of righteousness unto eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord*. This is the whole blessed aim of the ὑπερεπερίσσο. ἡ χάρις. Rothe incorrectly desires to treat οὐ δὲ . . . χάρις as a parenthesis. This proposition is in fact so essential, that it is the necessary premiss for the opening up of that most blessed prospect. See moreover Dietzsch. — ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ] *not unto death* (Luther, Beza, Calvin, and many others), nor yet *in death* as the *sphere* of its rule (Tholuck, Philippi), but *instrumentally*, corresponding to the antithesis διὰ δικαιοσύνης εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον (which belong together). Sin has brought death into the world with it, and subjected all to death (ver. 12), ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἥμαρτον ; thus sin exercised its dominion *in virtue of death*. This dominion however has given way to the dominion of grace, whose rule does not indeed abolish death, which having once entered into the world with sin has become the common lot of all, in itself, but accomplishes its object all the more blissfully, in that it confers a *righteousness redounding to everlasting life*.¹ And grace exercises this bliss-bringing rule *through the merit of its personal Mediator* (πρόξενος, Chrysostom) *Christ*, who has earned it for men through His expiatory death. The *full triumphant conclusion*, διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν (comp. vii. 25 ; 1 Cor. xv. 57 *al.*) belongs to the entire thought ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ . . . ζ. αἰώνιον, upon which it impresses the seal. Here, also, the δικαιοσύνη is the righteousness of *faith* (not of life).

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

XLIX. Ver. 1. ἔχομεν.

The textual question of this verse is one of extreme difficulty. That the weight of external authority is in favor of ἔχομεν cannot be doubted. But it is

¹ The pregnant sense, which Hofmann, seeks to apply analogically here also (comp. on ver. 14, attributes to the βασιλεῦν, and Dietzsch), is here least of all appropriate.

equally beyond doubt that the internal argument points toward the indicative. The remark of Godet is justified by an examination of what the advocates of the other reading have brought forward in its support: "No exegete has been able satisfactorily to account for this imperative suddenly occurring in the midst of a didactic development." The Apostle seems clearly, in these verses, to be presenting the blessed consequences of the doctrine which he has established by argument. That, in such a presentation, he should state the first of these consequences (or, indeed, the second and third also), only in the form of an exhortation to lay hold upon it, is, though not impossible, contrary to all probability.

L. Ver. 2. καὶ κανχόμεθα.

καί, as Meyer holds, is to be connected with ἔχομεν of ver. 1. There are three consequences of justification by faith, which the Apostle mentions in the first half of the chapter (1-11): peace with God, joy in hope of the future glory, and joy in present tribulations. These are the main points of the section, and are set forth in co-ordinate sentences. The other parts of the passage are subordinate: δὲ οὖν . . . ἐστήκαμεν of ver. 2 to the statement of ver. 1, and vv. 3b-11 to ver. 3a. The cause or ground of the believer's rejoicing in tribulations is, that he knows that, in a certain way and by a certain process, they lead to the confirmation of his hope of the future. Tribulation works out the result for him of steadfast endurance; this, in its turn, the result of "triedness" [δοκιμή apparently does not mean *probation* (*proving*), as R. V., but *approval*, or the condition of one who, having been tested and tried, has stood the test and is approved]; and this tested and approved character, again, naturally and necessarily strengthens hope—which hope is one that does not disappoint the man who has it. The foundation of the confidence that it will not prove disappointing is the greatness of the love of God. This greatness is exhibited and proved in vv. 6-8, and the conclusion resting upon it—that the Divine love will, beyond all doubting, bring to its end that which it has, by the provision of a reconciliation through Christ, so wonderfully begun—is declared and emphatically repeated in vv. 9-11.

LI. Ver. 12. διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.

The second section of this chapter (12-19) presents another blessed consequence of the proof that justification is by faith: namely, that in this doctrine we have a universal system of salvation—not limited to one nation as was the law, but open to all nations alike. In order to the setting forth of this universality in an impressive way, the parallelism with the case of Adam is introduced. As evil came from him, not to one section of mankind, but to all sections, so it is with the blessings from Christ. To Paul's mind this universality and "world-wide significance" was the glory of Christianity. It was natural, therefore, that he should give it special prominence, and should present it to his readers, as he does in this long paragraph, as standing over against or equalling all the other and special results to which he had just referred. To suppose that he here turns to consider the subject of original sin, for the purpose of enunciating fully the true doctrine concerning it, is to misapprehend the writer's design. It is also to suppose that from the outbreak of the joyous feeling of a full heart, in the preceding verses, he suddenly turns to the darkest and saddest side of human history, and then, after writing a few statements respecting it, leaves it entirely, to discuss another and quite

different matter. We must believe that the introduction of Adam and his relation to the world is altogether in the way of illustration, and is of secondary importance, as compared with the main object in view. This being the character of the passage, we can readily see how the writer should have limited himself—as we find that he does—to the one point which he had in mind, and should not have cared to express himself, with definiteness or fulness, as to the entire doctrine of the relation of Adam's sin to the condemnation of his posterity. That there is a consequential connection between that sin and the condemnation, it was necessary to his purpose to state. But it was by no means necessary to explain, in all its details, the mode of this connection.

LII. Ver. 12. εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

With reference to πάντας, see note on page 76. The fact there mentioned respecting the use of this word in the course of the argument (i. 18–iv. 25), renders it altogether probable that “all men” here means all, *without national limitations*, rather than all without the exception of any single individual. A writer is to be interpreted according to the thought which he is manifestly developing. The thought of the Apostle, for the setting forth of which he wrote his Epistle, is that righteousness is by faith for every one, *whether Jew or Gentile*. This proposition he has proved, and he is now declaring, with joy, that its truth involves universality of blessing. What is this universality but that which includes Gentiles as well as Jews?

LIII. Ver. 12. πάντες ἡμαρτον.

The aorist tense in this verb seems to require explanation. Neither here nor in iii. 23 and ii. 12, is it to be regarded as equivalent to the perfect or present. In this case it carries back the thought to the time of Adam's sin. But in what sense all men are declared to have sinned when he did is not determined by the mere fact that the aorist is used. The writer may be intending to state an actual participation in the first sin, or he may be expressing himself in a figurative or semi-figurative way. That the former of these suppositions is not true is rendered probable by the acknowledged independence on the part of each man of the sins of his ancestors. All admit that a man is in no literal sense, either physically or morally, one with his remotest forefather next this side of Adam. If no such union exists with the last but one in the ascending series, we naturally conclude that there is none with the last. This conclusion may not, indeed, be a necessary one. It is not. But it is so probable, that it may set us on an inquiry as to whether some other explanation cannot be found, which will relieve us of this difficulty; and, if such an explanation is discovered, it may give the weight of a strong presumption in its favor. The usage of Paul in employing the aorist, and the indications of the passage, point to the discovery. Of the view in question, Dr. Charles Hodge fitly says, “Even on the extremest realistic assumption that humanity as such is an entity, the act of Adam was not the act of all men. His sin was an intelligent act of self-determination; but an act of rational self-determination is a personal act. Unless, therefore, all men as persons existed in Adam, it is impossible that they acted his act. To say that a man acted thousands of years before his personality began does not rise even to the dignity of a contradiction: it has no meaning at all. It is a monstrous evil to make the Bible

contradict the common sense and common consciousness of men" (Comm. p. 236). The view adopted by Hodge himself, with others of similar theological opinions, gives to the verb the meaning "were accounted as sinners;" that is, all men *were regarded and treated as sinners* on account of Adam's offence, although they, in no actual sense, participated in it. He was their representative, and they are subjected to penal evils because their representative sinned. This explanation is not only exposed to the objection that it contravenes our ordinary ideas of justice—an objection which, if not absolutely fatal, at least throws a strong presumption against it, and impels us to search for some more reasonable account of the meaning—but is also inconsistent with the universal sense of the verb [Gen. xliii. 9, xlv. 32; 1 Kings i. 21, the only passages which are even claimed as exceptions, not being properly applicable to the case in hand], and is directly contradicted by what is said in vv. 18, 19. Dr. Shedd, who favors the view of actual participation, says of this mode of interpreting the words, "The clause is introduced to justify the infliction of death upon all men. But it makes an infliction more inexplicable, rather than less so, to say that it is visited upon those who did not commit the sin that caused the death, but were fictitiously and gratuitously regarded as if they had." (Comm. on Rom. p. 125.) The reader may be referred to the commentaries of these two writers, opposing each other, for a satisfactory refutation of the views of both. We are led, accordingly, by the failure of the literal explanation, to ask for another. And here we notice that Paul repeatedly uses the aorist tense in a semi-figurative or figurative sense, in cases analogous to the present. In the next chapter, vv. 4, 6, 8, he says that he and his Christian readers were buried with Christ, that their old man was crucified with Him, that they died with Him. Gal. ii. 20, he declares that he had been crucified with Christ. In passages like these he does not mean that the Roman believer, who became a Christian perhaps many years after the death of Jesus, was actually put on the cross with Him and participated in His dying. He means, simply, that by reason of his becoming a believer, and whenever he does so, any person is, *ipso facto*, so closely united with Jesus that it is *as if* he had been actually placed upon His cross. In a similar sense, the posterity of Adam sinned in his sin. As their individual sins were, in some way, a consequence of his sinning, and his sin, thus, in some way set the course of things sin-ward, they are said—though having no actual share in the committing of his act, and not born, even for many centuries after his time—to have sinned when he did. It is *as if* they had actually done so. That this mode of representing the matter was especially adapted to the case before us is clear from the fact that the object which the Apostle has in view is to compare Adam, and the results which flowed from his act, with Christ and those which are derived from Him. Here, therefore—beyond most other places in his letters—the impulse to centralize all in the two, in this figurative way, must have affected him. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews represents Levi as participating in Abraham's payment of tithes to Melchizedek, since he was then in the loins of Abraham. Being a more careful writer, in such minor points, than Paul, and leaving less to be supplied by the reader's mind, he adds to his statement that the sharing of the descendant in his ancestor's act was only a "so to speak" sharing. The participation of Adam's descendants in the committing of Adam's sin was, after a similar sort, a figurative participation.

LIV. Ver. 12. ἡμαρτον.

So, likewise, Weiss ed. Mey., who properly says that the words cannot, unless arbitrarily, be understood of anything except the individual sins of individual men. He also justly holds that, when interpreted in the right way, vv. 13, 14, which some commentators regard as favoring the other views, afford no such evidence as is claimed. In respect to the objection urged by Meyer (and by many writers who explain the verb here as referring to actual sinning in Adam, or as having the sense *were regarded as sinners*) against the reference to individual sins, that "all" includes the millions of children who have died without committing actual sin (*i.e.* in infancy), Weiss says that this objection overlooks the fact that Paul enters upon this whole matter only in order to develop the analogy between Adam and Christ by showing that sin and death come from the former, as righteousness and life from the latter. As certainly, therefore, as the Apostle has in mind only such as are capable of appropriating to themselves the salvation which is provided, so certainly he is thinking only of those in whose case actual sinning can be predicated. To these suggestions might well have been added that the right understanding of the word *all* (see note viii.) as meaning all without national limitations, and not all without exception of any individuals (even infants), deprives this objection of Meyer's of all force. The Apostle had no thought of the "millions of young children" in what he here says of Adam and Christ.

LV. Ver. 13. ἄχρι νόμου.

Weiss ed. Mey. holds that *νόμου* of this verse means *a law*, but admits it to be evident that, in both instances of its occurrence, it designates not any law whatever (whether written or on the conscience), but one of the same character with the Mosaic. He admits, also, that the period referred to is that which preceded the giving of the Mosaic law. The manifestly parallel expression in ver. 14 (from Adam until Moses) makes this admission necessary, so far, at least, as the first instance is concerned. Not only this, it also shows that the probability is very strong against the view of Weiss, and in favor of understanding by *ἄχρι νόμου* until the law (*i.e.* of Moses). A similar strong probability in the case of *μηδ' ὄντος νόμου* is indicated by the contrast between ver. 13b and ver. 14. But whatever may be said as to the possibility that the second *νόμου* may mean any *positive law*, the connection of these verses and the Pauline usage everywhere renders it clear that it does not mean any law whatsoever—whether given by revelation or by the light of nature.

LVI. Ver. 14. ἐπὶ τοὺς ἁμαρτήσαντας κ.τ.λ.

The view of Meyer is, that Paul had in his thought two classes of persons living between Adam and Moses—namely, those to whom positive divine commands were given, and those (the great majority indeed) to whom no such commands came. The former class, in sinning, transgressed as Adam did; the latter did not sin in this way. Yet even over the latter death reigned. This view is a perfectly legitimate one, so far as the use of *καὶ* is concerned; but Weiss objects to it, with some reason, on the ground that the Apostle seems to characterize the entire ante-legal period as without positive law, and certainly the numbers who had such law were insignificant. The opinion that Paul re-

fers here to infants, which has been held by many in former times, is rightly rejected by almost all the best commentators of recent date (Meyer, de Wette, Tholuck, Philippi, Godet, Alford, Weiss, and others). That there is no such reference is manifest, (a) from the fact that the words are not adapted to describe infants. If infants actually participated in Adam's sin, or were one with him, they are not those who did not sin after the likeness of his transgression; (b) from the fact that, as the infants of the time indicated, differed, as to the matter under consideration, in no respect from all other infants, there could be no occasion for designating them as a class of persons of that period especially; (c) from the fact that the reasoning of the Apostle in these verses (13, 14) neither requires nor is strengthened by such a reference; (d) from the fact that the contrast between *παράβασις* and *ἁμαρτία* indicates an intention on the part of the writer, in saying that these persons did not sin in the way of transgression, to convey the idea that they did actually sin in some other way. But this is not true of infants. The words refer either to *all*, or (as Meyer says) to *some* men who lived in the ante-legal period, and they describe them as sinning against the law of nature, and not, as Adam did, against a revealed command of God. More probably the reference is to all in those ages of the world.

LVII. Ver. 15. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ παράπτωμα κ.τ.λ.

That the Apostle turns aside, at this point, to introduce a parenthetical passage, is evident. He takes up the thought of ver. 12 again in vv. 18, 19. The design of vv. 15-17 is to show that the correspondence between Adam and Christ is not complete in every sense. The statement that it is not thus complete is made in ver. 15 *a*, and repeated, in substance, in ver. 16 *a*. The proof of its truth is contained in 15b and 16b. As the two verses are connected by *καί*, and as the language in the second clauses of the verses does not, necessarily or even probably, convey the same idea (as that of the first clauses does), we may hold that these second clauses are intended to indicate two points in which the exact correspondence fails. But, while we can proceed thus far with great confidence, the decision of the question as to what the two points are is a matter of much difficulty, and commentators have offered many explanations. The most satisfactory view is the following: that, in ver. 15, the difference in the *character* of the results is set forth—death in the one case, life in the other (cf. also ver. 17), and in ver. 16, the difference in the principles of the divine action, or, as it were, in the *causes* of the results—justice on the one hand, and superabounding mercy on the other.

LVIII. Ver. 16. ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων.

These words have been erroneously translated by many writers, as if they followed *δικαίωμα*, and the meaning were *justification from many offences*. The correspondence of the two clauses, on the other hand, clearly proves that they have the same relation to the thought which the words *ἐξ ἑνός* have. As the latter expression qualifies the statement by pointing out the occasioning cause—the judgment (which might have been favorable or unfavorable), became *as the result of one sin* a condemnatory judgment; so the former expression answers a similar purpose—the free gift (which might have been in one form or another), became, *as the result of many offences*, a gift of justification. The abounding of sins, which had put men beyond all possible hope of legal jus-

tification, was the *occasioning cause* of the introduction of the wonderful plan of forgiveness and salvation by faith, provided in Christ.

LIX. Ver. 17. οἱ τὴν περισσείαν—λαμβάνοντες.

That οἱ λαμβάνοντες means, not those who believingly accept, but simply the recipients—the idea being rather of the more passive, than the more active reception—is proved by the parallelism in the expressions of this verse with those of ver. 15. The parallelism seems to be complete, excepting that what is made the subject in the first of the clauses in ver. 15 becomes the object (i.e., as involved in the predicate) here, and the predicate of ver. 15 the subject here; and, in the second clauses, the opposite change takes place. οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον thus answers to ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσεν; and so εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσευσεν corresponds with οἱ τὴν περισσείαν . . . λαμβάνοντες. The λαμβάνειν is that which is involved in the very fact of the περισσεύειν, and not that which consists in a subjective and willing acceptance. The persons designated by οἱ λαμβάνοντες are the same with οἱ πολλοί of vv. 15, 19, and the same with πάντες ἄνθρωποι of ver. 18. The subject treated of in this chapter is, not the mode of appropriating the justification provided in Christ, or the acceptance of it by faith on the part of the individual, but the happy results which belong to it as a *system*, as contrasted with the legal system.

LX. Ver. 19. ὥστερ γὰρ διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς κ.τ.λ.

It is evident that ver. 19 (γάρ) gives the ground and proof of the statement of ver. 18. Condemnation comes upon all men by means of one offence, because all men κατεστάθησαν ἁμαρτωλοὶ by means of the disobedience of the one. The verb καθιστάναι is used in only one other passage in the Pauline Epp. (Titus 1, 5), where it means *to appoint to office*. This is the common signification of the word in the N. T. It is used in this sense, however, only in cases where the meaning is plainly indicated by the thought. Here this meaning is altogether inappropriate. [The suggestion that *to appoint* is equivalent, in such a case, to *to regard* (Hodge), involves the confounding of two different notions.] We are turned, therefore, to another signification of the word, of which we find instances both in the classics and in the N. T.—namely *to make or render*, in the active voice; *to become or be*, in the passive (cf. James iii. 6, iv. 4; 2 Pet. i. 8). This sense being given to the verb brings it into harmony with ἡμαρτον of ver. 12. The two verses, accordingly, declare that condemnation comes upon all by means of Adam's sin, because all by means of his sin themselves become sinners—the verbs being thrown into the past tense in the same manner, and for the same reason, as in ver. 12. The declaration of the Apostle, accordingly, is that the sin of Adam is the occasioning cause of the death of all, because, and by means of the fact that it is the occasioning cause of their sinning. A consequential relation between his sin and their sins is thus declared. But even here, where the matter is presented more fully than in the earlier part of the passage, this relation is not explained with definiteness as to its precise character. (See Note LI. above.) It will be noticed that the writer uses in every case (except ver. 16), either the instrumental dative or the instrumental preposition (διὰ); thus showing that his idea was of an *occasioning* as distinguished from an *efficient* cause. ἐξ, which *can* signify the *former*, is manifestly to be explained by διὰ, which *cannot* signify the *latter*.

LXI. Ver. 19. οἱ πολλοί.

That *οἱ πολλοί* and *πάντες* are co-extensive in meaning is placed beyond doubt by vv. 18, 19. The former expression only brings out more definitely the contrast with *the one*. That the two expressions, as used on the two sides of the comparison, are *equally universal*, is clear from the entire passage. The idea that the *all* on the one side are all who belong to Christ as his chosen and willing followers, while the *all* on the other are all the posterity of Adam—and thus, in the former case, a more limited number is spoken of than in the latter—is without foundation.

LXII. Ver. 20. νόμος δὲ παρεισήλθεν.

νόμος in this place, again, is made by Weiss ed. Mey. and others to mean *a law*, but yet one which corresponds in character with the Mosaic. The incorrectness of this view is indicated by two facts, which may be observed by the reader. (1) This verse is, in a sense, the foundation of the thought of the next two chapters. The Apostle, in the development of this thought, raises two questions, one in vi. 1, and the other in vii. 7. These two questions, as the language clearly indicates, are connected with and suggested by the words here employed: vi. 1, corresponding with the clause *οὐ . . . χάρις*, and vii. 7 with *νόμος . . . παράπτωμα*. In vii. 7 ff., however, the reference is confessedly to the Mosaic law (cf. also vii. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, of the next preceding passage). (2) The passage (Gal. iii. 19), which is more strikingly similar to this verse than any other in the Pauline Epp., and in which, as it can scarcely be questioned, the Apostle had in mind a thought answering to that here expressed, has *ὁ νόμος*, and certainly refers to the law of Moses. It may also be added that the connection of this verse with vv. 13, 14, where the words “until Moses” show what law was under consideration, confirms the argument founded upon these two facts.

LXIII. Ver. 20. ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα.

The design or purpose here referred to is not the primary or chief design. The lawgiver gives the law that it may be obeyed. But it is *a design*, i.e. an intervening (Meyer) or intermediate, secondary, one. The law in its actual results was, as it were, taken up into the Divine providential plan or arrangement, and made an occasion for the abounding of grace in the opening of the new way to justification and life.

CHAPTER VI.

Ver. 1. ἐπιμένονμεν] approved by Mill, Griesb. and others; adopted by Lachm. Tisch. and Fritzsche. The *Recepta* is ἐπιμενοῦμεν, contrary to decisive evidence (A B D E F G, min.); also contrary to K P 8, min., which have ἐπιμένονμεν. Brought into conformity with ἐποῦμεν. — Ver. 11. After μέν Elz. has εἶναι against preponderating evidence. Supplementary addition, which is also variously placed. Notwithstanding Tisch. (8) has adopted it, but before νεκρούς, following B C 8*. — τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν also, which Elz. has after Ἰησοῦ, is, according to decisive testimony, not genuine (an ascetic addition). — Ver. 12. ὑπακ. ταῖς ἐπιθ. αὐτοῦ] so also Lachm. and Tisch. following A B C* 8, min., and most vss. and Fathers. D E F G Clar. Boern. Iren. Tert. Vict. tunun., have ὑπακούειν αὐτῇ. Preferred by Rinck, and adopted by Scholz and Fritzsche. The reading of Elz. : ὑπακ. αὐτῇ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθ. αὐτοῦ has least evidence. The most strongly attested ὑπακ. ταῖς ἐπιθ. αὐτοῦ appears to have been the original. From it the ὑπακ. αὐτῇ arose through αὐτῇ being marginally annexed to ταῖς ἐπιθ. αὐτ. as a gloss, to render it apparent, that in the case of the lusts of the body the ἁμαρτία (*original sin*) was to be understood. This gloss was adopted partly instead of τ. ἐπιθ. αὐτοῦ (so ὑπακ. αὐτῇ arose); and partly along with τ. ἐπιθ. αὐτοῦ, which latter course occasioned a connecting ἐν, and gave rise to the *Recepta*. — Ver. 15. ἁμαρτήσομεν] A B C D E K L P 8, min. and Clem. have ἁμαρτήσωμεν. Recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. Tisch. and Fritzsche, and rightly on account of the decisive evidence in its favour. — Ver. 21. τὸ γὰρ τέλος] Lachm. reads τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέλος in agreement with B D* E F G 8* § 73, Syr. p. Theodoret. Rightly: how easily might the μέν *solitarium* be lost under the hands of unskilled copyists! Comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 313 [E. T. p. 365.]

Chs. vi.–viii. *Moral results from the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ.*¹ Chapter vi. shows how it, so far from furthering immorality, on the contrary excludes the latter from the Christian state, and for the first time rightly establishes, promotes, and quickens true morality. Chap. vii. shows the same in relation to the law; and ch. viii. sets forth the blessed condition of those who as justified are morally free. [See Note LXIV. p. 252.]

Ch. vi. 1–14. *Continuance in sin in order that grace may abound—that is a thing utterly opposed to the fellowship with Christ, into which we are brought by baptism; for we are thereby rendered dead unto sin, and translated into a new*

¹ Thus Paul certainly passes over from the field of the gaining salvation to that of its moral preservation; but not, as Th. Schott thinks, with a view to show the non-necessity of the law for the latter and so to justify his acting as Apostle to the Gentiles. In ch. vi. the law in fact is mentioned not

as unnecessary, but as the contrast to the state of grace (ver. 14 f.); and ch. vii. is occupied with something far loftier than its non-necessity. Of the justification of his apostolic working among the Gentiles, and of its bearing on the law, the Apostle says nothing.

moral life. Correspond therefore (vv. 12-14) *to this new relation* (your ideal, ver. 14) *by your conduct.*

Ver. 1. Οὖν] In consequence of what is contained in v. 20, 21. — With ἐπιμένωμεν κ.τ.λ. only Paul proposes to himself, as a possible inference from what he had just said “de pleonasmō gratiæ” (Bengel), the problem, whose solution in the negative was now to be his further theme—a theme in itself of so decisive an importance, that it does not require the assumption of a *Jewish-Christian* church (Mangold) to make it intelligible. On the introduction in *interrogative* form by τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν, comp. Dissen, *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 346 (τί οὖν φημι δεῖν ;). As however the “*what shall we say then?*” inquires after a *maxim* in some sort of way to be inferred, the deliberative “*shall we continue etc.?*” could at once follow directly, without any need for supplying before it a repeated ἐροῦμεν, or μὴ ἐροῦμεν ὅτι, and for taking ἐπιμένωμεν in a *hortatory* sense (van Hengel, Hofmann). — ἐπιμένειν τῇ ἁμαρτ., *to continue in sin*, not to cease from it. Comp. xi. 22 f.; Col. i. 23; 1 Tim. iv. 16; Acts xiii. 43; Xen. *Hell.* iii. 4, 6; Oec. 14, 7: ἐπιμένειν τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖν.

Ver. 2. Μὴ γένοιτο] *Let it not be* (see on iii. 4), namely, that we continue in sin. — οἵτινες] *as those who*, contains the reason (of the πῶς ἐτι κ.τ.λ.). See on i. 25. The relative clause is put first with rhetorical emphasis, in order at once to make the *absurdity* of the *maxim* plainly apparent.¹ — ἀπεθάν. τ. ἁμαρτ.]. [See Note LXV. p. 252.] *The dying to sin*, which took place by baptism (see ver. 3), is the *abandonment of all life-communication with it experienced in himself* by the convert (Col. ii. 20; Gal. ii. 19, vi. 14; 1 Pet. ii. 24). Comp. Theodoret: ἡρνήθη, φησὶ, τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ νεκρὸς αὐτῇ γέγονας. This moral change, which has taken place in him, has put an end to the determining influence of sin over him; in relation to it *he has ceased to be still in life*. Similar is the Platonic conception in Macrobi. *Somn. Scip.* i. 13: “mori etiam dicitur, cum anima adhuc in corpore constituta corporeas illicebas philosophia docente contemnit et cupiditatum dulces insidias reliquasque omnes exuit passiones.” Michaelis, Cramer, Storr, Flatt, Nitzsch (*de discr. revelat. etc.* II. p. 233) take the sense to be: *we who on account of sin have died* (with Christ), *i.e.* *who have to regard ourselves as if, on account of sin* (or Nitzsch: “ad eripiendam peccati vim mortiferam”), *we had ourselves endured what Christ suffered.* But in this view the main point “*with Christ*” is arbitrarily imported; and see ver. 11. — πῶς] denotes the *possibility* which is negatived by the question. The *having died to sin*, and the *living in it* (as the life-element, comp. Gal. ii. 20), are mutually exclusive. — ζήσομεν] purely future. How is it possible that *we shall be living in it* (in its fellowship) still (ἐτι), namely, at any future time whatever after the occurrence of that ἀπεθάνομεν? The very weakly attested reading preferred by Hofmann, ζήσωμεν, is only a case of mechanical conformity with ἐπιμένωμεν in ver. 1.

Ver. 3. Ἡ] *or*, if this (ver. 2) should still appear doubtful.² Comp. vii. 1. — ἀγνοεῖτε] presupposes an *acquaintance* with the moral nature of baptism;

¹ Comp. Kühner, II. 5, p. 1104; Bernhardy, p. 299.

² See Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 61; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 132.

it must in fact have been an *experimental* acquaintance. With this *knowledge*, how *absurd* would be that *ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ* ! Comp. 1 Cor. vi. 2. — ὅσοι] *all we who, not stronger than οἱτινες*, but put *differently*; not characterizing, but designating the *whole collectively*. — ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χ. Ἰ. εἰς τὸν θάνατον κ.τ.λ.] *we, who were baptized in reference to Christ Jesus*¹ (we who through baptism became those specifically belonging to Him), *were baptized in reference to His death*; i.e. we were brought through our baptism into the fellowship of His death; so that we have a real share ethically in His death, through the cessation of all our life for sin. Theodore of Mopsuestia: τὸ βάπτισμα κοινωνοὺς ποιεῖ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Ambrosiaster: “cum baptizamus, *commorimur Christo* ;” Bengel: “perinde est, ac si eo momento Christus pro tali homine, et talis homo pro Christo pateretur, moreretur, sepeliretur.” This interpretation, namely of the *spiritual fellowship* produced through baptism (prepared for by the repentance and *πίστις* that preceded baptism, accomplished by the baptism itself, Gal. iii. 27; Col. ii. 11 f.; Tit. iii. 5), is required by the context in ver. 2 (*ἀπεθάνομεν*), ver. 4 (*συνετάφημεν*) and ver. 5 f. It is therefore not the idea of *imitation* (Reiche, Köllner, following Grotius and others), but that of the *dying along with* (*συσταυροῦσθαι*, ver. 6; Gal. ii. 20; comp. 2 Cor. v. 14) unto which, i.e. in order to the accomplishment of which in us, we were baptized. The *efficient cause* of this fellowship of death is the divine grace, which forgives sin and grants the Holy Spirit to him who becomes baptized; the *means of this grace* is baptism itself; the *appropriating cause* is faith, and the *causa meritoria* the death of Christ.² Observe here also, however, that the spheres of justification and sanctification are not intermixed. The justified person becomes sanctified, not the converse. In baptism man receives forgiveness of sins through faith (comp. Acts ii. 38, xxii. 16); justified by which he also becomes partaker of the virtue of the Holy Spirit in the sacrament unto new life (Tit. iii. 5). “*Liberationem a reatu peccati vel justificationem consequitur liberatio a dominio peccati, ut justificati non vivant peccato, sed peccato mortui Domino*,” Calovius. Compare ἀπελούσασθε, ἡγάσθητε 1 Cor. vi. 11, and the remarks thereon. The *latter* is the fellowship in dying and living with Christ, which is accomplished

¹ Βαπτίζειν εἰς *never* means anything else than *to baptize in reference to, in respect to*; and the more special definitions of its import are furnished simply by the context. Comp. on Matt. xxviii. 19; 1 Cor. x. 2; Gal. iii. 27.—On εἰς Χ. Ἰησοῦν comp. Acts ii. 38, viii. 16, xix. 5. Undoubtedly the name “*Jesus*” was named in baptizing. But the conception of *becoming immersed into Christ* (in Rückert and others, and again in Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.* p. 343) is to be set aside, and is not to be supported by the figurative expression in Gal. iii. 27. The mystic character of our passage is not produced by so vague a sensuous conception,—which moreover has all the passages against it in which βαπτίζειν is coupled with ὄνομα (Matt. xxviii. 19; Acts ii. 38, x. 48, xix. 5; 1 Cor. i.

13)—but is based simply on the ethical consciousness of that intimate appertaining to Christ, into which baptism translates its recipients.

² Namely as the *atoning death* (v. 6, 19, 21), the appropriation of which shall be attended with the saving effect of a new life belonging to Him, 2 Cor. v. 14, 15. If this death thus becomes “*the end, once for all existent, of the relation of the world to God as determined by sin*” (Hofmann), that is the divinely willed *ethical result*, which faith obtains from the *ἱλαστήριον*, inasmuch as the believer realizes his being dead to the power of sin with Christ, who in His expiatory death underwent the killing power of sin and therewith died to that power (vv. 9, 10). Comp. ver. 10 f.

in baptism by the operation of the Spirit ; see on Gal. iii. 27 ; 1 Cor. xii. 13 ; Acts xix. 2 f. ; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 345 f. But it is of course obvious that the idea of the baptism of children was wholly foreign to this view of the Apostle based on experience.

Ver. 4. An inference from ver. 3, by which the impossibility indicated in ver. 2 is now made completely evident. — *Buried with Him therefore* (not merely *dead* with Him, but, as the dead Christ was *buried* in order to rise again, *buried with Him* also) *were we, in that we were baptized into His death.* [See Note LXVI. p. 252.] The recipient of baptism, who by his baptism enters into the fellowship of *death* with Christ, is necessarily also in the act of baptism ethically *buried* with Him (1 Cor. xv. 4), because *after* baptism he is spiritually *risen* with Him. In *reality* this burial with Him is not a moral fact *distinct* from the having died with Him, as actual burial is distinct from actual dying ; but it sets forth the fulness and completeness of the relation, of which the recipient, in accordance with the *form* of baptism, so far as the latter takes place through *κατάβυσις* and *ἀνάβυσις* (see Suicer, *Thes.*), becomes conscious *successively*. The recipient—thus has Paul figuratively represented the process—is conscious, (a) in the baptism *generally* : now am I entering into fellowship with the *death* of Christ, *εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ βαπτίζομαι* ; (b) in the *immersion in particular* : now am I becoming *buried* with Christ ; (c) and then, in the emergence : now I *rise* to the new life with Christ. Comp. on Col. ii. 12. — *εἰς τὸν θάνατον*] is necessarily, after ver. 3, to be joined with *διὰ τοῦ βαπτισμ.*, in which case, since one can say *βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς τι*, the connecting article was not required (comp. on Gal. iii. 26 ; Eph. iii. 13) ; consequently : *through baptism unto death*. It is not however specially the death of *Christ* that is again meant, as if *αὐτό* were again annexed ; but the description is *generalized*, agreeably to the context, in a way that could not be misunderstood. Whosoever, namely, as Paul has just set forth in ver. 3, has been baptized unto the death of *Christ*, has in fact thereby received baptism *unto death* ; *i.e.* such a baptism that, taken away by it from his previous vital activity, he has become one belonging to death, one who has fallen under its sway. This however is just that relation of moral death, which, in the concrete, is the fellowship of the death of *Christ*. The connection with *συνεράφ.*, in which *εἰς τ. θάνατον* is sometimes referred to the death of *Christ* (Grotius, Baumgarten-Crusius), and sometimes to the death of *sin* (Calovius, Wolf, Winzer, *Progr.* 1831), is erroneous, for this reason, that whosoever is buried does not *come* into death, but *is* in it already ; and hence “The becoming buried into death” would yield quite an *incongruous* conception. This also applies against the expedient tried by Hofmann of making *θάνατος* here the *death-state* of Christ, unto which we were given up. Even in this view that incongruity continues :¹ but after ver. 3 *θάνατος* can

¹ This cannot be got rid of by any artificial turns (like that of Hofmann : “His burial removed Him from the sphere of sin expiated through His death . . . whereby His existence in the world of sin came to a complete close”). Certainly the *θάνατος* of

the Lord, even regarded as a state, occurred at that great moment when He cries His *τετέλεσται* and departs ; and in nowise has He been translated into the *θάνατος* through His *burial*.

only be again *death* simply, not *state of death* (as if Paul could not have conveyed that sense by *εἰς τὸ μνημεῖον*, or *εἰς τοὺς νεκρούς*, or in some other suitable way). Observe, moreover, how Paul here also, since he has the *bodily* resurrection of Christ in view,¹ mentions specially the correlative of the *burial* that preceded it. Comp. on 1 Cor. xv. 4. — *ἵνα* purpose of the *συνετάφημεν* *θάνατον*, and this statement of purpose has the chief importance, corresponding to the *πῶς ἐτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ* in ver. 2. — *διὰ τῆς δόξης*. τ. πατρός] *through the majesty of the Father* was the resurrection of Christ brought about. The *δόξα*, גְּבוּרָה, the glorious collective perfection of God, certainly effected the raising of Jesus chiefly as *omnipotence* (1 Cor. vi. 14 ; 2 Cor. xiii. 4 ; Eph. i. 19 f.) ; but the comprehensive significance of the word—selected with conscious solemnity, and in highest accordance with the glorious victory of the Son—is not to be curtailed on that account (in opposition to Koppe, Baumgarten-Crusius, and earlier expositors). According to the invariable representation of the N. T. *God* is the raiser of Jesus (iv. 24, viii. 11 ; Acts ii. 24, 31 ff. *et al.* ; see on John i. 19) ; but yet the *δόξα* of God does not in this case any more than elsewhere in the N. T. denote *God Himself*.² Erroneously however Theodoret, Theophylact, and several Fathers explain : *διὰ τ. δόξης τ. πατρ.*, τούτέστι διὰ τῆς οἰκείας θεότητος. Linguistic usage admits as in itself allowable the view of Castalio and Carpzov : “*in paterna gloria* resurrexit,” so that *διὰ* would be used of the state ; to which also van Hengel inclines. But, had Paul desired to express a relation corresponding to the *ἐν καιν.* ζ. in the apodosis, he must have inserted *ἐν* also ; since the conception of the raising of Jesus *through* the Father was one of so solemn importance, and all the more appropriate here, since believers also owe their moral resurrection-life to the Father of Christ (Eph. ii. 10 *al.*) ; it is in fact the life of regeneration. Besides, the *paterna gloria* was attained by Christ only through His *ascension*. See on Luke xxiv. 26. — *ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς*] *in a new* (moral) *constitution of life* ;³ a stronger way of bringing out the idea of *καινότης*, than *ἐν ζωῇ καινῇ* would be, for which it does not stand (in opposition to Grotius, Koppe, Reiche, and others). See Winer, p. 221 [E. T. 236]. Comp. vii. 6. According to van Hengel *ζωῆς* is the genitive of *apposition* : “*in novo rerum statu, qui vita est.*” But this *qui vita est* is self-evident ; and therefore the emphasis must remain upon *καινότητι*. This newness is the ethical analogue of the new state in which Christ was alive from the dead, conceived in contrast to the *παλαιότης* which prevailed prior to baptism. Comp. ver. 8.

Ver. 5. Confirmatory elucidation (*γάρ*) of the previous *ἵνα* *ᾧ* *σωτηρίαν* κ.τ.λ. —

¹ *i.e.* His resurrection as respects the buried body ; so that the latter no longer remained in the grave, but came forth thence living and immortal. That the body of Christ “*perished*” and “*made room*” for a new pneumatic body (Holsten, z. *Ev. d. Paul u. Petr.* p. 133), is an unsuitable conception, seeing that the pneumatic body must necessarily have been assumed even in death, and independently of the burial of the old

body. Thus the resurrection of Jesus would be nothing else than the change of body that took place in death.

² Langer, *Judenth. in Paläst.* p. 210 ff.

³ τὴν καινὴν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν παρόντα βίον, ἐκ τῆς τῶν τράπων γινομένην. “*Οπου γὰρ ὁ πόρνος γένηται σώφρων καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης ἐλεήμων καὶ ὁ τραχὺς ἡμέρος, καὶ ἐν ταῦτα ἀνάστασις γέγονεν*,” Chrysostom.

σύνφυτος, which in classic authors usually means *innate, naturally belonging to* (see the passages from Plato in Ast, *Lex.* III. p. 313, Eur. *Andr.* 955 ; comp. 2 Macc. iii. 22), is here *grown together* (Theophr. *de caus. plant.* v. 5, 2 ; LXX. Zech. xi. 2 ; Amos ix. 14). This figurative expression represents the most intimate union of being, like our *coalescent* with anything (qui or quod *coaluit cum aliqua re*).¹ In the classics *συνφύης* is the more usual form for this idea, especially with *γίνεσθαι*.² Hence : *For, if we have become* (through baptism, vv. 3, 4) *such as are grown together with that which is the likeness of His death* (comp. on i. 23), *i.e.* persons, to whose nature it inseparably belongs to present in themselves that which resembles His death, *so also shall we be grown together with the likeness of His resurrection.* On *ὁμοίωμα* comp. i. 23, v. 14, viii. 3. The rendering of *σύνφυτοι* by *complantati* (Vulgate, Luther), in connection with which Chrysostom, Origen, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, Theophylact, Beza, and others explain the figure of the plant by the *fruits* of the ethical burial, is linguistically incorrect, as if the word came not from *συνφύω*, but from *συνφυτεύω*.³ The interpretation *engrafted* (Erasmus, Calvin, Estius, Cornelius à Lapide, Klee) is likewise without linguistic evidence, and does not suit the abstract τῷ ὁμοιώματι. — τῷ ὁμοίωμ. τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ] *i.e.* the condition corresponding in similarity of form to His death, which has specifically and indissolubly become ours. This *ethical conformity with His death*, however, the growing together with which took place through our baptism, is just that moral death to sin, vv. 3, 4, in which the spiritual communion in death with Christ consists. — τ. ὁμ. τ. θ. α. is to be joined with *σύνφύτοι* (Vulgate, Chrysostom, Beza, Calvin, Estius, Koppe, Tholuck, Rückert, Reiche, Olshausen, de Wette, Philippi, and others ; now including Hofmann). Others however take it as the dative of the *instrument*, and supply τῷ Χριστῷ to *σύνφύτοι* : “*for, if we have entered into close union with Christ through the ὁμοίωμα of His death,*” etc. So Erasmus, Beza, Grotius, Flatt, Fritzsche, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, Maier, Baur, van Hengel, and Reithmayr ; also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 344. Nevertheless it is arbitrary to *separate* τῷ ὁμ. from *σύνφ.* γει., seeing that it *stands* beside it and in a structural respect *presents* itself most naturally with it, and also as belonging to it yields a very *appropriate sense* ; and on the other hand to attach to *σύνφ.* a word which Paul *has* not put in, and which he *must have* put in, if he would not lead his readers astray. Still more mistaken is the view of Bisping, that *σύνφ.* belongs to τοῦ θανάτ. αὐτοῦ, and that τῷ ὁμοίωμ. comes in between them instrumentally. Hofmann has rightly abandoned this tortuous interpretation, which he formerly followed.⁴ — ἀλλὰ καί] *but also.* ἀλλά, for the speedy and more emphatic introduction of the contrasted element, as frequently also in the classics, at the head of the apodosis ; see on 1 Cor. iv. 15 ; Col. ii. 5. — τῆς ἀναστάσεως] cannot, in keeping with the protasis, depend directly upon the *σύνφύτοι* to be again under-

¹ Plat. *Phædr.* p. 246 A ; Aesch. *Ag.* and Klausen *in loc.* p. 111.

² Plato, *Soph.* p. 247 D, *Tim.* p. 45 D, p. 88 A ; Plut. *Lycurg.* 25.

³ Comp. *φυτευτός*, Plat. *Rep.* p. 510 A,

ἀφύτευτος, Xen. *Oec.* 20, 22.

⁴ Comp. on the right connection Cyril, *Catech.* iii. 12 ; and even *Martyr. Ignat.* 5 : ἐμναντὸν . . . σὺμφύτον θέσθαι τῷ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ ὁμοιώματι.

stood (Erasmus, Calvin, and others ; including Rückert, Olshausen, de Wette, and Krehl), but only upon the τῷ ὁμοιώματι to be supplied (Beza, Grotius, Estius, and many others ; including Winzer, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, Maier, Philippi, Tholuck, Ewald, van Hengel, and Hofmann), so that when completed it would run : ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ σύμφυτοι ἐσόμεθα. The former view is indeed likewise unobjectionable grammatically, for σύμφυτοι may also stand with the genitive ;¹ but the latter is suggested by the context, and presents itself easily enough and without harshness. Further, it is self-evident, after ver. 4, that in τ. ἀναστ. we are not to think of the resurrection of our *body* (Tertullian, Chrysostom, Ambrosiaster, Oecumenius, Cornelius à Lapide, and others ; comp. also Ewald), or of this as *included* (Koppe and Klee). — ἐσόμεθα] receives its only correct interpretation from its relation to, and bearing on, the clause expressive of the purpose, ἵνα . . . ἐν καιν. ζ. περιπ. in ver. 4, according to which it must express the *necessarily certain*.² Compare πῶς ἐτι ζήσομεν ver. 2. The sense of *willing* ("ut reviviscamus curabimus," Fritzsche) is not suggested by the connection ; nor is that of a *summons* (Olshausen, Rückert, and older expositors) ; but it is rather the expression of what shall certainly be the case, as the consequence of the σύμφυτοι γέγον. τῷ ὁμοίῳ, τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ assumed as real in the protasis ; *it cannot be otherwise* ; with the having become σύμφυτοι this ἐσεσθαι is *given* ; with that fact having begun and taken place is posited this further development, which necessarily attaches itself thereto.

Ver. 6. Τοῦτο γινώσκοντες] Definition to τῆς ἀναστάσ. ἐσόμεθα, which *objective* relation is confirmed by the corresponding experimental *conscious knowledge* (comp. εἰδότες in ver. 9) : *since we know this* ; not a mere continuation of the construction instead of κ. τοῦτο γινώσκομεν (Philippi), as the participle is never so used, not even in ch. ii. 4 ; nor yet to be conceived as *in the train* of the ἐσόμεθα (Hofmann), as if Paul had expressed himself by some such word as ὥστε, or with the telic infinitive (γινῶναι). Respecting τοῦτο see on ch. ii. 3. — ὁ παλ. ἡμ. ἀνθρ.] *i.e. our old ego*—our personality in its entire sinful condition before regeneration (John iii. 3 ; Tit. iii. 5). Comp. Eph. iv. 22 ; Col. iii. 9. From the standpoint of the καινότης πνεύματος, constituting the Christian self-consciousness, the Christian sees his pre-Christian ethical personality as his *old self* no longer to be found in life, as the person which he had formerly *been*. Comp. on 2 Cor. v. 17 ; Eph. ii. 10. — σπινεστανρώθη] namely, when we were baptized and thereby transplanted into the fellowship of death. See on vv. 3, 4. This special expression of the being killed with Him is selected simply because Christ was slain on the *cross* ; not as Grotius and others, including Olshausen, hold : "quia sicut per crucem non sine gravi dolore ad exitum pervenitur, ita illa natura (the old man) sine dolore non extinguitur." Compare Umbreit. The simple ἵνα καταργ. is not at all in keeping with this far-fetched reference, which is not supported by Gal. ii. 19 f. ; but just as little with the reference to the *disgrace* of crucifixion

¹ Plat. *Phil.* p. 51 D, *Def.* p. 413 C, Bernhardt, p. 171.

² Matthiae, p. 1122 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 148, ed. 2.

(Hofmann). — *ἵνα καταργ.*] Design of the *ὁ παλ. ἡμ. ἄνθρ. συνεστ.* : *in order that the body of sin might be destroyed*, i.e. *the body belonging to the power of sin, ruled by sin.*¹ [See Note LXVII. p. 253.] Comp. vii. 24. The old man had *such* a body ; and *this* *σῶμα* was to be destroyed, put out of existence by the crucifixion with Christ ; consequently not the body *in itself*, but *in so far* as it is the sin-body, becoming determined by sin in its expressions of life to sinful *πράξεσι* (viii. 13). The propriety of this interpretation appears from vv. 7, 12, 13, 23. Comp. on Col. ii. 11. If we explain it merely of “*the body as seat or organ of sin*,” the idea would not in itself be un-Pauline, as Reiche thinks ; for the *σῶμα* would in fact appear not as the soliciting agent of sin (not as the *σάρξ*), but as its vehicle, in itself morally indifferent, but serving sin as the organic instrument of its vital activity (see Stirn in the *Tübing. Zeitschr. f. Theol.* 1834, 3, p. 10 ff.) ; but *καταργηθῇ* is decisive against this view. For this could neither mean *destroyed*, *annihilated*, because in fact even the body of the regenerate is a *σῶμα τ. ἁμαρτίας* in the sense assumed (ver. 12) ; nor even *evacuaretur* (Tertullian, Augustine), *rendered inactive, inoperative*, partly because *then* the idea of *σάρξ* would be assigned to *σῶμα*, and partly because it is only the conception of the *destruction* of the body which corresponds to the conception of crucifixion. Others take the *corpus peccati* *figuratively* ; either so, that *sin* is conceived *under the figure of a body* with significant reference to its being crucified (so Fathers in Suicer, *Theol.* II. p. 1215, Piscator, Pareus, Castalio, Hammond, Homberg, Calovius, Koppe, Flatt, and Olshausen ; also Reiche, conceiving sin as a monster) ; or, similarly to this mode of apprehending it, in such a way as to find the sense : “*the mass of sin*,” *τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν μερῶν πονηρίας συγκεϊμένην* . . . *κακίαν*, Chrysostom. So Ambrosiaster, Pseudo-Hieronymus, Theophylact, Erasmus, Cornelius à Lapide, Grotius, Estius, Reithmayr, and others ; so also Calvin, who however takes the *corpus peccati* as a designation of the natural man itself, which is a *massa, ex peccato conflata*. Philippi also ultimately comes to the *massa peccati*, which is conceived as an organism having members, as *σῶμα* ; so likewise Jatho and Julius Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, I. p. 460, ed. 5 ; also Baur (“as it were *the substance of sin*”). But all these interpretations are at variance partly with the Pauline *usus loquendi* in general, and partly with ver. 12 in particular, where *ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὕμ. σώματι* by its reference to our passage confirms our view of the *σῶμα*. The right view is held substantially by Theodoret, Theophylact 2, Bengel, and others, including Tholuck, Köllner, de Wette, Rückert, Fritzsche, Maier, Nielsen, Hofmann, and Weiss ; whereas Baumgarten-Crusius, and also Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 113, convert *σῶμα* into the idea of *state of life*. — *τοῦ μηκέτι δουλ. κ.τ.λ.*] “*finem abolitionis notat*,” Calvin. The sin, which is committed, is conceived as a ruler to whom *service* is rendered. See John viii. 34.

Ver. 7. Establishment of the *τοῦ μηκέτι δουλ. ἡμ. τῇ. ἁμ.* by the general proposition : *whosoever is dead, is acquitted from sin.* — *ὁ ἀποθαν.*] is explained **by**

¹ It is self-evident that Paul might have said also *τὸ σῶμα τῆς σαρκός*, as in Col. ii. 11. But his whole theme (ver. 1) suggested his

saying *τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. He might even have written merely *ἡ σάρξ*, but *τὸ σῶμα* was given in the immediate context (*συνεστὰν*).

many of *ethical* death. So Erasmus, Calovius, Homberg, Bengel, and others, including Koppe, Flatt, Glöckler, Olshausen, Tholuck (who regards sin as *creditor*), de Wette ("whosoever has died to sin, he—alone—is acquitted from sin"), Rothe, Krehl, Philippi (whosoever is ethically dead, over him has sin lost its right to impeach and to control, just as Bengel explains it), also van Hengel, Jatho, and Märcker. But neither the nature of the *general proposition*, which forms in fact the major premiss in the argument, and of which only the *application* is to be made (in the minor proposition) to ethical dying; nor the *tautological* relation, which would result between subject and predicate, can permit this explanation. The conception of *ethical* dying recurs only in the *sequel*, and hence *σὺν Χριστῷ* is added to *ἀπεθάνομεν* in ver. 8, so that Paul in this development of his views draws a sharp distinction between the being dead in the spiritual (vv. 6, 8) and in the ordinary sense. We must therefore explain ver. 7 as a general proposition regarding death in the ordinary sense, and consequently regarding *physical* death (so rightly Hofmann), but not specially of the death by *execution*, through which sin is expiated (Alethæus, Wolf, and others: with this view they compare *δεδικ.*, the juristic expression: *he is justified*; see Michaelis' note); for *any such* peculiar reference of the still wholly unrestricted *ἀποθανόν* is forbidden by the very generality of the proposition, although for *δεδικαίωται* passages might be cited like Plat. *Legg.* II. p. 934 B; Aristot. *Eth.* v. 9. — *δεδικ.* ἀπὸ τ. ἁμ.] [See Note LXVIII. p. 253.] "*The dead person is made just from sin,*" i.e. he is in point of fact justified and acquitted from sin, he is placed by death in the position of a *δικαίος*, who is such thenceforth; not as if he were now absolved from and rid of the guilt of his sins committed in life, but *in so far as the dead person sins no more*, no longer *δουλεῖει τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*, from whose power, as from a legal claim urged against him during his life in the body, he has been actually released by death as through a decree of acquittal.¹ Just for this reason has Paul added *ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας* (comp. Acts xiii. 38; Eccles. xxvi. 29; *Test. XII. patr.* p. 541), which would have been quite superfluous, had he taken *δεδικαίωται* *justus constitutus est*, in the dogmatic sense of his doctrine of justification. The proposition itself, moreover, *is an axiom of the popular traditional mode of view*, which Paul uses for his purpose as *admitted*. This axiom has also its relative truth, and that partly in so far as the dead person has put off the *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός* with which he committed his sins (Col. ii. 11), partly in so far as with death the dominion of law over the man ceases (vii. 1), and partly in so far as in death all the relations are dissolved which supplied in life the objects of sinning.² For the discussion of the question as to the absolute truth of the proposition, in its connection

¹ Comp. Köstlin in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1856, p. 98 f.; Th. Schott, p. 260, and Hofmann; also Baur, *neut. Theol.* p. 161 f.; Delitzsch, Illustrations to his Hebrew version, p. 84.

² The Greek expositors—who already give substantially our explanation—have confined themselves to this point. Chrysostom: *ἐπὶ ἁλλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν νεκρὸς*

κείμενος. Theodoret: *τίς γὰρ ἰδεάσατο πάποτε νεκρὸν ἢ γάμον ἀλλότρου διορττόντα, ἢ μαιφονίᾳ τὰς χεῖρας φοινίττοντα κ.τ.λ.* Melancthon compares the proverb: *νεκρὸς οὐ δάκνει*, Beza the saying of Anacreon: *ὁ νεκρὸς οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖ*, Grotius that of Aeschylus: *οὐδὲν ἄλγος ἀπεται νεκρῶν*. Comp. Soph. *O. C.* 955.

with Biblical anthropology and eschatology, there was no occasion at all here,¹ where it is only used as an auxiliary clause, and ex concessio. Comp. 1 Pet. iv. 1. Usteri mistakenly explains it : by death man has suffered the punishment, and thus expiated his guilt. For that Paul does not here express the Jewish dogma : "death as the punishment for sin expiates the guilt of sin" (see Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. p. 283 f.) is proved partly by the irrelevancy of such a sense to the context (γάρ) ; and partly by its inconsistency with the doctrines of the Apostle as to justification by faith and as to the judgment, according to which death cannot set free from the guilt-obligation of sin. Ewald makes a new idea be brought in at ver. 7 : "Even in common life, in the case of one who is dead, the sins of his previous life cannot be further prosecuted and punished, he passes for justified and acquitted of sin . . . ; if in addition sin as a power has been broken by Christ (ver. 9 f.), then we may assuredly believe," etc., ver. 8. But γάρ in ver. 7 indicates its connection with *what goes before*, so that it is only with the δέ in ver. 8 that a new thought is introduced. Besides, we should expect, in the case of the assumed course of thought, an οὖν instead of the δέ in ver. 8. Finally, it is not clear how that rule of common law was to serve as a joint ground for the faith of becoming alive with Christ.

Ver. 8 f. *Carrying onward* the discussion by the metabatic δέ ; and thereby passing from the *negative* side of the having died with Christ as proved in personal consciousness (τοῦτο γινώσκοντες, ver. 6) in vv. 6, 7, to its *positive* side, which is likewise exhibited as based on the consciousness of faith (πιστεύομεν). "But if we have *died* (according to vv. 6, 7) with Christ, we believe that we shall also *live* with Him, since we know," etc. etc. — πιστεύομεν] expresses, not confidence in the divine aid (Fritzsche), or in the divine promise (Baumgarten-Crusius), or in God not leaving His work of grace in us unfinished (Philippi) ; but simply the *being convinced of our συζήσομεν αὐτῷ* ; in so far, namely, as the having died with Christ is, seeing that He has risen and dieth no more, in the consciousness of faith the necessary premiss, and thus the ground for belief as to our becoming alive with Him. If the former, the ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν Χριστῷ, be true, we cannot doubt the latter. — συζήσομεν αὐτῷ] must necessarily be understood, in accordance with the preceding and following context (ver. 11), of the *ethical* participation in the new everlasting life of Christ. Whosoever has died with Christ is now also of the belief that his life, *i.e.* the positive active side of his moral being and nature, shall be a fellowship of life with the exalted Christ ; that is, shall be able to be nothing else than this. This communion of life is the ἐν Χριστῷ and Χριστὸν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι. In the full consciousness of it Paul says : ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός (Gal. ii. 20). At the same time it is not to be explained as if an αἰεί or the like stood beside συζήσομεν (without falling away), as is done by Tholuck ; compare Theophylact. Others, in opposition to the context, hold that what is meant is the future participation of Christians in the bliss of the glorified Saviour (Flatt, Reiche, Maier,

¹ Compare Melancthon : "Ceterum hoc sciamus, diabolos et omnes damnatos in

omni aeternitate horribilia peccata facere, quia sine fine irascuntur Deo," etc.

following Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius, and Heumann) ; and others still, at variance alike with the definiteness and unity of the sense, interpret it of the earthly moral and the eternal blessed life *together* (Sebastian Schmid, Böhme, Rosenmüller ; and not rejected by de Wette). The reference or joint-reference to the future glory is not required either by the *future*, which, on the contrary, demands the same rendering exactly as ἐσόμεθα in ver. 5, nor by πιστεύομεν (see above). — ἰεδοτες, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] *since we know, that*, etc. Were we, namely, obliged to fear that Christ is still subject to the power of death,¹ that His life is not a perfected life, in that case we should lack the adequate secure *ground of faith* for that πιστεύομεν κ.τ.λ. The being assured that Christ liveth eternally and dieth no more (Acts xiii. 34), lends to our faith in our own moral communion of life with Him its basis and firm footing ; without that knowledge this faith would be wanting in that which gives it legitimacy and guarantee. For who can cherish the conviction that he stands in that holy communion of resurrection-life with Christ, if he should be compelled to doubt whether his Lord, though indeed risen, might not again fall a victim to death ? This thought would only keep us aloof from that faith and make it a moral impossibility for us, since it would set before us the prospect of a similar perishing of the new life which we had gained. Hofmann, who makes a new sentence begin with εἰδοτες, which is to continue till ver. 11, might have been warned against doing so by the absence of a particle (οὖν) ; and should have been decisively precluded from it by the tortuous way in which, if ver. 10 is set aside in a parenthesis, it is necessary to obtain a forced regimen for the passage. — θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυρ.] no longer dependent on ὅτι, but an independent and therefore all the more emphatic repetition of the important thought : *death is no longer Lord over Him*, has no more power over Him, such as it once had at the crucifixion. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 25.

Ver. 10. Proof of the θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει.² — ὁ γὰρ ἀπέθανε] ὁ is in any case the accusative of the object. But whether Paul conceived it as : *for as to what concerns His death* (see Vigerus, ed. Herm. p. 34 ; Frotscher and Breitenbach, *ad Xen. Hier.* 6, 12 ; Matthiae, p. 1063), or *what*, i.e. *the death which He died* (so Rückert, Fritzsche, de Wette, Philippi ; see Bernhardy, p. 106 f. ; comp. on Gal. ii. 20) cannot be determined, since both renderings suit the correct interpretation of what follows. Yet the latter, analogous to the expression θάνατον θανεῖν, is to be preferred as the more simple, and as uniform with Gal. ii. 20. — τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθ.] the relation of the dative is to be determined from νεκρὸς τῇ ᾄμ. in ver. 11 ; therefore it can be nothing else than what is contained in ἀπεθάν. τῇ ᾄμ. in ver. 2 (comp. Hofmann), namely : *he is dead to sin* (dative of reference), i.e. *His dying concerned sin* ; and indeed so that the latter (namely the sin of the

¹ Death had become lord over Him, because in obedience to God (Phil. ii. 6 ff.) Christ had subjected Himself to its power, so that He ἐσταυρώθη ἐξ ἀσθενείας (2 Cor. xiii. 4). The κυριεῦεν of death over Him was therefore a thing willed by God (v. 8-10), and realized through the voluntary obedience

of Jesus. See John x. 18 ; Matt. xx. 28.

² Not a parenthetical *intervening clause* (Hofmann), which is appropriate neither to the essential importance of the sentence in the train of thought, nor to the application which it receives in ver. 11.

world, conceived as power) has now, after He has suffered death on account of it, become without influence upon Him and has no more power over Him ; He submitted Himself to its power in His death, but through that death *He has died to its power*.¹ So also have we (ver. 11) to esteem ourselves as dead to sin (*νεκροὺς τῇ ἁμ.*), as rescued from its grasp through our ethical death with Christ, in such measure that we are released from and rid of the influence of this power antagonistic to God. The close accordance of this view of *τῇ ἁμ. ἀπέθ.* with the context (according to vv. 11 and 2) is decisive against the explanations of the dative deviating from it, such as : *ad expianda peccata* (Pareus, Piscator, Grotius, Michaelis, and others including Olshausen) ; or : *ad expianda tollendaque peccata* (Koppe, Flatt, Reiche, Fritzsche, Philippi) ; or : *in order to destroy the power of sin* (Chrysostom, Beza, Calvin, Bengel, and others, including Ewald and Umbreit). Rückert, Köllner, and de Wette wish to abide by an *indefinite* reference of the death of Jesus to sin as the remote object ; but this simply explains nothing, and leaves only a *formal* parallelism remaining. — *ἐφάπαξ*] *for once*, with emphasis, excluding repetition, *once for all*. Comp. Heb. vii. 27, ix. 12, x. 10 ; Lucian, *Dem. enc.* 21. — *ζῆ τ. Θεῷ*] *vivit Deo*, namely so, that now in His estate of exaltation, after He has through His death died to the power of sin, His life belongs to God, *i.e.* stands to God *in the relation of being dependent on, and of being determined by, Him*. The contrast to the preceding yields the *excluding* sense. Christ's earthly life, namely, was also a *ζῆν τῷ Θεῷ*, but was at the same time exposed to the death-power of human sin, which is now no longer the case, inasmuch as His life rescued from death is wholly determined by the fellowship with God. This latter portion of the verse belongs also to the proof of ver. 9, since it is in fact just the (exclusive) belonging to God of Christ's life, that makes it certain that death reigns no longer over Him ; as *ζῶν τῷ Θεῷ* he can no longer be *παθητός* (Acts xxvi. 23), which He previously was, until in obedience to God *ἐξ ἀσθενείας* He was crucified (2 Cor. xiii. 4).

Ver. 11. Application of ver. 10 to the readers.—Although in ver. 10 there was no mention of a *λογίζεσθαι* on the part of Christ, we are not, with Griesbach and Koppe, to break up the discourse by the punctuation : *οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς λογίσεσθε κ.τ.λ.* (comp. on the contrary Luke xvii. 10).—*Accordingly reckon ye yourselves also* (like Christ) *as dead*, etc. *λογίσεσθε*, namely, containing the standard by which they are to apprehend their moral life-position in its reality, is not, with Bengel and Hofmann, to be taken as *indicative*, but rather, seeing that *here* the discourse *passes over* to the second person and *proceeds* in exhortation in ver. 12 ff., with the Vulgate, Chrysostom and Luther, as *imperative*. — *ἐν Χρ. 'Ι.*] These words, which Rückert, Köllner, de Wette, and others quite arbitrarily join merely with *ζῶντας δὲ τ. Θεῷ*, belong to both portions of the summons ; and do not mean *per Christum*

¹ Rich. Schmidt, *Paul. Christol.* p. 55, justly insists that Christ for His own person died to sin, but further on (p. 59), ends in finding an *ideal*, not a real relation. But He died *really* to sin, inasmuch as He took

upon Himself, in the death of the cross, the curse of the law ; after which human sin had now no longer any power over Him. Compare on ver. 3.

(Grotius and others, including Fritzsche), but denote rather the specific *element*, in which the being dead and living take place, namely, in the ethical bond of fellowship, which is just the *εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ*.

Ver. 12 f. *Ὁν*] in consequence of this *λογίζεσθε*, for the proof of it in the practice of life. For this *practice* the *λογίζεσθαι κ.τ.λ.* is meant to be the regulative *theory*. The negative portion of the following exhortation corresponds to the *νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ* in ver. 11 ; and the positive contrast ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. to the *ζῶντας δὲ τῷ Θεῷ*. — *μὴ βασιλ.*] With this *nothing sinful* is admitted (comp. Chrysostom) ; but on the contrary the influence of the (personified) sin, conquering the moral ego, is *entirely forbidden*,¹ as the whole connection teaches. — *ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ἡμ. σώμ.*] *ἐν* simply indicates the seat and sphere, in which the forbidden dominion would take place (not *by means of*, as Th. Schott thinks). As to *θνητῷ*, every explanation is to be avoided which takes the word in any other sense than the ordinary one of *mortal* (comp. viii. 11), because it has no other signification (see all the examples in Wetstein), and because the context contains nothing at all in favour of giving any other turn to the notion of the word. We must reject therefore the opinion that it is equivalent to *νεκρῷ*, as taken in the ethical sense : dead *for sin* (Turretin, Ch. Schmidt, Ernesti, Schleusner, Schrader, and Stengel). Directly affirmed of the body, the mortality could not but be understood by every reader quite definitely as the *physical*. The *purpose* of the epithet however must manifestly result from the relation *of motive*, in which the mortality of the body stands to the prohibition of the reign of sin in the body. And the more precise definition of this motive is to be derived from the previous *νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ζῶντας δὲ τῷ Θεῷ*. If we are convinced, namely, that we are dead for sin and alive for God ; if we account ourselves as those who have put off the ethical mortality (*ὡς ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῶντας*, ver. 13), then it is an *absurdity* to allow sin to reign in the body, which in fact is *mortal*. This quality stands in a relation of *contradiction* to our *immortal* life entered upon in the fellowship of Christ, and thus the dominion, for which we should deliver over our body to sin, would prove that we were not that for which, nevertheless, in genuine moral self-judgment, we have to take ourselves ; since in fact the mortal life of the body, if we yield it to the government of sin, excludes the immortal Christian life described in ver. 11. Hofmann imports more into the passage than its connection with ver. 11 suggests ; namely the double folly, that such an one should not use the *power*, which the life of Christ gives him over the mortal body and therewith over sin ; and that he should permit himself to be *entangled in the death* to which his body falls a victim, while he possesses a life of which also his body would become joint-participant. This is a fine-spun *application* of the true interpretation. Different is the view of Köllner (comp. Calvin : “ *per contemptum vocat mortale*”), that it is here hinted how *disgraceful* it is to make the *spirit* subordinate to sin, *which only dwells in the perishable body* ; and of Grotius : “ *de vita altera cogitandum, nec formidandos labores haud*

¹ But Luther's gloss is good : “ Mark, the saints have still evil lusts in the flesh, which

they do not follow.” Comp. the carrying out of the idea in Melancthon.

sane diuturnos" (comp. Chrysostom and Theodoret; so also on the whole Reiche). But the context contains neither a contrast between body and spirit, nor between this and the other life. Flatt thinks that Paul wished to remind his readers of the *brevity of sensual pleasure*; comp. Theophylact. But how little would this be in keeping with the high standpoint of the moral sternness of the Apostle! According to others, Paul desired to remind them warningly of the *destructiveness* of sin, which had brought death on the body (de Wette, Krehl, Nielsen, Philippi, also Maier). But this point of view as to destructiveness is remote from the connection, in which the pervading theme is rather the *unsuitableness* of the dominion of sin to the communion of death and life with Christ. Others still explain it variously.¹ — σώματι] *body*, as in ver. 6; not a symbolic expression for the entire ego (Reiche, following Ambrosiaster and various early expositors); nor yet *body and soul*, so far as it is not yet the recipient of the Spirit of God (Philippi); for even in all such passages as viii. 10, 13, 23; xii. 1 σώμα retains purely its signification *body*. But sin reigns in *the body* (comp. on ver. 6), so far as its material substratum is the σάρξ (Col. ii. 11), which, with its life-principle the ψυχή, is the seat and agent of sin (vii. 18 ff. *al.*). Hence the sinful desires are *its* desires (αὐτοῦ), because, excited by the power of sin in the flesh, they are at work in the body and its members (vii. 5, 23; Col. iii. 5). Sin aims at securing obedience to these desires through its dominion in man. Consequently εἰς τὸ ὑπακ. τ. ἐπιθ. αὐτ. implies the—according to ver. 11 absurd—*tendency* of the allowing sin to reign in the mortal body, which the Apostle forbids. — μηδέ] *also especially not* (as e.g. 1 Cor. v. 8). — παριστάμεν] *present*, i.e. *place at the disposal, at the service*. Matt. xxvi. 53; Acts xxiii. 24; 2 Tim. ii. 15; Athen. iv. p. 148 B; Lucian, *d. Mar.* 6, 2; Diod. Sic. xvi. 79; Dem. 597. pen. — τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν] *your members*, which sin desires to use as executive organs, tongue, hand, foot, eye, etc. The *mental* powers and activities, feeling, will, understanding, are not included (in opposition to Erasmus, Reiche, Philippi, and others); but Paul speaks concretely and graphically of the *members*, in reference to which the mental activities in question are necessarily presupposed. Comp. Col. iii. 5. — ὅπλα ἀδικίας] *as weapons of immorality*, with which the establishment of immorality is achieved. The ἀμαρτία is conceived as a *ruler* employing the members of man as *weapons of warfare*, wherewith to contend against the government of God and to establish ἀδικία (opposite of the subsequent δικαιοσύνης). It injures the figure, to which ver. 23 glances back, to explain ὅπλα (comp. כְּלִי) *instruments*, as is done by many (including Rückert, Köllner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Krehl, Fritzsche, de Wette, and Ewald), a meaning which it indeed frequently bears in classic Greek since Homer,² but never in the N. T. Comp. especially 2 Cor. vi. 7, x. 4. — παραστήσατε] the aorist here following

¹ Olshausen connects thus: "let not the sin manifesting itself in your mortal body reign in you." In that case Paul must have repeated the article after ἀμ. According to Baur there lies in ὁνητὸς the idea: "whose mortality can only remind you of that, which it even now is as νεκρὸν τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ."

But, had Paul desired to set forth the moral death through the adjective by way of motive, he must then have written, after ver. 11, ἐν τῷ νεκρῷ ὑμῶν σώματι, which after what goes before would not have been liable to any misconception.

² See Duncan, *Lex.* ed. Rost, p. 844.

the present (comp. Bernhárdy, p. 393), marking the immediateness and rapidity of the opposite action which has to set in. It stands to *παριστάνετε* in a *climactic* relation. See Winer, p. 294 [E. T. 314], Kühner, II. 1, p. 158. — *ἐαυτοῖς*] *yourselves, your own persons*, and specially also your members, etc. — *ὡς ἐκ νεκρ.* *ζῶντας*] *as those that are alive from the dead* (risen), *i.e.* those who have experienced in themselves the ethical process of having died and attained to the resurrection-life with Christ. Only thus, in the sense of the moral renovation discussed in vv. 2–11—not in the sense of Eph. ii. 1 (Philippi and older expositors)—can it be explained agreeably to the context, especially as *ὡς* corresponds to the *λογίζεσθε κ.τ.λ.* in ver. 11. This *ὡς*, *quippe*, with the participle (as in xv. 15, and very frequently), expresses, namely, the relation of the case, in which what is demanded is to appear to the readers as corresponding to their Christian state, which is described as life from the dead.¹ — *τῷ Θεῷ*] *belonging to God*, as in vv. 10, 11.

Ver. 14. Not the *ground and warrant* for the exhortation (Hofmann), in which case the thought is introduced, that obedience is *dependent on the readers*; but an *encouragement* to do what is demanded in vv. 12, 13, through the *assurance* that therein sin shall not become lord over them, since they are not in fact under the law, but under grace. Comp. the similar encouragement in Phil. ii. 13. In this assurance lies a “*dulcissima consolatio*,” Melanchthon, comp. Calvin. They have not to dread the danger of failure. Understood as an expression of *good confidence*, that they would not allow sin to become lord over them (Fritzsche), the sentence would lack an element assigning an *objective* reason, to which nevertheless the second half points. Heumann, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Flatt, and Umbreit take the future *imperatively*, which is erroneous for the simple reason that it is not in the *second* person (Bernhárdy, p. 378). — *οὐ γὰρ ἐστε ὑπὸ νόμον* (Gal. iv. 21), *ἀλλ' ὑπὸ χάριν*: *For not the law but divine grace* (revealed in Christ) *is the power under which you are placed*. [See Note LXIX. p. 253.] This contrast, according to which the norm-giving position of the law is *excluded* from the Christian state (it is not merely the *superfluity* of the law that is announced, as Th. Schott thinks), is the justification of the encouraging assurance previously given. Had they been *under the law*, Paul would not have been able to give it, because the merely commanding law is the *δύναμις τῆς ἀμαρτίας* (1 Cor. xv. 56), and accumulates sins (v. 20), in which reference he intends

¹ The *ὡς* is not the “*like*” of comparison (Hofmann, who, following Lachmann, prefers with A B C N the *ὥσει*, which does not elsewhere occur in the writings of Paul), but the “*as*” of the *quality*, in which the subjects have to conceive themselves. Comp. Wunder, *ad Soph. Trach.* 394, p. 94; Kühner, II. 2, p. 649. According to Hofmann the comparative *ὥσει* is only to extend to *ἐκ νεκρῶν* (and *ζῶντας* to be predicative): *as living persons like as from the dead*. But such a mere comparison would be foreign to the whole context, according to which Christians are *really* alive (with

Christ) from the dead, and paralyzing the pith of the view, which does not lie in a *quasi*, but in a *tanquam*. The Vulgate renders correctly: “*tanquam ex mortuis viventes*.” He who participates ethically in the resurrection-life of the Lord is *alive from death*, but not alive *as if from death*; just as little is he *as if alive* from death. Theodore of Mopsuestia rendered the *ὥσει*, which he read, in the latter sense; referring it to *ἐκ νεκρ. ζῶντας* together, and explaining the meaning to be that, previous to the *actual* resurrection, only *ἡ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν μίμησις* is required.

to discuss the matter still further in ch. vii. But they stand under a quite different power, *under grace*; and *this* relation of dependence is quite calculated to bring to the justified that consecration of moral strength, which they require against sin and for the divine life (v. 21; vi. 1 ff.). “*Gratia non solum peccata diluit, sed ut non peccemus facit*,” Augustine.

Vv. 15–23. *This οὐκ εἶναι ὑπὸ νόμον, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ χάριν does not therefore give us freedom to sin.* From the οὐ γάρ . . . χάριν, namely, the inference of freedom to sin might very easily be drawn by immoral Christians (comp. ver. 1), which would be exactly the reverse of what the Apostle wished to establish by that proposition (ἀμ. ὑμ. οὐ κυρ. ver. 14). Paul therefore proposes to himself this possible inference and negatives it (ver. 15), and then gives in ver. 16 ff. its refutation. Accordingly vv. 15–23 form only an ethico-polemical preliminary to the positive illustration of the proposition, “ye are not under the law, but under grace,” which begins in ch. vii.

Ver. 15. [See Note LXX. p. 254.] τί οὖν sc. ἐστι; *what is then the state of the case?* Comp. iii. 9. Shall this Christian position of ours be misused for sinning?—With the reading ἀμαρτήσομεν the sense would be purely *future*: *shall we sin?* will this case occur with us? But with the proper reading ἀμαρτήσωμεν Paul asks: *Are we to sin?* *deliberative* subjunctive as in ver. 1. To the ἐπιμένωμ. τ. ἀμαρτ. in ver. 1 our ἀμαρτήσωμεν stands related as a *climax*; not merely the state of perseverance in sin, but every sinful action is to be abhorred; the former from the pre-Christian time, the latter in the Christian state of grace. — ὅτι οὐκ ἐσμὲν ὑπὸ νόμον κ.τ.λ.] *emphatic repetition.*¹

Ver. 16. Paul begins the detailed illustration of the μὴ γένοιτο with an appeal to the consciousness of his readers, the tenor of which corresponds to the saying of Christ: “No man can serve two masters.” This appeal forms the *propositio major*; the *minor* then follows in ver. 17 f., after which the *conclusion* is obvious of itself.—“*Know ye not, that, to whom ye yield yourselves as slaves for obedience, ye are slaves of him whom ye obey?*” Here the emphasis is not on ἐστε (*slaves ye are in reality*, as de Wette and others think), or even on the relative clause ὃ ὑπακούετε (Hofmann), but, as is required by the order of the words, and the correlation with παριστ. ἐαυτοῖς, on δοῦλοι. [See Note LXXI. p. 254.] Whosoever places *himself* at the disposal of another for obedience as a slave, is no longer free and independent, but is just the *slave* of him whom he obeys.—παριστάνετε] *The present*, as expressing the general proposition which continues to hold good.²—ὃ ὑπακούετε] *whom ye obey* (erroneously rendered by Reiche and Baumgarten-Crusius: *have to obey*). By this, instead of the simple αὐτοῦ or τούτου, the relation of *subjection*, which was already expressed in the protasis, is once more vividly brought into view: that ye are *slaves* of him, *whom ye*, in consequence of that παριστάνειν ἐαυτοῖς δοῦλους to him, *obey*. The circumstantiality has a certain earnestness and solemnity. If ye yield yourselves as slaves for obedience, then ye are nothing else than *slaves* in the service of him whom ye obey. The less reason is there for attaching εἰς ὑπακ. to the apo-

¹ Bornemann, *ad Xen. Mem.* iv. 3, 17,
Schol. in Luc. p. xxxix,

² See Kühner, II. 1, p. 115.

dosis (Th. Schott, Hofmann). — ἡτοι ἁμαρτίας] sc. δούλοι.¹ Respecting the disjunctive ἡτοι, *aut sane*, found nowhere else in N. T., see especially Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 609, Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 244. It lays strong emphasis on the first alternative. Very frequently thus used in Greek authors. Comp. Wisd. xi. 18. — εἰς θάνατον] result, to which this relation of slavery leads. The θάνατος cannot be *physical* death (Reiche, Fritzsche, van Hengel), since that is not the consequence of individual² sin (see on v. 12), and is not averted from the δούλος ὑπακοῆς [See Note LXXII. p. 254] ; nor is it, either generally, the *misery of sin* (de Wette), or specially *spiritual* death, alienation from the true ζωή, an idea which Paul never conveys by θάνατος ; but rather, seeing that θάνατος, as is more precisely indicated in ver. 21, and is placed beyond doubt by the contrast of ζωή αἰώνιος, must be conceived as the τέλος of the bondage of sin ; *eternal* death (Chrysostom, Theophylact, and others, including Rückert, Reithmayr, and Tholuck). Comp. i. 32. This is not at variance with the antithesis εἰς δικαιοσύνην, which is not to be taken (as in ver. 13) in the sense of *moral righteousness* (Philippi and others) ; for this is not the *result*, but is itself the *essence* of the δούλον εἶναι ὑπακοῆς (comp. v. 19), since ὑπακοή, in contradistinction to the ἁμαρτία, is obedience to the divine will. On the contrary δικαιοσύνη, antithetically correlative with the θάνατος, must be conceived as the *final result* of that δούλον εἶναι ὑπακοῆς, and apply to the time of final perfection in the αἰὼν μέλλων, when the faithful, who have not relapsed into the service of sin, but in their faith have been servants of obedience, on account of the death of Christ δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται, v. 19. It is therefore *the righteousness* which is awarded to them in the *judgment*.³ If it were the *righteousness of faith* even now attained (Th. Schott), ὑπακοῆς would need to be taken, with Schott, of *becoming a believer* (i. 5), which is contextually inadmissible, since what is spoken of is the state of grace already *existing* (ver. 15), in which service is rendered to the obedience of God only, and not to sin. In accordance with the misconceptions of Hofmann, already noticed in detail (see above), there results as his sense of the whole : “ *To whom ye place yourselves as servants at his disposal, ye are servants for the purpose of obedience ; ye are so to him whom ye obey, servants either—for there is no third alternative—who act contrary to their master’s will and thereby merit death, or such as live in obedience and are therefore right-*

¹ Consequently *servants of sin*, who are serviceable to that which is sin ; and then : *servants of obedience*, who are in the service of the opposite of ἁμαρτία, in the service of divine obedience. Hofmann erroneously takes the genitives as genitives of *quality* (*servants who sin and who obey*) ; see Winer, p. 222 [E. T. 237]. What reader could, after δούλοι (comp. John viii. 34), have stumbled on this singular relation of quality ; the assumption of which ought to have been precluded by vv. 17, 20. Comp. 2 Pet. ii. 19.

² Philippi here observes, with the view of including bodily death also in the idea, that it “ is personally appropriated and merited

by the individual through his own act.” This is not Pauline, and is at variance with the true interpretation of the ἐφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον in v. 12. It is not with death as it is with the atonement, which is objectively there for all, but must be *appropriated* by something subjective. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 22. Moreover, such personal appropriation would be inconceivable in the case of all children dying without actual sin.

³ Köstlin has also justly directed attention in the *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* 1856, p. 127, to the *sensus forensis* of δικαιοσύνη in our passage.

ous in the presence of their master." What kind of a θάνατος, and in what sense δικαιοσύνη is meant, is supposed accordingly to be self-evident. And by the following thanksgiving, ver. 17, the Apostle is alleged "as it were half to take back" his question, Whether they do not know etc., so that the medium of transition to ver. 17 is "why yet still the question?" A series of gratuitously imported fancies.

Ver. 17. *Propositio minor*. [See Note LXXIII. p. 255.] — χάρις δὲ τῷ Θεῷ, ὅτι] animated expression of piety; "ardor pectoris apostolici," Bengel. Comp. vii. 25. — ὅτι ἦτε δούλοι τ. ἁμ., ἱππκ. κ.τ.λ.] ἦτε has emphasis: *that ye were slaves of sin* (that this condition of bondage is *past*), etc. Comp. Eph. v. 8. The prefixing of ἦτε, and the non-insertion of a μέν, clearly prove that this is the true interpretation, and not that, by which the main idea is discovered in the *second* half: "non Deo gratias agit, quod servierint peccato, sed quod, qui servierint peccato, postea obedierunt evangelio," Grotius. In that case μέν at least would be indispensable in the first clause. The mode of expression is *purposely chosen*, in order to render more forcibly apparent their earlier dangerous condition (whose further delineation in ver. 19, moreover, points to the former *heathenism* of the readers). — ἐκ καρδίας] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἠναγκάσθητε, οὐδὲ ἐβιάσθητε, ἀλλ' ἐκόντες μετὰ προθυμίας ἀπέστητε, Chrysostom. Comp. Job viii. 10; Mark xii. 30; Wisd. viii. 21 *al.*; Theocr. xxix. 4; also ἐκ θυμοῦ, ἐξ εἰμενῶν στέρνων, and similar phrases in Greek writers. The opposite: ἐκ βίας. — εἰς ὃν παρεδ. τίπ. διδ.] may either be resolved: τῷ τέπῳ τῆς διδ., εἰς ὃν παρεδ., with Chrysostom and others, including Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, Tholuck, de Wette, Fritzsche, Winer, and Philippi; ¹ or: εἰς τ. τίπ. τῆς διδ., εἰς ὃν παρεδ. (as in iv. 17); or: εἰς τ. τίπ. τῆς διδ., ὃν παρεδ. *i.e.* ὃς παρεδ. ὑμῖν (see Castalio and Grotius on the passage, Kypke, II. p. 167, Ewald and Hofmann). It is decisive in favour of the first mode of resolution that ὑπακούειν εἰς τι is never equivalent to ὑπακούειν τινί; ² while to take ἱππκοῖσατε *absolutely* either in the sense of the obedience of *faith*, i. 5 (Ewald), or in that of *absolute obedience* ("as obedient servants in contrast to sinful ones," Hofmann), is inadmissible, because ἱππκοῖσατε in its antithetical correlation with δούλοι τῆς ἁμαρτίας needs a more precise definition. And this it has precisely in εἰς ὃν παρεδόθ. κ.τ.λ., which cannot therefore indicate *whereunto* (Ewald and Hofmann) the ὑπακούειν has taken place,—an artificial far-fetched expedient, which is wrung from them, in order to get instead of obedience towards the doctrine obedience as *effect* of the doctrine (comp. Matt. xii. 41, where however μετενόησαν stands by its side, which is in fact of itself a complete conception). The τίπος διδασκ., εἰς ὃν παρεδ. is usually (and still by Hofmann) understood of *Christian doctrine* generally, so far as it is a definite, express form of teaching. But since the singular expression τίπος does not thus appear accounted for, and since the Roman church was undoubtedly planted through the preaching of *Pauline* Christianity, which is certainly a particular *type*, different from

¹ See Fritzsche, *Diss.* II. p. 133, *Conject.* p. 34; Bornemann, *Schol. in Luc.* p. 177.

² In the passages quoted by Kypke from Greek authors ὑπακούειν εἰς τι means to

obey in reference to something, to be obedient in a matter. Reiche's judgment of these passages is erroneous. See on 2 Cor. II. 9.

Judaistic forms of Christian teaching and in various points even contrasting with these, it is preferable to understand by it the *distinct expression* which the Gospel had received *through Paul*, consequently the doctrinal form of his Gospel (ii. 16, xvi. 25), in opposition to anti-Paulinism (Rückert, ed. 1, de Wette, comp. Philippi). This *εἰς ὃν παρεδ.* is decisive in favour of the interpretation "form of doctrine" in an *objective* sense, and against the *subjective* explanation: image of the doctrine, which is impressed on the heart (Kypke). Following Theodore of Mopsuestia, Occumenius, Calvin, Grotius, Calovius, and many others, Reiche (as also Olshausen, Reithmayr and Krehl) take τύπος in the sense of *exemplar, ideal which the doctrine holds up*, consequently in that of the ethical rule, which as model of life is contained in the Gospel (διδάχ).¹ This is in harmony neither with the ἐπακοίειν nor with the εἰς ὃν παρεδ. Unsuitable to the former is also the interpretation of Beza and others, to which Tholuck inclines, that the evangelical doctrine is "quasi instar typi ejusdam, cui veluti immittamur, ut ejus figuræ conformemur." Van Hengel understands ἐπηκούσατε in the sense of obedience toward God, and εἰς as *quod attinet ad*; Paul in his view says: "obedivistis Deo ad sequendam quam profiteri edocti estis doctrinæ formam." This form of doctrine, to which the Romans were directed at the founding of their church, had been, he conceives, probably more Judaistic than purely Pauline. But against the absolute interpretation of ἐπηκούσ. see above; while the assumption of a τύπος διδασχῆς not truly Pauline is irreconcilable with the expression of thanksgiving, and is not supported by Phil. i. 15, a passage which is to be explained from the peculiar situation of the Apostle. We may add that Paul aptly specializes the ἐπακοή—which was set forth in the major, in ver. 16, quite generally (as obedience to God in general)—at the subsumption in the minor, ver. 17, as obedience to his Gospel. — παρεδόθ. | τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ βοήθειαν αἰνέττεται, Chrysostom. The reference to God, which is also to be observed for the passives in ver. 18, is plain from χάρις τῷ Θεῷ. That it is not to be taken as *middle* (to yield themselves, so Fritzsche) is shown by the same passives in ver. 18. Παρεδόμῃ either with the dative or with εἰς, in the sense of delivering over to the disposal and power of another, is very current everywhere in Greek literature (Judith x. 15; Rom. i. 26; Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 3; Dem. 515, 6, 1187, 5); but whether in a hostile sense or not, is conveyed not by the expression itself, but simply by the context. To the expression itself the abolition of one's own self-determination is essential. So also here. The Christian has at his conversion ceased to be *sui juris*, and has been given over to the morally regulative power of the Gospel.²

Ver. 18. "But, freed from sin, ye have become servants of righteousness." This is not to be regarded as the *conclusion* from the two premisses, vv. 16, 17 (Rückert, Reiche), because οὐν is not used, and because substan-

¹ So probably Chrysostom took it, who explains ὁ τύπος τ. διδασχῆς by ὁρθῶς ζῆν καὶ μετὰ πολιτείας ἀρίστης. So also Theophylact.

² On τύπος διδασχῆς comp. Jamblichus, *de Pythag.* vii. 16: τῆς παιδείσεως ὁ τύπος, Plat.

Rep. p. 412 B: οἱ τύποι τῆς παιδείας, p. 397 C: τύπων τῆς λέξεως, Jamblichus *l.c.* 23: τὸν τύπον τῆς διδασκαλίας, Isoc. *Antid.* 186: ὁ τύπος τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

tially the same thought was already contained in ver. 17. Paul rather expresses once more the happy change in his readers just described ; and does so in a thoughtfully chosen antithetical form, no longer however dependent on *ὅτι*, but independent and thus more emphatic (hence a colon is, with Lachmann, to be inserted before *ἐλευθ.*). But he leaves the reader to draw for himself the *conclusion*, namely : this *μὴ γένοιτο* is therefore fully justified. — The *δέ* is the *autem* of continuation ; the transition, however, is not from activity (*ὑπηρετοῦσατε*) to passiveness (Hofmann, comp. Th. Schott), for the latter is already given in *παρεδόθητε*, but from the state of the case expressed in ver. 17 to a striking *specification*, in a more *precise form*, of the revolution in the relation of service, which was accomplished in them. — *ἀπὸ τ. ἀμαρτ.*] that is, from the relation of slavery to it. — *ἰδουλ. τῇ δικαιοσ.*] *ye have been placed in the slave-relation to righteousness* ; a representation of the complete dependence on the moral necessity of being righteous, implied in conversion. On the dative comp. 1 Cor. ix. 19 ; Tit. ii. 3 ; 2 Pet. ii. 19. *This* slavery, where the *δικαιοσύνη* is the mistress, is consequently the true moral freedom (*ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς δὲ ἡ ἀρετή*, Plat. *Alc. I.* p. 135 C.). Comp. the similar paradox in 1 Cor. vii. 22.

Ver. 19. Paul had, in vv. 16–18, represented the idea of the highest moral freedom—in a form corresponding indeed with its nature as a moral necessity (“*Deo servire vera libertas est*,” Augustine), but still borrowed from human relations—as *δουλεία*. He now therefore, not to justify himself, but to induce his readers to separate the idea from the form, announces *the fact that*, and the *reason why*, he thus expresses himself regarding the loftiest moral idea in this concrete fashion, derived from an ordinary human relation. *I speak* (in here making mention of *slavery*, vv. 16–18) *what is human* (belonging to the relations of the natural human life) *on account of the* (intellectual) *weakness of your flesh*, *i.e.* in order thereby to come to the help of this your weakness. [See Note LXXIV. p. 255.] For the setting forth of the idea in some such sensuous form is the appropriate means of stimulating and procuring its apprehension in the case of one, whose knowledge has not yet been elevated by divine enlightenment to a higher platform of strength and clearness released from such human forms. Respecting *ἀνθρώπων* see the examples in Wetstein. It is the antithesis of *θεῖον*, Plat. *Rep.* p. 497 C. The expression *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω* in ch. iii. 5 is in substance equivalent, since *ἀνθρώπων* also necessarily indicates the *form and dress* employed for the idea, for whose representation the Apostle has uttered *what is human*. The *σάρξ*, however, *i.e.* the material human nature in its psychical determination, as contrasted with the divine pneumatic influence (comp. on iv. 1), is *weak* for religious and moral *discernment*, as well as for good (Matt. xxvi. 41) ; hence the *σοφία σαρκική* (2 Cor. i. 12) is foolishness with God (1 Cor. iii. 19). Others, taking it not of intellectual weakness, but of *moral* weakness, refer it to what *follows* (Origen, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Erasmus, Calvin, Estius, Hammond, Wetstein, and others, including Klee, Reithmayr, and Bisping), in the sense : “I do not demand what is too hard (*ἀνθρώπων*, comp. 1 Cor. x. 13) ; for although I might require a far higher degree of the new obedience, yet I require only the same

as ye have formerly rendered to sin."¹ But the following ὥστερ . . . οὕτω introduces not the equality of the *degree*, but, as is plain from ver. 20, only the comparison in general between the former and the present state. Besides, the demand itself, which by this interpretation would only concern a lower stage of Christian life, would be inappropriate to the morally ideal character of the whole hortatory discourse, which is not injured by the concrete figurative form. This remark also applies to the dismembering explanation of Hofmann (comp. Th. Schott), who makes ἀνθρώπινον λέγω form a parenthesis, and then connects διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τ. σαρκὸς ἡμῶν with ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, so that the thought would be : the weakness of our in-born nature gives occasion that our translation into the life of righteousness is dealt with as an *enslavement* thereto, while otherwise it would be simply restoration to the freedom of doing our own will ; according to this weakness what is right is not done freely of itself, but in the shape of a *service*. But how could Paul have so *degraded* the moral *loftiness* of the position of the δουλωθέντες τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ! To him they were indeed the δουλωθέντες τῷ Θεῷ (ver. 22), and in his estimation there was nothing morally more exalted than to be δοῦλος Θεοῦ, as Christ Himself was. The Christian has put on Christ in this respect also (Gal. iii. 27), and lives in the spirit of the holiest freedom (2 Cor. iii. 17 f.) ; his subjection to the service of δικαιοσύνη has not taken place on account of his in-born nature incapacitating him for moral freedom (as though it were a measure of compulsion) ; but on the contrary he has put off the morally weak old man, and so he lives as a new creature — by means of the newness of the spirit, and in virtue of his communion in the resurrection-life of Christ—in the condition of righteousness, which Paul has here under the designation of *bondage*, accommodating himself by the ordinary human expression to the natural weakness of the understanding, brought into contrast with the having been freed from sin. — ὥστερ γάρ κ.τ.λ.] *Practical assigning of a reason* for the proposition just affirmed ἀνθρώπινως in ver. 18, in the form of a *concrete demand*. In opposition to Hofmann, who (at variance with his own interpretation of xiii. 6 !) declares it impossible to clothe the assigning of a reason in the dress of an exhortation, see Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 86. Heb. xii. 3 (see Delitzsch) is to be taken in the same way ; comp. James i. 7 ; and see on 1 Cor. i. 26. Hence : *for, as ye have placed your members at the disposal, etc., so now place, etc.* Since the discourse proceeds indeed in the same figurative manner, but yet so that it now assumes the *hortatory* form, ἀνθρώπινον . . . σαρκὸς ἡμῶν is not to be put in a parenthesis, but with Fritzsche, Lachmann, and Tischendorf, to be separated from ὥστερ by a period. — τῇ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ κ. τῇ ἀνομίᾳ] The two exhaust the notion of ἁμαρτία (ver. 13), so that ἀκαθ. characterizes sin as morally defiling *the man* (see on i. 24), and ἀνομ. (1. John iii. 4) as a violation of *the divine law*.² — εἰς τὴν ἀνομ.] *on behalf of* antagonism to law, in order that it *may be established (in facto)*. The interpretation εἰς τὸ ἐπιπλεόν ἀνομεῖν, Theophylact (so also Oecumenius, Erasmus, Luther, Grotius, Köllner, Ewald, and

¹ So also probably Theodoret : τῇ φύσει μετρώ τὴν παραίνεσιν· οἶδα γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷ θνητῷ

σώματι κινούμενα πάθῃ.

² See Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 48.

others), is, in its practical bearing, erroneous, since it is only the yielding of the members to the *principle* of ἀνομία that actually brings the latter into a concrete reality. — εἰς ἁγιασμόν] *in order to attain holiness* (1 Cor. i. 30 ; 1 Thess. iv. 3 f. 7 ; 2 Thess. ii. 13), moral purity and consecration to God. To be an ἅγιος in mind and walk—that goal of Christian development—is the aim of the man, who places his members at the disposal of δικαιοσύνη as ruler over him. The word ἁγιασμός is found only in the LXX., Apocr. and in the N. T. (in the latter it is always *holiness*, not *sanctification*,¹ even in 1 Tim. ii. 15 ; Heb. xii. 14 ; 1 Pet. i. 2), but not Greek writers.² Ἀγιασμέν stands *without the article*, because this highest moral goal is conceived of *qualitatively*.

Vv. 20-22. [See Note LXXV. p. 255.] With γάρ Paul does not introduce an illustration to ver. 19 (Fritzsche), but rather—seeing that ver. 20 through οὖν in ver. 21, as well as through the correlative antithesis in ver. 22, must necessarily form a connected whole in thought with what follows till the end of ver. 22—the *motive* for complying with what is enjoined in ver. 19 ; and that in such a way, that he first of all *prepares the way* for it by ver. 20, and then in ver. 21 f., leading on by οὖν, *actually expresses* it, equally impressively and touchingly, as respects its deterrent (ver. 21) and inviting (ver. 22) aspects. The fact that he first sets down ver. 20 *for itself*, makes the recollection which he thus calls up more forcible, *more tragic*. Observe also the emphasis and the symmetrical separation of the several words in ver. 20. — ἐλεύθ. ἦτε τῇ δικαιοσ.] *Ye were free in relation to righteousness*, in point of fact independent of its demands, since ye were serving the opposite ruler (the ἀμαρτία). Οὐδὲ γὰρ διενέμετε τῆς δουλείας τὸν τρόπον τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἑαυτοὺς ἐξεδίδοτε τῇ πονηρίᾳ, Chrysostom. A sad truth based on experience ! not a flight of irony (Koppe, Reiche, Philippi, and others), but full of deep moral pain. — Ver. 21. οὖν] in consequence of this freedom. — τίνα . . . ἐπαισχύνεσθε is with Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Castalio, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Estius, Wetstein, Bengel, and others, including Winer, Reiche (but see below), Fritzsche, Jatho, and Hofmann, (but see below)—in harmony with the punctuation of the *text. rec.*—to be regarded as one connected question [See Note LXXVI. p. 256], so that the reason to be given for replying in the negative sense to this question is then contained in τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἐκείνων θάνατος ; namely, thus : *what fruit, now, had ye then* (when ye were still in the service of sin, etc., ver. 20) *of things, on account of which ye are now ashamed ? i.e. ye had then no fruit, no moral gain, etc., and the proof thereof is : for the final result of them* (those things) *is death*. What leads at last to death, could bring you no moral gain. For the grammatical explanation ἐκείνων is to be supplied before ἐφ' οἷς (which in fact is perfectly regular, Winer, p. 149 [E. T. 158]), and to this the ἐκείνων in the probative clause refers. Regarding ἐπαισχ. ἐπί τινι, to be ashamed *over anything* (not merely of the being put to shame *by the*

¹ In opposition to Hofmann, on ver. 22. But to the Christian consciousness it is self-evident that *holiness* can only be attained under the influence of the Holy

Spirit. Comp. Ritschl, *althath. K.* p. 82.

² In Dion. Hal. i. 21, it is a false reading, as also in Diod. iv. 89.

fact of something *not proving to be what* we thought it, as Th. Schott weakens the sense) comp. Xen. *Hell.* v. 4, 33 : ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φιλῇ αἰσχυνθῆς, Plat. *Rep.* p. 396 C : οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μῆσσει, LXX. Is. xx. 5, i. 29 ; 1 Macc. iv. 31 ; also Dem. 426, 10. Reiche makes the double mistake of very arbitrarily referring ἐφ' οἷς to καρπὸν, which is to be taken collectively ; and of explaining καρπὸν ἔχειν as meaning *to bring forth fruit* (which would be κ. ποιεῖν, φέρειν), so that the sense would be : "what deeds, on account of which ye are now ashamed, proceeded from your service of sin ?" Hofmann, resolving the expression into ἐπὶ τούτοις ἃ νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε, wishes to take ἐπὶ in the well-known sense of *addition to*, so that Paul asks : "what fruit had ye then *over and above* those things of which ye are now ashamed ?" those things being the former disgraceful *enjoyments*, with which they now desired to have nothing further to do. But how could the reader think of such *enjoyments* without any hint being given by the text ? And how arbitrary in this particular place is that interpretation of ἐπὶ, especially when the verb itself is compounded with ἐπὶ, and that in the sense : to be ashamed *thereupon*, and accordingly indicates how ἐφ' οἷς is to be resolved and properly understood !¹ Many others (Syriac, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Melancthon, Erasmus Schmid, Heumann, Carpov, Koppe, Tholuck undecidedly, Rückert, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Philippi, Reithmayr, Ewald, van Hengel, and Th. Schott) end the question with τότε, so that ἐφ' οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχ. becomes the answer, of which again τὸ γὰρ τέλ. ἐκ θάν. is the proof : "what sort of fruit had ye then ? Things (ye had as fruit) of which ye are now ashamed ; for the end of them is death." Καρπὸν is likewise regarded as a figurative description either of *gain* or *reward* ("ignoble and pernicious joys and pleasures," Ewald), or of *actions*, which are the penal consequence of reprobate sentiments. But fatal to all this explanation, which breaks up the passage, is the antithesis in ver. 22, where the *having of fruit*, not its *quality*, is opposed to the preceding ; if Paul had inquired in ver. 21 regarding the *quality* of the fruit, he must have used in ver. 22 some such expression as νυνὶ δὲ . . . τὸν ἁγιασμὸν ἔχετε τὸν καρπὸν ἡμῶν. Besides, we cannot well see why he should not have written either τίνας καρπούς or ἐφ' ᾧ and ἐκείνους ; he would by annexing the *plurals*, though these were in themselves admissible on account of the collective nature of καρπός, have only expressed himself in a fashion obscure and misleading. Finally, it is to be observed that he never attributes καρπὸν or καρπούς to immorality ; he attributes to it ἔργα (Gal. v. 19), but uses καρπός only of the good ; he speaks of the καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος, Gal. v. 22 ; of the καρπὸς τοῦ φωτός, Eph. v. 9 ; of the καρπὸς δικαιοσύνης, Phil. i. 11 ; of the καρπ. ἔργων, Phil. i. 22 ; comp. Rom. i. 13 ; in fact he *negatives* the idea of καρπός in reference to evil, when he describes the ἔργα τοῦ σκότους as ἄκαρπα, Eph. v. 11 ; comp. Tit. iii. 14. With this type of conception our interpretation alone accords, by which in the question τίνα καρπὸν κ.τ.λ. (comp. 1 Cor. ix. 18) there is contained the *negation* of καρπός in

¹ See generally on ἐπὶ with the dative, as specifying the ground with verbs of emo-

tion, Kühner, II. 1, p. 436, and with αἰσχύν. II. 2, p. 381, rem. 6.

the service of sin, the ἄκαρπον εἶναι. The most plausible objection to our explanation is this, that in accordance with it ἐφ' οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχ. becomes merely an incidental observation. But an incidental observation may be of great weight in its bearing on the matter in hand. It is so here, where it contains a trenchant argumentative point in favour of replying in a negative sense to the question. Calvin aptly says : "non poterat gravius exprimere quod volebat, quam appellando eorum conscientiam et quasi in eorum persona pudorem confitendo." Compare also Chrysostom. — ἐκείνων] *neuter* : those things, on account of which ye are now ashamed, the *pre-Christian sins and vices*. Bengel well remarks : "remote spectat praeterita." — θάνατος] *death*, i.e. *the eternal death*, whose antithesis is the ζωὴ αἰώνιος, ver. 23 ; not the *physical* (Fritzsche), comp. on ver. 16. — The μέν before γάρ (see the crit. remarks) does not correspond to the following δέ ; on the contrary, we must translate : *for the end indeed* (which however excludes every fruit) is death.¹ Ver. 22. νυνὶ δέ κ.τ.λ.] *But now* (ye are no longer without fruit, as formerly ; no, now) *ye possess your fruit unto holiness*, so that its possession has as its consequence holiness for you (εἰς consecutive). The ἁγιασμός is consequently not *the fruit* (the moral gain) *itself*, which they already *have* (that would also be at variance with οὕτω νῦν παραστ. . . . εἰς ἁγιασμόν in ver. 19), but the *state*, which the ἔχειν of their fruit shall in future bring about. The *fruit itself* — and καρπός is to be taken, quite as in ver. 21, as ethical product — is consequently the *new, Christian morality* (comp. the καὶνότης ζωῆς in ver. 4), the Christian virtuous nature which belongs to them (ἰμῶν), and the possession of which leads by the way of progressive development to *holiness*. — τὸ δὲ τέλος ζωῆν αἰών.] *as the final result however* (of this your fruit) *eternal life* in the kingdom of Messiah. This possession is now as yet an ideal one (viii. 24). Hofmann erroneously takes τὸ δὲ τέλος *adverbially* (1 Pet. iii. 8 ; comp. on 1 Cor. xv. 24), which is impossible after ver. 21, in accordance with which the word must here also be the emphatic *substantive*, the *finale* of the καρπός ; hence also ζωῆν αἰώνιον is dependent not on εἰς (Hofmann), but on ἔχετε. — The circumstance, moreover, that Paul in ver. 22 says δουλωθ. τῷ Θεῷ while in ver. 18 he has said ἐδουλ. τῇ δικαιοσίνῃ, is rightly illustrated by Grotius : "qui bonitati rebusque honestis servit, et Deo servit, quia Deus hoc semper amavit et in evangelio apertissime praecepit." Comp. xii. 2. And precisely therein lies the true freedom, 1 Pet. ii. 16 ; John viii. 36.

Ver. 23. Τὰ ὀψώνια] *the wages*. Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 7 ; Luke iii. 14. Ὁψώνιον κυρίως λέγεται τὸ τοῖς στρατιώταις παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως δεδομένον σιτηρέσιον, Theophylact.² The *plural*, more usual than the singular, is explained by the various elements that constituted the original natural payments, and by the coins used in the later money wages. — *The wages which sin gives* stands in reference to ver. 13, where the ἁμαρτία is presented as a ruler, to whom the subjects tender their members as weapons, for which they receive their *allowance* ! — θάνατος] as in ver. 22. — τὸ δὲ χάρισμα τ. Θεοῦ] Paul does not say τὰ ὀψώνια here also ("vile verbum," Erasmus), but characterizes what God

¹ See Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 414, Winer, p. 534 f. [E. T. 575].

² Comp. Photius, 367. See Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 420.

gives for wages as what it *is* in its specific nature—a *gift of grace*, which is *no ἀντιταλάντεθελαι* (Theodoret). To the Apostle, in the connection of his system of faith and doctrine, this was very natural, even without the supposition of any special design (in order—it has been suggested—to afford no encouragement to pride of virtue or to confiding in one's own merit). — ἐν Χριστῷ κ.τ.λ. | In Christ is the *causal basis*, that the χάρισμα τ. Θεοῦ is eternal life ; a triumphant conclusion as in v. 21 ; comp. viii. 39.

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

LXIV. Ver. 1. ἐπιμένωμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ.

To make the defence of his doctrine as the truth complete, the Apostle was obliged, not only to establish it by direct proofs, but also to meet the objections which might naturally arise. There were two of these which he must have often encountered, and which, in this Ep., he anticipates and answers. The first is the one presented in all ages against the doctrine—namely, that it tends toward immorality. As justification does not rest upon works, as forgiveness is always ready for the sinner who trusts in Christ, and as the abounding of sin causes grace to abound still more, will not the believer be careless about sinning, and even disposed to continue in sin? The second objection was peculiar to the age when the Judaistic views were held and the relation of the Jews to the old covenant was still pressed—namely, did not the doctrine of faith, which excluded all unbelieving Jews from salvation, involve unfaithfulness of God to His promises given to His peculiar people? The Apostle considers the first of these objections in chaps. vi.–viii., and the second in chaps. ix.–xi. He limits himself to the two, because he regarded them, probably, as containing in substance the sum of what could be urged against the faith-system.

LXV. Ver. 2. ὅτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ.

The aorist tense points to the time of entrance upon the Christian life. According to the doctrine of faith, the relation of the man to sin terminates at the moment of conversion. He dies, so far forth as sin is concerned, at that moment. Hence it is contrary to the very idea of the doctrine, that he should continue to live in sin. This thought is emphatically repeated in ver. 3 ff., as connected with the figure of burial and resurrection, and with that of crucifixion. It will be observed that Paul is considering *the doctrine*, and presenting the evidence that it does not tend towards immorality, and not describing *ordinary experience*. The ideal of Christian living involves dying absolutely to the old life, as soon as the new one begins. In ver. 12 f. he exhorts the readers to live in accordance with the ideal standard.

LXVI. Ver. 4. συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ.

It does not seem to be *necessary* to regard συνετάφημεν as referring to baptism by immersion. It may be that the thought of burial, being naturally suggested by that of death, is added only for the purpose of emphasis. It is clear, however, that, if it has this reference, the use of the verb is more fully and satisfactorily accounted for, and not improbably, to say the least, there is an allusion to this mode of baptizing.

LXVII. Ver. 6. τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

The explanation of τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας given by Meyer seems to be the most natural and satisfactory one. The body, according to the view of Paul, is evidently not evil in itself. On the other hand, it is an instrument which may be used either in the service of sin or of God. As the man dies to sin without dying in the ordinary sense, so his body is destroyed, so far forth as it belongs to sin and is given up to its control, without being actually destroyed. This view makes the words correspond with the thought or phraseology of the Apostle elsewhere (cf. vv. 12, 13, also vii. 24, etc.). It also brings ἁμαρτία, as no other explanation does, into accordance with the use of the word throughout this section of the Epistle—sin being, in many instances, evidently personified as a master (cf. e.g. vi. 12, 13, 16, vii. 14, 17, 23).

LXVIII. Ver. 7. δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

Godet, who holds the same view of ver. 7 with Meyer, says that “δικαιοῦσθαι signifies, in this connection, to be free from blame in case of disobedience to be legally entitled not to obey;” and he adds that the meaning of the Apostle is, “One who is dead, no longer having a body to put at the service of sin, is now legally exempted from carrying out the wishes of that master, who till then had freely disposed of him. Suppose a dead slave: it will be vain for his master to order him to steal, to lie, or to kill. He will be entitled to answer, My tongue, hands, and feet no longer obey me. How, then, could he be taken to task for refusing to serve?” Gifford, Beet, Sanday, and others, among the most recent commentators, regard ἀποθανόν as having the physical sense. Gifford views the sentence as containing “the general maxim, that death puts an end to all bondage.” Beet says that δικ. here means to *make righteous*. “Death separates a man even from his sins. The thief and the murderer will steal and kill no more. By death they have been forcibly made righteous. The statement of this ver. is implied in a still wider one, viz., that death separates a man completely from his former life. Whatever he was before, by death he ceases to be.” Sanday renders by “absolved,” and adds, “The dead man is no longer liable to have the charge of sin brought against him.”

LXIX. Ver. 14. οὐ γὰρ ἐστε ὑπὸ νόμου.

The question, What is the meaning of the words *not under the law*? may be answered by noticing the connection with the next preceding (v. 20), and the next following (vii. 1-6) statements in respect to the law. V. 20 presents the law as causing the offence to abound; vii. 1-6 sets forth the same idea substantially (cf. esp. ver. 5). The pointing of both alike is toward a kindred sense here. Moreover, the connection in thought (whatever may be said of the immediate grammatical sequence of the sentences), between this verse and vii. 1, shows the writer's conception to be, that the lordship of sin ceases for the believer because that of the law ceases; that the latter ceases because the man, through his union with Christ, dies, so far as the law is concerned; and that, thus dying, the man serves sin as a slave no longer, but serves a new master with newness of spirit. The reference in this verse is, therefore, to the legal system, as working, naturally towards the dominion of the sin-power. The development of the thought suggested by these words is suspended, by reason of the

question of ver. 15, until the seventh chapter. It is there presented in the first six verses, which by their statements and expressions lead to the inquiry of vii. 7, founded upon the earlier part of ver. 20. That this view of vi. 14 makes it anticipate the thought of chap. vii. and renders vi. 15-23 substantially, or at least in a sense, parenthetical, is, when the progress of the discourse is rightly apprehended, no valid objection to it. The Apostle arrests his thought for the moment, as it occurs to him that the same question may be asked in view of what he is saying, which was raised in the first verse.

LXX. Ver. 15. *τί οὖν; ἁμαρτήσωμεν κ.τ.λ.*

On ver. 15 Philippi says: "As from the doctrine of grace abounding through sin abounding, v. 20, the inference might be drawn that it is good to continue in sin that grace may be multiplied, so the statement of 14b might awaken the idea that with freedom from the law license is given to sin. This idea the Apostle repels with the utmost energy. But yet he does not here so much develop the inner psychological impossibility of the legal state fostering and furthering righteousness, and of the state of grace fostering and furthering sin, as rather again remind of a matter-of-fact relation into which his readers through faith in the gospel have entered. As baptism into Christ's death mediates the death of the old and the rising of the new man (ver. 3 ff.), so is freedom from the law, in point of fact, a bondage to righteousness, the dominion of grace a freedom from sin." This is the correct view of the passage, and thus there is a certain parallelism between these verses and ver. 1 ff., although the relation to sin and righteousness is set forth by a new figure--that of slavery and freedom, instead of that of dying and living.

LXXI. Ver. 16. *δοῦλοι ἐστε ᾧ ὑπακούετε.*

Weiss ed. Mey. holds that the emphasis is not on *δοῦλοι* alone (as Meyer maintains), but also on the relative clause, as indicated by the repetition of ᾧ, and by the following alternative. The idea conveyed, accordingly, is that the man is a slave of the one master or the other, and also that the particular slavery, by reason of the very fact that the man surrenders himself in obedience to one only, is exclusive of any other. Both of these suggestions are probably contained in the words, but the principal emphasis is on *δοῦλοι*, and, indeed, this word carries in *itself* the thought of entire and exclusive surrender.

LXXII. Ver. 16. *ἁμαρτίας εἰς θάνατον.*

Weiss regards *θάνατος* here as meaning physical death. Godet, Gifford, and others urge against this view, as Meyer does, that this death befalls the servants of righteousness. But Weiss answers that physical death, when, as in the case of these, there is a resurrection to eternal life, ceases to be the punishment of sin. Where there is no such awakening, however, it becomes eternal death, and so there is nothing in the word which contradicts the idea that obedience to sin leads to the latter. Godet holds that the meaning is, "death in the sense of moral corruption, and consequently of separation from God here and hereafter." Beet says, "the death of body and soul;" Gifford, "eternal death;" Shedd, "death physical, spiritual, and eternal." Hodge says, ver. 16, "spiritual and eternal;" ver. 21, "death of the soul, final and

hopeless perdition." The argument for Weiss's view here is much weaker than it is for the same view in vv. 12-19.

LXXIII. Vv. 17, 18. *χάρις τῷ Θεῷ ὅτι ἦτε δοῦλοι κ.τ.λ.*

The thought of vv. 17, 18 seems to be involved in the contrast of *ἦτε δοῦλοι τῆς ἁμ.* and *ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικ.*—as if the form of the sentence were the following: "that your slavery to sin is a thing of the past [this is the force of the emphatic *ἦτε*], and that, having yielded obedience from the heart to that form of teaching whereunto you were delivered [i.e. the Pauline gospel, with its doctrine of grace and faith], and being thereby made free from sin as a master, you came into [the aorist tenses pointing to the time of conversion] the relation of bond-servants to righteousness." As there must be service to one or the other, and as the former service is ended in the case of the believer, and the new one begun, the Christian doctrine, which teaches this, cannot encourage sin. It must, on the other hand, direct the man who accepts it—as in vv. 19, 20—to present his members for service to righteousness, now that he has become a Christian (and to do it at once and once for all), as fully and without reserve as, in his former life, he presented them to sin; and how fully he did this he may know from his own experience, for, when he was the slave of sin, he was altogether free as related to righteousness (ver. 19).

LXXIV. Ver. 19. *ἀνθρώπων λέγω διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός.*

ἀνθρώπων corresponds substantially with *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*, and refers to the figures of slavery and freedom derived from ordinary human life, which are used to describe the relations to sin and righteousness. *διὰ τ. ἀσθ. τ. σαρκός* probably refers to the intellectual, not the moral, weakness of the readers, and is to be explained in connection with the thought that we must represent moral and spiritual ideas in earthly figures, or with Meyer's suggestion that "the *σάρξ*, as the material human nature in its psychical determination, is weak for religious discernment." The reference to moral weakness, which Weiss ed. Mey., Godet, and some other recent writers favor, does not seem to be well founded. That the suggestion of the figure of bondage comes, as Godet conjectures, from the feeling sometimes arising in the Christian mind that perfect righteousness is an exacting and harsh master, and that it is employed, on the other hand, as Weiss intimates, because of the tendency to press Christian freedom even to libertinism, are suppositions of which no hint whatever is found in the context. The Apostle is only presenting the idea of bondage as showing that the man who comes under the new master cannot remain in the service of the old one. These writers connect the words with what *precedes*. The view of those writers, who make them refer to moral weakness, but connect them with the *following* sentence, is sufficiently answered in Meyer's remarks.

LXXV. Ver. 21. *τίνα οὖν κάρπον κ.τ.λ.*

The turn of thought is at ver. 21, ver. 20 being connected (see note LXXIII.) with ver. 19. This connection is not disproved by what Meyer suggests. The *οὖν* of ver. 21 shows, indeed, that the Apostle is led to present the question of that verse by his thought of their former condition, which is referred to in the words of ver. 20, as, also, it is in vv. 17, 19. But the question itself turns the

reader's mind to the matter of results, giving this prominence as a new point. If the intention of the writer had been to make vv. 20-23, through the γάρ of ver. 20, a ground of the exhortation of ver. 19—this ground being the issues on the two sides—he would more naturally have omitted the οὖν altogether, and arranged the construction in vv. 20, 21 as we find it in ver. 22. The presence of οὖν (ver. 21), therefore, is rather an argument for, than against, uniting ver. 20 with ver. 19. The mere fact that ver. 22 is antithetical in its form of expression to ver. 20, does not, it may be added, prove their immediate connection, for this antithesis is found in the entire thought of the paragraph. Weiss ed. Mey. favors the connection of ver. 20 with ver. 19, as Meyer himself did in one of his earlier editions.

LXXVI. Ver. 21. τίνα οὖν . . . ἐπαισχύνεσθε;

Westcott and Hort and Tregelles place the interrogation mark after ἐπαισχ., as Meyer does. Weiss ed. Mey. (and so Godet) agrees with Tischendorf in placing it after τότε. The considerations presented by Meyer are forcible, and we may regard the arrangement favored by him as the more probable one. The possibility of the other, however, cannot be denied. R. V. and A. V. both read according to Meyer's view.

CHAPTER VII.

Ver. 6. ἀποθανόντες] Elz. reads ἀποθανόντος, which was introduced as a conjecture by Beza, without critical evidence, solely on account of some misunderstood words of Chrysostom (see Mill, Bengel, *Appar.*, and especially Reiche, *Comment. crit.* I. p. 50 ff.). The ἀποθανόντες, adopted by Griesb. Matth. Lachm. Scholz, and Tisch., following Erasmus and Mill, is the reading in A B C K L P $\aleph$, min., and most vss. and Fathers. D E F G Vulg. It. codd. in Ruf. and Latin Fathers read τοῦ θανάτου. Preferred by Reiche. But especially when we consider its merely one-sided attestation (the Oriental witnesses are wanting), it seems to be a gloss having a practical bearing (see ver. 5) on τοῦ νόμου which has dispossessed the participle regarded as disturbing the construction. — Ver. 13. γέγονε] Lachm. and Tisch. (8), following A B C D E P $\aleph$, 47, 73, 80, Method. Damasc. read ἐγένετο. Some Latin codd. have *est*. F G have no verb at all. With the preponderance, thus all the more decisive, of the witnesses which favour ἐγένετο, it is to be preferred. — Ver. 14. σαρκικός] The σάρκινος adopted by Griesb. Lachm. Scholz, and Tisch. is attested by A B C D E F G $\aleph^*$, min., and several Fathers. For this reason, and because the ending κός was easily suggested by the preceding πνευματικός, as in general σαρκικός was more familiar to the copyists (xv. 27; 1 Cor. ix. 11; 2 Cor. x. 4; 1 Pet. ii. 11) than σάρκινος (2 Cor. iii. 3), the latter is to be assumed as the original reading. — Ver. 17. οἰκοῦσα] Tisch. (8) reads ἐνοικοῦσα, which would have to be received, if it were attested in more quarters than by B $\aleph$. — Ver. 18. οὐχ εὗρίσκω] A B C $\aleph$, 47, 67**, 80, Copt. Arm. Procl. in Epiph. Method. Cyr. codd. Gr. ap. Aug. have merely οὐ. Approved by Griesb.; adopted by Lachm. and Tisch. But if there had been a gloss, the supplement would have been παράκειται. The omission on the other hand is explained by the copyist's hurrying on from OTX to the OY at the beginning of ver. 19. — Ver. 20. θέλω ἐγώ] Since ἐγώ is wanting in B C D E F G, min., Arm. Vulg. It. and several Fathers, but is found in 219, Clem. after τοῦτο, in Chrys. before οὐ; and since it is, according to the sense and the analogy of vv. 15, 19, inappropriate, it has rightly been deleted by Lachm. and Fritzsche, and is to be regarded as a mechanical addition from what immediately follows. If ἐγώ were original (and had been omitted in accordance with vv. 15, 19), it must have had the emphasis of the contrast, which however it has not. — Ver. 25. εὐχαριστῶ] Lachm. and Tisch. read χάρις, which Griesb. also approved of, following B and several min., vss. and Fathers. Fritzsche reads χάρις δέ in accordance with C**, $\aleph^{**}$, min., Copt. Arm. and Fathers. Both are taken from the near, and, in the connection of ideas, analogous vi. 17 (not εὐχαρ. from i. 8). The reading ἡ χάρις τ. Θεοῦ (D E and some Fathers), or ἡ χ. τ. κυρίου (F G), is manifestly an alteration, in order to make the answer follow the preceding question.

Vv. 1-6. *The Christian is not under the Mosaic law; but through his fellowship in the death of Christ he has died to the law, in order to belong to the Risen One and in this new union to lead a life consecrated to God.*

Ver. 1.¹ Ἡ ἀγνοεῖτε] Paul certainly begins now the detailed illustration, still left over, of οὐ γάρ ἐστε, vi. 14 ; but he connects his *transition* to it, with what immediately precedes, as is clear from the nature of ἡ (comp. vi. 3). [See Note LXXVII. p. 289.] Nevertheless the logical reference of ἡ ἀγνοεῖτε is not to be sought possibly in the previous τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν, with which the following κυριεύει is here correlative (Reiche), since that κυρίῳ has in fact no essential importance at all and is for the progress of the thought immaterial ; but rather in the leading idea last expressed (ver. 22), and established (ver. 23), namely, *that the Christian, freed from the service of sin and become the servant of God, has his fruit to holiness, and, as the final result, eternal life.* This proposition could not be truth, if the Christian were not free from the law and did not belong to the Risen Christ instead, etc., vv. 1-6. — ἀδελφοί] address to the readers collectively (comp. i. 13), not merely to the Jewish Christians (Toletus, Grotius, Estius, Ch. Schmidt, and others, including Tholuck and Philippi), because in that case an addition must have been made excluding Gentile Christians, which however is so far from being contained in γινώσκονσι, especially when it is without the article, that in the case of Christians generally the knowledge of the O. T. was of necessity to be presupposed ; see below. This applies also against Hofmann's view, that Paul, although avoiding a specific express designation, has in view that portion of his readers, which had not been capable of the misconception indicated in ver. 15. This limitation also—and how easily could the adroit author of the Epistle have indicated it in a delicate way !—cannot be deduced either from ἀδελφοί or from γινώσκονσι κ.τ.λ. — γινώσκ. γὰρ νόμ. λ.] justifies the appeal to the readers' own insight : *for I speak to such as know the law.* We may not infer from these parenthetical words, or from vv. 4-6, that the majority of the Roman congregation was composed of Jewish-Christians ;² for, looking to the close connection subsisting between the Jewish and Gentile-Christian portions of the Church, to the custom borrowed from the synagogue of reading from the Old Testament in public, and to the necessary and essential relations which evangelical instruction and preaching sustained to the Old Testament so that the latter was the basis from which they started, the Apostle might designate his readers generally as γινώσκοντες τὸν νόμον, and predicate of them an acquaintance with the law. Comp. on Gal. iv. 21. The less need is there for the assumption of a previous proselytism (de Wette, Beyschlag, and many others), with which moreover the ἀδελφός addressing the readers in common is at variance ; comp. i. 13, viii. 12, x. 1, xi. 23, xii. 1, xv. 14, 30, xvi. 17. — ὁ νόμος] not every law (Koppe, van Hengel) ; nor the moral law (Glöckler) ; but the Mosaic, and that in the usual sense comprehending the whole ; not merely of the law of marriage (Beza, Toletus, Bengel, Carpzov, Chr. Schmidt ; comp.

¹ On the entire chapter, see Achelis in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1863, p. 870 ff.

² On the contrary, the inference would be : If the Church had been a Jewish-Christian one, the γινώσκειν νόμον would in its case have been so entirely self-evident, that

we should not be able at all to see why Paul should have specially noticed it. But as converted Gentiles the readers had become acquainted with the law. This also applies against Holtzmann, *Judenth. u. Christenth.*, p. 783.

Olshausen). This is required by the theme of the discussion generally, and by the foregoing γινώσκ. γ. νόμ. λαλῶ in particular. — τοῦ ἀνθρώπου] is not to be connected with ὁ νόμος (Hammond, Clericus, Elsner, and Mosheim), but belongs, as the order of the words demands, to κυριεύει. — ἐφ' ὅσον χρ. ζῇ] *For so long time as he liveth* (ἐπί as in Gal. iv. 1 in the sense of stretching over a period of time,¹ the (personified) law is lord over the man who is subjected to it (τοῦ ἀνθρ.)). That ὁ ἄνθρωπος is the subject to ζῇ, is decided by vv. 2, 3, 4. By the assumption of ὁ νόμος as subject (Origen, Ambrosiaster, Erasmus, Vat-ablus, Grotius, Estius, Bengel, Koppe, and Flatt), in which case ζῇ is supposed to signify *viget or valet* (in spite of vv. 2, 3), the discourse is quite disarranged; for Paul is not discussing the abrogation of the law, but the fact that the Christian as such is no longer under it. Nor do vv. 2, 3 require ὁ νόμος as subject, because the point there illustrated is, that the death of *the man* (not of the law) dissolves the binding power of the law over him.² The proposition in vi. 7 is similar, and presupposes this thought. To take ζῇν as equivalent to ζῇν ἐν σαρκί ("so long as the man *continues to lead his old natural life*, he is a servant of the law," Philippi, also Umbreit), is quite opposed to the context: see ζῶντι and ζῶντος in vv. 2, 3, with their antitheses. The *emphasis*, moreover, is not on ζῇ (Hofmann), but, as is shown by the very expression ὅσον, on ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον, *for the entire time*, that he lives; it does *not* lose its power over him *sooner* than when he dies; *so long* as he is in life, he remains subject to it. If this is attended to and there is not introduced a wholly irrelevant "*only* so long as he liveth," the thought appears neither trivial nor disproportionate to the appeal to the legal knowledge of his readers. For there is a *peculiarity* of the νόμος in the fact, that it cannot have, like human laws, merely temporary force, that it cannot be altered or suspended, nor can one for a time be exempted from its control, etc. No, *so long* as man's life endures, the dominion of the νόμος over him continues.³ Nor is the proposition incorrect (because that dominion ceases in the case of the believer, Philippi); for it simply contains a *general rule of law*, which, it is self-evident, refers to the ἄνθρωπος ἐννομος *as such*. If the Jew becomes a Christian, he *dies* as a Jew (ver. 4), and the rule in question is not invalidated.

Ver. 2. [See Note LXXXVIII. p. 289.] Concrete illustration of the proposition in ver. 1, derived from the relation of the law to *marriage* and its dissolution, which in the woman's case can only take place through the *death* of the husband, so that it is only after that death has occurred that she may marry another. This example, as the tenor of the following text shows (in opposition to Hofmann), is selected, not because the legal ordinance in question was in its nature the only one that Paul could have employed, but *because* he has it in view to bring forward the union with Christ, which takes place after the release from the law, as analogous to a

¹ See Bernhardy, p. 252; Comp. Nägelsbach, z. *Ilas*, ii. 299, ed. 3, Ast, *Lex. Plat.* I. p. 768.

² Comp. Schabb. f. 151, 2: "postquam mortuus est homo, liber est a praeceptis;"

Targ. Ps. lxxxviii. 6 in Wetstein on ver. 3.

³ Comp. Th. Schott, p. 267; Hofmann formerly held the right view (*Schriftbew.* II. 1, p. 352).

new marriage, and does so in ver. 4. The illustration is only apparently (not really ; Usteri, Rückert, and even Umbreit in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, p. 643) *awkward*, in so far namely as the deceased and the person released from the law through the event of death are represented in it as *different*. This appearance drove Chrysostom and his followers to adopt the hypothesis of an inversion of the comparison ; thus holding that the *law* is properly the deceased party, but that Paul expressed himself as he has done out of consideration for the Jews (comp. Calvin and others), whereas Tholuck contents himself with the assumption of a (strange) *pregnancy* of expression which would include in the one side the other also ; and Umbreit regards "the irregularity in the change of person" as *unavoidable*. But the semblance of inappropriateness vanishes on considering καὶ ἑμείς in ver. 4 (see on that passage), from which it is plain that Paul in his illustration, ver. 2 f., follows the view, that the death of the husband implies (in a metaphorical sense by virtue of the union of the two spouses in one person, Eph. v. 28 ff.) *the death of the woman also* as respected her marriage relation, and consequently her release from the law, so far as it had bound her as a ἱπανδρος γυνή to her husband, so that she may now marry another, which previously she could not do, because the law does *not* cease to be lord over the man *before he is dead*. So in substance also Achelis *l.c.* Consequently ver. 2 f. is not to be taken *allegorically*, but properly and concretely ; and it is only in ver. 4 that the allegorical *application* occurs. It has been allegorically explained, either so, that the wife signifies the soul and the husband the sin that has died with Christ (Augustine, comp. Olshausen) ; or, that the wife represents humanity (or the church) and the husband the law, to which the former had been spiritually married (Origen, Chrysostom, Calvin, and others, including Klee, Reiche, and Philippi). But the former is utterly foreign to the theme of the text ; and the latter would anticipate the application in ver. 4. — ἱπανδρος] *viro subjecta*, married ; also current in later Greek authors, as in Polyb. x. 26, 3, Athen. ix. p. 388 C ; in the N. T. only here.¹ — τῷ ζῶντι ἀνδρὶ] *to her (τῷ) living husband*. ζῶντι has the emphasis, correlative to the ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ζῇ in ver. 1. On δέσεται comp. 1 Cor. vii. 27. — νόμῳ] *by the law*. For by the law of Moses the right of dismissing the husband was not given to the wife.² Paul however leaves unnoticed *the* case of the woman through *divorce* ceasing to be bound to her husband (Deut. xxiv. 2) ;³ regarding the matter, in accordance with his scope, only in such a way as not merely seemed to be the rule in the majority of cases, but also harmonized with the original ordinance of the Creator (Matt. xix. 8). — καθήργηται ἀπὸ τ. νόμον τ. ἀνδρ.] [See Note LXXIX. p. 289.] that is, *with respect to her hitherto subsisting subordination under the law binding her to her husband she is absolved, free and rid of it*. See on Gal. v. 4. The Apostle thus gives expression to the thought lying at the basis of his argument, that with the decease of the husband the wife also has ceased to exist as respects her

¹ See Wetstein and Jacobs, *ad Ael. N. A.*

iii. 42.

² Michaelis, *Mos. R.* § 120 ; Saalschütz, p.

806 f.

³ Kiddusch. f. 2, 1 : "Mulier possidet se ipsam *per libellum repudi* et *per mortem mariti*."

legal connection with him ; in this legal relation, from which she is fully released, she is no longer existent. Comp. on ἀπό 2 Cor. xi. 3. She is still there, but no longer as bound to that law, to which she died with the death of her husband ; comp. ver. 6. The joining of ὁ νόμος with the genitive of the subject concerned (frequent in the LXX.) is very common also in classic authors. Th. Schott, following Bengel, erroneously takes τ. ἀνδρ. as genitive of *apposition* ; the law being for the wife embodied in the husband. The law that determines the relation of the wife to the husband is what is intended, like ὁ νόμος ὁ περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός ; see Kühner, II. 1, p. 287.

Ver. 3. Ἀρα οὖν] See on v. 18. — χρηματίζει] she shall (formally) bear the name. See Acts xi. 26.¹ The future corresponds to the following : ἐὰν γένηται ἀνδρὶ ἑτέρῳ] if she shall have become joined to another husband (as wife). Comp. Deut. xxiv. 2 ; Ruth i. 12 ; Judg. xiv. 20 ; Ez. xvi. 8, xxiii. 4. It is not a Hebraism.² — ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου] from the law, so far, that is, as it binds the wife to the husband. From that bond she is now released, ver. 2. — τοῦ μὴ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.] Not a more precise definition (Th. Schott) ; nor yet a consequence (as usually rendered), which is never correct, not even in Acts vii. 19 (see Fritzsche, *ad Matt.* p. 845 ff.) ; but rather : in order that she be not an adulteress. That is the purpose, involved in the divine legal ordinance, of her freedom from the law.

Ver. 4. Ὡστε] does not express the “agreement” or the “harmony” with which what follows connects itself with the preceding (Hofmann), as if Paul had written οὕτως or ὁμοίως. It is rather the common *itaque* (Vulgate), accordingly, therefore, consequently, which, heading an independent sentence, draws an inference from the preceding, and introduces the actual relation which results from vv. 1-3 with respect to Christians, who through the death of Christ are in a position corresponding with that of the wife. This inference lays down that legal marriage relation as type. — καὶ ὑμεῖς] ye also, like the wife in that illustration quoted in vv. 2, 3, who through the death of her husband is dead to the dominion of the law. In this, in the first instance (for the main stress falls on εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ.), lies the point of the inference ; analogously with the case of that wife Christians also are dead to the law through the death of Christ, because, in their spiritual union with Him, they have suffered death along with Him. Van Hengel takes καὶ ὑμεῖς in the sense : ye also, like other Christians, which, however, since ver. 4 begins the application of what had previously been said of the woman, is neither in harmony with the text nor rendered necessary by the first person καρποφορ. — ἐθαυτ. τῷ νόμῳ] ye were rendered dead to the law,³ so

¹ Plut. *Mor.* 148 D ; Polyb. v. 27, 2, 5, xxx. 2, 4.

² See Kypke, II. p. 170 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 384.

³ This is expressed from the Jewish-Christian consciousness, nevertheless it includes indirectly the Gentile-Christians also ; for without perfect obedience to the law no man could have attained to salvation, wherefore also obedience to the law was

expected on the part of Judaists from the converted Gentiles (Acts xv.). As the argument advances, the language of the Apostle becomes communicative, so that he includes himself with his readers, among whom he makes no distinction. Compare viii. 15 ; Gal. iii. 14, iv. 6. By our passage therefore the readers are not indicated as having been, as respects the majority, Jews or at least proselytes.

that over you as dead persons it rules no longer (ver. 1). The dative as in vi. 2, 10. The *passive* (not ye *died*) is *selected*, because this (ethical) death of Christians is fellowship with the death of Christ, which was a *violent* one. Therefore : διὰ τοῦ σώμ. τ. X.] *by the fact, that the body of Christ was put to death.* The conception of the participation of believers (as respects their inner life and its moral self-consciousness) in the death of their Lord, according to which the putting to death of their Master included their own putting to death, is justly assumed by Paul, after ch. vi., as something present to the consciousness of his readers, and therefore views deviating from this (e.g. that διὰ τ. σώμ. τ. X. applies to the atoning sacrificial death, which did away the dominion of the law) are to be rejected as here irrelevant, and not in keeping with the proper sense of ἔθαναρ. For that ἔθαναρ. τ. νόμῳ is meant to be a mild expression for ὁ νόμος ἐθανατώθη, ἀπέθανεν ὑμῖν (Koppe and Klee, following Calvin, Grotius, and others, also several Fathers ; comp. on ver. 2), is an assumption as gratuitous, as is a “contraction of the thought and expression,” which Philippi finds, when he at the same time introduces the conception of the putting to death of the law through the body of Christ, which is here alien. — εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἑτέρῳ] [See Note LXXX. p. 290.] *in order to become joined to another* (than the law)—this is the object which the ἔθαναρ. τ. νόμῳ κ.τ.λ. had, and thereby the *main point* in the declaration introduced by ὥστε, parallel to τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. κ.τ.λ. in ver. 3. Paul apprehends the relation of fellowship and dependence of the Christian's life to Christ—as he had prepared the way for doing so in vv. 2, 3, and as was in keeping with his mode of view elsewhere (2 Cor. xi. 2 ; Eph. v. 25 ff.)—under the image of a *marriage connection* in which the exalted Christ is the husband of His Church that has become independent of the law by dying with Him. — τῷ ἐκ νεκρ. ἐγεῖρθ.] apposition to ἑτέρῳ, in significant historical reference to διὰ τ. σώμ. τ. X. For if Christ became *through His bodily death* our deliverer from the law, we cannot now belong to Him otherwise than as the *Risen One* for a new and indissoluble union. The importance of this addition in its bearing on the matter in hand lies in the *καινότης ζωῆς* (vi. 3, 11, 13, 22) which, on the very ground of the ethical communion with the Risen One, issues from the new relation. Certainly the death of Christ appears here “as the end of a sin-conditioned state of the humanity to be united in Him” (Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. 1, p. 354) ; but this great moral epoch has as its necessary presupposition just the vicarious atoning power of the ἱλαστήριον which was rendered in the death of Jesus ; it could not take place without this and without the faith appropriating it, iii. 21 ff. ; v. 1 ff. — ἵνα καρποφ. τ. Θεῷ] The aim not of ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐγεῖρθέντι (Koppe, Th. Schott, Hofmann), but rather—because the *belonging to* is that which conditions the fruit-bearing—of the γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἑτέρῳ, τῷ ἐκ νεκρ. ἐγ., consequently the final aim of the ἔθαναρ. τῷ νόμῳ. There is here (though van Hengel and others call it in question, contrary to the clear connection) a continuation of the figure of marriage with respect to its *fruitfulness* (Luke i. 42 ; Ps. cxxvii. 3, Symm. and Theod. Ps. xci. 15). The morally holy walk, namely, in its consecration to God is, as it were, the fruit which issues from our fellowship of life with Christ risen from the

dead as from a new marriage-union, and which *belongs in property* to God as the lord-paramount of that union (the supreme ruler of the Messianic theocracy) ; the bringing forth of fruit takes place *for God*. The opinion of Reiche and Fritzsche that καρποφ. taken in the sense of the *fruit of marriage* yields an *undignified* allegory (the figure therefore is to be taken as borrowed from a field or a tree, which Philippi, Tholuck, and Reithmayr also prefer) is untenable, seeing that the union with Christ, if regarded as a *marriage* at all, must also necessarily, in accordance with its moral design, be conceived of as a *fruitful marriage*.¹

Ver. 5. Confirmation of the ἵνα καρποφ. τ. Θεῷ. That we should bring forth fruit to *God*, I say with justice ; for formerly under the law we bore fruit to *death*, but now (ver. 6) our position is quite different from what it was before. — ὅτε ἤμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκί] This is the positive and characteristic expression for the negative : when we were not yet made dead to the law. Then the σάρξ—the materially human element in us, in its psychically determined antagonism to the Divine Spirit and will—was the life-element in which we moved. Comp. viii. 8 f. ; 2 Cor. x. 3. We are ἐν τ. σώματι, 1 Cor. v. 3 (2 Cor. xii. 2), even after we have died with Christ, because that is an *ethical* death ; but for that very reason we are now, according to the holy self-consciousness of the new life of communion with the Risen One, no longer ἐν τ. σαρκί ; and our body, although we still as respects its material substance live in the flesh (Gal. ii. 20), is ethically not a σῶμα τῆς σαρκός any more, Col. ii. 11. The interpretation of Theodoret : τῇ κατὰ νόμον πολιτείᾳ (so also Oecumenius), though hitting the approximate meaning of the matter, has its inaccurate arbitrariness exposed by the reason assigned for it : σάρκα γὰρ τὰς τῇ σαρκί δεδομένας νομοθεσίας ὠνόμασε, τὰς περὶ βρώσεως κ. πόσεως. The description ἐν τῇ σαρκί must supply the ethical conception which corresponds with the contents of the apodosis. Therefore we may not render with Theodoret of Mopsuestia : *when we were mortal* (the believer being no longer reckoned as mortal) ; but the *moral* reference of the expression requires at least a more precise definition of the contents than that the existence of the Christian had ceased to be *an existence locked up in his inborn nature* (Hofmann). — τὰ παθ. τῶν ἁμαρτ.] *the passions through which sins are brought about*, of which the sins are the actual consequence. On παθήματα compare Gal. v. 24, and παθή, i. 26. They are the passive excitations (often used by Plato in contrast to ποιήματα), which one experiences (πάσχει). Comp. esp. Plat. Phil. p. 47 C. — τὰ διὰ τ. νόμον] sc. ὄντα, *which are occasioned by the law* ; How ? see vv. 7, 8. It is erroneous in Chrysostom and Grotius to supply φαινόμενα. Comp. rather 1 Cor. xv. 56. — ἐνηργεῖτο] *were active*, middle, not passive (Estius, Glöckler), which would be contrary to Pauline usage. See 2 Cor. i. 6, iv. 12 ; Eph. iii. 20 ; Gal. v. 6 ; Col. i. 29 ; 1 Thess. ii. 13 ; 2 Thess. ii. 7. The Greeks have not this use of the middle. — ἐν τ. μέλ. ἡμ.] *in our*

¹ This view is the one perfectly consistent with the context, and should not be superseded by the prudery of modern canons of taste (Fritzsche terms it *jejunam et odosconam*). Theodoret already has the right

view : καὶ ἐπειδὴ συνάφειαν κ. γάμον τὴν εἰς τὸν κύριον προσηγόρευσε πίστιν, εἰκότως δείκνυσσι καὶ τὸν τοῦ γάμου καρπὸν. Comp. Theophylact.

members (as in ver. 23 and vi. 13) they were the active agent. — εἰς τὸ καρποφ. τ. θανάτῳ] This is the *tendency* (the parallel ἵνα καρποφ. τ. Θεῷ in ver. 4 is decisive here against the interpretation, everywhere erroneous, of the *consequence*) which the passions of sin, in their operation in our members, had with us : *that we should bring forth fruit unto death*, that is, divested of figure : *that we should lead a life falling under the power of death*. The subject ἡμᾶς is supplied, as often along with the infinitive,¹ naturally and easily from the immediately preceding ἡμῶν (comp. 1 Cor. viii. 10 ; 2 Thess. iii. 9 ; Heb. ix. 14). There is therefore the less reason to depart from the mode of conception prevailing in ver. 4, and to understand the παθήματα as the fruit-bearing subjects (Hofmann ; comp. Vulgate, Luther, Calvin, and others), in which case there is imported the conception that the occurrence is something *foreign to the man himself* (Hofmann). The θάνατος personified as the lord-paramount opposed to τῷ Θεῷ in ver. 4, is not *physical* (Fritzsche) but *eternal* death, vi. 21, 23, which is incurred through sinful life. The καρποφ. however retains here the figure of the *fruit of marriage*, namely, according to the context, of the marriage with the law (ver. 4), which is now dissolved since we have died with Christ. Comp. Erasmus, *Paraph.*: “ex infelici matrimonio infelices foetus sustulimus, quicquid nasceretur morti exitioque gignentes.” In Matt. xii. 39 the conception is different. But comp. James i. 15.

Ver. 6. κατηγορ.] See on ver. 2. — ἀποθανόντες ἐν ᾧ κατεῖχ.] *dead* (see ver. 4) *to that* (neuter) *wherein we were held fast*. So also Fritzsche and Reiche in his *Comm. crit.* The construction is consistent and regular, so that τοῦτῳ is to be understood before ἐν ᾧ (Winer, p. 149 f. [E. T. 158 f.]). That wherein we were held fast (as in a prison), is self-evident according to the text ; not as the *government of sin* (van Hengel, Th. Schott), or as the *σάρξ* (Hofmann), but as the *law*, in whose grasp we were. Comp. Gal. iii. 28. Were we with the majority (including Rückert, de Wette, Köllner, Krehl, Philippi, Maier, Winer, Ewald, Bisping, and Reithmayr) to take ἐν ᾧ as *masculine* (and how unnecessarily !), the ἀποθανόντες as modal definition of κατηγορ. would have an isolated and forlorn position ; we should have expected it behind πρὸ δέ. — ὥστε δουλεῖν κ.τ.λ.] *actual result*, which has occurred through our emancipation from the law : *so that we* (as Christians) *are serviceable in newness of spirit, and not in oldness of letter* ; that is, so that our relation of service is in a new definite character regulated by spirit, and not in the old constitution which was regulated by literal form. That the δουλεῖν in καινότης πνεύμ. was a service of *God*, was just as obvious of itself to the consciousness of the readers, as that in παλαιότης γράμμ. it had been a service of *sin* (vi. 20.) On account of this self-evident *diversity* of reference no definition at all is added. On the *ὅν* in the contrast (not *μή*) see Buttmann, *neut.* (Gr. p. 300 [E. T. 349]).—ἐν indicates the sphere of activity of the δουλεῖν, and is to be understood again along with παλ. ; comp. ii. 29. The qualitatively expressed πνεύματος, meaning in concrete application the *Holy Spirit* as the efficient principle of the Christian life, and the qualitative γράμματος,

¹ Comp. Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* iii. 6, 10 ; *Anab.* ii. 1, 12.

characterizing the law according to its nature and character as non-living and drawn up in letters, are the specifically heterogeneous factors on which the two contrasted states are dependent. The *παλαϊότης*—in accordance with the nature of the relation in which the law, presenting its demands in the letter but not inwardly operative, stands to the principle of sin in man—was necessarily sinful (not merely in actual abnormality, as Rothe thinks; see ver. 7 ff., and comp. on vi. 14); just as on the other hand the *καινότης*, on account of the vitally active *πνεῦμα*, must also necessarily be moral. Where this is contradicted by experience and the behaviour of the Christian is immoral, there the *πνεῦμα* has ceased to operate, and a *καινότης πνεύματος* is in fact not present at all. Paul however, disregarding such abnormal phenomena, contemplates the Christian life as it is constituted in accordance with its new, holy, and lofty nature. If it is otherwise, it has fallen away from its specific nature and is a *Christian* life no longer. [See Note LXXXI. p. 290.]

Vv. 7-13. How easily might the Jewish Christian, in his reverence for the law of his fathers, take offence at ver. 5 (*τὰ διὰ τ. νόμον*) and 6, and draw the obnoxious inference, *that the law must therefore be itself of immoral nature*, since it is the means of calling forth the *sin-affections*, and since *emancipation* from it is the condition of the new moral life! Paul therefore proposes to himself this possible inference in ver. 7, rejects it, and then on to ver. 13 shows that the law, while in itself good, is that which leads to acquaintance with sin, and which is misused by the principle of sin to the destruction of men.

Paul conducts the refutation, speaking throughout in the first person singular (comp. 1 Cor. vi. 12, xiii. 11). This mode of expression, differing from the *μετασχηματισμός* (see on 1 Cor. iv. 6), is an *ιδίωσις*; comp. Theodore of Mopsuestia on ver. 8: *τὸ ἐν ἐμοὶ ὅτε λέγει, τὸ κοινὸν λέγει τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, and Theophylact on ver. 9: *ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ δὲ προσώπῳ τὴν ἀνθρώπινην φύσιν λέγει*. Thus he declares concerning himself what is meant to apply to every man placed under the Mosaic law generally, in respect of his relation to that law—before the turning-point in his inner life brought about through his connection with that law, and after it. The apostle's own personal experience, so far from being thereby excluded, everywhere gleams through with peculiarly vivid and deep truth, and represents concretely the universal experience in the matter. The subject presenting itself through the *ἐγώ* is therefore man in general, in his natural state under the law, to which he is bound, as not yet redeemed through Christ and sanctified through the spirit (for which see chap. viii.); without, however, having been unnaturally hardened by legal righteousness or rendered callous and intractable through despising the law, and so estranged from the moral earnestness of legal Judaism. Into this earlier state, in which Paul himself had been before his conversion, he transports himself back, and realizes it to himself with all the vividness and truth of an experience that had made indelible impression upon him; and thus he becomes the type of the moral relation, in which the as yet unregenerate Israelite stands to the divine law. "He betakes himself once more down to those gloomy depths, and makes all his readers also traverse them with him, only in order at last to conclude with warmer gratitude that

he is now indeed redeemed from them, and thereby to show what that better and eternal law of God is which endures even for the redeemed," Ewald. Augustine (*prop.* 45 *in ep. ad Rom. : ad Simplic.* i. 91 ; *Conf.* vii. 21), in his earlier days, acknowledged, in harmony with the Greek Fathers since Irenaeus, that the language here is that of the *unregenerate* man ; though later, in opposition to Pelagianism (especially on account of vv. 17, 18, 22 ; see *Retract.* i. 23, 26, ii. 3 ; *c. auas ep. Pel.* i. 10 ; *c. Faust.* xv. 8), he gave currency to the view that the "I" is that of the *regenerate*. In this he was followed by Jerome, who likewise held a different opinion previously ; and later by Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Beza (not by Bucer and Musculus), Chemnitz, Gerhard, Quenstedt and many others, more, however, among Protestant than among Catholic commentators (Erasmus says of him : "*dure multa torquens*;" and see especially Toletus). On the other hand, the Socinians and Arminians, as also the school of Spener, returned to the view of the Greek Fathers, which gradually became, and has down to the present day continued, the dominant one. See the historical elucidations in Tholuck and Reiche ; also Knapp, *Ser. var. arg.* p. 400 ff. The theory that Paul is speaking *simply of himself* and exhibiting his own experiences (comp. Hofmann), must be set aside for the simple reason, that in that case the entire disquisition, as a *mere individual* psychological history (7-13) and delineation (ver. 14 ff.), could have no general probative force whatever, which nevertheless, from the connection with what goes before and follows (viii. 1), it is intended to have. Others, like Grotius, who correctly referred it to the state *anterior* to regeneration, and among them recently Reiche in particular, represent Paul as speaking *in the person of the Jewish people as a people*.¹ But, so far as concerns vv. 7-13, it is utterly *untrue* that the Jewish nation previous to the law led a life of innocence unacquainted with sin and evil desire ; and as concerns ver. 14 ff., the explanation of the double character of the "I," if we are to carry out the idea of referring it to the nation, entangles us in difficulties which can only force us to strange caprices of exegesis, such as are most glaringly apparent in Reiche. Fritzsche also has not consistently avoided the reference of the "I" to the *people as such*, and the impossibilities that necessarily accompany it, and, in opposition to the Augustinian interpretation, has excluded, on quite insufficient grounds, the apostle himself and his own experience. Paul, who had himself been a Jew under the law, *could* not describe at all otherwise than from personal recollection that unhappy state, which indeed, with the lively and strong susceptibility of his entire nature and temperament, he must have experienced very deeply, in order to be able to depict it *as* he has done. Testimonies regarding himself, such as Phil. iii. 6, cannot be urged in opposition to this, since they do not unveil the inward struggle of impulses, etc. Similarly with Paul, Luther also sighed most deeply just when under the distress of his legal condition, before the light of the gospel dawned upon him, and he afterward lamented that distress most vividly and truly.

¹ Jerome on Dan. had already remarked :
 "Peccata populi. quia unus e populo est, enumerat persona sua, quod et apostolum
 in ep. ad Rom. fecisse legimus."

Philippi has rightly apprehended the "I" coming in at ver. 7 as that of the unregenerate man; but on the other hand, following the older expositors, has discovered from ver. 14 onward the delineation of the regenerate state of the same "I,"¹—a view inconsistent in itself, opposed to the context (since Paul does not pass on to the regenerate till viii. 1), and, when applied to the details, impossible (see the subsequent exposition). Hammond very truly observes: "*Nihil potest esse magis contrarium affectioni animi hominis regenerati, quam quae hic in prima persona Ego exprimuntur.*" Still Umbreit, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, p. 633 ff., has substantially reverted, as regards the entire chapter, to the Augustinian view, for which he especially regards ver. 25 (*αὐτὸς ἐγώ*) as decisive; and no less have Delitzsch (see especially his *Psychol.* p. 387 ff.); Weber, v. *Zorne Gottes*, p. 86; Thomasius, *Chr. Pers. u. Werk.* I. p. 275 f.; Jatho; Krummacher in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, p. 119 ff.; and also Luthardt, v. *freien Willen*, p. 404 f., adopted this view with reference to ver. 14 ff. Hofmann, who in his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 556 to all appearance, though he is somewhat obscure and at variance with himself (see Philippi, p. 285 f., and *Glaubenslehre*, III. p. 243), had returned to the pre-Augustinian interpretation, in his *N. T.*, hampers a more clear and candid understanding of the passage by the fact that, while he decidedly *rejects* the theory that the "I" of ver. 7 is that of the unregenerate man, he at the same time justly says that what is related of that "I" (which is that of the apostle) belongs to the time *which lay away beyond his state as a Christian*; and further, by the fact, that he represents vv. 14-24 as spoken from the same present time as ver. 25, but at the same time leaves the enigma unsolved how the wretched condition described may comport with that present; and in general, as to the point in question about which expositors differ, he does not give any round and definite answer. For if Paul is to be supposed, according to Hofmann, in ver. 14 ff., not to treat of the *natural* man, and nevertheless to depict himself in the quality of his moral state *apart from his life in Christ*, we cannot get rid of the contradiction that the "I" is the regenerate man apart from his regeneration, and of the obscuring and muffling up of the meaning thereby occasioned. The view which takes it of the *unregenerate* is followed by Julius Müller, Neander, Nitzsch, Hahn, Baur, Tholuck, Krehl, Reithmayr, van Hengel, Ewald, Th. Schott, Ernesti, Lipsius, Mangold, Messner (*Lehre der Ap.* p. 220), and many others, including Schmid, *bibl. Theol.* II. p. 262; Gess, v. *d. Pers. Chr.* p. 338; Lechler, *apost. u. nachapost. Zeitalt.* p. 97; Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 595; the anonymous writer in the *Erlangen Zeitschr.* 1863, p. 377 ff.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* § 95; Märcker, p. 23; Grau, *Entwicklungsgesch.* II. p. 126. The just remark, that the apostle depicts the *future present* of the state (Th. Schott) does not affect this view, since the *future* state realized as present was just that of the *unregenerate* Israelite at the preliminary stage of

¹ Comp. Calovius on ver. 14: "Postquam legem divinam vindicavit vel pravae concupiscentiae omnem culpam transscribendam docuit, ejus vim sese etiamnum experiri ingemiscit apostolus, etiamsi renatus

jam sit et justificatus." See also Calvin on ver. 14: "Exemplum proponit hominis regenerati, in quo sic carnis reliquiae cum lege Domini dissident, ut spiritus ei libenter obtemperet."

moral development conditioned by the law. Compare Ritschl, *altkath. Kirche*, p. 70 f. ; Achelis,¹ *l.c.* p. 678 ff. ; Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul u. Petr.* p. 406.

Ver. 7. [See Note LXXXII. p. 290.] 'Ο νόμος ἁμαρτία;] *Is the law sin?* a something, whose ethical nature is immoral? Comp. Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 46 ; Winzer, *Progr.* 1832, p. 5 ; also Fritzsche, Rückert, de Wette, Tholuck, and Philippi. For the contrast see ver. 12, from which it at once appears that the formerly current interpretation, still held by Reiche and Flatt, "originator of sin" (διάκονος ἁμαρτίας, Gal. ii. 17), is, from the connection, erroneous ; as indeed it would have to be arbitrarily imported into the word, for the appeal to Mic. i. 5 overlooks the *poetical* mode of expression in that passage. The *substantive* predicate (comp. viii. 10 ; 2 Cor. v. 21, *al.*) is more significant than an adjectival expression (ἁμαρτωλός), and in keeping with the meaning of the remonstrant, whom Paul personates. The question is not to be supposed *preposterous*, *setting forth a proposition without real meaning* (Hofmann), since it is by no means absurd in itself and, as an objection, has sufficient apparent ground in what precedes.—After ἀλλά we are no more to understand ἐροῦμεν again (Hofmann) than before ὁ νόμ. ἁμαρτ., for which there is no ground (it is otherwise at ix. 30). On the contrary, this ἀλλά, *but*, brings in the *real relation* to sin, as it occurs in contrast to that inference which has just been rejected with horror : ἁμαρτία μὲν οὐκ ἐστίν, φησὶ, γνωριστικὸς δὲ ἁμαρτίας, Theophylact. —τὴν ἁμ. οὐκ ἐγνων, εἰ μὴ δ. νόμον] [See, with reference to the development of thought in vv. 7–13, Note LXXXIII. p. 291.] *Sin I have not become acquainted with, except through the law.* The ἁμαρτία is sin as an *active principle in man* (see vv. 8, 9, 11, 13, 14), with which *I have become experimentally acquainted* only through the law (comp. the subsequent οὐκ ᾔδειν), so that without the intervention of the law it would have remained for me an unknown power ; because, in that case (see the following, and ver. 8), it would not have become active in me through the excitement of desires after what is forbidden in contrast to the law. The τὴν ἁμ. οὐκ. ἐγν., therefore, is not here to be confounded with the ἐπίγνωσις ἁμ. in iii. 20, which in fact is only attained through comparison of the moral condition with the requirements of the law (in opposition to Krehl) ; nor yet is it to be understood of the *theoretic* knowledge of the *essence* of sin, namely, *that the latter is opposition to the will of God* (Tholuck, Philippi ; comp. van Hengel and the older expositors), against which view ver. 8 (χωρὶς νόμον ἁμαρτ. νεκρά) and ver. 9 are decisive. The view of Fritzsche is, however, likewise erroneous (see the following, especially ver. 8) : *I should not have sinned*, "*cognoscit autem peccatum, qui peccat.*"—οὐκ ἐγνων is to be rendered simply, with the Vulgate : *non cognovi*. The sense : *I should not*

¹ Who transfers the personal experience of the apostle, so far as it is expressed in ver. 14 ff., to the last stage of his Pharisaism, consequently to a period shortly before his conversion. But we have not sufficient data in the text and in the history for mark-

ing off, and that so accurately, a definite period in Paul's life. We may add that Achelis has aptly and clearly set aside the interpretation of the *regenerate* in the case of the several features of the picture sketched by Paul.

have known, would anticipate the following clause, which assigns the reason. The νόμος is nothing else than the *Mosaic law*, not the *moral law* generally in all forms of its revelation (Olshausen) ; for Paul is in fact declaring his own experimental consciousness, and by means of *this*, as it developed itself under *Judaism*, presenting to view the moral position (in its general human aspect) of those who are subject to the law of Moses. — τὴν τε γὰρ ἐπιθ. κ.τ.λ.] *for the desire* (after the forbidden) *would in fact be unknown to me,*¹ *if the law did not say, Thou shalt not covet.* The reason is here assigned for the foregoing : “ with the dawning consciousness of desire conflicting with the precept of the law, I became aware also of the principle of sin within me, since the latter (see vv. 8, 9) made me experimentally aware of its presence and life by the excitement of desire in presence of the law.” What the law forbids us to covet (Ex. xx. 17 ; Deut. v. 21), was no concern of the apostle here, looking to the universality of his representation ; he could only employ the prohibition of sinful desire generally and in itself, without particular reference to its object. — On τὴν . . . γὰρ, *for . . . indeed*, comp. i. 26 ; it is not to be taken *climactically* (van Hengel), as if Paul had written καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιθ. or οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιθ. ἦδ. To the τε, however, corresponds the following δέ in ver. 8, which causes the chief stress of the sentence assigning the reason to fall upon ver. 8 (Stallb. *ad Plat. Polit.* p. 270 D) ; therefore ver. 8 is still included as dependent on γὰρ. Respecting the imperative future of the old language of legislation, see on Matt. i. 21.

Ver. 8. Δέ] placing over against the negative declaration of ver. 7 the description of the positive process, by which the consciousness of desire of ver. 7 emerged : *but indeed sin took occasion*, etc. In this ἀφορμὴν placed first emphatically, not in ἡ ἀμαρτία (Th. Schott), lies the point of the relation. — ἡ ἀμαρτία] as in ver. 7, not conceived as *κακοδαίμων* (Fritzsche) ; nor yet the *sinful activity*, as Reiche thinks ; for that is the *result* of the ἐπιθυμία (Jas. i. 5), and the sin that first takes *occasion* from the law cannot be an action.—For examples of ἀφορμὴν λαμβ., *to take occasion*, see Wetstein and Kypke. The principle of sin *took occasion*, not, as Reiche thinks, *received occasion* ; for it is conceived as something *revived* (ver. 9), which *works*. — διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς] *through the command*, namely, the οὐκ ἐπιθυμ. of ver. 7. This interpretation is plainly necessary from the following κατεργάσατο κ.τ.λ. Reiche, following De Dieu and several others, erroneously (comp. Eph. ii. 15) takes ἐντολή as equivalent to νόμος. We must connect διὰ τ. ἐντ. with κατεργ. (Rückert, Winzer, Benecke, de Wette, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Umbreit, van Hengel, and Hofmann), not with ἀφορμ. λαβ. (Luther and many others including Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen, Philippi, Maier, and Ewald), because ἀφορμ. λαμβάνειν is never construed with διὰ (frequently with ἐκ, as in Polyb. iii. 32. 7, iii. 7. 5), and because ver. 11 (δὲ αὐτῆς ἀπέκτ.) and ver. 13 confirm the connection with κατεργ. — κατεργ. ἐν ἐμοὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιθ.] *it brought about in me all manner of desire.* Respecting κατεργάζ., see on i. 27. Even without the law there is desire in man, but not yet in the ethical definite

¹ οὐκ ᾔδειν, *I should not know*, more definite and confident than οὐκ ἄν ᾔδειν. See Kühner,

II. 1, p. 175 f. Comp. also Stallb. *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 190 C.

character of desire *after the forbidden*, as ἐπιθυμία is conceived of according to ver. 7; for as yet there is no prohibition, and consequently no moral antithesis existing to the desire in itself ("ignoti nulla cupido," Ovid, *A. A.* 397), through which antithesis the inner conflict is first introduced. *Every* desire is, in accordance with the quite general οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, to be left without limitation. *No* desire (as respects category) was excluded. A reference to the desires, which the state of civilization joined with a positive legislation calls forth (de Wette), is foreign to the connection. Comp. Prov. ix. 17. — χωρὶς γὰρ νόμον ἁμαρτία νεκρά] *sc.* ἐστι, not ἦν (Beza, Reiche, Krummacher), just because the omission of the verb betokens a *general* proposition: for *without the law*, *i.e.* if it do not enter into relation with the law,¹ *sin*, the sinful principle in man, *is dead*, *i.e.* *not active*, because that is wanting, by which it may take occasion to be alive. The potentiality of the *nitimur in vetitum* is indeed there, but, lacking the *veto* of the νόμος (τοῦ τὸ πρακτέον ὑποδεκνύντος καὶ τὸ οὐ πρακτέον ἀπαγορεύοντος, Theodoret), can exhibit no actual vital activity; it does not stir, because the antithesis is wanting. Hence the law becomes the δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας, 1 Cor. xv. 56, though it is not itself τοῦ παρανομεῖν παράτιος (Chrysippus in Plut. *de Stoic Rep.* 33). Erroneous is the view held by Chrysostom, Calvin, Estius, Olshausen, and others, that νεκρά implies the *absence of knowledge* of sin (οὐχ οὕτω γνώριμος). The νόμος is here, as throughout in this connection, the *Mosaic law*, which contains the ἐντολή (vv. 7, 9, 12). That this may be and is misused by the principle of sin, in the way indicated, arises from the fact, that it comes forward merely with the *outward command* (*thou shalt, thou shalt not*), without giving the power of fulfilment; comp. Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 63 ff. And the analogous *application*, which the general proposition admits of to the moral law of nature also, is indeed self-evident, but lies here aloof from the apostle's sphere of thought.

Ver. 9. *But I was once alive without the law.* ἐγὼ δὲ, the antithesis of ἁμαρτία; ἔζων,² antithesis of νεκρά; νόμον, just as in ver. 8. — ἔζων] The sense is, on account of the foregoing (νεκρά) and the following (ἀπέθανον, ver. 10) contrast, necessarily (in opposition to Reiche and van Hengel) to be taken as *pregnant*; but not with the arbitrary alteration, *videbar mihi vivere* (Augustine, Erasmus, Pareus, Estius), or *securus eram* (Luther, Melancthon, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Calovius, Bengel, and others, including Krummacher), thus representing Paul as glancing at his *Pharisaic state*, in which the law had not yet *alarmed* him,—a view which is at variance with the words themselves and with the antitheses, and which is certainly quite inadmissible historically in the case of a character like Paul (Gal. i. 14, iii. 23; Phil. iii. 6), who could testify so truly and vividly of the power of

¹ According to Krummacher, indeed, the simple χωρὶς νόμον is held to mean: without knowing and laying to heart the significance of the law, which extends to the most secret motions, and condemns them. The dawning of this significance on the consciousness is then held to be ἐλθούσης τῆς

ἐντολῆς. In this way people read between the lines whatever they conceive to be necessary.

² On the forms ἔζων and ἔζην, which are both classical, see Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 738; Kühner, I. p. 829.

sin and of the curse of the law. No, Paul means *the death-free* (ver. 10) *life of childlike innocence* (comp. Winzer, p. 11 ; de Wette and Ewald *in loc.* ; Umbreit in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, p. 637 f. ; Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 101 ; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 287 ; also Delitzsch), where—as this state of life, resembling the condition of our first parents in Paradise, was the bright spot of his own earliest recollection¹—the law has not yet come to conscious knowledge, the moral self-determination in respect to it has not yet taken place, and therefore the sin-principle is still lying in the slumber of death. Rightly explained already by Origen : πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐξῆ χωρὶς νόμου ποτὲ, ὅτε παιδίον ἦν, and by Augustine, *c. duas ep. Pelag.* i. 9. This is certainly a *status securitatis*, but one morally indifferent, not immoral, and not extending beyond the childhood unconscious of the ἐντολή. Hence, in the apostle's case, it is neither to be extended till the time of his conversion (Luther, Melancthon, etc.), nor even only till the time of his having perceived that the law demands not merely the outward act, but also the inward inclination (Philippi and Tholuck)—which is neither in harmony with the unlimited χωρὶς νόμου (Paul must at least have written χωρὶς τῆς ἐντολῆς), nor psychologically correct, since sin is not *dead* up to this stage of the moral development. From this very circumstance, it is clear also that the explanation of *those* is erroneous, who, making Paul speak in the name of his nation, are compelled to think of the purer and more blameless life of *the patriarchs and Israelites before the giving of the law* (so Grotius, Turretin, Locke, Wetstein, following several Fathers, and recently Reiche ; comp. Fritzsche).—The *pregnant import* of the ἐξῶν lies in the fact that, while the sin-principle is dead, man has not yet incurred *eternal death* (*physical death* has been incurred by every one through *Adam's sin*, v. 12) ; this being alive is therefore an analogue—though still unconscious and weak, yet pleasingly presenting itself in the subsequent retrospection—of the *true and eternal ζωὴ* (comp. Matt. xviii. 3) which Christ (comp. ver. 24 f.) has procured through His atoning work. The theory of a *pre-mundane life* of the pre-existent soul (Hilgenfeld in his *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 190 f.) is a Platonism forced on the apostle (comp. Wisd. viii. 20, and Grimm *in loc.*) in opposition to the entire N. T. — ἐλθοῦσης δὲ τῆς ἐντολ.] *but when the command,* namely, the οὐκ ἐπιθυμίσεις of the Mosaic law, *had come, i.e. had become present to my consciousness.* To the person living still in childlike innocence the ἐντολή was *absent* ; for him it was not yet *issued* ; it had not yet *presented* itself. Comp. on Gal. iii. 23. Reiche, consistently with his view of the

¹ Comp. Mimmern. ii. 3 : πῆχυιον ἐπὶ χρόνον ἀνθεσεν ἡβης Τερπόμεθα πρὸς θεῶν εἰδότες οὔτε κακὸν οὔτ' ἀγαθόν. This recollection every one may have in looking back on the history of his own moral life ; and even the realization of the moment, at which the life of childlike innocence took its end, is by no means inconceivable (as Hofmann objects). A dogmatic judgment cannot *a priori* be pronounced respecting such psychological experiences in the inner life. Hofmann himself declares that a living and

dying of the personal Ego is meant : “ *so long as this Ego was not confronted by the command, it continued in the life given to it by God its Creator, which really deserved, as such, to be called a life.*” But how the looking back, which our passage expresses, to *this* former life differs essentially and materially from the recollection of that of *childlike innocence*, is not clear to me. That ἐξῶν is, at any rate, the *lost paradise of the individual inner history.*

entire section, explains it, as does also Fritzsche, of the historical Mosaic legislation. — ἀνέζησεν] is by most modern commentators rendered *came to life*. So Tholuck, Rückert, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Maier, and Hofmann. But quite contrary to the *usus loquendi* (Luke xv. 24, 32; Rom. xiv. 9; Rev. xx. 5), in accordance with which it means : *came again to life*. See also Nonnus, *Joh.* v. 25 : αὐτὸς ἀναζήσασεν, where (in opposition to the view of Fritzsche) αὐτὸς is added according to a well-known pleonasm; comp. ἐπαναζῶσιν, *reviviscet*, *Dial. Herm. de astrol.* i. 10, 42; respecting the case of ἀναβλέπω, usually cited as analogous, see on John ix. 11.¹ So, too, ἀναζωῶ in Aquila and Symmachus means *reviviscere facio*. See Schleusner, *Thes.* I. p. 219. And also the frequent classical ἀναβῶ and ἀναβύσκειν always mean to come to life *again*; Plat. *Rep.* p. 614 B; *Polit.* p. 272; Lucian, *Q. hist.* 40 : ἀνεβίων ἀποθανόν, *Gall.* 18. Comp. ἀναβίωσις, 2 Mace. vii. 9. It is therefore linguistically correct to explain it, with the ancients, Bengel, and Philippi : *sin lived again* (*revixit*, Vulgate); but this is not to be interpreted, with Bengel, following Augustine and others : “sicut vixerat, cum per Adamum intrasset in mundum” (comp. Philippi), because that is foreign to the context, inasmuch as Paul sets forth *his* experience as the expression of the experience of every individual in his relation to the law, not speaking of humanity as a whole. The ἀνέζησεν, which is not to be misinterpreted as pointing to a *pre-mundane* sin (Hilgenfeld), finds its true explanation, analogously to the ἀναβλέπω in John ix. 11, in the view that the ἀμαρτία, that *potentiality* of sin in man, is originally and in its nature a *living* power, but is, before the ἐντολή comes, without expression for its life, νεκρά; thereupon it *resumes* its proper living nature, and thus *becomes alive again*. Comp. van Hengel : “e sopore vigorem recuperavit.”

Ver. 10. Ἀπέθανον] correlative of ἀνέζησεν, antithesis of ἐζών. It is neither to be understood, however, of *physical* nor of *spiritual* death (Semler, Böhme, Rückert; comp. Hofmann and others), but, as the contrast εἰς ζωὴν requires, of *eternal death*. This was *given* with the actual sin brought about through the sin-principle that had become alive; the sinner had *incurred* it. Paul, full of the painful recollection, expresses this by the abrupt, deeply tragic ἀπέθανον. — ἡ εἰς ζωὴν] sc. οὐσα, *aiming at life*. For the promise of *life* (in the Messianic theocratic sense, Lev. xviii. 5; Deut. v. 33; Gal. iii. 12), which was attached to the obedience of the Mosaic law generally, applied also to the ἐντολή. — εὑρέθη] *was found*, proved and showed itself in the actual experimental result; comp. Gal. ii. 17; 1 Pet. i. 7. Chrysostom has well said : οὐκ εἶπε· γέγωνε θάνατος, οὐδὲ ἔτεκε θάνατον, ἀλλ' ἐβρέθη, τὸ καὶνὸν καὶ παράδοξον τῆς ἀποτίας οὐτως ἐρμηνεύων, καὶ τὸ πᾶν εἰς τῶν ἐκείνων (of men) περιτρίπων κεφαλὴν. — αὐτῇ] *haec*. To be written thus, and not αὐτῇ, *ipsa* (Bengel and Hofmann), after the analogy of ver. 15 f., 19 f. It has *tragic* emphasis. Comp. on Phil. i. 22.

¹ Generally, the citation of *other* verbs compounded with ἀνά, in which the latter means *not again*, but *up, aloft* (and that is, in fact, the case with very many), has no probative force. Passages should be quoted

in which ἀναζῆν means merely to *come to life*, especially as the analogy of the classical ἀναβῶν is against it. This remark applies also against Hofmann's citations.

Ver. 11. Illustration of this surprising result, in which ἡ ἀμαρτία, as the *guilty* element, is placed foremost, and its guilt is also made manifest by the διὰ τῆς ἐντολ. placed *before* ἐξηπάτ. *Sin* has by means of the *commandment* (which had for its direct aim my life) deceived me, inasmuch as it used it for the provocation of desire. An allusion to the serpent in Paradise is probable, both from the nature of the case, and also from the expression (LXX. Gen. iii. 13). Comp. 2 Cor. xi. 2. But such an allusion would be inappropriate, if it were "the struggle of the more earnest Pharisaism" (Philippi), and not the loss of childlike innocence, that is here described. As to the conception of the ἐξηπάτησε (sin held out to me something pernicious as being desirable), comp. Eph. iv. 22, Heb. iii. 13. — ἀπὸ κτείνεν | like ἀπὸ θανάτου in ver. 10.

Ver. 12. Ὡστε | The result of vv. 7-11. — ὁ μὲν νόμος | The contrast for which μὲν prepares the way was intended to be: "but sin has to me redounded unto death through the law, which in itself is good." This follows in ver. 13 as regards *substance*, but not as regards *form*. See on ver. 13. — The predicates—ἅγιος (*holy*, as God's revelation of Himself, ver. 14; 2 Macc. vi. 23, 28), which is assigned to the Mosaic law generally, and ἀγαθὰ, δεκαίᾳ (*just*, in respect to its requirements, which are only such as accord with the holiness), and ἀγασθῆ (*excellent*, on account of its salutary object), which are justly (comp. Acts vii. 38) attributed to the ἐντολῇ—exhaust the contents of the opposite of ἀμαρτία in ver. 7. They are *accumulated* on ἡ ἐντολῇ, because the latter had just been specially described in ver. 7 ff. as that which occasioned the activity of the sin-principle.

Ver. 13. Paul has hardly begun, in ver. 12, his exposition of the result of vv. 7-11, when his train of thought is again crossed by an inference that might possibly be drawn from what had just been said, and used against him (comp. ver. 7). He puts this inference as a question, and now gives in the form of a refutation of it what he had intended to give, according to the plan begun in ver. 12, not in polemical form, but in a sentence with δὲ that should correspond to the sentence with μὲν. — ἄλλὰ ἡ ἀμαρτία ἢ ὥστε ἐμοὶ ἐγένετο θάνατος. Altogether involved is the construction adopted by Luther, Heumann, Carpzov, Ch. Schmidt, Böhme, and Flatt: ἄλλα ἡ ἀμαρτία διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοι κατεργαζομένη (ἦν) θάνατον, ἵνα φανῇ ἀμαρτία. — ἵνα φανῇ κ.τ.λ.] *in order that it might appear as sin thereby, that it wrought death for me by means of the good.* ἵνα introduces the *aim*, which was ordained by God for the ἡ ἀμ. ἐμοὶ ἐγένετο θάνατος. This purposed *manifestation* (φανῇ has the emphasis) of the principle of sin in its sinful character served as a necessary preparation for redemption,—a view, which represents the psychological history of salvation as a development of the divine μοῖρα. — ἀμαρτία is certainly shown to be the *predicate* by its want of the article and the parallel ἀμαρτωλός in the second clause. The predicate attributed to the law in ver. 7 is appropriated to that power to which it belongs, namely, *sin*. Ewald: that it might be manifest, *how sin*, etc. But ἀμαρτία, because it would thus be the sin-principle, must have had the article, and the "how" is gratuitously imported. — ἵνα γένηται κ.τ.λ.] Climactic parallel (comp. on 2 Cor. ix. 3; Gal. iii. 14) to ἵνα φανῇ κ.τ.λ., in which γένηται is to be taken of

the *actual result*; see on iii. 4. The repetition of the *subject* of γένηται (ἡ ἁμαρτία), and of the *means* employed by it (διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς), may indeed be superfluous, because both are self-evident from what goes before; but it conveys, especially when placed at the close, all the weightier emphasis of a solemnly painful, tragic effect. The less, therefore, is ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τ. ἐντολ. to be separated from γένηται, and regarded as the resumption and completion of ἡ ἁμαρτία (sc. ἐμοὶ ἐγ. θάνατος); in which view there is assigned to the two clauses of purpose a co-ordinate intervening position (Hofmann), that renders the discourse—running on so simply and emphatically—quite unnecessarily involved. καθ' ὑπερβ., in *over-measure*, beyond measure. Comp. 1 Cor. xii. 13; 2 Cor. i. 8, iv. 17; Gal. i. 13; and see Wetstein. — διὰ τῆς ἐντολ.] *by means of the commandment*, which ἀγαθὸν it applied so perniciously; a pregnant contrast. — Observe the pithy, climactic, sharply and vividly compressed delineation of the gloomy picture.

Vv. 14–25. *Proof* not merely of the foregoing telic sentence (Th. Schott), but of the weighty main thought μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἁμαρτία. “For the law is spiritual, but man (in his natural situation under the law, out of Christ) is of flesh and placed under the power of sin; against the moral will of his better self, he is carried away to evil by the power of the sinful principle dwelling in him.” [See Note LXXXIV. p. 292.]

Ver. 14. Οἶδα μὲν] Ὡσαυτεῖ ἐλεγεν ὁμολογημένον τοῦτο κ. δῆλόν ἐστι, Chrysostom. Comp. ii. 2, iii. 19. It is not to be written οἶδα μὲν (Jerome, Estius, Semler, Koppe, Flatt, Reiche, Hofmann, Th. Schott), since the following δὲ would only correspond logically with the μὲν, if Paul, with a view to contrast the character of the *law* with his *own* character (so Hofmann), had said: οἶδα γὰρ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος κ.τ.λ.; or, in case he had desired to contrast his *character* with his *knowledge* (so Schott): οἶδα μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., σάρκινος δὲ εἰμι, or εἰμὶ δὲ σάρκινος, omitting the ἐγώ, which is the antithesis of the νόμος. — πνευματικός obtains its definition through the contrasted σάρκινος. Now σάρξ is the material phenomenal nature of man opposed to the divine πνεῦμα, animated and determined by the ψυχὴ (comp. on iv. 1, vi. 19), and consequently σάρκινος (*of flesh*) affirms of the ἐγώ, that it is of such a non-pneumatic nature and quality.¹ So πνευματικός must affirm regarding the law, that *its essence* (not the *form* in which it is given, according to which it appears as γράμμα) is *divine* = *spiritual*: its essential and characteristic quality is homogeneous with that of the Holy Spirit, who has made Himself known in the law. For believers no proof of this was needed (οἶδα μὲν), because the νόμος, as νόμος Θεοῦ, must be a holy self-revelation of the Divine Spirit; comp. ver. 12; Acts vii. 38. *In consequence* of this pneumatic nature the law is certainly διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολέμιος (Chrysostom), and its tenor, rooting in

¹ Not merely *direction of life* (Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 77 ff.). Least of all is this rendering sufficient here, looking to the strength of the expression σάρκινος. Not, however, as though the σάρξ *in itself* were evil, something *originally* evil; but it is the seat of the sin-principle, by which it is used as its organ to make through it the moral

will and the law ineffectual (ver. 14 ff., viii. 3), and—in the case of the regenerate—to react against the Holy Spirit. *Thus* the σάρξ itself is opposed to God, and has evil lusts and works, not in virtue of the necessity of its nature, but as the seat and tool of the sin-principle.

the Divine Spirit, is only fulfilled by those who have the *πνεῦμα* (Tholuck, with Calovius, joining together different references), as indeed the necessary presupposition is that it *θεῖον ἔγγραφο πνεύματι* (Theodoret), and the consequence necessarily bound up with its spiritual nature is that there subsists no affinity between the law and death (Hofmann); but all this is not conveyed by the word itself, any more than is the *impossibility of fulfilling* the law's demands, based on its pneumatic nature (Calvin: "*Lex coelestem quandam et angelicam justitiam requirit*"). Following Oecumenius 2, and Beza, others (including Reiche, Köllner, and de Wette) have taken *πνεῦμα* of the higher spiritual nature of *man* (i. 9; Matt. xxvi. 41), and hence have, according to this reference, explained *πνευματικός* very variously. *E.g.* Reiche: "in so far as it does not hinder, but promotes, the development and expression of the *πνεῦμα*;" de Wette: "of spiritual tenor and character, in virtue of which it puts forward demands which can only be understood and fulfilled by the spiritual nature of man." So too, substantially, Rückert. But vv. 22, 25 show that *πνευματικός* characterizes the law as *νόμος Θεοῦ*; consequently the *πνεῦμα* is just the *divine*, which the natural man, who knows and has nothing of the Spirit of God, resists in virtue of the heterogeneous tendency of his *σάρξ*. — *ἐγὼ δέ*] but I, *i.e.* according to the *ιδίῳ* pervading the entire section: *the man, not yet regenerate by the Holy Spirit, in his relation to the Mosaic law given to him*,—the still unredeemed *ἐγὼ*, who, in the deep distress that oppresses him in the presence of the law, ver. 24, sighs after redemption. For the subject is in vv. 14–25 necessarily the same—and that, indeed, in its unredeemed condition¹—as previously gave its psychological *history* prior to and under the law (hence the *preterites* in vv. 7–13), and now *depicts its position* confronting (*ἔ*) the pneumatic nature of the law (hence the *presents* in ver. 14 ff.), in order to convey the information (*γάρ*), that not the law, but the principle of sin mighty in man himself, has prepared death for him. It is true the situation, which the apostle thus exhibits in his own representative Ego, was for himself as an individual one long since past; but he realizes it as present and places it before the eyes like a picture, in which the standpoint of the happier present in which he now finds himself renders possible the perspective that lends to every feature of his portrait the light of clearness and truth. — *σάρκινος* made of *flesh*, consisting of flesh, 2 Cor. iii. 3; 1 Cor. iii. 1.² The signification *fleshy*, corpulentus, Polyb. xxxix. 2. 7, is here out of place. It is not equivalent to the qualitative *σαρκικός*, *fleshly* (see Tittmann's *Synon.* p. 23), that is, affected with the quality that is determined by the *σάρξ*. The *σάρκινος*, as the expression of the substance,³ is far stronger; and while not including the negation of the moral will in man (see ver. 15 ff., 22, 25), indicates the *σάρξ*

¹ Ewald: "He speaks, *if possible even more than previously*, from the standpoint of one *not yet redeemed*, who finds himself face to face with the law merely as a simple man, and consequently as still lacking all higher light and heavenly aid."—In fact, if all that follows can be asserted of the regenerate person, "the regenerate man would thus be

also the *unregenerate*;" Baur, in the *theol. Jahrb.* 857, p. 192; *neut. Theol.* p. 148.

² Comp. Plat. *Leg.* i. p. 906 C; Theocrit. xxi. 66; LXX. 2 Chron. xxxii. 8; Ezek. xi. 19, xxxvi. 26; Addit. Esth. iv. 8: βασιλεῖα σάρκινον.

³ Comp. Holsten, *z. Ev. des Paul. u. Petr.* p. 397.

—that unspiritual, material, phenomenal nature of man, serving by way of vehicle for sin—as the element of his being which so preponderates and renders the moral will fruitless, that the Apostle, transporting himself into his pre-Christian state, cannot—in the mirror of this deeply earnest, and just as real as it was painful, self-contemplation—set forth the moral nature of the natural man otherwise than by the collective judgment, *I am of flesh*; the *σάρξ*, my substantial element of being, prevails on me to such an extent that the predicate *made of flesh* cleaves to me as if to a nature consisting of mere *σάρξ*. This is the Pauline τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σάρξ ἐστίν (John iii. 6). The Pauline τὸ γεγενν. ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος πνεῦμά ἐστιν follows in chap. viii. Since the *σάρξ* is the seat of the sin-principle (see ver. 18, comp. ver. 23), there is connected with the *σάρκινος* also the *πεπραμένος ἐπὶ τὴν ἁμαρτ.*, *sold*, as a *slave*, under the (dominion of) sin *i.e.* as completely dependent on the power of the sin-principle¹ as is a serf on the master to whom he is sold: ἡ πρᾶσις δοῦλον πάντως ποιεῖ τὸν πεπραμένον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰπηρεσίας καθιστάμενον ἀνάγκην, Theodore of Mopsuestia. Comp. 1 Kings xxi. 20, 25; 2 Kings xvii. 17; 1 Macc. i. 15. The *passive sense* of *πεπραμ.* finds its elucidation in ver. 23. *πιπράσκεσθαι*, in Greek authors (Soph. *Tr.* 251; Dem. 1304. 8; Lucian, *Asin.* 32) with *τινί* (comp. also Lev. xxv. 39; Deut. xxviii. 68; Isa. l. 1; Baruch iv. 6), is here coupled with *ἐπὶ* (comp. Gal. iv. 3) for the more forcible indication of the relation. Compare *πιπράσκειν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας*, 1 Sam. xxiii. 7; Judith vii. 25; and on the matter itself, Seneca, *de brev. vit.* 3.

Ver. 15 elucidates and assigns the reason of this relation of slavery. "*For what I perform I know not*," *i.e.* it takes place on my part without cognition of its ethical bearing, in the state of bondage of my moral reason. Analogous is the position of the slave, who acts as his master's tool without perceiving the proper nature and the aim of what he does. Augustine,

¹ These very predicates, as strong as possible, expressed without limitation, and in contrast to πνευματικός, should have precluded men from explaining it of the regenerate man, of the condition in the state of grace. Paul would have been speaking in defiance of his own consciousness (vi. 14, 22, viii. 2). See, moreover, Achelis, p. 681 ff. Theodoret has the true view: τὸν πρὸ τῆς χάριτος ἄνθρωπον εἰσάγει πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν· σαρκικὸν γὰρ καλεῖ τὸν μηδέπω τῆς πνευματικῆς ἐπικουρίας τετυχηκότα. It is true that there are, in the case of the regenerate man also, "in natura carnali reliquiae prioris morbi" (Melancthon), and flesh and spirit are at warfare in him (viii. 5, Gal. v. 17); but he is not *σάρκινος* as opposed to *πνευματικός*, and not a slave sold to sin, else he must have fallen back again from his regenerate state. Very characteristic is the distinction, that in the case of the regenerate man the conflict is between *flesh* and *spirit* (*i.e.* the *Holy*

Spirit received by him); but in that of the unregenerate man, between the *flesh* and his *own moral reason* or *voûs*, which latter succumbs, whilst in the regenerate the victory in the conflict may and must fall to the Spirit. Comp. on Gal. v. 17; also Baur, *Paul.* II. p. 158 f. All who have taken the subject in our passage to be the man already redeemed have necessarily fallen into the error (especially apparent in the case of Krummacher) of confounding the struggle between flesh and Spirit in the case of the regenerate person, with that described in our passage in the case of the still unregenerate man, who is not yet able to oppose the *πνεῦμα*, but only his own too weak *voûs*, to the power of sin in the flesh. From this error they should have been deterred by the very circumstance that in the entire passage (how wholly different in viii. 2 f.!) Paul is quite silent regarding the *πνεῦμα* as a power opposed to the *σάρξ* and the *ἁμαρτία*.

Beza, Grotius, Estius, and others, including Flatt, Glöckler, Reiche, and Reithmayr, erroneously take γνώσκω as *I approve*, which it never means, not even in Matt. vii. 23; John x. 14; 1 Cor. viii. 3; Rom. x. 19; 2 Tim. ii. 19; Ps. i. 6; Hosea viii. 4; Eccles. xviii. 27. Hofmann's view, however, is also incorrect, that *the cognition is meant, "which includes the object in the subjectivity of the person knowing,"* so that the passage denies that the work and the inner life have anything *in common*. In this way the idea of the *divine* cognition, whose object is *man* (Gal. iv. 9; Matt. xii. 23), is extraneously imported into the passage. — οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω κ.τ.λ.] The proof of the ὁ κατέργ. οὐ γινώσκω. For whosoever acts in the light of the moral cognition does not, of course, do that which is hateful to him following his practical reason (ὁ μισῶ), but, on the contrary, that towards which his moral desire is directed (ὁ θέλω). The person acting without that cognition, carried away by the power of sin in him, does not pursue as the aim of his activity (πράσσει, comp. on i. 32) that which in the morally conscious state he *would* pursue, but, on the contrary, does (ποιεῖ) what in that state is *abhorrent* to him.¹ The ethical power of resolution, which decides for the good, is inactive, and man does the evil that he abhors. Paul consequently ascribes to the unregenerate man also the moral wish,² which he has in rational self-determination; but he denies to him the action corresponding thereto, because his moral self-determination does not come into exercise in the state of his natural bondage, but he is, on the contrary, hurried away to the performance of the opposite. His θέλειν of the good and his μισεῖν of the evil are not, therefore, those of the regenerate man, because the new man, in virtue of the holy πνεῦμα, emerges from the conflict with the σάρξ as a conqueror (against Philippi); nor yet the weak *velleitas* of the schoolmen (Tholuck, Reithmayr, comp. Baumgarten-Crusius); but a real, decided wishing and hating (comp. ver. 16), which present, indeed, for the moral consciousness the theory of self-determination, but without the corresponding result in the issue. The "I" in θέλω and μισῶ is conceived according to its moral self-consciousness, but in πράσσω and ποιῶ, according to its empiric practice, which runs counter to the self-determination of that consciousness. Reiche, in consistency with his misconception of the entire representation, brings out as the pure thought of ver. 15: "the sinful Jew, as he appears in experience and history, does the evil which the Jew free from sin, as he might and should have been, does not approve." As profane analogies of the moral conflict meant by Paul, comp. Epict. *Enchir.* ii. 26. 4: ὁ μὲν θέλει (ὁ ἁμαρτάνων) οὐ ποιεῖ, καὶ ὁ μὴ θέλει ποιεῖ; Eur. *Med.* 1079: θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων (stronger) τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, and the familiar "video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor" (Ovid, *Met.* vii. 19). See also Wetstein, and Spiess, *Logos spermat.* p. 228 f.

Ver. 16. Not an incidental inference (Rückert), but an essential carrying

¹ The μισῶ must not be weakened, as e.g. by Th. Schott, who makes it equivalent to οὐ θέλω in ver. 16.

² For the idea that this θέλειν has only *come to exist* through regeneration (Lu-

thardt, *v. freien Willen*, p. 405), is perfectly foreign to the expression, especially in its close connection with ver. 14, and is a pure *importation*.

on of the argument, from which then ver. 17 is further inferred. For the relation of the ἐγώ to the law is in fact the very aim of the section (see ver. 25). — ὁ οὐ θέλω] *whereto I am unwilling*, for in fact I hate it, ver. 15. By οὐ the θέλειν is turned into its opposite. Comp. Baeuml. *Partik.* p. 278 ; Ameis on Homer, *Odys.* iii. 274. — σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ, ὅτι καλός] since indeed the law also desires not what I do. My conduct, therefore, so far as my desire is opposed to it, appears, according to this contradiction, as a proof *that I concur with the law, that it is beautiful, i.e. morally good* ; the moral excellence which the law affirms of itself (e.g. Deut. iv. 8) I also agree with it in acknowledging ; in point of fact, I say *yes* to it. Comp. also Philippi and Hofmann. The *usual* view : *I grant to the law, that, etc.*, overlooks the συν, and the reference of the τῷ νόμῳ to συν (*I say with*).¹ We may add that Chrysostom, *in loc.*, has appropriately directed attention to the οἰκεία εἴγενηα of the moral nature of man.

Ver. 17. νυνὶ δέ] does not introduce a *minor proposition* attaching itself with a “*but now*” (Reithmayr and Hofmann)—a view which is unsuitable to the antithetical form of the expression ; nor is it to be taken, with Augustine, as “*nunc in statu gratiae*,” but it is the quite common and, in Paul’s writings especially, very frequent *as it is, however* (see on iii. 21), that is, *in this actual state of the case, however* ; namely, since my θέλειν, notwithstanding my conduct, is not opposed to the law, but on the contrary confirms it. In connection with this view οἰκέτι also is not, possibly, *temporal*, “pointing back to a time in which it was otherwise with the speaker” (Hofmann), namely, to what is related in vv. 7–11, but *logical*, as in ver. 20, xi. 6 ; Gal. iii. 18. What is indicated by νυνὶ δέ stands to ἐγὼ κατεργ. αὐτό in an *excluding* relation, so that after the former there can be no mention of the latter. It is the dialectic *non jam, non item* (Bornemann *ad Xen. Cyr.* i. 6, 27 ; Winer, p. 547 f. [E. T. 618] ; comp. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 432). — ἐγώ] with emphasis : my personality proper, my self-consciousness, which is my real, morally wishing Ego. It is not this “I” that performs the evil (αὐτό, i.e. ὁ οὐ θέλω, ver. 16), but the principle of sin, which has its dwelling-place in me (the phenomenal man), enslaving my better—but against its power too weak—will, and not allowing it to attain accomplishment. That ἐν ἐμοί is not, like ἐγώ, to be taken of the moral self-conscious “I,” is affirmed by Paul himself in ver. 18. But it is erroneous to infer, from what he here says of the ἐγώ, the necessity of the explanation in the sense of the regenerate person (see especially Calvin and Philippi) ; for if the power practising the evil be not the “I,” but the potentiality of sin, this accords perfectly with the state of the σαρκικός, ψυχικός (1 Cor. ii. 14), ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν πεπραμένος (ver. 14), consequently of the unregenerate, in whom sin rules, and not the grace and power of the Holy Spirit leading the moral Ego to victory. In the regenerate man dwells the *Spirit* (viii. 8 ; Gal. v. 16 f. ; 1 Cor. iii. 16), who aids the “I” in conquering the sin-power of the flesh (viii. 13 ff. ; Gal. v. 24).

¹ Comp. Plat. *Rep.* p. 608 B. *Theaet.* p. 199 C, *Phaed.* p. 64 B ; Soph. *Aj.* 271, *Oed. R.*

553 ; Eur. *Hippol.* 265 ; Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* IV. p. 153.

Ver. 18. Basing of the ἀλλ' ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἀμαρτία in ver. 17 on the human (not : Christian) experimental consciousness of the ἔμμετον κακόν (Wisd. xii. 10). — τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ μου] More precise definition to ἐν ἐμοί, by which it is designated, in order to make the meaning clear beyond all doubt, according to its aspect of self-verification here meant ; and the latter is expressly distinguished from that of the moral self-consciousness, conveyed by the ἐγώ in ver. 17. — That *good*, that is, moral willing and doing, consequently the opposite of ἀμαρτία, has its abode in the σάρξ of man, *i.e.* in his materio-physical phenomenal nature (comp. on ver. 14),¹ is negated by οὐκ οἰκεῖ. . . . ἀγαθόν, and this negation is then *proved* by τὸ γὰρ θέλειν κ.τ.λ. If the σάρξ, namely, were the seat of the moral nature, so that the will of the moral self-consciousness and that residing in the σάρξ harmonized, in that case there would be nothing opposed to the carrying out of that moral tendency of will ; in that case, besides the willing, we should find also in man the performance of the morally beautiful (τὸ καλόν, “quod candore moralitatis,” van Hengel). On the identity of the καλόν and the ἀγαθόν, according to the Greek view of morality, see Stallb. *ad Plat. Sympos.* p. 201 C. — παράκειται μοι] *lies before me* (Plat. *Tim.* p. 69 A, *Phil.* p. 41 D ; 2 Macc. iv. 4)—a plastic expression of the idea : *there is present in me*. Paul presents the matter, namely, as if he were looking around in his own person, as in a spacious sphere, to discover what might be present therein. There he sees the θέλειν (τὸ καλόν) immediately confronting him, before his gaze ; but his searching gaze fails to discover (οὐχ εἰρίσκω) the κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλόν. The performance of the good, therefore, is something not characteristic of the natural man, while that θέλειν of the moral “I” is present with him. “*Longe a me abest*,” says Grotius aptly in explanation of the reading οὐ sc. παράκειται, with which, however, οὐχ εἰρίσκω is perfectly equivalent in sense ; so that to render the latter “I gain it not, *i.e.* I can not” (Estius, Kypke, Flatt, Tholuck, and Köllner), or, “it is to me *unattainable*” (Hofmann), is inconsistent with the correlative παράκειται μοι, as well as the εἰρίσκω in ver. 21. Theodoret has rightly noted the ground of the οὐχ εἰρίσκω : ἀσθενῶ . . . περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἐτέραν ἐπικουρίαν (namely, that of the Holy Spirit) οὐκ ἔχων. But the ἐγώ, which has the willing, can *not* at all be the καὶνὸς πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος (against Philippi), whose θέλειν is the “*fidei promptitudo*” (Calvin), because that ἐγώ, clogged by the sinful power of the flesh, is naked and void of the κατεργάζεσθαι. The latter is the simple *to bring about, to bring into execution* (see on i. 27) ; and if, in order to interpret it appropriately of the regenerate person, it be made to mean, *to live quite purely* (Luther), or the “*implere qua decet alacritate*” (Calvin), or the act *which is in harmony with the will sanctified by the Spirit of God* (Philippi), these shades of meaning are purely imported.

Ver. 19. Proof of τὸ δὲ κατεργ. τὸ καλόν οὐχ εἰρίσκω in ver. 18. *For the good that I desire I do not ; but the evil that I desire not, that I pursue.* Respect-

¹ Jul. Müller, I. p. 458, ed. 5, wrongly takes it here as morally indifferent, “of the collective phenomenal reality of human

life.” See against this especially vv. 15, 25. viii. 3 ff. Comp. also Rich. Schmidt, *Paul. Christol.* p. 14.

ing the interlocking of the relative and main clauses, see Winer, p. 155 [E. T. 164].

Ver. 20. From this follows, however, the very proposition to be proved, ver. 17, that it is not the moral *self*, but the *sin-principle* in man, that performs the evil. — *οὐ θέλω*] as in ver. 16.

Vv. 21–23. Result from vv. 14–20.

Ver. 21. Among the numerous interpretations of this passage, which Chrysostom terms *ἀσαφές εἰρημένον*, and the exposition of which has been given up as hopeless by van Hengel and Rückert, the following fall to be considered :¹—(1) τὸν νόμον taken generally as *rule*, necessity, and the like : “ *I find therefore for me, who am desirous of doing the good, the rule, the unavoidably determining element, that evil lies before me ;*” so that it is substantially the ἑτερος νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, ver. 23, that is here meant. So, in the main, Luther, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Estius, Wolf, and others, including Ammon, Boehme, Flatt, Köllner, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Nielsen, Winer, Baur, Philippi, Tholuck, Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 379, Umbreit, Krummacher, Jatho, and the latest Catholic expositors, Reithmayr, Maier, and Bisping. But it is fatal to this view, that ὁ νόμος, in accordance with the entire context, can be nothing else than the *Mosaic law*, since a definition altering this wonted reference of the meaning is not appended, but is only introduced in ver. 23 by the addition of ἑτερον ; further, that ὅτι ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται is not a relation that presents itself in idea as a νόμος, but, on the contrary, as something *empirical*, as a *phenomenon* of fact ; and lastly, that we should have to expect τὸν νόμον, in that case, only before ὅτι. (2) τὸν νόμον understood of the *Mosaic law* : “ *I find therefore in me, who am desirous of doing the law, (namely) the good, that evil lies before me.*” According to this view, consequently, τὸ καλὸν is in apposition with τ. νόμον, and ὅτι κ.τ.λ. is the object of εὐρίσκω. So, in substance, Homberg, Bos, Knapp, *Ser. var. arg.* p. 389, Klee, Bornemann *in Luc.* p. lxvii, Olshausen, Fritzsche, and Krehl. But after what goes before (vv. 15–20), it is inconsistent with the context to separate ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν ; and, besides, the appositional view of τὸ καλόν is a forced expedient, feebly introducing something quite superfluous, especially after the τὸν νόμον prefixed with full emphasis. (3) τὸν νόμον likewise taken of the *Mosaic law*, and ὅτι taken as *because* : “ *I find therefore the law for me, who am disposed to do the good, because evil lies before me ;*” i.e. I find therefore that the law, so far as I have the will to do what is good, is by my side concurring with me, because evil is present with me (and therefore I need the law as *συνήγορον* and *ἐπιτείνοντα τὸ βούλημα*, see Chrysostom). So substantially the Peshito, Chrysostom, Theophylact (εὐρίσκω ἄρα τὸν νόμον συνηγοροῦντά μοι, θέλοντι μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, μὴ ποιοῦντι δὲ, διότι ἐμοὶ παράκειται τὸ κακόν) ; comp. also Origen, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Oecumenius (less clearly Theodoret), Hammond, Bengel, Semler, Morus, and my own second edition. But the idea, which according to this view would be conveyed by the dative τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ κ.τ.λ., must have been

¹ Leaving out of account Reiche's misinterpretation as to a double “I” of Jewish humanity.

more definitely and expressly indicated than by the mere *dativus commodi*; moreover, this explanation does not harmonize with the apostle's purpose of summing up now, as the result of his previous view, the whole *misery*, in which the natural man sees himself when confronted with the law; see vv. 22-25. Hofmann also, modifying his earlier similar view (*Schriftbew.* I. p. 549), now understands under τ. νόμον the *Mosaic law*, and takes ὅτι in the sense of *because*, but τὸ καλόν, as predicate to τ. νόμον, the dative as depending on τὸ καλόν, and ποιεῖν, which is supposed to be without an object, as belonging to θέλ. The speaker thus declares what he recognizes the law as being, "namely, as that which to him, who is willing to do, is the good;" and he finds it so, "because the evil is at hand to him;" when he "comes to act," the evil is there also, and presents itself to him to be done; which contradiction between the thing willed and the thing lying to his hand makes him perceive the harmony between his willing and the law, so that, namely, he "would be doing what he wills, if he were doing that which the law commands." This extremely tortuous explanation, which first of all imports the nucleus of the thought which is supposed to be expressed so enigmatically, breaks down at the very outset by its assumption that ποιεῖν is meant to stand *without object* (when I come to act!), although the object (comp. vv. 15-20) *stands beside it* (τὸ καλόν) and according to the entire preceding context *necessarily belongs to it*, — a statement as to which nothing but exegetical subjectivity can pronounce the arbitrary verdict that it is "groundless prejudice."¹ (4) Ewald's attributive reference of τὸ κακόν to the law is utterly erroneous: "I find therefore the law, when I desire to do what is beautiful, how it lies at hand to me as the evil." Paul assuredly could not, even in this connection, have said τὸ κακόν of the divine law after vv. 12, 14; comp. ver. 22. (5) Abandoning all these views, I believe that τὸν νόμον is to be understood of the *Mosaic law* and joined with τῷ θέλοντι, that ποιεῖν is to be taken as infinitive of the *purpose* (Buttmann, p. 224, E. T. 261), and ὅτι κ.τ.λ. as *object* of εὑρίσκω (comp. Esr. ii. 26): "it results to me, therefore, that, while my will is directed to the law in order to do the good, the evil lies before me." What deep wretchedness! My moral will points to the law in order to do the good, but the evil is present with me in my fleshly nature, to make the θέλειν void! What I will, that I cannot do.² In connection with this view, observe: (a)

¹ Th. Schott does not indeed commit the mistake of separating ποιεῖν from τὸ καλόν, but he introduces in another way what is not in the text: "I find the law for me, who am willing to do good, such an one as leaves the matter on the footing, that to me, etc."

² The objections urged against my explanation are very unimportant. It is said, in particular, that the inversion τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι is *harsh* (Delitzsch), *forced* (Philippi), *strange and meaningless* (Hofmann). But it is not *harsher* than the numerous perfectly similar hyperbata found in all classic authors (comp. e.g. Xen. Mem. i. 6. 13, where the Sophists are termed τὴν σοφίαν οἱ πωλοῦν-

τες, Plat. Apol. p. 39 C: ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, Herod. vii. 184: τὰς καμήλους τοὺς ἐλαύνοντας, Thuc. vi. 64. 5: ταῦτα τοὺς ἐνυδράσοντας, and Poppo *in loc.*; also Kühner, Gramm. II. 1, p. 532); and so far from being *meaningless*, the inverted arrangement, very appropriately to the sense, lays a great emphasis upon τὸν νόμον. For the νόμος, as the divine record of the καλόν, in contrast to the κακόν which lies in man, has the stress, which does not rest upon θέλοντι (Hofmann). Observe how the idea of the law is prominent and pervading down to the end of the chapter, and then again in viii. 2 ff. Least of all in the case of such an extremely difficult pas-

That the position of the words τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοί serves, without any harshness, to set forth τὸν νόμον emphatically, just as often also in classical writers the substantive with the article is emphatically prefixed to the participle with the article, on which it depends (see Kühner *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 6. 13; Bornemann and Kühner *ad Anab.* v. 6, 7; Krüger, § 50, 10. 1; Bernhardy, p. 461);—(b) That θέλειν with the accusative as object of the willing, *i.e.* of the moral striving and longing, of desire and love, is particularly frequent in the LXX. (see also Matt. xxvii. 43 and the remark thereon); compare here, especially, Isa. v. 24: οὐ γὰρ ἠθέλησαν τὸν νόμον κυρίου. (c) Finally, how aptly the συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ κ.τ.λ. in the illustrative clause that follows, ver. 22, harmonizes with the τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοί; while the subsequent βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον κ.τ.λ., in ver. 23, answers to the ὅτι ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται. [See Note LXXXV. p. 294.]—The dative τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοί is that of the *ethical reference*: *deprehendo mihi*, experience proves it to me. Comp. εὐρέθη μοι, ver. 10.¹

Vv. 22, 23. Antithetical illustration of ver. 21. — συνήδομαι τ. νόμῳ τ. Θεοῦ.] The compound nature of the verb is neither to be overlooked (as by Beza and others, including Rückert and Reiche), nor to be taken as a strengthening of it (Köllner), or as *apud animum meum laetor* (Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Tholuck, and Philippi). It means: *I rejoice with*, which sense alone consists with linguistic usage.² By this, however, we are not to understand the joy *over* the law, shared *with others* (van Hengel and others)—an idea here foreign to the connection; nor yet the joyful nature of *taking part in the law* (Hofmann), whereby the necessary conception of joy *in common* falls away; but rather: *I rejoice with the law of God*, so that *its* joy (the law being personified) is also *mine*. It is the agreement of moral sympathy in regard to what is good. Comp. on ἀμνησμι in ver. 16. So also συμπενεθῆν τινι, συναλγεῖν τινι, κ.τ.λ.; similarly συλλυποῦμενος, Mark iii. 5. Rightly given in the Vulgate: “condecorator legi (not lege) Dei.” Comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 6: συγχαίρει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. The *Mosaic law* is described as νόμος Θεοῦ (genit. auctoris) in contrast to the ἕτερος νόμος, which is the law opposed to God. — κατὰ τ. ἔσω ἀνθρ.] The rational and moral nature of man, determined by conscience (ii. 15), is, as the *inward man*, distinguished from the outward man that appears in the body and its members.³ ὁ νοῦς in its con-

sage should people suppose that they may dismiss a linguistically unassailable explanation by vague and merely dogmatical objections.

¹ Hom. *Od.* xxi. 304: οἱ δ' αὐτῷ πρώτῳ κακὸν εὔρετο οἶνοβαρείων. Soph. *Aj.* 1144: φῶ φθέγμ' ἂν οὐκ ἂν εὔρες. O. R. 546: δυσμενῇ γὰρ καὶ βαρύν σ' εὐρηκ' ἐμοί. *Oed. C.* 970: οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροις ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτίας ὄνειδος οὐδέν. Plat. *Rep.* p. 421 E; Eur. *Ion.* 1407.

² Plat. *Rep.* p. 462 E; Dem. 519. 10, 579. 19; Soph. *Oed.* C. 1398; Eur. *Med.* 136; Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* IV. p. 184; Reisig, *Enarr. Soph. Oed. C.* 1398.

³ It is erroneous to discover in the expression the designation of the *regenerate*

man (Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Calovius, Krummacher, and others), or to say (as Delitzsch does) that Paul means the higher better self produced or liberated by the grace of the discipline of the law (*Psychol.* p. 380). The unregenerate man also, whether the law have already taken him into its training or not, has the ἔσω ἀνδρῶπιος, and the connection alone must decide whether the ἔσω ἀνδρῶπιος of the passage relates to the redeemed or the unredeemed. The inner man is that which *receives* the Spirit and grace (comp. 2 Cor. iv. 16; Eph. iii. 16), and not the *work* of these. The latter is the *new man* (Eph. ii. 10, iv. 24). In our passage the entire connection de-

trast to *σάρξ* designates the same thing a *potiori*; see on Eph. iii. 16, 2 Cor. iv. 16; also 1 Pet. iii. 4, and Huther *in loc.* Philo (p. 533, Mang.) terms it *ἀνθρωπος ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ*. [See Note LXXXVI. p. 294.] — *βλέπω* Here also Paul represents himself as a *spectator* of his own personality, and as such he *sees*, etc. — *ἐτερον*] a law of *another nature*, not *ἄλλον*. Comp. ver. 4, and on Gal. i. 6. — *ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου*] *sc. ὄντα*, correlative, even by its position, with *κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον*. Fritzsche and Hofmann join *ἐν τοῖς μέλ. μου ἀντιστρατ.*,¹ whereby, however, the importance of the added elements *ἀντιστρατ. κ.τ.λ.* is more subordinated to the *ἐν τ. μέλ. μου*, and the symmetry of the discourse unnecessarily disturbed; comp. below, *τὰ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλ. μου*. The *members*, as the instruments of activity of the *σάρξ*, are, seeing that the *σάρξ* itself is ruled by sin (vv. 18, 25), that in which the power of sin (the dictate of the sin-principle, *ὁ νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτ.*) pursues its doings. This activity in hand, eye, etc. (comp. vi. 13, 19), is directed against the dictate of the moral reason, and that with the result of victory; hence the figures drawn from war, *ἀντιστρατ.* and also *αἰχμαλωτ.* — The *νόμος τοῦ νοῦς* — in which the genitive is neither to be taken as that of the subject (Fritzsche: “*quam mens mea constituit*,” comp. Hofmann, “which man gives to himself”), nor exegetically (Th. Schott), but *locally*, corresponding to the *ἐν τοῖς μέλ. μου* — is not identical with the *νόμος τ. Θεοῦ* in ver. 22 (Usteri, Köllner, Olshausen, and others), just because the latter is the *positive* law of God, the law of *Moses*; but it is the *regulator* of the *συνήδεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (ver. 22), implied in the *moral reason* and *immanent in the νοῦς*. As to *νοῦς*, which is here, in accordance with the connection, the reason in its *practical* activity, the power of knowledge in its *moral* quality as operating to determine the moral will,² see Stirn in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1834, 3, p. 46 ff.; Beck, *bibl.*

cides that it is the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* of the *unregenerate* man which is meant, in his relation to the law; to him also belongs, as respects his moral “I” (although this is quite arbitrarily denied by Philippi, following Melancthon, and many others), the *συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ τ. Θεοῦ* (comp. ii. 15), and it must belong to him, since the sinful nature has its seat and home in the *σάρξ*, vv. 18, 25, as the *antithesis* of the *νοῦς*. This does not indeed consist with the assumption that it is precisely the *higher* powers of the natural man that by nature are at diametrical variance with God and His law (*Form. Conc.* p. 640 f.), but it nevertheless rests on an exegetic basis. Comp. on Eph. iii. 16. The *σάρξ*, however, with the power of sin dwelling in it, overpowers the *νοῦς*; so that it becomes in bondage, darkened, and in the activity of its conscience blunt and perverted; hence it requires *renewal* (xii. 2): comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* § 95. There remains, therefore, the necessity for redemption of the whole natural man, as also his incapacity for self-attainment of salvation; and it

is an error to see in that contradiction to the *Formula Concordiæ* ought to shake the Pauline doctrine of atonement and justification by faith alone (Delitzsch). Delitzsch brings against me the charge of being un-Lutheran and unbiblical. The latter I must deny; the former does not affect me as *exegete*, since as such I have only to inquire what is exegetically *right* or *wrong*. Philippi, p. 307, ed. 3, *note*, quotes against me authorities (of very various kinds) which as such prove nothing; and reminds me of the position of investigation as to the idea of the *σάρξ*. I may be trusted to possess some acquaintance with the position of such investigations, including even those which the respected theologian has not embraced in his quotations and to some extent could not yet do so.

¹ Compare Th. Schott, who however renders *ἐν* in the *power* of my members.

² Consequently the morally willing *faculty* of the *human πνεῦμα*. Comp. (against Holsten) Pfeiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 165 f.; Kluge *l.c.*

Seelenl. p. 49 ff. ; Delitzsch, p. 179 ; Kluge in the *Jahrb. f. D. Th.* 1871, p. 327. The form *νόος* belongs to the later Greek. See Lobeck *ad Phryn.* p. 453. — καὶ αἰχμαλ. κ.τ.λ.] *and makes me prisoner-of-war to the law of sin* (makes me subject to the power of the sin-principle) *which is in my members*. The *με* does not denote the inner man, the *νοῦς* (Olshausen), for it, regarded in itself, continues in the service of the law of God (ver. 25) ; but the *apparent man*, who would follow the leading of the *νοῦς*. He it is, for the control of whom the law of sin contends with the moral law. The former conquers, and thereby, while the moral law has lost its influence over him, makes him its prisoner-of-war (Luke xxi. 24 ; 2 Cor. x. 5) ; so that he is now—to express the same idea by another figure—*πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τ. ἀμαρτίαν*, ver. 14,—a trait of the gloomy picture, which likewise does not apply to the condition of the redeemed, viii. 2. — τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἀμαρτ.] *is identical with the νόμος that was previously, without more precise definition, called ἕτερος νόμος*. Instead, namely, of saying : “and made me *its* prisoner,” Paul characterizes—as he could not avoid doing in order to complete the antithesis—the victorious law, not previously characterized, *as that which it is*, and says : αἰχμαλ. με τ. νόμῳ ἀμαρτ. Here τ. ἀμαρτ. is the *genitivus auctoris* ; τ. νόμῳ, however, is not instrumental (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact), but can only be taken as the dative of *reference* (*commodi*). The observation τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου, emphatically added to make the disgrace more palpably felt, obviates the misconception that a power different from the ἕτερος νόμος was meant. [See Note LXXXVII, p. 295.] We must dismiss, therefore, the distinctions unsupported by evidence that (following Origen, Jerome, and Oecumenius, but not Ambrosiaster) have been attempted ; e.g. recently by Köllner, who thinks that the ἕτερος νόμος means the demands of the sensuous nature, so far as they manifest themselves in individual cases as bodily lusts, while the νόμος τ. ἀμαρτ. is the sensuous nature itself conceived as a sinful principle ; or by de Wette, who thinks that the former is the proneness to sin which expresses itself in the determinableness of the will by the sensuous nature, while the latter is the same proneness, so far as it conflicts with the law of God, and by the completed resolution actually enters into antagonism thereto (comp. Umbreit) ; or by Ewald (comp. also Grotius and van Hengel), who thinks that Paul here distinguishes *two pairs* of kindred laws : (1) the *eternal law of God*, and alongside of it, but too weak in itself, the *law of reason* ; and (2) the *law of desire*, and along with it, as still mightier, the *law of sin*. Similarly also Delitzsch, Reithmayr, and Hofmann. The latter distinguishes the law of sin from the law in the members, in such a way that the former is prescribed by sin, as the lawgiver, to all those who are subject to it ; the latter, on the contrary, rules in the bodily nature of the individual, as soon as the desire arises in him.¹—αἰχμαλω-

¹ Calovius gives the right view : “Lex membrorum et lex peccati idem sunt, ut e verbis apostoli (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἀμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου liquet.” The clear words themselves do not convey, moreover, the distinction between the pro-

duced and the producer (Delitzsch) ; but, on the contrary, the law of sin coincides completely with the law of the members, as already Augustine perceived, *de nupt. et concup.* i. 30 : “captivantem sub lege peccati, h. e. sub se ipsa.” Comp. also Theo-

τίζω belongs to the age of Diodorus, Josephus, etc. (αἰχμαλωτίζω is still later).¹

Ver. 24. The marks of parenthesis in which many include vv. 24, 25, down to ἡμῶν, or (Grotius and Flatt) merely ver. 25 down to ἡμῶν, should be expunged, since the flow of the discourse is not once logically interrupted. — ταλαίπωρος κ.τ.λ.] The oppressive feeling of the misery of that captivity finds utterance thus. Here also Paul by his “I” represents the still *unredeemed* man in his relation to the law. Only with the state of the *latter*, not with the consciousness of the *regenerate* man, as if he “as it were” were crying ever afresh for a new Redeemer from the power of the sin still remaining in him (Philippi), does this wail and cry for help accord. The regenerate man *has* that which is here sighed for, and his mood is that which is *opposite* to the feeling of wretchedness and death, v. 1 ff., viii. 1 ff.; being that of freedom, of overcoming, of life in Christ, and of Christ in him, of peace and joy in the Holy Spirit, of the new creature, to which old things have passed away. Comp. Jul. Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, I. p. 458 f., ed. 5. The objection of Reiche, that Paul would, according to this view, speak of himself while he was thinking of men of quite an opposite frame of mind, is not valid; for that longing, which he himself had certainly felt very deeply in his pre-Christian life, and into whose painful feelings he *transports himself back* all the more vividly from the standpoint of *his blissful state of redemption*,² could not but, in the consistent continuation of the *idiosis*, be here individualized and realized as present through his ἐγώ. And this he *could* do the more unhesitatingly, since no doubt could thereby be raised in the minds of his readers regarding his present freedom from the *ταλαιπωρία* over which he sighs. Reiche himself, curiously enough, regards ver. 24 as the cry for help of Jewish humanity, to which “a redeemed one replies” in viii. 1; ver. 25, standing in the way, being a gloss! — ταλαίπ. ἐγὼ ἄνθρ.] Nominative of exclamation: *O wretched man that I am!* See Kühner, II. 1, p. 41; Winer, p. 172 [E. T. 182.] — ταλαίπ., Rev. iii. 17, very frequent in the tragedians: Plat. *Euthyd.* p. 302 B; Dem. 548. 12, 425. 11. — ῥύσεται] Purely future. In the depth of his misery the longing after a deliverer asks as if in despair: *who will it be?* — ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τ. θανάτου τούτου] τούτου might indeed grammatically be joined to σώματος (Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Estius, and many others, including Olshausen, Philippi, Hofmann, and Th. Schott), since one may say, τὸ σῶμα τ. θ. τοῦτο; but the sense is against it. For that which weighs upon him, namely, the

dore of Mopsuestia, who declares himself expressly and decidedly against the interpretation of our passage as pointing to *four* laws.

¹ See Thom. Mag. p. 23; Lobeck *ad Phryn.* p. 442.

² This applies also against Delitzsch's assertion, that the very form of this lamentation shows that it proceeds from the breast of a converted person. How natural is it, rather, that Paul should represent the redemption, as he had himself ex-

perienced it, and whose triumphant bliss he bore in his own bosom, as the object of the longing and sighing of the still unredeemed! And who can assert that he himself sighed *otherwise*, before Christ laid hold on him? Thus we here listen to the echo of what was once forced from his own breast. Where such sighing occurs, it is not the state of grace of the converted, but merely the operation of the so-called *gratia praeveniens* (comp. the Erlangen *Zeitschrift*, 1864, 6, p. 378 ff.).

being dependent on the body as captive of the law of sin, lies in the fact that the body belongs to *this* death, *i.e.* to the death *incurred by sin* (which is not physical, but *eternal* death, comp. ver. 10 ff.), consequently to this *shameful* death, as its seat ;¹ not in the fact that this relation takes place in the *present* body, or in a present time posited with the quality of the earthly body. [See Note LXXXVIII. p. 295.] If the words of the person who exclaims should amount to no more than "*the hopeless wish to get rid of the body, in which he is compelled to live,*" without expressing, however, the desire to be *dead* (Hofmann), they would yield a very confused conception. Moreover, by postponing the pronoun, Paul would only have expressed himself very unintelligibly, had his meaning been *hoc corpus mortis*, and not *corpus mortis huius* (Vulgate). Comp. Acts v. 20, xiii. 26. The correct explanation therefore is : "*Who shall deliver me, so that I be no longer dependent on the body, which serves as the seat of so shameful a death ?*" or, in other words : "*Who shall deliver me out of bondage under the law of sin into moral freedom, in which my body shall no longer serve as the seat of this shameful death ?*" Comp. viii. 9, vi. 6, vii. 5, 10 ff. ; Col. ii. 11. With what vivid and true plastic skill does the deeply-stirred emotion of the apostle convey this meaning ! underneath which, no doubt, there likewise lies the longing "*after a release from the sinful natural life*" (Th. Schott). In detail, *τίς με ῥύσεται* corresponds with the *αἰχμαλωτίζ. με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμ.* in ver. 23 ; *ἐκ τοῦ σώμ.* with the *τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου* in ver. 23 ; and *τούτου* denotes the death as occasioned by the tragic power of sin just described also in ver. 23 ; the *genitive* relation is the same as in vi. 6. The rendering "*mortal body*" is condemned by the close connection of *τούτου* with *θανάτου*, whether (inconsistently enough with the context, see vv. 23, 25, viii. 1, 2) there be discovered in the words *the longing for death* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Pareus, Estius, Clericus, Balduin, Koppe, and others), or, with Olshausen (introducing what is foreign to the argument), the longing "*only to be redeemed from the mortal body, i.e. from the body that through sin has become liable to perish, so that the Spirit may make it alive.*" Finally, as in vi. 6, so also here, those explanations are to be rejected which, in arbitrary and bold deviation from the Pauline usage, take *σῶμα* not of the human body, but as "*mortifera peccati massa*" (Calvin, Cappel, Homberg, Wolf) ; or : "*the system of sensual propensities (σῶμα), which is the cause of death*" (Flatt) ; or : "*death conceived as a monster with a body, that threatens to devour the ἐγώ*" (Reiche).

Ver. 25. Not Paul himself for himself alone, but, as is shown by the following *ἅπα ὅν κ.τ.λ.*, the same collective "I" that the Apostle has personated previously, speaks here also—expressing, after that anguish-cry of longing, its feeling of deep thankfulness toward God that the longed-for deliverance has actually come to it through Christ. There is not change of person, but change of scene. Man, still unredeemed, has just been bewailing his wretchedness *out of* Christ ; now the same man is *in Christ*, and gives thanks for the bliss that has come to him in the train of his cry for

¹ Comp. Εξ. x. 17 : περιλέτω ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὸν θάνατον τοῦτον.

help. — εὐχαριστῶ τ. Θεῷ] For what? is not expressed, quite after the manner of lively emotion; but the question itself, ver. 24, and the διὰ Ἰ. Χ., prevent any mistake regarding it. [See Note LXXXIX. p. 296.] — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ αἰτίου ὄντος τῆς εὐχαριστίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ, φησί, κατέργησεν ἃ ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἠδυνήθη· αὐτὸς με ἐβρύσατο ἐκ τῆς ἀσθενείας τοῦ σώματος, ἐνδυναμώσας αὐτὸ, ὥστε μηκέτι τυραννίσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, Theophylact. Thus, to the apostle Christ is the mediator of his thanks,—of the *fact itself*, however, *that* he gives thanks to God, not the mediator through whom he brings his thanks to God (Hofmann). Comp. on i. 8; 1 Cor. xv. 57; Col. iii. 17; similar is ἐν ὀνόματι, Eph. v. 20. — ἄρα οὖν] *infers* a concluding summary of the chief contents of vv. 14–24, *from the immediately preceding εὐχαριστῶ . . . ἡμῶν*. [See Note XC. p. 296.] Seeing, namely, that there lies in the foregoing expression of thanks the thought: “it is *Jesus Christ*, through whom God has saved me from the body of this death,” it follows thence, and that indeed on a retrospective glance at the whole exposition, ver. 14 ff., that *the man himself*, out of Christ—his own personality, *alone and confined to itself*—achieves nothing further than that he serves, indeed, with his νοῦς the law of God, but with his σὰρξ is in the service of the law of sin. It has often been assumed that this recapitulation does not connect itself with the previous thanksgiving, but that the latter is rather to be regarded as a parenthetical interruption (see especially Rückert and Fritzsche); indeed, it has even been conjectured that ἄρα οὖν . . . ἁμαρτίας originally stood immediately after ver. 23 (Venema, Wassenbergh, Keil, Lachmann, Praef. p. X, and van Hengel). But the right sense of αὐτὸς ἐγὼ is thus misconceived. It has here no other meaning than *I myself*, in the sense, namely, *I for my own person*, without that higher saving intervention, which I owe to Christ.¹ The contrast with others, which αὐτὸς with the personal pronoun indicates (comp. ix. 3, xv. 14; Herm. *ad. Vig.* p. 735; Ast, *Lex. Plat.* I. p. 317), results always from the context, and is here evident from the emphatic διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, and, indeed, so that the accent falls on αὐτὸς.² Overlooking this antithetic relation of the “*I myself*,” Pareus, Homberg, Estius, and Wolf conceived that Paul wished to obviate the misconception as if he were not speaking in the entire section, and from ver. 14 onwards in particular, as a regenerate man; Köllner thinks that his object now is to establish still more strongly, by *his own* feeling, the truth of what he has previously advanced in the name of humanity. Others explain: “*just I*,” who have been previously the subject of discourse (Grotius, Reiche, Tholuck, Krehl, Philippi, Maier, and van Hengel; comp. Fritzsche: “ipse ego, qui meam vicem deploravi,” and

¹ So also, substantially, Hofmann and Th. Schott; comp. Baur, Reithmayr, Bisping, Märcker, and Delitzsch, p. 883. Wrongly interpreted by Thomasius, I. p. 278: *according to my Ego proper*. The αὐτὸς ἐγὼ, is, in fact, at the same time the subject of the second clause.

² It is maintained without due reason by Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 91 A, that if

αὐτὸς stand before the personal pronoun (as here), the *latter* has the emphasis, and *vice versa*. The striking vivacity of Greek discourse has not bound itself down so mechanically. Comp. Bremi *ad Dem. Phil.* I. 24, p. 128; Herm. *Opusc.* I. p. 322 ff. In the particular cases the connection must decide.

Ewald) ; which is indeed linguistically unobjectionable (Bernhardy, p. 290), but would furnish no adequate ground for the special emphasis which it would have. Others, again, taking *αὐτός* as equivalent to *ὁ αὐτός* (see Schaefer, *Melet.* p. 65 ; Herm. *ad Soph. Antig.* 920, *Opusc.* I. p. 332 f. ; Dissen *ad Pind.* p. 412) : *ego idem* : “ cui convenit sequens distributio, qua videri posset unus homo in duos veluti secari,” Beza. So also Erasmus, Castalio, and many others ; Klee and Rückert. But in this view also the connection of *ἅρα οὖν κ.τ.λ.* with the foregoing thanksgiving is arbitrarily abandoned ; and the above use of *αὐτός* as synonymous with *ὁ αὐτός*, is proper to Ionic poetry, and is not sanctioned by the N. T. Olshausen, indeed, takes *αὐτ. ἐγώ* as *I, the one and the same* (have in me a twofold element), but rejects the usual view, that *ἅρα . . . ἀμαρτίας* is a recapitulation of ver. 14 ff., and makes the new section begin with ver. 25 ;¹ so that, after the experience of redemption has been indicated by *εὐχαριστῶ κ.τ.λ.*, the completely *altered* inner state of the man is now described ; in which new state the *νοῦς* appears as emancipated and serving the law of God, and only the lower sphere of the life as still remaining under the law of sin. But against this view we may urge, firstly, that Paul would have expressed himself inaccurately in point of logic, since in that case he must have written : *ἅρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῇ μὲν σαρκὶ δουλείῳ νόμῳ ἀμαρτίας, τῷ δὲ νοὶ νόμῳ Θεοῦ* ; secondly, that according to vv. 2, 3, 9 ff. the redeemed person is entirely liberated from the law of sin ; and lastly, that if the redeemed person remained subject to the law of sin with the *σάρξ*, Paul could not have said *οὐδὲν κατὰκριμα κ.τ.λ.* in ver. 1 ; for see vv. 7–9. Umbreit takes it as : *even I ; a climactic sense*, which is neither suggested by the context, nor in keeping with the deep humility of the whole confession. — *δουλείῳ νόμῳ Θεοῦ*] in so far as the desire and striving of my moral reason (see on ver. 23) are directed solely to the good, consequently submitted to the regulative standard of the divine law. At the same time, however, in accordance with the double character of my nature, I am subject with my *σάρξ* (see on ver. 18) to the power of sin, which preponderates. (ver. 23), so that the direction of will in the *νοῦς* does not attain to the *κατεργάζεσθαι*.

Remark 1. The mode in which we interpret vv. 14–25 is of decisive importance for the relation between the Church-doctrine of original sin, as more exactly expressed in the *Formula Concordiae*,² and the view of the apostle ; inasmuch as if in ver. 14 ff. it is the *unredeemed* man under the *law* and its discipline, and not the *regenerate* man who is under *grace*, that is spoken of, then Paul affirms regarding the moral nature of the former and concedes to it what the Church-doctrine decidedly denies to it³—comparing it (*Form. Conc.* p. 661

¹ The section is also made to begin with ver. 25 by Th. Schott and Hofmann ; the former with *ἅρα οὖν*, and the latter with *εὐχαριστῶ*. But it is only with *οὐδὲν κατὰκριμα* that the new scene opens, of which the cry of thanksgiving, ver. 25, was only a *previous glimpse* broken off again by *ἅρα οὖν αὐτός ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ.*

² It employs our passage (see p. 660) for

the inference : “ Si autem in beato ap. Paulo et aliis *renatis* hominibus naturale vel carnale liberum arbitrium etiam *post regenerationem* legi divinae repugnat, *quanto magis ante regenerationem* legi et voluntati Dei rebellabit et inimicum erit.”

³ Comp. Jul. Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, II. p. 238 f., ed. 5.

f.) with a stone, a block, a pillar of salt—in a way that cannot be justified (in opposition to Frank, *Theol. d. Concordienformel*, I. p. 138 f.). Paul clearly ascribes to the higher powers of man (his reason and moral will) the assent to the law of God ; while just as clearly, moreover, he teaches the great disproportion in which these natural moral powers stand to the predominance of the sinful power in the flesh, so that the *liberum arbitrium in spiritualibus* is wanting to the natural man, and only emerges in the case of the converted person (viii. 2). And this want of moral freedom proceeds from the power of sin, which is, according to ver. 8 ff., posited even with birth, and which asserts itself in opposition to the divine law.

Remark 2. How many a Jew in the present day, earnestly concerned about his salvation, may, in relation to his law, feel and sigh just as Paul has here done ; only with this difference, that unlike Paul he cannot add the εὐχαριστῶ τῷ Θεῷ κ.τ.λ. !

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

LXXVII. Ver. 1. ἡ ἀγνοεῖτε κ.τ.λ.

On this point Philippi says : “ In the nature of things, ἡ usually relates to the subject immediately preceding ; but there is no logical necessity for this. The point of connection may also lie farther back, provided that there is sufficient reason for this, and that it is obvious to the reader. But here this is actually the case. The proposition vi. 14 might, as vi. 15 shows, lie open to a dangerous misconception. This must first of all be repelled. After this is done in vi. 16-23, the Apostle returns, according to intention, to vi. 14, in order to expand the sentiment of that verse more fully, and defend it against the doubts that might arise.” He allows, however, the connection suggested by Meyer, if the necessity is felt of thus *formally* connecting with what immediately precedes. Whatever may be said upon this matter, it cannot be doubted that these early verses of ch. vii. are united in thought to vi. 14. Weiss ed. Mey. holds vi. 15-23 to be a development of the first half of vi. 14, and vii. 1-6 of the second half of that verse.

LXXVIII. Ver. 2. ἡ γὰρ ὑπανδρος γυνή κ.τ.λ.

The illustration here given is adopted, as we may suppose, because it presents a case to which that of the Christian is analogous—namely, where, without actually dying, a person dies, or is as it were put to death, so far as the law is concerned. νόμος, in all cases of its occurrence in these verses, refers to the Mosaic law—unless it be at the end of ver. 2, where the addition of the genitive, τοῦ ἀνδρός, may determine its meaning to be “the legal power with which the husband is invested” (Godet). But probably, even in this instance, it means the Mosaic law, so far as this law relates to the husband, or that provision of it which bears on the marriage bond.

LXXIX. Ver. 2. κατήργηται ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ἀνδρός.

The view of Meyer that κατήργηται has a sense corresponding to ἐθανατώθητε of ver. 4, (though Weiss ed. Mey. holds that this is an undue pressing of the word), seems to be justified by the point of the illustration. The adoption of this view, which naturally carries with it also Meyer's view of καὶ ὑμεῖς of ver.

4, gives a far simpler and more natural explanation of the *καὶ* of that phrase than the one which Weiss resorts to, namely, *you also, like all who, according to this analogy, are released from a legal obligation.* *κατήργηται* means, destroyed so far as she is related to the law, and thus freed from it.

LXXX. Ver. 4. *εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἑτέρω.*

The point of the analogy is simply the termination of relations to the old state. In respect to this there is a strict parallelism between the believer and the married woman whose case is supposed. The other elements of the illustration, with which the Apostle deals in a measure for the purpose of emphasis, are of secondary importance, and hence the correspondence so far as these are concerned is not to be pressed, and the search for exactness will be vain. No confident judgment can be pronounced as to whether the Apostle had definitely in mind a "first husband" in the case of the Christian, or, if so, whether it was sin or the law; and, for the same reason, it cannot be decided with certainty whether the figure of marriage is continued, as Meyer supposes, in *καρποφορήσωμεν*. Among the most recent commentators, Godet says of this verb, "By this expression he unmistakably continues and completes the figure which he began, namely, that of marriage." while Weiss ed. Mey. claims that the finding a continuance of the figure in the word is the result only of an artificial mode of interpreting. The true view lies, doubtless, between the two—that it may be continued, and may not.

LXXXI. Ver. 6. *ὥστε δουλεῦν ἡμᾶς κ.τ.λ.*

The expressions used in vv. 5, 6 anticipate, on the one hand, the thought which is brought out later in this chapter (see vv. 22, 23), and, on the other hand, carry the mind of the reader back to the preceding chapter (see vv. 4, 6, 18, etc.). This fact indicates the close connection of these six verses with what goes before, and also confirms the probability, derived from other parts of the two chapters, as well as from chap. viii. that the writer is pursuing a single line of thought throughout this entire section of the Epistle (chapters vi. 1-viii. 39).

LXXXII. Ver. 7 ff. *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτία;*

At this point the Apostle takes up the second of the two questions mentioned in a previous note, which are naturally suggested by v. 20—the verse in connection with which the present section of the Epistle (vi.-viii.) is introduced. If the doctrine of justification by faith does not directly lead to continuance in sin, does it not involve the view of the divine (Mosaic) law which makes that law "a something, whose ethical nature is immoral?" In the immediate sequence of thought and grammatical connection, however, the question arises out of what is said of the law in vv. 5, 6—*οὖν* pointing to those verses. The answer to the question is presented in the same form as in vi. 2; but the proof confirming the negative is set forth in a less direct way. In the confirmatory passage containing this proof, vv. 7-13, there are several elements: In the order of succession, (a) the statement that the law is not sin, but the means of the knowledge of sin; (b) the way by which it becomes the means to this end; (c) the condition of the man to whom the law comes, both

before and after its coming ; (*d*) sin, not the law, is the sinful thing, as made manifest by the fact that it uses the holy law as a means to bring about its own ends. *In the order of importance*, as related to the question of ver. 7, *a* and *d* are of primary consequence, and *d* contains the positive statement which is in direct contrast with the negative in the phrase *μὴ γένοιτο* ; *b* and *c*, however, are further developed, and brought into special prominence in vv. 14-23, and the writer thus shows that they involve thoughts of especial interest in his discussion.

LXXXIII. Vv. 7-13.

With respect to the development of the thought in vv. 7-13, the following points may be noticed : (1) *ἀλλά*, of ver. 7, evidently does not express the absolute contrast, which is commonly set forth in such sentences by the use of this word after a negative particle. Possibly the Apostle, in using it, may have had in mind the thought of the 13th verse, and have supposed that the reader would adjust the relations of the passage properly when he should have reached that verse. In Gal. iv. 8, *ἀλλά* contrasts with the idea of the sonship into which the readers had been brought (see the preceding verses), that of desiring and turning to a new bondage. Yet the latter idea is not found in the clause which is opened by the *ἀλλά*, but in a succeeding one introduced by *πῶς*. This and similar passages, though not in exact correspondence with the case here presented, may serve to illustrate the freedom of Paul's method of writing in reference to such words. The 8th verse here, with its *δέ*, belongs in close connection with the clauses from *ἀλλά* to *ἐπιθυμήσεις* of ver. 7, and fills out to completeness the thought of those clauses. Ver. 8, however, anticipates in substance the idea of ver. 13.—(2) Meyer seems to be correct in holding that the meaning of *οὐκ ἔγνων* is *I did not know*—pointing to the Apostle's own history—and not *I should not have known*. The reference, also, is, as Meyer says, to the consciousness of sin as a power and active principle. This is clearly indicated by the following verses. The meaning of *οὐκ ᾔδεν*, on the other hand, is probably, though not certainly, equivalent to *οὐκ ἂν ᾔδεν* (only, "more definite and confident," Mey.). It seems not improbable, also, that the Apostle may have intended to carry the *ᾔδεν* back to a time antecedent to the *ἔγνων*, and thus have meant *I should not have known—except the law had said* (so Godet), rather than *I should not know—except the law said* (so Mey., Weiss ed. Mey., etc.). Holsten, Gifford, and some others prefer to give to *ᾔδεν*, as to *ἔγνων*, the simple force of the indicative—*I did not know*. *ἐπιθυμία* and *οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις* manifestly have a more extended reference than is given in Exod. xx. 17, though the latter words are, doubtless, quoted from that passage. That the law produces conviction of sin—in the ordinary sense of this phrase—is not the direct and immediate statement of this and the following verses ; but this idea is, nevertheless, suggested, and vv. 14-23 present the condition and experience of one who is under such conviction.—(3) The meaning of *ἀπέθανον*, *θάνατος*, *ἔζων*, etc., is discovered by observing the fact that a new paragraph begins with ver. 7 ; also, that, in this paragraph, the state of the man under the power of sin as a controlling master is set forth ; and that, in ver. 24, this state is apparently described by the word *θάνατος*. The indications, thus, are that neither physical nor eternal death is referred to in this word, but spiritual death. This view is, also, given by Weiss ed. Mey., in opposition to Meyer, who understands by it eternal death. When the Apostle says, *I died*, accord-

ingly, he means that he passed into this state of spiritual death, whereas, during the period referred to in *ἔζω*, he had been in the opposite condition. As the verb *ἀνέζησεν*, ver. 9, however, means *came to life again*, and not simply *came to life*—and thus *νεκρά* does not involve the idea of an actually dead condition, as if there were and had been no existence of the sin-principle, but only of an inactive condition (dormant, “exhibiting,” as Meyer says, “no vital activity”), it seems probable that he has in mind, in the living and dying, the absence and presence not so much of sin, in every sense, as of sin in its working power and in the manifestation of that power to his consciousness. The time indicated by *ἔζω* . . . *πότε* is the time previous to this manifestation (the time of “childlike innocence” (Mey.), which, in some cases, may be extended beyond the limits of early childhood, if the knowledge of the divine law does not immediately after that period come to the soul. In Paul’s own experience, it ended when he began to understand the significance of the Mosaic law, to which *νόμος* in all instances throughout the passage, from ver. 7 to ver. 20, refers.—(4) It must be admitted—as Weiss ed. Mey., also allows—that, in ver. 10, the contrast between *εἰς ζωὴν* and *εἰς θάνατον* points to the idea of eternal death following upon, and in a sense involved in, spiritual death as before the writer’s mind. Yet even there this idea is suggested only secondarily, the primary reference being to the spiritual condition which has already begun.—(5) The 12th verse is introduced, through *ὥστε*, as the result and conclusion of the preceding verses, and the 13th as a question which might be suggested by this conclusion in its reference to what goes before. These verses, however, in their main thought, contain what might naturally have followed the question of ver. 7, and, as Meyer says, they answer to one another as if ver. 13 were opened by the particle *ὅτι*, corresponding with *μὲν* of ver. 12.—(6) By reason of the manner in which, in the progress of his sentences, the Apostle is led to introduce ver. 13, the 14th and fig. verses are made to be a proof (*γάρ*) of *μὴ γέν. ἀλλὰ ἡ ἁμαρτία*. These verses present in themselves, however, a further development of the thought suggested by *ἐγὼ ἀπέθανον*, and carry the man forward in his experience under the power and conviction of sin (vv. 14–23) to the turning point of his life (vv. 24, 25). They thus give, in substance, a part of the answer to the question of ver. 7.

LXXXIV. Vv. 14–23.

That the passage from ver. 14 to ver. 23 refers to the unregenerate man, and not the regenerate, is proved by the following considerations. (a) The most prominent words of a descriptive character are appropriate to the former, but are wholly inappropriate to the latter. (1) In ver. 14 the correct textual reading is undoubtedly *σάρκις*, which is a stronger word than *σαρκικός*, as Meyer shows, and signifies *made out of flesh*—the adjectives in *νός* having this meaning. By his first sentence, accordingly, Paul declares the “I” to be so thoroughly carnal as to justify the expression *made of the evil principle*. The regenerate person is not in this condition. (2) The next succeeding clause, in similarly emphatic language, pronounces him to be *sold under sin*. The thought is, unquestionably, of a being sold as a slave to a master who has complete dominion and ownership. This thought is confirmed and established by the following verses. The Christian, however, as the Apostle repeatedly says, is free from such complete dominion. (3) Ver. 21 presents the general rule or

the uniform experience of the life of the person under consideration as this : that when he desires to do what is good, evil is present with him ; and ver. 23 declares, as the evidence that such is the rule, the fact that the law in the members (the appetites and passions) overpowers the law of the mind and brings the man into captivity to itself. But this is neither the uniform experience nor the general rule of the regenerate life. The true Christian may sometimes yield to temptation and fall into sin ; he may even become *σαρκικός*. But he is never *σάρκινος* ; he is never sold under sin as an absolute slave ; comp. ch. vi. The *δούλος ἁμαρτίας* is not a Christian. (b) The words, which seem, at the first view of them, to favor a reference to the regenerate person, are easily reconciled with the other reference, when the passage is carefully examined. It may be noticed, (1) that the *ἐγώ* may be ruled over by two masters and involves two elements. The two masters are sin, and righteousness or God ; the two elements are the conscience and the passions, the better and worse side of the man. These two elements are always in the *ἐγώ*, but may, either of them, be more or less active, or, on the other hand, more or less dormant. When the man becomes convinced of sin, and is roused to a vigorous struggle to free himself from its power—and it is of such a condition that the Apostle is here speaking—he finds the two elements in conflict with each other. But he is so far under the dominion of the sin which holds him as a slave, that he does, not what his better nature wishes, but what it abhors. There is a desire, which accords with the demand of conscience and thus with the law of God, but the opposite force is too strong. The ruling power accomplishes its own will. (2) As the *ἐγώ* is thus conceived of for the purpose which the writer has in mind, we are not to understand the *ἐγώ*, in vv. 17, 20, as the man in a regenerate state, and the *ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία* as the lingering remains of sin abiding with him ; but the *ἐγώ* is the entire man, who is at one time occupied and ruled over, as a domain, or as a slave, by *ἁμαρτία*, and at another by *δικαιοσύνη*. The Apostle is setting forth the power of sin, and the consciousness of it in his own experience. To this end he adopts this method of representation. Sin governs him completely in his unregenerate condition. It is this master, taking up its abode with him and in him, which overcomes all his better desires and impulses, defeats all his efforts, wars against his conscience, and, whenever he wishes to do good, brings him into captivity to evil. So exceedingly sinful is it, and such is its deadly effect.—As these two points are observed, it will be seen that such words as *θέλω, μισῶ, οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι*, are properly applicable to the unregenerated man awakened to the consciousness of sin, and are used consistently with the object which the Apostle has in view. (c) The progress of thought in chaps. vii. and viii. is reconcilable only with the reference of vv. 14–23 to the unregenerate. If we do not hold that viii. 1 and the following verses refer to the regenerate person as such, we must either suppose that they describe him in some higher stage of development, either in this world or in heaven, which is contradicted by the very first words of those verses—the language being simply *those who are in Christ Jesus* ; or that there is an entirely new section opened with the eighth chapter, which cannot be accepted because of the manifest connection of this chapter with the seventh and the striking similarity in phraseology. But if viii. 1 ff. describes the regenerate as such, and from the turning point of conversion, vii. 14–23 must set forth the condition previous to this great change. (d) The most natural, not to say the necessary, interpretation of *αὐτός*, vii. 25, is that it means *in and of*

myself, as apart from Christ. If this be the true explanation, however, the words connected with it show that the state described in *vv.* 14-23 is the state apart from Christ, and before the deliverance through Him is gained.

LXXXV. Ver. 21. *εἰρίσκω τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι κ.τ.λ.*

Weiss ed. Mey. rejects the explanation which Meyer gives of these words, and says that nothing can be adduced sufficient to sustain such an artificial construction as it involves. He adopts substantially—and this seems quite clearly to be the correct view of the sentence—the interpretation given by Luther, de Wette, and most others, making *τὸν νόμον* mean the constant rule of experience. The objections urged by Meyer against this view are without real force. The *ὅτι* clause involves, in opposition to his statement, “a definition” of the *νόμος*, so far as to account for its use in a sense different from that which it has in other cases in the context. The position of *νόμον* after *εἰρίσκω* is the natural position, and the placing of *τῷ θέλοντι κ.τ.λ.* before *ὅτι* for the purposes of emphasis does not require the placing these words also before *τὸν νόμον*. Finally, the suggestion that *ὅτι . . . παράκειται* is not a *νόμος*, but “something empirical, a phenomenon of fact,” furnishes no argument, for the calling such a uniformly occurring experience a *law* or *rule* is allowable for any writer. As Weiss remarks, however, this *νόμος* is by no means to be identified with the *ἕτερος νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι* of ver. 23. The grounds for rejecting the other views alluded to by Meyer are presented, with sufficient fulness, in his notes. If *νόμος* in this sentence is, thus, to be regarded as not referring to the Mosaic law, it is because the indications of the sentence manifestly require another meaning; and the exception to the general usage with respect to this word, which is here presented, accords with the statement made in a previous note.

LXXXVI. Ver. 22. *κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον.*

The *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* is, as Meyer holds, substantially the same with the *νοῦς*. It is, says Godet, “the organ with which the human soul is endowed to perceive the true and good, and to distinguish them from the bad and false;” to *approve*, we may add, *the former*. It is that side of the *ego* which sympathizes with the law of God (comp. Weiss), and answers to the moral sense or conscience. That it does not necessarily or probably mean, in this passage, either the moral sense under the guidance and control of the Divine Spirit, as in the regenerate person, or “the new man,” *ὁ καινὸς ἄνθρωπος*,—that, on the other hand, it has, in all probability, no such signification, is proved by all the considerations, already presented, which show that Paul is speaking throughout the entire passage of the unregenerate, and also by the fact, alluded to in Meyer’s foot-note, ³ p. 282 that the expression “inner man,” as it occurs in other places (see 2 Cor. iv. 16; Eph. iii. 16), denotes “that which receives the Spirit and grace, and not the *work* of these” which is the *new man*. The argument derived from the fact that *νοῦς* is contrasted with *σὰρξ* in v. 25, which is urged by some writers as proof that both this word and *ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* refer to the regenerate, has no decisive force. The question in that verse depends wholly on what the contrast intended is; and this question is answered by the other emphatic contrast of the verse, which is implied in *αὐτὸς ἐγώ*. When rightly viewed, therefore, the 25th verse, so far from establishing what is claimed by

these writers, confirms the opposite. Godet says, "We must beware of confounding the *inward man* with the *new man*," and Dr. Gifford, in the Speaker's Comm., after remarking that "it is now admitted by all candid and competent interpreters that this expression is not *in itself* equivalent to the *new man*," very fitly adds, "that the context only can decide whether the inward man is regarded as in his natural or his regenerate state." This is the true position. The context, however, determines the former state to be the one referred to.

The closing words of Meyer's foot-note, already mentioned, are omitted by Weiss in his recent edition of Meyer, doubtless because they seemed to have only a personal reference and a passing importance. But they are worthy of preservation in this American edition, as indicating the character of the author and the great and true work as a biblical interpreter which he did; and also, *mutatis mutandis*, as having a wide application. "Delitzsch," he says, "brings against me the charge of being un-Lutheran and unbiblical. The latter I must deny; the former does not affect me as *exegete*, since *as such* I have only to inquire what is exegetically *right* or *wrong*. Philippi quotes against me authorities (of very various kinds) which as such prove nothing; and reminds me of the position of investigation as to the idea of the *σάρξ*. I may be trusted to possess some acquaintance with the position of such investigations, including even those which the respected theologian has *not* embraced in his quotations, and to some extent could not yet do so." The fact that Meyer was able to say—as the principle of his working—what he does in answer to Delitzsch, shows his great superiority as an exegetical scholar; and his words might well be made a motto for all rising scholars in this department. What he says of Philippi, on the other hand, will find a response in the experience of every widely read student who has been drawn by theological enemies into controversy.

LXXXVII. ver. 22, 23.

The question as to the number of laws alluded to in these verses, which has divided commentators—whether there are three or four—may be answered by observing two facts which the several clauses present: (1) that, whereas the Apostle, in designating the law of God, of the mind, and of sin, uses the genitive of the author or of possession, he describes the *ἐρεπον νόμον*, on the other hand, as a law *in* the members, using the local preposition; (2) that, in the latter part of ver. 23 he states, respecting the law of sin, that it is *the one which is in the members* (τῷ ὄντι κ.τ.λ.). These facts seem to make it evident that the *ἐρεπος νόμος* and the *νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας* are the same thing, and that three laws only are spoken of—namely, the law of God, the law of the mind, and the law of sin which is in the members.

LXXXVIII. Ver. 24. ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου.

The construction of *τούτου* with *σώματος* is justly objected to by Meyer, on the ground that "the sense is against it." The liability to misunderstanding on the part of the reader, which would have arisen from the position of the pronoun after *θανάτου*, had this been the writer's idea, is also alluded to by him, and is urged by Godet, Weiss, and others. Philippi, on the contrary, says that the latter argument rests on a very precarious canon, inasmuch as "a writer often intends a particular definite collocation of words, without reflecting that

for the reader it may be ambiguous." He claims, moreover, that, *θάνατος* not being the subject of thought in vv. 14-24, and vv. 10 ff. being too remote, the reference must be to the body which is spoken of as the seat of *ἀμαρτία*. To this it may be answered that, although the word *θάνατος* does not occur in vv. 14-23, the condition described in those verses is that of spiritual death consciously realized by the *ego*, and realized in such a way and degree as naturally to make him cry out for deliverance: who shall deliver me from *the body of this death*—i.e. so far forth as it is given up to this dreadful condition and this terrible master. The man, under conviction of sin, and seeing his own efforts to free himself from its dominion to be fruitless and hopeless, is in an agony of desire to find some helper who shall thus rescue him, but knows not whither to turn until Christ is revealed to his mind.

LXXXIX. Ver. 25. *χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

The textual reading *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ* in this verse, though manifestly, as Meyer says in his critical notes at the beginning of the chapter, an alteration of the true text, may be regarded not only as arising from the desire to give an answer to the preceding question, but also as suggesting the idea which was in the Apostle's mind in connection with the deliverance—namely, that it was through the great gift of the grace of God in the person of Jesus Christ. For this the man, as he is brought to know the help and the helper for whose appearance he has despairingly cried out, gives thanks to God through Christ.

XC. Ver. 25. *ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ . . . ἀμαρτίας.*

ἄρα οὖν introduces a concluding summary (as Meyer says) of the chief contents of vv. 14-23. Its position after the first clause of the verse does not indicate that the condition of the man described in the following words is his condition subsequent to the time of his deliverance through Christ. On the contrary, the emphatic *αὐτός*, as already stated in previous notes, proves that it is not so. The true explanation of the matter seems to be this:—that the Apostle, according to his purpose and plan, carries forward the experience of the man to the time of conversion; that vv. 24 and 25*a* describe the passing to the new life, the last step of the old and the first of the new; and that then, in a single sentence, he looks back and reviews the unregenerate state as preparatory to a setting forth of the opposite character of the regenerate condition in the next chapter. In order that he may not break the close connection, and thus the rhetorical force of vv. 24, 25*a*, he defers writing the words of 25*b* until after he has given in 25*a* the statement of *what, in point of time, actually follows the experience which they describe.*

CHAPTER VIII.

Ver. 1. After Ἰησοῦ Elz. has μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα, which, following Mill, Griesb. and subsequent critics have expunged. The words are wanting either entirely, or at least as to the second half, in a preponderance of codd., vss., and Fathers, and are an old inapposite gloss from ver. 4. — Ver. 2. με] B F G N, Syr. Tert. Chrys. have σε, which Tisch. 8. has adopted. Repetition in copying of the preceding syllable. — Ver. 11. διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα] So Griesb., Matth., Scholz, Fritzsche, Lachm. and Tisch. 7., following Erasmus, Mill, and Bengel. The Recepta, again adopted by Tisch. 8., is διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος. The witnesses (for an accurate examination of which see Reiche, *Commentar. crit.* I. p. 54 ff.) are so divided, that there is on neither side a decisive preponderance, although, besides A and C, N also supports the genitive. The thought of itself, also, equally admits either reading. A decision between them can only be arrived at through the circumstance that the passage came to be discussed in the Macedonian controversy, wherein the Macedonians accused the orthodox of having falsified the ancient codices, when the latter appealed to the Recepta and asserted that it stood in all the ancient codd. See Maxim. *Dial. c. Maced.* 3. in Athanas. *Opp.* II. p. 452. This charge, though retorted by the orthodox on the Macedonians, is worthy of credit, because διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ. already predominates in Origen and the oldest vss. (also Syr. Vulg.); consequently that assertion of the orthodox appears erroneous. The Recepta, indeed, is found in Clem. *Strom.* III. p. 344, Commel. 545. Pott.; but this single trace of its high antiquity loses its weight in opposition to the here specially important vss. and Origen (also Tert. and Iren.), and in the face of these bears the suspicion of orthodox alteration having been wrought on the text of Clement. It is possible, however, that even long previous to the Macedonian controversy the questions and disputes respecting the Holy Spirit may have occasioned now and again the changing of διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ. into διὰ τοῦ κ.τ.λ. At all events, the dogmatic interest attached to both readings is too great and too well attested to admit of διὰ τοῦ κ.τ.λ. being referred, with Bengel and Fritzsche, to a mere error in copying. In the controversy the *genitive* only (as introducing a relation different from that obtaining with the previous abstracts δι' ἁμαρτίαν and διὰ δικαιοσύνην) must have been welcome to the orthodox in defending the personality of the πνεῦμα. Among modern commentators, Rückert, Reiche, Philippi, van Hengel, and Hofmann have declared for the *accusative*; whilst de Wette, Krehl, Tholuck, and also Ewald, adopt the *genitive*. — Ver. 13. τοῦ σώμ.] D E F G, Vulg. It. Or. (who, however, gives both readings) al. read τῆς σαρκός, which Griesb. recommended. An interpretation in the sense of the preceding. — Ver. 14. εἰσιν υἱοὶ Θεοῦ] Since among the uncial A C D E N read υἱοὶ Θεοῦ εἰσ., while B F G have υἱοὶ εἰσιν Θεοῦ (so Lachm. and Tisch.), we must regard the Recepta as at all events too weakly attested. The preference belongs, however, to υἱοὶ εἰσιν Θεοῦ, because the omitted εἰσιν (it is absent also in the Sahid.) would be more easily inserted again at the beginning or end than in the middle. — Ver. 23. καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν ἁπ. τ. πν. ἔχ. κ. ἡμεῖς αὐτοί] So Elz. The variations are very numerous. The readings to be taken

into account, besides the Recepta, are—(1) *καὶ αὐτοὶ τ. ἀπαρχ. τὸν πνεύμ. ἐχ. καὶ αὐτοὶ* : so B, Meth. Tisch. 7. ;—(2) *κ. ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ τ. ἀπαρχ. τ. πν. ἐχ. αὐτοὶ* : so D F G, Ambros. Fritzsche ;—(3) *κ. αὐτοὶ τ. ἀπ. τ. πν. ἐχ. [ἡμεῖς] καὶ αὐτοὶ* : so Lachm. and, without bracketing *ἡμεῖς*, Tisch. 8., following A C $\aleph$, min. Copt. Dam. The first of the three seems to have been the original reading ; *ἡμεῖς* is an addition by way of gloss, which was written, in some cases, immediately beside the first *καὶ αὐτοὶ* (thus arose the reading of Fritzsche), and in some cases only beside the second, thus producing the reading of A C $\aleph$, as well as the Recepta. With the reading of Fritzsche the second *καὶ* disappeared, because, after the insertion of *ἡμεῖς* had taken place in the first part, the subsequent *καὶ αὐτοὶ* was no longer taken analeptically, and therefore *καὶ* was found to be merely confusing. The reading *αὐτοὶ οἱ τ. ἀπ. τ. πν. ἐχ. κ. ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ* has so exceedingly weak attestation, that on that very ground it ought (against Bengel and Rinck) to be rejected. — *ὑιοθεσίαν* wanting in D F G, codd. of It. Ambrosiaster. But how easily it came to be omitted, when the *ὑιοθεσία* was viewed as something already possessed ! — Ver. 24. *τί καί*] B** E F G, Syr. Vulg. codd. of It. and some Fathers have only *τί*. So Lachm. But the very absence of need for the *καὶ* occasioned its omission. — Ver. 26. *τῇ ἀσθ.*] Approved by Griesb., adopted also by Lachm. and Tisch. But Elz. and Scholz have *ταῖς ἀσθενείαις*, against decisive testimony. The sing. is also supported by *τῆς δεήσεως* in F G, which is an explanatory addition to *τῇ ἀσθεν.* Comp. Ambros. : “*infirmilitatem nostrae orationis.*” The plural was substituted for the collective singular.—The reading *προσευξόμεθα* (Griesb. and others have *προσευξόμεθα*) is decisively attested.—After *ὑπερεντυγχ.* Elz. and Scholz have *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, which, following A B D F G $\aleph$ * al. Arm. and Fathers, Lachm. and Tisch. have expunged. A defining addition. — Ver. 28. After *συνεργεῖ* Lachm. reads *ὁ Θεός*, in accordance with A B, Or. It was readily believed that, on account of ver. 27 and 29, *πάντα* must be understood as accusative and God as subject. — Ver. 34. *μᾶλλον δὲ καί*] Lachm. and Tisch. 8. have only *μᾶλλ. δὲ*, in accordance with A B C $\aleph$, min. vss. and Fathers. But between *δε* and *Εγ.* the seemingly unmeaning *καί* was easily overlooked and omitted.—The omission of the second *καί* (behind the first *ὅς*) is less strongly attested by A C $\aleph$, and may be sufficiently explained by non-attention to the emphasis of the thrice-used word. — Ver. 36. *ἐνεκα*] According to A B D F G L $\aleph$ 17. al. *ἐνεκεν* is, with Griesb., Lachm., Tisch., and Scholz, to be substituted. See LXX. Ps. xlv. 23. — Ver. 37. *τοῦ ἀγαπ.*] D E F G, vss. and Fathers read *τὸν ἀγαπήσαντα*, which has against it the Oriental witnesses, and seems to be an alteration in accordance with an erroneous exposition of *τ. ἀγαπ. τ. Χριστοῦ* in ver. 35 (see the exegetical remarks on that passage). — Ver. 38. *οὔτε ἐνεστ. οὔτε μέλλ., οὔτε δυνάμεις*] So also Griesb., Lachm., Tisch., and Scholz. But Elz. has *οὔτε δυνάμ., οὔτε ἐνεστ. οὔτε μέλλ.* Against greatly preponderating evidence. A transposition, because *δυν.* seemed to belong to the category of *ἀρχαί*. The evidence in favour of *οὔτε δυνάμ.*, moreover, is so decisive and so unanimous, that it cannot, with Fritzsche, be regarded as an addition from 1 Pet. iii. 22, 1 Cor. xv. 24, or Eph. i. 21. Tholuck, Philippi, and Ewald reject these words. But their different position in different witnesses is quite explained by supposing that their place behind *μέλλ.*, as well as their general isolation, were regarded as surprising and confusing.

Chap. viii. *Happy condition of man in Christ.* — The certainty of salvation, which is represented in chap. v. 1 f. as the effect of justification by faith,

appears here as brought about through the moral freedom attained in Christ. We see from this, that Paul conceived of faith not otherwise than as producing this freedom ; so that faith is not only that which appropriates the atonement, but also the continuous subjective source and motive power of the divine life up to the final attainment of bliss. See Luther's *Preface*, also his utterances quoted by Ritschl, *Rechtfert u. Versöhnung*, I. p. 142 ff., 180 f.

Vv. 1-11.¹ Accordingly, the Christian is aloof from all condemnation, because he is free from the law of sin—a result which the Mosaic law could not accomplish, but which God has accomplished through Christ. Yet he must live according to the Spirit, and not according to the flesh ; for the latter works death, but the former life.

Ver. 1. Ἄρα] draws an inference from the immediately preceding αὐτὸς ἐγώ. . . . ἀμαρτίας. If I, for my own person, left to myself, am subject indeed with the reason to the law of God, but with the flesh to the law of sin, then it follows that now, after Christ (as deliverer from the law of sin, ver. 2) has interposed, there is no condemnation, etc. This inference, and not that one must be in Christ, in order to get rid of every condemnation (Hofmann), is indicated by γὰρ in ver. 2 as a matter of fact that has become historical. It is arbitrary to seek a connection with anything more remotely preceding (Hofmann, Koppe, Fritzsche, Philippi, and Bisping, with εἰς χάριστῶ. . . . ἡμῶν in vii. 25 ; according to Bengel, Knapp, and Winzer, with vii. 6) ; but to suppose in ἄρα “a forestalling of the following γὰρ” (Tholuck), is linguistically just as mistaken as in the case of διό in ii. 1. Moreover, the emphasis is not upon νῦν, but on the prefixed οὐδέν : no condemnation therefore, none is now applicable, after that αὐτὸς ἐγώ κ.τ.λ. has been changed through Christ, etc. This applies against Philippi's objection, that, according to our conception of the connection, νῦν should have been placed at the beginning. But the objection, that Paul must have continued with δέ instead of ἄρα, is removed by the observation that in the αὐτὸς ἐγώ, properly understood, really lies the very premiss of the altered relation. — νῦν] temporally, in contrast to the former state of the case. Comp. vii. 6. [See Note XCI. p. 345.] Philippi erroneously holds ἄρα νῦν as equivalent to ἄρα οὖν—which it never is—being forced thereto by the theory that the regenerate person is the subject of discussion in chap. vii. 14 ff. Hofmann's view, however, that νῦν contrasts the present with the future αἰὼν (even now, during the life in the flesh), is also incorrect. Nothing in the context suggests it, and it must have been expressed in some such way as by ἡδῇ, or by a defining addition. — οὐδὲν κατάκριμα] sc. ἐστι : no sentence of condemnation (ver. 16), whereby God might deny them eternal life, affects them. The reason see in ver. 2. — τοῖς ἐν X. 'I.] i. e. to those in whose case Christ is the element, in which they are (live and move). The same in substance, but different in the form of the conception, is πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἔχειν and Χριστὸς ἐν ἡμῖν in vv. 9, 10.

¹ On vv. 1-11 see Winzer, *Progr.* 1828.—
On ver. 3, particularly the words ἐν ὁμοιώ-

ματι σαρκὸς ἀμαρτίας, see Overbeck in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1869, p. 178 ff.

Ver. 2.¹ [See, with reference to several words and phrases in vv. 2-11, Note XCII. p. 346.] *For the law of the Spirit leading to life delivered me in Christ Jesus from the law of sin and death.* For the right explanation, it is to be observed—(1) The νόμος τ. ἀμ. κ. τοῦ θαν. necessarily, in view of the connection, receives the definition of its meaning from chap. vii. 23, 25, as indeed ἡλενθ. answers to the αἰχμαλωτίζ. in ver. 23. For this very reason, neither the moral law (Wolf) nor the *Mosaic law* (Pareus, de Dieu, Semler, Böhme, Ammon, and Reiche) can be meant; the latter cannot, for the further reason that, after vii. 7, 12, 16, Paul *could* not thus name the Mosaic νόμος here, as Chrysostom has already urged. It is rather the law in our members, *the power of sin in us, which*, according to vii. 24, comp. vii. 10, 13, *is at the same time the power of (eternal) death* (καὶ τοῦ θανάτου), that is meant. The two are one power, and both genitives are genitives of the subject, so that sin and death are regarded as ruling over the man. — (2) Since the νόμος τ. ἀμ. κ. τ. θαν. cannot be the Mosaic law, so neither can the contrasted νόμος τ. πν. τῆς ζωῆς be the *Christian plan of salvation*, like νόμος πίστ. in iii. 27, but it must be an *inward power in the man* by which the law of sin and death is rendered powerless. It is not, however, the νόμος τοῦ νοός (which had become strengthened through Christ), as, following older expositors, Morus, Köllner, and Schrader think; because, on the one hand, νοῦς and πνεῦμα are specifically different, and if Paul had meant the law of the νοῦς, he must have so designated it, as in vii. 23; and, on the other hand, there would result the utterly paradoxical idea, that the law of reason (and not the divine principle of the πνεῦμα) makes man morally free. The τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ζωῆς is rather *the Holy Spirit*, who, working inwardly in the Christian (ver. 5), *procures to him eternal life* (comp. 2 Cor. iii. 6); and ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς is the *ethically regulative government exercised by the πνεῦμα* (not the Spirit Himself, as Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Maier, and Th. Schott understand it, but His ruling power). — ἐν Χ. 'I.] On account of ver. 3, to be connected neither with τῆς ζωῆς (Luther, Beza, and others, including Böhme, Klee, Ewald, and Hofmann), nor with τοῦ πνεύμ. (Flatt; Tholuck: "the sphere, in which the Spirit of life operates"), nor with νόμος (Semler, Reiche), nor with ὁ νόμ. τ. πν. τ. ζ. (Calvin, Köllner, Glöckler, Krehl, and others), but with ἡλενθέρωσε. So Theodoret, Erasmus, Melancthon, Vatablus, and others, including Rückert, Olshausen, de Wette, Fritzsche, Reithmayr, Maier, Philippi, and Bisping. *In Christ*, the law of the Spirit has made us free; for *out of Christ* this emancipating activity could not occur (comp. John viii. 36); but *in the fellowship of life with Him*, in the being and living in Him (ver. 1), the deliverance which has taken place has its causal ground. The view which takes it of the *objective* basis that is laid down in the *appearance and work of Christ*, is unsuitable, because the discourse treats of the subjective ethical efficacy of the Spirit, which has the εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ as the necessary correlative. — ἡλενθ.]

¹ In vv. 2, 3, we have one of the passages that are decisive in opposition to the affirmative answer which men have often attempted to give to the question, whether

the Son of God would have appeared as man, had man not become sinful. See generally Julius Müller, *dogm. Abh.* pp. 66 ff., 82 f.

aorist. For it is a historical act, which resulted from the effusion of the Spirit in the heart. The progressive sanctification is the further development and consequence of this act.

Ver. 3. An illustration justifying the ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἦλθεν. κ.τ.λ., just asserted, by a description of the powerfully effective *actual arrangement*, which God has made for the accomplishment of what to the law was impossible. — τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου is an *absolute nominative*, prefixing a judgment on the following κατέκρινε κ.τ.λ. “For the impossible thing of the law—God condemned,” etc. That is, *God condemned sin in the flesh, which was a thing of impossibility on the part of the law*. See Krüger, § 57. 10, 12. Comp. also Heb. viii. 1, and on Luke xxi. 6; Wisd. xvi. 17; Kühner, II. 1, p. 42. It could only be *accusative*, if we should assume a general verb (like ἐποίησε) out of what follows, which would, however, be an arbitrary course (in opposition to the view of Erasmus, Luther, and others). The *prefixing* τ. γ. ἀδύν. τ. ν. has rhetorical emphasis, in contrast with the ἐν X. Ἰ. in ver. 2.¹ On the *genitive*, comp. *Epist. ad Diogn.* 9: τὸ ἀδύνατον τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως, *what our nature could not do*. By a harsh hyperbaton Th. Schott takes a sense out of the passage, which it does not bear: *because the impotence of the law became still weaker through the flesh*. Erroneous is also Hofmann’s view: “*the impotence of the law lay or consisted therein, that it was weak through the flesh*.” The abstract sense of “*powerlessness*,” or *incapacity*, is not borne by τὸ ἀδύνατον at all; but it indicates *that which the subject* (here the νόμος) *is not in a position for*, what is impossible to it. See especially Plat. *Hipp. maj.* p. 295 E; comp. 9. 22; Xen. *Hist.* i. 4. 6: ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως δυνατοῦ, *i.e.* from what the city is in a position to tender. Moreover, since the words taken independently, with Hofmann, would only contain a preparatory thought for what follows, Paul would not have had *asyndetically* ὁ Θεός, but must have proceeded by a marking of the contrast, consequently with ὁ δὲ Θεός; so that these words, down to κατὰ πνεῦμα in ver. 4, would still have been in connection with γάρ. And even apart from this, the supplying of the substantive verb would at most only have been indicated for the reader in the event of the proposition having been a general one with ἐστὶ² understood, and consequently if ἀσθενεῖ, and not ἡσθάνει, were read. — ἐν ᾧ ἡσθ. διὰ τ. σαρκ. *] because it was weak (unable to condemn sin) through the flesh*, as is described in chap. vii. On ἐν ᾧ, comp. 1 Cor. iv. 4; John xvi. 30; Winer, p. 362 [E. T. 387]. It is our causal *in that*; διὰ τ. σαρκ. is the cause *bringing about* the ἡσθάνει: *through the reacting influence of the flesh*, vii. 18 ff. — ὁ Θεός τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κ.τ.λ. *] God has, by the fact that He sent His own Son in the likeness* (see on i. 23) *of sinful flesh, and on account of sin, condemned sin in the flesh*, that is, “*God has deposed sin from its rule in the σάρξ* (its previous sphere of power), thereby that He sent His own Son into the world in a phenomenal existence similar to the sinful corporeo-psychical human nature.” — The participle πέμψας is not an act that *preceded* the κατέκρινε (Hofmann, referring

¹ Comp. Dissen, *ad. Pind. Pyth.* iv. 152.

² Like ver. 1. Paul would have written intelligibly: τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου ἐν τούτῳ ἦν ὅτι ἡσθάνει; especially as, according to

Hofmann, ἦν would not be a mere copula, but would mean *situm erat, constitit in*. Märcker, p. 25, nevertheless agrees with Hofmann.

it to the supernatural birth) ; on the contrary, God has effected the *κατάκρσις* *in and with the having sent* the Son. Respecting this use of the aorist participle, comp. on Acts i. 24 ; Eph. i. 5 ; Rom. iv. 20. — *ἐαυτοῦ*] strengthens the relation to *ἐν ὅμ. σ. ἄμ.*, and so enhances the extraordinary and energetic character of the remedial measure adopted by God. Comp. ver. 32. We may add, that in the case of *ἐαυτοῦ*, as in that of *πέμψας* (comp. Gal. iv. 4) and *ἐν ὅμ. σ. ἄμ.* (comp. Phil. ii. 7), the conception of the pre-existence and metaphysical Sonship of Christ is to be recognized (in opposition to Hofmann) ; so that the previous *μορφῇ Θεοῦ* forms the background, although, in that case, the supernatural generation is by no means a necessary presupposition (comp. on i. 3 f.)¹ — *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*] *in the likeness of sinful flesh* ; *ἁμαρτ.* is the genitive of *quality*, as in vi. 6. He might indeed have come *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ*, Phil. ii. 6. But no : God so sent His own Son, *that He appeared in a form of existence which resembled the fleshly human nature affected by sin*. The *ἐν* indicates *in what material mode of appearance* God caused His sent Son to emerge. He came in flesh (1 John iv. 2), and was manifested in flesh (1 Tim. iii. 16). Yet He appeared not in *sinful flesh*,² which is otherwise the bodily phenomenal nature of all men. Moreover, His appearance was neither *merely* bodily, *without* the *ψυχὴ* (Zeller), which, on the contrary, necessarily belongs to the idea of the *σάρξ* ; nor *docetic* (Krehl ; comp. Baur's *Gesch. d. 3. erst. Jahrh.* p. 310), which latter error was already advanced by Marcion ; but it consisted of the general bodily material of humanity, to which, however, in so far as the latter was of sinful quality, it was not equalized, but—because without that quality—only *conformed*. Comp. Phil. ii. 7 ; Heb. ii. 14, iv. 15. The contrast presupposed in the

¹ See generally, Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 235 ff. ; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 317.

² In which, however, the idea is not conveyed, that, like a sacrifice, He was *loaded with the sin of others* (Reiche), which was the case only in His death, not at His sending. Holsten, following the precedent of Gennadius in Cramer's *Cat.* p. 123, has erroneously apprehended the *σάρξ* of Christ as having been really *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*, and as having thus had the objective principle of *ἁμαρτία*, which in his case, however, neither attained to subjective consciousness nor to subjective act. See Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 436 ff. ; comp. also Hausrath, *neut. Zeitgesch.* II. p. 481 f. But if this was the conception which Paul had, what was the expression *ἐν ὁμοιώματι* meant for ? In it lies the very negation of the *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*—of the *σάρξ*, therefore, so far as it had the quality of sin. What Holsten advances in explanation of this expression is forced and irrelevant, as if it were precisely the reality of the being affected by sin that is affirmed. Comp. against this, Sabatier, *l'apôtre Paul*, p. 285.—Overbeck, along with various appropriate remarks in opposition to Holsten,

comes nevertheless likewise to the conclusion that *ἐν ὁμοιώματι* bears, not a negative, but an affirmative relation to the *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*, although the *ἁμαρτία* of the *σάρξ* of Christ never in His case became conscious *παράβασις*. But that the Son of God was sent in *sinful flesh*—which, according to Pfeiderer also (in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 523), is assumed to be implied in our passage as an ethical antinomy—would be a paradox opposed to the entire New Testament, which Paul *could* by no means utter (2 Cor. v. 21) ; and which, in fact, he with marked clearness and precision guards against by saying, not *ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας*, but *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σ. ἄμ.*, and that in contrast to the quality of the *σάρξ* of all others, of which he had just predicated by *ἐν ᾧ ἡσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς* a power so antagonistic to God. That paradox would have run : *ἐν σαρκὶ μὲν ἁμαρτίας, χωρὶς δὲ παραβάσεως*. See also Zeller in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1870, p. 301 ff., who rightly comes to the conclusion that the *σάρξ* of Christ was of *like nature* to the *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*, in so far as the latter was a *σάρξ*, but of *unlike nature*, in so far as it was affected by sin.

specially chosen expression is not *the heavenly spirit-nature* of Christ (Pfleiderer)—to which the mere *ἐν σαρκί*, or *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπου*, as in Phil. ii. 7, would have corresponded—but rather holy *unsinfulness*.—The following κ. *περὶ ἁμαρτ.* adds to the *How* of the sending (*ἐν ὁμ. σαρκ. ἁμαρτ.*) the *Wherefore*. The emphasis is accordingly on *περὶ* : and *for* sin, *on account of* sin,—which is to be left in its *generality* ; for the following *κατέκρινε* κ.τ.λ. brings out something *special*, which God has done with reference to the *ἁμαρτία* by the fact that He sent Christ *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*. We are therefore neither to refer *περὶ ἁμαρτ.*, which affirms by what the sending of the Son was occasioned, exclusively to the *expiation* (Origen, Calvin, Melancthon, and many others, including Koppe, Böhme, Usteri ; comp. Baumgarten-Crusius), in which case *θυσίαν* (Lev. vii. 37 *al.* ; Ps. xl. 6 ; Heb. x. 6, 18) was supplied ; nor, with Theophylact, Castalio, and others, also Maier and Bisping, exclusively to the *destruction* and *doing away* of sin. It contains rather the *whole category of the relations* in which the sending of Christ was appointed to stand to human sin, which included therefore its expiation as well as the breaking of its power. The latter, however, is thereupon brought into prominence, out of that general category, by *κατέκρινε* κ.τ.λ. as the element *specially* coming into view. Hilgenfeld, in his *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 186 f., erroneously, as regards both the language and the thought (since Christ was the *real* atoning sacrifice, iii. 25), makes *καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτ.*, which latter he takes in the sense of *sin-offering*, also to depend on *ἐν ὁμοιώματι*. — *κατέκρινε* τ. ἁμ.] This *condemnation* of sin (the latter conceived as principle and power) is that which was *impossible* on the part of the law, owing to the hindrance of the flesh. It is erroneous, therefore, to take it as : “ *He exhibited sin as worthy of condemnation* ” (Erasmus, de Dieu, Eckermann), and : “ *He punished sin* ” (Castalio, Pareus, Carpzov, and others, including Koppe, Rückert, Usteri ; comp. Olshausen, and Köstlin in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1856, p. 115). *Impossible* to the law was only *such* a condemnation of sin, as should depose the latter from the sway which it had hitherto maintained ; consequently : *He made sin forfeit its dominion*. This *de facto* judicial condemnation (a sense which, though with different modifications in the analysis of the idea conveyed by *κατέκρινε*, is retained by Irenaeus, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Valla, Beza, Piscator, Estius, Bengel, Reiche, Köllner, Winzer, Fritzsche, Baur, Krehl, de Wette, Maier, Umbreit, Ewald, and others) is designated by *κατέκρινε*, without our modifying its verbal meaning into *interfecit* (Grotius, Reiche, Glöckler, and others), in connection with which Fritzsche finds this death of the *ἁμαρτία* presented as *mors imaginaria*, contained in the physical death of Christ. Various expositors, and even Philippi, mix up the here foreign idea of *atonement* (“to blot out by atoning”¹) ; comp. also Tholuck and Hofmann. The expres-

¹ See, against this, also Rich. Schmidt, *Paul. Christol.* p. 49 ff. He, however, takes *πέμψας* likewise (comp. Hofmann) as prior to the *κατέκρινε*, holding that the latter, which took place through the death of Christ, had for its immediate object the *σάπξ* and sin only as a mediate object. The mean-

ing, in his view, is : “ *God has pronounced sentence on the flesh, and therewith at the same time on the sin dwelling in it.* ” The destruction of *Christ's* flesh is thus an act of *universal* significance, by which the *flesh* in general, and therewith also *sin itself*, has been condemned. But the text clearly and

sion κατέκρινε is *purposely* chosen in reference to κατέκριμα in ver. 1, but denotes the *actual* condemnation, which consisted in the *dominion* of the ἁμαρτία being *done away*,—its power was lost, and *therewith* God's sentence was pronounced upon it, as it were the staff broken over it. Comp. on John xvi. 11; and see Hofmann's *Schriftb.* II. 1, p. 355, and Th. Schott, p. 286. Yet Hofmann now discovers God's actual condemnation of sin ("the actual declaration that it is contrary to what is on His part rightful, that it should have man like a bond-servant under its control") in the emancipation of those who are under sin *by bestowal of the Spirit*,—a view by which what follows is anticipated, and that which is the divine aim of the κατέκρινε is included in the *notion* of it.—Observe further the thrice-repeated ἁμαρτία; the last alone, however, which personifies sin as a power, has the article. — ἐν τῇ σαρκί belongs to κατέκρ., not to τὴν ἁμ. (Bengel, Ernesti, Michaelis, Cramer, Rosenmüller, and Hofmann), because it is not said τὴν ἐν τ. σ., and because this more precise definition, to complete the notion of the object, would be self-evident and unimportant. But God condemned sin *in the flesh*: for, by the fact that God's own Son (over whom, withal, sin could have no power) appeared *in the flesh*, and indeed *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, sin has lost its dominion *in the substantial human nature* (*hitherto ruled over by it*). The Lord's appearance in flesh, namely, was at once, even *in itself*, for sin the actual loss of its dominion as a principle; and *the aim* of that appearance, *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, which was attained through the death of Christ, brought upon sin that loss with respect to its totality. Thus, by the two facts, God has actually deprived it of its power *in the human σάρξ*; and this phenomenal nature of man, therefore, has ceased to be its domain. Hofmann, without reason, objects that τ. ἁμαρτ. must in that case have stood *before* κατέκρινε. The main emphasis, in fact, lies on κατέκρινε τ. ἁμαρτ., to which then ἐν τ. σαρκί is added, with the further emphasis of a reference to the causal connection. Many others take ἐν τ. σαρκί as meaning the *body of Christ*; holding that *in* this body put to death sin has been put to death at the same time (Origen, Beza, Grotius, Reiche, Usteri, Olshausen, Maier, Bispington, and others); or that the punishment of sin has been accomplished *on* His body (Heumann, Michaelis, Koppe, and Platt). But against this it may be urged, that plainly ἐν τ. σαρκί corresponds deliberately to the previous διὰ τ. σαρκός; there must have been αὐτοῦ used along with it. Comp. Baur, *neutest. Theol.* p. 160f.

Ver. 4. The purpose which God had in this κατέκρ. τ. ἁμ. ἐν τ. σ. was: in order that (now that the rule of sin which hindered the fulfilment of the law has been done away) *the rightful requirement of the law might be fulfilled*, etc. — τὸ δικ. τ. νόμου] Quite simply, as in i. 32, ii. 26 (comp. also on v. 16, and Krüger on Thuc. i. 41. 1): *what the law has laid down as its rightful demand*. The singular comprehends these collective (moral) claims of right as a *unity*.¹ Others, contrary to the signification of the word, have taken

expressly assigns, not the *flesh*, but τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, as the immediate object of κατέκρινε, so that an impartial exegesis can only discover in ἐν τῇ σαρκί, *where, i.e. in what*

material sphere, the act of the κατακρίνειν τὴν ἁμαρτ. has taken place.

¹ Many of the older dogmatic exegetes (see especially Beza, Calvin, Calovius, and

it as *justificatio* (Vulg.) understanding thereby sometimes *the making righteous* as the aim of the law, which desires sinlessness (Chrysostom and his followers, including Theodore of Mopsuestia), sometimes *the satisfaction of justice* (Rothe ; comp. on v. 16). Köllner, following Eckermann, makes it the *justifying sentence of the law* : “ that the utterance of the law, which declares as righteous, and thus not only frees from the punishment of sin, but secures also the reward of righteousness, might be fulfilled on us, if we,” etc. Substantially so (δικ. = *sententia absolutoria*), Fritzsche, Philippi, and Ewald (“ the verdict of the law, since it has condemnation only for the sinners, and good promises for the remainder, Deut. xxviii. 1–14”). But against this it may be urged, first, that δικαίωμα τ. νόμου, because the genitive is a rule-prescribing subject, cannot, without urgent ground from the context, be taken otherwise than as *demand, rightful claim* (comp. also Luke i. 6 ; Heb. ix. 1, 10 ; LXX. Num. xxxi. 21) ; secondly, that vv. 3, 4 contain the proof, not for οὐδὲν κατάκριμα in ver. 1, but for ver. 2, and consequently ἵνα . . . ἡμῖν must be the counterpart of the state of bondage under the law of sin and death (ver. 2)—the counterpart, however, not consisting in the freedom from punishment and the certainty of reward, but in the morally free condition in which one does what the law demands, being no longer hampered by the power of sin and death, so that the fulfilment of the δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου is the antithesis of the ἀμαρτία so strongly emphasized previously ; thirdly, that τοῖς μὴ . . . πνεῦμα is not the condition of justification (that is faith), but of the fulfilment of the law ; and finally, that in ver. 7, τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ τ. Θεοῦ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται, οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται is manifestly the counterpart of τὸ δικ. τ. νόμου πληρωθῇ in ver. 3. — πληρωθῇ] as in Matt. iii. 15 ; Acts xiv. 26 ; Rom. xiii. 8 ; Gal. v. 14, *al.* Those commentators who take δικαίωμα as *sententia absolutoria* take πληρ. as *may be accomplished* on us (ἐν ἡμῖν). — ἐν ἡμῖν] Not : *through us*, nor yet : *in us*, which is explained as either : *in our life-activity* (de Wette), or as referring to the *inward fulfilling of the law* (Reiche, Klee, and Hofmann), and to the fact that God fulfils it *in man* (Olshausen ; comp. Tholuck) ; but, as shown by the following τοῖς . . . περιπατοῦσιν κ.τ.λ. : *on us*, so that the fulfilling of the law's demand shall be accomplished and made manifest in the entire walk and conversation of Christians. This by no means conveys the idea of merely outward action (as Hofmann objects), but includes also the inner morality accordant with the law.¹ Regarding this use of ἐν, see Bernhardt, p. 211 f. ; Winer, p. 361 [E. T. 386]. The passive form (not : ἵνα πληρώσωμεν) is in keeping with the conception that here the law, and that so far as it must be fulfilled, stands out in the foreground of the divine purpose. The accomplishment of its moral requirement is supposed to present itself as realized in the Christian, and that ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου of ver. 3 is assumed to be thereby remedied. —

Wolf *in loc.*) have explained the demand of the law, and the mode of its fulfilment, contrary to the context (since what is here spoken of is the proper morality of the Christian as emancipated), in such a way that the law's demand is to be understood as well of the punishments which it would

require for transgression, as of the perfect obedience which it desires to have ; Christ having fulfilled both by His double obedience in our stead, so that the demand of the law is fulfilled in us (by imputation).

¹ Comp. Ernesti *Ethik d. Ap. P.* p. 69 f.

τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα κ.τ.λ.] *quippe qui ambularemus*, etc. These words give negatively and positively the specific *moral character*, which is destined to be found in Christians, so far as the just requirement of the law is fulfilled in them. The *μὴ* is here, on account of the connection with *ἵνα*, quite according to rule; Bäumlein, *Partik.* p. 287 f. In what that fulfilment *manifests* itself (Hofmann) Paul does not say,¹ but he announces the moral regulative that is to determine the inward and outward life of the subjects. He walks *according to the flesh*, who obeys the sinful lust dwelling in the *σάρξ* (vii. 18); and he walks *according to the Spirit*, who follows the guidance, the impelling and regulating power (ver. 2), of the Holy Spirit. The one excludes the other, Gal. v. 16. To take *πνεῦμα* without the article (which, after the nature of a proper noun, it did not all need), in a *subjective* sense, as the pneumatic nature of the regenerate man, produced by the Holy Spirit (see esp. Harless on Eph. ii. 22, and van Hengel)—as it is here taken, but independently of the putting the article, by Bengel, Rückert, Philippi, and others, following Chrysostom—is erroneous. See on Gal. v. 16. It never means, not even in contrast to *σάρξ*,² the “renewed spiritual nature of man” (Philippi), but the sanctifying *divine principle itself*, objectively, and distinct from the human *πνεῦμα*. The appeal to John iii. 6 is erroneous. See on that passage.

Ver. 5. The apostle regards the description just given, τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα κ.τ.λ., as too important not to follow it up with a justification corresponding with its antithetical tenor. This he bases on the opposite *φρονεῖν* of the subjects, according to their opposite moral quality, so that the emphasis lies, not upon *ὅντες* and *φρονοῦσιν* (Hofmann, “as the *being* of the Ego is, so is also its *mental tendency*”), but, as shown by the antithesis οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ., simply on *κατὰ σάρκα* and *κ. πνεῦμα*. The *ὅντες* might be entirely omitted; and *φρονοῦσιν* is the predicate to be affirmed of both parties, according to its different purport in the two cases. — οἱ κατὰ σ. ὄντες] A wider conception (*they who are according to the flesh*) than οἱ κ. σ. περιπ. The latter is the manifestation in life of the former. — τὰ τῆς σ. φρον.] *whose thinking and striving are directed to the interests of the flesh* (the article τῆς σ. makes the *σάρξ* objective as something independent); so that thus, according to vii. 21 ff., the fulfilment of the law is at variance with their efforts. Comp. on φρον., Matt. xvi. 23; Phil. iii. 19; Col. iii. 2; Plat. *Rep.* p. 505 B; 1 Macc. x. 20.

Ver. 6. A second *γάρ*. The former specified the reason (ver. 5), this second is *explicative* (*namely*); a similar repetition and mutual relation of *γάρ* being common also in Greek authors. Comp. xi. 24; see on Matt. vi. 32, xviii. 11; and Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 340; Kühner, II. 2, p. 856. — *The striving of the flesh, namely* (comp. *νοῦς τῆς σαρκός* in Col. ii. 18), tends to bring man to (eternal) *death* (through sin), but the striving of the *Holy Spirit* to conduct him to (eternal) *life and blessedness* (of the Messianic kingdom). The explanation: the striving . . . has death as its consequence (Rückert, de

¹ This would have required the *objective* negation, since the negation would attach to *κατὰ σάρκα*. In Plut. *Lyc.* 10, 19 (in opposition to Hofmann), the negation stands along with the participle, and the relation

of dependence is given in the text. See Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 132.

² Observe that in ver. 10 the contrast is not *σάρξ*, but *σῶμα*—in opposition to Pfeifferer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 177.

Wette, and many others), is right as to fact (comp. vi. 21), but fails to bring out the personifying, vivid *form* of the representation, which, moreover, does not permit us to introduce the analytic reflection, that the enmity against God is the desire of the flesh "*of itself*," and that it is death "*on account of God*" (Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 563). That death is *God's* penal decree, is true; but this thought does not belong here, where it is simply the destructive effort of the *σάρξ* itself that is intended to be conveyed, and that indeed, in accordance with the prevailing concrete mode of description, as a *conscious* effort, a real *φρονεῖν*, not as an *impulse* that makes the Ego its captive (Hofmann), since the same predicate *φρόνημα* applies to the *σάρξ* as well as to the *πνεῦμα*. On *εἰρήνη*, *blessedness*, comp. ii. 10. Understood in the narrower sense (*peace* with God), it would yield a *hysteronproteron*, which Fritzsche actually assumes.

Ver. 7. *Διότι*] *propterea quod*, introduces the reason *why* the striving of the flesh can be nothing else than death, and that of the Spirit nothing else than life and blessedness: *for the former is enmity against God*, the source of life; comp. Jas. iv. 4. The establishment of the *second* half of ver. 6 Paul leaves out for the present, and only introduces it subsequently at vv. 10, 11, in another connection of ideas.—The *ἐχθρα εἰς Θεόν* has its ground assigned by τῷ γ. νόμῳ τ. θ. οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται, of which τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς is still the subject (not ἡ σάρξ, as Hofmann quite arbitrarily supposes); and the inward cause of this reality based on experience is afterwards specified by οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται (*for it is not even possible for it*). — *δύναται*] namely, according to its unholy nature, which maintains an antagonistic attitude to the will of God. This does not exclude the possibility of conversion (comp. Chrysostom), after which, however, the *σάρξ* with its *φρόνημα* is ethically dead (Gal. v. 24). Comp. vi. 6 ff.

Ver. 8. *Δεῖ*] is not put for *οὖν* (Beza, Calvin, Koppe, and others; comp. also Rückert and Reiche), but is the simple *μεταβατικόν* (*autem*), which, after the auxiliary clauses τῷ γ. νόμῳ . . . δύναται, leads over to a *relation corresponding* to the main proposition τὸ φρ. τ. σάρκ. ἐχθρα εἰς Θεόν, and referring to the persons in the concrete. The propriety of this connection will at once be manifest if τῷ γ. νόμῳ . . . δύναται be read more rapidly (like a parenthesis). According to Hofmann, the progress of thought is now supposed to advance from the condemnation of *sin* to the freedom from *death*. But such a scheme corresponds neither with the preceding, in which sin and death were *grouped together* (vv. 2, 6), nor with what follows, where in the first instance there is no mention of death, and it is only in ver. 10 f. that the special point is advanced of the *raising* from the dead. — *ἐν σαρκί*] is in *substance* the same as *κατὰ σάρκα* in ver. 5; but the *form of the conception* is: those who are *in the flesh* as the ethical life-element, in which they subsist, and which is the opposite of the *εἶναι ἐν πνεύματι* in ver. 9, and *ἐν Χριστῷ* in ver. 1. Comp. on vii. 5. The one excludes the other, and the former, as antagonistic to God, makes the *ἀπέσαι Θεῷ* (comp. 1 Thess. ii. 15, iv. 1) an impossibility.

Ver. 9. Antithetic (*ye on the other hand*) application of ver. 8 to the readers. — *εἰπερ*] To take this word as *quandoquidem*, with Chrysostom and

others, including Olshausen, is not indeed contrary to linguistic usage, since, like *ei* in the sense of *ἐπεὶ* (Dissen, *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 195), *εἴπερ* also is used in the sense of *ἐπειπερ* (see Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* vi. 1. 26). But in the present instance the context does not afford the smallest ground for this view ; on the contrary, the conditional signification : *if certainly, if otherwise* (see Klotz, *ad Deuar.* p. 528 ; Bauml. *Partik.* p. 202), is perfectly suitable, and with it the following antithetic *εἰ δὲ* corresponds. It conveys an indirect incitement to self-examination. We may add that Paul might also have written *εἴε* without changing the sense (in opposition to Hermann's canon, *ad Viger.* p. 834). See on 2 Cor. v. 3 ; Gal. iii. 4 ; Eph. iii. 2. — *οἰκεῖ ἐν ἡμῖν*] That is, has the seat of His *presence and activity* in you. The point of the expression is not the *constantly abiding* ("stable domicilium," Fritzsche and others ; also Hofmann) ; in that case it would have needed a more precise definition (see, on the contrary, the simple *οὐκ ἔχει* that follows). Respecting the matter itself and the conception, see 1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 17, 19 ; 2 Tim. i. 14 ; John xiv. 23.¹ The *ἐν πνεύματι*, which is not to be taken as "in the spiritual nature" (Philippi), and the *πν. Θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν* said with a significant more precise definition of *πνεῦμα*, stand towards one another in an essential mutual relation. The former is conditioned by the latter ; for if the Spirit of God do not dwell in the man, He cannot be the determining element in which the latter lives. Compare the Johannine : "*ye in me, and I in you.*" According to Hofmann, the relation consists in the Spirit being on the one hand, "*as active life-ground,*" the absolutely inward, and on the other "*as active ground of all life,*" that which embraces all living. This, however, is a deviation from the specific strict sense of the *πνεῦμα*, which, in accordance with the context, can only be that *Holy Spirit* who is given to believers ; and the concrete conception of the apostle receives the stamp of an abstraction. — *εἰ δέ τις πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ κ.τ.λ.*] Antithesis of *εἴπερ* . . . *ἡμῖν*, rendering very apparent the *necessity* of that assumption. "*If, on the other hand, any one have not the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Him.*" is not in communion of life with Christ, is not a true Christian ; for *αὐτοῦ* refers to *Christ*, not to *God* (van Hengel). Moreover, it is not the *non-Christians*, but the *seeming-Christians* (comp. 1 John iv. 13), who are characterized as those who have not the Spirit. — *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*] (comp. Phil. i. 19 ; 1 Pet. i. 11) is *none other than the Holy Ghost*, the Spirit of God. He is so called because the exalted Christ really communicates Himself to His own in and with the Paraclete (John xiv.), so that the Spirit is the living principle and the organ of the proper presence of Christ and of His life in them.² Comp. on 2 Cor. iii. 16 ; Gal. ii. 20, iv. 6 ; Eph. iii. 17 ; Col. i. 27 ; Acts xvi. 7. That *this*, and not perchance the *endowment of Christ* with the Spirit (Fritzsche), is the view here taken, is clearly proved by the following *εἰ δὲ*

¹ Comp. also Ev. Thom. 10 : *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἰνοῖκεῖ ἐν τῷ παδίῳ τούτῳ*. See passages from Rabbinic writers on the dwelling of the Holy Spirit in man, quoted by Schoettgen, p. 527 ; Elsenmenger, *entdecktes Judenthum*,

I. p. 268.

² Bengel : "testimonium illustre de sancta Trinitate ejusque oeconomia in corde fidelium."

Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 346. The designation of the Holy Spirit by πν. Χριστοῦ is purposely selected in order to render very conspicuous the truth of the οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ. Köllner wrongly lays down a distinction between the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ; making the former the highest πνεῦμα, the source and perfection of all πνεῦμα, and the latter the higher God-resembling mind that was manifested in Christ. But a distinction between them is not required by vv. 10, 11 (see on that passage), and is decisively forbidden by Gal. iv. 6, compared with Rom. viii. 14–16. We cannot even say, therefore, with Umbreit: “the Spirit of Christ is the medium, through which man obtains the Spirit of God;” nor, with van Hengel, who compares Luke ix. 55: “si vero quis *Spiritum*, qui *Christi est*, cum eo non habet communem,” with which Paul would here be aiming at the (alleged) Judaism of the Romans.

Ver. 10. The contrast to the foregoing. “Whosoever has not the Spirit of Christ, is not His; if, on the other hand, Christ (i.e. πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, see on ver. 9) is in you,” then ye enjoy the following blissful consequences:—(1) Although the body is the prey of death on account of sin, nevertheless the Spirit is life on account of righteousness, ver. 10. (2) And even the mortal body shall be revived by Him who raised up Christ from the dead, because Christ’s Spirit dwelleth in you, ver. 11.—Vv. 10 and 11 have been rightly interpreted as referring to life and death in the proper (physical) sense by Augustine (*de pecc. merit. et rem.* i. 7), Calvin, Beza, Calovius, Bengel, Michaelis, Tholuck, Klee, Platt, Rückert, Reiche, Glöckler, Usteri, Fritzsche, Maier, Weiss *l.c.* p. 372, and others. For, first, on account of the apostle’s doctrine regarding the connection between sin and death (v. 12) with which his readers were acquainted, he could not expect his τ. σῶμα νεκρ. δι’ ἁμ. to be understood in any other sense; secondly, the parallel between the raising up of Christ from death, which was in fact bodily death, and the quickening of the mortal bodies does not permit any other view, since ζωπ. stands without any definition whatever altering or modifying the proper sense: and lastly, the proper sense is in its bearing quite in harmony with the theme of ver. 2 (which is discussed in vv. 3–11): for the life of the Spirit unaffected by physical death (ver. 10), and the final revivification also of the body (ver. 11), just constitute the highest consummation, and as it were the triumph, of the deliverance from the law of sin and death (ver. 2). These grounds, collectively,¹ tell at the same time against the divergent explanations: (1) that in vv. 10, 11 it is spiritual death and life that are spoken of; so Erasmus, Piscator, Locke, Heumann, Ch. Schmidt, Stolz, Böhme, Benecke, Köllner, Schrader, Stengel, Krehl, and van Hengel. (2) That ver. 10 is to be taken in the spiritual, but ver. 11 in the proper sense; so Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius,

¹ They do not permit, moreover, any such widening of the idea, as Philippi and Hofmann give to it. The former declares death to be, like the σῶμα itself, spiritual-bodily; as such it is even now the overruling principle, inhabiting soul and body. According

to Hofmann, the body is meant as in that death-condition which only finds its conclusion in dying, but in virtue of all this there is already present that, which makes the body incapable of being a manifestation of true life.

Grotius, Koppe, Olshausen, Reithmayr, and others; de Wette unites the moral and physical sense in *both* verses, comp. also Nielsen and Umbreit; see the particulars below. — νεκρόν] With this corresponds the θνήτá in ver. 11. It conveys, however, the idea "*conditioni mortis obnoxium*" (Augustine) more forcibly, and so as vividly to realize the certain result—he is dead!—a prolepsis of the final fate, which cannot now be altered or avoided. Well is it said by Bengel: "*magni vi; morti adjudicatum deditumque.*" Our body is a *corpse*! Analogous is the ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον in vii. 10, though in that passage not used in the sense of physical death; comp. Rev. iii. 1.¹ The commentators who do not explain it of physical death are at variance. And how surprising the diversity! Some take νεκρ. as a favourable predicate, embracing the new birth = θανατωθὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ (so with linguistic inaccuracy even on account of δὲ ἁμ., Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, and with various modifications, also Erasmus, Raphel, Grotius, Locke, Heumann, Böhme, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, and Märcker; comp. van Hengel, "*mortui instar ad inertiam redactum*"). Others take it as: *miserable by reason of sin* (Michaelis, Koppe, Köllner), comp. de Wette: "Even in the redeemed there still remains the sinful inclination as source of the death, which expresses its power;" Krehl as: "*morally dead*," Olshausen: "not in the glory of its original destiny;" Tholuck: in the sense of vii. 10 f., but also "including in itself the elements of moral life-disturbance and of misery." Since, however, it is the *body* that is just spoken of, and since δὲ ἁμαρτίαν could only bring up the recollection of the proposition in v. 12, every view, which does not understand it of *bodily* death, is contrary to the context and far-fetched,² especially since θνήτá in ver. 11 corresponds to it. — δὲ ἁμαρτίαν] The ground: *on account of sin, in consequence* of sin (Kühner, II. 1, p. 419), which is more precisely known from v. 12. Death, which has arisen and become general through the entrance of sin into the world, can be averted in no case, not even in that of the regenerate man. Hence, even in his case, the *body* is νεκρόν δὲ ἁμαρτίαν. But how completely different is it in *his case* with the *spirit*! τὸ πνεῦμα, namely, in contrast to the σῶμα, is necessarily not the *transcendent* (Holsten) or the *Holy Spirit* (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Calvin, Grotius, and others); nor yet, as Hofmann turns the conception, the spirit which we now have *when Christ is in us* and *His righteousness is ours*; but simply our *human spirit*, i.e. the substratum of the personal self-consciousness, and as such the principle of the higher cognitive and moral activity of life as directed towards God, different from the ψυχή, which is to be regarded as the potentiality of the human natural life. The faculty of the πνεῦμα is the νοῦς (vii. 25), and its subject the moral Ego (vii. 15 ff.). That the spirit of those who are here spoken of is filled with the Holy Spirit, is in itself a correct inference from the presupposition εἰ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, but is not im-

¹ Also ἔμψυχον νεκρόν, Soph. Ant. 1167; Epict. fr. 176: ψυχάριον εἰ βασιλάζον νεκρόν.

² Even though it be explained with Ewald, referring to vi. 2 ff., "*dead on account of sin*, in order that the latter should

not again rule." Comp. van Hengel: "*ne peccati principio serviat.*" But how gratuitously is this negative sense imported into the positive expression!

plied in the word τὸ πνεῦμα, as if this meant (Theodoret and de Wette) the human spirit pervaded by the Divine Spirit, the pneumatic essence of the regenerate man. That is never the case ; comp. on ver. 16. — ζωή] *i.e.* life is his essential element ; stronger than ζῆ, the reading of F. G. Vulg. and mss. of the It. Comp. vii. 7. With respect to the spirit of the true Christian, therefore, there can be no mention of *death* (which would of necessity be *eternal death*) ; comp. John xi. 26. He is *eternally alive*, and that διὰ δικαιοσύνης, on account of righteousness ; for the eternal ζωή is based on the justification that has taken place for Christ's sake and is appropriated by faith. Rückert, Reiche, Fritzsche, Philippi (comp. also Hofmann), following the majority of ancient expositors, have properly taken δικαιοσύνην thus in the Pauline-dogmatic sense, seeing that the *moral righteousness of life* (Erasmus, Grotius, Tholuck, de Wette, Klee, and Maier) because never perfect (1 Cor. iv. 4 ; Phil. iii. 9, *al.*), can never be ground of the ζωή. If, however, διὰ δικαιοσύνης be rendered : *for the sake of righteousness*, "in order that the latter may continue and rule" (Ewald, comp. van Hengel), it would yield no contrast answering to the correct interpretation of νεκρὸν δι' ἁμ. It is moreover to be noted, that as δι' ἁμαρτ. does not refer to one's own individual sin (on the contrary, see on ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, v. 12), so neither does διὰ δικαιοσύνης refer to one's own righteousness. — Observe, further, the fact that, and the mode in which, the δικαιοσύνη may be lost according to our passage, namely, if Christ is not in us,—a condition, by which the moral nature of the δικαιοσύνη is laid down and security is guarded against.

Ver. 11. According to ver. 10, there was still left one power of death, that over the body. Paul now disposes of this also, and hence takes up again, not indeed what had just been inferred (Hofmann, in accordance with his view of τὸ πνεῦμα, ver. 10), but the idea conditioning it, εἰ δὲ X. ἐν ἡμ. ; not, however, in this form, but, as required by the tenor of what he intends to couple with it, in the form : εἰ δὲ τ. πν. τοῦ ἐγείρ. 'Ι. ἐκ νεκρ. οἰκεῖ ἐν ἡμίν. In substance the two are identical, since the indwelling of the Divine Spirit in us is the spiritual indwelling of Christ Himself in us. See on ver. 9.—The δέ, therefore, simply carries on the argument, namely, from the *spirit* which is ζωή (ver. 10), to the quickening that is certain even in the case of the mortal *body* (for observe the position of the καί). The apostle's *inference* is : "The Spirit who dwelleth in you is the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus ; consequently God will also, with respect to your *bodies*, as dwelling-places of His Spirit, do the same as He has done in the case of Christ." The self-evident *presupposition* in this inference is, that the Spirit of God dwelt in Jesus during His earthly career (Luke iv. 1, 14, 18 ; Acts i. 2 ; John iii. 34, xx. 22). — ζωοποιεῖ] Not ἐγείρει, but the *correlate of ζωή* ver. 10 (comp. ver. 6), and counterpart of νεκρὸν and θνήσκει, is purposely selected. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 22. — θνήσκει] What he had previously expressed proleptically by νεκρὸν, he here describes according to the reality of the present by θνήσκει. Observe, moreover, that Paul leaves out of view the fate of those still living at the Parousia. Their *change* is not included in the expression ζωοποιεῖ (Hofmann), a view which neither the sense of

the word (comp. iv. 17 ; 1 Cor. xv. 22, 36 ; 1 Pet. iii. 18 ; John v. 21) nor the correlation with ἐγείρας permits. But to the readers' consciousness of faith it was self-evident from the analogy of what is here said to them with reference to the case of their being already dead at the Parousia ; 1 Cor. xv. 51 ; 2 Cor. v. 2-4 ; 1 Thess. iv. 15-17.—On the interchange of Ἰησοῦν and τὸν Χριστόν Bengel rightly remarks : “ Appellatio *Jesu* spectat ad *ipsum* ; *Christi* refertur ad *nos* ;” for Jesus as *Christ* is destined to be the archetype for believers even in an eschatological respect. — διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν κ.τ.λ.] *on account of His Spirit that dwelleth in you.* Observe the emphatic prefixing of the αὐτοῦ relating to God. How could God, the Raiser up of Christ, who was the possessor of His Spirit, leave the bodies of believers, which are the dwelling-places of the same Spirit, without quickening ? The more characteristic ἐνοικοῦν (previously it was only οἰκεῖ) is a climax to the representation.—Köllner's explanation may serve to exemplify the conception of our passage *in an ethical sense* (Erasmus, Calvin, and many others) : “ So will He who raised up Jesus from the dead bring to life also your bodies that are still subject to death (*sin and misery*), that is, *ennoble also your sensuous nature and so perfect you entirely.*” But even apart from this arbitrary interpretation given to the simple θνητά (which ought rather with van Hengel to be interpreted : “ *quamquam mortalia ideoque minoris numeri sunt*”), how diffuse and verbose would be the whole mode of expressing the simple thought ! How utterly out of place this *dualism* of the representation, as if the divine work of the moral revivification of the body were something independent, alongside of and subsequent to that of the spirit ! See, moreover, generally on ver. 10, and the appropriate remarks of Reiche, *Commentar crit.* I. p. 62 ff. Lastly, according to de Wette's combination of the two senses—the moral and the physical—the thought is : “ This death-overcoming Spirit of God shall destroy more and more the principle of sin and death in your bodies, and instead of it introduce the principle of the life-bringing Spirit into your whole personality, even into the body itself,”—a thought which opens up the prospect of the future resurrection or change of the body. But the resurrection will be participated in by all believers at once, independently of the development noticed in our passage, by which their bodies would have first to be made ripe for it ; and even the change of the living at the Parousia is, according to 1 Cor. xv. 51 ff., not a process developed from within outwardly, but a result produced in a twinkling from without (at the sound of the last trumpet),—a result, which cannot be the final consequence of the gradual inward destruction of the principle of sin and death, because in that case all could not participate in it simultaneously, which nevertheless is the case, according to 1 Cor. xv. 51. Notwithstanding, this view, which combines the spiritual and bodily process of glorification, has been again brought forward by Philippi, according to whom what is here meant is the *progressive merging of death* into life, which can only be accomplished ¹ by the *progressive merging of sin into the righteous-*

¹ If it be attempted to apply this view to the different subjects concerned, the absurdity is encountered, that it is incapable

of application to all those to whom no time is afforded between their conversion and their death, or between their conver-

ness of life, and of the *σῶμα* into the *πνεῦμα* (?). The simple explanation of the resurrection of the body is rightly retained by Tholuck, Umbreit, Hofmann, Weiss, and others ; whilst Ewald contents himself with the indeterminate double sense of eternal life beginning in the mortal body.

Vv. 12-17. Accordingly we are bound not to live carnally, for that brings death ; whereas the government of the Spirit, on the other hand, brings life, because we, as moved by the Spirit, are children of God, and as such are sure of the future glory.

Ver. 12. Ἀπα οὖν] Draws the inference not merely from ver. 11, but from the contents closely in substance bound up together of vv. 10, 11. "Since these blissful consequences are conditioned by the Spirit that dwelleth in us, we are not bound to give service to the flesh." That has not deserved well of us !—οὐ τῇ σαρκὶ . . . ζῆν] In the lively progress of his argument, Paul leaves the counterpart, ἀλλὰ τῷ πνεύματι, τοῦ κατὰ πνεῦμα ζῆν, without direct expression ; but it results self-evidently for every reader from ver. 13. [See Note XCIII. p. 348.]—τοῦ κ. σ. ζῆν] in order to live carnally. This would be the aim of our relation of debt to the flesh, if such a relation existed ; we should have the carnal mode of life for our task. Fritzsche thinks that it belongs to ὁφ. : "Sumus debitores non carni obligati, nempe debitores vitae ex carnis cupiditatibus instituendae ;" so also Winer, p. 306 [E. T. 326]. But in Gal. v. 3 Paul couples it with the simple infinitive ; as in Soph. Aj. 587, Eur. Rhes. 965. Since he here says τοῦ ζῆν that *telic* view is all the more to be preferred, by which the contents of the obligation (so Hofmann) is brought out as its destination for us. The idea conveyed by κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν is that of being alive (contrast to dying), according to the rule and standard of σάρξ, so that σάρξ is the regulative principle. The more precise and definite idea : carnal bliss (Hofmann), is not expressed. We should note, moreover, τῇ σαρκὶ with the article (personified), and κατὰ σάρκα without it (qualitative), ver. 5.

Ver. 13. Reason for ver. 12—"for so ye would attain the opposite of your destination, as specified in vv. 10, 11." The μέλλειν (comp. iv. 24) indicates the "*certum et constitutum esse secundum vim (divini) fati.*" Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 72. — ἀποδνήσκειν] The opposite of the ζωή in ver. 10 f. ; consequently used of the being transferred into the state of eternal death ; and then ζῆσεσθε in the sense of eternal life (see ver. 17). Comp. vii. 10, 24, viii. 6, 10. This dying does not exclude the resurrection of the body (Rückert), but points to the unblissful existence in Hades before (Luke xvi. 23) and after (comp. Matt. x. 28) the judgment. If it were true that Paul did not believe in a resurrection for unbelievers, he would stand in direct antagonism to John v. 28 f. ; Acts xxiv. 15 ; Matt. v. 29 f., x. 28 ; and even 1 Cor. xv. 24 (see on that passage). Here also Philippi combines bodily, spiritual, and eternal death ; but see above, on Rom. v. 12. And here it may be specially urged against this view, that the dying and living are assigned purely to the region of the future. Occumenius aptly says : τὸν ἀθάνατον

sion and the Parousia, for the development of the alleged spiritual-bodily process of glorification. This exposition, therefore,

yields an idea which would even *à priori*, in the generality in which Paul would have expressed it, lack truth.

θανάτου ἐν τῇ γέννῃ. — πνεύματι] *i.e.* by means of the Holy Spirit, comp. vv. 4, 5, 6, 9, and the following πνεύματι Θεοῦ ; consequently here also not subjective (Philippi and others : “pneumatic condition of mind”). — τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώμ.] *The practices (tricks, machinations, see on Col. iii. 9 ; Luke xxiii. 51 ; Acts xix. 18 ;¹ which the body (in accordance with the νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, vii. 23) desires to carry out.* These we make dead (θανατοῦτε), when the Ego, following the drawing of the Holy Spirit, conquers the lusts that form their basis ; so that they do not come to realization, and are reduced to nothing. Σῶμα is not used here for σάρξ (Reiche and others) ; Paul has not become inconsistent with his own use of language (Stirm in *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1834, 3, p. 11), but has regarded the (in itself indifferent) σῶμα as the executive organ of the sin, which, dwelling in the σάρξ of the body, rules over the body, and makes it the σῶμα ἁμαρτίας (vi. 6), if the Spirit does not obtain the control and make it *His* organ. The term πράξεις, further used by Paul only in Col. iii. 9 (not ἐργα), is *purposely* selected to express the evil conception, which Hofmann (“acts”) without any ground calls in question. It is frequently used thus by Greek authors, as also πράγματα. — The alternating antithesis is aptly chosen, so that in the two protases living and putting to death, in the apodoses death and life, stand contrasted with one another.

Ver. 14. Reason assigned for the ζήσεσθε. “For then ye belong, as led by God, to the children of God (for whom the life of the Messianic kingdom is destined, ver. 17 ; Gal. iv. 7).” Theodore of Mopsuestia : δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι τὴν μακαρίαν ζωὴν παρὰ τῷ ἐαντῶν πατρὶ ζήσονται. — ἀγονται] *i.e.* are determined in the activity of their inward and outward life. Comp. ii. 4 ; Gal. v. 18 ; 2 Tim. iii. 6.² The expression is *passive* (hence the *dative*), though without prejudice to the freedom of the human will, as ver. 13 proves. “Non est enim coactio, ut voluntas non possit repugnare : trahit Deus, sed volentem trahit,” Melancthon. — υἱοὶ Θεοῦ] Thus Paul elevates the hallowed theocratic conception, ix. 5, to the *purely moral idea*, which is realized in the case of those who are led by the Divine Spirit (which is granted only to those who believe in Christ, Gal. iii. 26). The οὗτοι is therefore not unemphatic (Hofmann)—which would make it quite superfluous—but has an excluding and contrasting force (*these and no others*, comp. Gal. iii. 7). Next to it υἱοὶ has the stress (hence its position immediately after οὗτοι, see the critical remarks), being conceived already as in contrast to δοῦλοι, see ver. 15. The υἱοὶ Θεοῦ are those who have been justified by faith, thereby lawfully received by Him into the fellowship of children with a reconciled Father (ver. 15), governed by the Holy Spirit given unto them (comp. Gal. iv. 6), exalted to the dignity of the relation of brethren to Christ (ver. 29), and sure of the eternal glory (of the inheritance). For a view of the relation in question under its various aspects in Paul, John, and the Synoptics, see on John i. 12.

¹ Dem. 126. 22 ; Polyb. ii. 7, 8, ii. 9. 2, iv. 8. 3, v. 96. 4 ; and Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* III. p. 646.

² Soph. *Ant.* 620 : ὅτω φρένας θεὸς ἄγει, *Oed.*

C. 254 (Reisig, *Enarr.* p. LXI.) ; Plat. *Phaed.* p. 94 E : ἀγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων,

Ver. 15 assigns the ground for ver. 14 in application to the readers. *For ye received not*, when the Holy Spirit was communicated to you, *a spirit of bondage*, that is, a spirit such as is the regulating power in the state of slavery.¹ This view of the genitive (Fritzsche, de Wette, Philippi) is required by the contrast; because the *υιοθεσία*, when the Spirit is given, is already present, having entered, namely, through faith and justification (Gal. iv. 6). Hence it cannot, with others (Köllner, Rückert, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hofmann, Reithmayr, following Theodore of Mopsuestia and others), be taken as the genitive of the effect (who works bondage). This also holds against Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungslehre*, p. 170. — *πάλιν εἰς φόβον*] *again to fear*, conveys the aim of the (denied) *ἐλάβ. πν. δουλ.*, so that *πάλιν*, as its very position shows, gives a qualification, not of *ἐλάβ.*, but of *εἰς φόβ.*: “in order that ye should once more (as under the law working wrath) be afraid.” — *πνεῦμα υιοθεσ.*] *i.e. a spirit which, in the state of adoption, is the ruling principle.* *Υιοθεσία* is the proper term for adoption (*θεσθαι υἱόν*, Plat. *Legg.* xi. p. 929 C; Arr. *An.* i. 23. 11); see Grotius and Fritzsche, *in loc.*; Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § 64. 15; comp. on Gal. iv. 5; also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 340. Therefore not *sonship* in general (the Patristic *υιότης*), as is the view of the majority; it is rightly rendered in the Vulgate: “*adoptionis filiorum*,” it does not represent believers as children of God by birth, but as those who by God’s grace (Eph. i. 5–8) have been assumed into the place of children, and as brethren of Christ (ver. 29). Those thus adopted receive the Spirit from God, but are not begotten to sonship through the Spirit (Hofmann); comp. Weiss, *l.c.* — The repetition of *ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα* has a certain solemnity. Comp. on 1 Cor. ii. 7; Phil. iv. 17. — *ἐν ᾧ*] *in whom*, as in the element that moves our inner life. Comp. on 1 Cor. xii. 3; Eph. ii. 18. — *κράζομεν*] *we cry*, the outburst of fervid emotion in prayer. Comp. on Gal. iv. 6. The transition to the first person takes place without special intention, under the involuntary pressure of the sense of fellowship. — *Ἀββᾶ*] See on Mark xiv. 36, and Buxtorf, *Lex. Talm.* p. 20. From the three passages, Mark, *l.c.*, Gal. iv. 6, and our present one, it may be assumed that the address *אבנא* was transferred from the Jewish into the Christian prayers, and in the latter received the consecration of special sanctity through Christ Himself, who as Son thus addressed the Father. This *Ἀββᾶ* gradually assumed the nature of a proper name; and thus it came that the Greek-praying Christians retained the Chaldee word in a vocative sense as a proper name, and further, in the fervour of the feeling of sonship, added along with it the specifically Christian address to the Father, using the appellative *ὁ πατήρ* in the appositional nominative (Kühner,

¹ Πνεῦμα δουλ. is therefore *what the Holy Spirit received is not*. Comp. 2 Tim. i. 7. Altogether contrary to the context, Grotius, Michaelis, and others understand *affectus servilis*, taking it consequently not of the objective spirit, but subjectively; as do also Reiche, Baumgarten-Crusius, and de Wette, with whom Philippi agrees: “a dis-

position of mind such as one has in slavery (childhood).” Vv. 14, 16 ought to have precluded such a view. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others understood it directly of τὸ γράμμα τοῦ νόμου ὡς παρὰ τοῦ πνεύματος μὲν δοθέν, δούλους δὲ μάλλον ἀρμόζον, Theophylact. Comp. Occumenius; τὸν πνευματικὸν φησὶ νόμον.

II. 1, p. 42) ; so that the "*Abba, Father*," now became fixed.¹ It has been frequently supposed (and is still by Rückert, Reiche, and Köllner) that Paul added *ὁ πατήρ* by way of explanation. But against this view it may be urged, that in passages so full of feeling as Rom. viii. 15 and Gal. iv. 6, an interpretation—and that too of a word which, considering the familiarity with Jewish modes of expression in the churches of Rome and Galatia, undoubtedly needed no explanation, and was certainly well known also through the evangelistic tradition as the form of address in prayer that had flowed from the mouth of Jesus—seems unnatural and out of place. Besides, in all three instances, in Mark² and Paul, uniformly the mere *Ἀββᾶ ὁ πατήρ* is given without any formula of interpretation (*τοῦτ' ἐστὶ* or the like) being added. Other views—destitute, however, of all proof—are : that the custom which insinuating children have of repeating the father's name is here imitated (Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, and Grotius) ; or that the *emphasis affectus* (Erasmus) is here expressed (either view would be possible only in the event of the passage standing as *Ἀββᾶ, Ἀββᾶ*) ; or even that it is meant to signify the Fatherhood of God for Jews and Gentiles (Augustine, Anselm, Calvin, Estius, and others). With our view Philippi is substantially agreed. Against the objections of Fritzsche, who regards *ὁ πατήρ* as an explanatory addition grown into a *habit*, see on Gal. iv. 6.—The *Father-name* of God in the Old Covenant (Ex. xx. 2 ; Isa. lxiii. 16 ; Hos. xi. 1 ; Jer. iii. 19, xxxi. 9) only received the loftiest fulfilment of its meaning in the New Covenant through the *νοθεσία* accomplished in Christ.³

Ver. 16. More precise information respecting the preceding *ἐν ᾧ κράζ.* *Ἀββᾶ ὁ π.* — *αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.*] Not *He, the Spirit* (Hofmann, inappropriately comparing ver. 21 and 1 Thess. iii. 11) ; but, since *αὐτός* in the *casus rectus* always means *ipse*, the context supplying the more special reference of the sense : *ipse spiritus*, that is, *Himself, on His own part, the (received) Spirit testifies with our spirit* ; He unites *His own* testimony that *we are children of God* with the same testimony borne by *our spirit*, which (1 Cor. ii. 11) is the seat of our self-consciousness. — In *συμμαρτ.* the *συν* and its reference to *τ. πν. ἡμ.* are not to be neglected, any more than in ii. 15, ix. 1, as the Vulgate, Luther, Grotius, and Fathers, also Koppe, Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, and others have done. Paul distinguishes from the subjective self-consciousness : *I am the child of God*, the therewith accordant testimony of the objective Holy Spirit : *thou art the child of God !* The latter is the *yea* to the former ; and thus it comes that we cry the *Abba ἐν τῷ πνεύματι*. Our older theologians (see especially Calovius) have rightly used our passage as a proof of the *certitudo gratiæ* in opposition to the Catholic Church with its mere *conjectura moralis*. Comp.

¹ It was owing simply to the provincial dialect of Palestine that אבא and not אב was used. Alberti, Tholuck, and Olshausen think it due to the former having a more childlike (lisping) sound. Other precarious views may be seen in Wolf, *Our.* ; Light-

foot, *Hor.* p. 654 f.

² In Mark xiv. 36 the expression is put into the mouth of Jesus from a later age. See *in loc.*

³ Comp. Umbreit, p. 287 f. ; Schultz, *alt-test. Theol.* II. p. 98.

Eph. i. 13, iv. 30 ; 1 John iii. 24, iv. 18. At the same time, it is also a clear *dictum probans* against all pantheistic confusion of the divine and the human spirit and consciousness, and no less against the assertion that Paul ascribes to man not a human πνεῦμα, but only the divine πνεῦμα become subjective (Baur, Holsten). Against this view, see also Pfeiderer, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 162 f., who nevertheless, at p. 177 f., from our passage and chap. viii. generally, attributes to the apostle the doctrine that in the Christian the real divine πνεῦμα has become the proper human one, and *vice versa* ; comp. on ver. 26. Against the *Fanatics* Melancthon truly observes, that the working of the Spirit in the believer begins "prælucente voce evangelii." — τέκνα] The term *children*, expressive of greater tenderness, called forth by the increasing fervour of the discourse.¹ Comp. ver. 21. The aspect of the *legal* relation (of the *νόθεσία*) at the same time recedes into the background. Comp. Phil. ii. 15.

Ver. 17. From the *truth* of the filial relation to God, Paul now passes over by the continuative δέ to the sure blissful *consequence* of it,—and that indeed in organic reference to the ζήσασθε promised in ver. 13. — From our *childship* follows necessarily our *heirship*. Comp. Gal. iv. 7. Both are to be left perfectly general, without supplying Θεοῦ, since it is only what follows that furnishes the concrete, more precise definition, in which here the general relation is realized. — κληρονόμοι Θεοῦ] The *inheritance*, which God once on a time transfers to His children as their property, is the *salvation and glory of the Messianic kingdom*. Comp. iv. 14. God is, of course, in this case conceived not as a *dying* testator, but as the *living* bestower of His goods on His children (Luke xv. 12). However, the conclusion (ver. 17) forbids us to disregard the idea of *inheritance*, and to find only that of the *receiving possession* represented (in opposition to van Hengel). — σύγκληρ. δὲ Χριστοῦ] Not something *greater* than κληρον. Θεοῦ, on the contrary in substance *the same*, but *specifically characterized* from the standpoint of our fellowship with Christ, whose *co-heirs* we must be as κληρον. Θεοῦ, since, having entered into sonship through the *νόθεσία*, we have become Christ's *brethren* (ver. 29). Moreover, that Paul has here in view, not the analogy of the Hebrew law of inheritance that conferred a man's intestate heritage only on sons of his body, if there were such, but that of the *Roman* law (Fritzsche, Tholuck, van Hengel ; see more particularly on Gal. iv. 7), is the historically necessary supposition, which can least of all seem foreign or inappropriate in an epistle to the *Romans*. — συμπάσχ.] [See Note XCIV. p. 349.] Whosoever, *for the sake of the gospel*, submits to suffering (Matt. x. 38, xvi. 24), suffers *with Christ* ; *i.e.* he has actual share in the suffering endured by Christ (1 Pet. iv. 13), drinks the same cup that He drank (Matt. xx. 22 f.). Comp. on 2 Cor. i. 5 ; Phil. iii. 10 ; Col. i. 24. This fellowship of suffer-

¹ Hofmann incorrectly imports the idea that *νός* emphasizes the *connection of life*, and τέκνον the *descent* ; hence Christ is not called τέκνον, but only νός. This view is demolished by the fact that, precisely in virtue of His descent as the μονογενής and πρωτότοκος, Christ is the νός. He is not

called τέκνον, simply because νός was the *prophetic and historical* designation of the Messiah consecrated by ancient usage. In fact, the LXX. render *promiscuously* יָד as well as יָדָא (which Hofmann compares) sometimes by νός and sometimes by τέκνον,

ing Paul regards as that which must be presupposed in order to the attainment of glory, of participation in the *δόξα* of Christ (*εἶπερ*, as in ver. 9) ; not indeed as *meritum*, or *pretium vitae aeternae*, but as *obedientia propter ordinem a Deo sancitum*, Melancthon. Comp. 2 Tim. ii. 11 f. This conviction developed itself, especially under the external influence of the circumstances of an age fruitful in persecution, just as necessarily and truly out of the inward assurance that in the case of Jesus Himself His suffering,¹ will be by God, and undertaken and borne in obedience to the Father, was the condition of His glory (Luke xxiv. 26 ; Phil. ii. 6 ff., *al.*), as it in its turn became a rich spring of the enthusiasm for martyrdom. Olshausen (comp. also Philippi) mixes up an element which is here foreign : "participation in the conflict with sin *in themselves* and in the world." Even without introducing this element foreign to the word itself, the *συμπάσχειν*, as the presupposition involved in the joint-heirship, has its universal applicability, based not merely on the general participation of all in the suffering of this time, but especially also on the relation of the children of God to the ungodly world (comp. John vii. 7, xv. 18 f., xvii. 14). — *ἵνα καὶ συνδοξ.*] *in order to be also glorified with Him* ; dependent not on *συγκλ.ηρ.* (Tholuck), but on *συμπάσχ.*, the divine final aim of which, known to the sufferer, it subjoins.

Vv. 18–31.² *Grounds of encouragement for the συμπάσχειν ἵνα κ. συνδοξ.* — Namely, (1) The future glory shall far outweigh the present sufferings, vv. 18–25. — (2) The Holy Ghost supports us, vv. 26, 27. — (3) Generally, all things must serve for good to those who love God, vv. 28–31. [See Note, on the connection of thought in vv. 18–25, XCV. p. 349.]

Ver. 18. [See, on several words and phrases in vv. 18–25, Note XCVI. p. 350.] *λογίζομαι*] *I reckon*, as in iii. 28 ; 2 Cor. xi. 5 ; Phil. iii. 13. In the singular we are not to discover a *turn* given to the argument, as if the apostle found it necessary to *justify* himself on account of the condition *εἶπερ συμπάσχ.* (Hofmann). Just as little here as in the case of *πέπεισμαι* in ver. 38. He simply delivers his judgment, which, however, he might have expressed with equal propriety in a form inclusive of others, as subsequently he has written *οἶδαμεν* (ver. 22). Such changing of the person is accidental and without any special design, especially as here he does not say *ἐγὼ γὰρ λογίζ.*, or *λογίζομαι γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐγώ*, or otherwise give himself prominence. A certain *litotes*, however, lies (not indeed in the singular, but) in the use of *λογίζομαι* itself, which really contains an *οἶδα* and a *πέπεισμαι*. — *οὐκ ἄξια*] *not of equal importance, not of corresponding weight ; they are unimportant.* On *πρὸς*, *in comparison with, in relation to*, comp. Plat. *Gorg.* p. 471 E : *οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν*, Protag. p. 356 A ; Winer, p. 378 [E. T. 405]. On *οὐκ ἄξιόν ἐστι* itself, however, in the sense : *non operae pretium est*, see

¹ Here also set forth by Hofmann under the aspect of treatment encountered by Him at the hands of the enemies of the work of salvation.

² See, on the section about the groaning of the creature, Köster, in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, p. 755 ff. ; M. Schenkel, *von d. Seuzen der Creatur* (Schulprogr. Plauen), 1862 ; From-

mann, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1863, p. 25 ff. ; Zahn, in the same, 1865, p. 511 ff. ; Graf, in Heidenheim's *Vierteljahrsschr.* 1867, 3 ; Engelhardt, in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 48 ff. (against Frommann) ; and against Engelhardt, see Frommann in the same *Zeitschrift*, 1872, p. 33 ff.

Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* vi. 5. 13.¹ On the *subject-matter*, see especially 2 Cor. iv. 17. — τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ] *of the present time-period*. [See Note XCVII. p. 351.] The νῦν καιρός marks off from the whole αἰὼν οὗτος (see on Matt. xii. 32) *the period then current*, which was to end with the approaching Parousia (assumed as near in xiii. 11, 12, 1 Thess. iv. 17, 1 Cor. vii. 29, and in the entire N. T.), and was thus the time of the crisis. — μέλλ. δόξ. ἀποκ.] μέλλουσαν (see on ver. 13) is, as in Gal. iii. 23, prefixed with emphasis, correlative with the foregoing νῦν. Comp. 1 Cor. xii. 22; Plat. *Rep.* p. 572 B: καὶ πάνν δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις μετρίοις εἶναι. See Stallbaum *in loc.* — ἀποκαλ.] Namely, at the Parousia, when the δόξα which is now hidden (in heaven, comp. Col. iii. 3 f.; 1 Pet. i. 4) is to be revealed. — εἰς ἡμᾶς] *on us*, so that we are those, *upon whom* (reaching unto them) the ἀποκάλυψις takes place. Comp. Acts xxviii. 6. The δόξα comes to us, therefore, from without (with Christ descending from heaven; comp. Col. iii. 4; Phil. iii. 21; Tit. ii. 13); but is not conceived as having already begun inwardly and then becoming apparent outwardly (in opposition to Lipsius, *Rechtfert.* p. 206).

Ver. 19. γάρ] introduces, from the waiting of the creation (to whose groaning that of Christians thereupon joins itself in ver. 23) for this glorious consummation, a peculiar *confirmation*, couched in a poetic strain, of the fact that the ἀποκάλυψις τῆς δόξης is *really impending*; and thus lends support to the comforting *certainty* of that future manifestation, that is, to the element involved in the emphatically prefixed μέλλουσαν; comp. Calovius, Fritzsche, de Wette, Krehl, Reithmayr, and Bisping. From Origen and Chrysostom down to Hofmann, there has usually been discovered here a ground assigned for the *greatness* of the glory. But this is neither consistent with the emphatic prominence of μέλλουσαν, nor with the subsequent ground itself, which proves nothing as to the *greatness* of the δόξα, but stands to the *indubitableness* of the latter, otherwise firmly established and presupposed, in the relation of a *sympathetic testimony of nature*.² Least of all can γάρ introduce a *ground* of the apostle's belief for his own λογίζομαι κ.τ.λ. (van Hengel). According to Philippi, what is to be established is, that the δόξα is not *already* present, but *only future*, which, however, even taking into account human impatience, was quite self-evident. For the *nearness* of the δόξα (Reiche), just as before it was not expressly announced in the simple μέλλουσαν, the sequel affords no proof, since the element of speediness is not expressed. — ἡ ἀποκαταδοκία] The verb καταδοκεῖν (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5, 6, frequent in Euripides) strictly means: *to expect with uplifted head*, then *to expect generally*, *to long for* (Valck. *ad Herod.* vii. 168; Loesner, *Obs.* p. 256 f.); and καταδοκία means *expectatio* (Prov. x. 28; Aq. Ps. xxxviii. 7). The strengthened (Vigerus, ed. Herm. p. 582; Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 106 ff.) ἀποκαταδοκεῖν (Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* iii. 7. 26; Polyb. xvi. 2. 8, xviii. 31. 4, xxii. 19. 3; Aq. Ps. xxxvi. 7; Alberti, *Gloss.* p. 106 ff.) and ἀποκαταδοκία (only elsewhere in Phil. i. 20) is the *waiting expectation* (not *anxious expect-*

¹ Comp. Dem. 300 *ult.*; Polyb. iv. 20. 2.

² The train of thought may therefore, expressed in Latin, be paraphrased somewhat thus: "τὴν μέλλουσαν κ.τ.λ. *inquam*,

haec enim spes nostra tantae est certitudinis, ut confirmetur totius naturae ad eundem finem nostrum tendentis expectatione suspirisque."

tation, as Luther has it) that continues on the strain till the goal is attained. See especially Tittmann, *l.c.*; Fritzsche in *Fritzscheior. Opuscul.* p. 150 ff. Without warrant, Loesner, Krebs, Fischer, *de vit. Lex.* p. 128 f., and others, including Rückert, Reiche, and van Hengel, have refused to recognize the strengthening element of ἀπό, already pointed out by Chrysostom and Theodore of Mopsuestia, although Paul himself gives prominence to it repeatedly in ἀπεκδέχ. (comp. vv. 23, 25; 1 Cor. i. 7; Gal. v. 5; Phil. iii. 20). — τῆς κτίσεως] Genitive of the subject. The waiting of the κτίσις is with rhetorical emphasis brought into prominence as something independent. See Winer, p. 221 [E. T. 236]. Ἡ κτίσις means—(1) *actus creationis*; so i. 20, corresponding to the classic usage in the sense of establishment (Pind. *Ol.* 13. 118; comp. 1 Pet. ii. 13), founding (Polyb., Plut., and others), planting, etc. — (2) *The thing created*, and that (a) where the context supplies no limitation, quite generally like our *creation*, Mark x. 6, xiii. 19; 2 Pet. iii. 4; Judith xvi. 14; Wisd. ii. 6, *al.*; and (b) where the context does limit it, in a more or less special sense, as in Mark xvi. 15, Col. i. 23 (of that portion of the creation, which consists of mankind), Col. i. 15, Heb. iv. 13 (of every individual creature); comp. i. 25, viii. 39; also καινὴ κτίσις in 2 Cor. v. 17, Gal. vi. 15. Since, then, the absolute ἡ κτίσις must receive its limitation of sense simply from the connection, the question is, What does the text in our passage exclude from the meaning of τῆς κτίσεως? There are plainly excluded not only the *angelic* and *demoniac* kingdom (see ver. 20), but also *Christians collectively*, as is clear from vv. 19, 21, and 23, where the Christians are *different* from the κτίσις, and even *opposed* to it, so that they cannot be regarded (according to the view of Frommann) as forming a *partial conception*, embraced also in the κτίσις.¹ But is the *non-Christian portion of humanity* to be excluded also? If not, it must be meant either *along with* something else, or *else alone*. If the former, then Paul, seeing that irrational nature at any rate remains within the compass of the idea, would have included under *one* notion this nature and the Jewish and heathen worlds, which would be absurd. But if non-Christian humanity *alone* be meant, then—(1) we should not be able to see why Paul should have chosen the term κτίσις, and not have used the definite expression κόσμος, which is formally employed for that idea elsewhere in his own writings and throughout the N. T. Besides, the *absolute* κτίσις nowhere in the entire N. T. means non-Christian mankind (in Mark xvi. 15 and Col. i. 23, πάση stands along with it); and, indeed, πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις (Mark) and πᾶσα κτίσις (Col.) mean nothing else than the whole *creation* and every *creature*, and in these cases it is purely the context that shows that created *men* are meant, while at the same time it is self-evident *ex adjuncto* (for the discourse concerns the preaching of the gospel to the κτίσις) that Christians are not to be understood. (2) The hostile attitude of the then existing κόσμος towards the Christian body would cause the assertion respecting it of a sympathetic and, as it were, prophetic yearning for the manifestation of the children of God

¹ Frommann unjustifiably appeals to 2 Cor. vii. 7. See, on the contrary, also Zahn, *l.c.* p. 516 f., and Engelhardt, p. 49.

to seem a curious paradox, which, moreover, as a truth, in the case of the Jews and Gentiles, would rest on quite a different foundation, namely, the expectation of the Jewish Messianic kingdom, and on the other hand, the yearning dream of a golden age. (3) Again, the expressions in ver. 20 are of such a character, that they in no way make us presuppose in the writer such a conception of humanity subjected through sin to the *θάνατος* as Paul had, but allow us just to think of the *κτίσις* as having fallen a prey to the lot of mortality, not by its own free action, but innocently, and by outward necessity; the apostle would not have left the *θάνατος* unmentioned.¹ (4) Further, the hope of attaining to the freedom of the glory of the children of God (ver. 21) was only left to the *κόσμος*, in so far as it should be converted to Christ; but ver. 21, in point of fact, merely asserts that on the entrance of that glory the *κτίσις* is to be glorified also, without touching, in regard to mankind, on the condition of conversion—which assuredly Paul least of all would have omitted. (5) Finally, Paul expected that, previous to the entrance of the Parousia, the fulness of the Gentiles and all Israel would become christianized (xi. 25, 26), and had to shape his conception, therefore, in such a way as to make humanity, taken as a whole, belong to the *νιοῖς Θεοῦ* when the manifestation of the kingdom should appear. And as to that, ver. 21 decidedly forbids the connecting of the notion of mankind with *ἡ κτίσις*. — There remains, therefore, as the definition of the notion of *ἡ κτίσις* in accordance with the text: *the collective non-rational creation, animate and inanimate, the same which we term in popular usage "all nature"* (comp. Wisd. v. 18, xvi. 24, xix. 6), from which we are accustomed to exclude intelligent beings. In view of the poetically prophetic colouring of the whole passage, the expressions of waiting, sighing, hoping, of bondage and redemption, excite the less surprise, since already in the O. T. instances of a similar prosopopoeia are very common (Deut. iv. 34; Ps. xix. 2, lxxviii. 17, xcvi. 8, cvii. 11; Isa. ii. 1, xiv. 8, lv. 12; Ezek. xxxi. 15; Hab. ii. 11; Bar. iii. 34; Job xii. 7–9, *al.*); and Chrysostom very aptly remarks: *ὥστε δὲ ἐμφαντικώτερον γενέσθαι τὸν λόγον, καὶ προσωποποιεῖ τὸν κόσμον ἅπαντα τοῦτον ἄπερ καὶ οἱ προφῆται ποιοῦσιν, ποταμοὺς κροτοῦντας χερσὶν εἰσάγοντες κ.τ.λ.* Comp. Oecumenius and Theophylact. The idea of the glorification of all nature cannot be accounted *unpauline*, for the simple reason that it is clearly expressed in our passage; and because, moreover, as being connected with the history of the moral development of humanity according to Gen. iii. 17 f., and necessarily belonging to the idea of the *ἀποκατάστασις πάντων* (Matt. xix. 28; Acts iii. 21; 2 Pet. iii. 10 ff.; Rev. xxi. 1), it may be least of all disclaimed in the case of Paul, since it emanates from the prophets of the Old Testament (Isa. xi. 6 ff.; Ezek. xxxvii.; Isa. lxv. 17, lxvi. 1; comp. Ps. cii. 27; and see Umbreit, p. 291 ff.), and has thence passed over into the Rabbinical system of doctrine.² The above interpretation, therefore, of the

¹ An antinomy of two different conceptions as to the origin of death (Frommann, 1872, p. 53) is certainly not to be found in Paul's writings. See on v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 47 ff.

² See Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. p.

367 ff., 824 ff.; Schoettgen, *Hor.* II. pp. 71, 76, 117 ff.; Bertholdt, *Christol.* p. 214; Corrodi, *Chiliasm.* I. p. 376 ff.; Ewald, *ad Apocal.* p. 307 f.; Delitzsch, *Erläut. z. s. Hebr. Uebers.* p. 87.

κρίσις has been rightly adopted—only that the intelligent creatures have not in all cases been expressly or exclusively separated from it (e.g. Theodoret includes also the *ἀόρατα*, angels, archangels, etc., as Origen previously, and Erasmus and others subsequently, have also done)—by the majority of expositors, following most of the Fathers (in the first instance Irenaeus, *Haer.* v. 32. 1), by Luther, Erasmus, Beza, Melancthon, Calvin, Cornelius à Lapide, Balduin, Estius, Grotius, Cocceius, Calovius, Calixtus, Seb. Schmid, Wolf, Bengel, and others, including Flatt, Tholuck, Klee, Usteri (in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1832, p. 835 ff., and *Lehrbegr.* ed. 4 and 5, pp. 373, 399 ff.), Rückert, Benecke, Schneckenburger, Reiche, Glöckler, de Wette, Neander, Nielsen, Reithmayer, Maier, Philippi, Ewald, Umbreit, Bisping, Lechler, *apostol. Zeitalt.* p. 143, Delitzsch, Ruprecht in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, p. 214 ff., Zahn, Mangold, Hofmann, and Engelhardt; comp. also M. Schenkel and Graf. Among these, however, are several who, like Luther, Beza, and also Fritzsche, wish to understand it too narrowly, merely of the *inanimate* creation,—a limitation not given in the text, and moreover antiprophetic (Tertullian, *ad Hermog.* 10); while, on the other hand, Köllner, with whom Olshausen agrees, takes it too widely of all created things generally. See, against this, the textual limitation explained above. If, however, in accordance with the above, the removal of intelligent beings from the compass of the *κρίσις* must be regarded as decided, the decision is fatal to the view of others, who, following the example of Augustine, explain *ἡ κρίσις* as *mankind*; and that either in the quite comprehensive sense of *mankind collectively* (in the state of nature), as, following older expositors especially scholastic and Roman Catholic, Döderlein, Gabler, Ammon, Keil (*Opusc.* p. 207), Grimm (*de vi vocabuli κρίσις*, Lips. 1812), Schulthess (*evangel. Belehr. üb. d. Erneuer. d. Nat.*, Zurich 1833), Geisler (in the *Annal. d. ges. Theol.* 1835, Jan. p. 51 ff.), Schrader, Krehl, van Hengel, Frommann, and others do; or, with exclusion of the Christians, in the sense of *mankind still unconverted*,¹ as Augustine himself suggested,² by which again, however, many understood specially the unconverted *Gentiles* (Locke, Lightfoot, Knatchbull, Hammond, Semler, and Nachtigall), and various others the unconverted

¹ So Wetstein, Baumgarten-Crusius, Jatho, and Köster; formerly (in eds. 1, 2, 3) also Usteri, following Schleiermacher.

² His entire exposition (see *Expos. quar. propos. ex ep. ad. Rom.* 53) runs thus:—"Sic intelligendum est, ut neque sensum dolendi et gemendi opinemur esse in arboribus et oleribus et lapideis et ceteris hujuscemodi creaturis (hic enim error Manichaeorum est); neque angelos sanctos vanitati subiectos esse arbitremur: sed omnem creaturam in ipso homine sine ulla calumnia cogitemus. . . . Omnis autem est etiam in homine, et spiritalis et animalis et corporalis, quia homo constat spiritu et anima et corpore. Ergo creatura revelationem filiorum Dei expectat, quicquid nunc in homine laborat et corruptioni subiacet. Erant enim

adhuc credituri, qui etiam spiritu subjacebant laboriosis erroribus. Sed ne quis putaret, de ipsorum labore tantum dictum esse, adjungit etiam de his, qui jam crediderant. Quamquam enim spiritu, i.e. mente, jam servirent legi Dei: tamen, quia carne servitur legi peccati, quamdiu molestias et sollicitationes mortalitatis nostrae patimur, ideo addit dicens: *Non solum*, etc. (ver. 28). Non solum ergo ipsa, quae tantummodo creatura dicitur in hominibus, qui nondum crediderunt, et ideo nondum in filiorum Dei numerum constituti, congemiscit ac dolet: sed etiam nosmet ipsi, qui credimus et primitias Sp. habemus, quia jam spiritu adhaeremus Deo per fidem, et ideo non jam creatura, sed filii Dei appellamur," etc.

Jews (Cramer, Böhme, and Gersdorf). Others have even explained it of *Christians collectively*, as the *new creature* (Vorstius, Deyling, Nösselt, Socinians and Arminians). And just as little can *κρίσις* be equivalent to *ψυχὴ* (Märcker) or to *σάρξ*, and be supposed to designate the *creaturely element in the regenerate* (Weissbach in the *Sächs. Stud.* I. p. 76 ff., and Zyro in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1845, 2, 1851, p. 645 ff.). Compare also, regarding the various expositions, M. Schenkel, p. 9 ff.; and against the view which takes it of mankind, Engelhardt, *l.c.* — τὴν ἀποκάλ. τ. νῦν τ. Θεοῦ] The event, the blissful catastrophe, whereby the sons of God become manifest as such (in their *δόξα*). How exalted the dignity in which they here appear above the *κρίσις*! Bengel: “ad creaturam ex peccato redundarunt incommoda; ad creaturam ex gloria filiorum Dei redundabit recreatio.” The *κρίσις*, in virtue of its physical connection with that ἀποκάλυψις, shall be a *partaker* in the blissful manifestation.

Vv. 20, 21. Ground of this longing. — τῇ ματαιότητι.] Prefixed with emphasis: *vanitati*, to *nothingness*. The substantive (Pollux, vi. 134) is no longer found in Greek authors, but frequently in the LXX. (as in Ps. xxxix. 6). See Schleusner, *Theo.* III. p. 501. It indicates here the empty (*i.e.* as having lost its primitive purport, which it had by creation) *quality of being*, to which the *κρίσις* was changed from its original perfection. — ὑπεράγῃ] *was subjected, was made subject to*, as to a ruling power formerly unknown to it. This historical fact (*aorist*) took place in consequence of the fall, Gen. iii. 17.¹ The reference to an *original ματαιότης*, introduced even by the act of creation (Theodoret, Grotius, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, and Köster), is historically inappropriate (Gen. i. 31), and contrary to οὐχ ἐκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., which supposes a previous state *not* subject to the *ματ.* Further, since the ὑποτάξις is subsequently mentioned, the interpretation *se subjecti* (Fritzsche) is thereby excluded. — οὐχ ἐκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τ. ὑποτάξ.] This must occasion their expectation all the more; for their subjection is at variance with their original state and the desire of immunity founded thereon, and it took place “*invita et repugnante natura*” (Calvin, namely, through the guilt of human sin), *on account of the subjector* (διὰ with the accusative, comp. on John vi. 57), that is, because the counsel and will of the subjecting God (the contrast to one's own non-willingness) had to be thus satisfied.² The idea of another than *God* in τὸν ὑποτάξ. (Knatchbull and Capellus: *Adam*; Chrysostom, Schneckenburger, Bisping, and Zahn: *man*; Hammond and others, quoted by Wolf: the *devil*) is forbidden by the very absence of a defining statement, so that the subject is assumed as *well known*. According to Gen. iii. 17, it was indeed man through whose guilt the subjection ensued; but *God* was the subjector (ὁ ὑποτάξας). — ἐν

¹ Comp. *Beresh. rabb.* f. 2, 3: “Quamvis creatae fuerint res perfectae, cum primus homo peccaret, corruptae tamen sunt, et ultra non redibunt ad congruum statum suum, donec veniat Pherez, h. e. Messias.” See also Zahn, p. 532.

² The marks of parenthesis before οὐχ and after ὑποτ. are to be expunged, since

the connection and construction proceed without a break. This applies also against Frommann, who assigns to this parenthesis merely the object of explaining the *passive ὑπεράγῃ*. Ewald puts in a parenthesis the entire verse, thus making ἐν ἑαυτῷ connect itself with ἀπεκδέχεσθαι. But for this there appears likewise no reason.

ἐλπίδι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] *on hope* (iv. 18) *that*, etc., may be joined either with ὑποτάξ. (Origen, Vulgate, Luther, Castalio, Calvin, Piscator, Estius, and others, including Ch. Schmidt and Olshausen) or with ὑπετάγη. The latter conjunction brings out more forcibly the ἐπ' ἐλπίδι; for this contains a new element by way of motive for the expectation of nature. ἐπὶ, *spe proposita*, indicates the condition which was conceded in the ὑπετάγη, as it were, the equivalent provisionally given for it, Acts ii. 24.¹ — ὅτι] *that*, object of the hope (Phil. i. 20; not *nam*, as it is taken by most expositors, who join ἐπ' ἐλπίδι with ὑποτάξ; among others by Schneckenburger, *Breitrag*. p. 122, who assigns as his reason, that otherwise the αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις could not be repeated. But that repetition is necessitated by the emphasis of the similarity of the relation, which αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις has over-against the children of God, for which reason Paul did not write ὅτι καὶ ἐλευθέρωθήσεται (in opposition to Hofmann's objection). Besides, the purport of the ἐλπίς *had necessarily* to be stated, in order to give the ground of the expectation of the κτίσις *as directed precisely to the manifestation of the sons of God*. The indefinite ἐπ' ἐλπίδι would supply a motive for its expectation of deliverance in general, but not for its expectation of the glory of the children of God. This applies also against Hofmann, who refers ὅτι κ.τ.λ., as statement of the *reason*, to the *whole preceding sentence*, whereby, besides, the awkward idea is suggested, that the subjection took place *on account of* the deliverance to be accomplished in the future; it had, in fact, an entirely different *historical* ground, well known from history, and already suggested by the διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξ., namely, the implication of the κτίσις in the entrance of sin among mankind. — καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις] *et ipsa creatura*, that is, the creature also on its part, not merely the children of God. There is simply expressed the *similarity*; not a *climax* (*even*), of which the context affords no hint. — τῆς φθορᾶς] Genitive of apposition: *from the bondage that consists in corruption*. See ver. 23. Incorrectly paraphrased by Köllner: "from the corruptible, miserable bondage." At variance with this is ver. 20, according to which τ. φθ. cannot be made an adjective; as is also the sequel, in which τὴν ἐλευθ. corresponds to τῆς δουλείας, and τῆς δόξης τ. τέκν. τ. Θεοῦ to the τῆς φθορᾶς. The φθορά (antithesis = ἀφθαρσία, ii. 7; 1 Cor. xiv. 42–50) is the *destruction*, that develops itself out of the ματαιότης, the κατὰλυσις opposed frequently in Plato and others to the γένεσις (*Phaed.* P. 95 E; *Phil.* p. 55 A; Lucian, *A.* 19). Comp. on Gal. vi. 8. It is not the φθορά in the first instance that *makes* the state of the κτίσις a state of bondage, as Hofmann apprehends the genitive; but the existing bondage is essentially such, that what is subjected to it is liable to the fate of corruption. — εἰς τ. ἐλευθ.] is the state, to which the κτίσις shall attain by its emancipation. An instance of a genuine Greek pregnant construction. See Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 322; Winer, p. 577 [E. T. 621]. — τῆς δόξης τ. τ. τ. Θεοῦ.] Likewise genitive of apposition: into the freedom which shall consist *in the glory of the children of God*, i.e. in a glory similar thereto (by participation in it); not, as Hofmann thinks: which the glory of the children of God *shall have brought with it*. If with

¹ Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1, 18, and Kühner *in loc.*; Ast, *Lex Plat.* I. p. 767; Bernhardt, p. 250.

Luther and many others, including Böhme and Köllner, τῆς δόξης be treated as an adjective : "to the glorious freedom," we should then have quite as arbitrary a departure from the verbal order, in accordance with which τῶν τέκν. belongs most naturally to τῆς δόξ., as from the analogy of the preceding τῆς δουλ. τῆς φθορᾶς. The accumulation of genitives, τ. δόξης κ.τ.λ., has a certain solemnity ; comp. ii. 5 ; 2 Cor. iv. 4 ; Eph. iv. 13, *al.* — Observe, further, how Paul has conceived the catastrophe, of which he is speaking, not as the *destruction* of the world and a new creation, but, in harmony with the prophetic announcements, especially those of Isaiah (Isa. xxxv., lxv. 17, lxvi. 22),¹ as a *transformation* into a more perfect state. The *passing away* of the world is the passing away of its *form* (1 Cor. vii. 31), by which this transformation is conditioned, and in which, according to 2 Pet. iii. 10, fire will be the agent employed. And the *hope*, the tenor of which is specified by ὅτι κ.τ.λ., might, in connection with the living personification, be ascribed to all *nature*, as if it were conscious thereof, since the latter is destined to become the scene and surrounding of the glorified children of God. But that ἐλπὶς does not pertain to *mankind*, whose *presentiment* of immortality, by means of its darkened original consciousness of God (Frommann), does not correspond to the idea of ἐλπὶς ; comp., on the contrary, Eph. ii. 12 ; 1 Thess. iv. 13. If, on the other hand, the *Gentile* hope, cherished amidst the misery of the times, as to a better state of things (according to poets : the golden age of the *Saturnia regna*), were meant as an image of the Christian hope (Köster), then Paul would have conceived the ἐλευθερωθήσεται as conditioned by the future *conversion* of the Gentiles. But thus the ἐλπὶς would amount to this, that the Gentiles should become *themselves children of God*, which is inconsistent with ver. 19. There, and likewise in ver. 21, the sons of God are the *third* element, for whose transfiguration the κτίσις waits, and from whose glorification it *hopes*, in ver. 21, that the latter shall benefit *it also*—the κτίσις—through participation therein ; and be to it also deliverance and freedom from its hitherto enduring bondage. This is applicable only to the παλιγγενεσία (see on Matt. xix. 28) at the *Parousia*.

Ver. 22. Proof, not of the ἀποκαταδοκία τῆς κτίσεως (Philippi), which is much too *distant*, and whose *goal* remains quite unnoticed here ; nor yet of the δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς (Zahn), which was not the point of the foregoing thought at all ; but of what was announced by ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, ὅτι κ. ἂ. ἡ κτ. ἐλευθερωθήσεται κ.τ.λ. For if that hope of glorious deliverance had not been left to it, *all* nature would not have united its groaning and travailing *until now*. This phenomenon, so *universal* and so *unbroken*, cannot be conducted without an aim ; on the contrary, it presupposes as the motive of the painful travail that very hope, towards whose final fulfilment it is directed.²

¹ Comp. Zahn, p. 537 ; Schultz, *altest.* Theol. II. p. 227.

² Consequently the element of proof does not lie in οἶδαμεν, but in the ὅτι πάντα κ.τ.λ., introduced as well known. This in opposition to Hofmann, who refers οἶδαμεν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

back as probative to the thought τῇ γὰρ ματαιότητι κ.τ.λ. in ver. 20 ; and gives as the sense of the argument : " *The Christian would not speak of a subjection of the creature under vanity, if he looked upon its present existence as one satisfied in itself and this world*

The *οἶδαμεν* (comp. ii. 2, iii. 19, vii. 14) is sufficiently explained as an appeal to the Christian consciousness, in which the view of nature stands in connection with the curse of sin.¹ The perfectly superfluous assumption, that the apostle had a book before him containing a similar deduction (Ewald), is suggested by nothing in the text. — In *συστενάζει* and *συνωδίνει* the *συν* is not a mere strengthening particle (Loesner, Michaelis, Semler, Ernesti, and Köllner), but, on the contrary (comp. Beza), finds its natural reference in *πάσα*, and denotes “gemitum et dolorem communem inter se partium creaturae,” Estius.² Calvin, Pareus, Koppe, Ewald, and Umbreit, following Oecumenius, have indeed referred *συν* to the groaning being *in common* with that of the *children of God*; but against this view ver. 23 is decisive, and the reference to *men* generally, with whom the *κτίσις* sighs (Fritzsche), is foreign to the context. Fritzsche, without due reason, asserts the want of linguistic usage in favour of our view. For it is unquestionable that, in accordance with the usage of analogous verbs, *συστενάζειν* may denote the common sighing of the elements comprised in the collective *πάσα ἡ κτίσις* among themselves³ (comp. Eph. iv. 16 : *πάν τὸ σῶμα συναρμολογούμενον*, comp. ii. 21 ; Plat. Legg. iii. p. 686 B : *ἐπεὶ γενομένη γε ἡ τότε διάνοια καὶ συμφωνήσασα εἰς ἓν*, Dem. 516. 7 : *συνοργισθεὶς ὁ δῆμος*, 775. 18 : *συνταράττεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς πόλεως κόσμος*). That *concrete examples* of that nature cannot be quoted, is not decisive against it, since *συστενάζειν* (Eur. *Ion*. 935, comp. *συστένειν*, Arist. *Eth.* ix. 11) and also *συνωδίνειν* (Eur. *Hel.* 727 ; Porphy. *de abst.* iii. 10) are only extant in a very few passages. Comp. generally Winer, *de verb. compos.* II. p. 21 f. Just the same with *συναλγεῖν*, Plat. *Rep.* p. 462 D, and *συλλυπεῖσθαι* p. 462 E. — *συνωδίνειν*] Not an allusion to the *הכבלי המשיח* (Reiche), because the *dolores Messiae* (see on Matt. ii. 3) are *peculiar* sufferings, that shall immediately precede the appearance of the Messiah, whilst the travail of nature has continued since as early as Gen. iii. 17 (ver. 20). But the *figure* is the same in both cases—that of the pains of labour. All nature groans and suffers anguish, as if in travail, over-against the moment of its deliverance. The conception of the *ωδίνειν* is based on the fact that the painful struggling of the *κτίσις* is directed towards the longed-for change, with the setting in of which the suffering has accomplished its end and ceases. Comp. John xvi. 21. — *ἀχρι τοῦ νῦν*] that is, up to the present moment ; so incessantly has the sighing continued. Formerly Frommann imported the thought : until now, when the revelation of the true goal in Christ has taken place ; see, against this, Zahn, p. 524 f. However, Frommann has now corrected his view. Hofmann erroneously takes it as : *now still*, in contrast to the future change. Comp. rather Phil. i. 5. The *point of beginning* of

as the best world.” But it could not at all be an object to prove that relation of *ματαιότης* (who can be supposed to have doubted it ?) ; but it was an object to prove the *ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι*. *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* ; this is the *punctum saliens*, which is then further brought out in ver. 23 ff.

¹ This consciousness is the necessary premiss of the Christian idea of the *Palin-genesia* of the universe at the end of history,

Matt. xix. 28. Hence Frommann is in error in discovering in the above *οἶδαμεν* the overthrow of our explanation of *κτίσις*.

² So already Theodore of Mopsuestia : *βούλεται δὲ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι συνμύφως ἐπιδείκνυνται τοῦτο πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις*.

³ Comp. also Nägelsbach, *z. Ilas*, p. 193, ed. 3.

the sighing and travailing is that *ὑπεράγῃ* in ver. 20. Comp. also *ἔως τοῦ νῦν* in Matt. xxiv. 21. *Now still* would be *ἔτι νῦν*, 1 Cor. iii. 2.

Ver. 23. Climax of the foregoing proof that the *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι*, *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* of the *κτίσις*, ver. 21, is well founded. "Otherwise, indeed, we Christians also would not join in that sighing." — *οὐ μόνον δὲ*] *scil.* *πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις στεναρίζει.* — What follows must be read : *ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ, τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς στεναζόμεν.* See the critical remarks. *But we also on our part, though we possess the first-fruits of the Spirit, sigh likewise in ourselves.* — *τὴν ἀπαρχ. τ. πνεύμ.*] *τ. πν.* is the *partitive* genitive, as is involved in the very meaning of *ἀπαρχή*. Comp. xvi. 5 ; 1 Cor. xv. 20, xvi. 15 ; Jas. i. 18 ; and all the passages of the LXX. and Apocr., where *ἀπ.* stands with the genitive of the thing, in Biel and Schleusner.¹ By the possessors, however, of the *ἀπαρχὴ τοῦ πνεύματος*, are not exclusively meant the *apostles*, who at Pentecost had received the first outpouring of the Spirit, and among whom Paul includes himself on account of his miraculous conversion (Origen, Oecumenius, Melancthon, Grotius, and others). He means rather *the Christians of that age* generally, since in fact they—in contrast to the far greater mass of mankind still unconverted, for whom, according to Joel iii. 1, the receiving of the Spirit was still a thing of the future (xi. 25 ff.)—were in possession of that, *which first had resulted from the communication of the Spirit*, and which therefore stood related to the *collective* bestowal as the *daybreak*. So, on the whole, Erasmus, Wetstein, Morus, Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen, Köster, and Frommann.² Paul does not say simply *τὸ πνεῦμα ἔχοντες*, but, in the lofty feeling of the *privilege*,³ which he discovered in the *earlier* calling and sanctification of the *then* Christians : *τὴν ἀπαρχ. τ. πν. ἔχ.* ; "even we, though favoured so pre-eminently that we possess the *first-fruit gift* of the Spirit, cannot refrain from sighing likewise." This we remark in opposition to the oft-repeated objection, that it was not an element of importance whether they had received the *πνεῦμα* at the first or a few years later ; and also in opposition to the quite as irrelevant objection of Hofmann, that the conception of a measure of the Spirit to be given forth by degrees is nowhere indicated. This conception has no place here, and the Spirit is one and the same ; but if, in the first instance, only a comparatively small portion of mankind has received it, and its possession in the case of the remaining collective body is still in abeyance, this serves to constitute the idea of an *ἀπαρχή* in relation to the whole body. Nevertheless, the sense : *best gift* of the Spirit (Ch. Schmidt, Rosenmüller), is not conveyed by *τ. ἀπαρχήν*, because that must have been suggested by the context, and also because Paul could not have regarded the later communication of the Spirit as less valuable. Further, the sense of a merely *provisional* reception of the Spirit, taking

¹ Comp. Herod. i. 92 ; Plat. *Legg.* vii. p. 806 D ; Dem. 164. 21 ; Thuc. iii. 58. 3 ; Soph. *Trach.* 758 ; Eur. *Or.* 96 ; *Phoen.* 864 ; *Ion.* 402 ; also *ἀπαρχὴ τῆς σοφίας*, Plat. *Prot.* p. 343 A ; and *ἀπαρχαὶ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας*, Plut. *Mor.* p. 172 C.

² See also Müller in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 618.

³ This is certainly no "*side-glance*" at other Christians" (as Philippi objects), which would be both a far-fetched and a disturbing element.

place, as it were, *on account, in contrast to the future full effusion in the kingdom of heaven* (Chrysostom and other Fathers, in Suicer, *Theol.* I. p. 423 ; Calvin, Beza, Pareus, Estius, Calovius, Semler, Flatt, Tholuck, Philippi, and Bisping ; comp. also Pfleiderer), is not contained in ἀπ. τ. πν., because Paul, had he wished to speak here of a preliminary reception in contrast to the future plenitude, must necessarily, in accordance with the connection, have so spoken of that of the *νοθεσία* or *δόξα*, not of the Spirit, and because a full effusion of the Spirit at the Parousia is nowhere taught in the N. T. The Spirit already *received*, not a new and more perfect reception of it in the future αἰών, by its quickening activity leads to and conditions the eternal ζωή, in which God is then all in all (1 Cor. xv. 28). Others, again, make τ. πν. an exegetical genitive of *apposition* ; *the Spirit as first-fruits*, namely, of the state of glory. So Bengel, Keil, *Opusc.*, Winer, p. 495 [E. T. 531], Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, Rückert, Maier, Hofmann, Zahn, and Engelhardt ; comp. also Flatt. But however Pauline the idea may be (2 Cor. i. 22, v. 3 ; Eph. i. 14 ; comp. Rom. ii. 5), it would, when thus expressed, be liable to be misunderstood, since the readers were accustomed to find in the genitive with ἀπαρχή nothing else than that, of which the latter is a portion ; and how intelligibly Paul *might* have expressed himself, either in accordance with 2 Cor. *l.c.* and Eph. *l.c.* by τὸν ἀρραβῶνα, or by τ. ἀπ. (scil. τῆς νοθεσ.) ἐν τῷ πνεύμ. ! This applies, at the same time, against Fritzsche, who takes τοῦ πνεύμ. as genitive of the *subject*, and the *first* gifts of the Spirit as in contrast to the σωτηρία which the Spirit will give to us in the αἰὼν μέλλων. Against this it may also be urged that the Holy Ghost is not described in the N. T. as the *Giver* of eternal life (not even in such passages as 2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5 ; Eph. i. 14, iv. 30 ; Gal. vi. 8). It is *God* who, in like manner as He calls and justifies, *confers* also the eternal δόξα (ver. 30). The Spirit *operates* to eternal life by His government (ver. 2), and is the ground (ver. 11) and pledge (ἀρραβών) of that life ; but He does not *give* it.¹ — καὶ αὐτοί] Repeated and placed along with ἐν ἑαυτοῖς with earnest emphasis : *et ipsi in nobis ipsis*. The latter is not equivalent to ἐν ἀλλήλοις (Schulthess and Fritzsche), but denotes, in harmony with the nature of the deep, painful emotion, the *inward* sighing of the *still* longing of believers ; which suffers, is silent, and hopes, but never complains, being assured of the goal that shall be finally reached. Hofmann incorrectly would join κ. αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς with ἔχοντες. But this would leave the καί, which, according to the common connection with στενάξ., has its appropriate correlative in the sighing of the κτίσις, without a reference. For, when Hofmann sets it down as the object of the καί to emphasize *personal possession* on the part of the Christians in contrast to the *future participation* of the κτίσις, there is thus forced on this καί the meaning of *already* ; and this all the more arbitrarily, since καὶ αὐτοὶ just precedes it in the quite common sense of *et ipsi*,² and its emphatic

¹ Hence also the expression used by Luther, in the explanation of the third article in the Smaller Catechism, does not accord with the New Testament mode of expression. The sense in which he meant it is

brought out, however, in the Larger Catechism.

² Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 151 ; Breitenbach, *ad Xen. Hell.* iii. 1. 10.

repetition is very appropriate to the lively emotion of the discourse.—*νιοθεσ. ἀπεκδεχ.*] whilst we wait for the adoption of children. It is true, believers have already this blessing (ver. 15), but only as *inward* relation and as *divine right*, with which, however, the objective and real state does not yet correspond. Thus, looked at from the standpoint of *complete realization*, they are only to receive *νιοθεσίαν* at the Parousia, whereupon the ἀποκάλυψις τῶν νῶν τ. Θεοῦ and their δόξα ensues. Comp. also Matt. v. 9, 45; Luke vi. 15. In like manner the δικαιοσύνη is a present possession, and also one to be entered on hereafter. Comp. on v. 19; and see on Gal. v. 5; Col. iii. 3 f. Luther incorrectly joins νιοθεσ. with στενάζ., which, with an accusative, means to *demoan* or *bewail* something.¹—τὴν ἀπολ. τ. σώμ. ἡμ.] epexegetis: (namely) the redemption of our body from all the defects of its earthly condition; through which redemption it shall be glorified into the σῶμα ἀφθαρτον similar to the glorified body of Christ (Phil. iii. 21; 2 Cor. v. 2 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 51), or shall be raised up as such, in case of our not surviving till the Parousia (1 Cor. xv. 42 ff.). So, in substance (τοῦ σώμ. as gen. subj.), Chrysostom and other Fathers (in Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 463), Beza, Grotius, Estius, Cornelius à Lapide, and most modern expositors. On the other hand, Erasmus, Clericus, and others, including Reiche, Fritzsche, Krehl, and Ewald, take it as: redemption from the body. This is linguistically admissible (Heb. ix. 15); we should thus have to refer it, not to death, but to deliverance from this earthly body through the reception of the immortal and glorious body at the Parousia, 1 Cor. xv. 51. But in that case Paul must have added to τοῦ σώματ. ἡμῶν a qualitative more precise definition, as in Phil. iii. 21.

Remark.—If we adopt the common reading (ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀπ. τ. πν. ἔχοντες, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ κ.τ.λ.), which Ewald and Umbreit follow, while Rückert, Philippi, Tholuck, and Hofmann declare themselves in favour of ours (see the crit. remarks), αὐτοὶ . . . ἔχοντες is understood, either as meaning the Christians of that age generally, and καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ the apostles (Köllner, following Melancthon, Wolf, and many others), or Paul alone (Koppe, Reiche, Umbreit, and many others); or, the former is referred to beginners in Christianity, and the latter to those who have been Christians for a longer time (Glöckler); or, both (the latter *per analepsin*) are referred to the apostles (Grotius), or to the Christians (Luther, Beza, Calvin, Klee, Maier, Köster, and Frommann). The interpretation referring it to the Christians is the only right one; so that ἡμεῖς brings into more definite prominence the repeated subject. The ἔχοντες, without the article, is fatal to every reference to subjects of two sorts.

Ver. 24. Τῇ γὰρ ἐλπ. ἐσώθ.] Ground of the νιοθεσίαν ἀπεκδ., so far as the νιοθεσία is still object of expectation; for in hope we were made partakers of salvation. The dative, “*non medii, sed modi*” (Bengel), denotes that to which the ἐσώθ. is to be conceived as confined (Winer, p. 202) [E. T. 215], and τῇ ἐλπ. is prefixed with the emphasis of the contrast of reality; for “*sic liberati sumus ut adhuc speranda sit haereditas, postea possidenda, et ut ita*

¹ Soph. *Ant.* 873; *Oed. C.* 1668; *Dem.* 690. 18; *Eur. Suppl.* 104; and often elsewhere.

dicam, nunc habemus jus ad rem, nondum in re," Melanchthon. Comp. Tit. iii. 7; Col. iii. 3 f. Following Chrysostom, others (recently Rückert, Köllner, and de Wette) take the dative in an *instrumental* sense: *by hope*—thus assuming that Paul characterizes *faith*, the proper medium of salvation, as hope. Incorrectly, because in general Paul specifically distinguishes faith and hope (1 Cor. xiii. 13),¹ while he always bases salvation only on faith, from which hope thereupon proceeds (comp. Col. i. 27); and here especially, as is shown by what follows, he brings into prominence the *definite* conception of *hope*, which as *δόξα μελλόντων* (Plat. *Legg.* I. p. 644 C) rests in the *προσδοκία ἀγαθοῦ* (Plat. *Def.* p. 416 A). Hofmann also takes τῇ ἐλπ. in the sense of the *means*, but so that it shall signify the *benefit hoped for*, the object of the waiting, *which God has offered to us in the word*, by which *we were converted to faith* (Col. i. 5). Thus, however, the thought that we have been saved by hope (instead of by faith, Eph. ii. 8) is set aside only by the insertion of parenthetical clauses. And in Col. i. 5, the blessing hoped for, heard of through preaching, is set forth as the ground, not of conversion or salvation, but of *love*.—*ἡ ἐλπὶς δὲ κ.τ.λ.* . . . *ἀπεκδέχ.*] is a deduction from τῇ ἐλπ. ἐσώθ., closing the first ground of encouragement, and meaning substantially: "the nature of hope, however, involves our *patiently waiting for*."—*βλεπομένη*] But a hope (*δὲ μεταβατικόν*) that is seen, i.e. whose object lies before the eyes (comp. on the objective *ἐλπὶς*, Col. i. 5; 1 Tim. i. 1; Heb. vi. 18; Thuc. iii. 57. 4; Lucian, *Pisc.* 3; Aeschin. *ad Ctesiph.* 100). Comp. 2 Cor. iv. 18.—*τί καὶ ἐλπίζει;*] *Why doth he still hope for it?* By *καὶ* is indicated the—in the supposed case groundless—*accession* of hope to sight (1 Cor. xv. 29). Comp. generally, on this strengthening use of the *καὶ*, *etiam*, in lively *interrogation*, Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 633 f., and on 1 Cor. *l.c.* Bengel aptly remarks: "*cum visione non est spe opus.*"

Ver. 25. *Δὲ ὑπομ.*] *With patience, perseveringly.* Heb. xii. 1; Kühner, II. 1, p. 418.—The *indicative ἀπεκδέχ.*, which is not, with Estius, Koppe, Köllner, and others, to be taken as *expectare debemus*, does not announce the *virtuous operation* (Grotius), but simply the *situation*, which the circumstance that we hope without seeing involves. The *ethical position* assigned to us is, that we patiently wait for the object of our hope.

Ver. 26. The second ground of encouragement (see on vv. 18–31), connected with the immediately foregoing by *ὡσαύτως*.²—*τὸ πνεῦμα*] The objective *Holy Spirit*. See vv. 16, 23, and what follows, where the activity of the *πνεῦμα* is described as something distinct from the subjective consciousness. Köllner incorrectly takes it (comp. Reiche) as: the Christian life-element; and van Hengel: "*fiduciae sensus a. Sp. s. profectus.*"—*συναντῶν*.] The

¹ See even Melanchthon, who rightly observes: "Differunt autem fides et spes, quia fides in praesentia accipit remissionem peccatorum . . . sed spes est expectatio futurae liberationis." Faith precedes the latter.

² The progress of thought is simple: "If we hope for what we see not, then the matter stands with us, (1) on the footing, that

we with patience wait; but likewise (2) on the footing, that the Spirit helps us." The *ὡσαύτως*, *pariter ac, itidem* (see generally Kühner, II. 1, p. 564), introduces a *symmetrical corresponding relation*, which is added on the *divine side to our waiting*. Comp. Mark xiv. 31; 1 Tim. v. 25; Tit. ii. 6; Plat. *Symp.* p. 186 E, *al.*; 2 Macc. xv. 39; 3 Macc. vi. 33.

our must neither be neglected (as by many older expositors, also Olshausen), nor regarded as a mere strengthening adjunct (Rückert and Reiche). Beza gives the right explanation : *ad nos laborantes refertur.*" *He joins His activity with our weakness*, helps it. See Luke x. 40 ; Ex. xviii. 22 ; Ps. lxxxviii. 22. — τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ ἡμῶν] Not specially *weakness in prayer* (Ambrosiaster and Bengel), for in what follows there is specified only the particular *mode of the help*, which the Spirit renders to us in our infirmity. It is therefore to be left general : *with our weakness*, — so far, namely, as in that waiting for final redemption adequate power of our own for ὑπομονή fails us. — τὸ ἅρ τι προσευξ. κ.τ.λ.] Reason assigned, by specifying *how* the Spirit, etc. ; *in prayer*, namely, He intercedes for us. — On τό, see Winer, p. 103 [E. T. 109]. It denotes *what of praying comes into question* in such a position. Comp. Krüger, *Xen. Anab.* iv. 4. 17. — τί προσευξ. καθὸ δεῖ] *what we ought to pray for according as it is necessary*, in proportion (comp. 2 Cor. viii. 12 ; 1 Pet. iv. 13) to the need. The latter is the subsequently determining element ; it is not absolutely and altogether unknown to us what we ought to ask, but only what it is necessary to ask *according to the given circumstances*. Usually καθὸ δεῖ is taken in reference to the *form* of asking, like πῶς in Matt. x. 19 ; but thus the distinctive reference of the meaning of καθὸ, *prout* (comp. Plat. *Soph.* p. 267 D ; Baruch i. 6) is neglected. Chrysostom rightly illustrates the matter by the apostle's own example, who ὑπὲρ τοῦ σκόλοπος τοῦ δεδομένου αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ σαρκί (2 Cor. xii.) had prayed for what was not granted him. According to Hofmann, καθὸ δεῖ connects itself with οὐκ οἶδαμεν, so that the thought would be : "*we do not so understand as it would be necessary.*" But how much too feeble in this connection would be the assertion of a merely *insufficient* knowledge ! — ὑπερευχαίνει] *i.e.* ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, *He applies Himself for our benefit* (counterpart of xi. 2), namely τῷ Θεῷ, which addition is read by Origen. The double compound is not elsewhere preserved, except in the Fathers, but it is formed after the analogy of ὑπεραποκρίνομαι, ὑπεραπολογέομαι, and many other words. The superlative rendering of it (Luther : "He intercedes for us *the best*") is improbable, since ἐντυγχάνει does not already express the notion of that which is much (v. 20) or triumphant (viii. 37 ; Phil. ii. 9), or the like, which would admit of enhancement. — στεναγμ. ἀλαλήτοις] *i.e.* *thereby that He makes unutterable sighs*, sighs whose meaning words are powerless to convey. The idea therefore is, that the Holy Spirit sighs unutterably in our hearts (ver. 27), and thereby intercedes for us with God, to whom, as heart-searcher, the desire of the Spirit sighing in the heart is known. It was an erroneous view, whereby, following Augustine, *Tr.* VI. on John ii., most expositors, who took τὸ πν. rightly as the *Holy Spirit*, held the στεναγμ. ἀλαλ. to be unutterable sighs *which the man*, incited by the Spirit,¹ *heaves forth*. The *Spirit Himself* (comp. also

¹ According to Philippi : "the sanctified human spirit," whose sighing is traced back to its ultimate origin, the Spirit of God Himself. In the cordial marriage of the Spirit of God with that of man, there takes place, as it were (?), an *incarnation* of the

former. This mysticism is not in harmony with the N. T., which always distinguishes clearly and specifically between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, as in ver. 16. This applies also against Pfleiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 178 f.; who thinks

Hofmann) must sigh, if He is to *intercede* for us with sighs, and if God is to understand the *φρόνημα* of the Spirit (ver. 27) ; although the Spirit uses the human organ for His sighing (comp. the counterpart phenomenon of *demons* speaking or crying out of men), as He likewise does elsewhere for His speaking, Matt. x. 20. See also on Gal. iv. 6. The tongue is analogously, in the case of speaking with tongues, the organ of the Spirit who speaks. The necessary explanation of the *πνεῦμα* as meaning the *Holy Spirit*, and the fact that the sighs must be *His* sighs, overturn the rationalizing interpretations of Reiche : "Christian feeling cherishes, indeed, the quiet longing in the heart, and therewith turns, full of confidence, to God, but nevertheless does not permit itself any inquisitive wishes towards him ;" and of Köllner : "The Spirit gained in Christ . . . works in man that deep and holy emotion in which man, turned towards God in his inmost feeling, cannot, in the fulness of the emotion, express his burden in words, and can only relieve his oppressed heart by silent groanings." A mere arbitrary alteration of the simple verbal sense is to be found in the view to which Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, and others have recourse, that the Spirit is here the *χάρισμα ἐν χῆς*, in virtue of which the human soul sighs. Comp. Theodoret, who thinks that Paul means not *τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ πνεύματος*, but *τὴν δεδομένην τοῖς πιστεύουσιν χάριν*· ἵπὸ γὰρ ταύτης διεγερόμενοι καταννττόμεθα, πρσευόμενοι προθυμότερον προσευχόμεθα κ.τ.λ. The question whether, moreover, ἀλαλ. should, with Beza, Grotius, Wetstein, Koppe, Flatt, Glöckler, Fritzsch, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, van Hengel, Köster, and others, be rendered *unexpressed*,¹ i.e. *dumb*, not accompanied with words, or, with the Vulgate and the majority of commentators, *inexpressible* (for the expression of whose meaning words are insufficient), is decided by the fact that only the latter sense can be proved by linguistic usage, and it characterizes the depth and fervour of the sighing most directly and forcibly.²

Ver. 27. Ὁ ἐρευν. τὰς καρδ.] Traditionally hallowed (1 Sam. xvi. 7 ; 1 Kings viii. 39 ; Ps. vii. 10 ; Prov. xv. 11 ; Jer. xvii. 9 f.), description of God, bearing on the subject in hand ; for it is *in the heart*, as in the central laboratory of the personal self-conscious life (comp. Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 254), that the praying Spirit sighs, Gal. iv. 6. — ὅτι] Not *for*, as many think, including Tholuck, Rückert, de Wette, Philippi, Ewald, and Umbreit. What follows in fact conveys no real *ground*, since God would *in every case* know the purpose of the Spirit, and to take *οἶδε* in the pregnant sense : *understands and hears* (so Rückert, following Calvin), is utterly unjustifiable,

that *our* spirit is to be distinguished from the *divine* Spirit dwelling in us only in such a way, that the two stand related merely as the *form* to the real contents of self-consciousness. In cases such as our passage, according to his view, the Ego *knows* itself in objective consciousness as furnished with the Divine Spirit, without *feeling* itself to be so in the subjective consciousness. In this way there is substituted for the two-

fold *spirit* in our passage a twofold form and activity of the Christian consciousness, which the plain words do not permit.

¹ As ἀρήντος may be used ; but not ἀνύθ-τος, which always means, *unutterable, unspeakable*.

² Comp. also 2 Cor. ix. 15 ; 1 Pet. i. 8 ; Anth. Pal. v. 4 (Philodem. 17) ; Theogn. 422 (according to Stob. *Serm.* 38, p. 216).

especially after *ὁ ἔρευν. κ.τ.λ.* The *ὅτι* is rather *that*, annexed by way of explanation : *that He, namely.* Comp. Grotius, Estius, Benecke, Reiche, Fritzsche, Maier, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, Bisping, Reithmayr, van Hengel, and Hofmann. See on Phil. i. 27, ii. 22, *al.* — *κατὰ Θεόν*] This, explained by Origen “*secundum divinitatem*,” does not mean : *on the instigation of God* (Tholuck, appealing improperly to 1 Cor. xii. 8), but : *in accordance with God, i.e. so as God desires it*, *κατὰ γνώμην αὐτοῦ*, Theodore of Mopsuestia. Comp. 2 Cor. vii. 9, 10 ; 4 Macc. xv. 2 ; Plat. *Apol.* pp. 22 A, 23 B. The sense : *in pursuance of the Divine disposal*, more common in classic usage (see Wetstein on the passage, and Valcken. *ad Herod.* iii. 153), is here foreign. Böhme, Reiche, and Fritzsche render it *before God, with God* (“*in Deum quasi conversus*”). This is indeed justifiable from a linguistic point of view (Bernhardy, p. 240), comp. Wisd. v. 1, Eccles. xxxiv. 6 ; but how superfluous and unsuited to the emphasis of the prominent position assigned to it ! With the emphasis on *κατὰ Θεόν* it cannot appear strange that Paul has not written *κατ’ αὐτόν*, but has rather named the subject. Comp. Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 2 : *εὐχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, . . . ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας κ.τ.λ.* The omission of the article, which does not render the expression adverbial (against Hofmann), establishes in the case of *Θεός* no difference of sense (Winer, p. 115 f. [E. T. 122]). — *ὑπὲρ ἁγίων*] *for saints*, without the article because *qualitative* ; “*sancti sunt et Deo propinqui et auxilio digni, pro quibus intercedit*,” Bengel. On *ἐντυγχ. ὑπὲρ τινος*, *to pray for any one*, see Bähr on Plut. *Flamin.* p. 83.

Ver. 28. Third ground of encouragement ; comp. on ver. 26. — *οἶδαμεν δέ*] *It is known to us, however* (as in ver. 22). This *δέ* is not : *on the other hand, however*, in contradistinction to the sighing discussed since ver. 22, as Hofmann thinks—a reference, that must have been marked in some way or other (at least by the stronger adversative *ἀλλά*). It is the usual *μεταβατικόν*, and carries us from the special relation discussed in ver. 26 f. over to a *general* one, the consciousness of which must finally place the good courage of the believer on a footing all the more sure. — *τοῖς ἀγαπ. τ. Θεόν*] the dative of *communion*. Paul characterizes as lovers of God (*κατ’ ἔξοχ.*) the true *Christians* (comp. 1 Cor. ii. 9, iii. 8 ; Eph. vi. 24 ; Jas. i. 12), as is plain from *τοῖς κατὰ κ.τ.λ.*¹ — *πάντα*] *everything, i.e.*, according to the context, *all destined events*, even those full of pain not excepted (ver. 35). On the thought, comp. Plat. *Rep.* p. 613 A. — *συνεργεῖ*] *works along with*, that is, *contributes* ; *βοηθεῖ*, Hesychius. See Wetstein. The *συν* does not refer to the common working together of the elements contained in *πάντα* (comp. ver. 22), but to the idea of the fellowship in which he who supports necessarily stands to him who is supported. Comp. on ver. 26. — *εἰς ἀγαθόν*] indefinitely : *for good* ; it works *beneficially*. Comp. Theogn. 161 ; Hom. *Il.* x. 102 ; Plat. *Rep.* *l.c.* ; Eccles. xxxix. 27 ; Rom. xiii. 4. Reiche erroneously takes it as : “the good of the Christians, their eternal welfare.” In that

¹ In this very description of the Christian estate there is implied a *ground of conviction* of the *οἶδαμεν*, the certainty of which is thereupon still more precisely explained.

Hofmann finds a retrospective glance at v. 1 ff., but only by means of his incorrect view of *ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ*, v. 5.

case, the article at least must have been used as in xiv. 16 ; and some witnesses in reality add it. Bengel has the right view : “*in bonum, ad glorificationem usque*” (ver. 30). — τοῖς κατὰ πρόθ. κλητοῖς οὖσιν [See Note XCVIII. p. 352.] These words may mean either (οὖσιν as predicate, joining on) : “*since they are the called according to His purpose*” (so Hofmann), or (taking τοῖς in conjunction with οὖσιν), *as to those who (quippe qui, i. e. since they indeed) are the called according to His purpose.* So usually ; and this latter is the true rendering, because otherwise οὖσιν would be put not only quite superfluously, but also in a way very liable to misconception, since it would occur to every reader, at the first glance, to join τοῖς with οὖσιν. Had Paul meant what Hofmann thinks he did, he would have written simply τοῖς κ. π. κλητοῖς without οὖσιν, or possibly οἰτινές εἰσιν οἱ κ. π. κλητοί. — Respecting the idea itself, there is causally involved in the relation of being *the called* according to His purpose (for the emphasis rests on κλητοῖς), *the certainty that to them all things, etc. ;* for otherwise that high distinction, which God has conferred upon them according to the purpose of His grace, would be vain and fruitless, which is impossible (ver. 30). The πρόθεσις here meant is the free decree formed by God in eternity for imparting bliss to believers through Christ (ix. 11 ; Eph. i. 11, iii. 11 ; 2 Tim. i. 9 ; Eph. i. 9). In accordance with that decree, the *call* of God to the Messianic salvation through the preaching of the gospel (x. 14 ; 2 Thess. ii. 14) has gone forth to those comprehended in that decree. Therefore, when Paul terms the Christians κλητοί, it is self-evident that in their case the call has met *with success* (1 Cor. i. 24), consequently has been combined with the converting operation of the divine grace,—without the latter, however, being found *in the word itself*, or the word being made equivalent to ἐκλεκτοί.¹ Christians are *at the same time* κλητοί, ἐκλεκτοί (ix. 11), ἄγιοι κ.τ.λ. ; but the significations of these predicates correspond to different characteristic qualities of the Christian state. Consequently, just as it was quite a mistaken view to interpret πρόθεσις of the personal self-determination of the subjects (Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others), so also it was an unbiblical and hazardous distinction (see against this, Calovius) to put the called κατὰ πρόθεσιν in contrast with those who are called μὴ κατὰ πρόθ. (Augustine, Estius, Reithmayr, and others). Weiss aptly observes, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1857, p. 79 : “Election and calling are inseparable correlative ideas ; where the one takes place, there the other takes place also ; only we cannot take cognizance of the former as an act before all time and within the divine mind, while the latter becomes apparent as a historical fact.” Comp. also his *bibl. Theol.* p. 386 f.

Vv. 29, 30. More detailed development and expression of τοῖς κ. πρόθ. κλ. οὖσιν,—as a continued confirmation of the οἶδαμεν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. “*For this divine plan of salvation advancing from the πρόθεσις to the κλήσις, leads the Christian safely and surely to the δόξα ;*” hence it is not conceivable that anything whatever, in opposition to this plan, should exercise other than a beneficial influence upon them (ver. 31 ff.). — προέγνω] *foreknew*, namely, *as those who should one day, in the way of the divine plan of salvation, become σύμμορφοι τῆς*

¹ Comp. Lamping, *Pauli de predest. decreta*, Leovard. 1858, p. 40 f.

εἰκόνος τ. υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ.¹ [See Note XCIX. p. 352.] That this character, in which they were foreknown by God, presupposes the subjection to faith (the ὑπακοή πίστεως i. 5), was self-evident to the Christian reader. Erasmus aptly remarks : "Non temere elegit Deus quos elegit, novit suos multo antequam vocaret." The text merely gives the terminus of the προ in προέγνω and προόρισε quite indefinitely, namely : *before their calling*. More precise definitions, therefore (e.g. that of Tholuck : "before the foundation of the world," though in itself correct, Eph. i. 4, iii. 11), should not be *here* given. The taking of the προέγνω in the sense of *prescience*, demanded by the signification, of the word, has been followed (though with various, and in part very arbitrary, attempts to supply *that, as which* the persons concerned were foreknown by God) by Origen, Chrysostom, Augustine, Ambrosiaster, Jerome, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Erasmus, *Paraphr.*, Toletus, Calovius, and others, including Reiche, Neander, Tholuck, Reithmayr, Maier, Philippi, van Hengel, Hahn, Ewald, Weiss, and others. The question whether *this* exposition or the *other* of the pre-election (Calvin and others, including Rückert, Usteri, Köllner, de Wette, Fritzsche, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, and Lamping), is the true one, cannot be got rid of by mixing up the two conceptions (Umbreit) ; nor is it to be decided by dogmatic presuppositions, but simply by the usage of the language, in accordance with which προγ. never in the N. T. (not even in xi. 2, 1 Pet. i. 20) means anything else than *to know beforehand* (Acts xxvi. 5 ; 2 Pet. iii. 17 ; Judith ix. 6 ; Wisd. vi. 13, viii. 8, xviii. 6). Comp. Philippi *in loc.*, and his *Glaubenslehre*, IV. 1, p. 117 ff., ed. 2. That in classic usage it ever means anything else, cannot be at all proved.² Comp. also πρόγνωσις and προγνώστικός. An appeal is made to the familiar use of γινώσκ. in the sense of *judicial cognizance*, or even of *other resolutions* and decisions (Herod. iv. 25, i. 74, 78 ; Thuc. iv. 30, iii. 99, and many other instances). But, in the first place, it is never in this sense joined with the accusative of the person without an infinitive ; and secondly, there is no such precedent of usage for the compound προγινώσκειν, current as it was in Greek authors ; for the few passages in which it means *to take forethought about something* (Thuc. ii. 64. 5 ; Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 4, 11, with a very doubtful reading) are not suitable for comparison, either as regards the sense, or as respects the union with the personal accusative in our passage. The incorrectness of this explanation is confirmed, moreover, by the analogy of the following clauses, which always add another and *different* idea to the one preceding. The right interpretation remains, therefore : *præcognovit* (Vulg. = *præcivit*), which, however, is neither to be altered, with Augustine, Vatablus, Grotius, Estius, and others, into *approbavit jam ante*, to which view also Tholuck and Rückert incline (see on vii.

¹ This filling up of the idea of προέγνω is implied, namely, in what follows. If God has *destined* them beforehand to a future fashioning in the likeness, etc., He must also have already *known* them beforehand as those who should one day be thus fashioned. Consequently we are not to understand the *predisposition to love* (ver. 28) as

the object of the προέγνω (Weiss *l.c.* p. 74 f., and *ibid. Theol.* p. 385). Bengel well remarks on συμμόρφους κ.τ.λ. : "Hic est character præcognitorum et glorificandorum."

² See, on the contrary, Hom. *Cer.* 258 ; Xen. *Ap.* 30 ; Plat. *Rep.* p. 426 C ; *Theæt.* p. 203 D ; *Tim.* p. 70 C ; Eur. *Hipp.* 1072 ; *Dem.* 861. 13 ; Lucian, *Prom.* 20.

15) ; nor to be taken, with Hofmann, in *that* sense of *γινώσκειν* which obtains in 1 Cor. viii. 3, xiii. 12, Gal. iv. 9, 2 Tim. ii. 19 (an *appropriating* cognizance of what is *akin* and *homogeneous*, according to Hofmann). The latter, to which also Delitzsch ultimately comes, *Psychol.* p. 39,¹ is incorrect, because in accordance with it the *πρόγνωσις* would be a relation of communion already entered into actively by God, which would necessarily include the *προορισμός*, and consequently exclude the latter as a special and accessory act. For to suppose that Paul, with *προέγνω* and *προόρισε*, does not mean two acts following each other in succession, but asserts the former of the persons, and the latter of the character ascribed to them (Hofmann), is wholly groundless in presence of the clearly progressive description of the apostle. The right view, since faith is the subjective ground of salvation, is that held by Calovius and our older dogmatists : “*quos credituros praevidit vel suscepturos vocationem.*” It is *God’s being aware in His plan*, by means of which, before the subjects are destined by Him to salvation, *He knows* whom He has to destine thereto. Comp. on xi. 2. — *καὶ προόρισε*] *them He destined also beforehand.* To what? *συμμόρφ. τῆς εἰκ. τ. νι. αὐτ. :* *to be conformed to the image of His Son, i.e. to be such as should present the image of His Son in their conformation.* From the following *εἰς τὸ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* it is plain that Paul here means the same which in ver. 23 he has designated as *νιοθεσίαν*, *τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν*, consequently the *glory* to which God has predestined them, the state of the *μέλλονσα δόξα* (ver. 18), so far as this shall be the same (even in respect of the glorified body, Phil. iii. 21, 1 Cor. xv. 49) as that which the exalted Christ has. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 18, 1 John iii. 2. The *fellowship in suffering* (Calvin, Grotius, Calovius, and others) is here remote. What Paul has in view must be the same as he denotes in ver. 30 by *ἐδόξασε*, consequently the *conformitas gloriae*. This very thought of the entire glorious *appearance*, which he means, has suggested the vivid expression *συμμόρφ. τ. εἰκόνος* ; wherefore we are not, with Chrysostom (*ὅπερ γὰρ ὁ μονογενὴς ἦν φύσει, τοῦτο καὶ αὐτοὶ γεγόνασιν κατὰ χάριν*), Theophylact, Bengel, and others, to refer it to the *present νιοθεσία*. Theodore has the right view. The conformity of the *inner* being is not conveyed in the expression (Hofmann understands it as *included*), but is the moral presupposition of the glory meant. — *σίμμορφος* (Lucian, *Amor.* 39), in Phil. iii. 21 with the dative, here with the *genitive*. See Bernhardt, p. 171 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 295. — *εἰς τὸ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.*] Not an inferential clause (see on i. 20), but—as the very notion of *προώρ.* embraces the purpose—the *final aim* of *προώρ.* *συμμόρφ. κ.τ.λ.* Nor is the main thought contained in *ἐν πολλ. ἀδελφ.*, as de Wette very arbitrarily supposes ; but, on the contrary, Paul contemplates *Christ* as the One, to whom the divine decree referred *as to its final aim*. *Christ* was to fulfil His lofty commission not merely by standing in the relation of His glory to the Father as the *μονογενὴς*, but *by being the First-born among many brethren, i.e. among many who through Him, the essential and primordial Son of God, should, as adopted νιοὶ Θεοῦ, and conse-*

¹ Comp. Calvin : the *πρόγνωσις* is an “*adoptio, qua filios suos a reprobis semper discre-*

vit ;” this *notitia* being dependent a *beneficio* of God.

quently in so far as his *brethren*, have attained to the same *δόξα* of sharing the possession of the dignity and privilege (Col. i. 18) of the First-born.¹ Comp. also Heb. i. 6, and Lünemann *in loc.* — *ἐκάλεσι* | Like *κλητοῖς* in ver. 28. For those who despised the invitation to salvation conveyed to them through the preachers of the gospel did not belong to the called, whom God *προέγνω* and *προώρισε* : the following *τούτους κ. ἰδοκ.* also presupposes that the calling has been attended with the result of the *ὑπακοῇ πίστεως*. Comp. on ver. 28. Hence the divine saving grace is to be conceived as working by means of the word on those who become called, namely, in opening and preparing the heart for the reception of the word,² Acts xvi. 14 ; Phil. i. 6, 29 ; John vi. 44. God has fore-known those who would not oppose to his gracious calling the resistance of unbelief, but would follow its drawing ; thereafter He has fore-ordained them to eternal salvation ; and when the time had come for the execution of His saving counsel, has called them, etc. (ver. 30). With the *κλήσις* begins the execution of the *προορισμός*, in accordance with the *πρόγνωσις* ; and the *subjects* concerned are, in contrast to the multitude standing outside of this divine process of salvation, the *ἐκλεκτοί* (ver. 33). — *ἰδικαίωσεν* | *Justification* is consequently the *sole ground* of the glorifying ; sanctification is added to it, in order that the justified may attain that goal in the way that God desires. — *ἰδόξασε* | Justification, as a divine act of imputation, is really (not merely ideally or in principle, in opposition to Lipsius, *Rechtfert.* p. 48 f.) accomplished ; but the glorification falls to the future (ver. 21, v. 2, and constantly in N. T. ; comp. also 1 Cor. ii. 7, Rom. ix. 23). Notwithstanding, the *aorist* neither stands for the future nor for the present (in opposition to Köllner ; see Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 746) ; nor does it express anywhere in the N. T. a habit, as Flatt thinks—against which view, in the present instance, the analogy of the preceding *aorists* is decisive ; but it represents the *de facto* certainly future glorification as so necessary and certain, that it appears as if already given and completed with the *ἰδικαίωσεν*. “Whom He has justified, them He has—viewing the relation from its final aim—therewith also glorified.”³ In order thus to place the glorification on the same platform of certainty with the *προέγνω*, *προώρισε*, *ἐκάλεσε*, and *ἰδοκ.*, Paul selected the proleptic *aorist*. On the other hand, the triumphant flow of the great chain of thought and the thoroughly Pauline boldness of expression (comp. on Eph. ii. 5) are misapprehended, if the act be regarded as accomplished only in the decree of God (Grotius, Reiche, and Umbreit) ; or if the expression be referred to the glory of God possessed “at first only inwardly and secretly” (Hofmann), or to “repute with God” (Märcker), or to the bestowal of grace and *vivification* here below (Chrysostom and his followers, Ambrosiaster, Pelagius, and Erasmus), to which also van Hengel adheres, appealing to John xii. 28.

Vv. 31-39. Inference from vv. 29, 30. So, then, the Christian has to fear nothing that might be detrimental to his salvation ; but on the contrary he is, with the love of God in Christ, assured of that salvation. — This whole passage

¹ Comp. Philippi, *Glaubensl.* II. p. 214, Julius Müller, *dogmat. Abhandl.* 264 ff. ed. 2. ² See Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 747 ; Kühner, II. ³ Comp. Luthardt, *v. Freien Willen*, p. 427 ; 1, p. 142.

is (observe the logical relation of *ὅτι* in ver. 29, and *ὅν* in ver. 31) a commentary on ver. 28. And what a commentary! "Quid unquam Cicero dixit grandiloquentius?" Erasmus on ver. 35. Comp. Augustine, *de doctr. Chr.* iv. 20. A sublime *ὁγκος τῆς λήξεως* (*Arist. Rhet.* iii. 6) pervades the whole, even as respects form.

Ver. 31. *What shall we therefore say* (infer thence) *with respect to these things* (vv. 29, 30)? — *εἰ ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ.*] Herewith begins a stream of triumphant questions and answers (on to ver. 37) which contains *what we say*. — The *ὁ Θεὸς ἐπὶ ἡμῶν* briefly sums up the divine guardianship according to the tenor of vv. 29, 30. — *τίς κατ' ἡμῶν*;] a question not of challenge (Hofmann), with which the following does not accord, but of the sure, already triumphant certainty that all hostile power must be unsuccessful and harmless for us. On *εἶναι κατὰ τινος*, comp. *Ecclus.* vi. 12; *Wisd.* iv. 6; *Plut. Nic.* 21; and on the contrast of *ὑπὲρ* and *κατά*, *2 Cor.* xiii. 8.

Ver. 32. The *answer* to the foregoing question,¹ likewise interrogative, but with all the more confidence. — *ὅσπερ*] *quippe qui*, *He, who indeed*, brings into *prominence causally* the subject of what is to be said of him by *πῶς κ.τ.λ.*² This causal clause is with great emphasis *prefixed* to the *πῶς κ.τ.λ.*, of which it serves as the ground (the converse occurs *e.g.* in *Xen. Mem.* iv. 4. 14; *Aristoph. Ran.* 739). — *τοῦ ἰδίου*] full of significance, for the more forcible delineation of the display of love. A contrast, however, to the *νιὸς θεοῦς* (Theophylact, Pareus, Wetstein, Tholuck, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Fritzsche, Philippi) is not implied in the text. Comp., rather, viii. 3: *τὸν ἑαυτοῦ νιόν*. — *οὐκ ἐφείσατο*] Comp. xi. 21; *2 Cor.* xiii. 2; *2 Pet.* ii. 4, 5; frequent also in classic authors. "Deus paterno suo amori quasi vim adhibuit," Bengel. The prevalence of the expression, as also the fact that Paul has not written *τοῦ νιού τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ*, makes the assumption of an allusion to *Gen.* xxii. 12 seem not sufficiently well founded (Philippi, Hofmann, and many older commentators). The juxtaposition of the negative and positive phrases, *οὐκ ἐφ., ἀλλ'* . . . *παρέδ.*, enhances the significance of the act of love. On *παρέδωκεν* (unto death), comp. iv. 25. *σὺν αὐτῷ*: *with Him who, given up for us*, has by God's grace already become ours. Thus everything else stands to this highest gift of grace in the relation of *concomitant accessory gift*. — *πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ*] *how is it possible that He should not also with Him*, etc.? The *καὶ* belongs, not to *πῶς οὐχὶ* (Philippi), but to *σὺν αὐτῷ*; comp. iii. 29; *1 Cor.* ix. 8; *1 Thess.* ii. 19. The inference is a *majori ad minus*. "Minus est enim vobis omnia cum illo donare, quam illum nostri causa morti tradere," Ambrosiaster. Comp. Chrysostom. — *τὰ πάντα*] *the whole*, of what He has to bestow in accordance with the aim of the surrender of Jesus; that is, not "*the universe of things*" (Hofmann), the *κληρονομία* of the world, which is here quite foreign, but, in harmony with the context, vv. 26–30: the col-

¹ That question no longer required a *corroboration* (Hofmann) after ver. 28 ff. Besides, Paul would have expressed this meaning by *γάρ*. Regarding the frequent use of *γάρ* to introduce the *answer* in classical Greek, see Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 292 f.; El-

lendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 347; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 62; Kühner, II. 2, p. 784.

² See Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 57 f.; Bornemann, *ad Xen. Symp.* iv. 15; Maetzn. *ad Laerc.* p. 228.

lective saving blessings of His love shown to us in Christ. This certainty of the divine relation toward us, expressed by πῶς κ.τ.λ., excludes the possibility of success on the part of human adversaries.

Ver. 33 ff. It is impossible that this σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ἡμῶν χαρίσεται should be frustrated, either on the side of *God*, with whom no accusation of His elect can have the result of their condemnation (ver. 33, down to κατακρίνων in ver. 34), or on that of *Christ*, whose death, resurrection, etc., afford the guarantee than nothing can separate us from His love (ver. 34, Χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθανών, on to ver. 36). In the analysis of this swelling effusion we must return to the method for which Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, and other Fathers paved the way, and which Erasmus followed : namely, that to the question τίς ἐγκαλέσει κ.τ.λ. the answer is : Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων· τίς ὁ κατακρίνων ; and then follows, moulded in similar form to that answer, the expression, passing over from God to Christ, Χριστὸς . . . ἡμῶν· τίς ἡμᾶς χωρίσει κ.τ.λ. ; so that after δικαίων, and also after ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, only a colon is to be inserted. *Who shall raise accusation against the elect of God?* Answer, in a boldly triumphant counter-question,—*God is the justifier, who the condemner?* (there is, consequently no one there to condemn, and every accusation is without result ! Comp. Isa. I. 8). And as regards *Christ* : *Christ is He that has died, yeu rather also has risen again, who also is at the right hand of God, who also intercedes for us : who shall separate us from the love of Christ?* This view (followed also by van Hengel, but by Hofmann only with respect to the first portion as far as κατακρίνων), though abandoned by nearly all modern expositors,¹ is 'corroborated by its entire accordance with the sense, by the harmony of the soaring rhetorical form, and by its freedom from those insuperable difficulties which beset the modes of division that differ from it. [See Note C. p. 353.] Of the latter, two in particular fall to be considered. 1. Luther, Castalio, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Wolf, and many others, including Ammon, Tholuck, Flatt, Fritzsche, Philippi, Reithmayr, and Ewald, take Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων as affirmative answer to τίς ἐγκαλέσει κ.τ.λ. ; then τίς ὁ κατακρίνων as a new question, and as the affirmative answer thereto : Χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθανών κ.τ.λ., thus : *Who shall accuse, etc. ? God is the justifier* (consequently no accuser shall succeed). *Who is the condemner ? Christ is He that has died, etc.* (so that He cannot, therefore, condemn us in judgment). But against this view it may be urged, (a) that Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων and τίς ὁ κατακρίνων are, as regards both substance (δικαίων and κατακρίνω) and form (Paul has not written τίς κατακρίνει to correspond with τίς ἐγκαλέσει), correlative, and therefore may not, without arbitrariness, be separated ; (b) that in ver. 34 Christ is not at all described as a judge, which would be in keeping with

¹ The difficulty started by Philippi, that corresponding to the τίς ἐγκαλ. κατὰ ἐκλ. Θεοῦ in ver. 33, there is introduced, with the τίς ἡμ. χωρ. κ.τ.λ. of ver. 35, a question for which nothing prepares the way, and which is not answered in the foregoing ver. 34—is incorrect in itself, since the answer to this question is certainly yielded by ver. 34 ; and it mistakes, moreover, the truly lyric char-

acter of the magnificent passage. Tholuck's objections, as also those of Hofmann, regarding the second half (from Χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθανών onwards), are quite unimportant. The latter lays particular stress on the fact that Paul has not added ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν to ἀποθανών. As if that purpose of the ἀποθ. were not perfectly self-evident, especially amidst such a vehement flight of the discourse !

the δ κατακρίνων, but, on the contrary, as redeemer and intercessor ; (c) that, if $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ ἐγκαλέσει is at once disposed of by Θεὸς ὁ δίκαιων, it must be already quite self-evident that there can be no κατακρίνων, and consequently $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ ὁ κατακ., as a new question, would be something superfluous and out of keeping with so compressed an utterance of emotion ; (d) and, finally, that in the entire context there is no mention of the last judgment. 2. The theory, that came into vogue after Augustine, *doctr. Chr.* iii. 3, and Ambrosiaster (adopted in modern times by Koppe, Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, and Maier, also by Griesbach and Lachmann ; Tholuck is undecided), consists in supplying ἐγκαλέσει with Θεὸς ὁ δίκαιων, and taking it as a question, and dealing in a corresponding manner with Χριστὸς . . . ἡμῶν also : *Who shall accuse ? Shall God do so, who justifies ? Who shall condemn ? Shall Christ do so, who has died, etc. ?* But against this view it suffices to urge the decisive reason, that to conceive of God as *accuser* (before Christ) is destitute of scriptural analogy, and could not at all have occurred to the apostle. Hofmann takes Χριστὸς . . . ἐντυγχ. ὑπὲρ ἡμ. as a *question with two dissimilar relative adjuncts*, of which the first declares how it was possible, after the question $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ ὁ κατακ., to subjoin the further question, whether it might not be feared with regard to Christ that He should condemn where God acquits ; while the second shows the impossibility of such a fear. But this artificial interpretation, in connection with which the first and second καὶ (see the critical remarks) are condemned as not genuine and this condemnation is acutely turned to account, fails, so far as the substance is concerned, on the very ground that the thought of its being possible perhaps for Christ to condemn where God acquits would be an *absurd* idea, which could not occur to a Christian consciousness ; and, so far as form is concerned, on the ground that the second relative clause is annexed to the first with entire similarity, and therefore does not warrant our explaining it, as if Paul, instead of $\delta\varsigma$ καὶ ἐντ., should have written ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐντ. — In detail, observe further : The designation of Christians in ver. 33 as ἐκλεκτοὶ Θεοῦ is *selected* as having a special bearing on the matter, and renders palpable at once the fruitlessness of every ἐγκλησις ; while Θεός coming immediately after Θεοῦ has rhetorical emphasis. — κατὰ ἐκλ. Θεοῦ] *i. e.* against those whom God has chosen ¹ out of the κόσμος (John xvii. 6) to be members of His Messianic peculiar people to be made blessed for Christ's sake, according to His eternal decree (Eph. i. 4) ; comp. on ver. 30. This is the Christian conception (comp. 1 Pet. ii. 9) of the Old Testament ἐκλεκτ. (Ps. cv. 43, cvi. 5 ; Isa. xlii. 1, lxx. 9 ; Wisd. iii. 9, *al.*). The elect constitute the Israel of God, Gal. vi. 16. Regarding the genitive Θεοῦ (ἐκλ. is used quite as a substantive ; comp. Col. iii. 12 ; Matt. xxiv. 31 *al.*), see Fritzsche, *Diss.* II. p. 31 ; Pflugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 1135. The *absence of the article* (comp. ver. 27) in the case of ἐκλ. Θεοῦ brings out the *quality* of the persons. — The predicates of Christ in ver. 34—under which His *death* is to be conceived as an atoning death, His *rising again* as having taken place διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν (iv. 25),

¹ Against Hofmann, who (*Schriftbew.* I. p. 223 f.) calls in question the reference to others, non-elect, see on Eph. i. 4.

and His *being at the right hand of God* as personal participation in the government of the world (Eph. i. 20, Col. iii. 1, *al.*; comp. also Dissen, *ad Pindar. Fragm.* xi. 9) in the heavenly dwelling-place of the Father's glory (see on Matt. vi. 6)—exclude the possibility of any one separating us from the love of Christ. For, as regards His *past*, He has proved by His *death* the abundance of His love (v. 6 f.; Eph. iii. 18 f.), and this demonstration of His love has been divinely confirmed by His *resurrection*; and as regards His *present*, through His *sitting at the right hand of God* He possesses the power to do for His own whatever His love desires, and through His *intercession* He procures for them every protection and operation of grace from the Father (Heb. vii. 25, ix. 24; 1 John ii. 1). But this intercession (comp. ver. 26 f.) is the continuous *bringing to bear* of His work of atonement, completed by His *ἡλαστήριον*, on the part of Christ in His glory with the Father; which we are to conceive of as real and—in virtue of the glorified corporeity of the exalted Christ, as also in virtue of the subordination in which He even as *σύνθετος* stands to the Father—as *request* properly so called (*ἐντευξις*) through which the “*continuous quasi vigor*” (Gerhard) of redemption takes place. Comp. John xiv. 16. There has been much dogmatic and philosophical explaining away of this passage on the part of systematists and exegetes. Some apt observations are to be found in Düsterdieck on 1 John ii. 1, who nevertheless, without assigning his exegetical grounds, calls in question that the intercession is *vocalis et oralis*. As such, however, it *must* be conceived, because it is made by the glorified God-man; though the more special mode in which it takes place is withdrawn from the cognizance of our earthly apprehension. Comp. Philippi, *Glaubensl.* IV. 2, p. 336, ed. 2. — *μᾶλλον δὲ* is the *imo vero, vel potius*, by which the speaker amends his statement (see on Gal. iv. 9); for what would Christ's having died have been of itself? how could it have been to us the bond and the security of His love against all distresses, etc., ver. 35 f., if the divine resurrection had not been added to it? Paul therefore appends to the *bare ἀποθανών*, by way of correction: *imo vero etiam resuscitatus*, in which the *καί*, *also*, signifies: *non solum mortuus, sed etiam resusc.*; comp. Eph. v. 11. It is thus clear that (contrary to Hofmann's view) this *καί* was quite essential and indispensable; for it was not the *ἀποθανών* itself, but its having been mentioned *alone* and *without* the *resurrection* belonging to it, that needed correction. It is, moreover, self-evident that all this application of the corrective expression is here merely of a *formal* nature, serving to bring into marked prominence the two elements in their important correlation. — The *ὅς καί* occurring twice has a certain solemnity. — Ver. 35. *τίς*] Paul puts the question by *τίς*, not *τί*, in conformity with the parallel *τίς ὁ κατακρίνων*. The circumstance that he subsequently specifies *states and things*, not *persons*—which, however, naturally suggest themselves to the conception of the reader—cannot lead any one astray, least of all in such a bold flight of rhetoric. — *ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπ. τ. Χριστοῦ*] Most expositors take τοῦ Χ. (comp. Eph. iii. 19) as genitive of the *subject*, and *rightly*, because this view was already prepared for by ver. 34 (in which the great acts of Christ's love toward us are specified), and is confirmed by ver. 37 (*διὰ τοῦ ἀγαπ. ἡμᾶς*), and by ver.

39, where the *ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ ἐν Χριστῷ* comes in the place of the *ἀγάπη τοῦ Χ.* This excludes the interpretation of others, who understand it of *the love to Christ* (Origen, Ambrosiaster, Erasmus, Majus, Heumann, Morus, Köllner, and Ewald). Köllner's objections to our view do not touch its *true* sense, since the point in question is not a possible interruption of the love of Christ to us, nor yet the hindering of our access to it (Philippi), but a possible *separation from the love of Christ* (that helps to victory, ver. 37) *through hindrances intervening between it and us, which might nullify its manifestation and operation upon us and might thus dissolve our real fellowship with it.*¹ It was therefore very unwarranted in de Wette (comp. Calvin, Rückert, and Tholuck), to convert, in accordance with v. 5, the love of Christ into "the joyful *feeling* of being loved by Christ," which ver. 37 does not permit, where manifestly the *aid* of the exalted Christ, who has loved us (comp. Matt. xxviii. 20; Phil. iv. 13), is meant.

Ver. 36. The marks of parenthesis are to be expunged, because the construction is unbroken, and *ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ. πᾶσιν* in ver. 37 refers to ver. 35 and ver. 36. On the accumulation of designations that follows, comp. 2 Cor. vi. 4 f.; and on the so frequently repeated *ἡ*, Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 7, Soph. *O. C.* 251. By way of scriptural proof for the most extreme element mentioned, for *ἡ μάχαιρα*, Paul quotes a passage, in accordance with which even the slaying *sword* has here its place already prophetically indicated beforehand. In Ps. xliv. 23 (quoted exactly from the LXX.), where the historical meaning refers to the daily massacres of Jews in the time of the Psalmist (in an age after the exile, but not so late as the Maccabean), he recognizes a type of the analogous fate awaiting the Christian people of God, as their sacred-historic *destiny*. *Κατάλληλος τοῖς προκειμένοις ἡ μαρτυρία· ἐκ προσώπου γὰρ ἀνδρῶν εἰρηται τὸν αὐτὸν ἐσχχότων σκοπόν*, Theodoret. Therein lies the *justification* of this typical view. But since our passage specially mentions only the *being put to death* and the *slaying*, we have no right to make the reference which Paul gives to them extend, with Hofmann, to the *treatment in general* which the Christians should have to experience, instead of leaving it limited to *μάχαιρα*.—*ὅτι* *for*. A part of the quotation, without relevant reference to the connection in our passage.—*ἐνεκεν σοῦ*] There is no reason whatever for departing, with Köllner (comp. Hofmann), from the reference of the original text to *God*, and referring *σοῦ* to *Christ*. For, in the first place, the probative point of the quotation does not lie in *ἐνεκεν σοῦ* (but in *θανατ.* and *ἔλογ.* *ὡς πρόβ.* σφ.); and in the second place, the very massacres of the Christians took place on account of *God*, because they continued faithful to *Him* in Christ, while the denial of Christ would have been a denial of *God*, who had sent Him. Hence martyrdom was regarded as a *δοῦλαίνε* *θανάτῳ τὸν Θεόν* (John xxi. 19).—*ὡλην τὴν ἡμ.*] Not *quotidie* (Castalio, Gro-

¹ The tribulations, etc., are, forsooth, not something which might form a wall of separation between us and the love of Christ, such as they might produce perhaps in human fellowship—so that the affection of any one should be unable to reach us or

act upon us. Philippi introduces a foreign element, when he holds that the tribulations might seem to us signs of the *divine wrath*, and thus mislead us into *unbelief* in the existence of the divine love.

tius, and Glöckler); Paul follows the LXX., who thus translate כָּל-הַיּוֹם. It means : the *whole day* (comp. x. 21 ; Isa. lxii. 6 ; Ex. x. 13 ; 1 Sam. xix. 24 ; 1 Macc. v. 50) *are we murdered*, so that at every time of the day murder is committed upon us (now on this one, now on that one of us); it ceases not the livelong day. And this is the consequence of the fact, that we have been counted (aorist) as sheep for the slaughter, reckoned like sheep destined for slaughter.

Ver. 37. *But in all this*—namely, what is specified in vers. 35 and 36—we conquer, etc. This ἀλλὰ does not break off an incomplete sentence (Hofmann), but is rather the simple antithetic *at, but*, whatever sufferings and dangers may await us. — ὑπερνικ.] We gain a victory that is more than victory; we are *over-victorious*. Luther well renders : “*we overcome far.*” Comp. v. 20. It does not involve more than this; neither the *easiness* of the victory (Chrysostom, Theophylact), nor the “*in cruce etiam gloriamur*” (Beza), which is rather the consequence of this victory; for a sublime testimony to the latter, see 2 Cor. iv. 8-11. In the ancient Greek ὑπερνικ. is not extant, but it occurs in Socr. *H. E.* iii. 21, Leo Tact. xiv. 25, although in a derogatory sense (νικᾶν μὲν καλόν, ὑπερνικᾶν δὲ ἐπίφθονον). Nevertheless there is contained in our passage also a holy *arrogance of victory*, not selfish, but in the consciousness of the might of Christ. — διὰ τοῦ ἀγαπ. ἡμῶς] He who hath loved us is the *procurer of this our victory*, helps us to it by His power. Comp. esp. 2 Cor. xii. 9. That it is not *God* (Chrysostom, Estius, Grotius, Bengel, and others, including Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen, and van Hengel) that is meant, but *Christ* (Rückert, de Wette, Philippi, Tholuck, Ewald, and Hofmann), follows, not indeed from Phil. iv. 13, but from the necessary reference to τίς ἡμ. χωρ. ἀπὸ τ. ἀγ. τ. X. in ver. 35; for ver. 37 contains the *opposite* of the separation from the love of Christ. — ἀγαπήσ.] denotes the act of love κατ' ἐξοχήν, which Christ accomplished by the sacrifice of His life. This reference was self-evident to the consciousness of the readers. Comp. v. 6; Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 2, 25.

Vv. 38, 39. Paul now confirms what he had said in ver. 37 by the enthusiastic declaration of his conviction that no power, in whatever shape it may exist or be conceived of, etc. For the singular πέπεισμαι there is as little necessity for seeking a special reason (Hofmann, *e.g.*, thinks that Paul wished to justify the *confidence with which he had expressed* ver. 37) as in the case of λογίζομαι in ver. 18, especially as ver. 37 contains only the simple assertion of a state of fact, and not a *how* of that assertion. — The following expressions (θάνατος κ.τ.λ.) are to be left in the generality of their sense, which is, partly in itself and partly through the connection, beyond doubt; every arbitrary limitation is purely opposed to the purpose of declaring *everything*—everything possible—incapable of separating the believers from the love of God in Christ. Hence : οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε ζωή : *neither death nor life*, as the two most general states, in which man can be. We may die or live : we remain in the love of God. The mention of *death first* was occasioned very naturally by ver. 36. It is otherwise in 1 Cor. iii. 22. Grotius (following Chrysostom and Jerome, *ad Aglas.* 9) imports the idea : “*metus mortis ; spes vitæ*,” which Philippi also regards as a “*correct para-*

phrase of the sense." — οἷτε ἀγγέλων οἷτε ἀρχαί] *Neither angels (generally) nor (angelic) powers (in particular).* ἀγγ. is, with Chrysostom, Theophylact, Beza, Tholuck, Philippi, Fritzsche, Hofmann, and others, to be understood of *good* angels, because the wicked are *never* termed ἀγγέλων without some defining adjunct (Matt. xxv. 41; 2 Cor. xii. 7; 2 Pet. ii. 4; comp. Jude 6). The objection repeated by Reiche (who, with Clemens Alexandrinus, Toletus, Grotius, Estius, and others, understands it of *wicked* angels), that an attempt on the part of the good angels to separate Christians from God is inconceivable, does not hold, since, according to Gal. i. 8, the case of such an attempt falling within the sphere of possibility could certainly be — *not believed*, but — *conceived* ex hypothesi by Paul. Theophylact already aptly says: οὐχ ὡς τῶν ἀγγέλων διοικωσάντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑποχὴν τῶν λόγων τῶν αὐτοῦ. Against the view that ἀγγ. denotes good and wicked angels (Wolf, Bengel, Koppe, and van Hengel), the linguistic usage is likewise decisive, since according to it the absolute ἀγγ. signifies *nothing* else than simply *good* angels. Comp. on 1 Cor. iv. 9. — ἀρχαί] obtains, through its connection with ἀγγ., its definite reference to particular powers in the category of angels — those *invested with power* in the *angelic* world. Paul recognizes a diversity of rank and power in the angelic hierarchy (of the good and the wicked), and finds occasion, especially in his later epistles, to mention it (Col. i. 16; Eph. i. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 24; Eph. vi. 12; Col. ii. 15); without, however (comp. on Eph. i. 21), betraying any participation in the fluctuating definitions of the later Jews.¹ Olearius, Wetstein, Loesner, Morus, Rosenmüller, Flatt, and Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 460, refer ἀρχ. to *human ruling powers*; van Hengel to "*principatus quoslibet*." Against these its connection with ἀγγ. is decisive, because no contrast is suggested of non-angelic powers. Just as little, because without any trace in the text, are we to understand with Hofmann the ἀρχαί, in contrast to the good God-serving ἀγγέλων, as spirits "*that in self-will exercise a dominion, with which they do not live to the service of God*," i.e. as evil spirits. — οἷτε ἐνεστώτα οἷτε μέλλοντα] *neither that which has set in nor that which is future.* Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 22. Quite *general*, and not to be limited to *sufferings* (Vatablus, Grotius, Flatt, and others). ἐνεστ., however, does not absolutely coincide with the idea *things present* (as it is *usually* taken), which is in itself linguistically possible, but is never the case in the N. T. (see on Gal. i. 4); but it denotes rather *what is in the act of having set in*, has already begun (and μέλλ., that, the emergence of which is still future). So, according to Gal. i. 4; 1 Cor. iii. 22, vii. 26; 2 Thess. ii. 2. Aptly rendered by the Vulgate: "*instantia*." Comp. Lucretius, i. 461: "*quae res instet, quid porro deinde sequatur*." — οἷτε δύναμεις] *nor powers*: to be left in its utmost generality, personal and impersonal (Hofmann arbitrarily limiting it to the latter). The common interpretation, *angelic powers*, would be correct, if its position after ἀρχαί were right; but see the crit. remarks. The incongruity of the apparent *isolation* of

¹ In opposition to Hofmann, who without any reason denies this (*Schreibweise*, I. 347. See Bahn, *Philo. N. T.* I. 282 ff.; Philippi, *Charakterist.* II. 307 ff., ed. 2.

² See, respecting these definitions, Bartolucci, *Bibl. rab.* I. p. 267 ff.; Eisenmenger, *entdecktes Judenthum*, II. p. 370 ff.

this link vanishes on observing that Paul, in his enumeration, twice arranges the elements *in pairs* (θάνατος . . . ἀρχαί), and then twice again *in threes* (viz. οὔτε ἐνεστ. οὔτε μέλλ. οὔτε δυνάμ., and οὔτε ὑψωμα οὔτε βάθος οὔτε τίς κτίσις ἑτέρα), and the latter indeed in such a way, that to the two that stand contrasted he adds a third of a general character. — οὔτε ὑψωμα οὔτε βάθος] *neither height nor depth*; likewise without any alteration or limitation of the quite general sense of the words. *No dimension of space* can separate us, etc. Arbitrary definitions are given: *heaven and hell* or the *nether world* (Theodoret, Bengel, Wetstein, Michaelis, Klee, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald, and Hofmann); *heaven and earth* (Fritzsche; comp. Theophylact, Morus, and Flatt); *the height of bliss and the depth of misery* (Koppe); *spes honorum and metus ignominiae* (Grotius, Rosenmüller); *sapientia haereticorum and communes vulgi errores* (Melanchthon); *neque altitudo, ex qua quis minaretur praecipitium, neque profundum, in quo aliquis minaretur demersionem* (Thomas Aquinas, Anselm, Estius). — οὔτε τίς κτίσις ἑτέρα] *nor any other created thing whatever*, covers all not yet embraced in the foregoing elements; and thus the idea of “*nothing in the world in the shape of a creature*” is fully exhausted. The attempt to bring the collective elements named in their consecutive order under definite *logical categories* leads to artificialities of exposition, which ought not to be applied to such enthusiastic outbursts of the moment. — Instead of τῆς ἀγ. τοῦ Χριστοῦ (ver. 35), Paul now says, τῆς ἀγ. τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆς ἐν Χ. Ἰ., not thereby expressing something different, but *characterizing* the love of Christ (toward us) as *the love of God which is in Christ Jesus*. The love of Christ, namely, is nothing else than the love of God Himself, *which has its seat and place of operation in Christ*. God is the original fountain, Christ the constant organ and mediating channel of one and the same love; so that in *Christ* is the love of *God*, and the love of Christ is the love of *God in Christ*. Comp. v. 6, 8.

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

XCI. Ver. 1. οὐδὲν ἄρα νῦν κατάκριμα κ.τ.λ.

ἄρα νῦν Meyer affirms, as against Philippi, never to be equivalent to ἄρα οὖν. This position seems to be correct. Here, at least, it may be confidently held that νῦν has the temporal sense, referring to the state following the intervention of Christ which is alluded to in vii. 25. To what is there said, as connected with what precedes it (also summed up in 25b), ἄρα points, and draws from it the declaration of this verse as an inference. The progress of the thought and its connection with the foregoing context, thus, show what is in the author's mind. The deliverance through Christ is from the condition described in vii. 14-23; that condition is one in which, whatever may be the better impulses or the interior conflict, the man is uniformly and hopelessly subjected as a slave to sin as his master. It is from the power and dominion of this master that Christ frees him. Through the aid of this Divine helper he ceases to be a δοῦλος ἁμαρτίας, and becomes ἐλεύθερος. The fact that he is thus free, accordingly, is the ground of the fact that there is for him now no condemnation. This view of the meaning is confirmed by the following verses. The reason given in ver. 2 for this statement of ver. 1, that there is no condemnation, is that “the law

of the Spirit freed me (or thee) from the law of sin ;" *i.e.* that the man has passed out of the control of sin into a new and opposite condition. And the aorist, tense *ἡλευθέρωσεν* declares that this change was wrought at the time indicated in vii. 25*a*. Ver. 4 ff. also set forth, (1) the idea of a fulfilling of the requirements of the law in the case of those who come under the controlling influence of the new principle ; (2) the fact that, where this new principle thus gains control, the "mind" is wholly turned towards the things of the Spirit, which are the exact opposite to those of the flesh ; and (3) the declaration that if a man has this "mind"—though his bodily part remains still subject to death on account of sin—his spiritual part is already possessed of life because of righteousness. The entire context, therefore, points in one direction and to one conclusion. The same general thought is brought out in Gal. v. 18 ff., where the statement that, in case we are led by the Spirit, we are not under the law [*i.e.* its condemnation], is founded upon an enumeration of the *fruits* of the Spirit, against which the law has no condemnatory judgment to pronounce. The man has ceased to sin, having been made free, and hence cannot be condemned.

It must be borne in mind here, as in chap. vi., that the Apostle is in this entire section of the Epistle discussing an objection to his doctrine—that it tends to sin,—and is showing that there is no such tendency. When he describes the state of the man who has become a Christian, therefore, he naturally presents it in accordance with the ideal involved in the doctrine. In the realization of this ideal there is and must be a complete change of masters and governing principles at the turning-point of life. All before this is under sin ; all after this under Christ, the Spirit, righteousness. The doctrine is thus completely vindicated, when it is exhibited in its true light. That individual human experience does not always answer to this ideal is plainly admitted by the Apostle in the fact that, immediately after these verses, he exhorts the Christian readers to conform their lives to the doctrine, ver. 12 (cf. vi. 12, Gal. v. 25). But whether the individual believer does thus live or not, the legitimate tendency of the doctrine itself is the same ; and, wherever he does not, the same exhortation, and this only, is the one to be given.

XCH. Ver. 2-11.

In the passage extending from ver. 2 to ver. 11 the following points may be noticed. (a) The connection of *ἐν Χρ. Ἰησοῦ* (ver. 2) with *ἡλευθέρωσεν*, which is favored by Meyer, is to be preferred. Meyer finds this view of the construction upon ver. 3. Weiss, in his ed. of Mey., inserts, in place of "ver. 3," "the manifest reference *τοῖς ἐν Χρ. Ἰησ.* ver. 1." We may properly include both of the verses alluded to, and also vii. 25*a*, in the argument, for this verse has a close relation to them all, and they all support this understanding of the sentence. (b) The textual reading *σε* after *ἡλευθ.* is placed by West. and Hort. (as by Tisch., 8th ed.) in the text. They indicate doubts, however, respecting its genuineness, and in their "Notes on Select Readings," after presenting the facts of the case, they say, "The distribution of documents, combined with internal evidence, favors the omission of both pronouns ;" adding the remark (comp. Meyer), "*σε*, a very unlikely reading, is probably only an early repetition of—*σε*." [*i.e.* from *ἡλευθέρωσε*]. Weiss ed. Mey., on the other hand, seems to regard the substitution of *με* for *σε* by a copyist as readily

to be supposed, by reason of the *I* and *me* of the preceding context. The connection of the verse with the preceding context certainly favors strongly the reading *με*, as compared with *σε*. But, while it must be admitted that this fact might have induced a copyist to change the text from *σε* to *με*, a careful observation of the progress of the thought will lead rather to the conviction that the Apostle himself wrote *με*, as still bringing forward his own personality. (c) The law of sin and of death, from which the man is freed, is the same law which is mentioned at the end of vii. 23, to whose power he was always brought into captivity before the deliverance. The addition of τοῦ θανάτου is suggested by vii. 24. (d) The sense in which κατέκρινε (ver. 3) is to be understood must be determined (1) by the force of the verb itself;—it is a judicial word, and hence we must find in it this element; (2) by ἐν τῇ σαρκί, which qualifies the verb;—this denotes the sphere within which the condemnation was effective; (3) by τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου;—this phrase, being appositional with the sentence of which κατέκρινε is the leading verb, shows that the condemnation referred to is one which the law could not accomplish; (4) by ἐν ᾧ ἡσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός;—these words contain the ground of this inability of the law; (5) by the fact that throughout the entire passage from vii. 14 to this point ἁμαρτία is conceived of in the light of a master and lord. Sin is declared in this verse, therefore, to be condemned, not in the ordinary meaning of the word, but in a peculiar one. In the ordinary sense, the law could condemn it. It could pronounce judgment and secure the infliction of penalty. To this end there was no weakness of the law through the flesh. But in the sense of a judicial deposing of sin from its lordship, and of excluding it from the domain where it had held sway, the Mosaic law had no power of condemnation. It was hopelessly weak as related to the accomplishment of this result, because of that element of man's nature over which sin ruled. It could reveal the will of God and demand righteousness, but, by reason of what is set forth in vii. 14-23, could do no more. This practical, or as Meyer calls it *de facto*, condemnation is, accordingly, what was in the writer's mind. (e) The means by which God effected what the law had not been able to accomplish was the sending of his Son ἐν μορφῇ σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας. In the former of these two phrases the genitive ἁμαρτίας is not to be explained, with Meyer, as a gen. of quality, but, with Weiss ed. Mey., as expressing the relation of sin as a master. In the latter phrase the same idea is probably suggested, and thus the preposition, which is indefinite in itself, is to be taken, not as involving the thought of an offering for sin, but as referring to the destruction of sin's power. As Weiss justly remarks, these verses speak of sin only with respect to this point. The Son was sent ἐν σαρκί (as Meyer also says), but not ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας, only ἐν μορφῇ. σαρκ., ἄμ. He was sent with reference (περὶ) to sin in different senses, but here the attention of the reader is confined to the one sense indicated by the context. Meyer, on the other hand, holds that in περὶ ἄμ. is contained the whole category of the relations in which Christ stood to sin. (f) In accordance with all that has been said, and with all the indications of the passage, δικαίωμα, ver. 4, must be interpreted as meaning ordinance, requirement, "what the law lays down as its rightful demand" (Meyer). The end in view of the condemnation is the fulfilment of this demand. This verse, accordingly, confirms the view of the preceding verse which has been stated, and, in its turn, has its own true meaning indicated and established by what the former verse declares. (g) In ver. 7b the ground on which is founded the affirmation that the mind of the flesh

is enmity against God is set forth in the words, "for it does not subject itself to the law of God;" and then this latter statement is strengthened by the clause "for not even can it do so." This οὐ δύναται and similar phrases elsewhere are not to be regarded as stating anything respecting the ability or inability of the will, as a faculty, to rid itself of the dominion of sin. What is said here is only that the mind of the flesh cannot subject itself, etc. It cannot, because a thing cannot be its opposite. If the man, in the exercise of his will, submits to God, the mind of the flesh, *ipso facto* and at that moment, ceases to exist. (h) Vv. 10, 11 state what is already secured for the Christian while he lives on earth, according to the proper idea of the doctrine of justification by faith, and what will be realized hereafter. Already in this life, so far as the πνεῦμα is concerned, there is ζωή because of righteousness, but nevertheless the body is dead. Hereafter the body of the believer is to share in the ζωή, and thus the work of the deliverer from the power of sin is to be completed. That δικαιοσύνη here means conformity to right, and not righteousness by faith, is indicated by the context, even from the beginning of this section. Weiss ed. Mey. recognizes this, rejecting the view of Meyer. νεκρόν clearly refers to physical death (comp. θνήσκει, ver. 11), and the sentence is put in this form for the purpose of contrast with ζωή:—the spirit is life, the body is dead. So far as relates to the matter of time, the death of the body is, for the living man, a thing of the future. Meyer takes the sentence proleptically. Weiss regards it as said from the standpoint of the end of life, when the result which Christ accomplishes for us here is made manifest. The view of Meyer seems more correct, for the declaration with regard to the spirit (as shown by the preceding verses) has reference to what is before the end. (i) With respect to the manner of the ζωοποιεῖν, or the view which we are to regard the Apostle as holding concerning the resurrection, it is to be remarked that his most full and distinct utterance on this subject is found in 1 Cor. xv. Expressions of a more general nature, like the present—at least those written so soon afterwards—must be explained, in their minuter points, by that chapter. Evidently Paul did not look for a literal resurrection of the earthly body. (j) As to the textual reading in ver. 11, it must be admitted that the thought of the preceding verses points strongly towards διὰ τὸ ἐνοικεῖν . . . πνεῦμα. The fact, also, which is urged by many, that the Spirit is not represented in the N. T. as the instrumental agent in the resurrection, favors the same text. In a case where the external evidence is so nearly evenly divided as it is here, the evidence derived from the passage itself may properly have great weight. Tisch. 8th ed., West. and Hort, R. V., adopt the genitive reading; W. & H. and R. V., however, record the other in the margin. Tregelles, Alford, Godet, Weiss, Gifford, and others prefer the accusative reading.

XCIII. Ver. 12. ἄρα οὖν ὀφείλεται ἔσμεν κ.τ.λ.

The remarks of Meyer on this verse are evidently correct. It may be added, (a) that the statement of the former part of the verse involves and (though the thought is expressed only on the negative side) is equivalent in substance to an exhortation to the readers to make their living correspond with the ideal indicated (see preceding notes); and (b) that the cause of the omission of the positive part (but to the Spirit, etc.) is undoubtedly the same which we discover in many other instances—namely, that the writer is led away by his

desire to introduce the proof of the negative part, and, after this has been presented, regards the positive as suggested with sufficient clearness for his purpose.

XCIV. Ver. 17. *εἴπερ συμπάσχομεν ἵνα καὶ συνδοξασθῶμεν.*

The connection both of the clauses and the thought is very close from ver. 12 to ver. 17a. But a new thought is evidently suggested in ver. 17b. "We are heirs, *if we suffer*," etc. To this new thought the entire passage vv. 18-39 is attached. It may be noticed, as connected with 17b, that *ἵνα* seems to express the end in view which belongs to the very idea of *συμπάσχομεν*, rather than that which alone moves the man thus to suffer: *If we move on in that course of suffering in union with Christ which looks, as it also leads, to a union with Him in glory.* It may also be remarked that *εἴπερ* assumes the condition as a fact, and although the position of Hermann ad Viger. p. 834, referred to by Grimm and many commentators, may be admitted—that this particle is used "*de re, quæ esse sumitur, sed in incerto relinquitur utrum jure an injuria sumatur*"—yet in the N. T. it is found almost universally (if not, indeed, without any exception in cases where it is not joined with some other particle), as it is here, in suppositions which are clearly regarded by the writer as *justly* assumed. As in ver. 9 he takes it for granted, since they are Christians, that the readers (*ὑμεῖς*) have the Spirit of God dwelling in them—and considers himself justified in so taking it,—so here he presents a condition which, as he holds, will naturally be fulfilled by the followers of Christ to whom he was writing. For the use of *εἴπερ* comp. ver. 9, also Rom. iii. 30 (where some texts read *ἐπείπερ*), 1 Cor. viii. 5; 2 Cor. v. 3 (where Tisch. and W. & Hort read *εἴγε*); 2 Thess. i. 6; 1 Pet. ii. 3 (when *NA* A B read *εἰ*). With *ἄρα* it occurs in 1 Cor. xv. 15, where *ἄρα* conveys the idea of *in the case supposed* in the preceding context. *In that case* it may be justly held that the dead are not raised.

XCV. Ver. 18 ff.

The relation of vv. 18-39 to ver. 17b is correctly given by Meyer. The passage sets forth three grounds of encouragement to endure the sufferings which are to end in the glory. The first of these is connected with the future and with hope. The other two relate to the present life. Weiss ed. Mey. objects to this view on the ground that ver. 17 does not contain an exhortation. It does not, indeed, *in form*, but it does *by way of suggestion* and through its close union with ver. 18. That the latter verse is introduced as a reason for something which precedes it, is evident from the *γάρ* with which it opens. That the particular thing to which it refers is the entire clause, *συμπάσχομεν ἵνα καὶ συνδοξασθῶμεν*, is indicated by the fact that it compares the sufferings with the glory. That the reference is to this clause as suggesting an *exhortation* we must hold, because there is no proof given in the verse of the *only fact* stated in ver. 17b—namely, that we are God's heirs and Christ's fellow-heirs *if, or only if, we suffer*, etc. Weiss admits that this fact, considered in itself, is not established by ver. 18, but regards the verse as proving that, whereas the suffering might seem to be inconsistent with that fatherly love of God on which our confidence in the final consummation of our salvation must depend, there was, nevertheless, to the mind of Paul, no such inconsistency. To any inconsistency of this sort or any difficulty likely to arise in connection with it, however, there is no

allusion in ver. 18 or the verses which follow ; the first clearly manifest suggestion of such an idea being found near the close of the chapter, and in what must be considered as another paragraph,—at vv. 35, 36.

According to Godet, "Paul seemed, in the previous verses, to assume that the work had already reached its goal, and that nothing remained but to pass into glory." The words of 17*b* are added to remove this possible misapprehension of his meaning, and in connection with them he is led to "develop two ideas," ver. 18 ff. : (1) "the world's state of misery in its present condition demonstrated by the groaning of the creation, by that of believers themselves, and by that of the Holy Spirit," and (2) the certainty, notwithstanding all, of the future glory. But this view seems less simple, natural, and accordant with the progress of the thought, and must be rejected.

XCVI. Ver. 18-25.

The relation of the verses in this passage is indicated by the repeatedly occurring γάρ. (a) Ver. 19 is introduced as a confirmation of ver. 18. Meyer thinks it is intended to prove the *certainty* suggested by the emphatic *ὀφείλουσαν* ; but, though this participle has a prominence by reason of its position, it does not apparently contain the main thought of the verse—which is, that the glory, which is certainly to be revealed, *far outweighs* the present sufferings. It is, then, the *greatness* of the glory, rather than its *indubitableness*, which we must regard as in the Apostle's mind in ver. 18 also. If even the *κτίσις* (the entire irrational creation) is patiently waiting for the revelation of this glory, with earnest expectation, it must be something with which "the light afflictions which are but for a moment" can bear no comparison. (b) Vv. 20, 21 give the ground of the fact that the *κτίσις* thus waits with expectation—namely, because its original subjection to the law of decay was accompanied by a hope for itself of future deliverance from the bondage of corruption, and of participation in the freedom therefrom which belongs to the glorified state of the children of God. (c) Ver. 22 presents a proof of the statement of vv. 20, 21. This statement is not that the *κτίσις* was subjected to vanity, but that it was thus subjected *in hope*. The view of Meyer, at this particular point, must, therefore, be correct. The ever-continued sighing for deliverance indicates the hope of it. (d) With regard to ver. 23, however, it seems better, with Weiss ed. Mey., to hold that its connection is with ver. 18, and that it has a sort of parallelism with ver. 19, than, with Meyer, to make it a climax of the proof of the *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι* of ver. 20. From ver. 19 to ver. 22 the waiting expectation of the *κτίσις* is presented and explained. The similar longing and waiting of the children of God themselves is now set forth. We who have the first-fruits of the Spirit, Paul says, groan within ourselves, waiting out the completeness of our adoption, the redemption of the body. This, which has been already alluded to in vv. 10, 11, as not yet accomplished, but as the promise of the future, is the final consummation of that which Christ works out for us through the deliverance referred to in vii. 25. The body is redeemed from the power of sin, which causes its death, and is made free from the bondage of corruption. (e) Ver. 24 adds a reason for "our" groaning and looking forward ; that the salvation which "we" gained as we entered the Christian life was a salvation in hope, and not in the actual experience of all that it involves. By this word "hope," the thought is brought into a correspondence with the idea of hope as

predicated of the *κρίσις*; and the two together give the double proof, not simply of the *certainty*, but of the *greatness* of that which awaits the sons of God. (f) Having thus developed his thought, the Apostle turns, at the close of the paragraph, to an inference which includes within itself an exhortation. If our condition is one of hopeful expectation of a glory which we do not yet realize, we may well wait for it with a steadfast endurance under whatever sufferings we may be called to experience.

XCVII. Vv. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.

As regards the individual words and phrases of the passage, the following points may be noticed : (a) *τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ* does not necessarily indicate that the Parousia was, to the Apostle's thought, near at hand, but may imply this, and is entirely consistent with any statements of the Epistles which convey this idea. The evidence for or against the view that he had this thought must, however, be sought elsewhere. (b) *εἰς ἡμᾶς*. This form of expression shows, not that the revelation of the glory is *to us* or *in us*, but that it finds its end—terminates, as it were—in us. Hence we have, also, in ver. 19 the revelation of the sons of God. R. V. renders "to us-ward." Godet says, "*in and for us*." (c) *ἀποκαταδοκία, ἀπεκδέχεται*. There is here a personifying of the *κρίσις* so far that the imperfection and perishableness seen everywhere in nature, which suggest the idea of, and seem to demand, an answering perfection, are conceived as a longing desire and earnest hope for this completeness. (d) That the explanation of *κρίσις* given by Meyer is the right one is satisfactorily proved by the arguments and suggestions presented in his note. (e) *ματαιότητι* refers to the perishableness alluded to above, or the law of decay to which all things in the natural world are subject. The subjection, however, is not a hopeless and perpetual one. (f) *ὅτι*. Tisch. (8) reads with $\aleph$ D* F G, *διότι*, and Weiss ed. Mey. regards this as probably the original text, the first syllable having subsequently been omitted by reason of the occurrence of the same letters at the end of the next preceding word, *ἐλπίδι*. If we read *διότι* we must, and if *ὅτι* we may, translate *because*. It is apparently, however, much more in the Apostle's line of thought here to state the contents of the hope—namely, *that* there will be a deliverance, than to declare this fact as a *ground* of the affirmation that there was a subjecting in hope. This being the case, and the external evidence being strong for *ὅτι* (A B C D^c E K L P, etc.), it seems better to adopt this reading with W. & Hort, and to translate, as R. V. text, *that*. The other text and rendering are, however, properly recognized by R. V. in the margin. (g) That *δόξης* is not equivalent to an attributive adjective belonging to *ἐλευθερίαν* (A. V. *the glorious liberty*), is clear not only from the universal usage of the N. T., but also because of the *δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς* which precedes. The genitives in both cases, it may be added, are not gen. of apposition (the bondage which *consists* in corruption, etc.), as Meyer holds, but rather gen. of possession or the gen. indicating that the bondage and freedom appertain to the corruption and glory. The contrast between *φθορᾶς* and *δόξης*, and the connection with *ματαιότητι* and *ἐλπίδι* of the previous clause, make it evident that *φθορά*, as here used, corresponds substantially with *ματαιότης*. (h) *αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες*. The view of Meyer with reference to these words must be rejected, because there seems to be no occasion for thus referring to the first believers in distinction from others; because we do not find this idea expressed elsewhere by

similar words ; and because there is nothing in the context to suggest such an interpretation. The context, on the other hand, suggests the thought of the perfected condition connected with the *δόξα*. The first-fruit of this perfection is the gift of the Spirit bestowed already upon the Christian. The evident connection in thought between this verse and vv. 10, 11 renders it almost certain that this is the true meaning, and that the genitive *πνεύματος* is appositional. (i) *νιοθεσία* in connection with *ἀπεδεχ* is used in a peculiar sense. It does not here designate the adoption which takes place at the beginning of the Christian life (cf. ver. 15 ; also Gal. iv. 5 ; Eph. i. 5), but the full realization of what that adoption involves in itself and brings to the soul in the future. (j) The word *ἀποδείξεις* is used, apparently, because, in the passage to which this paragraph is attached (vii. 25–viii. 17), the Apostle has set forth the effects of Christ's work of deliverance, together with their present limitations. In the redemption from the power of sin, the body participates latest. Death is the last enemy destroyed (1 Cor. xv. 26). (k) *τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐσώσμεν* The aorist tense points to the time of conversion (vii. 25), and *ἐλπίδι* denotes the respect in which salvation was then secured. The dative, as Winer and Meyer express the idea of it, “designates the sphere to which the predicate is to be conceived as confined.” *In* hope, not *by* hope, is thus the meaning. So the Amer. Appendix to R. V., as against the rendering of R. V. text. That this is the correct view is indicated (1) by the fact that this clause is introduced as accounting for our longing desire for a future completeness. We have this longing because we have thus far attained full salvation only in hope ; (2) by the 25th verse, which refers to us as having something before us not yet realized, and accordingly as being still within the region of hope and expectation ; (3) by the parallelism of ver. 23 with vv. 21, 22, which is connected with this word ; (4) by the fact alluded to by Meyer and others, that, while Paul represents us as saved by faith, he does not represent us as saved by hope.

XCVIII. Ver. 28. *τοῖς κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοῖς.*

These words are added as confirming the statement of the earlier part of the verse. The purpose of God is placed at the foundation of the assurance that all things do, and must, work together for good to those who love Him. The strength of the assurance is the certainty (vv. 29, 30) that God's purpose will be carried out. The persons whom He foreknew and predestinated He will glorify at the end. No sufferings or afflictions can prevent the result, or issue in final evil. The doctrine of predestination, so far as it is alluded to here, is not presented for its own sake, as if the Apostle would set it forth in detail ; it is introduced incidentally, and as subordinate to the main thought which is expressed in ver. 28a. It will be noticed, also, that it is introduced—as, indeed, it is generally by the N. T. writers who refer to it at all—at the point where it gives encouragement to the believer. If he believes and loves God he may have all hope and confidence, for his eternal life rests on the predestinating purpose. The presentation of it where it burdens the mind with difficulties and throws it into doubts belongs to post-apostolic times.

XCIX. Ver. 28. *προέγνω.*

That *προέγνω* has a different meaning from *προώρισεν* is proved not only by the fact that they occur, as different words, in the same sentence, but also by the manifest intention of the Apostle to move on from step to step in a progress

from the first beginning to the final consummation. This progressive development of the sentence, moreover, shows that what is indicated by *προέγνω* precedes in the order of sequence that to which *προῶν* refers. Meyer maintains that *προέγνω* never in the N. T. means anything else than to *know beforehand*, and affirms, also, the impossibility of proving that in classic usage it ever has any other signification. But, whether this view is pressed to an absolute negative or not, both common usage and the facts of vv. 29, 30 render it altogether probable that *foreknow* is the meaning here. Before the adoption of His plan of creation, God foreknew what persons under the circumstances and conditions involved in the plan would love Him. These persons He—even by and with the adoption of the plan—predestinated to be conformed to the image of His Son. In the development of the plan He calls and justifies them, and, at the end, He will give them the glory of the sons of God. The successive parts of the fulfilment which are accomplished in the present or the future are all carried by the Apostle's form of expression into the past (see the aorist tenses throughout), since he desired to gather them up into and centre them all in the eternal purpose.

C. Vv. 33–35. *Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων κ.τ.λ.*

The explanation of these clauses given by Meyer, following Erasmus and the Greek fathers, is, as Dr. Gifford says, “the only one that fully preserves the simplicity, freedom, and vigor of this loftiest flight of Christian eloquence.” Meyer's arguments for this explanation and against others are sufficient. Among the very recent commentators, however, Godet and Weiss object to this view and adopt that of Luther, Calvin, and others, mentioned in Meyer's note. Godet's objections are the following: (1) The question: *who will condemn*, cannot be the reproduction, negatively, of the question, *who will accuse*. To this may be answered: It is not such a reproduction; it is a part of the reply to that question. The thought, presented apart from the interrogative form, is this: If no one can condemn when God justifies, there will appear no accuser to bring any charge against those for whom God's justifying judgment is sure. (2) A *then* would be indispensable in the questions, *who shall condemn* and *who shall separate*. But why indispensable? It might have been inserted, had such been the desire of the writer. But, when we consider the form of the sentence, “God is the one who justifies, who is the one who condemns?” the insertion cannot be deemed necessary. Indeed, such an insertion would weaken the force of the two abruptly contrasted clauses. (3) The question, *who shall separate*, finds its answer in ver. 39: *nothing shall separate*, and hence cannot express the conclusion of what precedes. The more correct view of ver. 39, or of vv. 35b–39, however, is that they do not so much answer the question of ver. 35a, as unfold the negative which is involved in it. These verses add no new idea to that which ver. 35a has already suggested. (4) This question, *who shall separate*, is followed by an enumeration of the sufferings which are calculated to separate the believer from his Saviour, and thus we are prohibited from regarding this question as a conclusion. The reply to this is very simple. They may be “calculated,” indeed, thus to separate him; he may be apprehensive that they will; but the declaration of the Apostle is that they actually will not, and this is the very conclusion involved in the question, “*who shall separate us?*” Weiss, on the other hand, calls the explanation unnatural, and says that it forces a meaning upon what, when taken in a

natural and simple way, would not suggest it. It seems difficult to understand, however, in what manner Paul could have expressed himself more simply and naturally, if he had desired to bring the two clauses into a contrasted parallelism with each other, than by writing these words, Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων τις ὁ κατακρίνων; Why, in case he wished to make the latter question parallel with τις ἐγκαλέσει (as Weiss holds), did he take pains to put it in a form which corresponds, not with this phrase, but with the other? The course adopted might, at the least, mislead the reader. Paul must have known, it would seem, that it probably would mislead him.

CHAPTER IX.

Ver. 3. The verbal order *ἀνάθεμα εἶναι αὐτὸς ἐγώ* (recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. and Tisch.) receives preponderant attestation from A B D E F G, min., vss., and Fathers; as also from *Σ*, reading *εἶναι before ἀνάθ.* Erroneously attached to *ἡνυχόμην, αὐτὸς ἐγώ* became placed before *ἀνάθ.* (Elz.). — Ver. 4. *αἱ διαβήκαι*] B D E F G, min., Vulg., with several Fathers, read *ἡ διαθήκη*, which Lachm. has adopted. An alteration, because the plural was understood of the Old and New Test. (Gal. iv. 24), and yet the latter could not be considered as a privilege of the *Jews*. — Ver. 11. *κακόν*] Lachm. and Tisch. read *φῶλον*, according to A B *Σ*, min., Or. Cyr. Damasc. Rightly; the more usual opposite of *ἀγαθόν* easily intruded. — Ver. 15. The order *τῷ Μωϋσεὶ γάρ* is decidedly to be received, with Lachm. and Tisch., following B D E F G *Σ*. The Recepta *τ. γ. Μ.* is a mechanical alteration. — Ver. 16. *ἐλεούντος*] A B* D E F G P *Σ*, 39, read *ἐλεῶντος*; so Lachm. and Tisch. But since in no other passage of the N. T. is *ἐλεάω*, the form belonging to the *κοινή* (see *Elym. M.* 327. 30), to be found; and in ver. 18 only D* F G have *ἐλεᾶ* instead of *ἐλεεῖ* (and yet in both places Paul doubtless used one form); it is most probable that *Ω* instead of *ΟΥ* was merely an early copyist's error, which, as the form *-αω* was actually in existence, became diffused, and also induced in some Codd. the alteration *ἐλεᾶ* in ver. 18 (so Tisch. 7). — Ver. 27. *κατάλειμμα*] A B *Σ** Eus. read *ὑπόλειμμα*; so Lachm. and Tisch. Rightly; see LXX. Isa. x. 22. — Ver. 28. *ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, ὅτι λόγον συντετμημένον*] is wanting in A B *Σ**, 23*, 47*, 67**, Syr. Aeth. Erp. Copt. Eus. Damasc. Aug. It certainly bears the suspicion of being an addition from the LXX.; but its deletion, which Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have carried out, is precluded by the ease with which it was possible for transcribers to turn from *συντέμνων* at once to *συντετμημένον*. — Ver. 31. The second *δικαιοσύνης* is wanting in A B D E G *Σ*, 47, 67**, 140, Copt. It. Or. and several Fathers, and is marked with an obelus in F. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8. But the omission admits of no sense accordant with the context. See the exeg. notes. The weight of the omitting codd. is much diminished by the counter-testimony of ancient vss. (including Syr. and Vulg.) and of most Greek Fathers. The omission itself might easily, from the frequent recurrence of the word in vv. 30, 31, occur through a homoeoteleuton, which led, in the first instance, to the disappearance of the words *εἰς νόμ. δικαιοσύνης* (they are still absent from 2 min.), followed by their incomplete restoration. — Ver. 32. *νόμον*] Wanting in A B F G *Σ**, min., Copt. Vulg., and several Fathers. Rightly deleted by Lachm. and Tisch. A defining addition. — The *γάρ* after *προσέκοψαν*, which is wanting in A B D* F G *Σ** 47*, Copt. It. Vulg. ms, Goth. Ambr. Ruf. Dam. (and is omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8), is simply a connective insertion. — Ver. 33. *πᾶς*] has preponderant evidence against it, and must, with Lachm. and Tisch., be struck out. An addition from x. 11, where it stands in all the witnesses.

Chap. ix.-xi.¹ [See Note CI. p. 396.] On the *non-participation hitherto of the greater part of the Jews in the Christian plan of salvation*; and specially (a) the *lamentation* over this (ix. 1-5); (b) the *Theodicee* on its account (ix. 6-29); (c) the *fault* thereof, which rests upon the Jews themselves (ix. 30-33 and x. 1-21); (d) the *consolation* in reference to this (xi. 1-32), with final *giving glory* to God (xi. 33-36). Paul could not do otherwise, he *must* still settle this great problem; this is inevitably demanded by all that had gone before. For if the whole previous treatise had as its result, that only *believers* were the recipients of the promised salvation, and if nevertheless the Messianic promise and destination to salvation had their reference in the first place (comp. i. 16) to the Israelites, concerning whom, however, experience showed that they were for the most part *unbelieving* (comp. John i. 11), this contradictory relation thus furnished an *enigma*, which Paul, with his warm love for his people, could least of all evade, but in the solution of which he had on the contrary to employ all the boldness and depth of his clear insight into the divine plan of redemption (Eph. iii. 4 ff.). The *defence of the efficacy of his Gentile apostleship* (Th. Schott, and in another way Mangold and Sabatier) is not the *object* of the section—that object Paul would have known how to meet directly—but such a defence results indirectly from it, since we see from the section how fully the apostle had recognized and comprehended his place in connection with the divine plan of salvation. The *problem itself*, the solution of which is now taken in hand by the apostle, was sufficiently serious and momentous to be treated with so much detail in this great and instructive letter to the important mixed community of the world's capital, which, however, does not thereby appear to have been a Jewish-Christian one.

Vv. 1-3.²] The new section is introduced without connection with the foregoing, but in a fervent outburst of Israelitish patriotism, the more sorrowful by contrast with the blessedness of the Christian previously extolled and so deeply experienced by the apostle himself. This sorrow might be deemed incredible, after the joyous triumph which had just been exhibited. Hence the extremely urgent asseveration with which he begins: *truth I speak in Christ*, that is, in my fellowship with Christ; *ev X.* is the *element*, in which his soul moves. Just so Eph. iv. 17; 1 Thess. iv. 1; 2 Cor. ii. 17, xii. 19. The explanation adopted by most of the older commentators (especially Joh. Capellus, Clericus, Locke), and by Nösselt, Koppe, Böhme, Flatt, Reiche, Köllner, and others, of *ev* in the sense of *adjuration*, is a perfectly

¹ On this section, see Nösselt in his *Opusc.* I. p. 141 ff.; Beck, *Vers. e. pneumatisch hermeneutischen Entwickel. d. neunten Kap.*, etc., Stuttg. 1833; Steudel in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1836, I. p. 1 ff.; Baur, *ib.* III. p. 59 ff.; Haustedt in Pelt's *Mitarbeiten*, 1838, 3; Meyer, *ib.*; Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 240 ff.; Krummacher, *Dogma von der Gnadenwahl*, Duisb. 1856, p. 142 ff. (though less for the purpose of strict scientific exegesis); Weiss, *Prädestinationslehre d. Ap. P.* in the *Jahrb. f.*

Deutsche Theol. 1857, p. 54 f.; Lamping, *Pauli de praedest. decreta*, Leovard. 1858, p. 127 ff.; Beyschlag, *d. Paulin. Theodicee Rom. ix.-xi.*, 1868; also Th. Schott and Mangold. — According to Weiss's criticism, based on style, the whole section, chap. ix.-xi., would be an *interpolation*; according to the view on which Baur proceeds (see *Introd.* § 3), the three chapters would be the *chief portion* of the whole epistle.

² On vv. 1-5, see Winzer, *Progr.* Lips. 1832.

alimentary departure both from the manner of the apostle, who never connects by Christ, and also from Greek usage, which would have required — *καὶ* with the genitive (Kühner, II. 1, p. 448; Ellendt, *Lex. Syncl.* II. p. 647); and cannot at all be justified from Matt. v. 34. LXX. Jer. vii. 7. Dan. xiii. 7. Rev. x. 6. because in these passages *ἐννοια* expressly stands beside it. — αἰ ψευδοῦσαι] προτερον δε διαβουλιαν τινος δε καλουν ψευδος, thus making *ψευδος*, κατα μηλησιν τι λεγοντας παρὰ τοις πολλοις ἀποκρισαντες comp. e.g. Acts xxi. 37. καὶ ἐν τῷ οὐνόφω ὁμοιωτοὺς διὰ πτωχεύοντες, Chrys. Compare 1 Tim. ii. 7. Conversely, Lys. iv. 12 : ψευδία κτλ. εἴς θεόν λέγειν. — *conscience*, *me*; *conscience*, *and* ground assigned for the αἰ ψειδ.; since with *me* agreeing with my express assurance, *my conscience gives testimony*. Compare ii. 15. viii. 16. — ἐκ τίνος δύνω] is by no means to be connected with τῇ σκεπῇ, see Gruter and several others. Semler, Ammon, Vater : “*conscientia à Spiritu sancto gubernata*”), because otherwise τῇ would not be wanting ; but either with αἰ ψευδοῦσαι (Cramer, Morus, Nösselt, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Platt, Winzer, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche; of whom, however, only Winzer and Fritzsche take it not as an oath, but as equivalent to *dicere* ἐκ τίνος δύναμις), or—which is the nearest and simplest—with *conscience*. (Beza, Böhme, Thielck, Rackert, de Wette, Maier, Philippi, van Hengel, Hofmann, and others.) Compare Matt. xxii. 43 : Luke ii. 27 : Mark xii. 36 : 1 Cor. xii. 3. The testimony of his conscience, Paul knows, is not apart from the witness that fills him, but “*Spiritu sancto duce et moderatore*” Beza in that sense. And thus the negative αἰ ψειδ. receives its sacred guarantee through a concurrent testimony of the conscience is *witnessing*; δύναμις as the positive *testimony* had received it through ἐκ Χριστοῦ. This very appropriate symmetry dissuades us from joining συναστ. πο. κ. λ. to ἐκ τίνος δύναμις, so that αἰ ψειδ. would be only “*thrown in between*” (Hofmann). — ἐκ τίνος κ. λ.] *that, etc.* A comma only preceding. Over what is this sorrow ? Over the exclusion of a great part of the Jews from the Messianic salvation. With tender forbearance Paul does not express this, but leaves it to be gathered by the reader from what follows, in which he immediately, by *you*, assigns the ground for the greatness and continuance of his sorrow. — *εἴθετον*] I would wish, namely, if the purport of the wish could be realized to the advantage of the Israelites. Comp. on Gal. iv. 20, where also *no* it is entered. But van Hengel takes it of a wish which had actually arisen in the mind of Paul amidst his continual sorrowfulness. So also Hofmann : the wish had entered his mind, though but momentarily. But a thing so incapable of being fulfilled he can scarce have actually wished ; he would only wish it, if it were capable of being fulfilled ; this is expressed by εἴθετον, and that without it, as a definite assurance : comp. on Acts xxv. 22 : Gal. iv. 20 : Brunsman, *neut. Gr.* p. 187 [E. T. 217] ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 178. On the wish itself, comp. Ex. xxxii. 32.—ἀνάθυσμα] or, in the Attic form, ἀνάθυμα in Greek writers (also Luke xxi. 5 : 2 Macc. ii. 13, et al., a votive offering, corresponds frequently in the LXX. to the Hebrew שָׂדֵה, and means something devoted to God without redemption (Lev. xxvii. 28) ; then—in so far as such

¹ Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* pp. 242, 445. and *Paralip* p. 391 ff

a thing was devoted to the divine *wrath*, and destined to *destruction* (see Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 101 ff.)—*something abandoned to destruction*; a *curse-offering*. So in the N. T. See Gal. i. 8, 9, 1 Cor. xii. 3, xvi. 22, which passages at the same time prove that the (later) special sense of *קֶרֶם*, as denoting the Jewish curse of *excommunication*, is not to be here introduced. The *destruction*, to which Paul would fain yield himself on behalf of his brethren, is not to be understood of a *violent death* (Jerome, Limborch, Elsner, and others, also Michaelis, Nösselt, Flatt), but, as ἀπὸ τ. X. renders necessary, of the *everlasting ἀπώλεια*. It has been objected that the wish must thus be irrational (Michaelis: “a *frantic prayer*”); but the standard of selfish reflection is not suited to the emotion of unmeasured devotedness and love out of which the apostle speaks. Groundlessly, and contrary to Paul’s usage elsewhere, Hofmann weakens the positive notion of the expression into the negative one of *the being excluded from Christ*. This element is implied in ἀπὸ τοῦ X. as the specific *accompanying relation* of the ἀνάθεμα. Bengel well remarks that the *modus ratiocinationum nostrarum* as little comprehends the love of the apostle, as does a little boy the *animos heroum bellicorum*. — αὐτὸς ἐγὼ] belonging to εἶναι by attraction (Kühner, II. 2, p. 596): *I myself, I, as far as my own person is concerned*. Comp. on vii. 25. Paul sees those who belong to the fellowship of his people advancing to ruin through their unbelief; therefore he would fain wish that *he himself* were a curse-offering, if by means of this sacrifice of his *own self* he could only save the beloved *brethren*. The contrast, with reference to which αὐτὸς ἐγὼ is here conceived, lies therefore in ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφ. μου, whose unhappy state appears already in vv. 1, 2 so sad in the eyes of the apostle; not in the *duty* of the apostle’s *calling* (Th. Schott); and least of all in a “*nescio quis alius*” (Fritzsche). Theodoret and Theophylact (comp. Chrysostom) refer back to viii. 39 (*I myself*, whom nevertheless nothing can separate, etc.); but this lies too far off. Van Hengel (after Krehl): “*Ipse ego, qui me in Christi communione esse dixi*.” But ἐν X. in the previous instance was merely an accessory definition. — ἀπὸ τοῦ X.] *away from Christ*, separated from Him. Comp. 2 Thess. i. 9; Gal. v. 4; 2 Cor. v. 6, xi. 3; Lev. xxvii. 29; and see generally, Nägelsbach on *Ilias*, p. 188, ed. 3; Ameis on *Hom. Od. Anh.* ξ, 525; Buttm. *neut. Gr.* p. 277 [E. T. 322]. Christ is not conceived as *author* of the ἀνάθ. (Nösselt, Morus, Flatt, and others); for ἀπὸ (comp. Lev. xxvii. 29) does not stand for ὑπό, which latter D E G actually read in consequence of this erroneous view. — ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφ. μου] ὑπὲρ is here also not *instead of* (Rückert, Tholućk, Olshausen, and many others), but *for the advantage of*, for their deliverance. Grotius aptly paraphrases: “*Si ca ratione illos ad justitiam veram et ad aeternam salutem possem perducere*.” — κατὰ σ.] subjoined, without the connective of the article, as a familiar accessory definition, which blends with the principal word into a single notion. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 18; Eph. ii. 11, vi. 5. Moreover, there lies in the addition τ. συγγ. μ. κ. σ. already something conveying with it the wish of love, and that from the *natural* side; the *theocratic* grounds for it follow, ver. 4 ff.

Ver. 4. Οἵτινες κ.τ.λ.] *quippe qui, who indeed*; a description—assigning the

motive for what is said in ver. 3—of the ἀδελφῶν κατὰ . . . σάρκα according to their theocratic privileges, and first of all by significant designation according to their ancient and hallowed (Gen. xxxii. 28, xi. 1 ; 2 Cor. xi. 21 f. ; Phil. iii. 5 ; John i. 48) national name Ἰσραηλῖται. To the latter are then attached the relative definitions, which are *threefold* (ὧν . . . ὧν . . . ἐξ ὧν) ; the first of them embraces *six* particulars connected by καί,—purely sacred-historical divine benefactions. — ἡ νομοθεσία] *the adoption*. They are those adopted by God into the place of children, which must of course be understood, not in the Christian (chap. viii.) but in the old theocratic sense, of their adoption, in contradistinction to all Gentile peoples, to be the people of God, whose *Father* is God. Comp. Ex. iv. 22 ff., xix. 5 ; Deut. xiv. 1, xxxii. 6 ; Hos. xi. 1, *et al.* In the *νομοθεσία* of the N. T. (see on viii. 15), the specific essence of which is the reconciliation obtained for Christ's sake, there has appeared the antitype and the completion of that of the O. T. — καὶ ἡ δόξα] *The fivefold* καὶ lends an emphatic weight to the enumeration. ἡ δόξα is the *glory* κατ' ἐξοχὴν, *i.e.* יְהוָה יְכָבוֹד (Ex. xxiv. 16, xl. 34, 35 ; 1 Kings viii. 10, 11 ; Ezek. i. 28 ; Heb. ix. 5), *the symbolically visible essential communion of God*, as it was manifested in the wilderness as a pillar of cloud and fire, and over the ark of the covenant ; the same as יְהוָה שָׁכֵן, of which the Rabbins maintained (erroneously, according to Lev. xvi. 2) that it had hovered as a cloud of light *continually* over the ark of the covenant. See Ewald, *ad Apoc.* p. 311. But ἡ δόξα is not *the ark of the covenant itself* (Beza, Piscator, Hammond, Grotius), for in 1 Sam. iv. 22 the ark of the covenant is not called “the glory of Israel,” but this is only predicated of it. Others understand *the whole glory of the Jewish people in general* (De Dieu, Calovius, Estius, Semler, Morus, Böhme, Benecke, Köllner, Glöckler, Fritzsche, Beck). Incorrectly, since it is merely *individual* privileges that are set forth. — αἱ διαθήκαι] *not the tables of the law* (Beza, Piscator, Pareus, Toletus, Balduin, Grotius, Semler, Rosenmüller), which it cannot denote either in itself or on account of the following νομοθ. ; nor yet *the O. and N. T.* (Augustine, Jerome, Calovius, and Wolf, in accordance with Gal. iv. 24), which would be entirely unsuitable in respect of the N. T. ; but *the covenants concluded by God with the patriarchs since Abraham*. Compare Wisd. xviii. 22 ; Ecclus. xlv. 11 ; 2 Macc. viii. 15 ; Eph. ii. 12. — ἡ νομοθεσία] *The (Sinaitic) giving of the law*. This is “*una et semel habita per Mosen* ;” but the “*testamenta frequenter statuta sunt*,” Origen. There is no ground for taking it, with others (including Reiche, de Wette, Fritzsche), not of the act, but of the contents, like νόμος (why should not Paul have written this ?). Certainly, he who has the νομοθεσία has also the νόμος ; but on that account the two *significations* are to be kept distinct even in places like 2 Macc. vi. 23. The giving of the law was a *work* (comp. Plat. *Legy.* vi. p. 751 B : μεγάλου τῆς νομοθεσίας ἔργον ὄντος), by which God, who Himself was the νομοθέτης, had distinguished the Israelites over all other peoples. — ἡ λατρεία] *the cultus* κατ' ἐξοχὴν, the service of Jehovah in the temple. Comp. Heb. ix. 1. It corresponds to the νομοθ., in consequence of which the λατρεία came into existence ; just as the following αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι (κατ' ἐξοχὴν, the collective *Messianic promises*) is correlative to the αἱ διαθήκαι, on which the ἐπαγγ.

were founded. The *chiasmus* in this order of sequence (comp. Bengel) is not accidental; but αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι is intentionally put at the end, in order that now, after mention of the *fathers*, to whom in the first instance the promises were given, the *Promised one Himself* may follow.

Ver. 5.¹ Now, after that first relative sentence with its six theocratic distinctions, two other relative clauses introduce the mutually correlative *persons*, on whom the sacred-historical calling of Israel was based and was to reach its accomplishment. — οἱ πατέρες] Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who are *per excellentiam* the patriarchs, Ex. iii. 13, 15, iv. 5; Acts iii. 13, vii. 32. — καὶ ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ.] The last and highest distinction of the Israelites: and from whom Christ descends, namely, according to the human phenomenal nature, as a human phenomenon, apart from the spiritually-divine side of His personality, according to which He is not from the Jews, but (as υἱὸς Θεοῦ κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης, i. 4) is ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Regarded in the light of His supernatural generation, He would be also κατὰ σάρκα of God. Comp. Clem. Cor. I. 32: ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα. On the article τὸ κ. σ., see Heind. *ad Gorg.* p. 228; Buttm. *neut. Gr.* p. 84 [E. T. 95 f.]. The καὶ before ἐξ ὧν forbids the reference of the latter to οἱ πατέρες. — ὁ ὧν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς εὐλογ. εἰς τ. αἰῶνας] This passage, which has become of dogmatic importance, has received two different leading interpretations, by the side of which yet a third way, namely, by taking to pieces the relative sentence, came to be suggested. (1) The words are referred (placing a comma after σάρκα) to Christ, who is God over all, blessed for ever.² So, substantially, Irenaeus (*Haer.* iii. 16. 3), Tertullian (*adv. Prax.* § 13, p. 2101, ed. Seml.), Origen, Cyprian, Epiphanius, Athanasius, Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Augustine, Jerome, Theodoret, and later Fathers; Luther, Erasmus, *Paraphr.*, Flacius, Calvin, Beza, and most of the older expositors; and of the later, Michaelis, Koppe, Tholuck, Platt, Klee, Usteri, Benecke, Olshausen, Nielsen, Reithmayr, Maier, Beck, Philippi, Bisping, Gess, Krummacher, Jatho, Hahn, Thomasius, Ebrard, Ritschl, Hofmann, Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 306, Delitzsch, and others; in a peculiar fashion also, Herm. Schultz (see below); de Wette is undecided. (2) The words are regarded (placing a period after σάρκα, as do Lachm. and Tisch.) as a *doxology to God*, isolated from the foregoing: “Blessed for ever be the God who is over all.” So none of the Fathers (as to those erroneously adduced by Wetstein, see Fritzsche, p. 262 ff.³), at least not expressly; but Erasmus in his *Annot.*,

¹ See on ver. 5, Herm. Schultz, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1868, p. 462 ff., where also a list of the earlier literature is given; Grimm, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1869, p. 311 ff. Among the English opponents of the Unitarians there is to be especially noted, in defence of the orthodox explanation, Smith, *Scripture Testimony to the Messiah*, 1847, ed. 4, II. p. 370 ff.

² So also the *Catech. Racov.* 159 f. But, in its view, since there are not two Gods, “qui natura sit Deus” cannot be understood. Conversely, Flacius infers from ἐπὶ

πάντων, that Christ is designated as *naturaliter Deus*.

³ Yet the non-reference to Christ is indirectly implied in Ignatius, *Tars. interpol.* 5 (οὐκ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός κ.τ.λ.), and *Phil. interpol.* 7. The reference to God is also found in a fragment ascribed to Diodorus, in Cramer, *Caten.* p. 162, where it is said: ἐξ αὐτῶν φησιν ὁ Χριστός. Θεὸς δὲ οὐ μόνον αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐστι Θεός. In the Arian controversies our passage was not made use of. But at a later period it was triumphantly made available against

Wetstein, Semler, Stolz, and several others, and recently Reiche, Köllner, Winzer, Fritzsche, Glöckler, Schrader, Krehl, Ewald, van Hengel, and, though not fully decided, Rückert.¹ Now the decision, which of the two leading interpretations fits the *meaning of the apostle*, cannot be arrived at from the language used,² since, so far as the words go, both may be equally correct [See Note CII. p. 396.]; nor yet from the immediate connection, since with equal reason Paul might (by no means : *must*, against which is the analogy of ver. 3 ; and the divine in Christ did not belong here, as in i. 3, necessarily to the connection) feel himself induced to set over-against the human side of the being of Jesus its divine side (as in i. 3), or might be determined by the recital of the distinctions of his nation to devote a doxology to God, the Author of these privileges, who therefore was not responsible for the deeply-lamented unbelief of the Jews ; just as he elsewhere, in peculiar excited states of piety, introduces a giving glory to God (i. 25 ; 2 Cor. xi. 31 ; Gal. i. 5 ; comp. 1 Tim. i. 17). Observe, rather, with a view to a decision, the following considerations : Although our passage, referred to *Christ*, would term Him not *ὁ Θεός*, but (*who is God over all*) only *Θεός* predicatively (*without* the article), and although Paul, by virtue of his essential agreement in *substance* with the Christology of John, might have affirmed, just as appropriately as the latter (i. 1), the predicative *Θεός* (*of divine essence*) of Christ, because Christ is also in Paul's view the Son of God in a metaphysical sense, the image of God, of like essence with the Father, the agent in creation and preservation, the partaker in the divine government of the world, the judge of all, the object of prayerful invocation, the possessor of divine glory and fulness of grace (i. 4, x. 12 ; Phil. ii. 6 ; Col. i. 15 ff., ii. 9 ; Eph. i. 20 ff. ; 1 Cor. viii. 6 ; 2 Cor. iv. 4, viii. 9) ; yet Paul has *never*³

the Arians. Thus Oecumenius, *e.g.* exclaims : ἐνταῦθα λαμπρότατα Θεὸν τὸν Χριστὸν ὀνομάζει ὁ ἀπόστολος αἰσχύνῃτι τρισάθλιε Ἀρεῖε, ἀκούων παρὰ Παύλου δοξολογούμενον τὸν Χριστὸν Θεὸν ἀληθινόν ! Comp. Theophylact ; also Proclus, *de fide*, p. 53, who says generally of our passage : παρεισδυσιν συκοφαντίας ἀποστεριχίζει τοῖς φιλολοιδόροις. In Cyril of Alexandria this passage is insisted on in opposition to the assertion of Julian, that only John calls Christ God ; whilst the *πρακτικά* of the Synod of Ephesus make no reference to it, which is, however, carefully done in the Synod of Antioch. See the passages in question in Tisch. 8, who also observes that, among the codd. C. L. 5, 47, place a full stop after *σάρκα*.

¹ See also Baur, II. p. 231 ; Zeller, in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1842, p. 51 ; Rübiger, *Christol. Paul.* p. 26 f. ; Beyschlag, *Christol.* p. 210.

² As van Hengel has attempted, who starts from the idea that the contrast to be thought of in τὸ κατὰ σάρκα (according to him : "non quatenus spiritus divini participes erat") excludes a *vider antithesis*, and therefore a point must necessarily be

placed after *σάρκα*. Such prepositional definitions with the accusative of the article τό or τά (see also Kühner, II. 1, p. 272) certainly denote a complete contrast, which is either expressly stated (as *e.g.* Xen. *Cyr.* v. 4. 11, νῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐμοὶ οἰχομαι, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ σοὶ σείσωμαι : Plat. *Min.* p. 320 C ; Rom. xii. 5, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἐς), or may be self-evident from the context, as i. 15, xii. 18, and very frequently in the classics. The latter would, however, be the case in our passage according to the ancient ecclesiastical exposition, inasmuch as the contrast obviously implied in τὸ κατὰ σάρκα would permit us mentally to supply a τὸ κατὰ πνεῦμα as suggesting itself after ὁ ὢν. That self-evident negative antithesis : *non quoad spiritum*, would thus have in ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός κ.τ.λ. its *positive elucidation*.

³ Not even in 2 Thess. i. 12 (in opposition to Hofmann's invention), or in Eph. v. 5. As regards the *Pastoral Epistles*, if they actually denominated Christ *Θεός*, this would be one of the signs of a post-apostolic epoch. But not once do they do this. The most specious passage is still Tit. ii. 13,

used the express *Θεός* of Christ, since he has not adopted, like John, the Alexandrian form of conceiving and setting forth the divine essence of Christ, but has adhered to the popular concrete, strictly monotheistic terminology, not modified by philosophical speculation even for the designation of Christ; and he always accurately distinguishes God and Christ; see, in opposition to such obscure and erroneous intermingling of ideas, Rich. Schmidt, *Paulin. Christol.* p. 149 ff. John himself calls the divine nature of Christ *Θεός* only in the introduction of his Gospel, and only in the closest connection with the Logos-speculation. And thus there runs through the whole N. T. a delicate line of separation between the Father and the Son; so that, although the divine essence and glory of the latter is glorified with the loftiest predicates in manifold ways, nevertheless it is only the Father, to whom the Son is throughout subordinated, and never Christ, who is actually called *God* by the apostles (with the exception of John i. 1, and the exclamation of Thomas, John xx. 28)—not even in 1 John v. 20. Paul, particularly, even where he accumulates and strains to the utmost expressions concerning the Godlike nature of the exalted Christ (as Phil. ii. 6 ff.; Col. i. 15 ff., ii. 9), does not call Him *Θεός*, but sharply and clearly distinguishes Him as the *κύριος* from *Θεός*, even in x. 9, 1 Cor. xii. 3 (in opposition to Ritschl, *Altkath. K.* p. 79 f.). The post-apostolical period (and not at all 2 Pet. i. 1, see Huther) first obliterated this fine line of separation, and often denominated Christ *Θεός*, *ὁ Θεός ἡμῶν*, and the like. So, e.g., already several of the Ignatian epistles in the shorter recension (not those *ad Magnes.*, *ad Philadelph.*, *ad Trall.*, not even chap. vii.) and the so-called second epistle—not the first¹—of Clement, nor the epistle of Polycarp. In the closest internal connection herewith stands the fact, that in the properly apostolical writings (2 Pet. iii. 18 does not belong to them, nor does Heb. xiii. 21) we never meet with a doxology to Christ in the form which is usual with doxologies to God (not even in 1 Pet. iv. 11); therefore, in this respect also, the present passage would stand to the *apostolic* type in the relation of a complete *anomaly*.² Besides the insuperable difficulty would be introduced, that here Christ would be called not merely and simply *Θεός*, but even *God over all*, and consequently would be designated as *Θεός παντοκράτωρ*, which is absolutely incompatible with the entire view of the N. T. as to the dependence of the Son on the Father (see Gess, *v. d. Pers. Chr.* p. 157 ff.; Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 457 ff.), and especially with passages like viii. 34 (*ἐντυγχάνει*), 1 Cor. iii. 23, viii. 6, xi. 3, Eph. iv. 5, 6, and notably 1 Cor. xv. 28. Accordingly, the doxology of our passage cannot be referred to Christ, but must be referred to *God*;

respecting which, however, Huther is in the right, and Philippi, *Glaubenslehr.* II. p. 308, ed. 2, is incorrect. In 1 Tim. iii. 16, *ὅς* is to be read, with Lachm. and Tisch.; on Tit. i. 4 even Philippi desires to lay no particular stress; it has, in fact, no bearing whatever on our passage, any more than Col. ii. 2 (see *in loc.*).

¹ There certainly occurs at chap. ii. in Clement, the expression *τὰ παθήματα αὐτοῦ*

(i.e. τοῦ Θεοῦ), where we are not to correct it into *μαθήματα*, with Hilgenfeld. This expression, however, is fully explained, without Christ being named *Θεός*, from the Pauline view: *Θεός ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσω ἐαυτῷ*, 2 Cor. v. 19.

² The doxology in xvi. 27 does not refer to Christ. 2 Tim. iv. 18 certainly refers to Christ; but this is just one of the traces of post-apostolic composition.

although Philippi continues of opinion that the *former* reference has *all* in its favor and *nothing* against it. On the other hand, Tholuck (see also Schmid, *bibl. Theol.* II. p. 540, ed. 2) does more justice to the objections against the old ecclesiastical interpretation, which Messner also, *Lehre d. Ap.* p. 236 f., prefers, but only with a certain diffidence; whilst Herm. Schultz (comp. Socinus, in Calovius, p. 153) comes ultimately to a *lower* acceptation of the notion of Θεός, which is meant *not metaphysically*, but only *designates the fulness of power committed to Christ for behoof of His work, and excludes neither dependence and coming into being, nor beginning and end.* Against the latter suggestion it may be decisively urged, that thus characteristics are attached to the notion Θεός, which, compared with the current Pauline mode of expression, directly annul it, and make it interchangeable with κύριος, as Paul uses it of Christ (Eph. iv. 5, 6; Phil. ii. 11; 1 Cor. viii. 6, and many other passages). See, in opposition to it, also Grimm. If we suppose the quite singular case here to occur, that Paul names Christ *God*, yea God over all, we need not shrink from recognizing, with the orthodox interpreters, an expression of the fact that Christ is not *nuncupative*, but *naturaliter* God (Flacius, *Clav.* II. p. 187). (3) *Another way*, that of *taking to pieces* the relative clause, was suggested by Erasmus, who proposed to place the point (as in Cod. 71) after πάντων (in which Locke, Clark, Justi, Ammon, Stolz, Grimm, &c., and in *de Johann. Christol. indole Paulinae compar.* p. 75 f., Baumgarten-Crusius, Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 200 ff., and Märcker follow him), so that *qui est super omnia* (or *omnes*) refers to Christ (comp. Acts x. 36), and then the doxology to *God* follows. But how intolerably abrupt is this!—not merely the brief description given of Christ, but also the doxology itself, which with ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων loses its natural connection with the preceding. Again, with this separation would disappear the motive for Paul's not having put εὐλογ. *in the first place*, as usually (comp. 2 Cor. i. 3; Eph. i. 3; also the doxologies in the LXX). This motive is, namely, the *emphasis* which Θεός obtains *by the characteristic description* ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων (*the God who is over all*).¹ Still more disjointed and halting the language becomes through the punctuation of Morus (who, however, concurs in referring the whole to *Christ*): ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων, Θεός, εὐλογ. εἰς τ. αἰ.² Why Reiche, whom Krehl and van Hengel have followed, although rightly referring the whole to God, has adopted this punctuation (*He who is over all, God, be praised for ever*), we cannot perceive;

¹ With emphasis, too, in the LXX. Ps. lxxviii. 20, κύριος ὁ Θεός appears to be *prefixed* to εὐλογ. Yet the translator must have had קָרָן twice in the original text.

² Otherwise Hofmann (comp. his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 144; also Kahnis, *Dogmat.* I. p. 453 f.): Paul predicates ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων of Christ, and then causes Θεός εὐλογ. εἰς τ. αἰών. to follow as a *second predicate*. But if we once believe that the sentence must be referred to Christ, it is in any case far more in keeping with the emotional flow of the language to leave the whole unbroken, without making an artificial abatement

from the result, that Paul has named Christ ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός. This artificial abatement is thus brought out by Hofmann: he takes ἐπὶ πάντων as in contradistinction to ἐξ ὧν, and Θεός as in contradistinction to κατὰ σάρκα, after which arbitrary analysis the twofold antithetic sequence of thought is supposed to be: "*He who supremely rules over all has come forth out of this people, and, in respect of the self-transmitting human corporeal nature, there has come forth out of this people He who is God.*" As though Paul had written: ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, ὁ ὢν Θεός εὐλογητὸς εἰς τ. αἰῶνας, Gess.

ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, taken independently, forms in fact, according to a quite customary manner of expression, one phrase, so that Θεός is *not* without the article. Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 7; Kühner, II. § 464, 8, c. Finally, Grotius (not also Schoettgen, as Schultz states) would consider Θεός as not genuine, and would refer ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ π. εὐλ. to *Christ*, to whom “*laus et honor debetur supra omnes, i.e. etiam supra Abrah., Isaac. et Jacob.*” But that Θεός is not wanting in the *Peshito*, as Grotius maintains, is decisively settled (see Koppe), and the witnesses who actually omit it (*edd.* of Cyprian, and Hilary, Leo once, Ephraem) are much too weak and doubtful; see Bengel, *Appar. crit. in loc.* Quite arbitrary is the conjecture of Sam. Crell (*Artemonius*): ὢν ὁ ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. — ἐπὶ πάντων] *neuter*. The limitation which takes it as masc. (Syr., Beza, Grotius, Socinus, Justi, Hofmann, and others), in which case it is by some held to apply to men generally, by others to the patriarchs,¹ must have been presented by the context; but it is not at all suggested by anything, not even in the reference of the sense, which Fritzsche introduces: “*qui omnibus hominibus prospicit Deus, ut male credas Judaeos ab eo destitutos esse, etc.*” — ἐπὶ indicates the relation of the *rule over all things*.² God is the παντοκράτωρ, 2 Cor. vi. 18; often in the Apocalypse, ὁ μόνος δυνάστης ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλεόντων κ.τ.λ., 1 Tim. vi. 15, 16.

Vv. 6–13. First part of the *Theodicée*: *God's promise, however, has not become untrue through the exclusion of a part of the Israelites; for it applies only to the true Israelites, who are such according to the promise, which is confirmed from Scripture.*

Ver. 6. Having in vv. 4, 5 adduced the great divine prerogatives of his people, and given honour to God for them, as his Israelitish sympathies impelled him to do,³ his thought now recurs to that utterance of grief in vv. 2, 3, over-against which (δέ) he now proposes to *justify* the God of his people. [See Note CHL. p. 399.] Quite unnecessarily Lachmann has put vv. 3–5 in a *parenthesis*. — οὐχ οἶον δέ, ὅτι] does not mean: *but it is not possible that* (Beza, Piscator, Grotius, Homberg, Semler, Ch. Schmidt, Morus, Böhme, Rosenmüller, Benecke, Ewald); for in that case ὅτι would not be allowable, but the infinitive must follow (Matthiae, § 479; Krüger, § 55. 3. 1); moreover as Calvin has rightly observed, οἶον τε would be found, at least according to the invariable usage (4 Macc. iv. 7; Xen. *Anab.* ii. 2. 3, vii. 7. 22; and Bornemann, *in loc.*; *de Rep. Ath.* ii. 2; *Mem.* iv. 6. 7; *Thuc.* vii. 42, 3; *Soph. Phil.* 913; *O. C.* 1420; *Ast. Lex. Plat.* II. p. 425), instead of which scarcely an uncertain example (as Gorgias, *pro Palam*, in Wetstein) is forthcoming of the *simple* οἶον without τέ, whilst the masculine οἶός εἰμι (without τέ) is frequent (see Schömann, *ad Is.* p. 465; Weber, *Dem. Aristocr.* p. 469; Kühner, II. 2, p. 702. 580). It is rather to be explained by the very current usage in later Greek (Lennep. *ad Phalar.* p. 258;

¹ Van Hengel assumes that the *Israelites* and *patriarchs* and *Christ* are intended.

² See Lobeck, *ad Herodian.* p. 474, *ad Phryn.* pp. 164, 174; Bähr, *ad Plut. Alc.* p. 162.

³ And yet Hofmann terms the words ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός κ.τ.λ., taken as a doxology, an *uncalled-for*, and *aimless, insufferable interruption*. Psychologically, a *very unjust judgment*.

Fritzsche on our passage) of *οὐχ οἶον* with a following finite tense ; (e.g. *οὐχ οἶον ὀργίζομαι* in *Phryn.* p. 372, and the passages from Polybius in Schweighäuser, p. 403). According to this usage, the attracted *οἶον* is not to be resolved, with Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 790, into *τοῖον οἶον*, because the following verb does not suit this, but with Fritzsche into *τοιούτον ὅτι* : the matter is not of such a nature, that. But since Paul has here expressed *ὅτι*, he cannot have conceived it as contained in *οἶον* : in reality he has fallen into a mixing up of two kindred modes of expression—namely, of *οὐχ οἶον* with a finite tense, and *οὐχ ὅτι*, i.e. *οὐχ ἐρῶ ὅτι*.¹ Without this intermingling he would have written *οὐχ οἶον δὲ ἐκπέπτωκεν* ; but consequent on this intermingling he wrote *οὐχ οἶον δὲ, ὅτι ἐκπ.*, which accordingly may be analyzed thus : *οὐ τοῖον δὲ λέγω. οἶον ὅτι, I do not speak of a thing of such kind, as (that is) that.* So also substantially Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 319 [E. T. 372 f.], and previously, by way of suggestion, Beza. The deviation from Greek usage into which Paul has fallen renders also necessary this solution, which *deviates*² from the analysis of the Greek *οὐχ οἶον δὲ ἐκπέπτ.* (without *ὅτι*) ; and we have here, amongst the many solecisms falsely ascribed to the apostle, a real one. Observe, moreover, the *strength* of the negation implied in *οὐχ οἶον* ; for this affirms that the lament of the apostle was to be *something quite other* than a lament over the frustration of the divine word. According to Hofmann, *ἡχόμην* is to be again supplied to *οὐχ οἶον*, and *ὅτι* to be taken as *because*,³ so that thus Paul would deny that he had for that *wish* the *ground* which is named is *ὅτι ἐκπέπτωκεν κ.τ.λ.* This is—independently of the arbitrariness of the insertion of *ἡχόμην*—incorrect, just because the thought that this *ἡχόμην* could have had that *ground* would be an *absurd* thought ; for it would suppose a fact, which is inconceivable as a *motive* of the wish. — *ἐκπέπτωκεν*] *has fallen out of its position, i.e. fallen through*, become unavailing, without result.⁴ So *διαπίπτειν*, Josh. xxi. 45 ; Judith vi. 9 ; and *πίπτειν*, Josh. xxiii. 14 ; both in use also among the Greeks ; comp. *ἐκβάλλεσθαι*, Dissen, *ad Pind. Nem.* xi. 30. The opposite is *μένειν*, ver. 11. Comp. also 1 Cor. xiii. 8. — *ὁ λόγος τ. Θεοῦ*] namely, not the *Dei edictum* (ver. 28) as to the bestowal of blessing only on the *election* of the Israelites, as Fritzsche, anticipating, would have it, but generally *the promise given by God to the Israelites*, by which the assurance of the *Messianic salvation* is obviously intended. This sense the context yields generally, and especially by *ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς τὸ κ. σ.*, ver. 5, without our having exactly to think of Gen. xii. 3, where the promise is to *Abraham* (Th. Schott). — *οὐ γὰρ πάντες κ.τ.λ.*] *for not all who spring from Israel*, not all *ἱσραήλ* (ver. 27), *are Israelites* (Israel's children, according to the divine idea), so as to be all destined to receive the salvation promised to the Israelites. Comp. Gal. iv. 29, vi. 16. The *first ἱσραήλ* is

¹ See Tyrwhitt, *ad Arist. Poet.* p. 128 ; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 153 f. ; Kühner, II. 2, p. 800 f.

² Fritzsche prefers to assume a *constructio p̄p̄s τὸ σημαίνόμενον*, so that Paul has written *ὅτι* because in *οὐχ οἶον δὲ* lies the essential meaning : *sed multum abest.*—Van

Hengel proposes to resolve the expression thus : *τοιόνδε λέγων, οἶον τοῦτό ἐστιν, οὐ λέγω ὅτι.*

³ Comp. also Erasmus, Castallo, Reithmayr.

⁴ See Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 21 ; Ael. *V. H.* iv. 7 ; Kypke, II. p. 173 f.

the name of the *patriarch*; the *second*, instead of which the old reading 'Ισραηλῖται (D. Chrys.) contains a correct gloss, is the name of his *people* (xi. 2, 7, 26, *al.*). Mistaking the subtle emphatic character of this mode of expression, Hofmann, in spite of the clear οἱ ἐξ, takes the first 'Ισρ. also as a name of the people, so that the sense would be : the *unity* of the people is something other than the *sum of its members*. To οἱ ἐξ 'Ισρ. corresponds σπέρμα 'Αβρ., ver. 7.

Ver. 7. *Nor yet, because they are descendants of Abraham, are they all* (his) *children*.—Before οὐδ' a colon only is correct, because the discourse proceeds continuously, annexing denial to denial. — εἰσὶ] The subject is that of the previous clause, οἱ ἐξ 'Ισραήλ. The τέκνα of Abraham, as significantly contrasted with the mere bodily descendants (σπέρμα), are those destined by God to receive the promised salvation. Comp. Matt. iii. 9; John viii. 33, 39; Justin, *c. Tryph.* 44. That it is not *God's* children that are to be understood (although they *are* such), as, after Theodoret and several others, Glöcker afresh takes it, is manifest from the foregoing parallel οὗτοι 'Ισραήλ, and from the fact that it is not till afterwards that τέκνα τ. Θεοῦ are spoken of.—Wrongly, but in consequence of his erroneous understanding of the ὅτι, ver. 6, Hofmann regards οὐδ' ὅτι εἰσὶ σπ. 'Αβρ. as the negation of a second ground of the *ὑπόμνην*, so that then a new sentence begins with πάντες τέκνα. This view the obvious correlation of οὐδ' . . . τέκνα with the preceding οὐ γὰρ πάντες κ.τ.λ. should have precluded. — After ἀλλ' we are not to supply γέγραπται or οὕτως ἐρρέθη, which would be quite arbitrary; but the saying in Gen. xxi. 12, which is well known to the reader as a saying of God, is subjoined unaltered and immediately (comp. Gal. iii. 11, 12; 1 Cor. xv. 27) without a καθὼς γέγραπται (xv. 3; 1 Cor. i. 31) or the like being introduced, or the second person being altered into the third; simply because it is taken for granted that *the saying is one well known*. — ἐν 'Ισ. κληθ. σοι σπέρμα] closely after the LXX., which renders the original literally. In the original text we read יְרַע יְהוָה לְךָ יִצְחָק יָקָרָא : *through Isaac posterity shall be named to thee, i.e. through Isaac it will come to pass to thee, that posterity of thine shall have the status and the name of the σπέρμα 'Αβρ.* (comp. Heb. xi. 18); the descendants of Isaac (consequently not the Ishmaelites) shall be recognized as thy posterity (and therewith as the heirs of the divine promise).¹ But the apostle has otherwise apprehended the sense of the passage according to its *typical* reference; for it is evident from the relation of ver. 9 to ver. 8, that he *limited* that saying to the person of Isaac himself, who (not Ishmael) was the *promised* child of Abraham, and thus represented in himself the character of the true posterity of Abraham accounted as such by God. Hence, in the sense of the apostle: "*In the person of Isaac will a descendant be named to thee;*" i.e., Isaac will be he, in whose person the notion "descendant of Abraham" shall be represented and recognized.

¹ According to Hofmann, the sense is: "The race, whose ancestor Abraham is assumed to be, shall bear Isaac's name." This sense would, instead of

quire יִצְחָק יָקָרָא, and in the Greek τῷ ὀνόματι (Isa. xliii. 7) or (xlviii. 1) ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι 'Ισαάκ.

Paul finds in this divine declaration the idea enunciated (ver. 8), that not on bodily descent (which was also the case with Ishmael), but on divine promise (which was the case with Isaac, ver. 9), the true sonship of Abraham is founded. Usually (not by Philippi and Ewald, who concur with our view) the passage is understood, conformably to the historical sense of the original, not of the *person* of Isaac, but of his *posterity*; which, because Isaac himself was the son of promise, represents the true descendants of Abraham according to the promise. But to this posterity *all* Israelites certainly belonged, and it would therefore be inappropriate to set them down, by virtue of their extraction from Isaac, as the type of the true sonship of Abraham, when the very claim to that sonship, resting upon bodily descent, is to be withdrawn from them. The *person* of Isaac himself, as contrasted with Ishmael, was this type, which was thereupon repeated in Jacob, as contrasted with Esau (in their *persons*), vv. 10-13. Chrysostom aptly indicates the reference to Isaac himself: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο εἶπεν· ἐν Ἰσ. κλ. σ. σπ., ἵνα μάθῃς, ὅτι οἱ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ γεννώμενοι τῷ κατὰ τὸν Ἰσαάκ, οὗτοι μάλιστα εἰσι τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ· πῶς οὖν ὁ Ἰσαάκ ἐγενήθη; οὐ κατὰ νόμον φύσεως, οὐδὲ κατὰ δύναμιν σαρκὸς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπαγγελίας. — κληθήσεται] *nominabitur*.¹ The opinion of Reiche, that καλ. denotes *to call out of nothing* (see on iv. 7), which it signifies also in Gen. xxi. 12, so that the sense would be: “In the person of Isaac a descendant will be imparted to thee,” is erroneous, because that saying of God was uttered *after* the birth of Isaac. — σοι] Dative of ethical reference. — τοῦτ’ ἐστίν] *This purports, thereby the idea is expressed*. Rightly Grotius: “Haec vox est explicantis ὑπόνοιαν latentem, quod שׂרר dicitur Hebraeis.” — τέκνα τ. Θεοῦ] Paul characterizes the true descendants of Abraham, who are not so from bodily generation, as *God’s children*, that is, as such descendants of the ancestor, whose Abrahamic sonship is not different in the idea of God from that of sonship to Him, so that they are regarded and treated by God as *His* children. — τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγ.] might mean: *the promised children* (so van Hengel); for the *promised* child of Abraham was Isaac (ver. 9), whose birth was *the realization of a promise*, (and so Hofmann takes it). But that Paul had the conception that Isaac was begotten *by virtue of the divine promise*, is evident from Gal. iv. 23 (see *in loc.*), and therefore the genitive (as also previously τῆς σαρκὸς) is to be taken *causatively*: the children of Abraham *who originate from the divine promise*, who are placed in this their relation of sonship to Abraham through the creative power of the divine promise, analogously to the begetting of Isaac; ἡ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἰσχὺς ἔτεκε τὸ παιδίον, Chrysostom. — λογίζεται] by God. Comp. iv. 3, 5. — εἰς σπέρμα] that is, as an *Abrahamic* posterity. See ver. 7. To understand *gentiles* also, is here foreign to the context (in opposition to Beyschlag); see vv. 9-13. *Abraham’s* race is treated of, to which not *all* who descend from him are without distinction reckoned by God as belonging.

Ver. 9. Proof of the foregoing ἀλλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας. "The children of promise, I say, for a word of promise is that which follows: about this

¹ See Winer, p. 571 f. [E. T. 615]; Eur. *Hec.* 625, and Pflugk *in loc.*

time, etc." Hence, therefore, we see that not the bodily descent, but the divine *promise*, constitutes the relation of belonging to Abraham's fatherhood. The quotation is freely put together from Gen. xviii. 10 and xviii. 14, after the LXX. — Το κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, as *this time* (namely, of the next year), corresponds חֵן חֵן in the original (comp. 2 Kings iv. 16, 17 ; Gen. xvii. 21), which is to be explained : *as the time revives*, that is, when the time (which is now a thing of the past and dead) returns to life ; not with Fritzsche : in the *present* time (of the next year), which suits the words of the LXX.,—where, by way of explanation, the classical εἰς ὥρας, *over the year*, is added,—but not the Hebrew. See Gesenius, *Thes.* I. p. 470 ; Tuch and Knobel on Gen. xviii. 10. On the whole promise, comp. Hom. *Od.* xi. 248 f., 295.

Ver. 10. A fresh and still more decisive proof (for it might be objected that, of Abraham's children, Sarah's son only was *legitimate*) that only the divine disposal constituted the succession to Abraham which was true and valid in the sight of God. Comp. Barnab. 13. The more definite notion of *promise*, which was retained in the preceding, is here expanded into the more general one of the *appointment* of the divine *will* as made known. — οὐ μόνον δέ] See generally on v. 3. What is supplied must be something that is gathered from the preceding, that fits the nominative Ῥεβέκκα, and that answers as regards sense to the following ἐρρέθη αὐτῇ. Hence, because τῇ Σάρρα precedes, and with ἀλλὰ καὶ another *mother's* name is introduced, we must supply, as subject, not *Abraham* (Augustine, Beza, Calvin, Reithmayr, van Hengel ; comp. also Hofmann, who however thinks any completing supplement useless), but Σάρρα ; and moreover, not indeed the definite λόγον ἐπαγγελίας εἶχεν or ἐπηγγελμένη ἦν (Vatablus, Fritzsche, Winer, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius), but the more general λόγον or ῥῆμα Θεοῦ εἶχεν, which is suitable to the subsequent ἐρρέθη, as well as to the contents of the sayings adduced in vv. 12, 13 : "*But not only had Sarah a saying of God, but also Rebecca, etc.*" We must therefore throw aside the manifold arbitrary supplements suggested, some of which are inconsistent with the construction, not suiting the nominative Ῥεβ., as *e.g.* : "non solum id, quod jam diximus, documentum est ejus, quod inferre volumus ; Rebecca idem nos docet" (so Grotius, also Seb. Schmid, Semler, Ch. Schmid, Cramer, Rosenmüller, and several others ; comp. Tholuck and Philippi) ; or : τοῦτο ἦν (Rückert, de Wette), so that the nominative Ῥεβ. forms an *anacoluthon*, and the period begun enters with ver. 11 upon quite another form (how forced, seeing that vv. 11 and 12 in themselves stand in perfectly regular construction !). It is only the semblance of an objection against our view, that not Sarah, but Abraham, received the word of promise, ver. 9 ; for Sarah was, by the nature of the case, and also according to the representation of Genesis, the co-recipient of the promise, and was mixed up in the conversation of God with Abraham in reference to it (Gen. xviii. 13–15) ; so that Paul, without incurring the charge of contradicting history, might have no scruple in stating the contrast as between the *mothers*, as he has done. — ἐξ ἐνὸς κοίτην ἔχουσα] *Who had cohabitation of one (man)*, the effect of which was the conception of the *twin* children. The contextual importance of this addition does not consist in

its denying that there was a breach of conjugal fidelity, but in its making palpably apparent the invalidity—for the history of salvation—of bodily descent. She was pregnant by *one* man, and yet how different was the divine determination with respect to the two children!—ἐξ ἑνός] masculine, without anything being supplied; for Ἰσ. τ. π. ἡμ. is in apposition. *κοίτη*, couch, bed, often *marriage bed* (Heb. xiii. 4), is found seldom in the classical writers,¹ with whom *εὐνή* and *λέχος* often have the same sense, euphemistically used as equivalent to *concubitus*, but frequently in the LXX. See Schleusner, *Thes.* III. p. 347. Comp. Wisd. iii. 13, 16. — τοῦ πατρ. ἡμ.] from the *Jewish* consciousness; for the discourse has primarily to do with the Jews. Comp. iv. 1. If Isaac were to be designated as the father of *Christians* (Reiche, Fritzsche), the context must have necessarily and definitely indicated this, since believers are *Abraham's* (spiritual) children. We may add that Ἰσ. τοῦ πατρ. ἡμῶν is not without a significant bearing on the argument, inasmuch as it contributes to make us feel the independence of the determination of the divine will on the theocratic descent, however legitimate.

Vv. 11, 12. *Although, forsooth, they were not yet born, and had not done anything good or evil, in order that the purpose of God according to election might have its continued subsistence, not from works, but from Him who calls, it was said to her, etc.* [See Note CIV. p. 399.]—μήπω] not οὐπω, because the negative relation is intended to be expressed *subjectively*, that is, as placed before the view of God and weighed by Him in delivering His utterance.² —The *subject* (αὐτῶν) to the participles is not expressed, according to a well-known classical usage (Matthiae, § 563; Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 2. 17), but it would be self-evident to the reader from the history familiar to him, that the *twins of Rebecca* were intended; Winer, p. 548 [E. T. 589]. — *The sentence expressive of purpose, ἵνα . . . καλοῦντος, is placed with emphasis before ἐρρέθη, and therefore not to be placed in a parenthesis. — ἵνα introduces the purpose which God had in this, that, notwithstanding they were not yet born, etc., He yet gave forth already the declaration of ver. 12. He thereby purposed, namely, that His resolve—conceived in the mode of an election made amongst men—to bestow the blessings of the Messianic salvation should subsist, etc.—ἡ κατ' ἐκλογ. πρόθεσις³] can neither be so taken, that the ἐκλογή precedes the πρόθεσις in point of time (comp. viii. 28), which is opposed to the nature of the relation, especially seeing that the πρόθεσις pertains to what was antecedent to time (see on viii. 28);⁴ nor so that the ἐκλογή follows the πρόθεσις,*

¹ Eur. *Med.* 151, *Hippol.* 154; not Anacr. 23, see Valck. *Schol.* II. p. 594.

² See Winer, p. 450 [E. T. 483 f.]; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 295. Comp. Xen. *Cyr.* iii. 1. 37.

³ Taken by Beck in a rationalistic sense: "The fundamental outline which serves as a standard for the temporal training of the ἐκλογή, and pervades their temporal development in all its parts".

⁴ Since the divine πρόθεσις is antecedent to time (Eph. iii. 11; 2 Tim. i. 9), as is also the ἐκλογή (Eph. i. 4; and see Weiss, *bibl. Theol.*

§ 126), we cannot, with Beyschlag, p. 38, understand it of the plan developing itself in history, pertaining to the history of God's kingdom, as God forms it in the calling of Abraham and executes it up to the apostolic present. Mistaken also is van Hengel's view, according to which the κατ' ἐκλογ. πρόθ is to be limited to the determination of choice respecting the two brothers, and μένη to the abiding realization of it in the posterity of both sides, while οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος is supposed to be a gloss.

whether it be regarded as the act of its fulfilment (Reiche) or as its aim (Krehl). These latter interpretations might certainly be justified linguistically (see Kühner, II. 1, pp. 412, 413), but they would yield no *specific peculiarity of the act* of the *πρόθεσις*. Yet, since *κατ' ἐκλογὴν* must be the characteristically distinctive mark of the purpose, it cannot by any means denote : the resolution adopted *in respect of an election* (Grotius, Rückert) ; but it must be apprehended as an essential *inherent* of the *πρόθεσις*, expressing the *model character* of this divine act : *the purpose according to election, i.e. the purpose which was so formed, that in it an election was made*. The *πρόθεσις* would have been *no* *πρόθ. κατ' ἐκλογὴν*, no “*propositum Dei electivum*” (Bengel), if God had resolved to bless *all without exception*. His resolve to vouchsafe the Messianic blessedness did *not*, however, concern all, but *those only* who were to be comprehended in this very resolve (by virtue of His *πρόγνωσις*, viii. 29), and who were thereby, by means of the *πρόθεσις* itself, *chosen out* from the rest of men (xi. 5), and *thus* the *πρόθεσις* was no other than *ἡ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις* (comp. Bengel, Flatt, Tholuck, Beck, Fritzsche, Philippi, Lamping). In a linguistic aspect *κατ' ἐκλογ.* (frequently in Polybius, see Raphael) comes under the same category with the well-known expressions *κατὰ κράτος*, *καθ' ὑπερβολήν κ.τ.λ.*¹ Comp. xi. 21 ; 1 Tim. vi. 3. But it is incorrect to alter, with Carpzov, Ernesti, Cramer, Böhme, Ammon, Rosenmüller, the signification of *ἐκλ.*, and to explain *ἡ κατ' ἐκλ. πρόθ.* as “*propositum Dei liberum*.” For, as *election* and *freedom* are in themselves different conceptions, so in those passages which are appealed to (Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* ii. 8. 14 ; Psalt. Sal. ix. 7), *ἐκλ.* is none other than *electio* ; and especially in the N. T. *ἐκλογή*, *ἐκλέγεσθαι*, and *ἐκλεκτός* are so statedly used for the dogmatic sense of the *election to salvation*, that no alteration can be admitted. In general, Hofmann has rightly understood it of the *quality, which the purpose has from the fact that God chooses* ; along with which, however, he likewise transposes the *notion* of the *ἐκλογή* into that of the *free act of will*, “*which has its presupposition only in the chooser, not on the side of the chosen*.” This anticipates the following, which, moreover, joins itself not to *ἐκλογή*, but to the abiding of the *κατ' ἐκλ. πρόθεσις* ; hence *ἐκλογή* must be left in its strict verbal sense of *election*. The *ἐκλογή* may in and by itself be even an unfree act of will ; its freedom does not lie in the notion in itself, but it is only to be inferred mediately from what is further to be said of the *μένειν* of the *κατ' ἐκλ. πρόθεσις*, viz. *οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ.* — *μένειν*] The opposite of *ἐκπέπτωκεν*, ver. 6.² It is the *result aimed at* in such a declaration as God caused to be given to Rebecca before the birth of her two sons : His purpose according to election is meant to remain unchangeable, etc., so much He would have to be settled in His giving that declaration. — *οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ.*] is by most joined, through a supplied *οὐσα*, to *πρόθεσις τ. Θεοῦ* ;³ by Fritzsche

¹ Bornem. *ad Cyrop.* i. 4. 23 ; Bernhardy, p. 241.

² Comp. Xen. *Anab.* ii. 3. 24 ; Eurip. *Iph.* T. 959 ; Herod. iv. 201.

³ Luther, however, with whom agree Hofmann and Jatho, connects with *ἐρρέθη*

αὐτῇ. But this last has already its defining clause in *μήπω κ.τ.λ.*, and that a clause after which *οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ.*, annexed to the *ἐρρέθη αὐτῇ* as a definition of mode, would be something self-evident and superfluous. Hofmann insists, quite ground-

regarded even as a supplementary definition to κατ' ἐκλογὴν, in which he is followed by Lamping, as though Paul had written ἡ οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ. But for rejecting the natural and nearest connection with μένῃ there is absolutely no ground from the sense which thus results : the elective resolution must have its abiding character *not on account of works, which the subjects concerned would perform, but on account of God Himself, who calls to the Messianic salvation.*¹ Accordingly, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ. is a causal specification annexed to the—in itself independent—μένῃ, namely, of its objective actual relation (hence οὐ, not μή), and should be separated from μένῃ by a comma (Paul might more formally have written : καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ.). Hence the objection that μένειν ἐκ is not found is of no importance, since μένῃ in itself stands absolutely, and ἐκ is constantly employed in the sense of *by virtue of, by reason of*. See Bernhardt, p. 230 ; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 551.² — On the form ἐρρήθη, which, instead of the Recepta ἐρρήθη, is to be adopted with Lachmann and Tischendorf, following the preponderance of testimony, in all passages in Paul, see on Matt. v. 21, and Kühner, I. p. 810 f.—The quotation is Gen. xxv. 23, closely following the LXX. ; ὅτι forms no part of it, but is recitative. *In the connection of the original text, ὁ μείζων and ὁ ἐλάσσ., the greater and the smaller, refer to the two nations represented by the elder and younger twin sons, of which they were to be ancestors ; and this prediction was fulfilled first under David, who conquered the Edomites (2 Sam. viii. 14) ; then, after they had freed themselves in the time of Joram (2 Kings viii. 21), under Amaziah (2 Kings xiv. 7 ; 2 Chron. xxv. 11) and Uzziah (2 Kings xiv. 22 ; 2 Chron. xxvi. 2), who again reduced them to slavery ; and lastly, after they had once more broken loose in the time of Ahaz (2 Chron. xxviii. 17 ; according to 2 Kings xvi. 6, they had merely wrested the port of Elath from the Jews), under Johannes Hyrcanus, who completely vanquished them, forced them to be circumcised, and incorporated them in the Jewish state (Joseph. Ant. xiii. 9. 1). Paul, however, has in view, as the entire context vv. 10, 11, 13 evinces, in ὁ μείζ. and τῷ ἐλάσσ., Esau and Jacob themselves, not their nations ; so that the fulfilment of the δουλ. is to be found in the theocratic subjection into which Esau was reduced through the loss of his birthright and of the paternal blessing, whereby the theocratic lordship passed to Jacob. But inasmuch as in Gen. l.c. the two brothers are set forth as representatives of the nations, and their persons and their destiny are not consequently excluded,—as, indeed, the relation indicated in the divine utterance took its beginning with the brothers themselves, by virtue of the preference of Jacob through the paternal blessing*

lessly, that, according to the ordinary connection of οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ., instead of οὐκ, μή must have been used. On account of the following ἀλλ' κ.τ.λ., on which the main stress is meant to be laid, οὐκ, even in a sentence expressing purpose, is quite in its place. See Buttm. *Neut. Gr.* p. 302, § [E. T. 352]. The negation adheres to the ἐξ ἔργων, see Kühner, II. 2, p. 747 f.

¹ This characteristic designation of God as ὁ καλῶν makes it apparent that the at-

tainment of the salvation entirely depends on Him.

² Not essentially different from our view is that of Tholuck, de Wette, Philippi, who regard οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ. as a subjoined definition of the whole final clause : "And this indeed was not to be effected by virtue of works, etc." (Philippi). But Rückert incorrectly explains it, as though the passage ran μένῃ μὴ ἐξ ἔργ. κ.τ.λ.

(Gen. xxvii. 29, 37, 40),—the apostle's apprehension of the passage, as he adapts it to his connection, has its ground and its warrant, especially in view of similar hermeneutic freedom in the use of O. T. expressions. — ὁ μείζων and τῷ ἐλάσσ. have neither in the original nor in Greek the *signification*: the first-born and the second-born, which indeed the words do not denote; but Esau, who is to come to birth first, is regarded as the *greater* of the twins in the womb, and Jacob as the *smaller*.

Ver. 13. "This utterance (ἐρρέθη) took place in conformity with the expressly testified (in Mal. i. 2, 3, freely cited from the LXX.) love of God towards Jacob and abhorrence of Esau." Thus, *that* utterance agrees with *this*. But just like Paul, so the *prophet himself* intends by Ἰακώβ and Ἡσαῦ, not the two *nations* Israel and Edom, but the *persons of the two brothers*; God *loved* the former, and *hated* the latter (and *therefore* has exalted Israel and destroyed Edom).—The *aorists* are, in the sense of the apostle—as the relation of καθὼς γέγρα. to the preceding, imparting information respecting the subjective ground of the divine declaration in ver. 12, shows—to be referred to the love and abhorrence entertained towards the brothers *before their birth*, but are not to be understood of the *de facto* manifestation of love and hatred by which the saying of Gen. xxv. 23 had been in the result confirmed (van Hengel). Ἐμίσησα, moreover, is not to have a merely privative sense ascribed to it: *not to love*, or *to love less* (as Fessel, Glass, Grotius, Estius, and many, including Nösselt, Koppe, Tholuck, Flatt, Beck, Maier, Beyschlag), which is not admissible even in Matt. vi. 24, Luke xiv. 26, xvi. 13, John xii. 25 (see, against this and similar attempts to weaken its force, Lamping); but it expresses the opposite of the positive ἠγάπ., viz. *positive hatred*. See Mal. i. 4. And as that love towards Jacob must be conceived of as completely independent of foreseen virtues (ver. 11), so also this hatred towards Esau as completely independent of foreseen sins (in opposition to the Greek Fathers and Jerome on Mal. i.). Both were founded solely on the free elective determination of God; with whom, in the necessary connection of that plan which He had freely adopted for the process of theocratic development, the hatred and rejection of Esau were presupposed through their opposite, namely, the free love and election of Jacob to be the vehicle of the theocracy and its privileges, as the reverse side of this love and choice, which the history of Edom brought into actual relief.

Vv. 14–18. [See Note CV. p. 400.] Second part of the *Theodicée*: *God does not deal unrighteously, in that His πρόθεσις according to election is to have its subsistence, not ἐξ ἔργων, but ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος; for He Himself maintains in the Scripture His own freedom to have mercy upon or to harden whom He will.*—This reason has *probative* force, in so far as it is justly *presupposed* in it, that the *axiom* which God expresses respecting Himself is absolutely worthy of Him. Hence we are not, with Beyschlag, to refer the alleged injustice to the fact that God now prefers the *Gentiles* to the *Jews*, which is simply imported into the preceding text, and along with which, no less gratuitously, the following receives the sense: "*the Jews have indeed become what they are out of pure grace; this grace may therefore once again be directed towards others, and be withdrawn from them*" (Beyschlag).

Ver. 14. A possible inference, unfavourable to the character of God, from vv. 11-13, is suggested by Paul himself, and repelled. — *οὐ ἀδικία παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ* ;] *but is there not unrighteousness with God?* Comp. the question in iii. 5. *παρὰ*, with qualities, corresponds to the Latin *in*. See Matthiae, § 588. 6. Comp. ii. 11.

Ver. 15. Reason assigned for the *οὐ γένοιτο*, not for the *legitimacy of the question* *μὴ ἀδικία π. τ. Θε.* (Mangold, p. 134), so that the *opponent's* language *continues*, until it "culminates in the audacious exclamation of ver. 19." *Γάρ* after *οὐ γένοιτο* always relates to *this*. Bengel rightly remarks on γάρ : "Nam quod asserimus. Dei assertum est irrefragabile." — τῷ Μωϋσ. γ. (see critical remarks) brings into strong relief the venerated recipient of the word, which makes it appear the more *weighty* (comp. x. 5. 19). The citation is Ex. xxxiii. 19, verbally following the LXX. (which would have more closely translated the Heb. by *ἐλεῶ ὅν ἂν ἐλεῶσω κ.τ.λ.*).¹ In the *original text* it is an assurance by God to Moses of His favour now directly extended towards him, but expressed in the form of a divine *axiom*. Hence Paul, following the LXX., was justified in employing the passage as a scriptural statement of the general proposition : God's mercy, in respect of the persons concerned, whose lot it should be to experience it, lets itself be determined solely by His own free will of grace : "*I will have mercy upon whosoever is the object of my mercy*;" so that I am therefore in this matter dependent on nothing external to myself. This is the *sovereignty* of the divine compassionating will. Observe that the *future* denotes the *actual* compassion, fulfilling itself in point of fact, which God promises to show to the persons concerned, towards whom He stands in the *mental relation* (*ἐλεῶ*, *present*) of pity. The distinction between *ἐλεῶ* and *οἰκτεῖρω* is not, as Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 69 f., defines it, that *ἐλ.* denotes the active mercy, and *οἰκτ.* the compassionate kindness, but that the same notion *misereri* is more strongly expressed by *οἰκτ.* See Fritzsche. Comp. Plat. *Euthyd.* p. 288 D : *ἐλεῖσάντι με καὶ οἰκτεῖραντε*. The latter denotes originally bemoaning sympathy, as opposed to *μακαρίζειν* (Xen. *Anab.* iii. 1. 19). Comp. *οἰκτός* (to which *ὀδύρος*, Plat. *Rep.* iii. p. 387 D, corresponds), *οἰκτιζῶ*, *οἰκτρόος* κ.τ.λ. On the form *οἰκτεροῦσθαι*, see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 741. — *ὅν ἂν*] The *ἂν* is that everywhere usual with the relative in the sense of *cunque*. Hence conditionally expressed : *if to any one* I am gracious, etc. See generally Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 293 f. : Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 119. Consequently, not merely the mercy in itself, but also the determination of those who should be its objects, is designated as a free act of God, resting on nothing except on His elective purpose, and affecting the persons according to it ; for the emphasis lies in the relative clause on the repeated *ὅν ἂν*, as *ἂν* generally has its place after the emphatic word.

Ver. 16. Paul now infers from this divine word the doctrine implied in it of the causality of the divine redemption. — *οἱ τοῦ θεῶντος καὶ ἐστί.* Accordingly, therefore, it (the participation in that which has just been des-

¹ Even thus *ἐλεῶσω* would be future *indicative*, not *subjunctive* (in opposition to Fritzsche's criticism). See Bornemann, *ad*

Xen. *Apol.* 16; Poppo, *ad Cyrop.* ii. 1. 13; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 61. 5 D.

ignated in the divine utterance as *ἐλεος* and *οἰκτιρμός*) is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God who is merciful; it depends not on the striving and urgent endeavour of man, but on the will of the merciful God.¹ The relation of the *genitive* is: *penes*. See Bernhardt, p. 165; Kühner, II. 1, p. 316 f. — *τρέχειν*, a figurative designation of *strenuously active endeavour*, borrowed originally from the competitive races (1 Cor. ix. 24). Comp. Gal. ii. 2, v. 7; Phil. ii. 16; also in the classical writers. Incorrectly, Reiche (following Locke and others) thinks that *θέλοντος* was probably chosen with reference to the wish of Abraham to instal Ishmael, and of Isaac to instal Esau, in the heirship; and *τρέχ.* with reference to the fruitless running in of Esau from the chase (Theophylact understands it of his *running off* to the chase). For Paul, in fact, draws an inference with his *ἀπα οὖν* only from the divine utterance issued to Moses; and hence we are not even to conjecture, with van Hengel, a reference to Pharaoh's hasty pursuit of the Israelites. Not on the runner himself depends the successful struggle for the prize (in opposition to Reiche's objection), but he, whom God has chosen to obtain it, now on his part so runs that he does obtain it. Consequently the conception is, that man by his *τρέχειν* never *meritoriously acquires* the divine favour; but, fulfilling the predetermination of God, he, in the power of the grace already received, *demeans himself conformably to it*; hence Paul, in another place, where the context suggests it, *exhorts* to the *τρέχειν* (1 Cor. ix. 24). Beck's opinion, that *θέλειν* and *τρέχειν* are here intended not in the moral sense, but metaphysically and juridically, is nothing but an exegetically groundless deviation from the simple and clear meaning of the words. — τ. *ἐλεούντος Θεοῦ*] to be taken *together*. Had Paul intended τ. *ἐλεούντος* as *independent*, and Θεοῦ as an *apposition*, he would have only weakened the antithetic emphasis by the very superfluously added Θεοῦ (in opposition to Hofmann).

Ver. 17. *Γάρ*] *Establishment* of this doctrine *e contrario*,² as the inference of ver. 18 shows. — *ἡ γράφη*] for in it God speaks; comp. Gal. iii. 8, 22. — *τῷ παρῶ*] Paul has selected two very striking contemporaneous and historically connected examples, in ver. 15 of election, and here of rejection. The *quotation* is Ex. ix. 16, with a free and partly intentional variation from the LXX. — *ὅτι*] does not form part of the declaration, but introduces it, as in ver. 12. — *εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο*] brings the meaning into stronger relief than the *ἐνεκεν τοῦτου* of the LXX.: *for this very purpose* (for nothing else). Comp. xiii. 6; 2 Cor. v. 6, vii. 11; Eph. vi. 22; Col. iv. 8. — *ἐξήγειρά σε*] The

¹ The proposition in the *generality* with which it is expressed forbids the assumption of a particular reference to *Israel* (Beyschlag), whose moral and religious endeavour (ver. 21) hinders not the right of God's world-ruling majesty to open the heart of the Gentiles for the gospel, and not that of the Jews.

² The counterpart of that *ἐλεος* is, namely, the divine *hardening*; and if this likewise presents itself as dependent only on the divine determination of will,—as the lan-

guage of Scripture to Pharaoh testifies,—what is said in ver. 16 thus receives a further scriptural confirmation from the correlative counterpart. Beyschlag also recognizes a reasoning *e contrario*, but sees in Pharaoh the type of Israel, unto whom the Gospel has not merely remained strange, but has tended to hardening. Thus in this type “the present exchange of *rôle* between Israel and the Gentile world is illustrated in a terrible manner.” This change of *rôle* is imported.

LXX. translates וַיִּצְמַח־הָאֱרֶז by *διετηρήθης*, i.e. *vivus servatus es*, and so far, leaving out of view the factitive form of the Hebrew word (to which, however, a reading of the LXX. attested in the Hexapla with *διετήρησά σε* corresponds), correctly in the historical connection (see Ex. ix. 15). *Paul*, however, *expands* the special sense of that Hebrew word to denote *the whole appearance* of Pharaoh, of which general fact that particular one was a part ; and he renders the word according to this general relation, which lies at the bottom of his view, and in reference to which the active form was important, by : *I have raised thee up*, that is, *caused thee to emerge* ; thy whole historical appearance has been brought about by me, in order that, etc. Comp. the current use of *ἐγείρειν* in the N. T., as in Matt. xi. 11, xxiv. 11 ; John vii. 52, *et al.* ; Ecclus. x. 4 ; 1 Macc. iii. 49 ; and the Hebrew וַיִּצְמַח. So, in substance, Theophylact (*εἰς τὸ μέσον ἡγαγον*), Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Bengel, and various others, including Reiche, Olshausen, Rückert, Beck, Tholuck, Philippi ; formerly also Hofmann ; comp. Beyschlag : “*I have allowed thee to arise.*” The interpretation : *vivum te servavi* (Vorstius, Hammond, Grotius, Wolf, and many, including Koppe, Morus, Böhme, Rosenmüller, Nösselt, Klee, Reithmayr), explains the Hebrew, but not the expression of the apostle ; for Jas. v. 15 ought not to have been appealed to, where the *context* demands the sense of “*erigere de lecto graviter decumbentem.*” Yet even now Hofmann compares Jas. v. 15, and explains accordingly : *I have suffered thee to rise from sickness.* But this would only be admissible, provided it were the sense of the original text, which was assumed by Paul as well known ; the latter, however, simply says : *I allow thee to stand for the sake of, etc.* (comp. Knobel, *in loc.*), with which also the LXX. agrees. Others explain : *I have appointed thee to be king* (Flatt, Benecke, Glöckler). Others : *I have stirred thee up for resistance* (Augustine, Anselm, Köllner, de Wette, Fritzsche, Maier, Bisping, Lamping, comp. Umbreit), as *ἐγείρειν* and *ἐξεγείρ.* denote, in classical usage, *to incite*, both in a good and bad sense ; comp. 2 Macc. xiii. 4 ; Hist. Sus. 45. But these special definitions of the sense make the apostle say something *so entirely different* both from the original and from the LXX., that they must have been necessitated by the connection. But this is not the case ; not even in respect to the view of Augustine, etc., since in ver. 18 *ὃν δὲ θέλει, σκληρύνει* is not inferred from the *verbal sense* of *ἐξήγ.* *σε*, but from the relation of the *ὅπως κ.τ.λ.* to the *ἐξήγειρά σε* (*εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο* evinces this),—a relation which would presuppose a hardening of Pharaoh on the part of God, and for the reader who is familiar with the history (Ex. iv. 21, vii. 3, xi. 10, xiv. 4, *et al.*), actually presupposes it. — *ὅπως ἐνδείξ.* *κ.τ.λ.*] namely, by means of thy final overthrow ; not : by means of the leading out of Israel (Beyschlag), against which is *ἐν σοί.* — *ἐνδείξ*] *may show*, *may cause* to be recognized in thy case. Comp. iii. 25 ; Eph. ii. 7 ; 1 Tim. i. 16. — *δύναμιν*] LXX. : *ισχύν.* With Paul not an intentional alteration, but another reading according to the Hexapla (in opposition to Philippi). — *διαγγ.*] *might be thoroughly published.* Comp. Luke ix. 60 ; Plat. *Protag.* p. 317 A ; Pind. *Nem.* v. 5 ;

Herodian, i. 15. 3, ii. 9. 1; Plutarch. *Camill.* 24. — τὸ ὄνομά μου] As naming *Him* who has shown Himself so mighty in the case of Pharaoh. For the opposite, see ii. 24; 1 Tim. vi. 1. — ἐν πάσῃ τῇ γῇ] in the whole earth; a result, which in the later course of history (comp. Eusebius, *praep. ev.* ix. 29), especially was fulfilled in the dispersion of the Jews and the spread of Christianity, and continues to be fulfilled. The explanation: in the whole land (van Hengel), is less in keeping with the tendency of the original text than the all-comprehensive destination of this great judgment of God.

Ver. 18. Result from vv. 15–17. — σκληρύνει] Opposite of ἐλεεῖ, not merely negative like οὐκ ἐλεεῖ (Bengel), but positive: He *hardens* him, makes him thereby incapable of being a σκεῦος ἐλέους (ver. 23). Such an one becomes σκληρός τε καὶ ἀμετάστροφος. (Plato, *Crat.* p. 407 D), σκλ. καὶ ἀπειθής (Plato, *Loecr.* p. 104 C), in a moral respect.¹ Comp. Acts xix. 9; Heb. iii. 8, 13, 15, iv. 7; σκληροκαρδία, Matt. xix. 8; Mark xvi. 14; Rom. ii. 5.² Vv. 19 ff. prove that all warping or alteration of this sense of the word is erroneous; that the suggestion, *e.g.*, in Origen and several Fathers, in Grotius, Koppe, Platt, Klee, Maier, and others, that only the divine *permission* is intended (comp. Melanchthon: “Indurat, i.e. *sinit esse durum*, nec convertit eum”), is erroneous; and equally erroneous is the interpretation *duriter tractat* (Carpzov, Semler, Cramer, Ernesti, Schulthess, *Exeg. Forsch.* II. p. 136; comp. Beck, p. 75 f.), which is contrary to the signification of the word (also in the LXX. Job xxxix. 16).³ Evidence to the same effect is supplied by the *twofold* representation given of the hardening of Pharaoh in Exodus, where it appears partly as *self-produced* (viii. 15, 32, ix. 34; comp. 1 Sam. vi. 6), partly as *effected by God* (iv. 21, vii. 3, ix. 12, x. 20, 27, xi. 10). Of these two ways of regarding the matter, however, Paul, suitably to his object, has expressly adopted the latter; Pharaoh *hardened by God* is to him the type of all who obstinately withstand the divine counsel of salvation, as Israel does. In opposition to Beck's evasive expedients, see Lamping. On the *hardening itself* Olshausen remarks:—(1) That it presupposes already the beginnings of evil. But this is at variance with ὃν θέλει and ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος, ver. 21. (2) That it is not an aggravation of sin, but a means of preventing its aggravation. But Pharaoh's history is against this. (3) That the total hardening is an expression of simple penal justice, when sin has become sin against the Holy Ghost. But in that case there could be no mention of a ὃν θέλει. The clear and simple sense of the apostle is, that it depends on the free determination of God's will whether to bless with His saving mercy, or, on the other hand, to put into

¹ For an analogous *pagan* conception, comp. especially Euripides, in *Lycurgus adv. Leocr.* p. 198 (§ 92):

ὅταν γὰρ ὀργὴ δαιμόνων βλάβητι τινα,
τοῦτ' αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἐξαφαιρείται φρενῶν
τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐσθλόν, εἰς δὲ τὴν χεῖρω τρέπει
γνώμην, ἵν' εἰδῇ μὴδὲν ὧν ἀμαρτάνει.

See also Ruhnkens, *ad Vell. Paterc.* ii. 57, p. 265 ff.

² See also Soph. *Aj.* 1340, *Trach.* 1250; Lo-beck, *ad Aj.* p. 884; from the O. T., Umbreit

d. Sünde, p. 113 ff.

³ In Job, *l.c.*, ἀπεσκληρύνει, LXX., is said of the ostrich, which *renders hard*, i.e. *makes hardy*, its young ones. Comp. Leon. Tarent. 11; Athen. I. p. 24 D; Theophr. *C. pl.* iii. 16, 2, v. 15. 6. Such is also the meaning of ἀποσκληρώω. The sense of the original (Πῶψη) is not decisive. The LXX. has understood it as ἀπεσκληρ. Comp. Lamping, p. 188 f.

that spiritual condition, in which a man can be no object of His saving mercy (but rather of His *ὀργή* only). Accordingly, the will of God is here the *absolute* will, which is only in the *ἐλεει* a will of grace, and not also in the *σκληρύνει* (in opposition to Th. Schott). Of the style and manner in which the older dogmatic interpreters have here introduced qualifying clauses in the interests of opposition to absolute predestination, the development of the matter by Calovius may serve as an example. He maintains, that when it is said that God hardens, this is not to be taken *ἐνεργητικῶς* or *effective*, but (1) *συγχωρητικῶς*, propter *permissionem*; (2) *ἀφορμητικῶς*, propter *occasionem*, quam ex iis, quae Deus agit, sumunt reprobi; (3) *ἐγκαταλειπτικῶς*, ob *desertionem*, quod gratia sua deserat reprobos; (4) *παραδοτικῶς*, ob *traditionem* in sensum reprobum et in ulteriorem Satanae potestatem. But Philippi's suggestion of the immanent law which the divine freedom carries within itself,—according to which God will have mercy upon *him* who acknowledges His right to have mercy on whom He will, and to harden whom He will; and will harden *him* who denies to Him this right,—will only then come into consideration by the side of what Paul here says, when (see remarks after ver. 33) we are in a position to judge of the relation of our passage and the connection that follows it to the moral self-determination of man, which the apostle teaches *elsewhere*; seeing that no further guiding hint is here given by Paul, and, moreover, that immanent law of the divine freedom, as Philippi himself frankly recognizes, is *not at all here* expressed. For now the apostle has been most sedulously and exclusively urging nothing but the complete independence of the divine willing in *ἐλεειν* and *σκληρύνειν*,¹ which the *Form. Conc.* p. 821 does not duly attend to, when it maintains that Paul desired to represent the hardening of Pharaoh as an example of divine *penal justice*. Not “ut eo ipso Dei *justitiam* declararet,” has Paul adduced this example, although it falls *historically* under this point of view, but as a proof of the completely *free self-determination* of God to harden *whom He will*. Accordingly, the hardening here appears by no means, as has been lately read between the lines, “as a consequence of preceding conceited self-righteousness” (Tholuck), or “such as the man himself has willed it” (Th. Schott), or conditioned by the divine standard of holiness confronting human sin (Weiss), or with an obvious presupposition of human self-determination (Beyschlag). Elsewhere the hardening may be adjudged as a *punishment* by God (Isa. vi. 9 ff.; Ps. lxxix. 28; see Umbreit, p. 310 f.), but not so here. The will of God, which in truth can be no arbitrary pleasure, is no doubt holy and just; but it is not here apprehended and set forth under this *point of view*, and from this *side*, but in reference to its *independence of all human assistance*, consequently in accordance with its *absolute aseitas*, which is to be retained in its clear precision and without any qualifying clause to the words *ὃν θέλει ἐλεει*,² and must not be obscured by ideas of mediate agency that are here foreign.

¹ Observe that in *ὃν θέλει* the emphasis falls on *θέλει*, not—as in ver. 15, where *ἂν* was added—on *ὃν*. In the second clause this emphatic *ὃν θέλει* is then repeated, on which occasion *δέ* (*again, on the other hand*)

brings out the corresponding symmetry of the relative definition on both sides (Hartung, *Partik.* I. p. 168 f.).

² Hofmann rightly remarks: the *ἐλεειν* is designated as an act, whose object one is, in

Vv. 19-21. *Third part of the Theodicée : But man is not entitled to dispute with God, why He should still find fault. For his relation to God is as that of the thing formed to its former, or of the vessel to the potter, who has power to fashion out of a single lump vessels to honour and dishonour.*

Ver. 19. An objection supposed by the apostle (comp. xi. 19) which might be raised against ver. 18, not merely by a Jew, but generally. — οὐν] in pursuance of the ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει. — ἔτι] logical, as in iii. 7, and frequently : If He hardens out of His own determination of will, *why does He still find fault?* That fact surely takes away all warrant from the reproaches which God makes against hardened sinners, since they have been hardened by the divine will itself, to which no one yet offers opposition (with success). — τῷ γὰρ βουλ. κ.τ.λ.] ground assigned for the question, τί ἐτι μέμφ. — ἀνθέστηκε] *Who withstands?* whereby, concretely, the *irresistibility* of the divine decree is set forth. *The divine decree is exalted above any one's opposition.* According to the present opinion of Hofmann (it was otherwise in the *Schriftbew.* I. p. 246 f.), the opponent wishes to establish that, if the words ὃν θέλει, σκληρύνει be correct, *no one may offer opposition to that which God wills*,¹ and therefore God can in no one have *anything to censure*. But thus the thought of the question τίς ἀνθέστηκε would be one so irrational and impious (as though, forsooth, no sinner would be opposed to God), that Paul would not even have had ground or warrant to have invented it as an objection. That question is not *impious*, but *tragic*, the expression of human weakness in presence of the divine decree of hardening. — On the classical βούλημα (more frequently βούλευμα), *the thing willed, i.e. captum consilium* (only here in Paul), see van Hengel, Lobeck, *ad Aj.* 44. Comp., as to the distinction between βούλομαι and θέλω (Eph. i. 11), on Matt. i. 19.

Ver. 20. Μενούνγῃ] *Imo vero*, here not without irony : *Yea verily, O man* (ii. 1), *who art thou (quantulus es) who repliest against God?* See on Luke xi. 28 ; also Ast, *Lex. Plat.* II. p. 303. On σὺ τίς εἶ, comp. xiv. 4 ; Plato, *Gorg.* p. 452 B : σὺ δὲ . . . τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε ; Paul does not give a *refutation* of the τί ἐτι μέμφ., but he repudiates the question as *unwarranted* ; “*abruptit quaestionem*” (Melanchthon), and that wholly from the standpoint of the entirely unlimited divine omnipotence, on which he has placed himself in the whole of the present connection, and consistently with that standpoint. — ὁ ἀνταποκριν.] For in τί ἐτι . . . ἀνθέστ. there is contained an *oppositional reply*, namely, to *God's finding fault*, not to the *saying* of Scripture, ver. 17 (Hofmann), which the apostle's present train of thought has already left behind. On the expression, comp. Luke xiv. 6 ; Judg. v. 29 ; Job xvi. 8, xxxii. 12. The word is not found in the Greek writers. But ἀνταποκρίνεσθαι, says Paul, as little belongs to man against God, as to the thing formed belongs the question addressed to its former : *Why hast thou made me thus* (as I am) ?

virtue of the fact that God wills to make him its object. Just so it stands with the σκληρύνειν, by which God fulfils His own will in the person concerned, without having his action and character as a ground of determination in the matter.

¹ The general expression “opposition”

[Widerpart] does not correspond with sufficient definiteness to the notion of ἀνθέστηκε, since the latter everywhere signifies the real and active *resistere*. So also in Paul (xiii. 2 ; Gal. ii. 11 ; Eph. vi. 13). Comp. Soph. *Fragm.* 234 ; Dindorf : πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνίσταται Plato, *Symp.* p. 196 D.

This comparison is *logically correct* (in opposition to Usteri, *Lehrbegr.* p. 269), since the *tertium comparationis* generally is the *constituting of the quality*. As the moulder produces the quality of the vessel formed by him according to his own free will, so God constitutes the moral quality (fitted for blessedness or not so) of men as He will. Only when it is maintained that the comparison with the thing formed must properly refer only to the first formation of men, and not to the subsequent ethical moulding of those created (as in Pharaoh's case, whom God hardened), can its logical correctness be denied. But Paul wrote in a popular form, and it is to do him injustice to press his simile more than he himself, judging by the tenor of the entire connection, would have it pressed. Glöckler (following Pareus) finds in *μη ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.* and ver. 21 an *argumentatio a minore ad majus*: "If not even in the case of an effigy can such a question be addressed to its former, how much less can man, etc." But this also is to be quite laid aside, and we must simply abide by the conception of a simile, since that question on the part of the thing formed cannot certainly be conceived as really taking place, and since the simile itself is of so frequent occurrence in the O. T., that Paul has doubtless employed it by way of reminiscence from that source. See Isa. xxix. 16, xlv. 9; Jer. xviii. 6; Wisd. xv. 7; Ecclus. xxxvi. 13. Vv. 21-23 also show that Paul sets forth God Himself under the image of the potter. According to Hofmann, the sense of the question resolves itself into a complaint over the *destiny*, for which the *creature is created* by God. But the contextual notion of *ποιεῖν* is not that of *creation*, but that of *preparation, adjustment* (vv. 21, 22), correlative to the making of the potter, who does not *create* his vessels, but *forms and fashions* (πλάσαντι) them thus or thus; and οὕτως simply *specifies the mode of the making*: *in such shape*, in such a kind of way, that I have *not* issued from thy hands as one of *another* mould. Comp. Winer, p. 434 [E. T. 465]. It is the τρόπος of the ποιεῖν, which presents itself in the result.

Ver. 21. [H] The sense, without an interrogation, is: *Unless perhaps the potter should not have power over his clay* (τοῦ πηλοῦ), *to make* (ποιῆσαι, the infinitive of more precise definition,) etc. Comp. Wisd. xv. 7. — ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φεράμ. The φέραμα (comp. on xi. 16; 1 Cor. v. 6) is the *lump* of the πηλός, mixed with water and *kneaded*, out of which the potter makes the different vessels. In the *application* of the simile, the *same lump* denotes human nature in and by itself, as it is alike in all with its opposite moral capabilities and dispositions,¹ but not yet conceived of in its definite individual moral stamp. Out of this, like the potter out of the clay-dough which is susceptible of various moulding, God—who does not merely "*allow to come into being*" the different moral quality of individuals, in order *then* to fulfil on them the ἐλεειν or σκληρύνειν which He will (Hofmann), but effectively *produces it*—makes partly such as are destined to stand in honour (namely, as partakers of the Messianic glory), partly such as are to stand in dishonour

¹ This *massa* is by Augustine onesidedly viewed as "*peccato originali infecta, corrupta damnationisque obnoxia*," so that then the vessels εἰς τιμὴν are those which *assu-*

mundur in gratiam, and the vessels εἰς ἀτιμίαν those which *ad luendum debitum relinquuntur*.

(namely, through the eternal ἀπόλεια). Comp. vv. 22, 23. See also 2 Tim. ii. 20, 21. The former is the effect of His ἐλεεῖν, as in the case of Moses ; the latter that of His σκληρύνειν, as in the case of Pharaoh. Much too general and rationalizing, in opposition to the text, is van Hengel's view, that the figure refers generally to the "inexplicabiles divini rerum humanarum regiminis rationes;" and Beyschlag's view amounts to the same thing : "out of the material of the human race (?) which is at His disposal as it continues to come into existence, to stamp individuals with this or that historical destination" (?). — εἰς τιμὴν] This is the destination of the vessel ; it is either to be honoured, so that it has τιμὴν (as e.g. a sacred vase), or is to experience the opposite, so that ἀτιμία cleaves to it (as e.g. an utensil destined to foul use). — Observe the purposely-chosen arrangement of the words : the juxtaposition of οὐκ ἔχει (or lacks), the juxtaposition of ὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦ (although τοῦ πηλ., belongs to ἐξουσ. ; comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 332, [E. T. 387]) and the prefixing of εἰς τιμὴν.

Vv. 22–29. Fourth part of the Theodicée : God, full of long-suffering, has borne with vessels of wrath, in order withal to make known His glory on vessels of mercy, as which He has also called us Christians both out of the Jews and out of the Gentiles. Comp. on vv. 22, 23 ; Wisd. xii. 20, 21. These two kinds of σκεύη are necessarily the same as those meant in ver. 21 (in opposition to Weiss, p. 66 f., and *bibl. Theol.* p. 383). This is shown by the retention of σκεύη, as well as by the attributes κατηρτισμένα and ἀ προητοίμασεν corresponding to the ποιῆσαι of ver. 21, just as εἰς ἀπόλειαν aptly corresponds to the εἰς ἀτιμίαν, and εἰς δόξαν to the εἰς τιμὴν, ver. 21. The former vessels as κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπόλειαν are necessarily σκεύη ὀργῆς, for the divine ὀργή and ἀπόλεια are correlates, which suppose one another. But the guilt, which is supposed by the notion of ὀργή, is, in the entirely consistent connection of our passage, presented—by the καταρτίζειν which precedes the guilt, and in virtue of which God has made them such as they are and not otherwise—as the consequence of the moral development conditioned by this previous preparation. Weiss fails to recognize the *onesidedness* of the mode of view here necessarily intended and boldly carried out by the apostle, which will not, moreover, bear the attempts of Hofmann to explain it away, or those of Beyschlag to twist the notion ; the latter least of all, on the subjective ground that the strictly understood notion of σκεύη ὀργῆς is incapable of fulfilment, which at the absolute standpoint of the text it is not.

Ver. 22 f. forms a conditional interrogative sentence, the *apodosis* of which is not expressed, but is gathered from the context, viz. : *Wilt thou still be able to venture the ἀνταποκρίνεσθαι τῷ Θεῷ of ver. 20 f. ? Must thou not utterly become dumb with thy replies ?* Comp. on John vi. 61 ; Acts xxiii. 9 ; Luke xix. 41.¹ This *aposiopesis* with εἰ δὲ corresponds perfectly to our : *but how if*, etc. It is to be translated : "*But how if God, although minded to manifest His wrath and to make known His power, has endured with much long-suffering vessels of wrath, which are nevertheless adjusted for destruction, in*

¹ See also Calvin and Calovius, *in loc.* ; Fritzsche, *Conject.* p. 30 ; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 212 ; Dissen, *ad Dem.* de cor. p. 297.

order also to make known the riches of His glory on vessels of mercy, which He has prepared beforehand for glory?" Paraphrased, the sense is: "But if God, notwithstanding that His holy will disposes Him not to leave unmanifested His wrath and His power, but practically to make them known, has nevertheless hitherto, full of long-suffering, endured such as are objects of His wrath, and spared them from the destruction, to incur which they are nevertheless constituted and fitted like a vessel by the potter—endured them and spared them not merely as a proof of such great long-suffering towards them, but also with the purpose in view of making known, during the period of this forbearance, the fulness of His glorious perfection in respect to such as are objects of His mercy, whom He, as the potter fashions a vessel, has prepared beforehand, and put in order for eternal glory,—how, in presence of that self-denying long-suffering of God towards vessels of wrath, and in presence of this gracious purpose, which He withal, at the same time, cherishes towards the vessels of mercy, must any desire to dispute with God completely depart from thee!"—in detail the following points are to be observed: $\delta\epsilon$ is neither equivalent to $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\iota}$, nor resumptive, but the simple μεταβατικόν, making the transition to something further, namely, from the previous dismissal of the objector to the refutation which puts him to shame.¹ Tholuck (comp. also Weiss, Reithmayr, and others) takes it antithetically, so that the sequence of thought would be: "I assert this as God's absolute right against you, if you choose to take your stand on the point of right; but how if God has not so much as even dealt thus, etc.?" But such an interpretation, which would require the contrast to be much more strongly marked than by the mere $\delta\epsilon$, is at variance with the retention in the sequel of the figurative σκεῖν and their preparedness; because it is thence evident, that what Paul had previously said concerning the freedom of God to prepare men of different character and destiny like potters' vessels, he by no means intended to cancel, as if God had not thus dealt. Θέλων is, with Fritzsche, Philippi, Lamping, and several others, to be resolved by although, because only thus is there yielded the logically correct preparation for the notion of πολλῇ μακροθυμία, which is a self-denying one; the θέλειν ἐνδείξασθαι κ.τ.λ. is the constant essential characteristic of the holy God, and yet He has borne, etc. The analysis: because God willed (so most, including de Wette, Rückert, van Hengel), yields the sense that God has, in order thereupon to issue all the more evidently a penal judgment, endured patiently, etc.; but this would not amount to a πολλῇ μακροθυμία, but in fact to a delay occasioned by an ungodlike motive, and having in view the heaping up of wrath. Unworthy of God, and only rendered possible by the importation of parenthetical thoughts, is the sense which Hofmann educes: God has not so borne with those men, that He would first see how it would be with them, in order then to deal with them accordingly; but He has done so with the will already withal firmly settled, to prove, etc. That negative and this already firm settlement of will are read between the lines.—Θέλων is placed at the head of the sentence, in

¹ Hofmann asserts, with singular dogmatism, that the metabatic $\delta\epsilon$ (Hartung, I. p. 165) is not fitted to introduce the transition

to a stronger reply. Why not? It introduces a new point (Baumlein, p. 90).

order by contrast the more forcibly to prepare the mind for the notion for which it is intended to prepare, that of the *μακροθυμία*. Τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτοῦ is *what is possible to Him, what He is in a position to do*. Comp. viii. 3, τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου. Xen. Hell. i. 4. 13, τοῦ τῆς πόλεως δυνατοῦ. As to the matter itself, see 3 Macc. ii. 6. The aorist ἤνεγκεν does not refer to the long forbearance with *Pharaoh* (Chrysostom, de Wette, and most); the reference to him has been already concluded with ver. 18; but Paul intends generally the *time hitherto* (which will in like manner run on under this divine long-suffering up to the *Parousia*), when God has still restrained the will of His holiness, and has not yet accomplished the destruction of the objects of His wrath, which He will do for the first time in judgment. The σκεῖη ὀργῆς, without the article, *vessels of wrath*, denotes not *some*, but such σκεῖη generally,¹ *qualitatively* understood, namely, vessels which are prepared (ver. 20 f.) to experience God's wrath on themselves, to be the objects of it. The effect of this wrath, which will go forth at the judgment, is *everlasting destruction*;² hence κατηρτ. εἰς ἀπώλ., *adjusted for destruction* (not "*ripe for destruction*," as Weiss and Hofmann explain), serves to bring the μακροθυμία into still clearer relief, which is not that which *waits* for the *self-decision of human freedom* (Beyschlag), especially for *amendment* (in opposition to Bengel, Tholuck, and others), but that which *delays* the *penal judgment* (comp. on Luke xviii. 7), the *prolongatio irae*, Jer. xv. 15, et al. [See Note CVI. p. 401.] The passage ii. 4 f. is no protest against this view, since the apostle does not there, as in the present passage, place himself at the standpoint of the absolute divine will. The subject who has adjusted those concerned for ἀπώλεια is *God*,³ and any saving clause whereby the passive sense is made to disappear, or the *passive* expression—which, after ver. 20 f., not even a certain refinement of piety is to be suggested as underlying—is made to yield the sense that *they* had adjusted *themselves* for destruction, or had *deserved* it (see Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Grotius, Calovius, Bengel, and many; also Steudel, Olshausen, Reithmayr, Beck, Hofmann, and Krummacher), is opposed to the literal meaning and to the context (ver. 21). See also Lamping, p. 213. Hofmann's interpretation especially: "*who had advanced to that point, and found themselves therein*," is wrecked on his incorrect explanation of τί με ἐποίησας οὕτως, ver. 20. In καὶ ἵνα κ.τ.λ., καὶ is also, *introducing*, in addition to the object involved in the previous ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ, that *accessory* object which God had in view in enduring the vessels of wrath *in reference to vessels of mercy* (the use of the genit. ἐλέους corresponds to that of ὀργῆς, ver.

¹ And that so that both kinds of vessels exist among Jews and Gentiles (see ver. 24); in opposition to van Hengel, who thinks that the vessels of wrath represent only the *Jewish people*; comp. also Weiss and others.

² Hahn, *Theol. d. N. T.* I. p. 166 f., erroneously refers the ὀργή and the ἀπώλεια to *time*, as opposed to *eternity*. The employment of εἰς ὄψα in contrast is decisive

against this view. Comp. Ritschl, *De ira Dei*, p. 15. This remark also applies against Beyschlag, p. 57, who thinks that I change notions *pertaining to the history of God's kingdom* into abstract *dogmatic* ones. As though the everlasting ἀπώλεια and the everlasting ὄψα were not precisely the *issues of that kingdom's history*!

³ Comp. also Estius and Lechler, *apost. Zeit.* p. 123.

22). Besides His great long-suffering towards *those*, He would *also* make known how rich in glory He was towards *these*. For had He not so patiently tolerated the σκεῖν ὀργῆς, but already caused the penal judgment to set in upon them (which is to be thought of as setting in along with the *Parousia*, not antecedently to this, like the destruction of Jerusalem), He would have had no space in which to make known His glory on σκεῖν ἐλέους. [See Note CVII. p. 401.] But this purpose was to be served exactly by that long period of forbearance, during which such σκεῖν as were prepared beforehand by God for eternal δόξα should through their calling (ver. 24) be led to Christ, and thereby the fulness of the divine glory should be made known in respect to them ; which making known is matter of fact (Eph. iii. 10). In τῆς δόξ. αὐτοῦ, the context directs us to think of the *divine majesty* in relation to its beneficent glory, its glory in the bestowal of blessing ; but εἰς δόξαν, as the opposite of εἰς ἀπώλ., denotes the everlasting *Messianic glory* (viii. 21, 30). The verbs ἐτοιμάζειν and καταρτίζειν are not as different from one another as *existence* (*Dasein*) is from *mode of existence* (*Sosein*),—an assertion of Hofmann's as incorrect as it is devoid of proof,—but ἐτοιμάζειν also denotes *to constitute qualitatively*, to prepare in the corresponding quality (1 Cor. ii. 9 ; Eph. ii. 10 ; Philem. 22 ; Matt. iii. 3 ; Luke i. 17, ii. 31 ; John xiv. 2, *et al.*). Comp. here especially 2 Tim. ii. 21. Against such an error the well-known reflexive use of ἐτοιμάζειν ἑαυτὸν (Rev. viii. 6, xix. 7) should have warned him, as well as the equivalent use of the middle (1 Macc. v. 11, xii. 27, and very frequently in the classics). It is solely with a view to variety and illustration that Paul uses for the same notion the *two* verbs, of which Hofmann rationalizes the ἐτοιμάζειν to mean : “that it is God who *has caused* those who attain to glory *to come into being for the end* of possessing the glory, to which they thereupon attain by the fact that He pours forth His own upon them.” Nor is there anything peculiar to be sought behind the change from passive to active ; the transition to the active was more readily suggested by the thought of the activity of *love*. The προ in προητοιμάσεν is not to be disregarded (see on Eph. ii. 10) ; nor is it to be referred to the time before birth, nor to the *æterna electio* (the latter is the act of God, which before time *preceded* the *præparatio*) ; but to the fact that God has so previously fashioned the σκεῖν ἐλέους, before He makes known His glory on them (just as the potter fashions the vessel), that is, has constituted in them that ethical personality, which corresponds to their destination to obtain eternal δόξα through Christ.¹ In ἐπὶ the act of making known is contemplated as *extending* over the men, who are its objects. If, with Beza and Fritzsche (*Conject.* p. 29 ; not abandoned in his *Comment.* p. 343 f., but placed *alongside* of the ordinary mode of connection), we should make καὶ ἵνα γνωρίσῃ κ.τ.λ. dependent, if not

¹ Thus the προετοιμάσεν, *to prepare beforehand*, is to be understood according to the context (vv. 21, 22), in the real sense, therefore, of actual *constituting*, as previously *κατηρτ.*, and not in the sense of the mere *predestination* in the divine counsel (Philippi), to which also the explanation of

Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 40, amounts, who represents God as having eternally before Him “the whole *future state of the facts as to the decision*” of the subjects, and dealing accordingly. Comp. Matt. xxv. 34, 41 ; 2 Tim. ii. 21 ; Eph. ii. 10.

simply on *κατηρτισμένα* (Rückert), yet on *κατηρτ. εἰς ἀπόλειαν* (so also Beyschlag), in which case *καὶ* would have to be taken most simply as *and*, the entire balance of the discourse would be deranged, inasmuch as the important thought *καὶ ἵνα γνωρίσῃ κ.τ.λ.*, on which the whole sequel depends, would be subordinated to a mere secondary definition. The centre of gravity of the argument lies in the bearing with the vessels of wrath on the part of the divine long-suffering; and *thereof* in ver. 23 there is brought forward an explanation glorifying God, which is *added in respect to the σκεὴν ἐλέους*.¹ The connection above referred to would also certainly yield a severity of thought, a *rigour* of telic view, which, granting all the boldness of deduction with which Paul follows out the idea of predestination, yet finds nothing further in accord with it in the whole treatise; the thought, namely, that God has made ready the *σκεὴν ὀργῆς* for destruction, in order, *through the effect of the contrast*,² the more fully to make known His glory in the *σκεῖσι ἐλέους*. — It is further to be remarked, (1) That the interrogative conditional sentence forming an *aposiopesis terminates* with ver. 23, and is not (with Fritzsche) to be extended to ver. 24, since all that follows from ver. 25 onward belongs to the topic started in ver. 24. (2) That we are *not*, following Reithmayr and older commentators with Philippi,³ to *supply a second εἰ* between *καὶ* and *ἵνα* in ver. 23, and to assume that Paul had intended at the close of ver. 23 to say, *ἐκάλεσεν αὐτοίς*, but that he at once directed his glance at the concretes, and therefore wrote *οὗς καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς* instead of *ἐκάλεσεν αὐτοίς*. Thereby a rambling and confusion in the presenting of his thoughts is, quite unnecessarily, imputed to the apostle, which would be very glaring, particularly in a dialectic passage so stamped throughout with clearness, definiteness, and precision as the present. Similarly, but still

¹ Beyschlag incorrectly objects, that thus the notion of long-suffering is deprived of its value; for it is no more such, if it is exercised not for the sake of its objects, but for the love of others. This does not take account of the fact that Paul has certainly expressed with sufficient definiteness, by his *καὶ* before *ἵνα*, that he is speaking only of an aim which subsisted *along with* others, not of that which took place *alone*.

² Beyschlag here pushes to the utmost his explanation *from the history of God's kingdom*, in order to obtain the very opposite of this rigour: "If God now drives the Jewish people through hardening towards destruction, He does certainly no more towards them than what they have richly deserved (?); but, at the same time, by breaking the brittle shell of Judaism, in which the gospel has germinated (?), He turns the same to account for the unfettered adoption of the Gentile world, and brings in, along with the day of judgment (?) on Israel, the day likewise (?) of the glorification of the community chosen (?) by Him out of all the world." This is con-

sistent *interpolation*, with an elastic *interpretation* of the strict notions conveyed by the words.

³ In regard to my explanation, Philippi stumbles especially at the fact that Paul has not written *ἐπὶ πλεονα σκεὴν ἐλέους*. But the apostle has in truth the two kinds of *σκεὴν* in view solely according to their *quality*; the opposition thought of by him is purely *qualitative*; a *numerical* comparison did not concern him. Had God not been so long-suffering towards *vessels of wrath*, He would not have been able to make known how rich in glory He was towards men of an opposite sort—towards *vessels of grace*. The reflection is not concerned with how *many* of one and the other class were in reality extant; but with the fact that God, with His long-suffering exercised in spite of His holy will towards the first category, had purposed at the same time the making known of His *δόξα* respecting the second category. Philippi's doubt, still expressed in the third edition, touches Fritzsche's exposition, but hardly mine.

more confusedly, Tholuck. The language in vv. 22, 23 is condensed and rich in thought, but runs on according to plan and rule in its form. (3) The *apodosi*s (which on our understanding is not expressed) is not to be found in ver. 23, because this would only be possible by arbitrarily supplying *hoc fecit*, or the whole preceding chief sentence. So Ewald: "so *He did that also*, in order that He might make known, on the other hand, the riches of His glory, etc.;" so also Th. Schott and Hofmann. — With our explanation agree substantially Calvin, Grotius, and several others; including Winer, p. 530 [E. T. 570]; Baur, in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1857, p. 200; Lamping and van Hengel, whilst Umbreit educes something which has no existence in the passage, as though it ran: *εἰ δὲ ἐθελεν ὁ Θεὸς . . . ἀλλ' ἤνεγκεν κ.τ.λ.* (He has, on the contrary, endured, etc.).

Ver. 24. [See Note CVIII. p. 401.] Not a confirmation of the design of the divine endurance expressed in ver. 23 (Hofmann), but as the continuation of the relative construction most readily suggests, the *concrete more precise designation of those intended by σκεῖν ἔλεους*, and that for the *confirmation of what was said of them by ἡ προητοίμασεν εἰς δόξαν*. The *καὶ* denotes what is added to this προητοίμ. ἔ. δ. : as *which σκεῖν He has also called us to this glory of the Messianic kingdom. — οὗς* attracted by ἡμᾶς into the same gender. See Bernhardt, p. 302; Winer, p. 156 f. [E. T. 166]. The *relative* after an interrogative sentence has the emphasis of an οὗτος γάρ (Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 64); but the *masculine* is first introduced here, not in the preceding relative sentence (against Hofmann's objection), because the neuter expression ἡ προητοίμ. was required by the conformity with the correlate *κατηρτισμένα. — οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ.*] Therefore without preference of the Jews. "Judaeus credens non est eo ipso vocatus, quod Judaeus est, sed vocatus est ex Judaeis," Bengel.

Ver. 25. Of the *καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν*¹ it is shown that it is in accordance with (ὥς) a divine prophetic utterance. The *ἐξ Ἰουδαίων* required no confirmation from prophecy; but the other statement required it the more, inasmuch as it was exactly the Gentiles who had become believing that had been introduced as *σκεῖν ἔλεους*, in place of the Jews who had remained unbelieving. — *ἐν τῷ Ὄσ.*] in *libro Hoseae*: comp. Mark i. 2; John vi. 45; Acts vii. 42. The passage Hos. ii. 25 (the citation varies both from the LXX. and the original text) treats of the idolatrous *people of the ten tribes*, to whom God announces pardon and renewed adoption as the people of God. The apostle recognizes in this pardon the type of the reception of the Gentiles to salvation, and consequently, as its prophetically *Messianic* sense, a prediction of the *calling of the Gentiles*; and from this point of view, which has its war-

¹ According to Hofmann (comp. his *Weisag. u. Erf.* II. p. 215, and *Schriftbew.* I. p. 251), Paul has referred the quotation to the *Jewish* people, in so far, namely, as it was called out of free grace, according to which the bestowal of grace promised by Scripture appears as an act of God not founded on the condition of the subjects. But this after the immediately preceding ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ

ἐθνῶν is quite inadmissible, as it is also forbidden by the transition to *Israel*, which first appears in ver. 27. Very rashly, Hofmann terms the establishing of the typically prophetic reference to the *Gentiles* an "idle talk." Comp. 1 Pet. ii. 10, with Wiesinger and Huther thereon. See also on x. 20. The simply correct view is already given by Chrysostom.

rant in the likeness of *category* to which the subjects belong (comp. Hengstenberg, *Christol.* I. p. 251), he has also introduced the deviations from the words of the original and of the LXX., transposing the two parallel sentences, and rendering the thought ἐρῶ τῷ οὐ λαῷ μου κ.τ.λ. (LXX.) by καλέσω κ.τ.λ., because the divine κλήσις of the Gentiles loomed before him as the Messianic fulfilment of the saying. Yet we are not thereby justified in understanding καλέσω and κληθήσονται, ver. 26, *immediately* in the sense of *vocation* (Fritzsche); for καλεῖν τινά τι, *to call any one to something*, is without linguistic warrant, and the departure thus assumed from the original and from the LXX. would be *unnecessary*, and would amount to a *mechanical* proceeding. On the contrary, καλεῖν is to be left in its ordinary signification *to name* (comp. Hos. i. 6) ; the divine *naming*, however, as “my people, my beloved,” of which the Gentiles were previously the very opposite, is in point of fact none other than just their *calling to Messianic salvation*, in consequence of which they are then *named* also from the human side υἱοὶ Θεοῦ ζῶντος (ver. 26), and are therewith *recognized* according to the theocratic *status* which they have obtained. The vivid thought laid hold of the expression καλέσω the more readily, since in this word to *call* and to *name* form a single notion. Accordingly we must translate : *I will name that which is not my people, my people ; and her who is not beloved, beloved.* Both expressions refer in the original to the significant names of a son (עֲבָדִי) and of a daughter (עַמִּי) of the prophet, which he had been directed to give them as symbolically significant of the rejection of the people, Hos. i. 6-9. —On the οὐ standing beside the noun with the article, where the denial refers to a concrete definite subject, see Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 276.

Ver. 26. Hos. ii. 1 (almost literally from the LXX., i. 10) is joined to the former passage, so that both are regarded as forming *one* connected declaration. Often so in Rabbinical usage, even when the passages belong to different writers. See Surenhusius, *καταλλ.*, p. 464. 45. —καὶ ἔσται] וְהָיָה, *and it* (the following) *will come to pass.* Comp. Acts. ii. 21. These words are included in those of the prophecy (see also the LXX.), and therefore a colon is not to be placed after καί, as though they were the apostle's (Hofmann and others).—These words also treat, *in Hosea himself*, of the theocratic restoration of the exiled people of the kingdom of Ephraim, so that ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὖν¹ denotes *Palestine*, whither the outcasts were to return (not the place of exile, as Hengstenberg, I. p. 248, and others think). But Paul recognizes the antitypic fulfilment, as before at ver. 25, in the *calling of the Gentiles*, who, previously designated by God as not His people, *become* now, in consequence of the divine calling, *sons of the living* (true) *God.* See on ver. 25. But in this sense of Messianic fulfilment, according to Paul, the τόπος οὖν ἐρρήθη αἰνότος κ.τ.λ. cannot be *Palestine*, as it is in the historical sense of the prophet ; nor yet is it “the communion of saints” (de Wette, comp. Baumgarten-Crusius : “the ideal state, the divine kingdom”), nor the “*coetus Christianorum*, ubi diu dubitatum est, an recte gentiles reciperentur” (Fritzsche) ; but simply—and this is also the ordinary explanation—the *local-*

¹ For analogous examples of οὖν after ἐν τ. τόπῳ, see Bornemann, *Schol. in Luc.* p. 132.

ity of the Gentiles, the Gentile lands. *There*, where they dwelt, *there* they, called by God to the salvation of the Messiah, were now named sons of the true God ; and *there*, too, it had been before said to them : Ye are not my people ! *in so far*, namely, as this utterance of rejection was the utterance of God, which, published to the Gentiles, is conceived, in the plastic spirit of poetry, as *resounding in all Gentile lands*. To suppose the locality *without significance* (Krehl), is inconsistent with its being so carefully designated. And to take ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὗ, with Ewald, not in a local sense at all, but in that of *instead that*, even if it agree with the Hebrew (comp. Hitzig), cannot be made to agree with the Greek words. The LXX. understood and translated אֲשֶׁר בְּמִקְלָם *locally*, and rightly so.

Vv. 27, 28. If Paul has, in vv. 25, 26, shown ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν to be based on prophecy, he now begins, seeing that the accepted Gentiles have taken the place of the excluded Jews, also to adduce prophetic evidence of the exclusion of the greater part of Israel. — δέ] leads over to *another* prophet,¹ who prophesies something further, and that concerning Israel: "*But Isaiah cries respecting Israel*, etc." — κράζει] Of the loud crying, and therefore with peculiarly *impassioned*, profoundly moved, and urgent call of the speaker, comp. Acts xxiii. 6, xxiv. 21 ; John vii. 28, 37, xii. 44, i. 15. — ὑπὲρ] Like περί, *in respect of*, as, since Demosthenes, frequently with verbs of saying. The quotation is Isa. x. 22 f., not quite closely following the LXX., and with a reminiscence (ὁ ἀριθμ. τ. νῶν Ἰσρ.) of Hos. ii. 1. — τὸ ὑπόλειμμα σωθ.] *The remnant concerned* (with emphatic accentuation, *i.e.* not more than the remnant) *will be saved* ; that is, in the sense of the apostle : out of the countless great people *only that small number which remains after the rejection of the hardened mass will attain to the Messianic salvation*.² With

¹ Only this view agrees with the connection, since the prophet Hosea was previously cited *by name*, and now *another* is likewise introduced *by name*. Therefore we are not to say, with van Hengel, that by δέ the prophet is placed in contradistinction to God Himself speaking. But Hofmann's opinion, that the position of ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἰσρ. (for Paul has not placed ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ Ἰσρ. first) proves that ver. 25 refers to Israel, is incorrect ; because, if ver. 25 did not refer to the Gentiles, Paul would have had no reason for here adding ὑπὲρ τ. Ἰσρ., since in the very passage under citation Israel is expressly named. The train of thought is : (1) Hosea gives the divine prediction respecting the not-God's-people (respecting the Gentiles) vv. 25, 26 ; (2) but Isaiah utters a prophecy which contains information respecting the relation of Israel to the reception of salvation. Thus both prophets establish what was said in ver. 24, οὐ μόνον ἐξ Ἰουδαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν, — namely, Hosea the καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν, and Isaiah the οὐ μόνον ἐξ Ἰουδαίων. Thus the emphasis in ver. 27 lies primarily on Ἡσαίας δέ, whose prophecy,

differing from the oracle of Hosea, is to be introduced by the significant κράζει ὑπὲρ τ. Ἰσρ. Paraphrase somewhat thus: But Isaiah, what do we hear from him? We hear the cry respecting Israel, etc.

² Hofmann misinterprets the passage in Isaiah, making it to mean that the whole people Israel, which shall return, be it never so numerous, is called a "remnant," for the reason that it has come out of a severe time of distress. In correspondence with this sense, the passage, which is incorrectly translated by the LXX. (because they have εἰς γέννηται, and add αὐτῶν το κατέλειμμα), is held to be rightly understood by Paul: "*that the remnant which obtains salvation is one with the people, of which the case is supposed, that it is then as numerous as the sand by the sea*." Against this it may be urged (1) that יְשׁוּבָה אֲרָץ according to the context (comp. also vii. 3) cannot mean: the return of the people will be the return of a remnant, so that the latter would be the people itself, but only: a remaining part (not the mass) will return in the people,

this understanding Paul employed the translation in the LXX.—not verbally exact, but corresponding to the Messianic reference—of יְשׁוּבָה by σωθήσεται (which they understood of the deliverance by a return into Palestine) in the *Messianic* sense. In *Isaiah* the word refers to the return to God, *is converted*, of which the Messianic σώζεσθαι is just the consequence.

Ver. 28. The Hebrew runs: כָּלֵה וְנִחְרָצָה אֶרֶץ: יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת עֹשֶׂה בְּקֶרֶב כָּל-הָאָרֶץ. *Extirpation is decided,¹ streaming justice (i.e. penal justice); for extirpation and decision (penal decision) the Lord Jehovah Zebaoth makes (i.e. is on the point of executing) in the midst of the whole earth (on Zion).* The LXX. did not understand these words, and translated them incorrectly (on how they came to do so, see Fritzsche, also Maier, in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1845, I. p. 190 f.). This cannot be denied; nor are we, with Olshausen, to attempt to conceal or smooth over the fact by arbitrary interpretation of the Hebrew. Paul has nevertheless felt no scruple in abiding by their translation with a few unimportant deviations, since its sense is not less suitable than that of the original to the connection and object which the declaration here subserves. The words, as Paul has them, mean: “*For utterance-accomplishing and (as matter of fact, through a speedy execution of it) short-cutting in righteousness (is He); for a short-cut utterance (i.e. a saying in which the whole penal decision is summarily included) will the Lord bring to pass on the earth.*” In reference to single expressions, remark: (1) λόγον, which belongs to both participles, is neither *decree* (usually so taken, but this is not its meaning), nor *matter of fact* (Beza, Melancthon, Castalio, Calvin, Koppe, Reithmayr, formerly also Hofmann, *Weissag. u. Erf.* II. p. 213, and various others), which it never denotes with Paul, nor *reckoning*,² which, in connection with ποιεῖν, would be contrary to idiom, but *dictum*, an *utterance*, which He has delivered; and this indeed, in the first clause of the verse, which expresses the executive justice of God *in general*, is to be understood quite generally; comp. Erasmus, *Paraphr.*: “*quicquid dixit, plene praestet et quidem compendio.*” In the second clause, on the other hand, which adduces proof of that gen-

i.e. among the people,—the rest not. (2) The LXX. have understood the original substantially with perfect correctness, inasmuch as, instead of writing word for word τ. κατά. σωθῆς. ἐν αὐτοῖς, they give the explanation: τ. κατά. αὐτῶν σωθῆς. (3) Paul follows the LXX. in this, only passing over the self-understood αὐτῶν. That the LXX. render יְהוָה by γέννηται, and Paul writes ᾧ instead, is entirely unessential.

¹ According to Hofmann, חֲרִיץ must be not predicate, but adjective: “*an end-making, which actually and truly makes an end,*” which permits no further extension of the present state of the world; such an end-making will bring in the state of righteousness as with the force of waves. Incorrectly, because thus חֲרִיץ is made to contain something which is not in it (even at

Job xv. 1), and because צִדְקָה is understood with Dréchsler contrary to the context, and unsuitably to the figurative שָׁטַח (comp. viii. 7, xxviii. 15, 18).

² So now Hofmann, omitting (see critical notes) the words ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ· ὅτι λόγον συντεμνῇ. The λόγον ποιεῖν is supposed to be the *appointment* of an accounting, which is designated by συντελεῖν as a *settlement of account*, and by συντέμνειν as an *abridged process of accounting*. The notion of holding a reckoning is certainly expressed in the Greek writers by the familiar phrases λόγον λαμβάνειν, ὑπὸ τὸν λόγον ἄγειν, λόγον αἰτεῖν etc., but not by λόγον ποιεῖν, which has quite other significations, and in which λόγος never means *reckoning*. Besides, συντέμνειν with λόγον demands for the latter, according to constant usage, the *signification of speech, saying*.

eral description of God with the *concrete case*, the occurrence of which is predicted, the *divine saying* of ver. 27, delivered through the prophet, is intended. (2) *συντέμνειν*, used of something that is said (speeches, answers, and the like), like *συναίπειν*, never denotes in Greek anything else than to *cut short*,¹ and it is therefore inadmissible to depart from this signification of the *συντομία λόγων* (Plato, *Phaedr.* p. 267 B). We must, however, observe that in *συντέμνων* this “*comprising in short*” must be a *matter of fact*, consisting in the short summary despatch of the matter (comp. LXX. Isa. xxviii. 22; Eur. *Rhes.* 450), like our “*cut it short*,” while, on the other hand, *συντετμημένον* (*perfect*) refers to the concise, short, and stern style in which the *saying itself* is conceived (τὸ ὑπόλειμμα σωθήσεται !).² Passages in which *συντέμνειν* denotes *overtake* and the like (as Soph. *Ant.* 1090) have no bearing on the present one. Neither are we to adopt what Tholuck reads into it, that God will accomplish the promise delivered in Isa. x. 20, 21, *only with great limitation of the number of the people*, which would, besides, be not at all suitable to the perfect participle *συντετμημένον*. Moreover, the LXX. cannot have meant *λόγον* of the word of promise, but, according to the sense of the original, only of the penal judicial declaration. (3) ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ does not stand for the *righteousness of faith* (Fritzsche), but is to be referred, according to the context, as in the Hebrew, to the judicial *righteousness* of God. (4) The participles *συντετ.* and *συντέμνων* require only *ἐστί* to be supplied.³ See Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 776; Bernhardt, p. 470; Kühner, II. 1, p. 37. And (5) as respects the argumentative force of the γάρ, it lies in the fact that, if God causes such a penal judgment to be issued on Israel, the part of the people remaining spared, which obtains salvation, can only be the *ὑπόλειμμα* out of the mass, that which *remains over*. Incorrectly Hofmann, in accordance with his erroneous interpretation of vv. 27, 28, explains: So long as this present world-period endures, Israel's final salvation might remain in suspense; “*but Jehovah leaves it not on this footing, He makes an end and settles accounts with the world, and the remnant which is then Israel's people returns to Him and attains to salvation.*”

Ver. 29. Since the preceding prophecy was not introduced by *καθώς* or *ὥς*, we must here punctuate *καὶ, καθὼς προείρηκεν Ἡσαίας, εἰ μὴ κ.τ.λ.*, so that Paul adopts as his own⁴ the words of Isa. i. 9 (closely following the LXX.):

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 334 D, *Ep.* 3, p. 318 B; Aeschines, p. 32. 23; Euripides, *Iph.* A. 1249, *Aeol. fr.* v. 2; Lucian, *dis. accus.* 28; Soph. *fragm.* 411, Dind.; 2 Mac. x. 10; Pluget, *ad Eur. Hec.* 1180.

² The Vulgate has, with literal correctness, rendered *brevians* and *breviatum*. Van Hengel abides by this signification, but assumes as the sense of *συντέμνων*: *de ipsa tamen minatione nonnihil detrahens*, so that God, in virtue of His righteousness, does not reject all, but saves a small part, consisting of the less refractory; *συντετμημένον* he then makes dependent on *ποιήσει*: “*faciet, ut dictum suum inctum sit, i.e. ut minatio sua plerisque tantum Judaeorum attin-*

gat, de ea detrahens ad salutem pauciorum.” But so *συντέμνειν* would amount to the sense of *subjecting something in part to deduction*; but it is not employed thus of speeches, but only of *things*, Thuc. viii. 45. 2 τὴν τε μισθοφορὰν ἐνέτεμεν), Xen. *Hier.* iv. 9, (τὰς δαπάνας συντέμνειν).

³ The subject, God, is here understood of itself according to the following context, so that it is unnecessary to parenthesize *ὅτι . . . ποιήσει* in order to gain κύριος as subject, as van Hengel artificially proposes.

⁴ To supply an *apodosis* (Philippi: οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔχει) is therefore completely superfluous, and consequently arbitrary,

"And, as Isaiah has prophesied, if the Lord of Zebaoth had not left behind to us a seed (in the sense of the apostle, this is that very *ὑπόλειμμα* of ver. 27, which, like seed out of which new fruit grows, preserves and continues the true people of God), we should have become as Sodom, and like to Gomorrah;" the whole nation (by exclusion from Messianic salvation) would have without exception perished (fallen unto *ἀπόλεια*). — *προείρ.*] Not to be understood, with Baumgarten-Crusius and van Hengel, following Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Michaelis, and others: *has said at an earlier place*, for local specifications of this kind are quite unusual in quotations with Paul, and here such reference would be without significance. It is used in the *prophetic* sense; the prophet has said of the fate of the people in *his* time, with a forecast of its corresponding fate in the present time, what holds good of *Israel's present*; the mass of its people is hardened by divine judgment, and forfeits salvation, and only a holy *σπέρμα* is left to it.¹ — *ὡς Γόμ.*] Two modes of conception are intermixed: *become like*, and *become as*, LXX., Hos. iv. 6; Ezek. xxxii. 2; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 140 f. Compare the classical connection of *ὅμοιος* and *ὅμοιος* with *ὡς* and *ὥσπερ*.

Vv. 30–33. [See Note CIX. p. 402.] *The blame of their exclusion rests upon the Jews themselves, because they strove after righteousness not by faith, but by works; they took offence at Christ.* Observe how Paul here "with the fewest words touches the deepest foundation of the matter" (Ewald).

Vv. 30, 31. From the preceding prophecies, ver. 25 ff. (not with particular regard to ver. 16, as de Wette), Paul now, in order to prepare the transition to the *διὰ τὴν*; *ὅτι* κ.τ.λ., ver. 32, draws the *historical result*, and that in the form of question and answer: "What shall we say then? (we shall say) that Gentiles, they who strove not after righteousness, have obtained righteousness, but righteousness which proceeds from faith; while Israel, on the contrary, in spite of its endeavour after the law which justifies, has not attained to this law." Others take *ὅτι* . . . *ἐφθασε* to be a *question*, namely *either*: "What are we to say to the fact, that Gentiles, etc.?" So, following Theodore of Mopsuestia and others, Heumann, Flatt, Olshausen, also Morus, who takes *ὅτι* as *because*. Or: "What are we therefore to say? Are we to say that Gentiles, etc.?" So Reiche, who is then compelled to consider *δικ.* *δὲ τὴν ἐκ πίστεως*, as an answer inserted as in a dialogue, and to see in ver. 32 the "removal of the ground of the objection by a disclosure of the cause of the phenomenon, which has now no longer anything surprising in it." But Reiche's view is to be rejected, partly on the ground that the insertion of a supposed answer, *δικ.* *δὲ τ. ἐκ π.*, is a makeshift and unexampled in Paul's writings; partly because *ὅτι* . . . *ἐφθασε*, even with the exclusion of *δικ.* *δὲ τ. ἐκ π.*, contains complete Pauline *truth*, and consequently does not at all resemble a problematic inquiry, such as Paul elsewhere introduces by *τί* *ἰροῦμεν*, and then refutes as *erroneous* (see iv. 1). This, too, in opposition to Th. Schott, who, taking *τί* *ὄν* . . . *δικαιοσύνην*; as a *single independent question* (What shall we now say to the fact, that Gentiles, etc.), then finds

¹ Comp. on *προείρ.*, Acts i. 16; Plato, *Rep.* p. 619 C; Lucian, *Jov. Frag.* 30; Polyb. vi. 3, 2,

the answer in δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐκ πίστεως, but afterwards, no less strangely than groundlessly, proposes to connect *διὰ* immediately, no punctuation being previously inserted, with the proposition Ἰσραὴλ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Finally, it is decisive against Heumann and others, that the answer of ver. 32, *ὅτι οὐκ κ.τ.λ.*, does not concern the *Gentiles* at all (see ver. 30). — *ἔθνη*] *Gentiles* (comp. ii. 14), not *the Gentiles* as a collective body. On the part of *Gentiles* righteousness was obtained, etc. — *τὰ μὴ διώκ.*] *They, whose endeavour* (for they had not a revelation, nor did they observe the moral law) *was not directed towards becoming righteous*, they obtained righteousness, but—and hereby this paradox of sacred history is solved—that which proceeds *from faith*. In the first two instances *δικ.* is used without any special definition from the Christian point of view; the latter only comes to be introduced with the third *δικ.* — *δὲ*] comp. iii. 22; Phil. ii. 8. — On the figurative *διώκειν*, borrowed from the running for the prize in the racecourse, as also on the correlate *καταλαμβάνειν*, comp. Phil. iii. 12–14; 1 Cor. ix. 24; 1 Tim. vi. 11, 12; Eccclus. xi. 10, xxvii. 8; on *διώκειν δικαιοσύνην*, Plato, *Rep.* p. 545 A. Observe the *threefold δικαιοσύνην*, as in ver. 31 the repetition of *νόμον δικαιοσ.* The whole passage is framed for *pointed effect*: “Vehementer audito rem commovet ejusdem redintegratio verbi . . . quasi aliquod telum saepius perveniat in eandem partem corporis.” *Auct. ad Herenn.* iv. 28.

Vv. 31, 32. *Israel, on the contrary, striving after the law of righteousness, has* (in respect to the mass of the people) *not attained to the law of righteousness.* — *νόμον δικαιοσ.*] *The law affording righteousness.* Quite erroneous is the view of Chrysostom, Theodoret, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Bengel, Heumann, that it is a *hypallage* for *δικαιοσύνην νόμον*; and that of Rückert and Köllner is arbitrary, that Paul, in his effort after brevity and paradox, has used a *condensed phrase* for *τὸν νόμον ὡς νόμον δικ.* On the contrary, the *justifying law* is in both instances (comp. *δικαιοσύνην*, ver. 30) to be left without any more precise concrete definition, and to be regarded as *the ideal* (comp. also Fritzsche and Philippi), *the reality of which the Israelites strove by their legal conduct to experience in themselves* (to possess), *but did not obtain.* The *justifying law*! this is the *idea*, which they pursued, but to the reality they remained strangers. If, finally, we chose, with many others (including Bengel, Koppe, Flatt, Reiche, Köllner, Krehl, de Wette), to understand the first *νόμ. δικ.* of the historical *Mosaic law*, and the second of *Christianity*, *διώκων* would be opposed to us; for this, according to ver. 30, expresses not *the endeavour to fulfil the law*, but the endeavour *to possess the law*, as, indeed, *οὐκ ἔφθασε εἰς* must correspond to *κατέλαβε* in ver. 30, and therefore must simply denote *non pervenit* (Vulg.), not: *non praevenit* (Erasmus, Estius, Hammond, and others, including Ewald and Jatho). Comp. on Phil. iii. 16. The reading of Lachmann, *εἰς νόμον οὐκ ἔφθασε*, which Hofmann follows, is explained by the latter: *Israel was set upon fulfilling a law which teaches what is right* (*διώκων νόμον δικαιοσύνης*), *but did not thereby succeed, did not become*

¹ Ver. 31, although belonging to the answer to the *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν*, and therefore regarded by many as still dependent on *ὅτι*, is nevertheless better taken as an *independ-*

dent proposition, because thus more emphatic, and because *διὰ*, ver. 32, refers only to ver. 31,

ἐν νόμῳ (εἰς νόμον οὐκ ἔφθασε); because the law remained for it, like a shadow, ever only near, but unattainable, *thus Israel had not at all come to have its standpoint generally in a law and to live in it*, neither in that of the *Old Testament*, which it sought to follow, nor in that of the *New Testament*, on which it turned its back. An entirely subjective artificial complication of ideas, with invented accessories, and not even historically correct, since in fact the Israelites stood and lived only too much ἐν νόμῳ and as ἐννομοί, but could not withal attain to the νόμος δικαιοσύνης. This δικαιοσύνης is the tragic point of the negative counter-statement, and hence is indispensable in the text. — διὰ τί] *sc. εἰς νόμον δικ. οὐκ ἔφθασεν*; answer: *ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως. sc. ἐδίωξαν νόμον δικ.* For, had they started from *faith* in their striving, they would have obtained in Christianity the realization of their endeavour, the νόμον δικαιοσύνης; through faith in Christ, to whom the law already points (iii. 31, x. 5 ff.; John v. 46), they would have become righteous, and would thus in the gospel have *really* attained what floated before them as an *idea*, the *justifying law*. — ὡς ἐξ ἔργ.] ὡς can neither denote a *hypocritical* conduct (Theophylact), nor *presumed* works (Fritzsche), nor *quasi* (van Hengel, following the Vulgate); for, indeed, the Jews *really set out from* the works of the law in their endeavour. On the contrary, it means: Because their δῶκεν was *in the way, in which* a δῶκεν starting from works is *constituted*; the (perverted) *kind and quality* of the endeavour¹ is designated, comp. 2 Cor. ii. 17; John i. 14. The ἐξ ἔργ. is by ὡς brought into fuller relief; see Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 757 f. — προσέκοψαν κ.τ.λ.] without γάρ (see critical remarks), but thus coming in all the more strikingly: *they stumbled*, etc.; that is the fatal fact, which befell them in their δῶκεν, and caused that they οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως κ.τ.λ. Had they not stumbled at the stone of stumbling, they would have entered on the right line of endeavour ἐκ πίστεως, instead of their perverted one ὡς ἐξ ἔργων νόμον. The simple appropriateness, clearness, and force, with which the προσέκοψαν κ.τ.λ. is thus introduced, must exclude the connection with ἀλλ' ὡς ἐξ ἔργων νόμον (Lachmann), followed also by Th. Schott ("but, as *could not but happen* in consequence of works, *came to ruin* on the stone of stumbling"). The λίθος προσκόμματος, the stone on which one stumbles (trips), is Christ, in so far as occasion for *unbelief* is taken at his manifestation (especially at His death on the cross, 1 Cor. i. 23). Comp. Luke ii. 34; 1 Pet. ii. 7, 8. The figure is in perfect correspondence with the conception of the δῶκεν, and was perhaps selected in anticipation of the passage of Scripture to be adduced. Aptly, moreover, Theophylact remarks: λίθ. προσκ. κ. πέτρα σκανδ. ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους καὶ τῆς ἐκβάσεως τῶν ἀπιστησάντων ὠνόμασαι ὁ Χριστός· αὐτὸς γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸν θεμέλιος καὶ ἐδραῖωμα ἐτέθη.

Ver. 33. This προσέκοψαν τῷ λίθῳ τ. προσκ. ensued—and this is the θεία μοῖρα

¹ To this, according to the real sense, Philippi's explanation amounts; taking ὡς, however, of the *subjective conception* of the δῶκοτες, equivalent to ὡς φησόμενοι κ.τ.λ. This is inadmissible, because, as with ἐκ πίστ., so also with ἐξ ἔργων, only the notion

of δῶκεν can be supplied. Hofmann has, in consistency with his erroneous understanding of ver. 31, extorted from the words the sense, "*that Israel fancied itself to be in the position of a doing, by virtue of which it was in pursuit of the law of God.*"

herein—in conformity with the prophetic declaration, according to which Christ is laid as *the stone of stumbling* in Israel (*ἐν Σιών*, as the theocratic seat of the people), and *faith* on Him would have been that very thing which would have preserved them from the forfeiture of salvation.—Isa. xxviii. 16 and viii. 14 are blended into one declaration, with a free but pertinent variation both from the original and also from the LXX. With *Isaiah*, in the *first* passage, the *theocracy*—the kingdom of Jehovah,¹ whose sacred basis and central seat is the temple—is the stone laid by God; and in the *second*, *God Himself* is the stone of stumbling and the rock of offence for His enemies. But *Paul* (comp. 1 Pet. ii. 6–8) justly perceives in the passages *prophecies of the Messiah* (as do also the Rabbins), and, in connection with the Messianic character, of all the glory and triumph of the theocracy, the fulfiller of which is the Messiah. — *ὁ πιστ. ἐπ. αὐτῷ*] *he who relies on Him*, in the Messianic fulfilment: *he who believes on Christ*. Comp. x. 11; 1 Tim. i. 16; 1 Pet. ii. 6; Luke xxiv. 25. Christ, the object of faith, is conceived of as He to whom faith adheres as its foundation (comp. Bernhardt, p. 250); there is therefore no need of the circumlocution: “*fidem in Deo ponit Christo fretus*” (van Hengel). See also on Matt. xxvii. 42, and comp. *ἐλπίζειν ἐπ’ αὐτόν*, xv. 12. We may add that *πᾶς*, if it were the genuine reading, would not have the emphasis; but the latter lies upon *ὁ πιστεύων*, as the opposite of *προσκόπτειν*. — *κατασχυνθήσεται*] The LXX. have this verb (*κατασχυνθῆ*), apparently deviating from the original text, Isa. xxviii. 16, where probably they have merely given an inaccurate translation of *שׁוּן*, according to the approximate sense, and have not adopted another reading, namely *שׁוּן* (Reiche, Olshausen, Hofmann).—In the sense of the Messianic fulfilment of the saying, “he will not be put to shame” means, “*he will not forfeit the Messianic salvation.*” Comp. on v. 5.

REMARK.—The contents of ix. 6–29, as they have been unfolded by pure exegesis, certainly exclude, when taken in and by themselves, the idea of a decree of God *conditioned* by human moral self-activity, as indeed God’s *absolute* activity, taken as such by itself, *cannot* depend on that of the individual. On the other hand, a fatalistic *determinism*, the “*tremendum mysterium*” of Calvin, which, following the precedent of Augustine, robs man of his self-determination and free personal attitude towards salvation, and makes him the passive object of divine sovereign will, may just as little be derived as a Pauline doctrine from our passage. It cannot be so, because our passage is not to be considered as detached from the following (vv. 30–33, chap. x. xi.); and because, generally, the countless exhortations of the apostle to obedience of faith, to steadfastness of faith and Christian virtue, as well as all his admonitions on the possibility of losing salvation, and his warnings against falling from grace, are just so many evidences against that view, which puts aside the divine will of love, and does away the essence of human morality and responsibility. See also, against the Calvinistic exposition, Beyschlag, p. 2 ff. If we should assume, with Reiche and Köllner, Fritzsche and Krehl, that Paul, in his dialectic

¹ See the varying interpretations in Gesenius, Drechsler, Hofmann. The latter understands the house of David.

ardour, has allowed himself to be carried away into *self-contradiction*,¹ we should thus have a self-contradiction so palpable, and yet so extremely grave and dangerous in a religious and ethical aspect, making the means of grace illusory, and striking so heavily at the Christian moral idea of divine holiness and of human freedom,—that we should least of all suppose *this very* apostle to be capable of it; for, on the one hand, his penetration and his dialectic ability well *might*, just as, on the other hand, his apostolic illumination in particular, and the clearness and depth of his own moral experience *must*, have guarded him against it. But this affords no justification of the practice which has been followed by those of anti-predestinarian views from the time of Origen and Chrysostom (see Luthardt, *vom freien Willen*, p. 14 ff.) until now (see especially Tholuck on vv. 16–18, 20–22, and also Weiss, *ib.*; comp. Gerlach, *letzte Dinge*, 1869, p. 159), of importing into the clear and definite expressions of the apostle in this place, and reading between the lines, the moral self-determination and spontaneity of man as the correlate factor to the divine volition.² On the contrary, a correct judgment of the deterministic propositions of vv. 15–23 lies in the middle between the admission, which is psychologically and morally impossible, of a self-contradiction, and the importation, which is exegetically impossible, of conceptions of which the apostolic expression is the stark opposite—somewhat as follows. Seeing that the *mode* of the concurrence, so necessary in the moral world, of the individual freedom and spontaneity of man on one side, and the absolute self-determination and universal efficiency of God on the other,—which latter, however, as such by no means lacks the immanent law of holiness (against the objection of Beyschlag, p. 20),—is incomprehensible by human reflection, so long, that is, as it does not pass out of the sphere of the *Christian* fundamental

¹ Fritzsche, II. p. 550: “Melius sibi Paulus consensisset, si Aristotelis, non Gamalilæi alumnus fuisset.”

² This practice of *importing* is obvious, among the Greek Fathers, especially in Theodore of Mopsuestia, and among modern theologians since the precedent of Arminius (see Beyschlag, p. 9 ff.), but especially in Tholuck's paraphrase of the passages in question. Thus he paraphrases, *e.g.*, ver. 17: “How greatly this is the case, is shown according to Scripture in Pharaoh, of whom, *in spite of his running against the divine will*, it is said, etc.” Again, in ver. 18: “Thus God executes His decree of mercy on those *who desire to become blessed through mercy* [δὲ θέλει], and hardens those who in their resistance reject such decree of grace” [δὲ θέλει]. It is self-evident that, with such importations and alterations of the sense, no text is any longer sufficiently safe from the subjectivity of its interpreter. See, against such methods, the in the main apt observations of Baur in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1857, p. 196 ff., and in his *N. T. Theol.* p. 182 ff. Lechler also, *Apost. Zeit.* p. 122 ff., passes an unprejudiced and correct judgment; whilst Weiss, by the mediating sug-

gestion that God may determine, according to His unlimited will, to *what condition He will annex His grace*, can by no means avail against the clearness and definiteness of the text; and Hofmann, by the intermingling of rationalizing attempts to explain the details, cannot remove the difficulties. Philippi (*Glaubensl.* IV. 1, p. 113) rightly leaves the absolute divine freedom in the bestowal of salvation, as Paul dwells on it, intact, and connects with this result the solution which is disclosed by Paul himself in reference to that, at first sight, one-sided theory at the close of this very chapter, and in chap. x. and xi. The doctrine of election of Schleiermacher pours unbiblical notions into the mould of biblical expressions, and finishes with a general *apokatastasis*; whilst in the Hegelian school, to which evil is a necessary element in the absolute process, the positive fundamental doctrines of the gospel as to sin, grace, regeneration, and reconciliation with God, when they are thought to be raised at all to their *notion* [Begriff], find no longer a place. For the history of doctrine in modern times here concerned, see Luthardt, *vom freien Willen*, p. 366 ff.

view into the unbiblical identity-sphere of the *pantheistic* view, in which indeed freedom has no place at all;¹ as often as we treat *only one* of the *two* truths: "God is absolutely free and all-efficient," and "Man has moral freedom, and is, in virtue of his proper self-determination and responsibility as *liberum aqens*, the author of his salvation or perdition," and carry it out in a consistent theory and therefore in a one sided method, we are compelled to speak in such a manner, *that the other truth appears to be annulled*. Only *appears*, however; for, in fact, all that takes place in this case is a temporary and conscious *withdrawing of attention* from the other. In the present instance Paul found himself in this case, and he expresses himself according to this mode of view, not merely in a passing reference, vv. 20, 21 (Beyschlag), but in the whole reasoning of vv. 6-29. In opposition to the Jewish conceit of descent and of works, he desired to establish the free and absolute sovereign power of the divine will and action, and that the more decisively and exclusively, the less he would leave any ground for the arrogant illusion of the Jews, that God *must* be gracious to them. The apostle has here wholly taken his position on the *absolute* standpoint of the theory of pure dependence upon God, and that with all the boldness of clear consistency;² but only until he has done justice to the polemical object which he has in view. He then returns (see vv. 30 ff.) from that abstraction to the human-moral standpoint of practice, so that he allows the claims of *both* modes of consideration to stand *side by side*, just as they exist side by side within the limits of human thought. The contemplation—which lies beyond these limits—of the metaphysical relation of essential interdependence between the two,—namely objectively divine, and subjectively human, freedom and activity of will,—necessarily remained outside and beyond his sphere of view; as he would have had no occasion at all in this place to enter upon this problem, seeing that it was incumbent upon him to crush the Jewish pretensions with the one side only of it—the absoluteness of God. The fact that, and the extent to which, the divine elective determination is nevertheless no "*delectus militaris*," but is immanently regulated in God Himself by His holiness, and consequently also conditioned by moral conditions on the human side, does not enter into his consideration at all for the moment. It is introduced, however, in ver. 30 ff., when the one-sided method of consideration temporarily pursued is counterbalanced, and the ground, which had been given up for a while in an apologetic interest to the doctrinal definition of an absolute decree, is again taken away. Comp. also Beck l. c. and Baur, *neut. Theol.* p. 182 ff. But when Beyschlag places chap. ix. under the point of view, that the discussion therein relates not to a decree, *antecedent to time*, for men's everlasting salvation or perdition, but only to their *adoption* or *non-adoption* into the *historical* kingdom of God (thus into Christianity), and that of the *Jews* and *Gentiles* as the two groups of *mankind*, not of *individual* men, and when he finds the true key of exposition in this view; his idea cannot be justified by the simple ex-

¹ To say nothing at all of the modern materialism (Vogt, Moleschott, Büchner, and others), according to which spirit is replaced by the exertion of force in brain-substance, nerve-material, change of matter, and in material *substrata* generally. See on it, and its relation to theology, Rosenkranz in Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschr.* 1864, p. 225 ff.

² He says by no means only how God *could* proceed without violating a claim of right (Julius Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, I. p. 514, ed. 5), but how He *does* proceed. Older expositors have also endeavoured to help themselves with this problematic paraphrasis. See, e.g., Flacius, *Clav.* II. p. 387.

egesis of chap. ix., and without anticipating the contents of chap. x. and xi. ; and the difficulty in *principle*, which is involved in the entirely free self-determination of the divine will, remains—while it is transferred to the sphere of the action of God in the *historical government of the world*—even thus unremoved.

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

CI. Chaps. ix.-xi.

In chapters ix.-xi. the second main objection to the doctrine of justification by faith is considered—namely, that, by reason of the rejection of all unbelieving Jews which it involves, it contradicts the promises of God and His covenant with His chosen people. The preceding section (vi.-viii.) has reference to an objection of a general character ; this section refers to one that arises from the Jewish standpoint and belongs in the sphere of the thought and controversy of the time when the Epistle was written. (See Note LXIV.) Accordingly we find the Apostle, as he turns to the discussion of this difficulty, proceeding in a similar course to that which he takes in ch. ii. He prepares the way carefully—in this case, by a declaration of his affection for and sympathy with the Jews as his own countrymen—for the statement of the true view of the covenant and promises which they had fatally misinterpreted. This declaration is repeated, in substance, at the opening of chs. x. and xi.—a fact which shows the delicacy of the task which he was now undertaking. There are in this section three principal subdivisions, which correspond very nearly with the arrangement of the chapters ; only that the second one begins at ix. 30, instead of x. 1. The subject of these divisions is given in Meyer's note introductory to the chapters. The final purpose of the Apostle is to show that in this darkest and most mysterious part, as it might seem, of God's administration of the world, the end in view was mercy and blessing to all—Jews and Gentiles alike. The summation of the whole, as it were, is in the exclamation of wonder and praise, xi. 33-36. As everywhere in the Epistle, so even in this portion of it, Paul's mind is filled with a sense of the infinite goodness of God, and with joy in the thought of the free salvation which was designed for men of all nations, and was finally to be extended to all.

CII. Ver. 5. ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς εὐλογητός κ.τ.λ.

Meyer admits that these words *may* be interpreted as referring to Christ, and thus makes the question concerning them one of probabilities. The unprejudiced investigator of the meaning will accept the latter position, as well as the former. He will also admit that they may refer to God, even though believing, for himself, that they have reference to Christ. The grounds on which Meyer rests his view—that the words are a doxology to God—are substantially the same with those presented by other advocates of that understanding of the clause. They are the following : (1) that Paul does not, elsewhere, apply the name Θεός to Christ ; (2) that some passages in his Epistles (e.g. 1 Cor. viii. 6 ; Eph. iv. 5, 6) make a marked distinction between Christ and ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός or Θεός ; (3) that doxologies to Christ are not found in the writings of the Apostles ; (4) that εὐλογητός is not used of Christ in the N. T.

To the *first* of these arguments it is answered : (a) that Christ is called Θεός by Paul in Acts xx. 28 ; Tit. ii. 13 (some also hold the same view with respect

to Col. ii. 2 ; Eph. v. 5 ; 2 Thess. i. 12), [to which, however, reply is made that such an interpretation of the passage in Acts is founded on a wrong text, and of the one in the Ep. to Titus on a wrong construction] ; (b) that, even admitting that there is no such use of Θεός elsewhere in Paul's Epistles, he may have given this name to Christ in a single instance, as John does in only one or two cases, though he employs the word Θεός (referring to God) quite as many times as does Paul in proportion to the extent of his writings [but to this, also, a reply is made that John uses the word in connection with the Logos idea peculiar to his writings, and that the calling Christ *God over all* is incompatible with the N. T. view of the dependence of the Son on the Father].—To the *second* argument it is answered, that the distinction made in the verses alluded to is not inconsistent with the application of the name Θεός to Christ here. He may be Θεός and ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός in His own nature and in Himself ; and yet, as distinguished from the Father and as related to the work of redemption [Eph. iv. 3 ff., through the expressions, *one body, one hope, one faith, one baptism*, turning the reader's thought to this work], He may be called κύριος, while the Father is described as Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων.—In answer to the *third* argument, instances are pointed out where doxologies refer to Christ : e.g., as some maintain, 1 Pet. iv. 11 ; as most writers admit, 2 Tim. iv. 18 ; and, beyond question, 2 Pet. iii. 18 ; Rev. i. 6, v. 13. [Reply, however, is made with regard to the first of these cases, that, when the verse is properly explained, the reference to God becomes clear, and with regard to all the others, that they occur in non-apostolic writings].—The *fourth* argument is answered by calling attention to the fact that the number of instances in which the word εὐλογητός occurs (only four others in Paul's Epp. and seven in the entire N. T.) is too small to afford any such evidence of usage as to exclude the possibility of employing it with reference to Christ.

On the other side, the following points are urged by those who regard the words as descriptive of Christ : (1) That, inasmuch as Χριστός immediately precedes ὁ ὢν at the opening of this clause, it is the most natural and simple explanation of the sentence to make these words refer to Χρ. as an antecedent. This argument has been pressed by some authors beyond its legitimate force ; and the affirmation, as thus understood, has been denied. It is believed, however, that the greater simplicity of this construction, unless overborne by other considerations, will be admitted by all as favoring, at least in some degree, the reference to Christ. (2) That τὸ κατὰ σάρκα suggests a contrast, and that the expression, rather than the omission, of that which forms the other side of the contrast is to be expected—some claim that it is demanded. To this argument, even in the milder form of stating it, a reply is offered, (a) by calling attention to cases where the antithesis is omitted—one such case occurring only two verses earlier than that which contains this clause ; (b) by saying that there is an implied antithesis, which answers the demands of the case here, of another sort than that suggested by interpreting these words of Christ—namely, the relation of Christ in his redemptive work to all men, as contrasted with his membership as a man in the Jewish race ; and (c) on van Hengel's part, by declaring that τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, according to the usage of Greek writers, requires a period after it, and cannot be followed by such an antithetical clause. This position of van Hengel's, however, is not defended by most others, and it seems to be untenable. If it is abandoned, the case stands thus with respect to κατὰ σάρκα. This phrase naturally suggests to the reader's mind an anti-

thetical statement. There is a certain antecedent probability that this statement would be made in words by the author, and not left to be supplied in the thought of the reader. If the clause *ὁ ὢν κ.τ.λ.* is regarded as descriptive of Christ, the author gives such an expression of the contrast ; otherwise he does not. That which is expressed in these words, as, thus explained, is the antithesis adapted to the Apostle's purpose, which is to set forth the honor put upon the Israelites by God. *κατὰ σάρκα*, therefore, points towards this construction of the sentence. — (3) That the position of *εὐλογητός* in the clause is the right and natural one if the words are descriptive of Christ, but not so if a doxology to God is intended. This word, it is claimed, is in all instances of doxologies of this character throughout the Scriptures placed at the beginning of the sentence (the case in LXX. Ps. lxvii. 20, which is sometimes cited, forming no proper exception) ; and not only this, but it is affirmed also that it is of the very nature of such a sentence that this should be the arrangement. It is maintained, in answer to this argument, that the entire matter of the order of words in a Greek sentence is dependent on emphasis ; and that while, in ordinary doxological sentences, the doxological word is designed to be emphatic, this is not necessarily the case ; and furthermore, that it is not so in this particular sentence. The fact that God is over all is suggested by the previously-mentioned blessings ; and,—as this is the natural suggestion,—when the thought turns from an enumeration of His gifts to Himself as their author and source, ruling over all, the words describing Him must be most emphatic. It is denied, however, by advocates of the reference to Christ, that the Scriptural writers varied their usage respecting the doxological word, whatever emphasis might appertain to the subject of the sentence ; and it is added that, if the subject in this clause had been designed to be made so much more prominent than the word of blessing as to necessitate its holding the first position, it would have been placed in the dative, *τῷ ὄντι ἐπὶ πάντων Θεῷ*—a mode of expression which would have prevented all misunderstanding.—(4) That the use of the words *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων* is readily accounted for if the writer wished to set forth the glory and exaltation of Christ, but is not so well adapted to express the idea of the superintending providence of God as connected with the blessings bestowed upon the Jewish people. Some other expression for the latter idea would have been more appropriate. It is claimed by some, also, that if the Apostle had desired to introduce an ascription of praise to God with reference to the gifts which had just been mentioned, he would have glorified Him for His goodness, and not for His controlling providence or power.—(5) That a doxology to God is out of place here, at the close of a passage which is a lamentation over the lapse of the Jews. To this, however, it is answered that there is here, not a lamentation, but an enumeration of privileges and distinguishing honors, and for these it was most natural to praise God, who in His sovereignty had ordered it thus.—(6) That this interpretation was given by the Christian Fathers, or the great majority of them. It is claimed on the other side, however, that the Fathers are not so unanimous as has been supposed ; that many of them simply adopted that view of an ambiguous passage which agreed with their doctrinal opinions ; that as exegetes they do not in many or most cases deserve special regard—their qualifications in this respect being often moderate and their interpretations sometimes fanciful or even absurd. The English Revisers of the Auth. Ver. of the N. T. seem to have given much weight to the views of the Fathers respecting this clause, for, in recording other explanations,

they refer to them as represented by "some modern interpreters"—words which are not elsewhere used in their marginal notes.

The strength of the argument for the reference of the words to Christ lies in the fact that each phrase and element of the clause indicates a probability, as connected with itself, that this is the true explanation. That of the argument for the other view—that they are a doxology to God—is centred, mainly or wholly, in the fact that Paul uses the word *Θεός* in only one or two other instances (as affirmed by the advocates of this view, in no other instance), as descriptive of Christ. When, however, it is borne in mind that the apostolic writers, by reason of the very work to which they were consecrated—the persuading men to become reconciled to God through Christ—were naturally led to speak of Christ almost wholly as in his mediatorial office and as man, the force of the alleged fact is very largely diminished. It is believed that it cannot sustain the weight of the opposing considerations, and that the interpretation which applies the word to Christ must be adopted as the more probable one.

The construction of the words which places a period after *πάντων* has less ground for acceptance than that which makes the whole a doxology, for by it all supposed justification for placing *εὐλογητός* after the subject is taken away, and the words which are regarded as alluding to the superintending providence of God—and thus as connecting the ascription of praise with the statement of the privileges—are removed from the doxological sentence.

A full discussion of this matter cannot be presented within the limits here allowed. The object of this note is to set forth, in outline, the considerations urged by the two parties, and to indicate what conclusion the probabilities of the case may lead us to adopt. The reader will find in the *Journal of the American Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis* for 1881 an extended paper on the subject by Professor Ezra Abbot, defending with great learning and ability the view which refers the words as a doxology to God, and in the same *Journal* a paper advocating the other view by the writer of this note. The latter paper was prepared on a somewhat different plan from Prof. Abbot's, and is much shorter, but was designed to give a full and fair presentation of the case. It may be added, that Weiss, in his edition of Meyer's work, rejects the view of Meyer and adopts the opposite one, applying the words to Christ.

CIII. Ver. 6. *οὐκ οἶον δὲ ὅτι ἐκπέπτεκεν κ.τ.λ.*

The explanation of these words and of their connection with vv. 2, 3, which is given by Meyer, is to be accepted. As related to the main thought and progress of discussion in the Epistle, this verse may be regarded as carrying with it the declaration, that the doctrine of faith which the Apostle defends does not involve in itself any failure of God's promises to His people. In this way he meets, at the beginning of the section, the objection or difficulty which made the writing of these chapters necessary.

CIV. Ver. 11. *μήπο γὰρ γεννηθέντων μηδὲ πραξάντων τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον.*

The object of these words is evidently to show that God's choice in such cases is not made in dependence on, and after, human action. It is, on the other hand, determined before such action. That the passage refers to an

election to salvation in Jacob's case and a non-election in that of Esau cannot be proved, for the context does not necessitate the giving of this meaning to the illustrative example, and we are nowhere informed in the Scriptures that Esau failed of salvation. That Esau and his descendants were not placed by God in the historic line of the spiritual plan is evident, but nothing beyond this. Dr. Shedd, following Calvin, Augustine, and some others, holds that while these two children had as yet no actual sin, they had original sin as being descendants of Adam. They were not innocent, he says, because salvation to which one of them was elected presupposes sin and condemnation. Having already a physical and psychical existence in the mother's womb, they became subject to the divine decision, and this decision was for eternal life for one of the two, not for the other. That they had such a physical and psychical existence he founds upon Heb. vii. 10.—the only N. T. passage cited. This passage states that Levi was in the loins of his great-grandfather, but can scarcely be understood as affirming that he had a psychical and physical life when Melchisedek met Abraham. Of the only action assigned to Levi by the verse, also, it is said that it was action in a figurative sense. The bearing of Levi's experience therefore on original sin, or on the innocent condition of Jacob and Esau just before birth, does not seem to be more decisive than does that of the context here or the O. T. history on the eternal future of the two. Godet remarks, in his annotations on these verses: "In speaking of Jacob and Esau, either as men or as nations, neither Genesis, nor Malachi, nor St. Paul has eternal salvation in view; the matter in question is the part they play regarded from the theocratic standpoint." The view of Godet is favored by all the indications which the passage and the relation of these chapters to the plan of the Epistle afford.

CV. Ver. 14. *μὴ ἀδικία παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ;*

The evidence that God's plan involves selection, which is furnished by the cases occurring in the earliest stage of its development, having been given, the Apostle now proceeds to consider the question whether such selection shows injustice on God's part. This question, like similar ones arising in previous chapters from the opposite side in the discussion (*e.g.* vi. 1, vii. 7, cf. vi. 15), is introduced by *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν*; it is answered by *οὐ γένοιτο*; and the negative is then proved. The proof, in this case, consists of two points: (1) An argument addressed to those on the Jewish standpoint:—the O. T., in what it says respecting Moses and Pharaoh, declares that God acts in this way. A representation of God, however, which is found in the O. T., the Jew must admit to be consistent with justice. To this extent it is an *argumentum ad hominem*. (2) The dealing of God with all in the way of long-suffering and mercy is irreconcilable with such an idea of Him as the question suggests. His benevolence establishes the fact of His righteousness. This argument is equally adapted to the minds of all, Gentiles or Jews. It is prefaced, in vv. 19-21, by a passage which is designed to rebuke the presumption of the objector and express the shocked feeling of the Christian mind at the presentation of the question. That this is the true view of these three verses, and that they are not strictly a part of the proof, is indicated by the fact that they are not necessary to the argument, and, also, by the additional fact that no valid argument can be drawn for the justice of God in relation to the destiny of immortal and

intelligent creatures from the right which the potter has to fashion lifeless clay according to his arbitrary will. It is evident, accordingly, as this paragraph (vv. 14-29) is carefully examined, that the *main point* in the writer's mind is the goodness of God—long-suffering even towards those who are rejected. This fact may well be borne in mind in interpreting the statement with regard to Pharaoh. In connection with the same statement the primary reference of the entire section to nations, and not to individuals, should be remembered. The same thing is worthy of consideration as we inquire as to the meaning of special words in the 22d verse.

CVI. Ver. 22. *ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ.*

The view of Meyer that *μακροθυμία* here means the *prolongatio irae*, and not that which waits for the self-decision of human freedom, is justly rejected by Weiss, who says that the latter idea is evident from the very nature of the case, and is distinctly declared by Paul in ii. 4. Godet also calls attention to the fact that this human self-decision is brought forward in the next following context, ver. 30 ff. Weiss further holds, as against Meyer, that *σκεύη ὀργῆς* does not denote the vessels which are prepared to experience God's wrath on themselves—to serve for a manifestation of His wrath, which, especially in connection with ver. 21, would require *σκ. εἰς ὀργήν*, but vessels which appertain to, i.e. have fallen under His wrath, i.e. through their own acts. *κατηρτισμένα* he regards as to be taken in an adjective sense, *ready*, ripe for (so also Godet). He refers, as a proof that it does not mean *prepared or fitted by God*, to the variation from the construction *ἀ προητοίμασεν* of the next verse, which is apparently intentional. The observation of such points as these makes evident the weakness of the supports on which the more extreme views of individual election, as connected with these verses, rest. Individual election is an inference from what is said in the chapter, rather than a distinct declaration of any of its words.

CVII. Ver. 23. *ἵνα γνωρίσῃ κ.τ.λ.*

The relation of ver. 23 to ver. 22 is as given by Meyer. The vessels of wrath are borne with in mercy and long-suffering to give them opportunity for repentance, but there is also an additional purpose—namely, that God may make known the riches of His glory (i.e. in the manifestation of it in mercy and blessing) to the vessels of mercy. This view does not involve the idea that God's design of good for the vessels of mercy is of secondary importance; but only that their good is, in the matter of His dealing with the vessels of wrath, a thing secondary to His purpose with reference to the latter class. The explanation of this second design by supposing the Apostle to mean that, if penal judgment had come upon the *σκεύη ὀργῆς* without such delay, no time would have been open for the exhibition of mercy to the *σκεύη ἐλέους*, is not necessary, though it may be not improbable. A thought somewhat similar to this, though connected with a different subject and a different class of persons, may be found in Heb. xi. 39, 40.

CVIII. Ver. 24. *οὓς καὶ ἐκύλεσεν κ.τ.λ.*

The Apostle now declares the vessels of mercy to be called of God not merely from among the Jews but also the Gentiles. Three points may be noticed:

(1) that he again expressly sets forth the division into the two classes which have been so prominent throughout the Epistle, and the union of which makes the πάντες of whom he thinks ; (2) that in the words 'Ιουδ. κ.τ.λ. and also in the proof-passages cited from the O. T. in the following verses, the national, and not the individual, reference of the thought is manifested ; (3) that the course of God's action and the sovereignty of His plan with regard to the Jews (and now, at the end, the Gentiles also), in the historic development of the spiritual system are the things set forth in the entire passage vv. 6-29. This is true of what is said of Sarah and Rebecca and their children (comp. also Gal. iv. 24 ff.) ; of God's word to Moses, also, and to Pharaoh ; of the potter and the clay ; of the vessels of wrath, and of the call of Gentiles and Jews who are vessels of mercy. This view gives unity to this chapter as related to the two which follow, and also as related to the whole doctrinal part of the Epistle. Paul is not discoursing upon a series of doctrines, as if in a treatise on Theology, but is discussing a single subject of vital interest, at the time, in connection with the controversy between Judaistic views and the Pauline Christianity ; and he follows the course of his thought steadily and undeviatingly through the proofs and the objections and difficulties. Everywhere the universal and national ideas are prominent.

CIX. Ver. 30.

At ver. 30 we have the reason of the lapse of the Jews introduced. This reason is stated briefly, at first, vv. 30-33, and then, after a few words of the same general character with those at the opening of this chapter, it is developed more fully x. 3-21. In presenting the reason for the lapse, however, he adds at the beginning a word (as was natural because of the preceding context) respecting the ground of the acceptance of the Gentiles. The fact which has been referred to as connected with the sovereign and independent choice of God is now traced to its source in human action. The Jews failed because they did not submit themselves to God's method of justification.

CHAPTER X.

Ver. 1. *ἡ* before *πρός* is wanting according to a large preponderance of evidence, and is omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. A hasty grammatical emendation, as *ἐστίν* before *εἰς* is supplied in Elz. — *αἱ-αὐτῶν*] Elz: τῶν Ἰουδαίων, against decisive evidence. With ver. 1 a church-lesson begins. — Ver. 3. After *ἰδὼν, δεκάσυντην* is wanting in A B D E P. min., and several versions (including Vulg.) and Fathers. Omitted by Lachm. But the very emphasis of the thrice-occurring word, so obviously intended (comp. ix. 30), speaks for its originality; and how easily the omission of the second *δεκάσυντην* might arise, as that of a supposed quite superfluous repetition! — Ver. 5. *αἰ-τοῖς*] Lachm. and Tisch. 8: *αὐτῇ*, according to A B *8**, 17. 47. 80, Copt. Arm. Vulg. Germ. Damasc. Ruf. But this would involve that, with the most of these, and with yet other witnesses, the preceding *αὐτα* should be omitted, as also Tisch. 8. has done. However, both *αὐτῇ* and the omission of *αἰ-τῇ* appear like an emendatory alteration, since the context contains no reference for *αὐτα* and *αὐτοῖς*. In the same light we must also regard the reading *ὅτι τὴν δεκάσυντην τὴν ἐκ νόμου* (instead of *τὴν δικ.* . . . *ὑπὲρ*), as Tisch. 8. has it, in A D* *8**, and some min., Vulg., and some Fathers. — Ver. 15. *εἰρήνην, τῶν εἰσαγγ.*] is wanting in A B C *8**, min., Copt. Sah. Aeth. Clem. Or. Damasc. Ruf. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8. Copyist's omission, through the repetition of *εἰσαγγ.* If it had been interpolated from the LXX. (Isa. lli. 7), *ἀκοὴν εἰρήνης* would have been written instead of the mere *εἰρήνης*. The article before *ἀγαθά* is, with Lachm., on decisive evidence to be omitted, although it is also wanting in the LXX. — Ver. 17. *Θεοῦ*] Lachm. and Tisch. 8: *Χριστοῦ*, according to B C D* E *8**, min., several yss., Aug. Pel. Ambrosiast. There is no genitive at all in F G, Boern. Hilar. But how readily this omission might suggest itself by a comparison of ver. 8! *Χριστοῦ*, however, appears to be a more precise definition of the sense of the divine *ῥῆμα*, the expression of which by *ῥ. Θεοῦ* is found already in Syr. and Clem. — Ver. 19. The order *Ἰσρ. οὐκ ἔγνω* is supported by decisive evidence; Elz: *οὐκ ἔγνω Ἰσρ.*

Vv. 1-13. *More particular discussion of the guilt of the Jews specified in ix. 32; introduced (vv. 1, 2) by a reiterated assurance of the most cordial interest in their salvation.*

Ver. 1. *Ἀδελφοί*] Address to the readers, expressive of emotion. Comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 20; Gal. iii. 15. — *μέν*] without a corresponding *δέ*; the thought following in ver. 3 loomed before the apostle, as standing in the relation of opposition to his heartfelt interest, of which the solicitude thus remained unfulfilled through the perverted striving after righteousness of the people. — *εὐδοκία*] does not denote the *wish*, the *desire* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and many, including Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen). It may mean *pleasure*, *delight* (Bengel: “*lubentissime auditorus essem de salute Israelis*,” comp. Philippi), Matt. iii. 17, xi. 26; or

goodwill (Phil. i. 15, ii. 13), *i.e. propensa animi voluntas*. See generally Fritzsche. The latter signification is that most immediately suggested by the connection here; comp. van Hengel, "*benevola propensio*." It is indeed *the intention of the will* (Hofmann), but conceived of and designated as *the being well-disposed of the heart*, as it *was* such.—*πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν* is joined to *ἡ δέησις*, hence there was no need of the (not genuine) article (Acts viii. 24; Winer, p. 128 f. [E. T. 135]); to the connection with *ἐστὶ* to be understood, *εὐδοκία* would not be suitable. Hence: *The goodwill of my heart and my petition to God are on their behalf towards this end, that they might obtain salvation*; *σωτηρία* is the goal which my *εὐδοκία* wishes for them, and my prayer entreats for them. In this view *ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν* belongs so necessarily to the completeness of the thought, that we are not to assume a tacit contrast to a *κατὰ* (Hofmann). The article before *δέησις* represents, according to the context, the personal pronoun (*ἡ ἐμὴ δ.*); Winer, p. 103 [E. T. 108]; Kühner, II. 1, p. 515. — On the distinction between *δέησις* and *προσευχή*, *petition* and *prayer*, see on Eph. vi. 18. Bengel aptly remarks: "*Non orasset Paulus, si absolute reprobati essent.*"

Ver. 2. Reason assigned *ὡχρὶ ἡ εὐδοκία . . . εἰς σωτηρίαν*. — *ζῆλον Θεοῦ* *zeal for God*. Comp. Acts xxi. 20, xxii. 3; Gal. i. 14; John ii. 17; 1 Macc. ii. 58. This their zeal makes them *worth* that interest of my heart. — *οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν* knowledge is not that, according to the measure of which they are zealous for God. We must here again (comp. on i. 28) note the composite expression; for the Jews were not wanting in *γνώσις* generally, but just in the very point, on which it depended whether their *γνώσις* was the right and practically vital *ἐπίγνωσις*.

Ver. 3. Confirmatory elucidation of *οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν*: "for else they would not, unacquainted with the divine righteousness (see on i. 17), have insisted on their own righteousness, and striven against the divine." This is just the *actual proof* that their zeal for God is wanting in knowledge. — *ἀγνοοῦντες* does not mean any more than at ii. 4, 1 Cor. xiv. 38,¹ anything else than *not knowing*; Reiche, de Wette, Tholuck, Ewald, and several others: *misapprehending*; Hofmann: *overlooking*. The *guilt* of this not-knowing Paul does not further enter into, not so much (comp. Acts iii. 17, xvii. 30) from mild forbearance (Rückert and others), but because he had simply nothing else than the *οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν* to explain. — *τὴν ἰδίαν δικαιοσύνην* *τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, τὴν ἐξ ἔργων ἰδίων καὶ πόνων κατορθουμένην*, Theophylact. Comp. Phil. iii. 9, and see on i. 17. — *στήσαι* *stabilire, to make valid*. Comp. iii. 31; Heb. x. 9. — *ὑπετάγησαν* The *δικ.* Θεοῦ is conceived of as a divine ordinance, to which one *subjects oneself* (through faith). The sense is not that of the *passive*, as viii. 20, but that of the *middle*, as in viii. 7, xiii. 1, and frequently, expressing the *obedience*. As to the subject-matter, comp. *προσέκοψαν κ.τ.λ.*, ix. 32.

Ver. 4. *For the validity of the law has come to an end in Christ, in order that every believer may be a partaker of righteousness*. Herewith Paul, for the

¹ In the classical passages also, which are adduced for the signification *misapprehend* (as Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 25, 29, Cyr. iv. 1. 16;

Dem. 151. 7, et al.), the sense of *not know* is to be maintained.

further confirmation of what was said in ver. 3, lays down the great principle of salvation, from the non-knowledge of which among the Jews that blinded and perverted striving after righteousness flowed. — Τέλος νόμου, which is placed first with great emphasis, is applied to Christ, in so far as, by virtue of His redemptive death (Gal. iii. 13, iv. 5), the divine dispensation of salvation has been introduced, in which the basis of the procuring of salvation is no longer, as in the old theocracy, the Mosaic νόμος, but faith, whereby the law has therefore ceased to be the regulative principle for the attainment of righteousness.¹ Only this view of τέλος, *end, conclusion* (adopted after Augustine by most of the modern expositors), is conformable to what follows, where the essentially *different* principles of the old and new δικαιοσύνη are stated. For its agreement with the doctrinal system of the apostle, see vii. 1 ff. [See Note CX. p. 421.] Contrary to the meaning of the word τέλος (even in 1 Tim. i. 5), and contrary to the inherent relation of what follows, Origen, Erasmus, Vatablus, Elsner, Homberg, Estius, Wolf, Ch. Schmidt, Jatho, and several others, take it as : *fulfilment of the law* ("quicquid exigebat lex moralis praestitit perfectissime," Calovius), which many dogmatic expositors understood of the *satisfactio activa*, or of the *activa* and *passiva* together (Calovius). Linguistically faultless, but at the same time not corresponding to the connection, is the interpretation of Chrysostom, Theophylact, Melancthon, Beza, Michaelis, and others, that the *object* and *aim* of the law was the making men righteous, and that this was accomplished through Christ ; or (Theodoret, Toletus, Vorstius, Grotius, Wetstein, Loesner, Heumann, Klee, Glöckler, Krummacher), that Christ was called the *object* and *aim* of the law, because everything in the law, as the παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν (Gal. iii. 24), led up to Him ; "quicquid praecipiat, quicquid promittat, semper Christum habet pro scopo," Calvin. Observe further, that Χριστός must be the definite historical *person* that appeared in *Jesus*, and not the *promised Saviour generally*, without regard to *whether* and *in whose person* He appeared (Hofmann), an abstraction which would have been impossible to Paul, particularly here, where all righteousness is traced back only to definite faith in contrast to works—as impossible as is the reference combined with it, of νόμος to *any law whatever*, no law has validity any longer, if the promised Saviour be at hand. See, in opposition to this, immediately below, ver. 5 ff. — εἰς δικαιοσ. παντὶ τῷ πιστ.] *aim*, for which Christ is the end of the law : *in order that every one who believes may obtain righteousness*. The principal stress lies on πιστ., as the opposite of that which the law required in order to righteousness ; see vv. 5, 6, iii. 21 ff.

Ver. 5. Now follows, as far as ver. 10, the *proof* of ver. 4, and that *from Moses himself*. — γράφει τὴν δικ.] *writes concerning righteousness*, John i. 46 ; Hermann, *ad Eur. Phoen.* 574. As to the use of the *present* tense, comp. the frequent λέγει in scriptural citations. — The passage introduced by the recitative ὅτι is Lev. xviii. 5, almost exactly after the LXX. Comp. Neh. ix.

¹ The πλήρωσις τοῦ νόμου, Matt. v. 17, does not conflict with the present passage. For the ideal, purely moral import of the law cannot be annulled, and it is exactly this

which Christ has freed from its limitations. See on Matt. *l.c.* Comp. also Lipsius, *Rechtfert.* p. 85 ff.

29 ; Ezek. xx. 21 ; Gal. iii. 12. — ἀντά] refers in the original, and so also here, to the προτάγματα Θεοῦ, which Paul supposes as well known ; but the principal stress lies upon ποιήσας : he who shall have *done* them, so that thus Moses exhibits the *doing* as the condition of the attainment of ζωή (which is referred by Paul not to the happy and prosperous life in Palestine, but to its antitype, the ζωὴ αἰώνιος). — ἐν αὐτοῖς] *i.e.* by the fact, that they are fulfilled.

Vv. 6–8. [See Note CXI. p. 421.] The righteousness which comes from faith is personified (comp. Heb. xii. 5), so that the following words of Moses, *in which Paul recognizes an allegorically and typically prophetic description of this righteousness*, appear as its self-description. An increasing animation, and indeed triumphant tone in the representation, which thus introduces over-against that dark background (ver. 5) the bright picture the more immediately in concrete vividness. Hofmann artificially imports the antithesis, that the righteousness of the law is found only in a description of the lawgiver, but the righteousness of faith itself speaks as one existing and present. There is the less room for this supposition, since vv. 6 ff. are also *Mosaic* expressions. But that Paul actually regarded the words of Moses as a *prophetical testimony* to the nature of the righteousness of faith, is an opinion sanctioned only by a minority of expositors (Augustine, *de nat. et grat.* 83 ; Bucer, Balduin, Calovius, Semler, Ch. Schmidt, Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen, Benecke, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald, Umbreit). The majority, on the other hand, assume that Paul *only clothed* his own thoughts in the words of Moses, and used the latter as a *suitable substratum for the former*. So Tholuck, Flatt, Rückert, Reithmayr, Maier, Philippi : “a holy and charming play of the Spirit of God upon the word of the Lord ;” van Hengel and several others, as formerly Chrysostom, Luther,¹ Beza, Calvin, Cornelius à Lapide ; Bengel : “suavissima parodia.” But against this view is the fact that ver. 5 begins with γὰρ a demonstration of the τέλος νόμου Χριστός, of which ver. 5 contains only the one, and vv. 6–8 the other, side ; both sides, however, unite their probative force in Μωϋσῆς γὰρ γράφει. Therefore it is quite wrong (see esp. Rückert, Philippi) to look upon ἡ δὲ ἐκ πιστ. δικ. as the opposite to Μωϋσῆς, and to suppose that the parallel would be more sharply drawn if Paul had said : But *Christ* speaks thus, etc. No, δὲ places the righteousness of faith in opposition to the previously mentioned δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ; and for these *two* modes of righteousness the testimony of the lawgiver himself is introduced by Μωϋσῆς γὰρ γράφει. “For Moses writes of the righteousness of the law, etc. ; but the other kind of righteousness, the righteousness of faith, says (in the same Moses) thus, etc.” The Μωϋσ. γ. γρ. thus holds good not only for ver. 5, but also covers vv. 6–8 ; therefore the absence of a formula of quotation before ver. 6 is no valid argument against our view. This applies likewise against Hofmann, according to whom that, which the righteousness of faith speaks, is intended to recall Deut. l.c. ;² in such a way, however, that the word of which Moses

¹ Luther, on Deut. l.c., says that Paul has, *abundante spiritu*, taken occasion from Moses against the *justitiariorum velut novum et proprium textum componendū*.

² Hofmann arrives at the sense : “What Israel could not say in respect of the revealed law of God, after possessing it, that should he, to whom the righteousness of

speaks is related to that which the righteousness of faith means, as the O. T. T. to the N. T.,¹ and thus the former is a prediction of the latter. Groundless is the further objection, that Paul nowhere else thus mixes up a biblical passage with comments. For we are acquainted with comments in the style of the Midrash in Paul's writings (ix. 8; Gal. iii. 16, iv. 23, 24); and that they are here *interspersed* is unessential, and was very naturally suggested by the opposed ἀναβ. εἰς τ. οὐρανόν and καταβ. εἰς τ. ἄβυσσον. In conclusion, we must further observe that, if Paul had given the biblical words only as the clothing of his own representation, yet we should have to assume, and that for the very sake of the *honesty* of the apostle (which Philippi thinks endangered by our view), that he actually found in the saying the typical reference to the righteousness of faith; even the holy "play" upon words of the Spirit can be no erroneous play. Theodoret took the right view: διδάσκει πάλιν νόμον καὶ χάριτος τὴν διαφορὰν, καὶ, ἀμφοτέρων εἰσάγει Μωϋσέα τὸν νομοθέτην διδάσκαλον. Erasmus, *Paraphr.*: "*utriusque justitiae imaginem Moses ipse depinxit.*" Comp. also Hofmann, *Weissag. u. Erf.* II. p. 217. *The Mosaic declaration itself* is Deut. xxx. 12-14, with free deviations bearing on his object, from the original and the LXX. Moses has there said of the *commandment* of God to Israel to fulfil His law (for the passage speaks of nothing else according to its historical sense) in ver. 11, that this commandment does not transcend the sphere of what is capable of accomplishment, nor does it lie at strange distance; and he then adds, ver. 12 ff., in order more precisely to depict this thought: *It is neither in heaven nor beyond the sea, so that one must first ascend to the former or sail over the latter* (comp. Bar. iii. 29, 30) *to fetch it, that one may hear and do it; rather is it quite near, in the mouth and in the heart (and in the hands, an addition of LXX., and in Philo); that is, the people itself carries it in its mouth, and it is stamped upon its heart, in order that they may accomplish it* (ἰσχυρῶς). Paul finds here a type, and therewith an indirect prophecy, of the demand which the righteousness of faith presents, entirely different from that ποιεῖν which is demanded by the righteousness of the law, inasmuch as the righteousness of faith forbids only unbelief in reference to Christ, as though He had not come from heaven, or had not risen from the dead, and directs men, on the other hand, to the word of faith, which, through its preachers, is laid in their mouth and heart. The sum and substance of this typically prophetic sense is therefore: "*Be not unbelieving, but believing*;"² and here the grand historical points, to which faith as well as unbelief relate, could not be brought into relief more definitely and significantly³ than by means of the Χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν and ἀνα-

faith speaks, not think in respect of the revealed and perfect Saviour." But how could Paul, without any indication whatever, have expected of the reader that he should infer, from mere reminiscence of the Mosaic words, the point of the thought intended, that what the one *could* not, the others *should* not?

¹ But for this purpose Hofmann employs an incorrect reference and understanding of ὄντι, ver. 9.

² The allegorical and typical signification of the apostle finds its correct logical point of connection in the fact that every one who, instead of bearing the *ῥῆμα* of God in his mouth and in his heart, asks, Who will ascend into heaven for us, and bring it to us? puts a question of unbelief.

³ For he who thinks that one must ascend into heaven to bring Christ down, *denies* thereby that Christ has come in the flesh; and he who supposes that one must de-

γαγεῖν (in opposition to Tholuck's objection). According to Fritzsche (comp. Calovius), the sense meant is : no one can become righteous *through works*, ‘*faciendo et moliendo*,” vv. 6, 7 ; for in fact one must otherwise have been able—since the becoming righteous rests upon the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ—to ascend into heaven in order to bring Him down, or to descend into the lower world in order to bring Him up ; but (ver. 8) after that salvation has been obtained by Christ, we are to have *faith* only. But in this case, vv. 6, 7 would surely be a warning from the mouth of the righteousness of faith against a *facere et moliri*, which would be of quite another kind than that of the righteousness of the law, and which even would have included in abstracto, as a *presupposition*, this very faith in the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ. Still less can we, with Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Grotius, and several others (comp. also Reithmayr, Philippi, and Krummacher), find in vv. 6, 7 the denial of the *difficulty*, and then in ver. 8 the assurance of the *facility*, of becoming righteous. For against this view is the fact, in the first place, that in what Paul subjoins, ver. 9 ff., nothing at all is said of difficulty and facility ; secondly—and this is decisive—the fact that vv. 5–8 is to be a *proof* founded on Moses of the statement, τέλος νόμου Χριστός ; but it is evident, that not from the *facility* of the Christian δικαιοσύνη, but from its *being essentially different from the old* (the latter resting on *doing*, the former on *faith*), it follows that with Christ, the Mediator of the new δικαιοσύνη, the νόμος must have reached its end. This, too, in reply to Knapp, *Ser. var. arg.* II. p. 558 f., who, besides the erroneous point of view of difficulty and facility, reads otherwise between the lines the most essential points of his interpretation. See, on the other hand, van Hengel, who, however, on his side assumes that Paul desired “*avocare*” unsettled Jewish Christians “*a salutis duce longe quaerendo, quum quisque, qui Christi communione utatur, per fidem in Deo positam possideat, quod, ut ex legis alicujus observatione, sic etiam aliunde afferri non possit.*” The connection with ver. 4 likewise tells against this view, as does also the circumstance that, if only the *longe quaerere* were the conception presented, it would not be easy to see why Paul should have inserted at all his explanations τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., and why he should not have retained in ver. 7 the words of the LXX. : τις διαπεράσει ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης. — μή εἶπης ἐν τ. καρδ. σου] LXX. : λέγων, Heb. לֵאמֹר, wherein, according to the connection (“It is not in heaven that one might speak,” etc.), the forbidding sense *indirectly* lies. This Paul expresses *directly*, because his quotation is severed from the connection of the original ; and he adds ἐν τ. καρδ. σου, because unbelief has its seat *in the heart*, and the expression “*to speak in the heart*” (as Ps. xiv. 1 ; Matt. iii. 9 ; Rev. xviii. 7) was very current in the mention of unholy thoughts and dispositions (Surenhusius, *καταλλ.*, p. 479). — τις ἀναβ. εἰς τ. οὐρ.] *Who will ascend into heaven?* In the sense of the apostle, the inquiry is one

ascend into the lower world to bring Christ up from the dead, *denies* that He arose from the dead. This likewise against Hofmann, p. 436, according to whom it is only meant to be said, that *in order to produce Christ,*

an impossibility—namely, an ascent into heaven, or a descent into the lower world—would be requisite. Therein lies the *folly*, as if that which we *have* were at *unattainable distance*.

not expressive of a wish ("utinam quis sit, qui nos e longinquo in viam salutis ducat," van Hengel), nor yet of *despair*, but—correlative of that τῷ πιστεύοντι in ver. 4, and opposed to the ὁ ποιήσας, ver. 5—the inquiry of *unbelief*, which holds the appearance of Christ from heaven, *i.e.* His *incarnation*, as *not having taken place*, and as *an impossibility*. Therefore Paul adds the Midrashistic interpretation: *that expresses*, that signifies: *in order to bring Christ down*—this is the *object*, which is implied in ἀναβήσεται εἰς τ. οὐρ., and by its addition Paul thus contributes a more precise *explanation* of the question (τοῦτ' ἐστι: *scilicet*), namely, as respects its *tendency*, as respects that at which it aims.¹ Thus more exactly defined, the question would presuppose, that he who puts it does not believe that Christ has come out of the heavenly world and has appeared in the flesh (comp. viii. 3), ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων (Phil. ii. 6, 7; comp. 1 John iv. 2).² Following Melancthon, Castalio, Calvin, and others, Reiche thinks that unbelief *in regard to the session of Christ on the right hand of God* is meant. But if there were here a prohibition of the desire to behold with the eyes this object of faith (Reiche), the second question, which nevertheless is manifestly quite parallel, would be highly inappropriate; for then an existence of Christ in the αἰβυσσος would of necessity be an object of faith, which yet it is not at all. Nor could we see why Paul should have said καταγαγεῖν in ver. 6, since the matter would in fact turn only on a *seeing* of Christ in heaven. Moreover, Paul, considering the freedom with which he handles this passage from Moses, would have *transposed* the two questions, in order to avoid the glaring historical *prothysterion* which occurs, if the first question refers to the session of Christ at the right hand of God, to which van Hengel also refers it. According to Glöckler, the question, Who will go up into heaven? means to ask, Who will accomplish redemption? for the ascension was a necessary requisite for the Mediator; and therefore τοῦτ' ἐστι signifies: this would mean *to deny the ascension of Christ*. Consistently, Glöckler then understands the second question as, Who will (voluntarily) go into death? this would mean *to deny the death of Christ*. But by this necessarily consistent view of ver. 7 the whole exposi-

¹ Many others (Erasmus, Calvin, Cornelius à Lapide, Bengel, Usteri, Rückert, Glöckler, etc.) regard τοῦτ' ἐστι as the *ground* of the prohibition, and that in the sense: *that is just as much as*, etc. So also Philippi: "Righteousness is for me as distant and high as if it were in heaven and I must fetch it down from thence; . . . that is just as much as if thou wouldst bring down Christ from heaven, as if thou didst deny that He has already come down from heaven and become man;" and afterward, ver. 7: that is just as much as to deny that He has already risen from the dead. But it is inappropriate to conceive of righteousness itself as the imagined distant (and to-be-fetched) object, because righteousness itself is speaking, and because Paul names *Christ Himself* as the object to be fetched. Inappropriate, too, is the idea of allowing

righteousness in any way to be represented as found in Hades, and brought up thence, from whence Christ, indeed, has not brought it with Him. To this connection belongs van Hengel's view: "Hæc quæ-rere nihil aliud est quam Christum indigne tractare, tanquam e locis remotis, at salutis auctor sit, in terram revocandum." In this case the *Christum indigne tractare* is imported. Further, it makes absolutely no difference to the sense of τοῦτ' ἐστι, whether it is written divided (Lachm., Tisch.) or united (τοῦτεστιν, Hofmann). The codd. yield no certain basis; see Lipsius, *gramm. Unters.* p. 131 ff. Τοῦτο is the subject, and ἐστι the copula of that which is to be predicated epexegetically of the subject.

² The Χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν presupposes the certainty of the personal pre-existence. Comp. Lechler, *Apost. Zeit.* p. 50.

tion is overthrown. For ver. 9 proves that ver. 7 refers to the *resurrection* of Christ; nor did unbelief, in truth, *deny* the death of Christ, but took offence at it. Like Glöckler, Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 102 f., has essentially misunderstood both verses, and Rückert the question of ver. 7. — ἡ τίς καταβ. εἰς τ. ἅβ. ;] The colon after ἡ is to be omitted. The question is, in the sense of the apostle, likewise a question of *unbelief*, and that in reference to the fact and the possibility of the *resurrection* of Christ ἐκ νεκρῶν (i.e. out of *Scheol*, ἄβυσσος). The LXX., following the original, has : τίς διαπεράσει ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης ; But Paul, in his typical reference to Christ, had sufficient cause and liberty, from the standpoint of the historical fulfilment, to put expressly, instead of πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης, even without reflecting that the springs of the sea lie in the lowest depth of the earth (see Ewald, *Jahrb.* III. p. 112), the familiar contrast to heaven, εἰς τ. ἄβυσσον (Job xi. 8 ; Ps. cvii. 26, cxxxix. 8 ; Amos ix. 2 ; Eccclus. xvi. 18, xxiv. 5). For Christ is the object of justifying faith, not merely as He who came from heaven, but also as He who descended into *Hades*, and came up again thence, and rose from the dead.¹ — ἀλλὰ τί λέγει ;] But what says it (the righteousness of faith) ? An unexact contrast to μὴ εἴπῃς, ver. 6, as though previously the negation had stood with λέγει, ver. 6 (οὐχ οὕτω λέγει· εἰπέ κ.τ.λ.). The interrogative form serves “ad attentionem excitandam,” Dissen, *ad Dem. decor.* p. 186, 347. Comp. Gal. iv. 30. — ἐν τῷ στόμ. σ. κ. ἐν τ. κ. σ.] Epexegetis of ἐγγύς σου ἐστίν. — τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.] This ῥῆμα, so designated by the righteousness of faith, signifies the word of faith. The genitive τ. πίστ. is genit. *objecti* (comp. Acts xx. 32 ; Heb. v. 13 ; Eph. i. 13, vi. 15 ; Gal. iii. 2). Note here the two articles ; for that ῥῆμα intended by the righteousness of faith is not generally “a word of faith,” whose contents desire to be believed as historical reality (as Hofmann takes it), but the *definite specific κήρυγμα*, whose entire summary contents are faith in Jesus Christ ; comp. vv. 4, 9 ff., i. 5, 17. — κηρύσσομεν] we preachers of the gospel.

Ver. 9. Not a statement of the contents of the ῥῆμα,² but assigning the ground of the immediately previous τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσει.³ The force of the argument lies in the fact that, in respect of the ῥῆμα published by its preachers, *confession* and *faith* (mouth and heart) must be contemporaneous in order to obtain salvation, which is what Moses also means of the ῥῆμα (ver. 8). — ὁμολ. ἐν τ. στόμ. σου] corresponds to ἐν τῷ στόμ. σου (ἐστὶ) in ver. 8, as afterwards πίστ. ἐν τ. καρδ. σου to ἐν τ. καρδ. σου in ver. 8. — κύριον as Lord (comp. 1 Cor. xii. 3, viii. 6 ; Phil. ii. 11). “In hac appellatione est summa fidei et salutis,” Bengel. It refers to the question τίς ἀναβ. εἰς τ.

¹ The *descensus Christi* is in any case the undoubted presupposition, which led Paul to substitute the words of our passage for those of the original. The passage has therefore more probative force in favour of that doctrine than Güder, *Lehre von der Erschein. Christi unter d. Todten*, p. 20 f., is willing to accord to it.

² So van Hengel and others. But by τῆς πίστεως the ῥῆμα in ver. 8 is already com-

pletely defined.

³ Which is not with Hofmann to be leaped over, so that ἐστὶ refers to ἐγγύς σου τὸ ῥῆμά ἐστι, and introduces the reason why it is that we have this word so near, in the mouth and in the heart. Hofmann strangely objects to the view taken above, that not ὅτι, but γάρ, must then have been used. Why so ?

οὐρ., ver. 6 ; for the whole acknowledgment of the heavenly κυρίου of Jesus as the σύνθετος of God is conditioned by the acknowledgment of the preceding descent from heaven, the incarnation of the Son of God ; viii. 3 ; Gal. iv. 4 ; Phil. ii. 6, *et al.* — ἡγείρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν] corresponds to the question of ver. 7. — σωθῆσθ] corresponds to ζήσεται in ver. 6, but characterizes the latter, according to the doctrinal system of the apostle (i. 16, v. 9, 10, *et al.*), as a deliverance from destruction to the Messianic salvation. — The *confession of the mouth* (of high essential importance for the relations of every time, and peculiarly of that time !) and *faith in the heart* are not separate things, as though one without the other had as its consequence the σωτηρία, but they are mutually dependent requisites. Comp. Knapp, p. 565 ff. — The *resurrection* of the Lord here appears, as suggested by ver. 7, and according to iv. 25 quite justly, as the object of that faith which makes blessed. Without it, His death would not be the atoning death, 1 Cor. xv. 17, 18, nor would He Himself be the Son of God, i. 4.

Ver. 10. Elucidation of ver. 9. With πιστ. and ὁμολ. Jesus is not to be supplied as subject (Hofmann), which is not even in accordance with the linguistic usage of the N. T., for 1 Tim. iii. 16 has a singular poetical style ; but the contents of the faith and of the confession *are understood, according to ver. 9, entirely of themselves.* “ *With the heart, namely (γάρ), one believes unto righteousness, but with the mouth confesses unto salvation.*” In the style of Hebrew parallelism the thought is thus expressed : “ *With the faith of the heart is united the confession of the mouth to the result that one obtains righteousness and salvation.*” The righteousness obtained through faith would, forsooth, fall to the ground again, and would not be attended by salvation, if faith had not the vital force to produce confession of the mouth (which speaks out of the fulness of the heart) ; see Matt. x. 32 ; comp. 2 Cor. iv. 13. We have thus here no merely formal parallelism, but one framed according to the actual relation of the dispensation of salvation ; and in this case, moreover, Paul observes the *genetic* sequence in καρδίᾳ . . . στόματι, because he is now no longer dependent on ver. 8.

Ver. 11. Now, after that grand proposition : τέλος νόμου Χριστός κ.τ.λ. (ver. 4), has been proved from Moses himself (vv. 5-8), and this proof has received its confirmatory discussion (vv. 9, 10), Paul brings forward, as if *for the solemn sealing of all this*, once more that weighty word of Scripture which he has already adduced in ix. 33. But this scriptural saying (Isa. xxviii. 16) now receives, with the object of closely connecting with it what is further to follow, the significant addition of the *universal* element πᾶς (perhaps already with a regard to Joel iii. 5), which indeed is found neither in the LXX. nor in the Hebrew ; but in the unlimited ὁ πιστεύων in Isaiah, ground and justification for its appearance was found to the apostle's mind, since he had the sacred historical *fulfilment* of the prophecy before his eyes, and therein its more particular definitive character.

Ver. 12. Elucidation of πᾶς. — οὐ γάρ ἐστι διαστ. Ἰουδ. τε καὶ Ἑλλ.] In respect, namely, to the bestowal of blessing on the believing, ver. 11. Comp. iii. 22. — *For the Lord of all is one and the same.* This κύριος is *Christ* [See Note CXII. p. 423.] (Origen, Chrysostom, Calovius, Wolf, Bengel, Böhme, Tholuck,

Flatt, Rückert, de Wette, Fritzsche, Philippi, Hofmann, and several others), the *αὐτός* of ver. 11, and the *κύριος* of ver. 13, who is necessarily identical with this *αὐτός*. Were *God* intended (Theodoret, Theophylact, Grotius, and many, including Ammon, Reiche, Köllner, Ewald, Umbreit, van Hengel, Krummacher), it would in fact be necessary first to suggest the *Christian* character of the demonstration (as Olshausen : "God in Christ"). — *κύριος πάντων*] comp. Phil. ii. 11 ; Acts x. 36 ; Rom. xiv. 9. — *πλουτῶν*] comp. Eph. iii. 8 : "Quem nulla quamvis magna credentium multitudo exhaustare potest," Bengel. *In what He was rich*, the Christian consciousness understood of itself ; it is contained also in the previous *κατασχυνθήσεται* and in the subsequent *σωθήσεται*,—namely, in *grace and salvation*. Comp. v. 15, xi. 33, and on 2 Cor. xiii. 13. — *εἰς πάντας*] *for all, for the benefit of all*. See Bernhardy, p. 219 ; Maetzner, *ad Lycurg.* 85. — *The calling upon Christ*, who nowhere in the N. T. appears as *identical* with the Jehovah of the O. T. (in opposition to Philippi), is not *the worshipping absolutely*, as it takes place only in respect of the Father, as the one absolute God ; but rather worship according to that relativity in the consciousness of the worshipper, which is conditioned by the relation of Christ to the Father (whose Son of like nature, image, partner of the throne, mediator and advocate on behalf of men, etc., He is). This is not imported as an Origenistic gloss (Philippi), but is necessarily founded on the dependence and subordination in which even the glorified God-man Christ, in virtue of His *munus regium*, stands in relation to the Father ; see on 1 Cor. iii. 23, xi. 3, xv. 28.¹ He who calls upon Christ is conscious that he does not call upon Him as the absolute God, but as the divine-human Representative and Mediator of God exalted to the divine glory, in whom God's adequate revelation of salvation has been given. To the *mediatorial* relation of Christ Hofmann also reverts.² Comp. on Phil. ii. 10, 11 ; 1 Cor. i. 2.

Ver. 13. Ground assigned for *εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἱπικαλ. αὐτόν*, ver. 12, and that with words of Scripture from Joel iii. 5. This passage (LXX. ii. 32, closely following the LXX.) treats of the coming in of the *Messianic* era ; hence Paul might refer *κυρίου*, which in the original points to *God*, justly to *Christ*, who has appeared in the name of God, and continually rules as His Representative and Revealer, and Mediator, whose name was now the very specific object of the *Christian* calling on the Lord. That Paul writes not *αὐτοῦ*, but *κυρίου*, is from no particular motive (against Hofmann) ; he simply reproduces the words of Scripture, which he presumes to be well known and makes his own.

Vv. 14–21. [See Note CXIII. p. 423.] In order to realize this calling upon the Lord, proclaimers of the gospel had of necessity to be sent forth ; nevertheless all did not obey the gospel ; in which case neither does *this* excuse avail, that they had not heard the preaching (ver. 18) ; nor *that*, that Israel did not recognize the universality of the preaching (ver. 19 ff.).

¹ Comp. Lücke, *de invocat. J. Chr.*, Gott. 1843.

² According to Hofmann, the promise attached to the calling on Jehovah is re-

garded by the Apostle as valid in New Testament times, for those, and those only, who place their confidence of salvation on Jesus and thus call on Him.

Thus, following up 1-13, there is still further set forth *the people's own guilt* in their exclusion.

Vv. 14, 15. Introduction : *In order now that men should call on the name of the Lord, it is necessary that they should have been believing, hearing, preaching, and that the sending forth of preachers should have taken place, which sending forth also the Scripture prophesies.* The object of this introduction is not already to cut off every way of escape from the Jews (Chrysostom, Theodoret, and several others, including Köllner), for this is spoken of for the first time in ver. 18 ff. ; but *the necessity of the evangelical ἀποστολή* is first of all to be established generally, in order then to make the disobedience of the Jews stand out with the force of contrast. Grotius and Michaelis see in vv. 14, 15 a Jewish objection, which alleges that the gospel had not been preached to all the Jews in the world, etc. ; Paul then answers in ver. 16 ff. But how unsuitably he would have answered ! Must he not, before everything else, make good—what he only brought in at ver. 18—that all Jews had heard the announcement of the gospel ? The objection here assumed is made by Paul himself in ver. 18. — οὐν] draws an inference from ver. 13 : *How shall they accordingly* (in pursuance of the requirement of ἐπικαλεῖσθαι contained in ver. 13) *call on, etc. ?* On the future of ethical possibility, see Winer, p. 262 [E. T. 279]. Important codd. and Lachm. have, instead of the futures, the deliberative subjunctive aorists : *How should they, etc. ?* The attestation in the case of the different verbs of which Tisch. 8. likewise reads the subjunctive forms, although he retains instead of ἀκούσωσιν the future form ἀκούσονται, is so unequal, that we can come to no decision. Comp. generally Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 734 f. The subject to ἐπικαλέσονται κ.τ.λ. is those who, according to the passage of Scripture in ver. 13, shall attain to salvation through calling on the name of the Lord ; that to κηρύξουσιν and ἀποστάλ., the κηρύσσοντες. The impersonal rendering (Fritzsche, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Philippi, van Hengel, and several others) has against it the fact that κηρύξ. has not the same general subject as the foregoing verbs. — εἰς ὃν οὐκ ἐπίστ.] *Him, on whom they have not become believing ;* see Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 92 [E. T. 105]. — πῶς δὲ πιστεύσουσιν κ.τ.λ.] Rightly the Vulg. : “ *Quomodo credent ei, quem non audierunt.*” οὐ is not an *adverb of place* (Hofmann) ; for thus after εἰς ὃν the symmetry of the discourse would only be heterogeneously disturbed. Nor can it denote *de quo* (Luther, Castalio, and many, including Philippi and van Hengel), since ἀκούειν τινός in the sense of ἀκ. περί τινος, without a participle annexed, is entirely foreign both to the N. T. and to Greek prose (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5. 9 is a case of attracted genitive) ; and in Homer only, *Od.* iv. 114, is the solitary instance of it found.¹ Just as little is the object, i.e. the contents of the preaching heard, meant by οὐ, which would rather be expressed by ὅν (Eph. iv. 21) ; but rather the speaking subject, who is listened to as he from whom the discourse proceeds (Mark vi. 20, vii. 14 ; Luke ii. 46, *et al.* ; Winer, p. 187 [E. T. 199]), Christ being in this case conceived of as speaking *through His preachers* (see the

¹ See Kühner, II. 1, p. 309 ; Buttmann, *Progr. üb. d. syntakt. Verbind. der Verba ἀκούειν and ἀκροᾶσθαι*, Potsd. 1855, pp. 7, 12,

and *neut. Gr.* p. 144 f. [E. T. 166]. Comp. the Homeric πυνθάνεσθαι τινος, equivalent to περί τινος (Nägelsbach, *Iliad*, p. 104, ed. 3).

following) ; comp. Eph. ii. 17. On the general thought, comp. Plat. *Rep.* p. 327 C : ἡ καὶ δύνασις αὐτῶν, ἡ δ' ὁς, πείσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας ; — χωρὶς κηρύσσει.] without their having a preacher, *apart from a preacher*. Comp. Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 95 ; who, however, wrongly explains, οὐ πιστεύσαντες τῷ κηρύσσοντι. — ἀποστολῶσι] *Whence?* διὰ ῥήματος Θεοῦ, ver. 17, informs us.—The *form* of the argument is a *sorites*, and its conclusion : The appointment of evangelical heralds is the first condition in order to bring about the calling upon the Lord. This retrograde *sorites* thus leads us back to the *source* ; and of the ἀποστολή thus suggesting itself as primarily necessary, the *prophetic confirmation* from Isa. lii. 7 (not closely after the LXX.) is then given. This “*dulcissimum dictum*” (Melanchthon), because it speaks of the message of blissful liberation from exile, therein possesses the Messianic character, as concerning the restoration of the theocracy ; and therefore is legitimately¹ understood by Paul—in connection with the Messianic idea and its historical fulfilment—as a prophecy of the evangelical preachers. These preach salvation (σωτηρία, meaning in Isaiah also not merely *peace*, but the theocratic *saving deliverance*), preach *good* (ἡ ἀγαθή) ; that is, still more generally, *omne quod felix faustumque est*, which is to be received through Christ, the accomplisher of the divine dominion. That the Rabbins also understood the passage in a Messianic sense, and in what way, see Wetstein.—The opposite of the poetical : *how pleasant are the feet (i.e. how welcome the arrival)*, etc., at iii. 15 ; Acts v. 9 ; Neh. i. 15.²

Ver. 16. Ἄλλ' contrast to the prophetic saying of ver. 15 : *But*—notwithstanding that accordingly the blessed sending forth of messengers of salvation did not fail to take place—all did not obey the message of salvation, all did not submit to the requirement (of faith), which the glad news concerning Messiah and His kingdom placed before them ; comp. i. 5, xvi. 26 ; 2 Thess. i. 8. With Theodore of Mopsuestia, who takes ἀλλ' οὐ κ.τ.λ. as a *question* (comp. Theodoret), Reiche thinks that ἀλλ' . . . εὐαγγ. is an opponent's objection, which Paul accordingly repels by the passage from Isaiah. Against this view the presence of the following γάρ would not be decisive—it would rather be quite in its proper place in the reply (Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 829 ; Hartung *Partikell.* I. p. 473 f.)—but vv. 18 and 19 (comp. xi. 1, 11), to which Reiche appeals, testify directly against it, because there λέγω is found. Fritzsche, following Carpsov, refers οὐ πάντες to the Gentiles, of whom, however, although van Hengel also understands them to be intended in vv. 14, 15, nothing is said in the whole context ; hence it is not to be even taken quite *generally* (Hofmann), but is to be referred textually to the *Jews*, of whom so many, notwithstanding that the lovely feet of the messengers of salvation came to tread amongst them, yielded no result. The *negative* expression for this multitude is a *litotes*, forbearing, but making it felt quite tragically enough, that the opposite of οὐ πάντες should have been found. Comp. iii. 3 : ἡπίστησάν τινες. — γάρ] *prophetic confirmation* of the sad phenomenon (οὐ πάντες κ.τ.λ.), which thus, as already *predicted*, enters into the connection of

¹ Comp. Hengstenberg, *Christol.* II. p. 292.

² See Schaefer, *ad Eur. Or.* 1217 ; Boeckh,

Expl. Pind. p. 281 ; Wunder, *ad Soph. El.* 1357 f. p. 120.

divine destiny, and is not an accidental occurrence. This Hofmann misapprehends, extending the reference of the γάρ to the following ἄρα ἡ πίστις κ.τ.λ., which is impossible on account of the ἄρα commencing a new sentence, since Paul has not written εἰ γὰρ Ἑσάτης λέγει κ.τ.λ. . . . ἄρα ἡ πίστις κ.τ.λ., whereby to these latter words would fall the definition of the citation, as Hofmann thinks.—In the lament of the author of Isa. liii. 1 (closely following the LXX., even with the κύριε added by them) over the unbelief of *his* time in the prophetic preaching (ἀκοή, see on Gal. iii. 2), Paul sees—and on account of the Messianic character of the entire chapter justly—a prophecy of the Jewish unbelief of *Christian* times in the *Christian* preaching. Comp. John xii. 38. Following Syr., Calovius, and others, Umbreit and Hengstenberg, *Christol.* II. p. 307, take ἀκοή as the *thing heard*, i.e. “that which is announced to us through the word of God (*by revelation*).” But the very following ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς shows, that Paul did not wish to be understood as meaning the divine communication which the preacher received, but the *preaching* of that word heard by the listeners. The historic aorist corresponds closely to ὑπήκουσαν. We may add that Theophylact rightly remarks : τὸ τίς ἀντὶ τοῦ σπάνιοι κεῖται ἐνταῦθα· τοῦτέστιν ὀλίγοι ἐπίστευσαν.

Ver. 17. Inference from the prophetic passage, with the view of substantially recapitulating what was said in ver. 14, and then pursuing the subject in ver. 18. — ἀκοή] the same as in ver. 16, *the announcement*, which is heard ; comp. on John xii. 38. *From this comes faith* ; the heard preaching of the gospel brings about in men's minds faith on Christ ; *but preaching is brought about by God's behest* (Luke iii. 2 ; Matt. iv. 4 ; Heb. xi. 3), set to work by the fact that God commands preachers to their office. Rightly have Beza, Piscator, Semler, Cramer, Fritzsche, Glöckler, Tholuck, Baumgarten-Crusius so understood ῥῆμα Θεοῦ. For the *ordinary* interpretation of it, also followed by Hofmann, as the *preached word of God*, is incorrect for this reason, that according to it ῥῆμα Θεοῦ in point of fact would not be different from ἀκοή ; and this ῥῆμα Θεοῦ does not point back to ver. 8, but to ἀποσταλῶσι in ver. 15, as the remaining contents of the verse show, so that the signification *saying* obtains textually the more precise definition of its sense as *behest*. But when ἀκοή¹ has been taken in two different senses in ver. 16 and ver. 17, so that in ver. 16 it signifies the preaching, but in ver. 17 the *hearing* (Rückert, de Wette, Philippi, according to whom the preaching is to be analyzed into its two elements, the hearing and the word of God, comp. Tholuck) ; or when in διὰ ῥήματος Θεοῦ, instead of “God's word,” *divine revelation* has been substituted (Reiche, van Hengel, comp. Olshausen, who explains it as equivalent to διὰ πνεύματος Θεοῦ) : these are just makeshifts in order to separate the incorrectly assumed notion of ῥῆμα Θεοῦ from that of ἀκοή.²—How could Paul infer also ἡ δὲ ἀκοή διὰ ῥήματος Θεοῦ

¹ That ἀκοή may denote *hearkening, listening to*, is undoubted. See Plato, *Theæt.* p. 142 D ; Diod. xix. 41. But more usually it denotes, even in the classics, either the *faculty of hearing*, or, as here, the *thing heard*. Comp. on Gal. iii. 2.

² In which they cannot succeed, however,

for ἐξ ἀκοῆς in fact could not be a *hearkening in the abstract*, but only the *hearkening to the word of God* (the gospel). So also, the *thing heard* would be even in itself the word of God ; therefore we are not to explain, with van Hengel : “id vero, quod auditum est, debetur patefactioni divinae.”

from Isaiah? Certainly not from the mere address *κίριε*, but rather from the whole attitude of the prophet towards God, as it is expressed in *κίριε . . . ἡμῶν*,—an attitude in which the prophet stands as the servant and ambassador of God, so that God thus appears as He on whose *saying*, i.e. on whose *command*, the *ἀκοή* is preached.

Ver. 18. A perhaps possible exculpation for the Jews is suggested by Paul as a *spontaneous objection*, and that in the form of a question to be *negatived*, and is then repelled with words from Scripture. “But I ask: Was it then in any way not possible for them to come to faith *ἐξ ἀκοῆς*? The preaching surely did not remain unheard by them, surely did not fail to come at all to their ears?” The correct view is simply and clearly given by Chrysostom. Incorrectly Hofmann: After Paul has introduced the *prophet* as speaking, he leaps over to the saying something *himself*, which that prophetic saying suggests to him. Against this may be urged, (1) that not here for the first time, but already in ver. 17, it is *Paul* who speaks; (2) that he, in placing himself in contradistinction to the prophet, must have written not merely *ἀλλὰ λέγω*, but *ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ λέγω*; (3) that *ἀλλὰ λ.* is not to be taken, with Hofmann, “Well! then I say,” since in that case *ἀλλά* would have the sense of agreement or concession (see Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 16), which is suitable neither here nor in ver. 19.¹ The *ἀλλά* is the quite customary *ἀλλά of objection*, which is made by oneself or in the name of the opponent; Baeumlein, p. 13. — On the following question: *Surely it cannot be that they have not heard?* observe that *οὐκ* is closely joined to *ἤκουσαν*, expressing the opposite of *ἤκουσαν* (Baeumlein, p. 277 f.; Winer, p. 476 [E. T. 511]; comp. 1 Cor. ix. 4, xi. 22), and that the interrogative *μή* supposes the *negative answer*: *by no means has it remained unheard by them*, which negation of the *οὐκ ἤκουσαν* implies the assertion of the *ἤκουσαν*. — *ἤκουσαν*] *sc. τὴν ἀκοήν*. The subject is those who remained unbelieving (*οὐ πάντες ὑπήκ.*, ver. 16), by whom Paul certainly means the *Jews*, although without expressing it directly and exclusively. The reference to the *Gentiles* (Origen, Calvin, Fritzsche, and others, including van Hengel and Krummacher) is quite foreign to the connection; comp. on ver. 15. — *μενοῦνγε ἴμο vero*.² See on ix. 20. — *εἰς πᾶσαν κ.τ.λ.*] from Ps. xix. 5 (close after the LXX.), where the subject spoken of is the universally diffused *natural revelation* of God; Paul clothes in these sacred words the expression of the going forth (*ἐξηλθεν, aor.*) everywhere of the preaching of the *gospel*. Comp. Justin, *c. Tryph.* 42, (*Apol.* i. 40. — *ὁ φθόγγος αὐτῶν*) *their sound*, the sound which the preachers (to these, according to the connection, *αὐτῶν* refers, which in the psalm refers to heaven, the handiworks of God, day and night) send forth while they preach. In the LXX. it is a translation of *מִזְרָג*, which some have understood, with Luther, as *their measuring line* (comp. Hupfeld), some, and rightly so, according to the parallelism, with the LXX., Symm., Syr., Vulg., and most expositors

¹ Hofmann appeals without pertinence to Hartung, II. p. 35. For the *proinde* in challenges or exclamations is here entirely heterogeneous.

² Theodore of Mopsuestia aptly says: τὸ

μενοῦνγε ἐπὶ λύσει κέχρηται, . . . λύων τὸ ζητούμενον. Comp. on the *μὲν οὖν* introducing a *correcting answer*, Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 845; Pfugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 1261; Kühner, II. 2, p. 711.

tors, as *their sound*. — The answer *μενοῦνγε κ.τ.λ.* (in which, moreover, Paul does not adduce the passage from the Psalms as a *quotation*) confutes the *οὐκ ἤκουσαν* very forcibly, because it argues *a majori*, and even applies to all the Jews of the dispersion. But the conclusion that, according to our present passage, the gospel had at that time *actually* penetrated everywhere (even to China, America, etc.), is simply an arrant mistake, contrary to the nature of the popularly poetical expression, although, in imitation of the older commentators, renewed by Löhe (*v. d. Kirche*, p. 34 ff.), and Pistorius in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1846, II. p. 40. The universal extension of the gospel (comp. Col. i. 6, 23; Clem. Cor. i. 5) set on foot by the *apostles* on a sufficiently large scale, is *continually* in course of development. Comp. xi. 25, 26.

Ver. 19. A further possible exculpation,¹ introduced in emphatic conformity with the preceding, and the repelling of it by means of scriptural declarations down to ver. 21. On *ἀλλά* Theodore of Mopsuestia rightly observes : *πάλιν ἑτέραν ἀντίθεσιν ἐπάγει. — μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω ;] surely it did not remain unknown to the Israelites ?*² The “*it*” to be supplied with *ἔγνω* (see Nägelsbach, *z. Ilias*, p. 120, ed. 3) is : *ὅτι εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐξελεύσεται ὁ φθόγγος αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.* This universal destination of the preaching of Christ expressed in ver. 18 must have been known by the Jews, for long ago Moses and also Isaiah had prophesied the conversion of the Gentiles — Isaiah likewise, the refractory spirit of opposition thereto of the Jews (vv. 20, 21). This reference of *οὐκ ἔγνω* alone (followed also by de Wette, Fritzsche, and Tholuck) flows purely in accordance with the text from what immediately precedes, and is at the same time naturally in keeping with the contents of the corresponding biblical passages ; for the conversion of the Gentiles and the universality of Christianity are one ; since the former was prophesied to the Jews, the latter could not be unknown to them ; and they could not therefore allege as the excuse for their unbelief : We did not know that Christianity is destined for the whole of humanity — the less could they do so, since Isaiah places before them the true source of their unbelief in their own spirit of resistance. The view of the passage which comes substantially nearest to ours, is that of Thomas Aquinas, Cornelius à Lapide, Piscator, Pareus, Toletus, Calovius, Turretine, Morus, Rosenmüller, Koppe, Benecke, Köllner, Ewald (comp. Tholuck), who supply with *οὐκ ἔγνω* : *that the Gospel would pass over from the Jews to the Gentiles*. So Pelagius and Theodore of Mopsuestia : *τὸ τοῦς ἐξ ἐθνῶν προσελῆθαι εἰς τὴν εὐσέβειαν*. But this is wrong, in so far as the object to be supplied is not purely borrowed from the preceding, but is already in part anticipated from what follows. Beza has vaguely and erroneously supplied *Deum* with *ἔγνω* ; Reithmayr, on the other hand, thinks no object is to be supplied ; while others imagine *the gospel* to be the object (“Have they not learnt to know the gospel, in order to be able to believe in it ?”). So Chrysostom, Vatablus, Gomarus, Hammond, Estius,

¹ The correctness of which would in turn weaken the blamableness pointed out in ver. 18. Comp. Chrys.

² Those previously *meant* (in opposition to Hofmann) are here expressly *named* — which

indicates a climax of the increasing *urgency* of the question, and which is the more naturally suggested to Paul, since he has already in view a prophecy directed to the people in contrast to the Gentiles (ver. 21).

and several others, including Rückert, Olshausen, van Hengel, Beyschlag, Mangold, and, with a peculiar turn, Philippi also ; similarly Hofmann and others, taking up the following *πρῶτος* (see below). In that case—against which there is no objection in itself—*μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω* would be so complete a parallel to *μὴ οὐκ ἤκουσαν* in ver. 18, that here, as there, *the gospel* would have to be supplied. But as this is by no means necessary (in opposition to Hofmann)—since it fully satisfies the symmetry of the discourse, if in both instances *ἀλλὰ λέγω* has its reference to what immediately precedes—so it is directly opposed by the fact, that the following reply beginning with *πρῶτος* would not be suitable. For if we were to assume that Paul has given an *indirect* answer (“when he shows that the *Gentiles* believe, he says : How should not, could not *Israel* have believed, if it had willed ?” Olsh.), this would only be a makeshift, in which the answer would appear the more unsuitable in proportion to its indirectness, and still leave open the possibility of the *οὐκ ἔγνω*. Or if we were to suppose with Rückert, that the thought is : “Want of knowledge is not the cause, but God is now putting into penal execution what He has threatened, and is allowing salvation to pass over to the *Gentiles*, in order thereby to convert the Jews to a better disposition,” the point of the *ἔγνω* would not be entered into at all, and moreover, the essential part of the interpretation would simply be supplied by the reader. This objection is at the same time valid against van Hengel, according to whom it is to be made to appear from the following prophetic quotations that *Israel* had indeed known, but had shamefully despised, the gospel. Or if, finally, with Philippi, we are to say that the passages from the prophets contained not a refutation, but a *substantiation*, of the fact that verily *Israel*¹ had rejected the gospel (which rejection lies in *οὐκ ἔγνω*), this would be inconsistent with the interrogative form with *μή* (comp. on iii. 5), which necessarily presupposes the *denial*² of the *οὐκ ἔγνω* (consequently the affirmative : *ἔγνω*). In entire deviation from the views just given, Reiche thinks that Ἰσραὴλ is *accusative*, and Θεός to be supplied as subject. “Did not God recognize *Israel* for His people ? How could He permit it to be so blinded and hardened ?” It is decisive against this view, that to supply Θεός as subject, especially after ver. 18, is highly arbitrary, and that the following passages of Scripture would be quite inappropriate. — *πρῶτος*] not in the sense of *πρότερος* (which, regarded by itself, might indeed be the case according to the context ; see on John i. 15) ; but, since *Moses* is quoted,

¹ Philippi paraphrases : “Is it conceivable that *Israel* precisely, the chosen people of God, did not recognize the Messianic *σωτηρία* destined in an especial manner for it, or the preaching thereof, while yet the *Gentiles* attained to this knowledge ?” “The adduced passages from the prophets show now that there was *by no means any cause of wonder* over this fact, for thus exactly it had been predicted in the divine word,—namely, that the *Gentiles* would accept, but *Israel* would reject, the salvation.”

² Philippi, indeed, in eds. 2 and 3, pro-

poses, in the event of the *denial* of the question being retained,—which, however, he does not concede,—the expedient, that then the prophetic passages might serve to prove that the fact of the prophecy, which appeared in itself *incredible*, had *nevertheless* occurred in correspondence therewith. But the contents of this thought would be invented, not gathered from the language ; and self-contradictory besides, for the *no* would be involved in the question, and in *πρῶτος* κ.τ.λ. the *yes*, which had yet occurred in accordance with prophecy.

with whom the testimony of God in the O. T. begins : *at the first* (who in Scripture comes forward in opposition to this) *speaks Moses*. Of the later testimonies of Scripture, Paul then contents himself with adducing only the bold divine utterances of Isaiah. Theodore of Mopsuestia well gives it : εἰς τὸν Μωϋσῆς. Wetstein, Michaelis, Storr, Flatt, Hofmann, connect πρώτος with οὐκ ἔγνω. But the supposed sense : "Did not Israel first learn to know it (the gospel)?" or, as Hofmann expresses it : "*Was it possibly to stand in such a position, that Israel did not obtain the first experience of it?*" must have been expressed *without* μή.¹—ἐγὼ παραξ. κ.τ.λ.] Deut. xxxii. 21, almost exactly after the LXX. God there, in the song of Moses, threatens the idolatrous Israelites, that He on His part (ἐγὼ) will bless a Gentile people, and thereby incite the former to jealousy and to wrath, as they had incited Him by their worship of idols. Paul recognizes in this—according to the rule of the constancy of the divine ways in the history of the development of the theocracy—a type of the attaining of the Gentiles to participation in the communion of God's people, whereby the jealousy and wrath of the Jews will be excited.—ἐπ' οὐκ ἐθνει] עַם נֶאֱמָר, *in respect to a not-people*; for only the people of God was the real one, the people corresponding to the divine idea of a people; every other is the negation of this idea. Comp. ix. 25; 1 Pet. ii. 10. On the connection of οὐ with nouns, cancelling the notion objectively, see Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 129; Grimm on 2 Macc. iv. 13. Often found in Thucydides (Krüger on i. 137. 4). On ἐπί, *over*, on the ground, that is, *on account of*, comp. Demosthenes, 1448. 4: παροξυνθέντων ἐπὶ τῷ γεγεννημένῳ, Polyb. iv. 7, 5.—ἀσυνέτῳ] τί γὰρ Ἑλλήνων ἀσυνετώτερον ξύλοις καὶ λίθοις προσκεχηγνόντων; Theophylact. Comp. i. 21.

Vv. 20, 21. Δέ] marking the transition to another prophet, as at ix. 27.—ἀποτολμᾷ κ. λέγει] *is emboldened and says*. The latter is the immediate consequence of the former; hence here not a Hebraizing mode of expression for the adverbial notion (*he freely speaks out*), but ἀποτολμ. is *absolute* (Hom. *Il.* x. 232, xii. 51, *et al.*).²—ἀποτολμᾷ] ἐβιάσατο γυνῆν εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ κινδυνεύσαι ἢ ἀποσιωπῆσαι, Theophylact. Yet the prophet of bold speech is *represented as present*, as previously Moses in λέγει. The citation is Isa. lxxv. 1, freely from the LXX., and with undesigned transposition of the two parallel clauses. According to its *historical* sense, the passage refers to the *Jews*³ who had become apostate from God through immorality and idolatry, on whose behalf the prophet has just begged for grace, to which entreaty

¹ By taking πρώτος with ἔγνω, there would result the quite preposterous sense of the question: Surely it is not possibly the case that Israel first remained unacquainted with it? *i.e.* that the Israelites were the first to whose knowledge the gospel had not come? Hofmann groundlessly refers to Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 214 [E. T. 248], and explains as though οὐκ did not qualify ἔγνω, but πρώτος, as though consequently Paul had said: μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐ πρώτος ἔγνω; *This* would be: Surely Israel has not experienced it only in the second place (the Gen-

tile world in the first)? With strange incorrectness, Hofmann says that, according to our way of taking πρώτος, εἰπεν should stand instead of λέγει. Moses speaks and writes (ver. 5) *still at this day* as πρώτος in the O. T.

² Comp. Winer, p. 437 f. [E. T. 468 f.]; Buttmann, p. 249 [E. T. 290]; and see Maetzner, *ad Antiph.* p. 173; Hom. *Il.* i. 92: θάρσθη καὶ ἦδα μάντις.

³ Not to the *Gentiles* (Calvin, Vitranga, Philippi). See, on the other hand, Delitzsch on Isa.

Jehovah begins His answer by reminding them how He had given Himself to be found, and revealed Himself with prevenient undeserved kindness to the faithless people. But in the apostate Israel, which was in fact sunk into an *idolatrous* condition (see esp. Isa. lxiv. 6, lxx. 3 ff.), and in the relation to it which Jehovah here affirms of Himself, Paul sees a *typical representation* of the *Gentile world*, which (as ἄθεοι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, Eph. ii. 12) did not concern itself about God, but to which God has given Himself to be found, and (epexegetic parallel) to be recognized in His self-revelation (through the gospel). The Gentiles have *accepted* this prevenient divine compassion, but Israel in its obstinate apostasy has *resisted* it; hence Paul continues in ver. 21 with πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ λέγει. The latter clearly indicates that Paul really found in ver. 20 the prophetic reference to the *Gentile world* (of which Israel is the opposite); and not, as Hofmann with strict adherence to the historical sense of the original supposes, the *fruitlessness of the divine long-suffering towards Israel, which justifies God's dealing if He now rests not until He has requited its disobedience*. According to this interpretation, πρὸς τὸν Ἰσραὴλ would have been already said in ver. 20, against which view ver. 21 testifies. — εὑρέθην] not: "I have allowed myself to be found" (Reiche and others), but: *I have been found*. On the sense, comp. Acts xvii. 27; and on the connection of εὑρ. and ἐμφ. ἐγεν., Wisd. i. 1 f. The *aorists* are, in the sense of the apostle, to be understood of that which has taken place in the Christian present. — τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ἐπερωτ.] *who inquired not of me*, namely, respecting revelation; comp. Ezek. xx. 1; Dem. 1072. 12. — Ver. 21. πρὸς] not *adversus* (Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Toletus, Grotius, Cramer, Koppe), since in itself—without a more special indication of the text which would yield the hostile sense—it denotes only the simple placing in contrast. Hence, either: *in reference to Israel* (Estius, Wolf, Ch. Schmidt, and others, including Tholuck, de Wette, Fritzsche, Philippi), like Heb. i. 7, 8, Luke xii. 41, xx. 19; or, "*in the case of Israel He declares*" (Köllner, Rückert, Ewald, and others, following Luther and Vulg.). The former view, which is adopted also by van Hengel, is to be preferred *for this reason*, that δέ introduces a contrast, not with those to whom the previous passage was *directed*, but with those to whom it *refers* in respect of its figurative application. — λέγει] Isaiah, namely. That he speaks in the name of God, is understood of itself. — ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν.] *the whole day*, like viii. 36. Expresses the *unremitting nature* of the love. — ἀπειθ. κ. ἀντιλέγοντα] *present participle*, denoting the continuance of the conduct. ἀντιλέγ. is not to be explained, with Grotius, Reiche, Fritzsche, van Hengel, and most, as *to be refractory*, which it does not mean, but *to contradict*. The Jews—although God stretched out His saving hands towards them from early morning till evening (comp. Prov. i. 24)—are disobedient, and say: *We will not!* Comp. Matt. xxiii. 37; Tit. ii. 9; 3 Macc. ii. 28; Lucian. *D. M.* xxx. 3; and see on John xix. 12. Also in Achilles Tatius, v. 27 (in opposition to Kypke and Fritzsche), ἀντιλέγειν is conceived as *contradiction*; as also ἀντιλογία, Heb. xii. 3. Note how opposed the passage is to absolute predestination, and particularly to the Calvinistic "*voluntas beneplaciti et signi.*"

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

CX. Ver. 4. τέλος γὰρ νόμον Χριστός.

That Meyer's view of τέλος is correct is shown both by the preceding and by the following context. The idea of the Apostle in ix. 30-32, and in the third verse of this chapter, is that of two opposite and mutually exclusive systems. The same is true of vv. 5 ff. In these verses he is not discussing the matter which is under consideration in Gal. iii. 23 ff., but that which is noticed in Gal. iii. 11, 12. According to the plan adopted, indeed, and the line of argument pursued, he introduces the point in a different place and connection in the two Epistles. But the point itself is the same. The law-system and the faith-system are, in their very nature, contrary to each other. That which lies at the foundation in the one case is *doing*: in the other, it is *believing*. It will be observed, also, that the same passage from the O. T. (Levit. xviii. 5) is cited here which appears in Gal. iii. 12. The thought connected with τέλος must, accordingly, be this: When Christ, who brings in the completeness of the faith-system, enters upon His work, the law-system is ended and excluded. Hence, also, it follows that the Jews, in holding to the law-system, fail of righteousness, which comes only by faith.

The connection, in this underlying idea, between the present passage and Gal. iii. 11 f., has also an important bearing on the meaning of νόμον in this verse. In Gal. iii. the fact that ὁ νόμος, which must mean the Mosaic law, occurs both in ver. 10 and ver. 12, together with the fact that the proof given of the subjection of those who are ἐξ ἔργων νόμον to a curse is the declaration of the O. T., that every man who does not continue in all the things which are written in the book of the law (τοῦ νόμου) is accursed, makes it manifest that νόμον and τοῦ νόμου are intended by the writer to refer to the same thing. If, however, this is true in the corresponding verses in the letter to the Galatians, it must be admitted to be true also in the verses now before us, for we find here the same principal thought confirmed by the same O. T. passage, and not only so, but we find the cited words, which in the original refer to the Mosaic law (*i.e.* ὁ νόμος), used as giving Moses' description of the δικαιοσύνη νόμου.

That παντί in this verse has the same sense with that mentioned in Note VIII., p. 76, is evident from the words Ἰουδαίον τε καὶ Ἕλληνας of ver 12 (comp. πάντας, ver. 12, πᾶς, vv. 11, 13), and also from vv. 18-21.

CXI. Vv. 6-9.

The citation here is from Deut. xxx. 11-14. There can be no doubt that this passage, as it occurs in the O. T., refers to the law of Moses, and declares to the people that, inasmuch as that law had been clearly set before their minds, the fulfilment of its duties was a thing close at hand for them in their daily living. It is applied, however, by Paul to the faith-system, as descriptive of its distinguishing peculiarity in contrast with the law-system. In connection with this fact the following points may be noticed. (a) The writer allows himself to use an O. T. citation in a sense different from the primary sense of the original. That there was a secondary meaning in the passage quoted, which answers to the one brought out by the Apostle, is indicated only by the fact that he employs the words as he does. (b) In his peculiar use and application

of the words, the Apostle changes the original expressions so far as to adapt them more fully to his purpose : *e.g.* "who shall descend into the abyss," instead of "who shall go over the sea for us." (c) He also adds explanatory words which are connected with his application of the passage, and, in the instance just mentioned, such explanatory words as seem to indicate plainly his object in altering the original. (d) He does not, however, formally declare that Moses describes the righteousness of faith in this language, but simply appropriates the words of Moses for the purpose of setting forth the description of it. The passage serves, thus, to show the freedom which the writer exercises in the matter of quotation, and its phenomena, with those which kindred passages present, must be fairly considered in any examination or discussion of the question as to the use made by N. T. writers of words from the O. T.

In the attempt to determine the precise thought which the Apostle intends to express by *τίς ἀναβήσεται κ.τ.λ.*, as he makes the words descriptive of faith, we must observe : (1) That the main design of the introduction of the passage is to set forth the contrast with the law-system. The central idea, thus, is believing as opposed to doing. (2) That the questions *τίς κ.τ.λ.* in the O. T. verses refer to the difficulty and remoteness of the thing in question, as if it must be brought to us from heaven, or from beyond the sea, in order to our hearing or doing it. (3) That, in the use of the citation by Paul, we must look for the second idea (2) as well as the first (1), if we would reach the full significance of it to his mind. He denies, in the earlier and negative part, that the faith-system involves the necessity of any great or impossible work, and affirms, in the positive part, the simple demand for believing. (4) The explanation of the added words, *to bring Christ down from heaven, or up from the dead*, is most readily suggested by the fact that, as connected with the system of faith, His descent to this world and resurrection from the dead accomplished the two great things which were essential to be done. These two things have been already accomplished, and the Christian has only to accept them by faith. The understanding of these questions, therefore, as questions of *unbelief*, as Meyer and some others explain them, is unnecessary, and also contrary to the indications of the passage. Meyer urges that vv. 9 ff. suggest nothing of difficulty and facility. This suggestion is made, however, by the *ἐγγύς κ.τ.λ.* of ver. 8 in contrast with *μὴ εἶπης . . . τίς κ.τ.λ.* of ver. 6 (comp. the verses in Deut.), and is carried over, without further repetition of it, into vv. 9 ff. He also presses, as if decisive, the fact that vv. 5-8 are designed to be "a proof, founded on Moses, of the statement *τέλος νόμου Χριστός*," and that the force of the proof depends on the essential *difference* between the faith *δικαιοσύνη* and that of the law, and not on the *facility* of the former. No doubt it does thus depend on the *difference*. But in the investigation of the *τίς* questions we are considering not the *central idea* of the passage alone, but the cause for introducing *certain words*. These words, which are in the negative part of what is said, contain something more than the mere foundation thought of that part, *i.e.* *not doing*. They refer to the *not doing a particular thing*, and the point to be determined is why this particular thing is mentioned. Meyer himself is compelled to give an answer to this inquiry, and to say that the words imply a denial that Christ has come in the flesh. There is no hint of such a denial, however, in any simple application of the O. T. verses, and no necessary suggestion of it in anything which the Apostle says.

CXII. Ver. 12. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κύριος πάντων.

That *κύριος* here refers to Christ cannot be considered certain. That this reference is probable, however, must be admitted, because we find the same word in ver. 9 as the predicate in the confession *Jesus is Lord*; because it occurs here in a sentence introduced for the purpose of proving that every one, whether Jew or Gentile, who believes on Him, will not be ashamed; because with the idea of calling upon this *κύριος*, which is presented in the last clause of the verse, is connected the idea of believing, ver. 14; and because the hearing, which is intimated to be the necessary antecedent condition to believing, is said in ver. 17 to come through the word of Christ [*Χριστοῦ* is the true reading in that verse].

The remark of Meyer (who accepts the reference of *κύριος* to Christ), that "the calling upon Christ—who nowhere in the N. T. appears as identical with the Jehovah of the O. T.—is not the worshipping absolutely, as it takes place only in respect of the Father, as the one absolute God; but rather worship according to that relativity in the consciousness of the worshipper, which is conditioned by the relation [i.e. of 'dependence and subordination'] of Christ to the Father," is not suggested by anything in this chapter or verse. Whatever foundation may be claimed for it must be discovered elsewhere. Alford, on the other hand, affirms that "there is hardly a stronger proof, or one more irrefragable by those who deny the Godhead of our Blessed Lord, than the unhesitating application to Him of the name and attributes of Jehovah."

CXIII. Ver. 14–21.

The verses from ix. 30 to x. 13 set forth directly the cause of the failure of the Jews. Vv. 14–21 show that, as related to this cause, they were without excuse. The cause is their failure to accept and adopt the way of righteousness which God has provided—righteousness by faith. The only two excuses for this failure, which they could present, were, *first*, that they had not heard of the faith system, and *secondly*, that, having heard it, they had found it to be a system so inconsistent, in respect to its universality, with the teachings of the O. T. Scriptures as to render it natural for them to reject it. Both of these points are considered, and the Apostle gives, in citations from the O. T., a denial of each of them. The Jews had heard, since the messengers had gone forth far and wide. The prophets, and even Moses, had pointed to the ingathering of the Gentile nations, and also to the disobedience and gainsaying of the Jews. But, after they had heard, they had not yielded to God's method, vv. 16–18; and, notwithstanding they had known, they would not accept and believe, vv. 19–21. To these verses, as Meyer also says, a prefatory passage, vv. 14, 15, is prefixed, which allows that there would be an excuse were there no preachers sent forth by the Lord to proclaim the truth. The form and phraseology of vv. 14, 15 are determined by the preceding verses, out of which they naturally spring in the progress of the sentences. But in relation to the main line of the thought, they open a new paragraph.

CHAPTER XI.

Ver. 1. After *τ. λαὸν αὐτοῦ*, A D* *** and some Fathers have *ὃν προέγνω*. So Lachm. in brackets. An addition from ver. 2. — Ver. 2. After *Ἰσραὴλ* Elz. has *λέγων*, against decisive evidence. — Ver. 3. *τὰ θυσιαστ.*] Elz.: *καὶ τὰ θυσ.*, against so important witnesses, that *καὶ* would appear a connective addition. Comp. the LXX. — Ver. 6. The addition in Elz., *εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἔργων, οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶ χάρις· ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶν ἔργον*, is wanting in A C D E F G P **, 47, Copt. Sah. Arm. Vulg. It. Dam. Rufin., and all the Latin Fathers. An old interpolation (found already in B L ***, Syr. Arr. Chrys.), with a view to the completion of the proof; rejected by Erasmus, Grotius, Wetstein, Griesbach, Scholz, Lachm.; adopted, indeed, by Tisch. 7, but again omitted in ed. 8; after Beza, Bengel, Matthiae, Rinck, defended most thoroughly by Fritzsche and Reiche (in opp. to his Commentary) in the *Comment. Crit.* I. p. 68 ff. But considering the preponderance of the opposing testimony, the completely superfluous character of the proposition in the argument, and the anomalous form in which the words appear in the principal Codex which contains them (B: *εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἔργων, οὐκ ἔτι χάρις· ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶν χάρις*), and also the other variations in detail (see Tisch. 8), the defences of them are not convincing. See also van Hengel. The argument for retaining them, on the ground that an interpolator would have framed them more closely in conformity with the first half of the verse, is weakened by the fact that very ancient authorities have *ἐστὶν* instead of *γίνεται* also in the first half of the verse. — Ver. 7. *τοῦτο*] Elz.: *τούτου*, against decisive evidence. An emendation in accordance with the usual construction. — Ver. 13. *γάρ*] Lachm., Tisch. 8: *δέ*, according to A B P **, min. Syr. Copt. Damasc. Theodoret, ms.; C has *οὐν*; Aeth. utr. no particle. With such divided testimony, *δέ* is the best supported, and to be preferred; it came to be glossed by more definite particles. — *μεν*] is wanting in D E F G, min., which was occasioned by the apparent absence of reference for the *μέν*. Lachm., Tisch. 8: *μέν οὐν*, according to A B C P **, Copt., which has therefore the external attestation decidedly in its favour, but is to be explained from the fact that the unrelated *μέν* was glossed by *οὐν* (a new sentence was commenced with *ἐφ' ὅσον*); therefore these authorities indirectly pass over to the side of the otherwise weakly accredited Recepta. — Ver. 17. *τῆς ρίζης καὶ*] This *καὶ* is wanting in B C **, Copt. Omitted by Tisch. 8; but how easily it might be suppressed, owing to the *homoeoteleuta*! In D* F G, codd. It. Jr., *τῆς ρίζης* is also wanting from the like cause. — Ver. 19. *κλάδου*] So Rinck, Scholz, Lachm., Tisch. 8, according to decisive testimony. But Elz. and Tisch. 7 have *οἱ κλάδοι*, the article being mechanically introduced in imitation of *τῶν κλάδων*, vv. 17, 18. Were *οἱ* original, and had it been desired through its omission to designate the *τινὲς τῶν κλάδων* in ver. 17 (Matth., Fritzsche), it would have more readily occurred to the mechanical tendency of copyists to insert *τινὲς* instead of *οἱ*. — Ver. 20. *ὑψηλοφρονεῖ*] Lachm. and Tisch. 8: *ὑψηλὰ φρόνει*, according to A B **. Resolution of the word—which is only found besides in 1 Tim. vi. 17—into its elements in con-

formity with xii. 16. — Ver. 21. *μήπως*] is wanting in A B C P $\aleph$, min., Copt. Damasc. Ruf. Aug. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8. But the offence which was taken partly at the apparent unrelatedness of *μήπως* (which is therefore exchanged in Or. for *πόσω μάλλον* and *πόσω πλέον*), partly at the following future, readily induced the omission. For *φείσεται*, which Elz. has instead of *φείσεται*, is very feebly supported by evidence, and has manifestly come in in accordance with the original *μήπως*; wrongly defended anew by Rinck. See the exegetical notes; comp. also Beng. *Apparat. Crit.* — Ver. 22. In the second clause Lachm. and Tisch. have, instead of *ἀποτομίαν*, *ἀποτομία*, and instead of *χρηστότητα*, *χρηστότης Θεοῦ*; the former according to A B C $\aleph^*$, 67**, Or. Damasc.; the latter according to A B C D* ($\aleph$ has *χρηστότης Θεοῦ*), 67**, Arm. Or. Eus. Damasc. Rightly; the common reading is a hasty grammatical emendation. Θεοῦ, too, bears, in its belonging to the reading *χρηστότης*, the stamp of genuineness. — Ver. 25. *παρ' ἐαυτ.*] Lachm. and Tisch. 7: *ἐν ἐαυτ.*, according to A B, Damasc. The latter is to be preferred (*παρ' ἐαυτ.* was introduced through a comparison of xii. 16), and it explains, too, the origin of the *bare ἐαυτοῖς* in F G; for by the omission of the N the preposition would easily come to be dropped. — Ver. 30. *ὕμεις*] Elz., Scholz: *καὶ ὑμεῖς*, against decisive evidence. — Ver. 31. Before *ἐλεηθ.* B D* $\aleph$, Copt. Dam. have *νῦν*; so Lachm. in brackets, and Tisch. 8. Inappropriate addition, arising from misconception, instead of which some min. have *ἵστερον*. — Ver. 32. *τοὺς πάντας.*] Instead of the first τ. π., D. Ir. *et al.* have *τὰ πάντα*, and F G *πάντα*. Also Vulg. It. express the neuter, which, however, is taken from Gal. iii. 22.

CONTENTS :—After the humiliation hitherto expressed, there now follows the *consolation* in respect to the exclusion of a large part of Israel. (1) God has not cast off His people, but has allowed a part of them, according to a gracious election, to attain to salvation, and has hardened the remainder, vv. 1–10. (2) Yet God wills not their final destruction; nay, their unbelief subserves the salvation of the Gentiles, and their conversion will have yet more happy consequences. This is matter for hope, and the Gentile Christians may not therefore give way to self-exaltation, vv. 11–24. (3) For the hardening of a portion of the people will last no longer than until the whole of the Gentiles have become Christians; and then Israel will obtain salvation, vv. 25–32. How unfathomable are the riches, wisdom, and knowledge of God! To Him be glory! vv. 33–36.

Ver. 1. *Λέγω οὖν*] [See Note CXIV. p. 458] corresponds to the twofold *ἀλλὰ λέγω*, x. 18, 19, but so, that now this *third* interrogative *λέγω* is introduced in an *inferential* form. In consequence, namely, of what had just been clearly laid down in x. 18 ff., as to the guilt of resistant Israel in its exclusion from salvation in Christ—over-against the Gentiles' acceptance of it—the difficult question might arise: *Surely God has not cast off His people?* Surely it is not so tragic a fate, that we must infer it from that conduct of the people?¹ Paul states this question, earnestly negatives it, and then sets

¹ Namely, as a divine measure of retribution taken in consequence of their spirit of resistance to the message of salvation preached to them. The divine act of cast-

ing off from Himself is not viewed as the *cause* (against this is x. 21), but as the penal *consequence*, of the disdaining God's loving will.

forth the real state of the matter. The opinion of Hofmann, that the apostle starts this question *because the scriptural passages* x. 18 ff. *show that it is to be negatived*, is the consequence of his incorrect interpretation of those scriptural sayings, and is confuted by the fact that the negation is first given and supported *in what follows*, not drawn *from what precedes*, but made good by a quite *different* scriptural proof, ver. 2. — *μὴ ἀπόσωτο* κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Ps. xciv. 14, xc. 3 ; 1 Sam. xii. 32 ; on the form, see Winer, p. 86 [E. T. 90]. Reiche thinks, but erroneously, that the question is not expressed sharply enough, and that *ἀπαντα* is to be supplied. 'Απόσωτο has in truth the emphasis, and is placed first on that account ; so that Paul's simple idea is, that the *casting off* of God's people, exclusion from the divine decree of the bestowal of salvation, recall of this destination to salvation, may not be inferred from what has gone before. Rightly, too, Bengel remarks : "*Ipsa populi ejus appellatio rationem negandi continet.*" This *ratio negandi* is then, in ver. 2, additionally strengthened by *ὁν προέγνω*. — The *μὴ γένοιτο* expresses horror at the *ἀπόσωτο*, not at the *λέγω* (van Hengel), as though Paul had written simply *ἀπόσωτο* without *μὴ*. — *καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ* κ.τ.λ.] *For I also*, etc., expresses the motive for *μὴ γένοιτο* ! For Paul, as a true Israelite of patriotic feeling, cannot, in virtue of his theocratic self-esteem, admit that *ἀπόσωτο*, but can only repel the suggestion with abhorrence. Comp. de Wette and Baumgarten-Crusius. A peculiar *proof* of the *οὐκ ἀπόσωτο* was yet to *follow*. Usually it is thought that Paul proves the negation *by his own example*, since he in truth was not cast off. So also Philippi. But apart from the consideration, that the example of a single elected one, however highly favoured,¹ would be far from convincing, we see no reason why Paul should have added *ἐκ σπέρμ.* 'Αβρ., *φυλ. Βενιαμ.* ; moreover, it appears from ver. 2, where he defines the negation, emphatically reiterates it, and then confirms it from Scripture, that he did not intend till ver. 2 to adduce the argument against the *ἀπόσωτω*, which he had *only provisionally* rejected in ver. 1. Without the least indication from the text, Hofmann introduces into κ. ἐγὼ the reference : Even I, the apostle entrusted with the calling of the Gentile world (which is supposed to imply a sealing of the sacred historical call of Israel) ; even I, as once upon a time a persecutor, deserving of rejection. — *ἐκ σπέρμ.* 'Αβρ., *φυλ. Βενιαμ.*] added, in order to exhibit the just and genuine privileges of his birth. Comp. Phil. iii. 5 ; Acts xiii. 21 ; Test. XII. Patr. p. 746 f. The tribe of Benjamin was in truth, along with that of Judah, the theocratic core of the nation after the exile. Es. iv. 1, x. 9.

Ver. 2. *Ὅν προέγνω*] An element which renders the impossibility of *ἀπόσωτο* at once palpable ; comp. ver. 29. Others take it as a *limiting* definition, *τὸν λ. αὐτοῦ ὃν πρ.* being understood *of the spiritual people of God destined to the Christian salvation* (Origen, Augustine, Chrysostom, Luther, Calvin, and others, including Heumann, Semler, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Glöckler). But against this view it is decisive that τ. λαὸν αὐτ. in ver. 1, without any limitation, denotes the Jewish nation, and consequently Paul himself would now

¹ Theodore of Mopsuestia asks : πῶς γὰρ οἷον . . . τε ᾧν ἀπόσασθαι τὸν Θεὸν τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ

πίστει σεμνυνόμενον καὶ περὶ ταύτης διδάσκειν ὑπισχνούμενον ἑτέρους ;

completely disarrange the point in question; the whole chapter has for its subject, not the *spiritual* Israel, but the fate of the *nation* in respect to the salvation of Messiah. Hence, too, we are not to supply, with Philippi, p. 554, after *ὃν προέγνω* the limitation: *as seminary of the spiritual σπέρμα*. — The sense of *προέγνω* has been understood as variously as in viii. 29, but is to be taken just as there: God *knew* His people as such *beforehand*, before it actually existed; that is to say, it was to Him, to whom the whole future development of sacred history was present in His pretemporal counsel and plan, known and certain: *Israel is my peculiar people!* And consequently God cannot have afterwards rejected Israel; for this would in truth presuppose that which is inconceivable with God (comp. Acts xv. 18), and irreconcilable with the ἀμετάθετον τῆς βουλῆς αὐτοῦ (Heb. vi. 17), namely, that he had been deceived in His *προέγνω*; comp. ver. 30 ff. To suppose the *qualitas mala* of the people as that which God foreknew (van Hengel) is inadmissible, for the reason that *πρόγνωσις* must be the premiss of the *προορίζειν* of the people of God (comp. viii. 29); hence, too, it is not to be objected, with Hofmann,¹ against our view, that God would surely have been able to foresee the fact that, and the time when, His people would cease to be His people. — ἡ οὐκ οἶδατε κ.τ.λ., down to ver. 4, adduces a proof for οὐκ ἀπώσατο from an historical example of Scripture, according to which a case analogous to the present of the resistance of the people to God had once occurred, but God has made the declaration that He had (not indeed cast off His people, but) reserved to Himself, in the midst of the depravity of the mass, a number of faithful ones. So (ver. 5) too now there has taken place, not a rejection of the people, but rather a gracious election out of the people. [See Note CXV. p. 458]. — ἐν Ἠλίᾳ belongs to τί λέγει, but is not: *de Elia* (Erasmus, Luther, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Castalio, Calovius, and others), which would be linguistically erroneous, but: *in the passage treating of Elias*. Comp. Thuc. i. 9. 3, where ἐν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἅμα τῇ παραδόσει εἶρηκεν means: *at the passage, where he (Homer) treats of the yielding of the sceptre*, he has said, etc. Very prevalent is this mode of quotation in Philo, and also in the Rabbinical writings (Surenhusius, καταλλ. p. 493.) Comp. also Mark xii. 26; Luke xx. 37, but not Heb. iv. 7. — ὡς ἐντυγχ. τ. Θ. κατὰ τ. Ἰσραήλ dependent on οὐκ οἶδατε, as a more precisely defining parallel of ἐν Ἠλ. τί λέγει ἡ γρ. Comp. Luke vi. 4, xxii. 61; Acts xi. 16, xx. 20, et al.; Göller and Krüger on Thuc. i. 1. 1. On ἐντυγχάνειν (viii. 27, 34; Heb. vii. 25), with dative of the person concerned (frequently in Plutarch, Polyb., Lucian, etc.), comp. Acts xxv. 24; Wisd. viii. 21, xvi. 28. On κατὰ (*accusing*), comp. 1 Macc. viii. 32; 2 Macc. iv. 36.

Ver. 3. 1 Kings xix. 10, 14, freely from the LXX. — ἀπέκτ.] The Israelites, namely, under Ahab and Jezebel. 1 Kings xviii. 4, xiii. 22. — κατέσκαψ.] *have thoroughly destroyed, have razed*. Comp. Soph. Phil. 936: Τροίαν . . . κατασκάψαι. Eur. Hec. 22 (of the domestic altar); Dem. 361. 20; Plut.

¹ Who also here (comp. on viii. 29) takes *προέγνω* as an act of the will, by which God has beforehand constituted Israel what it, in accordance therewith, actually became.

This would amount to the notion of the *προετοιμάζειν* in the divine decree (comp. Eph. ii. 10).

Popl. 10 ; 2 *Macc.* xiv. 38 (τὸ θυσιαστήριον). — τὰ θυσιαστ.] On the *plural*, as the temple in Jerusalem was the place exclusively destined for worship, the view of Estius suffices : “ Verisimile est, Eliam loqui de altaribus, quae passim in excelsis studio quodam pietatis Deo vero erecta fuerant ; maxime postquam decem tribus regum suorum tyrannide prohibita fuerunt, ne Jerusalem ascenderent sacrificii causa. Quamvis enim id lege vetitum esset [see *Lev.* xvii. 8, 9 ; *Deut.* xii. 13, 14] ac recte fecerint Ezechias et Josias, reges Judae, etiam ejusmodi aras evertendo, tamen impium erat eas subvertere odio cultus Dei Israel.” Comp. Grotius, also Keil, on the books of Kings, p. 262, *Archäol.* I. § 89. — ὑπελείφθ. ὀνόμας] in the sense of *Eliás* : alone of the prophets ; but according to the application designed by the apostle, as ver. 4 shows : as the only one of *Thy faithful*. But in this case we are not to assume, as Hofmann and others wish to do, that Paul, in order to suggest this sense, has transposed the original order of the two clauses of the verse—which is rather to be regarded as accidental ; and this, considering the freedom of citation otherwise used, we need the less hesitate about, since Paul could not, even in the original order, see the reference of the verse which was in his thoughts to be excluded. — On ζητεῖν τ. ψυχ. τινος, to seek after one's life, see on *Matt.* ii. 20.

Ver. 4. Ἀλλά] But, although Elijah complained that he had been left sole survivor. — ὁ χρηματισμός] the divine oracular utterance (replying to this accusation). Found here only in N. T. (in the Apocrypha, 2 *Macc.* ii. 4, xi. 17) ; but see *Diod. Sic.* i. 1, xiv. 7, and *Suicer, Thes.* II. p. 1532 ; and respecting χρηματίζω, on *Matt.* ii. 12. — κατέλιπον κ.τ.λ.] 1 Kings xix. 18, with free deviation, bearing on his object, both from the LXX. and from the original. It means : I have left remaining, so, namely, that they are not slaughtered with the rest. Comp. *Xen. Anab.* vi. 3. 5 : ὁκτῶ ὀνόμας κατέλιπον (superstitēs, vños reliquerunt) ; 1 *Macc.* xiii. 4. Hofmann incorrectly takes κατέλ. as the third person plural, having the same subject as ἀπέκτειναν. A groundless departure from the Hebrew text and from the LXX., according to which God is the subject. And it is God who has guided and preserved those who remained over. — ἐμὰντ' ᾧ] i.e. to myself as my property, and for my service, in contrast to the idolatrous abomination. — οἵτινες κ.τ.λ.] ita comparatos ut, etc. — γόνυ] Not a knee has been bowed by them ; hence the singular, comp. *Phil.* ii. 10. — τῇ Βάαλ] Dative of worship. *Bernhardy*, p. 86. Comp. xiv. 11. The Phœnician divinity 𐤁𐤏𐤃, the adoration of which was very widely diffused (Keil, § 91) amongst the Jews, especially under the later kings, though not of long subsistence (see *Ewald, Alterth.* p. 304), is most probably to be regarded as the sun-god (Movers, *Phœnicier*, I. p. 169 ff. ; J. G. Müller in *Herzog's Encyklop.* I. p. 639 f.), not as the planet Jupiter (Gesenius in the *Hall. Encyklop.* VIII. p. 384 ff.). It is remarkable—seeing that בעל (according to different local and ritual forms also in the plural) is a masculine noun—that in the LXX. and in the Apocrypha it has sometimes, and most frequently, the masculine article (*Num.* xxii. 41 ; *Judg.* ii. 13 ; 1 Kings xvi. 31, et al.), sometimes the feminine (*Zeph.* i. 4 ; *Hos.* ii. 8 ; 1 *Sam.* vii. 4 ; always in *Jer.* ; *Tob.* i. 5, et al.). That the LXX. should have thought בעל to be of the common gender, and

to denote also *Astarte* (Reiche), is not probable for this reason, that in the LXX. not merely are the masculine Baal and Astarte often mentioned together (Judg. ii. 13, x. 6, *et al.*), but also the feminine Baal and Astarte (1 Sam. vii. 4). The view that the feminine article was assigned to *Báal contemptuously* (Gesenius, in Rosenmüller's *Repert.* I. p. 139), as also Tholuck and Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 302, assume, finds no sufficient support—seeing that *בעל* was a very well known divinity—in the feminine designation of idols unknown to them in the LXX. at 2 Kings xvii. 30, 31; cannot be justified by comparison of the Rabbinical designation of idols as *אֱלֹהִים*; and cannot be made good in the particular passages where the LXX. has the masculine or the feminine. To refer the phenomenon solely to an opinion of the LXX., who held *בעל* to be the name of a god and also that of a goddess, and therefore, according to the supposed connection, used now the masculine and now the feminine article,—the latter particularly, where the word occurs along with *עֲשֵׂתֵרִית* (Fritzsche), as in Judg. ii. 13, x. 6, 1 Sam. vii. 4,—is improbable in itself (because of the *unity* of the Hebrew name), and cannot be maintained even in passages like Judg. iii. 7, 2 Kings xxi. 3 (comp. with 1 Sam. xii. 10; Hos. ii. 10, 15), without arbitrariness. An *historical* reason must prevail, and it appears the most feasible hypothesis that Baal was conceived as an *androgynous* divinity (Beyer, *ad Selden. de Diis Syr.* p. 273 f., Wetstein, Koppe, Olshausen, Philippi), although more precise historical evidence is wanting. The feminine article has been also explained by supplying a substantive (*εἰκόνη* by Erasmus, Luther, Beza, Grotius, Bengel, and others; *στήλη* by Glass, Estius; *θηρσκειά* by Cramer; even *δαμάλει* by Drusius, after Tob. i. 5, but see Fritzsche on Tob.); but this is both erroneous and arbitrary, because at least the expression must have run *τῇ τοῦ Báal*, since *בעל* has always the article. This linguistic incongruity van Hengel avoids only by the precarious conjecture that *ἡ Báal* signifies the *column of Baal*, and *ὁ Báal* the *god Baal*.—We have to remark, moreover, that the LXX. have in our passage the *masculine* article; but Paul, acquainted with the use also of the feminine article, has, in quoting from memory, changed the article. According to Fritzsche and Ewald, he had found *τῇ* in his copy of the LXX.; but *τῇ* is now found only in more recent codd. of the LXX., into which it has found its way merely from our passage.

Ver. 5. *In this way*, corresponding to this Old Testament historical precedent, *therefore* (in order to make the application of vv. 3, 4), *there has been* (there has come into existence, and actually exists—*perfect*) *also in the present time, in consequence of an election made out of grace, a remnant*, namely, a small part taken out of the hardened mass of the people, *i.e.* the comparatively insignificant number of *believing* Jews, whom God's grace has *chosen* out of the totality of the people. It is related to the latter as a *remainder* (Herod. i. 119; 2 Kings xix. 4) to a whole, from which the largest part is removed (vv. 3, 4, ix. 27, 29), notwithstanding Acts xxi. 20. The *point of comparison* is the notion of the *λείμμα* in contrast to the remaining *mass*; the latter in the typical history has *perished*, but in the antitypical event has *forfeited saving deliverance*. — *κατ' ἐκλ. χάρι.*] opposed to the presumption in reference to works of the Jewish character; hence, too, the

emphatic declaration in ver. 6. It is to be connected not with *λείμμα* as its more precise definition (Hofmann), but with *γέγονεν* as its mode. This is evinced by the following *εἰ δὲ χάριτι*, *sc. γέγονεν*, where *χάριτι* is equivalent to the *κατ' ἐκλογ.* *χάριτος*.

Ver. 6. This thought is not merely *by the way and incidental* (Koppe, Rückert, de Wette, Fritzsche, Maier, and others), but it belongs *essentially* to the development of the apostle's thought to set forth the mode according to which *λείμμα γέγονε*, not only *positively* (*κατ' ἐκλ. χάρ.*), but also *negatively* (*οὐκ ἐξ ἔργ.*); because he then, in ver. 7, goes on to argue: *ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ Ἰσραὴλ κ.τ.λ.*, which *ἐπιζητεῖν*, in fact, took place exactly *ἐξ ἔργων*, ix. 32. — *εἰ δὲ χάριτι*] *but if through grace*, *sc. λείμμα γέγονε*. — *οὐκέτι ἐξ ἔργων*] As previously the *individuals* who compose the *λείμμα* are conceived as the objects of the divine grace, through which they belong to the *λείμμα*; so are *they* also (not *the people generally*, as Hofmann takes it) conceived in this contrasted negative statement as the subjects, who do not owe it to legal works that in them is present the *λείμμα* composing the true community of God. On the logical *οὐκέτι*, see on vii. 17. Of *ἐξ ἔργων* there can be *nothing more said*. — *ἐπεὶ ἡ χάρις κ.τ.λ.*] *because* (otherwise) *grace ceases to be grace* (namely, if *ἐξ ἔργων λείμμα γέγονε*)—since in truth “*gratia nisi gratis sit, gratia non est*,” Augustine. “*Ἡ χάρις* is the definite grace, which has made the election, and *γίνεται* (not equivalent to *ἐστὶ*) means: it ceases, *in its concrete manifestation, to become*, *i.e.* to show itself as, that (comp. on Luke x. 18, *et al.*) which according to its nature it is. Positively expressed: it *becomes* what according to its essence it *is* not; it gives up its specific character.

Ver. 7. *Τί οὖν*] infers the *result* from vv. 5 and 6. Since a *λείμμα* has been constituted according to the election of grace, and therefore not possibly from the merit of works: *accordingly Israel* (as regards the mass) *has not obtained that which it strives after* (namely, *δικαιοσύνη*, as is known from ix. 30 ff.)—for it strives, in fact, *ἐξ ἔργων*—the election, on the other hand, namely, that chosen *λείμμα*, *has obtained it* (for they were the objects of the divine *χάρις*); *but the rest were hardened*. In this manner the true state of the case is now set forth, in contrast to *ἀπόσατο*, without its being necessary on this account to refer *τί οὖν* to the whole preceding vv. 2-6 (de Wette, Fritzsche, Philippi, and others); since the reference to vv. 5, 6 is quite sufficient, and quite in keeping with the logical progression. Reiche (comp. Lachm., who places a note of interrogation after *τί οὖν* and after *ἐπέτυχεν*) makes the question extend to *ἐπέτυχεν*, to which question of wonder Paul then answers by *ἡ δὲ ἐκλ. κ.τ.λ.* But the futility of Israel's endeavour has already been long (ix. 31, 32) known to the reader, and is therefore not appropriate as the subject of such a question. Hofmann also takes *ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ . . . ἐπέτυχεν* as a question, but in the sense whether that which Israel has not obtained is *the same thing* as that to which its quest and striving tends (namely, its own righteousness)? To the self-evident *negation* of this question *ὁ* then relates in the sense of *nevertheless*, and after the second *ἐπέτυχεν* there is to be supplied, not *ὁ ἐπιζητ.* *Ἰσραὴλ*, but merely *ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ* (namely, to be, out of grace, the people of salvation). This complete distortion of the sense falls to the ground from the very fact, that for the second *ἐπέτυχεν*,

since $\delta \epsilon \pi \iota \zeta \eta \tau \epsilon \iota$ is not appended, no other object can be thought of without the greatest arbitrariness than that of the first $\epsilon \pi \epsilon \tau \upsilon \chi \epsilon \nu$, namely $\delta \epsilon \pi \iota \zeta \eta \tau \epsilon \iota$ 'Ισραήλ; and also, as respects the contents of the question, from the consideration, that if we should not be able to say that Israel has not obtained that for which it strove, this would stand in contradiction to the universal Pauline dogma of the impossibility of righteousness by the law. — $\epsilon \pi \iota \zeta \eta \tau \epsilon \iota$ does not denote the *zealous* pursuit (Fritzsche, Philippi), but its *direction*, correlative to $\epsilon \pi \epsilon \tau \upsilon \chi \epsilon \nu$. See on Matt. vi. 33; Phil. iv. 17. By the *present*, the *continuance* of the endeavour is admitted. — The $\tau \omicron \upsilon \tau \omicron$ (on the *accusative* instead of the customary genitive, see Matthiae, § 328; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 861) has tragic emphasis: *even this* it has not reached. — $\eta \delta \epsilon \epsilon \kappa \lambda \omicron \gamma \eta$] that is, here “reliquiae illius populi, quas per gratiam suam Deus elegit,” Estius. Comp. the use of $\pi \epsilon \rho \iota \omicron \mu \eta$, etc., Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 469. — The $\pi \acute{\omega} \rho \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma$, *hardening* (not *blinding*, as Hofmann thinks; see on 2 Cor. iii. 14), is the making unsusceptible in understanding and will as respects the appropriation of salvation in Christ. Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 78; Winzer, *Progr.* 1828, p. 8. The subject who hardens is *God*. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 14, and on ix. 8.

Ver. 8. This $\epsilon \pi \omega \rho \acute{\omega} \theta \eta \sigma \alpha \nu$ ensued in conformity with that which stands written, etc. That which is testified of the hardening of the people in the time of Isaiah, and as early as that of Moses, has its Messianic fulfilment through the hardening of the Jews against the gospel, so that this hardening has taken place $\kappa \alpha \theta \omega \varsigma \gamma \acute{\epsilon} \gamma \rho \alpha \pi \tau \alpha \iota \kappa . \tau . \lambda .$ This *prophetic* relation is groundlessly denied by Tholuck and Hofmann. The agreement denoted by $\kappa \alpha \theta . \gamma \acute{\epsilon} \gamma \rho$. is just that of prophecy and fulfilment according to the divine teleology. Comp. Matt. xv. 7. — In the citation itself, Isa. xxix. 10 (as far as $\kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \acute{\upsilon} \xi$.) and Deut. xxix. 3 (not Isa. vi. 9) are combined into one saying, and quoted very freely from the LXX. Deuteronomy *i. e.* has after $\acute{\alpha} \kappa \omicron \upsilon \epsilon \iota \nu$: $\epsilon \omega \varsigma \tau \eta \varsigma \eta \mu \acute{\epsilon} \rho \alpha \varsigma \tau \alpha \upsilon \tau \eta \varsigma$, hence $\epsilon \omega \varsigma \tau \eta \varsigma \sigma \eta \mu . \eta \mu$. belongs to the quotation; and the words $\kappa \alpha \theta \omega \varsigma . . . \acute{\alpha} \kappa \omicron \upsilon \epsilon \iota \nu$ must not be put in a parenthesis, as Beza, Wolf, Griesbach, and others have done. — $\epsilon \delta \omega \kappa \epsilon \nu$] *He gave*¹ not mere permission (Chrysostom, Theophylact, and many). — $\pi \nu \epsilon \upsilon \mu \alpha \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \acute{\upsilon} \xi \omega \varsigma$] Heb. רוּחַ תַּרְדֵּמָה , *i. e.* a *spirit producing stupefaction*, which is obviously a *daemonic spirit*. Comp. 2 Cor. iv. 4; Eph. ii. 2. Elsewhere the LXX. translate תַּרְדֵּמָה by $\epsilon \kappa \sigma \tau \alpha \sigma \iota \varsigma$ (Gen. ii. 21, xv. 12), or $\theta \acute{\alpha} \mu \beta \omicron \varsigma$ (1 Sam. xxvi. 12), or $\alpha \nu \delta \rho \acute{o} \gamma \nu \nu \omicron \nu$ (Prov. xix. 15). They gave the approximate sense of the word differently according to the connection. But that they understood $\kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \acute{\upsilon} \xi \iota \varsigma$ actually as *stupefaction*, *intoxication*, is clear from Ps. lx. 5, where they have rendered יַיִן תַּרְעֵלָה , *intoxicating wine*, by $\omicron \lambda \nu \omicron \nu \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \acute{\upsilon} \xi \omega \varsigma$. See in general, Fritzsche, *Exc.* p. 558 ff. This sense of $\kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \acute{\upsilon} \xi \iota \varsigma$ is explained by the use of $\kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \acute{\iota} \sigma \sigma \epsilon \sigma \theta \alpha \iota$, *compungi*, in the LXX. and the Apocrypha to express the deep, inward paralyzing *shock* caused by grief, fear, astonishment, etc., whereby one is stupefied and as if struck by a blow (Schleusner, *Theol.* III. p. 256; comp. on Acts ii. 37). In classical Greek neither the substantive nor the verb is found. We may add that every derivation is erroneous, which does not go back to

¹ LXX. Isa. xxix. 10: $\pi \epsilon \rho \acute{o} \tau \iota \kappa \epsilon \nu \upsilon \mu \acute{\omega} \varsigma \kappa \acute{\upsilon} \rho \iota \omicron \varsigma \pi \nu \epsilon \upsilon \mu \alpha \tau \iota \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \acute{\upsilon} \xi \omega \varsigma$.

νόσσειν (comp. *νόσις*, Plut. *Mor.* p. 930 F) ; nor is it admissible (since Paul certainly knew that *κατάν.* expressed *תורמה*) to seek explanations which depart from the notion of *תורמה*. So *e.g.* Calvin : “*Spiritum vocat . . . compunctionis, ubi scilicet quaedam fellis amaritudo se prodit, imo etiam furor in respuenda veritate.*” Similarly Luther (“an embittered spirit”) and Melancthon. Chrysostom, indeed (and Theophylact), hits the *thing itself* rightly : *κατάνυξιν ἐνταῦθα τὴν περὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐξιν τῆς ψυχῆς φησὶ τὴν ἀνιάτως ἔχουσιν καὶ ἀμεταθέτως*, but his analysis of the word : *κατανυγῆναι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἑτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἐμπαγῆναι πού καὶ προσηλωσθαι*, is arbitrarily far-fetched. — *τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν*] A fatally pregnant *oxymoron*. The genit. is that of the aim : eyes, *in order that they may not see*, etc. Linguistically correct is also the rendering of Grotius : *eyes of not-seeing, i.e.* “*oculos ad videndum ineptos*,” Fritzsche, comp. Philippi and van Hengel. But the former view corresponds better at once to the original text (LXX. *οὐκ ἔδωκε . . . ὀφθαλμοὺς βλέπειν κ. ὅσα ἀκούειν*), and to the telic *τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν*, ver. 10. Comp. Isa. vi. 9, 10 ; John xii. 40 ; Acts xxviii. 27. — *ἕως τ. σήμε. ἡμέρ.*] belongs to the whole affirmation *ἔδωκεν κ.τ.λ.* Thus *interruptedly* God dealt with them. The glance at a *future*, in which it was to be *otherwise* (Hofmann), is here (comp. ver. 10) still quite remote.

Vv. 9, 10. A further Scripture proof of *ἐπαρώθησαν*,¹ and that from Ps. lxi. 23, 24, quoted with free deviation from the LXX. The composer of this psalm is *not* David (in opposition to Hengstenberg, Hävernick), but some one of much later date ; a circumstance which we must judge of analogously to the expression of Christ, Matt. xxii. 43. The suffering theocrat of the psalm is, as such, a type of the Messiah, and His enemies a type of the unbelieving Jews ; hence Paul could find the fulfilment of the passage in the *παρώσις* of the latter. Consequently, in pursuance of this typical reference, the sense in which he takes the words is as follows : “*Let their table become to them for* (let it be turned for them into, comp. John xvi. 20) *a snare, and for a chase, and for a trap, and (so) for a retaliation ;*” *i.e.*, *while they feast and drink securely and carelessly at their well-furnished table,*² *let the fate of violence overtake them unawares*, just as wild beasts are surprised in a snare, and by the capture of the chase, and by a trap ; and so must *retaliation* alight upon them for that which they have done (in rejecting, namely, faith on Christ). But *what* violent calamity is meant, the sequel expresses, namely : “*Darkened must their eyes become, that they may not see,*” *i.e.* *they must become spiritually blinded*, incapable of discerning the truth of salvation ; and finally the same thing under another figure : “*And bend their back always,*” denoting the keeping them in *bondage*, and that, in the sense of the apostle, the *spiritual bondage* of the unfree condition of the inner life produced by the *παρώσις*.³ The *hardening*, therefore,

¹ With the simple *καί, and*, to take which climactically (Hofmann) is justified neither by the name of David nor the contents of the passage. It would place a quite uncalled-for emphasis on *Δαυὶδ* (even *David*).

² To conceive of the *table* as an outspread coverlet (Gesenius, *Thes.* III. p. 1417, Hof-

mann) in which they entangle themselves, is to come very unnecessarily and arbitrarily to the aid of the boldness of the poetical expression.

³ Those who have found in ver. 9 the destruction of Jerusalem predicted (Micaëlis, after Grotius, Wetstein, and many),

which Paul recognizes as predicted in the passage, does not lie in ἡ τράπεζα αὐτῶν (Fritzsche),—which is not to be explained “of the *law* and its works, which was Israel’s food” (Philippi, following older expositors, also Tholuck),—but in γεννηθῆτω εἰς παγίδα κ.τ.λ., and is more precisely indicated in ver. 10. The express repetition in ver. 10 of the *becoming blinded*, already designated in ver. 8, forbids our explaining the prophetic images in vv. 9, 10 generally as representations of *severe divine judgments* like Pharaoh’s overthrow, in which case the specific *point* of the citation would be neglected (in opposition to Hofmann). — καὶ εἰς θήραν] stands neither in the Hebrew nor in the LXX. ; but *θήρα* means *chase*, not *net* (Tholuck, Ewald), to establish which signification the solitary passage Ps. xxxv. 8, where the LXX. render חַבֵּץ inexactly by *θήρα*, cannot suffice. It often means *booty* (van Hengel) in the LXX. and in classical Greek ; but this is not appropriate here, where the “becoming for a booty” is said not of such as men, but of the τράπεζα. This shall be turned for them into a *chase*, so that they, in their secure feasting, become like to the unfortunate object of the chase, which is captured by the hunter.¹ — σκάνδαλον] corresponding primarily to the classical σκανδάληθρον, *the stick set in a trap* (Schol. *Ar. Ach.* 687), is frequently in the LXX. (see Schleusner, *Theol.* V. p. 38), and so also here, the translation of שָׁרִיט, *snare*, by which we must therefore abide.—ἀνταπόδομα is not found in classical Greek, but often in the LXX. and Apocrypha, Luke xiv. 12. — καὶ τὸν νῶτον κ.τ.λ.] is to be taken, according to the context, as the expression of the idea of *hardening* (represented as a bending together under the *yoke* of spiritual servitude), not, with Fritzsche, of rendering miserable through the withdrawal of the Messianic salvation. On the masculine ὁ νῶτος, see Lobeck, *ad Phrym.* p. 290.

Ver. 11.² At this point begins the teleological discussion respecting the οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ἐπωρώθησαν, ver. 7. See the *contents* above. — λέγω οὖν] quite as in ver. 1 : *I ask therefore*, attaching it by way of inference to the ἐπωρώθησαν just supported by Scripture. [See Note CXVI. p. 459.] — μὴ ἐπταῖσαν, ἵνα πέσῃ.] *But their stumbling had not the aim* (ordained by God) *that they should fall?* i.e., by the fact of their stumbling at Christ (ix. 32, 33), and refusing faith to Him, has the divine purpose not aimed at their everlasting ἀπώλεια ? This emphasis on πέσσει (*come to be prostrate*) involves the climactic relation to ἐπταῖσαν (*to stumble*),—a relation which Hofmann loses sight of when he makes the question express nothing further than : whether the fall which Israel suffered had been *its own aim* ? Photius aptly remarks : τὸ πταίσμα αὐτῶν οὐχὶ εἰς κατὰπτωσιν τέλειαν γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷον ὑπεσκελίσθησαν. Others

so as to refer τράπεζα to the Passover meal, for the celebration of which the Jews were in Jerusalem at the very time the city was invested (Josephus *Bell. Jud.* vi. 9. 3, 4), or even (Grotius) to the altar in the temple ; and those who have regarded ver. 10 (καὶ τὸν νῶτον κ.τ.λ.) as a prophecy of the servitude of the Jews to Rome (so some of the Fathers) ; could not have given an explanation more opposed in sense to the connec-

tion.

¹ How very often *θήρα*, *θηρᾶν* and *θηρᾶσθαι* are used also in classical Greek in the figurative sense, see in Dorvill, *ad Charit.* p. 539 ; Heind. *ad Plat. Theæt.* p. 143.

² On vv. 11-33, see Luthardt, *Lehre von d. letzten Dingen*, p. 106 ff. ; von Oettingen, *Synagogale Elegik des Volks Israels*, 1853, p. 133 ff.

have found the point of the question not purely in the climax of the two figurative verbs, but in definitions *mentally supplied*, which, however, as such, cannot be admitted. So, in particular, Augustine and many : *only* in order that they should fall, as though it ran *μόνον ἵνα*, as Umbreit still takes it (comp. Hofmann) ; further Melanchthon : “non sic impeerunt Judaei, ut in tota gente nemo sit salvandus,” as though it ran *ἵνα πάντες* ; and yet further, Ewald : “that they might *purely in accordance with the divine design, and therefore without their freedom* and their own will, fall into sin and into destruction,” as though it ran *ἵνα ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, or the like. We must simply abide by the view, that *πταίνειν* is a figure for the taking offence at Christ which refuses faith, and *πίπτειν* a figure for the being involved in everlasting destruction ; comp. Heb. iv. 11, Ecclus. ii. 7. In the *former* the *latter* was not present as the aim of God’s purpose. — On *ἐπτασαν*, comp. the proverb : *μὴ δις πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν λίθον πταίνειν*, Polyb. xxxi. 19. 5, xxxi. 20, 1 ; and on the sense of moral stumbling, Jas. ii. 10, iii. 2 ; 2 Pet. i. 10 ; Eur. *Aeg. fr.* ii. 1 : *πταίσαντ’ ἀρετὰν ἀποδείξασθαι*. The *subject* is the *λοιποὶ* of ver. 7, the mass of the people not belonging to the *ἐκλογή*. — *τῷ αὐτῶν παραπτ.*] *through their fault* consisting in the refusal of faith, through their *offence*. Παραπτ. does not refer to *πέσωσι* (Reiche, Tholuck, and several others),—which the *emphatic* sense of *πίεσ.* forbids ; but in substance that *πταίσμα* is meant, which is morally characterized by means of *παράπτωμα* as *delictum* (so rightly Vulg.) as *ἁμαρτία* (comp. John xvi. 9), according to its stated figurative designation (comp. also iv. 25, v. 15). Quite against the usage of the N. T., Tholuck renders : *defeat* (Diod. xix. 100). — *τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*] *sc. γέγονεν*. That through the despising of the Messianic salvation on the part of the Jews its attainment by the Gentiles was effected—this experience Paul had learnt to recognize as that which it actually was, as the way which the fulfilment of the divine arrangement, i. 16, took. Comp. Matt. xxi. 43, xxii. 9 ; Acts xiii. 46, xxviii. 28. — *εἰς τὸ παραζ. αὐτοῖς*] *aim* ; comp. Calovius : “Assumptio novi populi *directa* fuit ad veteris provocationem ad aemulationem, ut nempe Israelitae . . . seria aemulatione irritati, et ipsi doctrinae ev. animos suos submitterent.” Comp. x. 19. With this *εἰς τὸ παραζ. αὐτ.*, exactly the *counterpart* of *ἵνα πέσωσι* is expressed.

Ver. 12. Δέ] *μεταβατικόν*, leading over from what has been said in ver. 11 to a very joyful prospect thereby opened into the future. — The *conclusion* is a “*felici effectu causae peioris ad feliciorem effectum causae melioris.*” — *πλοῦτος*] for the Gentile world (*κόσμος*) became *enriched with the σωτηρία* (ver. 11), through the *παράπτωμα* of the Jews. — *τὸ ἡττημα αὐτ. πλοῦτ. ἐθνῶν*] *and their overthrow riches for Gentile peoples*. Parallel to the foregoing. [See Note CXVII. p. 459.] — *ἡττημα*] is not found in the old Greek, but only in the LXX. Isa. xxxi. 8, and 1 Cor. vi. 7 ; it is, however, equivalent to the classical *ἡττα*, which is the opposite of *νίκη*,¹ and, corresponding to the signification of *ἡττᾶσθαι*, *profligari, vinci*, means *clades*, both in its proper sense, and also generally : *succumbing, decline* (comp. Dem. 1466. 23, *ἡττα τῆς προαιρέσεως*), *loss* suffered (1 Cor. vi. 7), *getting the worse*.² Here the

¹ Plato, *Lach.* p. 196 A, *Legg.* i. p. 638 A ; Dem. 1486. 3 ; Xen. *Cyr.* iii. 1. 19, 20.

² See Perizon. *ad Ael. V. H.* ii. 25.

proper signification is to be retained, and that, as the contrast of τὸ πλήρωμα requires, in a *numerical* respect. So now also Tholuck, likewise Mangold. Through the fact that a part of the Jews was unbelieving, the people has suffered an overthrow, has, like a vanquished army, been weakened in numbers, inasmuch, namely, as the unbelieving portion by its unbelief practically seceded from the people of God. Comp. Vulg.: "*diminutio eorum*;" Luthardt: "loss in amount." If it be explained as: *loss of the Messianic salvation, which they have suffered* (Fritzsche and others),¹ or: *the loss which the kingdom of God has suffered in their case* (Philippi, comp. Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 573), the former is not appropriate to the contrast of πλήρωμα, and the latter introduces the reference to the kingdom of God, as that which has suffered the detriment, the more unwarrantably, inasmuch as the genit. αὐτῶν is expressed. The *threefold* αὐτῶν is to be taken with the *like* reference as the genitive of the subject, and applies in each instance to the people Israel as a whole (whose collective guilt also is the παράπτωμα), in contrast to the κόσμος and the ἔθνη—which likewise is not preserved in Philippi's view. This very circumstance, and more decisively the utter absence of linguistic proof, tells also against the traditional usual rendering, according to which τὸ ἥττημα is supposed to signify the *minority*: "*paucitas Judaeorum credentium*" (Grotius). So, in substance, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Erasmus, Beza, Estius, Wetstein, Bengel, and many others, including Reiche, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Maier, Bisping, Reithmayr; comp. Ewald: "their *remaining behind*." — πόσῳ μᾶλλον τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν] sc. πλοῦτος ἔθνων γενήσεται; *how much more their becoming full*, that is, how much more will it issue in the enrichment of the Gentiles with the Messianic salvation, if the Jews, after the defeat which they have suffered, shall again be reinstated to their *plena copia*, so that they will then again in their full amount (ver. 26), as an integral whole, belong to the people of God,—which will take place through the conversion of all Israel to Christ (not *would*, as Luther has it).² The ἥττημα αὐτῶν is then compensated, and the πλήρωμα αὐτῶν brought in, which, moreover, may take place even with a continuance of the διασπορά. On πλήρωμα generally, see Fritzsche, II. p. 469 ff. Comp. on Eph. i. 10. The *numerical* reference of the πλήρωμα αὐτῶν is suggested by the correlative τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν in ver. 25; and in so far the view which takes it of the *full number* of the Jews (Theodoret: πάντες πιστεύσαντες μειζόνων ἀγαθῶν ἔασι ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο ἂν πρόξενοι, so most) is correct. Comp. Ewald: "their *full admission*, supplying what is wanting." With this Umbreit mixes up at the same time "the fulfilment of their predestination;" whilst van Hengel sees in the πλήρ. αὐτ., not absolutely the full number, but only the collective body of *those destined by God to conversion*, which, however,

¹ So also de Wette; similarly Ruckert: "the loss of their original dignity and glory as the people of God;" and Hofmann: "their hurt, in that they, by virtue of their unbelief, are not what they should be." Comp. Köllner and Glöckler. Among the older interpreters, Calvin: "Diminutio honoris sui, qui fuerant populus Dei gloriosus."

² Philippi also explains vv. 12 and 15 not of an actual, but only of a possible πρόσληψις of Israel (p. 554). Vv. 13, 14 are not in favour of this, where Paul has in view the intermediate time until the final πρόσληψις of the πλήρωμα; and ver. 26 is decisive against it.

is not expressed, but is supplied by the reader. The various views correspond to the varying explanations of *ἡττημα*. So *e.g.* Fritzsche : the fulness of Messianic salvation, which they will possess ; Philippi : the filling up—which takes place through their conversion—of the blank in the kingdom of God which arose through their unbelief ;¹ Rückert, Köllner : the restoration of Israel to its befitting position ; Hofmann : the status, in which they are fully and entirely that which they ought to be (qualitative). Luthardt also takes the correct view.

Vv. 13, 14. [See Note CXVIII. p. 460.] Not a parenthetical thought (Reiche), but the connection with the preceding and following is : “*πόσω μᾶλλον τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν* I say : but you precisely, the Gentile Christians,—who might think that my office belongs only to you and the Gentiles, and that the conversion of the Jews lies less in my vocation,—*you*² I hereby make to know (*ὑμῖν λέγω*), that I, as apostle of the Gentiles, etc. ; for (motive) the conversion of the Jews will have the happiest consequence (ver. 15).” — *τοῖς ἐθνέσιν* to the (born) Gentiles, denotes, as an apposition to *ὑμῖν*, the readers according to their chief constituent element, in virtue of which the Christian Gentile body is represented in them ; comp. i. 13. Observe that Paul does not write *τοῖς δὲ ἐθνέσιν ἐν ὑμῖν λέγω*, as though he intended only a Gentile fraction of the otherwise Jewish-Christian community (in opposition to Man-gold). In contradistinction to his readers, the Jews, although his flesh, are to him third persons, whom he, as apostle of the Gentiles, might *mediately* serve. Baur fails to recognize this, I. p. 371. — *ἐφ’ ὅσον* not *temporal* (*quandiu*, Matt. ix. 15 ; 2 Pet. i. 13), but : *in quantum, in as far as* I, etc. Comp. Matt. xxv. 40 ; Plato, *Rep.* p. 268 B ; Xen. *Cyr.* v. 4. 68. Just so *εἰς ὅσον* and *καθ’ ὅσον*. — *μέν* as so often in Paul without a corresponding *δέ*. But we see from the following that the train of ideas passing before his mind was this : “I seek indeed, so far as I am one who has the commission of Apostle to the Gentiles (observe the emphatic *ἐγώ*, in which a noble self-consciousness is expressed), to do honour to my office, but I have in view withal (for see x. 1, ix. 2, 3) to incite my kinsmen to emulation, etc.” — *εἰπως* whether in any way. The practical honouring of the office, which consists in a true discharge of it, is an acting, whereby the desired attainment is attempted, see on i. 10 ; Phil. iii. 11 ; Acts xxvii. 12 ; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 220 [E. T. 256]. Less in accordance with the text—since the very *εἰπως παραζ. κ.τ.λ* presupposes an *actual* *δοξάζειν* (2 Thess. iii. 1 ; John xii. 28). — Reiche and Ewald (after Grotius and many others, including Flatt) take it as : *I boast*, hold my office something high and glorious. Hofmann, indeed, understands an *actual* glorification, but *conditioned* by *εἰ πῶς κ.τ.λ.*, so that the latter is not *whether possibly*, but *if possibly*. From this the illogical relation of present and future which thus arises³ must deter us (Paul

¹ Comp. Melancthon : “*Complementum integræ ecclesiæ convertendæ ex semine Abrahæ.*” Similarly Origen.

² According to the reading *ὑμῖν δέ* (see the critical notes). This *δέ* forms a contrast with the perspective just opened by *ποσ. μᾶλλ. τ. πλήρ. αὐτῶν* in favour of the

Jews.

³ Hofmann adduces as an example Xen. *Anab.* iv. 7. 3. But such passages are of a quite different kind (see Brunck, *ad Arist. Plat.* 1064 ; Maetzner, *ad Lycurg.* p. 251) ; and to the necessary connection expressed in them of the consequence with the con-

must have used the future δοξάσω). — παραζ. and σώσω] future indicative, like i. 10. On σώσω, comp. 1 Tim. iv. 16 ; 1 Cor. vii. 16, ix. 22. The enclitic μου standing before the noun cannot be emphatic (van Hengel), but represents, at the same time, the dative of interest (whether I shall perhaps *rouse to me my flesh to jealousy*), like 1 Cor. ix. 27, Phil. ii. 2, Col. iv. 18, *et al.*, and frequently in classical Greek. — αὐτῶν] refers to those intended by the collective τὴν σάρκα. Σάρκα δὲ εἰπὼν γνησιότητα καὶ φιλοστοργίαν ἐνέφημε, Theophylact. Theodoret quite erroneously thinks that Paul wished to intimate a denial of spiritual fellowship. On the contrary, πλέον αὐτοὺς οἰκειούμενος (Oecumenius), he says μ. τ. σάρκα, which is like τοὺς συγγενεῖς μου κατὰ σάρκα, ix. 3, but more strongly significant. Gen. xxxvii. 27 ; Judg. ix. 2 ; 2 Sam. v. 1. Comp. Isa. lviii. 7. Note the *modesty* of the expression τινάς, which, however, was suggested by the experience of the *difficulty* of the conversion of the Jews ; comp. 1 Cor. ix. 22.

Ver. 15. By way of inference, like ver. 12 ; γάρ assigns a *motive* for vv. 13, 14. — ἀποβολή, *casting away* ; Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 493 E. 944 C ; Aq. Prov. xxviii. 24. By this is meant their exclusion from the people of God on account of their unbelief, and the opposite of it is their πρόσληψις, *reception in addition* (Plato, *Theæt.* p. 210 A), by which they, having become believing, are *adopted* by God into the fellowship of His people. The view of ἀποβολή as *loss* (Acts xxvii. 22 ; Plato, *Phaed.* p. 75 E ; *Lach.* p. 195 E ; Plut. *Sol.* 7) is less suitable to this contrast (in opposition to the Vulg., Luther, Bengel, and others, including Philippi, who understands the loss, which the *kingdom of God* has suffered in their case). — καταλλαγή κόσμου] in so far, namely, as the *converted portion* of the Gentiles has attained to δικαιοσύνη through faith, and is no longer subjected to the ὀργή of God ; and therewith *reconciliation* of the Gentile world with God has begun. Comp. v. 11. It is a more precise definition of the notion expressed in ver. 12 by πλοῦτος κόσμος. — ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρ.] *i.e. life, which proceeds from the dead* (namely, when these arise). [See Note CXIX. p. 460.] The πρόσληψις of the still unconverted Jews, Paul concludes, will be of such a kind (τίς, not τί, is his question), will be of so glorious a character (comp. Eph. i. 18), that it will bring with it the last most blessed development, namely, the life beginning with the resurrection of the dead in the αἶδν ὁ μέλλων, the ζωὴ αἰώνιος, which has the awakening from death as its causal premiss. Hence Paul does not say ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν (as Philippi objects) ; for his glance is already passing beyond this event to its blessed *consequence*. The transformation of the living is *included* in this last development (1 Cor. xv. 51), which is here designated *a potiori* ; comp. viii. 11. The conclusion of the apostle does not, however, rest on Matt. xxiv. 14 (Reiche after Theodoret), but on the fact of the καταλλαγή κόσμου, whose most blissful final development (as it, according to Paul, must necessarily be occasioned by the blissful opposite of the ἀποβολή) can be none other than the blessed resurrection-life which will set in with the Parousia (Col. iii. 3, 4 ; 1 Thess. iv. 14 ff.). The view which takes

dition, the "if in any way" (possibly), which would make the condition *problematic*, would be wholly unsuitable. Comp. also

Kühner, *ad Xen. l.c.* and *Gramm.* II. 1, p. 120.

ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρ. in the *proper* sense has been held by Origen, Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, Anselm, Erasmus, Toletus, Semler, Reiche, Glöckler, de Wette, Nielsen, Fritzsche, Rückert, Reithmayr, Bisping, Hofmann, Beyschlag, and others. Approaching it, but taking the resurrection *by way of comparison*, stands the view of Ewald: "The final completion of all history down to the last day, and *like the very resurrection itself*, which is expected on this day." Luthardt, too, is substantially in the right, taking, however, νεκρῶν in the *ethical* sense: from the *dead Israel* the new bodily life of glorification will proceed. A *heterogeneous* mode of viewing the contrasts, for which the text affords no support. The *non-literal* interpretation of the "*futura quasi resurrectio ex mortuis*" (Melancthon), *i.e.* of the "*novitas vitae ex morte peccati*" (Estius; so in substance Calvin, Hunnius, Calovius, Vorstius, Bengel, Carpzov, Ch. Schmidt, Cramer, Böhme, Baumgarten-Crusius, Maier; also Lechler, *apost. u. nachapost. Zeitalt.* p. 129; Krummacher, p. 172 f.; and Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 574), is to be set aside on the ground that then nothing *higher* than the καταλλαγὴ (and it must be something *far higher*) would be expressed,¹ but only its ethical consequence in the activity of life. Olshausen, too, understands it primarily of the spiritual resurrection, yet thinks that the notion "*plays into the bodily resurrection*" (?). Umbreit finds spiritual *and* bodily revival from death conjoined. Others explain the expression *metaphorically*, as designating *summum gaudium* (Grotius after Oecumenius) or *summa felicitas* (Hammond, Koppe, Köllner). Comp. Theophylact (ἅπειρα ἀγαθὰ), Beza, Flatt, van Hengel, and now, too, Tholuck, who recurs to the general thought of the *most important position in the history of the divine kingdom* to be occupied by converted Israel. But interpretations of such a non-literal character must be necessitated by the context; whereas the latter by the relation, in accordance with the connection, of ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν to the quite *proper* καταλλ. κόσμον requires us to abide by the literal sense. Hence we are not to understand, with Philippi, at once both the extensive diffusion of the kingdom of God, and a subjective revivification of Christendom, which had again become dead, "and thus a *glorious flourishing time for the church on earth*." So, again, Auberlen supposes a *charismatic life of the church*, and depicts it with the colours of the *palingenesia* of the golden age. No such ideas are here expressed; and it would have been peculiarly necessary to indicate more particularly the *dead state* into which Christendom was *again to fall*, especially after the καταλλαγὴ κόσμον already including within itself *spiritual revival*. And by no means is the supposed flourishing time (the time of *worship* (!) Auberlen calls it, as opposed to the present time of *preaching*) compatible with the nearness of the *Parousia* (xiii. 14; 1 Cor. vii. 29, *et al.*), with the ἀνάγκη immediately preceding it (1 Cor. vii. 26; Matt. xxiv. 29), and with the *πονηρία* of the last period (on Gal. i. 4).

Ver. 16. Δέ] continuative; but this πρόσληψις, how well it corresponds to the character of holiness, which has been associated with the people of

¹ Calvin's excuse: "Nam etsi una res est, verbis tamen plus et minus inest pon-

deris," only shows the baldness of this interpretation.

Israel from its origin till now ! The two figures are parallel, and set forth the same thought. [See Note CXX. p. 461.] — ἀπαρχή obtains the genitival definition to be mentally supplied with it through τὸ φύραμα, just as in the second clause ἡ ρίζα is the root of the κλάδοι. The ἀπαρχή τοῦ φνράματος is known from Num. xv. 19–21 to be a designation of the *first of the dough*; that is, from every baking, when the dough was kneaded, a portion was to be set aside and a cake to be baked therefrom for the priests.¹ This ἀπαρχή, as the first portion devoted to Jehovah from the whole, was designed to impart the character of its consecration to the remainder of the lump. The *article* with φύραμα denotes the lump of dough *concerned*, from which the ἀπαρχή is separated; hence ὅλον did not require to be expressed (in opposition to Hofmann's objection). Grotius and Rosenmüller take τ. φύρ. to be the *corn* destined for the baking, and ἀπαρχή to be the *first-fruits*. But (ix. 21) φύραμα always denotes a mass *mixed* (with moisture or otherwise), particularly a *kneaded* one, and is in the LXX. (Ex. xii. 34) and in Paul (1 Cor. v. 6, 7; Gal. v. 9) the standing expression for *dough*. Estius, Koppe, Köllner, Olshausen, Krehl rightly take it so, but nevertheless understand by ἀπαρχή the sacred *first-fruits* (comp. Ex. xxiii. 10) which were *employed* for φύραμα. But in that case ἀπαρχή obtains a genitival definition not presented by the text; and this can the less be approved, since ἀπαρχή φνράματος, in fact, was the stated expression from Num. *l.c.* This applies also against Hofmann, who likewise explains the ἀπαρχή as the *firstling-sheaf*, but considers the φύραμα to be the dough worked up from the harvest-fruit generally. —The figure is correctly *interpreted*, when by ἡ ἀπαρχή we understand the *patriarchs* (Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob), and by τὸ φύρ. *the whole body of the people*, to whom the character of holiness—of consecration in property to God—passed over from the former. With the holiness of the πατέρες, ix. 4–13 (in accordance with which we are not here to think of Abraham *alone*), is given also the holiness of the theocratic people, their posterity, according to the divine right of covenant and promise. Comp. ix. 4, 5. But this holiness, which Paul looks upon, as respects the national whole, in the light of a *character indelebilis*, is not the inner moral, but (comp. 1 Cor. vii. 14) the theocratic legal holiness (“quod iuribus ecclesiae et promissis Dei frui possint,” Calovius). The expression is taken of the patriarchs by Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Estius, Grotius, Calovius, Bengel, and others, including Koppe, Tholuck, Köllner, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Philippi, Maier, de Wette, Krehl, Umbreit, Ewald, Reithmayr, Hofmann (though the latter thinks only of *Abraham*). This is correct, because the second figure (εἰ δὲ ρίζα κ.τ.λ.) is capable of no other interpretation (see below; but to explain the two figures differently, as Toletus and Stolz,² Reiche and Ruckert,³ Glöckler, Stengel, Bisping, van Hengel, after Theo-

¹ See Philo, *de sac. hon.* II. p. 232; Josephus, *Antt.* iv. 4. 4; Saalschutz, *M. R.* p. 347; Keil, *Archäol.* I. § 71; and the Rabbinical prescriptions in *Mischn. Surenh.* p. 289 ff.

² Toletus and Stolz suppose the ἀπαρχή to be the Jews who first accepted Christianity, and the φύραμα to be the remaining part

of the nation. The second figure they suppose to denote our first parents and their posterity. So, too, van Hengel.

³ In substance like Toletus and Stolz. On the first figure Reiche remarks: “As the whole, whereof a firstling gift is consecrated to God, is something excellent, worthy

dore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret,¹ have in manifold ways arbitrarily done, is simply a violation of the parallelism.² This holds also against the interpretation of the *Jews who have become believing*, and of the remaining *mass of the people* (Ambrosiaster, Pelagius, Anselm, Toletus, Rosenmüller, Stolz, Reiche, Rückert, Bisping). — ἡ ρίζα and οἱ κλάδοι are the *patriarchs* and their theocratic bodily descendants, the *Jews*. As the ἀπαρχή is related to the φάραμα, so is the ρίζα to the κλάδοι; comp. on the latter, Menander, 711 : ἀκαρπὸς ἐστὶν οὗτος ἀπὸ ρίζης κλάδος. The divergent interpretation, which may deserve to be considered in opposition to this usual one, is, that the ρίζα is the *first primitive or mother church* consisting of the believing Jews, and that the κλάδοι are the *Jews*, in so far as they in virtue of their national position were primarily called thereto. This exposition (substantially in Cornelius à Lapide, Carpzov, Schoettgen; Semler and Ammon suppose οἱ κλάδοι to be the Gentile Christians), is still considered possible by de Wette. It is, however, unsuitable; for the (natural) κλάδοι must have *proceeded* from the ρίζα, must have their origin from it (comp. Eccus. xxiii. 25, xl. 15), and the *broken-off branches* (ver. 17) must have earlier belonged to the ρίζα,—which is not the case, if ρίζα is the Christian mother-church of which they were never κλάδοι. The true theocracy (the olive tree, comp. Jer. xi. 16; Hos. xiv. 7; Zech. iv. 11; Neh. viii. 15) did not begin in the Christian mother-church (as its root), but in the patriarchs, and Christ Himself was κατὰ σάρκα from this sacred root, Matt. i. 1 f. In this view it is clear that the unbelieving Jews, in so far as they rejected Christ, ceased thereby to belong to the true people of God, and fell away from their root. They were now—after the light, and with it judgment, had come into the world (John iii. 19)—broken-off branches, *apostate* children of Abraham (John viii. 37, 39, 40), children of the kingdom who were to be cast out (Matt. viii. 12). Comp. the figure of the vine in John xv. See also Rom. ix. 6 ff.

Vv. 17–24.³ In pursuance of the figure, a warning to the Gentile Christians against self-presumption, and an exhortation to humility, down to ver. 24. — τινές] *some*, a portion of the branches;⁴ comp. on iii. 3. — ἐξεκλάσθ.] *were broken off* (Plat. Rep. p. 611 D), κλάω being the proper word for the *breaking* of the young *twigs* (κλάδοι); Theophrastus, c. pl. i. 15. 1. They were broken off on account of their unfitness for bearing. — σὺ δέ] individualizing address to each *Gentile Christian*. — ἀγριέλ. ὢν] *although being of the wild olive*. ἀγρ. is here an *adjective*, like ἐκ τῆς ἀγριελαίου, ver. 24. This view is *assured by linguistic usage*,⁵ and *necessary*; for the traditional interpretation: “oleaster,

of God, or by the very offering of it is declared to be such, so is also the Jewish people through the fact, that a part of it has been received into God's fellowship, declared to be a noble people, worthy to be wholly accepted, so soon as it only fulfils the conditions.”

¹ Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret explain the ἀπαρχή of *Christ*, and the ρίζα of the *patriarchs*; while Origen interprets both figures as referring to *Christ*.

² The identity of the thought expressed

by a twofold figure is also confirmed by the fact, that in what follows Paul pursues only the one figure, and entirely drops the first.

³ On vv. 17, 18, see Matthias in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1886, p. 519 ff.

⁴ Without indicating the *great multitude* of them, in order not to promote Gentile-Christian self-exaltation (ver. 18).

⁵ Erys. 4, in *Anthol.* ix. 237: σκυτάλην ἀγριελαίου, Theocr. xxv. 285; see Jacobs, *Delect. Epigr.* p. 33; Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 376.

i.e. surculus oleastri," is as arbitrary as the apology for the expression when so explained, on the ground that Paul wished to avoid the *proximity* of the distinction between tree and branch, is absurd (in opposition to Hofmann), inasmuch as he would only have needed to employ the genitive instead of the nominative, and consequently to write not a word *more*, if he wished to be thus sparing. The opinion of Reiche, Rückert, Köllner, Philippi, Krehl, Ewald, van Hengel—that the *collective body* of the Gentiles is conceived as an *entire tree*—is inappropriate to the *relation portrayed by the figure*, because the ingrafting of the Gentiles took place at first only partially and in single instances, while the *σὺ* addressed cannot represent heathendom as a whole, and is also not appropriate to the *figure itself*, because in fact not whole trees, not even quite young ones (in opposition to de Wette), are ingrafted either with the stem, or as to all their branches; besides, ver. 24 contradicts this opinion. Matthias also takes the right view. — *ἐν αὐτοῖς*] may grammatically be equally well understood as *among them* (the branches of the noble olive tree *generally*)—so Erasmus, Grotius, Estius, and many others, including Rückert, Fritzsche, Nielsen, Tholuck, Philippi, Maier, Reithmayr, Hofmann—or as : *in the place of the broken-off branches* (Chrysostom, Beza, Piscator, Semler, and others, including Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen), which, however, would have to be conceived of, not as ordinarily, *in locum*, but *in loco eorum* (Olshausen has the right view). The first rendering is preferable, because it corresponds to the notion of the *συγκοινωνός*. [See Note CXXI. p. 461.] — *τῆς ῥίζης κ. τ. πύθ. τ. ἐλ.*] *of the root* (which now bears thee also among its own branches, ver. 18) *and fatness* which now goes jointly to thee) *of the olive tree*. On the latter, comp. Judg. ix. 9. The assumption of a *hendiadys* (*of the fat root*) (Grotius and others) is groundless and weakening.¹ The *sense without figure* is : "Thou hast attained to a participation in holy fellowship with the patriarchs, and in the blessings of the theocracy developed from them,"—both which the unbelieving Jews have forfeited.—*Has Paul here*, ver. 17 ff., *had in view the process, really used in the East, of strengthening to renewed fertility olive trees by grafting scions of the wild olive upon them?*² Answer : The *subject-matter*, which he is setting forth, *required* not at all the figure of the ordinary grafting of the noble scion on the wild stem, but the converse, namely, that of the ingrafting of the wild scion and its ennoblement thereby. The thing *thus* receiving illustration had *taken place* through the reception of *Gentile members* into the theocracy; and the *thing that had taken place* he was bound to represent (figuratively depict) *as it had taken place*. "Ordine commutato res magis causis quam causas rebus aptavit," Origen. But that, while doing this, he had before his mind that actual pomological practice, and made reference to it (Matthias : in order to exhibit the *παραζηλωθῆναι* of the unbe-

¹ *τῆς πύθης* would only represent the adjectival notion, if *καί*—omitted by B C N* Copt. Dam.—were not genuine, as Buttmann in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 386, pronounces it. Tisch. 8 omits it. But D* F G and Codd. of It. omit *τῆς ῥίζης καί* (manifestly through a copyist's error); therefore *τῆς ῥίζης* without

καί appears as an incomplete restoration.

² See Columella, v. 9. 16; Pallad. xiv. 53; Schulz, *Leit. d. Höchsten*, V. p. 88; Michælis, *orient. Bibl.* X. p. 67 ff., and note, p. 129; Bredenkamp in Paulus, *Memorab.* II. p. 140 ff.

believing Jews, ver. 13), is not to be assumed for this reason, that here, conformably to the following *καὶ συγκοινωνῶς κ.τ.λ.*, there is conceived as the object of the ingrafting the ennobled fertilization of the *graft itself*; whereas, in the practice referred to, the ingrafted scion was not to receive the fatness from the noble tree, not to *become fertilized*, but to *fertilize*; for "*foecundat sterilis pingues oleaster olivas, et quae non novit munera, ferre docet*," Palladius.

Ver. 18. *μὴ κατακ. τῶν κλάδ.*] *Boast thyself not against* (comp. Jas. ii. 13, iii. 14; also in the LXX., not in classical Greek) *the branches*. These are not the *broken-off* branches, of which he has just been speaking (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Calovius, and many others, including de Wette, Rückert, Ewald), but, according to vv. 16, 17, *the branches of the olive tree generally* (of which *some* have been broken off); without figure, therefore; *the people Israel*, but by no means merely those now composing the *non-Christian Israel* (Hofmann). The *latter*, because the Christian Israelites also still belonged to the branches of the olive tree, must, as well as the *broken-off* κλάδοι, have been more precisely designated (against which Hofmann urges subtleties); moreover, the following warning would not be suitable to the broken-off ones, because they no longer stand in any connection with the root. The κλάδοι standing on the root of the patriarchs are the *Israelites*, whether believing or unbelieving; but under the broken-off ones, which are therefore no longer borne by the root, we are to think not generally of all those Jews who at the time had not yet become believers in Christ (vv. 13, 14)—otherwise the apostolic mission to the Jews would in truth have no meaning (in opposition to Hofmann's denial of this distinction)—but only of those who had *rejected* the Christ preached to them (Acts xxviii. 23, 24), and therefore were already no longer in living communion with the patriarchal root, excluded in God's judgment from the theocracy borne by this root (ix. 7, 8). Hence, too, we are not, with Fritzsche, to think in τῶν κλάδων merely of the *converted Jews*, as indeed to give a particular warning against pride towards *Jewish-Christians* was foreign here to the object of the apostle. — *εἰ δὲ κατακ. κ.τ.λ.*] *But if the case occur, that thou boastest against them*, then know, reflect: *it is not thou who bearest*, etc.; without figure: Thy theocratic position is not the original theocratic one, but only a derived one, proceeding from the patriarchs and imparted to thee, conditioned by the relation into which thou hast entered towards them; thou therefore standest likewise only in the relation of a *branch* to the root, which is borne by the latter, and not the converse, and which may not therefore bear itself proudly towards its fellow-branches, as though it were something better. In these words there lies a warning hint beforehand of the possibility which Paul afterwards, vv. 21, 22, definitely expresses.—The οὐ οὐ τ. ρίζ. βαστ κ.τ.λ. is to be taken *declaratively*. See Winer, p. 575 [E. T. 619]; Buttmann, p. 338 [E. T. 395]. Comp. on 1 Cor. xi. 16. The *fact itself* is quite independent of the case supposed in *εἰ κ.τ.λ.*, but it is brought to mind.

Ver. 19. Οὐν] *therefore*; since *this* reason (οὐ οὐ τὴν ρίζαν κ.τ.λ.) forbids thee κατακυνῆσθαι, thou wilt have something else to allege. — *ἐξεκλ. κ.τ.λ.*] *branches*

were broken off" (see critical notes), in order that I, etc. This *ἵνα ἐγὼ* has the stress of arrogant self-esteem, which, however, is not to be extended also to *κλάδοι*¹ forming the simple subject, and not even standing in the first place (Hofmann: "*branches which were so are broken off*"). [See Note CXXII. p. 462.]

Vv. 20, 21. By *καλῶς* Paul admits the *fact*; but in what follows he points out its *cause*, as one which must prevent haughtiness, and inspire fear and anxiety respecting the duration of the state of grace; assigning the reason in ver. 21. — *καλῶς*] *Good! recte ais.*² — The *τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ* and *τῇ πίστει* placed first with emphatic warning means: *on account of* unbelief, etc. Comp. ver. 30. See on Gal. vi. 12. — *ἑστηκας*] *thou standest*, namely, as a branch upon the olive tree. As the figure is present, both before and afterwards, it is opposed to the context to take *ἑστηκ.* absolutely, as the opposite of *πίπτειν* (vv. 11, 22, xiv. 4; Fritzsche, Tholuck, Krehl, Philippi—the latter doubtfully). — *ὑψηλοφρονεῖν*, to be haughty (1 Tim. vi. 17), is foreign to classical Greek, which has *μεγαλοφρονεῖν*; yet see *scholion* on Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 91: *ὑψηλοφρονοῦντα καὶ καυχώμενον κατακάμπτει ὁ θεός*. The adjective *ὑψηλόφρων* is found in the classics in a good sense: *high-spirited*. — *φοβοῦ*] "*timor opponitur non fiducia, sed supercilio et securitati*," Bengel. Secure haughtiness fears not the possible loss. — *τῶν κατὰ φύσιν*] *those according to nature*, not ingrafted. — *μήπως οὐδὲ σ. φείσ.*] to be referred to the underlying conception: *it is to be feared*³ (Winer, pp. 469 f., 442 [E. T. 504, 474]; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 288; Ast, *Lex. Plat.* II. p. 335). The *future* is more definite and certain than the subjunctive.⁴ At the same time the specially chosen mode of expression with *μήπως* (Paul does not say directly *οὐδὲ σοῦ φείσεται*, as Lachmann reads) is sufficiently *mitigating* and *forbearing*.

Vv. 22, 23. An exhortation inferred from ver. 21, and corresponding to *μὴ ὑψηλοφρόνει, ἀλλὰ φοβοῦ* in ver. 20. — *Behold, therefore, the goodness and the severity of God*, how both divine attributes present themselves before thee side by side. That *χρηστ.* and *ἀποστ.* should be without the article is, on account of the following *θεοῦ*⁵ being anarthrous, quite regular, and does not entitle us artificially to educe (as Hofmann does) the sense of "*a goodness*" (which is here exhibited), etc. According to the correct reading (see the

¹ Were we to read, with the Rec., *οἱ κλάδοι*, the article would have to be taken *δεικτικῶς* of the branches concerned, not the collective branches, from the haughty standpoint of the opponents, as Philippi holds. The simple *καλῶς* of the apostle does not suit this.

² Demosth. 998. 24; Plat. *Phil.* p. 25 B; Eur. *Or.* 1216; Lucian, *Deor. Jud.* 10.

³ Observe, however, that *μήπως κ.τ.λ.* is not an actual formal apodosis (in opposition to van Hengel's difficulty, by which he sees himself compelled to adopt Lachmann's reading); that, on the contrary, a formal apodosis, as frequently along with conditional protases (see Winer, p. 556 [E. T. 598]; Buttmann, p. 330 [E. T. 385 f.]), is by *anacoluthon*

suppressed, and instead of it the fear *μήπως κ.τ.λ.* is independently introduced, in keeping with the emotional vividness of the discourse. Consequently: "*For if God has not spared the natural branches, . . . He will, I am apprehensive, also not spare thee.*" Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 199 E, rightly observes that the suppression of the apodosis after a conditional protasis has minimum offensionis in familiari colloquio." And such we have here, vv. 19-21.

⁴ See Hermann, *ad El.* 992, *Aj.* 272, *Med.* p. 357, *Elmsl.*; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 451 A; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 140.

⁵ Comp. Elwert, *Quaest. ad philolog. sacr.*, Tüb. 1860, p. 7 f.

critical notes), a point is, with Lachmann, to be placed after ἀποτομίαν Θεοῦ ; and with the following nominatives, ἀποτομία and χρηστότης Θεοῦ, ἐστὶ is to be supplied :¹ “ *Towards the fallen there is severity, but towards thee (directed to thee) goodness.*” The *fallen* are the Jews who have refused to believe,—so designated, because they are conceived as *branches* broken off and thereby *fallen from the tree*. Comp. ἐσσηκας, ver. 20. In allusion to this, the *severity* of God is also designated as ἀποτομία (only here in the N. T., but see on 2 Cor. xiii. 10 : Kypke, II. p. 179 ; Grimm on Wisd. v. 21). This reference to the figure, which certainly pervades the whole representation, it is arbitrary to deny (de Wette, Fritzsche). — ἐὰν ἐπιμείν. τῇ χρηστότ.] *if thou shalt abide* (see on vi. 1) *by the goodness, i.e. if thou shalt not have separated thyself from the divine goodness* (through apostasy from faith), but shalt have remained true to it ; comp. Acts xiii. 43. Rightly, therefore, as respects the *mode* of the ἐπιμένειν τ. χρ., Clemens Alex. *Paedag.* I. p. 140 Pott : τῇ εἰς Χριστὸν πίστει. But it is erroneous, because contrary to the context (for the emphasis lies on ἐπιμείν., and τῇ χρηστότ. is but the repetition of the divine attribute just mentioned) and un-Pauline, to take χρηστότης, with Fritzsche, following Ch. Schmidt, in the sense of human *rightness of conduct* (iii. 12). Comp. rather on χρηστότ., ii. 4, and on Eph. ii. 7 ; also Tit. iii. 4. — ἐπεὶ καὶ σὺ ἐκκοπήσῃ] *for otherwise thou also* (like those broken-off branches) *shalt be cut off*. The threatening tenor of the discourse suggests unsought the stronger word ἐκκοπ., which is also in ver. 24 retained of the wild olive tree. — Since καὶ ἐκεῖνοι² δὲ κ.τ.λ. does not depend on the condition previously to be supplied with ἐπεὶ, but has its own conditional sentence, a point is to be placed (in opposition to Hofmann) after ἐκκοπ. ; and with καὶ ἐκεῖνοι δὲ a new sentence, still further repressing Gentile self-exaltation, must be begun, which usual punctuation Lachmann, *ed. maj.*, has again adopted : *And those, too, if they shall not have persisted in unbelief, will be grafted in*, —whereby the reception into the true divine community (vv. 25, 31) is figuratively depicted. The καὶ puts the ἐκεῖνοι on a parallel to the ingrafted wild olive branches (ver. 17.) — δυνατὸς γάρ] *if, namely, the cause has ceased to exist, on account of which God had to break off these branches, the power of God* (comp. iv. 21, xiv. 4) leaves no doubt, etc. In πάλιν the conception is, that by the ingrafting their *restoration to their previous condition* is accomplished. Comp. Winer, p. 576 [E. T. 620].—We may notice that this is a probative passage for the *possibility of forfeiture* of the state of grace, for the *conversio resistibilis* and for *reiterabilitas gratiae*, and also against *absolute predestination*.

Ver. 24. Γάρ] does not serve to assign the reason of δυνατὸς κ.τ.λ., so that the *ability of God* for that reingrafting would be popularly illustrated from the facility of this process as according to nature (the ordinary view).

¹ To assume epexegetic nominatives *absolute* (Jacobs, *ad Del. epigr.* v. 43), with Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 329 [E. T. 384], is inappropriate, because the appended ἐὰν ἐπιμείν. κ.τ.λ. can no longer be dependent on ἰδέ, but presupposes an independent sen-

tence.

² Such, with Griesb. Lachm. Scholz, Tisch., according to a large preponderance of evidence, is to be the reading, instead of καὶ ἐκεῖνοι.

[See Note CXXIII. p. 463.] Against this it may be decisively urged, that—apart from the difficulty which experience attests in the conversion of unbelieving Jews—the power of God is the correlative, not of that which is easy, but precisely of that which is difficult, or which humanly speaking appears impossible (iv. 21, xiv. 4; 2 Cor. ix. 8; Rom. ix. 22; Matt. xix. 26; Luke i. 37, *et al.*), and that πόσῳ μᾶλλον, as a designation of greater easiness, must have found in the context a more precise explanation to that effect, if it was not intended to express generally, as elsewhere (comp. Philem. 16, and the similar use of πολλῷ μᾶλλον), the greater degree of probability or certainty. Rightly, therefore, have Winzer, *Progr.* 1828, Reiche, Philippi, and Tholuck, referred the γάρ to the main thought of the previous verse, to ἐγκεντρισθήσονται. Yet they should not have taken this γάρ as purely *co-ordinate* with the preceding γάρ, but—as must always be done with two such apparently parallel instances of γάρ—as *explicative* (see on viii. 6) *namely*, so that after the brief *ground assigned* for ἐγκεντρισθήσονται (δυνατὸς κ.τ.λ.), the same is now yet more fully *elucidated* in regard to its certainty, and by this elucidation is still further *confirmed*. To this the confirmatory reference to ἐγκεντ. in Hofmann substantially amounts. — σὺ] Gentile-Christian. — ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν . . . ἄγριελ.] *out of the wild olive, which is so according to nature, which by nature has grown a wild olive.* — παρὰ φύσιν] for the grafting, as an artificial proceeding, alters the natural development, and is so far *contrary to nature* (i. 26). The interposition of ἐξεκοπ. brings out more markedly the contrast between κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φ. Very violently the simple words are twisted by Hofmann as follows: ἄγριε-λαίου is in *opposition* to ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν; while for the latter there is to be borrowed from ἄγριελαίου the *more general* notion of the *olive tree*, and ἡ κατὰ φύσιν is the tree, which is so for the *branch* in a natural manner. — εἰς καλλιέλ.] *into a (not the) noble olive tree.* The word is also found in Aristotle, *Plant.* i. 6, in contrast to ἄγριέλ. — οὗτοι] the Jews who have refused to believe. — οἱ κατὰ φύσιν] *sc. δυντες*,¹ *those according to nature.* In *what respect* they are so, the context exhibits, *namely, as the original branches of the holy olive tree*, whose root the patriarchs are, ver. 16. — τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐλ.] *for they have originally grown upon it, and then have been cut off from it; hence it is still their own olive tree.*

Vv. 25–32. [See Note CXXIV. p. 463.] The formal and unconditional promise of the collective conversion of the Jews, and the confirmatory proof of this promise, now follow down to ver. 32. — γάρ] introduces the corroboration of the previous ἐγκεντρισθήσονται: “*they shall be grafted in*, I say; *for be it not withheld from you*,” etc. — οὐ θέλω ὑμᾶς ἀρνοεῖν] not a mere formula of announcement generally (Rückert), but always of something important,

¹ Fritzsche takes οἱ as the relative οἱ: how much more shall *these* be grafted into the olive tree, *who*, according to nature, shall become grafted into their own olive tree! Superfluous in itself,—and what diffuse and unwieldy circumstantiality of expression! Hofmann has nevertheless acceded to this reading of οἱ, in which case,

through the punctuation οὗτοι, οἱ κατὰ φύσιν (*sc. ἐγκεντρισθήσονται*) ἐγκεντρισθήσονται τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐλαίᾳ, nothing is gained. How simply and clearly would the thought thus artificially made out have been expressed, if Paul had only left out that alleged relative οἱ!

which Paul desires to be specially noticed, i. 13 ; 1 Cor. x. 1, xii. 1 ; 2 Cor. i. 8 ; 1 Thess. iv. 13. That which is *addressed*, under the fervent addition of the ἀδελφοί embracing *all* readers, is the *whole church*, although it stands before the apostle's eyes such as it was, namely, in its *predominantly Gentile-Christian* character. Comp. vv. 13, 28, 30. — τὸ μυστήριον] has not in the N. T. the sense in which profane writers speak of mysteries (something mysterious in itself, comprehensible only by the initiated, and to be concealed from the profane).¹ But it signifies that *which, undiscerned by men themselves, has been made known to them by divine ἀποκάλυψις*, and always refers to the relations and the development of the Messianic kingdom (Matt. xiii. 11). Thus it frequently denotes with Paul the divine counsel of redemption through Christ,—as a whole, or in particular parts of it,—because it was veiled from men before God revealed it (Rom. xvi. 25 ; 1 Cor. ii. 7–10 ; Eph. iii. 3–5). Whether the contents of a mystery have already become known through the preaching of the gospel, may be gathered from the scope of the particular passages. That, however, which Paul *here* means by μυστήρ., is something the ἀποκάλυψις of which he is conscious of having received by divine illumination (just as in 1 Cor. xv. 51), and he declares it as a prophet ἐν ἀποκαλύψει (1 Cor. xiv. 6, 30) ; without presupposing that the church, personally still strange to him, was already acquainted with the peculiar point of doctrine, as is evinced by ἵνα μὴ ᾗτε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς φρόν. He desires, namely, by a disclosure of the μυστήριον, to take care that *his readers*, from their Gentile-Christian standpoint, *should not, under a misapprehension of the divine counsel, hold for truth their own views on the exclusion of the Israelitish people*, and therewith *be wise in themselves* (ἐν ἑαυτ., see the critical notes), *i.e.* in their own judgment (comp. Jas. ii. 4). What Luther has : “that ye be not *proud*” (comp. Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Calovius), is not *directly* expressed, but is rightly pointed out by Theodoret as a *consequence*. Comp. Isa. v. 21 ; Soph. *El.* 1055 f. — ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] *Contents* of the μυστήρ., namely, the duration of the hardening of Israel, which will not be permanent. — πῶρως] See on ver. 7. — ἀπὸ μέρους] is to be connected with γέγονεν, not, as by Estius, Semler, Koppe, Fritzsche, contrary to the construction, with τῷ Ἰσραήλ. *Hardening has partially befallen* the people, in so far as οὐ πάντες ἠπίστευσαν πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐπίστευσαν (Theodoret). Comp. xv. 15. It is therefore to be understood *extensively* (comp. οἱ λοιποί, ver. 7 ; τινές, ver. 17), not *intensively*, as Calvin takes it (attaching it to πῶρως) : *quodammodo*, which was intended to soften the severity of the notion. So taken, it would not modify the conception, but alter it (ver. 7 ff.). Köllner finds in ἀπὸ μ. the statement of a *single ground* of the divine arrangement, leaving it undecided whether other reasons, and what, were in the mind of the apostle : *on the one part* the hardening had been decreed by God over Israel only for the end, that first, etc. But in that case ἀπὸ μ. must have referred to an expressed ἵνα or the like. The *temporal* view, “*for a while*” (Hofmann), is here as contrary to usage as in 2 Cor. i.

¹ See on μύειν and μυστήρ., Creuzer on Plotin. *de Pulcr.* p. 357 f. ; Lennep. *Etymol.* p. 441 ; comp. Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* I. p. 85 ff.

14, ii. 5. Paul would have known how to express this sense possibly by τὸ νῦν, or by the classical τῷ. — γέγονεν] *from whom?* is known from ver. 8. — ἀχρις οὗ] *usque dum intraverit.* Then—when this shall have taken place—the hardening of Israel shall cease. Calvin's *ita ut* is intended, in spite of the language, to remove the idea of a *terminus ad quem*; and for the same reason Calovius and others employ much artifice in order to bring out the sense, that down to the end of the world the partial hardening will endure, and therefore, too, the partial conversion, but *only* that which is partial. — τὸ πλῆρ. τῶν ἐθνῶν] In opposition to Gusset, Wolfburg, and others named by Wolf, also Wolf himself, Michaelis, Olshausen, Philippi, who understand only the *complementum ethnicorum* serving to make up for the unbelieving Jews (“the recruitment from the Gentiles,” Michaelis), the *usus loquendi* is not decisive; for according to usage that, with which something else is made full, might certainly be expressed by the genitive with πλήρωμα (Mark viii. 20, and see on Mark vi. 43; comp. Eccles. iv. 6). But how enigmatically, and in a manner how liable to misapprehension, would Paul have indicated the supposed thought, instead of simply and plainly writing τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐθνῶν! especially as already, in ver. 12, the analogous expression τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν was used in the sense of “*their full number.*” Fritzsche also finds too little: *caterova gentiliūm*, so that only a *great multitude* is meant. Comp. on Eph. iii. 19. We must observe the correlation of ἀπὸ μέρους . . . πλήρωμα . . . πᾶς: a *part* of Israel is hardened, until the Gentiles *collectively* shall have come in, and, when that shall have taken place, then *all* Israel will be saved. The conversion of the Gentiles ensues by successive stages; but when their *totality* shall be converted, then the conversion of the Jews in their *totality* will also ensue; so that Paul sees the latter—which up to that epoch certainly also advances gradually in individual cases—ensuing, after the full conversion of the Gentiles, as the event completing the assemblage of the church and accomplishing itself probably in rapid development.¹ All this, therefore, *before* the *Parousia*, not *by means of it*. Comp. on Acts iii. 20. The expression τὸ πλήρωμα τ. ἐθνῶν is therefore to be taken *numerically*: the *plena copia* of the Gentiles (of whom in the first instance only a *fraction* has come and is coming in), their *full number*. Rightly Theophylact: πάντες, but with arbitrary limitation he adds: οἱ προεργασμένοι ἐθνικοί. Just so, in substance, Augustine, Oecumenius, and many others, including even van Hengel: “*plenus numerus gentiliūm, quotquot comprehendebant proposita Dei,*” comp. Krummacher: “only the *elect* among the Gentiles.” The *collective multitude* of the Gentiles in the strict sense Hof-

¹ There would have been no offence taken at the full sense of the πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν, as well as of the correlate πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ, ver. 26, and there would have been no occasion to seek artificial limitations of the fulness of these notions, had it been sufficiently considered that Paul is speaking *apocalyptically*, in virtue of his *prophetic contemplation* of the last sacred-historical development before the *Parousia*. The prophet (comp. e.g. Acts ii. 17, xi. 28) contemplates and speaks

of the grand things in the perspective opened to his view *in the bulk and summarily*, without being answerable for such utterances according to strict mathematical precision. By a restrictive explaining away and modification of these utterances the prophetic character and spirit suffers a violence foreign to it, against which the simple and clear words do not cease to offer resistance.

mann seeks to get rid of, by making τὸ πλῆρωμα serve only to emphasize the fact that τὰ ἔθνη is to be thought of "in the full compass of the notion," so that by τὸ πλῆρ. τ. ἔθνων no other full amount is intended than that which would be expressed by τὰ ἔθνη itself. Thus there would result as the sense : until no people of the Gentile world is any longer found outside the church. This is decidedly at variance with ver. 12, and with the whole context down to its evident concluding verse (ver. 32), according to which not the peoples as such (in the lump, as it were), but all persons who compose them, must be the subjects of the entrance into the church and of the divine mercy. The above interpretation is a process of *rationalizing*, artificial and far-fetched, and contrary to the language and the context, by interpreting what is said of the individuals as applying to the nations ; just as Beyschlag, p. 75, understands the two great groups of mankind to be thought of here and in ver. 26. — εἰσέλθῃ] namely, into the community prefigured by the holy olive tree, i.e. into the people of God. There is not yet mention of the kingdom of Messiah ; its establishment is later. The passage Col. i. 13 is wrongly employed with a view to supply εἰς τ. βασιλ. Θεοῦ. See *in loc.*

Ver. 26 f. καὶ οὕτω] And so, namely, after the πλῆρωμα τῶν ἔθνων shall have come in. The modal character of the οὕτω therefore lies in the succession of time conditioning the emergence of the fact (comp. 1 Cor. xi. 28), as it also in the classics, in the sense of *so then*, embraces what has been previously said.¹ Theodoret rightly says : τῶν γὰρ ἔθνων δεξαμένων τὸ κήρυγμα πιστεῖουσιν καὶ αὐτοὶ, and that, according to ver. 11, under the impulse of powerful emulation. We may add that this great final result is brought into more important prominence, if we take καὶ οὕτω κ.τ.λ. independently, than if we make it form part of the statement dependent on ὅτι (Lachmann, Tischendorf, Fritzsche, Ewald, Hofmann, and others). — πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ] This notion, so definitely expressed, of the totality of the people is in no way to be limited ; the whole of those are intended, who, at the time that the fulness of the Gentiles shall have come in, will compose Israel. All Israelites who up to that time shall be still unconverted, will then be converted to salvation, so that at that term entire Israel will obtain the saving deliverance ; but comp., as to the quite unlimited expression, the remark on ver. 25. Limitations from other interests than that of exegesis have been suggested : such as that the spiritual Israel, Gal. vi. 16, is meant (Augustine, Theodoret, Luther, Calvin,² Grotius, and others, including Krummacher) ; or only the

¹ See Schweighäuser, *Lex. Herod.* II. p. 167 ; Thucyd. iii. 96. 2 ; Xen. *Anab.* iii. 5. 6 ; Dem. 644. 18, 802. 20. Hofmann, in connection with his incorrect explanation of ἀπὸ μέρους, ver. 25, refers οὕτω to the temporal limitation of the Jewish hardening ; through the fact that the latter took place in the first instance only and thus in its time ceases, there is given to the people the possibility (?), etc. In this way this definitely prophetic element, which lies in the καὶ οὕτω joined to what immediately precedes, is removed, and resolved into something entire-

ly self-evident !

² "Ego Israelis nomen ad totum Dei populum extendo, hoc sensu : Quum gentes ingressae fuerint, simul et Judaei ex defectu se ad fidei obedientiam recipient, atque ita complebitur salus totus Israelis Dei, quem ex utrisque colligi oportet."—The Reformers were induced to depart from the literal sense of the apostle, not by exegetical, but by dogmatic considerations, and also by their bad opinion of Jewish depravity ("a Jew or Jewish heart is as hard as stock, stone, iron, or devil, so as in no way to

select portion of the Jews (Calovius, Bengel, and several others, including Olshausen : "all those members of the Israelitish people who from the beginning belonged to the true *λείμμα*") ; or that *πᾶς* is to be taken *comparatively* only of the *greater* number, of the *bulk* (Oecumenius, Wetstein, Rückert, Fritzsche, Tholuck). To this comes in substance also Hofmann's explanation : "that the people, *as a people*, will be converted ;" but *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ* is, in fact, not "*Israel as a whole*," but rather *the entire Israel*, as is also meant in 2 Chron. xii. 1 and in all O. T. passages, in contrast to *ἀπὸ μέρους*, ver. 25. Comp. *πᾶς οἶκος Ἰσρ.*, Acts ii. 36, *πᾶς ὁ λαὸς Ἰσρ.*, and the like. This also against Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 404. — *σωθήσεται*] *will be saved*, unto Messianic salvation, by their conversion to Christ. — *καθὼς γέγρ.*] For *πᾶς Ἰσρ. σωθῆς*. Paul finds a *Scripture warrant*,¹ not merely a substratum for his own

be moved," etc., Luther, 1543, who passed a milder judgment at an earlier period). Still the literal interpretation remained predominant amongst the Reformed through the influence of Beza ; and through Calixtus and Spener it became so again in the Lutheran Church, in which it had even at an earlier period asserted its claims, through Hunnius, Balduin, and others, in spite of Luther's authority. Melancthon held simply by the *statement* (see his *Enarratio*, 1556) : "futurum esse ut *subinde* usque ad finem mundi *aliqui* ex Judaeis convertantur." The modest addition which he made at an earlier period (1540), of a possible universal conversion of the Jews, is not found in this, his last exposition of the epistle. Following Luther, Calovius also explains it only of a *successive* conversion of the Jews, which is gradually to ensue up to the end of the world, so that there is merely meant a *magnus numerus* still to be converted. So, too, others in Calovius, and now also Philippi (p. 557 ff.) joins them : Israel is *partially* hardened until the entrance of the *pleroma* of the Gentiles ; and in this way, namely, that out of the *only partially* hardened people a *great assemblage* of believing ones is *continually being formed until the end of the days*, will the *entire Israel properly aimed at* by the O. T. divine word, according to the prophetic passage, be saved. It is self-evident that thus all the elements which form the points properly so called of this interpretation are forced upon the text, and the result is an historical process recognizable by any one, concerning which it is not easy to see how Paul could introduce it as a *μυστήριον*.—On the history of the exposition of this passage, see, moreover, Calovius, p. 190 ff., and Luthardt.

¹ Not, however, as though Paul had *derived* his prophecy from Isa. l.c., for the *ὅτι πᾶσι . . . καὶ οὕτω* he could not derive

thence. Rather has he—after having *ἐν ἀποκαλύψει* recognized the declared *μυστήριον*—now also recognized an O. T. prophecy in reference to that constituent of it which is contained in *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται* ; this, therefore, pertains no longer to the *ἀποκάλυψις*, by which the *μυστήριον* itself was disclosed to him, but is to be ascribed to his own apprehension of the meaning of Scripture. The Messianic prophecy of Isa. lix. 20, 21 (also with the Rabbins a solemn Messianic utterance ; see Schoettg. *Hor.* II. pp. 71, 187), refers merely to the Israelites turning *from apostasy*, and appears therefore incapable of warranting *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται*. We have, however, to observe that, according to the apostle's view and exposition in ver. 17 ff., it is only those who *reject Christ* among the Jews who have fallen away from the true theocracy (from the olive tree) ; consequently, if these are converted, *entire Israel* is reconciled, because they who remained and do remain in the theocracy are those who have accepted and accept the preaching of Christ—of whom the *σωτηρία* is therefore self-evident. This mode of apprehending the quotation, corresponding to the contextual view of the state of the matter, excludes the far-fetched and artificial expedient which Fritzsche offers, when he brings out from the *anarthrous ἀσέβειας*, and from *τὰς ἀμαρτίας* having the article (*aliqua peccata—all sins*), the result that in the first half only the *elect* Israelites, but in the second the *entire people*, are meant.—Following Calvin and others, Glöckler again believes that ver. 27 is borrowed from Jer. xxxi. 31-34 ; but this must be rejected, because *καὶ αὕτη . . . διαθήκη* stands in Isa. lix. 21, while *ὅταν κ.τ.λ.* stands literally in Isa. xxvii. 9. Philippi also thinks that the *contents* of the passage in Jeremiah floated before the mind of the

ideas (Tholuck), in Isa. lix. 20, 21 (not quite closely after the LXX., and, from *ὑταν* onwards, with a bringing in of xxvii. 9 ; see Surenhus. *καταλλ.* p. 503 f.) ; to the prophetic sense of this passage the future salvation of all Israel *corresponds as result*. — ἐκ *Σιών*] for *from God* will the deliverer come ; the theocratic central-point and dwelling-place of the divine kingdom is the holy mount of *Zion*. Comp. Ps. xiv. 7, liii. 7, *et al.* See also ix. 33. The LXX. have, following the original, *ἐνεκεν Σιών* (עֵינַן, *i.e.* for *Zion*). Our ἐκ *Σιών* is a variation of memory, *occasioned by the reminiscence of other passages* (comp. Ps. xiv. 7, liii. 7, cx. 2) ; for ἐνεκεν Σ. would have been quite as suitable to the apostle's purpose (in opposition to Reiche, Fritzsche, van Hengel) ; hence to discover intentional reasons for this deviation (Philippi : in order to bring into stronger relief the *claim* of the people as contrasted with the Gentiles) is groundless. Nor was this deviation *more convenient* (Hofmann) for the apostle, namely, in order to designate Christ's place of manifestation ; but it involuntarily on his part found its way into the citation freely handled. — ὁ *ῥυόμενος*] *i.e.* not *God* (Grotius, van Hengel), who first emerges in ver. 27, but the *Messiah*. In the Heb. we find מוֹשִׁיעַ, a deliverer, *without* the article, by which, however, no other is intended. The *future coming* of the deliverer which is here predicted is, in the sense of the fulfilment of this prophecy, necessarily that whereby the πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται will be effected ; consequently not the *Parousia*, because the conversion of all Israel must be antecedent to this, but rather that specially efficacious *self-revelation of Christ in the preaching of His gospel* (comp. Eph. ii. 17), to be expected by the future, whereby He will bring about that final sacred-historical epoch of the people, the conversion of its totality. Erroneously, however, Augustine, Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Beza have supposed it predicted that Elijah or Enoch would appear before the end of the world as converter of the Jews. — ἀποστρ. ἀσεβ. ἀπὸ Ἰακ.] *He will turn away, i.e.* (comp. Bar. iii. 7 ; 1 Macc. iv. 58) remove, do away with *impieties from Jacob*. By this, in the sense of the apostle, is meant the atoning, *reconciling* work of the Messiah (comp. John i. 29 : αἱρων τ. ἁμαρτ), which He will accomplish in Israel by its conversion. Hence there follows, as the correlative to this in ver. 27, the *forgiveness of sins* on the part of *God*, procured through Him, and that as the actually saving essence of the *covenant*, which the people possesses from God.¹ Compare the original text, which, however, instead of κ. ἀποστρ. ἀσεβ. ἀπὸ Ἰακώβ has וְיִשְׁכְּבֵי פֶשַׁע בְּיַעֲקֹב, and for *those turning from apostasy in Jacob*. Paul, however, because following generally in this quotation the LXX., retains also its deviation from the original text, but not as if this could have been more welcome to him for his object, for in that respect he might have just as well made use of the words of the original. — αὐτῇ] points to the *following* (comp. 1 John v. 2), so that the sense of ver. 27 is : “ *And when I shall have forgiven their sins, this, this remission of sins conferred by me, will be my covenant to them, i.e.* they will

apostle. If this were the case, why should he not have cited this well-known leading passage in reference to the new covenant ?

¹ How happy a final result ! Instead of a

rejection of the people of God (ver. 1), the covenant of God with them now subsists in its entire fulfilment !

therein have from me the execution of my covenant." Both in the original and in the LXX. αὕτη points to the following, in which the words of the covenant (τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἔμδν . . . οὐ μὴ ἐκλίπη ἐκ τοῦ στόμ. κ.τ.λ.) are adduced ; but instead of them, Paul, for the object which he has in view, puts ὅταν ἀφέλῳμαι κ.τ.λ. from Isa. xxvii. 9, where likewise a preceding demonstrative (τοῦτ' ὅ ἐστιν ἡ εὐλογία αὐτοῦ) points forward to ὅταν. Hence we may not, with others (including Köllner and Hofmann), refer αὕτη to the preceding, in which case ἀποστρ. ἀσεβείας ἀπὸ 'Ιακ. is supposed to point to the moral conversion, and ἀφελ. τ. ἁμαρτ. αὐτ. to the forgiveness, on the ground of which that conversion takes place (see Hofmann). According to this view, the essence of the covenant would lie in sanctification, not in reconciliation, which would be conceived rather as antecedent to the covenant,—a view which runs counter to the N. T. doctrine (Matt. xxvi. 26 ; Heb. ix. 15 ff., x. 29, xii. 24, xiii. 20). — ἡ παρ' ἐμοῦ διαθήκη] *The covenant which proceeded from me*, which was made on my part. See Bernhardt, p. 255 f. ; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 182 f. ; van Hengel, *in loc.*

REMARK.—The conversion of entire Israel promised by Paul as a μυστήριον revealed to him, has not yet taken place ; for the opinion, that the promise had been fulfilled already in the apostolic age through the conversion of a great part of the people (comp. Euseb. *H. E.* iii. 35 ; *Judaizantes* in Jerome ; Grotius, Limborch, Wetstein), is set aside, notwithstanding Acts xxi. 20, by the literal meaning of πᾶς 'Ισραὴλ and of πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν. The fulfilment is to be regarded as still future, as the last step in the universal extension of Christianity upon earth. In respect of time no more special definition can be given, than that the conversion of the totality of the Gentiles must precede it ; whence only this is certain, that it is still a time very distant. Paul has certainly viewed the matter as near, seeing that he conceived the Parousia itself to be near (not merely, perhaps, its possible, but its actual emergence—in opposition to Philippi),—a conception which was shared by him with the whole apostolical church, although it remained without the verification of the event, as this was conceived of. But the promise of the conversion of the people of Israel is not on that account itself to be regarded as one, the fulfilment of which is no longer to be hoped for,—as though, with the non-verified conception of the time of the event, the event itself should fall to the ground (Ammon, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche) ; for it is the fact in itself, and not the epoch of it, which is disclosed by the Apostle as part of the μυστήριον which was revealed to him ; and therefore this disclosure rested on the ἀποκάλυψις received, not on individual opinion and expectation. The duration of time until the Parousia was not subject-matter of revelation, Acts i. 7, and the conception of it belongs, therefore, not to that in the apostolic teaching which has the guarantee of divine certainty, but to the domain of subjective hope and expectation, which associated themselves with what was revealed,—a distinction which even Philippi does not reject. The latter, however, endeavours to remove from the category of error the apostolic expectation of the nearness of the Parousia, because it was not cherished with that divine certainty ; but cannot thereby prevent it, where it is presupposed so definitely, as e.g. xiii. 11, or is expressed so unconditionally, as e.g. 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52, from being characterized by an unprejudiced mind as a human error, which did not, however, exclude occasionally other moods, as in 2 Cor. v. 8,

Phil. i. 23. Of such human mistakes and vacillations, which lie outside the range of revealed truth, that truth is independent (against Hoelemann, *neue Bibelstud.* p. 232 ff., and others).—We may further notice that our passage directly controverts the Ebionitish view, now renewed in various quarters (Chr. A. Crusius, Delitzsch, Baumgarten, Ebrard, Auberlen, and others; expositors of the Apocalypse), of an actual restoration of Israel to the theocratic kingdom in Canaan, as to be expected on the ground of prophetic predictions (Hos. ii. 2, 16 ff., iii. 4, 5; Isa. xi. 11, xxiv. 16, chap. lx.; Jer. xxxiv. 33, *et al.*). Israel does not take in the church, but the church takes in Israel; and whenever this occurs, Israel has in the true sense again its kingdom and its Canaan. Comp. Tholuck on ver. 25; Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 576 f.; Hengstenberg, *Christol.* I. p. 256; and see especially Bertheau, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1859, p. 353 ff.

Ver. 28 ff. Yet a final summary gathering up of the sacred-historical relation of Israel to God, and (vv. 29–32) discussion of it; in which, however, the reference, bearing on the apostle's object, to the statement καὶ οὕτω πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται does not require the parenthesizing of καθὼς γέγραπται κ.τ.λ. (Ewald), as in ver. 28 the substantive verb is easily and obviously supplied.—The unbelieving Israelites *as such* are the *subject* (αὐτῶν, ver. 27). —κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγ.] The *relation* is thereby designated, according to which they are ἐχθροί. [See Note CXXV. p. 464.] The gospel was preached to them; but they rejected it, in which relation they are hated of God. In *conformity with* the message of salvation, which reached them, but was despised by them (comp. ver. 25), they must necessarily be ἐχθροί; since in fact, not accepting the δικαιοσύνη proffered in the gospel, they remained under the wrath of God (ver. 7). According to the context, we must think of the ἀπειθεῖα of the Jews, ver. 30; and therefore neither of their *exclusion from the gospel* (Fritzsche), nor even of the *diffusion* of the latter (Rückert). —ἐχθροί] not *my enemies* (Theodoret, Luther, Grotius, Semler, and others), nor yet *enemies of the gospel* (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Michaelis, Morus, Rosenmüller). That, on the contrary, Θεῷ (see on Gal. iv. 16) is to be supplied, as Θεοῦ with ἀγαπητοί, is evident generally from the connection with vv. 27 and 29; and that ἐχθροί is to be explained not in an *active* (Olshausen, van Hengel, Ritschl, and older interpreters), but in a *passive* sense (*to whom God is hostile*), is shown by the contrast of ἀγαπητοί. Comp. on v. 10. —δι' ὑμᾶς] *for your sake*, because you are thereby to attain to salvation, ver. 11. —κατὰ τὴν ἐκλ.] is usually taken: as fellow-members of the nation elected to be the people of God; comp. ver. 2. But ἐκλογή—differently from the προέγνω, ver. 2—has already been clearly defined in vv. 5, 7 as the elect *λείμμα*, and hence, with Ewald, is here also to be taken in this sense. Consequently: *in conformity with the fact, however, that among them is that elect remnant.* This believing ἐκλογή is the living testimony of the undying love of God towards the people. Comp. ver. 5. —διὰ τοὺς πατ.] *for the fathers' sake.* Calvin aptly remarks: “Quoniam ab illis propagata fuerat Dei gratia ad posterios, secundum pacti formam: Deus tuus et seminis tui;” comp. ver. 16; Luke i. 54, 55.

Ver. 29. Confirmation of the second half of ver. 28 by the axiom: “Un-

repented, and so subject to no recall, are the displays of grace and (especially) the calling of God." The application to be made of this general proposition is : Consequently God, who has once made this people the recipient of the displays of His grace and has called them to the Messianic salvation, will not, as though He had repented of this, again withdraw His grace from Israel, and leave and abandon His calling of Israel without realization. — On ἀμεταμέλητος, comp. 2 Cor. vii. 10.

Vv. 30, 31. Γάρ] not referable to ver. 28 (Hofmann), introduces that, which, according to the economy of salvation under the divine mercy, will emerge as actual proof of the truth of ver. 29. — ἡπειθήσατε] have refused obedience, which came to pass through unbelief. For the elucidation of this, see i. 18 ff. — νῦν δέ] contrast to the time before they become Christian (ποτέ), Eph. ii. 8. — ἡλείθητε] For the reception into Christianity with its blessings is, as generally, so in particular over-against the preceding ἡπειθήσατε, on God's part solely the work of mercy. — τῇ τούτων ἀπειθ.] through the disobedience of these; for they are ἐχθροὶ δι' ὑμᾶς, ver. 28. Comp., besides, vv. 11 f., 15, 19 f. The non-compliance of the Jews with the requirement of faith in the gospel brought about the reception of the Gentiles. The latter, the converted Gentiles, are individualized by the address to the Gentile-Christian community of the readers (ὑμεῖς). — ἡπειθήσαν] namely, through rejection of the gospel. — τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἐλέει] is, on account of the parallelism, to be joined to the following (ἵνα κ.τ.λ.), and the dative to be taken in the sense of mediate agency, like τῇ τούτ. ἀπειθ. : in order that through the mercy that befell you (which may excite them to emulation of your faith, ver. 11) mercy should also accrue to them. The position of τ. ὑμ. ἐλ. before the introductory conjunction is for the sake of emphasis; comp. 2 Cor. xii. 7; Gal. iv. 10, et al.; Winer, p. 522 [E. T. 561]. Hence the parallelism is not to be sacrificed by placing a comma after ἐλέει. Nevertheless such is the course followed—and with very different views of the dative, arbitrarily departing from the datival notion in τῇ τούτ. ἀπειθεία—by the Vulgate ("in vestram misericordiam"), Peshito, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Estius, Wolf, Morus, Lachmann, Glöckler, Maier, Ewald ("so these also became now disobedient alongside of [bei] your mercy"), Buttmann in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 367 ("in favour of your mercy, that you might find mercy"), and others.—ἵνα] the divinely ordained aim of the ἡπειθήσαν. On the emphatic ὑμετέρῳ in the objective sense, see Winer, p. 145 [E. T. 153]; Kühner, II. 1, p. 486.

Ver. 32. Establishment of ver. 30 f., and that by an exhibition of the universal divine procedure, with the order of which that which is said in ver. 31 of the now disobedient Jews and their deliverance is incorporated. Thus ver. 32 is at once the grand summary and the glorious key-stone—impelling once more to the praise of God (ver. 33 ff.)—of the whole preceding section of the epistle.¹—συνκλείω εἰς : to include in (2 Macc. v. 5, comp. Luke v. 6), has, in the later Greek (Diod. Sic. xix. 19, comp. xx. 74, frequently in Poly-

¹ "Note this prime saying, which condemns all the world and man's righteous-

ness, and alone exalts God's mercy, to be obtained through faith" (Luther's gloss).

bis), and in the LXX. (after the Heb. נָתַן with לְ), also the metaphorical sense : *to hand over unto or under a power* which holds as it were in ward. Comp. on Gal. iii. 22, 23. Correspondent, as regards the notion, is *παρέδωκε*, i. 24. The compound expression *strengthens* the meaning ; it does not denote *simul* (Bengel and others).—The *effective* sense is not to be changed, which has been attempted by taking it sometimes as *declarative* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius, Zeger, Glass, Wolf, Carpzov, Wetstein, Ch. Schmidt), sometimes as *permissive* (Origen, Cornelius à Lapide, Estius, and many others, including Flatt and Tholuck).—*εἰς ἀπειθ.*] towards God ; see vv. 30, 31.—*τοὺς πάντας*] Of Gentiles (*ἑμείς*) and Jews (*οἱτοί*) Paul has previously spoken ; hence *οἱ πάντες* now comprises the *totality*, namely all Jews and Gentiles *jointly and severally*,—“*cunctos s. universos*, i.e. singulos in unum corpus colligatos,” Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 521. Comp. on the subject-matter, iii. 9, 19 ; Gal. iii. 22. So necessarily also the following *τοὺς πάντας*. The view which understands only the two *masses* of Jews and Gentiles, these two halves of mankind in the gross (usually so taken recently, as by Tholuck, Fritzsche, Philippi, Ewald, Weiss), cannot suit the comprehensive *τ. πάντας* (as if it were equal to *τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους*), since it is by no means appropriate to the mere *number of two*, but only to their *collective subjects*. Not even the Jewish *ἐκλογή*, vv. 7, 28, is to be excepted (Maier, van Hengel), because its subjects were also before their conversion sinners (iii. 23), and therefore subjected to the power of disobedience towards God ; for the *συνέκλεισε . . . ἀπειθεῖαν* points back, in the case of each single member of the collective whole, to the time *before* conversion and *until* conversion. If we should desire to refer *οἱ πάντες* merely to the *Jews* (van Hengel by way of a suggestion, and Hofmann), who are meant as a *people* in their *collective shape* (consequently not in all individuals ; see Hofmann), the close relationship between ver. 30 and ver. 31 would be opposed to it, since the reference of *γάρ* merely to the apodosis in ver. 31 is quite arbitrary ; and, indeed, the bold concluding thought in ver. 32 possesses its great *significance* and its suitableness to the following outburst of praise, simply and solely through its *all-comprehensive* contents. And even apart from this, *τοὺς πάντας* in fact never denotes : *them as a collective whole, as a people*,¹ but, as universally (in 1 Cor. ix. 22, x. 17 ; 2 Cor. v. 14 ; Phil. ii. 21 ; comp. Eph. iv. 13 ; 2 Macc. xi. 11, xii. 40, *et al.*, and in all the classical writers) *all of them*, as also only in *this* sense does the suitable *emphasis* fall on the repetition in the apodosis.—*ὥς τ. π. ἐλεῆσθ]* in order that *He may have mercy upon all*. This divine purpose Paul saw to be already in part attained,—namely, in the case of all already converted ; but its general fulfilment lay, to his view, in the development of the future on to the great *terminus* expressed in ver. 25 f. We may observe that our passage is at variance not merely with the *decretum reprobationis* (“*hanc particulam universalem opponamus tentationi de particularitate . . . ; non fingamus in Deo contradictorias voluntates*,” Melanchthon), but also with the view (Olshausen, Krummacher, and older

¹ *οἱ πάντες* has, as is well known, the sense of *in all* in the case of *numbers*. See Krüger, § 50. 11. 13 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 545.

expositors) that Paul means the *collective body* of the *elect*. See rather ver. 25 f. The ἀποκατάστασις is not, however, to be based on our passage for this reason, that the universality of the divine *purpose* of redemption (comp. 1 Tim. ii. 4), as well as the work of redemption having taken place for the justification of all (ver. 18), does not exclude its final non-realization in part through the fault of the individuals concerned,¹ and cannot do away with either the applicability of the purpose-clause exhibited in principle and summarily in prophetic fashion (comp. remark on ver. 25), nor with the divine judgment on final concrete self-frustrations of the counsel of salvation. And this the less, because such misinterpretations of the universalistic axiom are opposed by the apostle's doctrine of election as a sure corrective. There has been incorrectly discovered in such general expressions a want of consistency on the part of Paul, namely, "undeveloped outlines of a liberal conception" (Georgii in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1845, I. p. 25).

Ver. 33. [See Note CXXVI. p. 464.] The great and holy truth containing the whole divine procedure in preparing bliss (ver. 32),—with which Paul now arrives at the close of his entire *development of doctrine* in the epistle,—compels first an enraptured expression of praise to God from his deeply-moved heart, before he can commence the *exhortations*, which he then (chap. xii.) purposes to subjoin. —ὦ βάθος] θαυμάζοντός ἐστιν ἡ ρῆσις, οὐκ εἰδότες τὸ πᾶν, Chrysostom. — The *depth* is an expression of *great fulness* and *superabundance*, according to the very prevalent mode of expressing also in the classics *greatness* of riches by βάθος πλούτου.² By this sense we are here to abide, just because πλούτου, is added, and without deriving the expression from the conception of subterranean treasure-chambers (van Hengel);³ and we are not to find in it the sense of *unsearchableness* (Philippi), which is not expressed even in 1 Cor. ii. 10, Judith viii. 14, and is not required by the following ὡς ἀνεξ. κ.τ.λ., since this rather characterizes the βάθος σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως from the point of view of human knowledge, to which it must necessarily be unfathomable, but in a peculiar relation. In its reference to σοφίας κ. γνώσεως, namely, βάθος is the *depth* of wisdom, i.e. the fulness of wisdom, which is acquainted with the nature and the connection of its objects not superficially, but exhaustively and fundamentally, and is therefore incomprehensible by human judgment.⁴ — πλούτου] is either regarded as opening the series of genitival definitions of βάθος: 1) *depth of riches*, and (2) *of wisdom*, and (3) *of knowledge of God* (so Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Grotius, Bengel, Semler, Flatt, Tholuck, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Philippi, Ewald, Hofmann, Man-

¹ Comp. Gerlach, *d. letzten Dinge*, p. 154 ff.; Schmid, in the *Jahrb. f. D. Th.* 1870, p. 133.

² Soph. *Aj.* 130, and Lobeck, *in loc.*; but comp. with Ellendt, I. p. 286, βαθὺς πλούτος (Ael. *V. H.* iii. 18), βαθὺ πλουτεῖν (Tyrt. iii. 6), βαθύπλουτος, *very rich* (Aesch. *Suppl.* p. 549, *Crinag.* 17), βαθυπλούσιος (Poll. iii. 109). Comp. Dorville, *ad Charit.* p. 232; Blomfield, *Gloss. ad Aesch. Pers.* 471.

³ This idea might have been precluded by the fact that the expression βάθος κακῶν (Eur. *Hel.* 310) and the like are used.

⁴ See on βάθος and βαθύς, as applying to mental depth (Plat. *Theæt.* p. 183 E; Polybius, xxvii. 10. 3, vi. 24. 9, xxi. 5. 5), Dissem, *ad Pind. Nem.* iv. 7, p. 396; Blomfield, *ad Aesch. Sept.* 578; Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* XI. p. 252. Comp. βαθύφρων, Pind. *Nem.* vii. 1; Plut. *Sol.* 14; βαθύβουλος, Aesch. *Pers.* 138,

gold, and others); or the two other genitives are *subordinated* to πλούτου (Augustine, Ambrosiaster, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Wolf, Koppe, Reiche, van Hengel, and others), in which case, however, βάθ. πλούτ. is not to be resolved into *deep riches*, but is to be taken: *O depth of riches in wisdom as well as in knowledge of God*; comp. Col. ii. 2; Rom. ii. 4. The decision between these two suppositions is given by what follows, of which ὁ βάθος . . . Θεοῦ is the *theme*. As vv. 33, 34 describe the σοφία and γνώσις, and vv. 35, 36 the πλούτος Θεοῦ, the former view, which also primarily and most naturally presents itself, is to be preferred. Πλούτος, however, is usually understood of the divine *riches of grace* (comp. ii. 4, x. 12; Eph. i. 7, ii. 7); see ver. 32. To this ver. 35 aptly corresponds; and see x. 12. But since no genitival definition is appended, we must content ourselves simply with the sense of the word itself: how superabundantly *rich* is God! Phil. iv. 19. Comp. Rückert, Fritzsche, Philippi, Hofmann. — Σοφία and γνώσις are certainly to be distinguished (comp. on Col. ii. 3), but *popularly*, so that the *former*, the more general, is the *wisdom* of God (comp. xvi. 27; Eph. iii. 10), ruling everything in the best way for the best end; while *the latter*, the more special, is the *knowledge* pertaining to it of *all relations*, and thus especially of the means which He therein employs, of the methods which He has therein to take. To the latter—the γνώσις—are to be referred αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ, *i.e.* His measures, modes of procedure, αἱ οἰκονομίαι, Chrysostom (comp. Heb. iii. 10, Acts xiii. 10, according to the Heb. הַדָּרֹגִים, and also to classical usage); to the former—the σοφία—belong τὰ κρίματα αὐτοῦ, *i.e.* decisions, resolves formed, according to which His action proceeds (comp. Zeph. iii. 8; Wisd. xii. 12), as He, *e.g.*, has decided, according to ver. 32, that all should be disobedient, in order that all might find mercy. On account of the deep σοφία of God His κρίματα are unsearchable for men, etc. — ἀνεξερεύνητος, *unsearchable*, is found only in Heraclitus as quoted in Clement and Symmachus, Prov. xxv. 3, Jer. xvii. 9, Suidas; ἀνεξιχνίαστος, *untraceable* (Eph. iii. 8), οὐ μὴδ' ἰχνος ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν (Suidas), corresponds to the metaphorical ὁδοί. Comp. Job v. 9, ix. 10, xxxiv. 24; Manass. 6; Clement, *ad Cor.* i. 20.

Ver. 34. Paul, by way of confirming his entire exclamation in ver. 33 (not merely the second half), continuing by γάρ, adopts the words of Isa. xl. 13 (almost quite exactly after the LXX.) as his own. Comp. 1 Cor. ii. 16; Judith viii. 13, 14; Wisd. ix. 17; Eccles. xviii. 2 ff.—The first half has been referred to γνώσις, the second to the σοφία (Theodoret, Theophylact, Wetstein, Fritzsche), and rightly so. Paul goes *back* with his three questions upon the γνώσις, to which the νοῦς, the divine reason as the organ of absolute knowledge and truth, corresponds;¹ upon the σοφία, which has no σύμβουλος; and (ver. 35) upon the πλούτος, from which results the negation of τίς προέδωκεν κ.τ.λ. Philippi is opposed to this view, but can at the same time (similarly van Hengel and Hofmann) only bring out in a very far-fetched and indirect manner the result, that ver. 35 also sets forth the divine wisdom and knowledge (so far, namely, as the latter is not bound from without). — τίς σύμβ. αὐτοῦ ἐγέν. *Who has become his adviser, His counsel-*

¹ Comp. Kluge in the *Jahrb. f. D. Theol.* 1871, p. 324 ff.

giving helper? "Scriptura ubique subsistit in eo, quod Dominus voluit et dixit et fecit; rationes rerum universalium singulariumve non pandit; de iis, quae nostram superant infantiam, ad aeternitatem remittit fideles, 1 Cor. xiii. 9 ss.," Bengel. For parallels in Greek writers, see Spiess, *Logos Spermatis*. p. 240.

Ver. 35. Description of the *πάθος πλούτου* by words which are moulded after Job xli. 3, according to the Hebrew, not according to the LXX. (xli. 11), whose translation is quite erroneous.¹—καὶ ἀνταποδ. αὐτῷ] *and will it be recompensed again to Him?* With whom does the case occur, that he has previously made a gift to God, and that a recompense will be made to him in return for it? Change of construction by καὶ . . . αὐτῷ, here occasioned by the Heb. *וְיָשׁוּב*. But for the Greek usage, comp. Bernhardt, p. 304; Kühner, II. 2, p. 936.

Ver. 36 does not apply to all the three foregoing questions (Hofmann), but simply the *last* of them is *established* by the connective *ὅτι* (*for truly*) as regards its negative contents: "No one has beforehand given to God," etc.—All things are *from God* (*primal cause*), in so far as all things have proceeded from God's creative power; *through God* (*ground of mediate agency*), in so far as nothing exists without God's continuous operation; *for God* (*final cause*), in so far as all things serve the ends of God (not merely: the honour of God, as many think). Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 6; Col. i. 16; Heb. ii. 10. These passages speak quite *against* the opinion, that in the present passage the relation of *Father, Son, and Spirit* (Olshausen, Philippi, Thomasius, Jatho, Krummacher, following Ambrosiaster, Hilary, Toletus, Estius, Calovius, and others) is expressed—a view which is also quite remote from the connection.² The context speaks simply of *God* (the Father), to whom no one can have given anything beforehand, etc., because He, as Bengel aptly expresses it, is *Origo et Cursus et Terminus rerum omnium*. This may be recognized by the exegesis that has the deepest faith in Scripture without any rationalistic idiosyncrasy, as the example of Bengel himself shows. With reason neither Chrysostom, nor Oecumenius, nor Theophylact,³ neither Erasmus, nor Melancthon, nor Calvin, nor Beza have expressed any reference to the Trinity in their explanations; but Augustine has this reference, against which also Tholuck, Hofmann, and Gess (v.

¹ In the LXX. Isa. xl. 14, Cod. A, as also **N**, has our words, but certainly through interpolation from the present passage. According to Ewald, Paul probably found them in his copy of the LXX. just after Isa. xl. 13.

² With the same warrant, or, in other words, with the same arbitrariness, the Trinity might be found, with Origen, in ver. 33; and in particular, *πλούτου* might be referred to the Father, *σοφίας* to the Son (Luke xl. 49), and *γνώσεως* to the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11); in consistency with which, moreover, the *πάθος*, belonging to all three elements, might have been explained of the *mystery* of the Trinitarian

relation. This observation is not meant to sound like "*Gnostic mockery*" (Philippi); such is far from my intention. That the doctrine of the Trinity (that of the New Testament, namely, which is Subordination) was vividly before the consciousness of the apostle, no unprejudiced person denies; but *here* he has neither *stated* nor *hinted* at it, as the third element *εἰς αὐτόν* shows sufficiently in and by itself, for all things can have their *telic* reference to none other than to the *Father* or (Col. i. 16) to the *Son*.

³ Theodoret argues from the first two statements the equality of the Father and the Son; he says nothing concerning the Spirit.

d. Pers. Chr. p. 158) have been sufficiently unbiassed to declare themselves — δι' αὐτοῦ] God is *mediate cause* of all things by His *upholding and ruling*. Comp. Heb. ii. 20. To refer, with others, this statement to *creation* (Theophylact : ὁ ποιητὴς πάντων ; comp. Oecumenius, Rückert, Fritzsche), would fail to bring out at least any popular distinction from ἐξ αὐτοῦ, and—which is decisive against such reference—that would be affirmed of the *Father* which pertains to the *Son* (Col. i. 16 ; 1 Cor. viii. 6 ; John i. 2). Theodoret rightly remarks : αὐτὸς τὰ γεγονότα διατελεῖ κυβερνῶν. — εἰς αὐτόν] All things *serve* Him (comp. Heb. ii. 10) as their ultimate *end*. This is explained by Oecumenius, Theophylact, and Fritzsche of the *upholding* (συνέχονται ἐπεστραμμένα πρὸς αὐτόν). On the whole, comp. what Marcus Antoninus, iv. 26 says of φύσις : ἐκ σοῦ πάντα, ἐν σοὶ πάντα, εἰς σὲ πάντα, and Gataker *in loc.* — ἡ δόξα] *sc. eīγ* ; as at xvi. 27 : the *befitting* glory. Gal. i. 5 ; Eph. iii. 21.

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

CXIV. Ver. 1. λέγω οὖν, μὴ ἀπόσαστο κ.τ.λ.

Having presented in ch. ix. the fact that the promise and covenant of God were consistent with a lapse and rejection of the Jews and, also, with making all dependent on faith, and in ch. ix. 30-x. 21 the cause of the lapse and its inexcusableness, the Apostle now raises the question whether the rejection thus occasioned involved in itself an entire casting off of the chosen people. Did the nation stumble to the end that it should utterly fall? This thought he repudiates as abhorrent to his holy feeling, and especially to his Jewish national sentiment. How can God reject forever His people whom He foreknew? Can the προέγνω fail to be realized in the δοξάζειν, in any and every part of God's spiritual plan, from the beginning with Abraham to the final consummation? (Compare viii. 29.) This cannot be. The losses and failures must be partial and temporary, but the end will show the depth of the riches both of wisdom and knowledge.

Τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ refers to the nation, not to individuals, and thus accords with the preceding chapters, as well as with all that follows, as showing that the national reference is the primary, if not the exclusive one throughout the entire section. Ὅν προέγνω is not a limitation of λαόν, which would, as Meyer says, make the Apostle disarrange completely the point in question. The careful observation of the progress of thought makes it evident that what the Apostle means to declare is, that though, as in the time of Elijah, there has been a great falling away and the remnant only holds fast, yet God does not forget His promise. His gifts and calling are without repentance. The nation is beloved for the fathers' sake.

CXV. Ver. 2. ἡ οὐκ οἶδατε κ.τ.λ.

The particle ἡ here, as in other similar instances (cf. vi. 3, vii. 1), introduces a confirmatory proof of what precedes by presenting the only alternative in the case ; and οὐκ οἶδατε indicates that this cannot be thought of as true. The facts of the Israelitish history in the time of Elijah were too familiar to the readers to whom the writer especially refers for him to suppose, for a moment, that

they were not in their minds. But, if they were thus in mind, they must make the great fact evident that God keeps His hold upon the nation as His own, however many of its individual members may turn away from His service and Himself. The selected few receive the blessing, and pass it on to a better age. It is not, however, the salvation of the individuals making up this chosen few which constitutes the chief thought of the passage; but, as Godet has well expressed it, "the indestructible existence of a believing remnant at all periods of their history, even in the most disastrous crises of unbelief." This securing such a remnant involves the fact of an election of grace. As Weiss ed. Mey. remarks, we have in κατ' ἐκλογὴν χάριτος γέγονεν an added thought, not essential to the proof of ver. 2. It recalls what was said in ix. 11, and suggests with regard to the λείμμα what was true in the case of Jacob and Esau. The selection has been manifest through all the history. It has made the progress of the Divine plan of redemption an unbroken one in its course. But it has never in a single instance been due to works in any degree more than it was in the beginning. It is God's favour that has made it, and so, as He has never forgotten His people, He never will utterly reject them.

CXVI. Ver. 11. λέγω οὖν, μὴ ἔπταισαν ἵνα πέσωσιν;

The subject of ἔπταισαν may be the λοιποί (ver. 8), or it may be the nation which, as a whole, stumbled in their being hardened. The general subject throughout the chapter and the αὐτῶν in the phrase πλήρωμα αὐτῶν point toward the latter view. The same view is favored by vv. 25-28. On the other hand, the fact that οἱ λοιποί is the nearest subject to which the word can refer in the context, and that the verb itself is plural, while ἐπέτυχεν is singular in ver. 7, where the nation is mentioned by its collective name, suggest the other explanation. Though the particular idea of the sentence will be modified, in some degree, according as this point is determined, the main, thought of the passage will be substantially the same—namely, that this stumbling was not to the end of a final and remediless fall of the Jews, but to the end of securing salvation for the Gentiles, and of bringing, through what should be accomplished for them, a reacting influence upon the chosen nation itself, which should lead it also to salvation. Probably the nation is to be regarded as the subject of the verb.

The view of some writers, following Augustine, that the meaning is, Did they stumble *merely* that they should fall? Was there not some further design? must be rejected, with Meyer, because there is no "merely" in the text, and also because it loses sight of the *emphatic* contrast between πέσωσιν, as denoting absolute final fall, and ἔπταισαν, referring to a temporary lapse.

CXVII. Ver. 12. τὸ ἥττημα αὐτῶν — τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν.

That αὐτῶν in these phrases refers to the Jews as a nation, and not to the individuals among them, or the portion of the people who were hardened, seems to be proved by the words connected with it. The ἥττημα, as contrasted with the πλήρωμα, is the loss or diminishing which is occasioned by, and involved in, the ἔπταισαν, and the παράπτωμα. [This is the fundamental idea, even if we give to ἥττημα, with Meyer, the sense of *clades*—as, not improbably, we should.] The nation suffered a disaster or loss in this unbelief and rejection of the

λοιποί, and its numbers are made full (πλήρωμα) when all believe (ver. 26). The same thing is indicated by ver. 15, and also by vv. 16 ff. This reference of αὐτῶν (cf. also παραζηλώσαι αὐτούς, ver. 11, τὴν σάρκα μου, ver. 14, πύρωσις ἀπὸ μέρους τῷ Ἰσραὴλ γέγονεν, ver. 25) favors strongly the view that the subject of ἐπαισαν, also, is the nation, and that the Apostle conceives of the nation as stumbling in the action of the unbelieving part of it. πλήρωμα here, and probably in all cases in the N. T., means *that by which something is made full*.

The plan of God is stated in ver. 11 in relation to the first stages of its development and influence; in ver. 26 in respect to its consummation; in vv. 31, 32 in its grand sweep and its purpose of mercy for all. It is declared to be the Divine plan in vv. 11, 12, and the declaration is confirmed in vv. 13 ff. by setting forth the fact that, as the divinely commissioned apostle to the Gentiles, Paul was himself laboring in the line of this plan and for the accomplishment of it.

CXVIII. Ver. 13. ὑμῖν δὲ λέγω τοῖς ἔθνεσιν.

That δέ is the correct reading here (rather than T. R. γάρ) is rendered probable, not only by the external evidence (see Meyer's textual note at the beginning of the chapter), but also by the progress of the thought of the passage. γάρ was, not improbably, introduced because the sentence was supposed to state a reason for the prominence given to the Gentiles in the preceding verse. But the writer is making a transition (see Note CXVII.) from the statement of the Divine plan, to the statement of his own course of working in the line of that plan, and δέ is thus the particle which is appropriate to the clause. The verse being introduced in this way, its general bearing on the previous verses will be the same, whether we read μὲν οὖν after ἐφ' ὅσον, or μὲν only. If, however, we read μὲν, λέγω is probably to be translated *say*: And I say to you who are Gentiles, that inasmuch, etc., while if the reading μὲν οὖν is adopted, λέγω may mean *speak*: But I speak to you who are Gentiles. Inasmuch, then, etc., I glorify, etc. The emphasis is evidently on ὑμῖν, and, in case we read with οὖν, the attention of the readers is called to the fact that what is said (though referring to the Jews) is addressed to them as Gentiles; and they are then, in an independent sentence, reminded that in all his labors for the Gentile nations he has the good of his own also in view. I glorify my office as an apostle of the Gentiles, he says, by so directing my efforts that, if by any means possible, I may provoke the Jews to emulation.

CXIX. Ver. 15. ζῶν ἐκ νεκρῶν.

In the attempt to determine what the Apostle has in mind in the use of these words, the following points may be noticed: (1) The form of expression in the verse indicates that ζῶν ἐκ νεκρῶν is something beyond καταλλαγή. (2) The same thing is indicated by ver. 12. (3) The chapter evidently carries forward the development of the plan of salvation until all nations, Gentiles and Jews alike, are saved. (4) The last thing in the progress of the plan is the bringing in of all the Jews. (5) The representation of the N. T. seems to be that, when the plan is accomplished, the end will come. (6) The view of the Apostle in the eighth chapter, vv. 11, 23, and in 1 Cor. xv. 23 ff., is that, at the end, the resurrection takes place, and that this is introductory to the consummation of blessedness for those who are saved. These indications of Paul's thought

in these verses of the present chapter, and in the other passages alluded to, point very strongly, as it must be admitted, towards the view advocated by Meyer (that ζωῇ refers to the ζωὴ αἰώνιος in the αἰὼν μέλλων, beginning, in its most blessed development, with the resurrection of the dead) as the right one. At the same time, the fact that ver. 12 does not necessarily, in the πολλῶ μάλλον clause, suggest anything more than a larger measure of what is referred to in the πλοῦτος of the previous clause, and that the writer is evidently highly rhetorical in the whole passage, makes it doubtful whether the considerations above mentioned can be insisted upon with as much confidence as they might be under other circumstances.

CXX. Ver. 16. εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀπαρχὴ ἀγία, κ.τ.λ.

This verse is regarded by some writers as belonging with those which precede it. Tisch. makes it close the paragraph which begins with ver. 11. Westcott and Hort make a half-paragraph begin with ver. 17. Meyer regards the δέ as continuative, and gives the verse a special relation to πρόσληψις which precedes. The thought of the paragraph opening with ver. 11 seems, however, to be brought to its natural conclusion in ver. 15, while that of this verse has a closer connection with what follows, cf. vv. 24, 28, 29. In preparation for what he is to say to the Gentiles (that they should not boast, etc.), and for his declaration that all Israel shall be saved, as well as for the purpose of arresting attention, he places the words of this verse, with emphasis, at the beginning of the new paragraph. The paragraphs of the chapter are as follows: Vv. 1-10, God has not cast off His people—a remnant is reserved and is kept in the enjoyment of the blessing, when the main part of the nation proves unfaithful. —Vv. 11-15. The stumbling of the nation through this unfaithfulness is not, in the Divine plan, to the end of a complete and final fall, but in order that salvation may go out to the Gentiles, and may react in its power from them upon the Jews. —Vv. 16-24. The Gentiles should not glory over the Jews because of this temporary stumbling, whereby the Jews have become secondary in a sense to them (rejected, even, for their benefit), for, as the branches are holy when the root is holy, God can restore the Jews. —Vv. 25-32. This restoration will take place when the appointed time shall come; and thus the entire plan will be manifest, as arranged with a merciful end in view for all, Jews and Gentiles alike. —Vv. 33-36. An exclamation of praise and wonder in the thought of this marvellous plan.

CXXI. Ver. 17. ἐνεκεν τρίσθης ἐν αὐτοῖς.

Meyer admits that ἐν may, grammatically, be understood as equivalent to *in loco* (*eorum*). Weiss ed. Mey., on the other hand, claims that this is very doubtful. That it is impossible to give the preposition this sense can scarcely be affirmed, but it must be admitted that it is much more in accordance with general usage in such cases to assign to it the meaning *among*. The context, when rightly interpreted, favors the same view. Accordingly, αὐτοῖς does not refer to *τινες*, i.e. the broken-off branches in whose place the Gentiles were grafted, but to the κλάδοι in general. The conception of the writer is of the Jewish nation as a tree, from whose life some branches have been cut off, but which remains a living tree because the root (and therefore all the branches,

whether few or many, which have a vital connection with the root) has true life. Into this living tree, and among its remaining natural and living branches, the wild branch is grafted, and thus draws life from the root. That the wild branch is inserted in the place of the cut-off branches is an incidental thought, rather than the main one of the passage. The main thought (comp. also the previous verses) is that, in connection with the cutting off, the insertion of the branches from the wild olive is accomplished; that the union of the wild olive with the life of the good tree is made, thus, both possible and actual. The Gentiles, however, should not glory over the Jews (the natural branches of the tree), because for their ingrafting the tree had lost some part of its outgrowth, since all the source of their life, which comes through the ingrafting, is derived from the tree's root. The life-force and the blessing are received by the Gentile through the Jew, and not by the Jew through the Gentile. The spiritual plan moves from the Abrahamic covenant downward, and from the Israelitish nation outward.

CXXII. Ver. 19. ἐξεκλάσθησαν κλάδοι ἵνα κ.τ.λ.

The external evidence here is decisive in favour of κλάδοι as the true reading, rather than οἱ κλάδοι. The indication of this fact is that the writer does not refer in this word to τῶν κλάδων of ver. 18, but that, on the contrary, in that verse he is speaking of the branches in general, while here those that were broken off are specially alluded to. Two reasons are presented in the two verses, and in those which immediately follow, for the bidding which is given to the Gentiles, *not to boast against the Jews*:—*first*, because the Gentiles owed everything to their incorporation into the spiritual body of which the Jewish fathers were the beginning (ver. 18; see also note CXXI.); and *secondly*, because for both parties alike the continuance in the spiritual body and the final reception of the blessing were dependent wholly on faith (ver. 19 ff.). The second reason is, however, set forth in a more indirect manner than the first. The Apostle supposes that, on the presentation of the first reason, the Gentile replies, "Even if I am thus dependent on the Jewish root, certain branches (κλάδοι) were broken off that I might be grafted in, and I may glory on this account." To this the answer is immediately given, They were, indeed, thus broken off, but it was only because of their unbelief, and all alike must stand upon faith. If the Gentile fails in this, he will be cut off as the Jew was. If the Jew returns to this, he will be again received as the Gentile has been received. It will be even a thing of less difficulty to restore the natural branches to their own tree, than it has been to ingraft into the tree the branches which were wholly foreign to it, and which belonged to an olive wild by nature.

The paragraph commencing with ver. 16 and continuing as far as ver. 24, accordingly, by its peculiar figure of the olive tree, into which the wild branch is grafted; by the special words employed in the unfolding of the figure, (e.g. the root, the fatness passing from the root to the branches, the cutting off and grafting into the tree which keeps throughout its entire vital force, the restoration of the severed branches); and, particularly, by the use of οἱ κλάδοι, vv. 16, 18, as contrasted with κλάδοι, ver. 19, *τινες τῶν κλάδων*, ver. 17, confirms the view, which the other parts of the chapter, each of them in and for itself, establish, that the writer is speaking of the Israelitish nation and its place in the spiritual plan.

CXXIII. Ver. 24. *πόσω μάλλον—ἐνκεντρισθήσονται.*

Meyer objects to the explanation of *πόσω μάλλον* which makes it designate greater easiness of a restoration of the natural branches than of an ingrafting of the wild shoots, (1) on the ground that experience testifies to the extreme difficulty of converting unbelieving Jews, and (2) because the power of God is correlative not of that which is easy, but of that which is difficult. But, as Weiss ed. Mey. urges in reply, the Apostle's words do not refer to the conversion of unbelieving Jews, but the reingrafting of those who have become believing, and the argument is presented from the standpoint of human judgment—if the one thing is less difficult than the other, we may readily believe that it will be done. Paul is merely setting before the man who boasts against the Jew, on the ground that the latter has been cast off, a consideration which might appeal forcibly to his mind,—the greater easiness, etc. Meyer's view of the verse involves giving to *γάρ* the explicative sense *namely*, which is improbable (according to N. T. usage) where the ordinary meaning *for* will satisfy the conditions of the sentence; and, in addition to this, it makes ver. 24 a mere unfolding of the certainty of *ἐνκεντρισθήσονται* of the 23d verse, which certainty is again declared as the revelation of a *μυστήριον* in ver. 25. By this threefold repetition of the idea of certainty, with little or no advance in the thought respecting it, the force and emphasis of the final presentation of it in ver. 25 is diminished. The ordinary view (which is also favoured by Weiss) is therefore to be adopted with reference both to *πόσω μάλλον*, and to the relation of ver. 24 as a reason justifying *δύνατος κ.τ.λ.*

CXXIV. Ver. 25, 26. *πάρωσις ἀπὸ μέρους—σωθήσεται.*

The Apostle here states—as a proof (*γάρ*) of *ἐνκεντρισθήσονται* of ver. 23—the *μυστήριον* which had been given to him to make known. This *μυστήριον* involves the entire plan of God with reference to Jews and Gentiles, which has been spoken of throughout the chapter, with its final and glorious consummation. Hardening has partially befallen Israel until the fulness of the Gentiles shall have entered in, and then all Israel is to be saved. *The fulness of the Gentiles* and *all Israel* are expressions which show, at the end of the entire doctrinal discussion, what has been manifested at its *beginning* and in its *progress*—that the universalism of the Apostle is that which includes all nations; that *πάντες* means Gentiles as well as Jews, as contrasted with one of the two parties only.

πλήρωμα—meaning that by which the *ἐθνη* are made full—must, it would seem, have reference to the idea of *number*, and this numerical idea is not limited by any word except *ἐθνῶν*. *Πᾶς*, in like manner, is limited only by *Ἰσραήλ*. In the phrases themselves, accordingly, we have universality with respect both to the Jews and to the Gentiles. Does the Apostle declare, then, in these verses, that every individual Gentile and Jew will, at the time indicated, be included in the church of God? This view, which Meyer holds, is certainly favored by the phraseology which is employed in the statement of the *μυστήριον*. A degree of doubt, however, is occasioned by the fact that, in the previous part of the chapter, the writer has reference to nations as a whole, and not to individuals. Still, it must be borne in mind that the expressions have a universal character which goes beyond any other words of the chapter,

and hence the burden of proof falls upon one who would deny to them absolute universality of meaning. The reference is to the last times, evidently, and no affirmation is made as to the salvation of all men of all ages. This subject does not even come before the writer's mind in this passage. He is speaking of a different matter, which had a vital and important bearing on his argument for his doctrine of justification, and which concentrated all his present interest on itself. The doctrine of universal salvation, as now understood, like the doctrine of the election or reprobation of individuals, is not directly alluded to in this section of the Epistle (chaps. ix.-xi.). If discovered at all, they are discovered by inference from what is said on another universalism and another election and rejection. It need scarcely be said, that there is nothing in these chapters which disproves the doctrine of individual election, or which proves the actual restoration or salvation of all. But the teaching of Paul with reference to both of these subjects is to be sought for in other parts of his writings where he expresses himself more directly respecting them, and in his whole theological system as discovered by an examination of all his epistles.

CXXV. Ver. 28. κατὰ μὲν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον κ.τ.λ.

The subject of *εἶσιν*, to be supplied in this verse, is regarded by Meyer and many others as the unbelieving Israelites, the lapsed portion of the people. More probably, as in ver. 11, it is the entire people who stumble and have a hardening ἀπὸ μέρους in the lapse of the great majority. The nation, in its relation to the gospel, is in the ἐχθρὸς condition, so far as the rejection referred to in the previous verses and paragraphs is concerned; but, in relation to the election of the nation made by God and recognized in His covenant, it is beloved. If ἐκλογὴ is to be explained, with Meyer and Ewald, as meaning the elect remnant (cf. ver. 7)—which view Weiss ed. Mey. rejects—the explanation of the entire verse will be, that the nation is ἐχθρὸς so far as related to the λοιποὶ (ver. 8), but ἀγαπητός as related to the λείμμα (ver. 5.). ἐχθροί is, doubtless, to be explained as having a passive sense, and is connected, in its idea, with the various words suggesting the thought of casting off, etc. Ver. 29 adds a confirmation of the last clause of ver. 28, which is founded upon the unchangeable purpose of God. He will not be unfaithful to His covenant and promises. The seeming rejection of His chosen people will be only for a time, and for a merciful end, vv. 30-32.

CXXVI. Ver. 33-36.

This exclamation of praise to God evidently has reference to and arises out of the thoughts of this chapter *primarily*. As this chapter, however, is only the closing part of the section ix.-xi., it reviews, as it were, all that has been said from ix. 1. onward. It must be explained, accordingly, as praise to God for His wonderful plan of mercy for all, even in the shutting up of all under sin (vv. 30-32). In this darkest part of His administration of the world His love and goodness manifest themselves. The words of the passage are chosen as referring to the plan. Σοφία is, thus, the wisdom which forms the plan, κρίματα are the judgments or decisions which the wisdom makes in its formation, ἀνεξεραύνητα describes the κρίματα, and consequently the wisdom, as un-

searchable to human powers. *γνώσις*, on the other hand, is the knowledge which knows the ways (*ὁδοί*) of carrying out the plan decided upon, which, in their turn, are beyond the ability of man to trace from the beginning to the end. Ver. 34 is probably a passage quoted from the O. T. as expressing the two thoughts corresponding with *σοφία* and *γνώσις*, and confirming *ἀνεξεραύνητα* and *ἀνεξιχνίαστοι* (34*a* answering to *σοφ.* and *ἀνεξερ.*, and 34*b* to *γν.* and *ἀνεξιχν.*). *Πλούτου* is, thus, to be taken as connected with both *σοφίας* and *γνώσεως*: O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge. Ver. 35, containing the third part of the O. T. quotation, carries back the thought, at the end, to the *πλούτου*. Who has been able to give to Him, the possessor of this wealth of wisdom and knowledge, so as to claim in return a recompense for his gift? This seems to be the simplest and most natural explanation of the verses and words. It must be admitted, however, that Meyer's view (held also by many others), which makes *πλούτου* an independent word parallel with *σοφ.* and *γν.*, may be correct.

CHAPTER XII.

Ver. 2. Instead of the imperatives, which Tisch. also defends, Lachm. has, what Griesb. already approved : *συσχηματίζεσθαι* and *μεταμορφοῦσθαι*, according to A B** D F G, min. Theoph. The preponderating evidence of the codd. is in favour of the *infinitives*, while that of the vss. (Vulg. It. Syr. etc.) and Fathers is in favour of the *imperatives*. But, since the frequent practical use of the precept in the direct *paraenetic* form of expression at any rate suggested—especially considering the closely similar pronunciation of the infinitives and imperatives—the writing of the latter rather than the former, the infinitive reading is to be preferred, which *Σ* also supports by reading *μεταμορφοῦσθαι*, although it has *συσχηματίζεσθε*. — *ὑμῶν*] is wanting in A B D* F G, 47, 67*, Copt. Clem. Cypr. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. The preponderance of evidence, as well as the circumstance that *ὑμῶν* very readily suggested itself to mechanical copyists for repetition from ver. 1, justifies the omission. — Ver. 5. Lachm. and Tisch. 8 : *τό*, according to A B D* F G P *Σ*, 47*, Antioch. Damasc. Rightly ; *τὸ δὲ καθ' εἰς*, not being understood, was exchanged with *ὁ δὲ καθ' εἰς*, as the antithesis of *οἱ πολλοί*. — Ver. 11. *τῷ καιρῷ*] So Griesb., after Erasm. 2, Steph. 3, Mill, and others. But Erasm. 1, Beza, Elz., Matth., Lachm., Scholz, Tisch., and Rinck have *τῷ κυρίῳ*. The former is found in D* F G, 5, and Latin Fathers ; the latter in A B D** E L P *Σ*, and most min. vss. and Greek Fathers. See the accurate examination of the evidence in Reiche, *Comm. crit.* p. 70 ff., who decides for *κυρίῳ*, and in Tisch. 8. *Κυρίῳ* is certainly the oldest and most diffused reading. Nevertheless, if it were original, we cannot well see why *καιρῷ* should have been substituted for it ; for *δουλ. τῷ κυρίῳ* is a very usual Pauline thought (Acts xx. 19 ; Eph. vi. 7 ; Rom. xiv. 18, xvi. 18 ; Col. iii. 24, *et al.*), and would suit our passage very well. It would be far easier to take exception to *καιρῷ* than to *κυρίῳ* (as in xiii. 11, instead of *καιρόν*, the reading *κύριον* is already found in Clement), especially as the principle itself, *τῷ καιρῷ δουλεύειν*, might readily seem somewhat offensive to a prejudiced moral feeling. Hardly can *κυρίῳ*, considering its great diffusion, be a mere copyist's error (in opposition to Fritzsche). — Ver. 13. *χρείας*] D* F G, Clar. Boern. codd. Lat., in Rufinus and some Latin Fathers : *μείας* (defended by Mill). Its origin is due to the reverence for martyrs : "lectio liturgica pro tempore ficta," Matth. — Ver. 17. *ἐνώπιον*] A** has *ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἐνώπιον*. F G, Arm. Goth. Vulg. and several Fathers : *οὐ μόνον ἐνώπιον τ. Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνώπιον*. Ascetic amplification, after Prov. iii. 4 ; 2 Cor. viii. 21. — Instead of *πάντων* Lachm. has *τῶν*, according to A** D* F G, min. It. Harl. Guelph. Tol. Tert. Lucif. Probably, however, this was connected with that amplification. — Ver. 20. *ἐὰν οὖν*] A B P *Σ*, min. Copt. Arm. Vulg. Clar. Bas. Dam. : *ἀλλὰ ἐὰν* (so Lachm. and Tisch. 8). D* F G, min. Goth. : *ἐάν*, which is to be preferred, with Griesb. ; the other readings aim at furnishing a connection.

THE SECOND, OR PRACTICAL PART OF THE EPISTLE.¹

Ver. 1 f. *General exhortation to sanctification*. [See Note CXXVII. p. 482.] — *ὁν*] drawing an inference, not from the whole dogmatic part of the epistle, beginning with i. 16 (Calvin, Bengel, and many others, including Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Philippi, Hofmann),—as also in Eph. iv. 1 and 1 Thess. iv. 1, the *ὁν* which introduces the practical portion is not to be taken so vaguely,—but from xi. 35, 36, where the riches of God were described as, and shown to be, imparted apart from merit. This connection is, on account of *διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμ. τ. Θεοῦ*, more readily suggested and simpler than that with ver. 32 (Rückert, Fritzsche, and several others). — *διὰ τῶν οἰκτ. τ. Θεοῦ*] *by means of the compassion of God*, reminding you of it. Just so *διὰ* in xv. 30, 1 Cor. i. 10, 2 Cor. x. 1. The exhortation, pointing to the compassion of God, contains the *motive of thankfulness* for compliance with it. “*Qui misericordia Dei recte movetur, in omnem Dei voluntatem ingreditur*,” Bengel. — On *οἰκτιρμοί*, see Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 68 ff. On the *singular*, comp. Pind. *Pyth.* i. 85 ; Eccles. v. 6 ; Bar. ii. 27 ; 1 Macc. iii. 44. The *plural* conforms, indeed, to רַחֲמִים, but is conceived according to the Greek plural usage of abstract nouns (see Kühner, II. 1, p. 15 f. ; Maetzner, *ad Lycurg.* p. 144 f.) : the *compassions*, *i.e.* the stirrings and manifestations of compassion. — *παραστήσαι*] *selected* as the set expression for the *presenting of sacrificial animals at the altar* ; Xen. *Anab.* vi. 1. 22 ; Lucian, *de sacrific.* 13 ; and see Wetstein and Loesner, p. 262. Paul is glancing at the *thank-offering* (*διὰ τ. οἰκτιρμ. τ. Θ.*), and raises the notion of sacrifice to the highest moral idea of self-surrender to God ; comp. Umbreit, p. 343 ff. — *τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν*] not, on account of the figure of sacrifice, instead of *ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς* (so usually ; still also Philippi), as if *σῶμα* might denote the entire person, consisting of body and soul (but comp. on vi. 12). On the contrary, the apostle means quite strictly : *your bodies*, reserving the sanctification of the *νοῦς* for ver. 2, so that the two verses *together* contain the sanctification of the *whole* man distributed into its parts,—that of the outer man (set forth as the offering of a sacrifice), and that of the inner (as a renewing transformation). Fritzsche also takes the correct view ;² comp. Hofmann. Other peculiar references of *τ. σώμ. ὑμ.* (Köllner : “the *sensuous nature* of man, which draws him to sin ;” Olshausen : “in order to extend the idea of Christian sanctification down even to the *lowest potency* of human nature”) are not

¹ See Pet. Abr. Borger, *Dissertatio de parte epistolæ ad Rom. paraenetica*, Lugd. Bat. 1840.—The subdivision of what follows into ἠθικά (chap. xli.), πολιτικά (chap. xlii.), and ἱερατικά (chap. xiv. f.) is, considering the miscellaneous character of the contents, an untenable *formal scheme* (in opposition to Melancthon, Beza, and others). Paul proceeds from the general to the particular, and *vice versâ*.

² The ordinary objection brought against this view in its literal fidelity, that the body

could not be sacrificed to God without the soul, is just in itself, but does not exclude the supposition that Paul might *formally* separate the bodily self-sacrifice and the spiritual renewal. He passes from the organism of the bodily life, in which the inner is made manifest, over to the latter ; comp. 1 Cor. vii. 34. In passages also of the Greek writers, in which *σῶμα* is apparently used for the personal pronoun (as Eur. Alc. 647 ; see Brunck *in loc.*), *σῶμα* is simply *body*. Comp. also Soph. *O. C.* 355, *et al.*

indicated by the text. The following τ. λογικ. λατρ. is not opposed to our view ; for, in truth, bodily self-sacrifice is also an *ethical* act, 1 Cor. vi. 20. Comp. on the subject-matter, vi. 13, 19. — *θυσίαν ζῶσαν* as a *sacrifice which lives*. For the moral self-offering of the body is the antitypical πλήρωσις of the ritual sacrificial-service, in which the sacrifice *dies* ; whereas that ethical sacrifice is no doubt also connected with dying, as to sin namely, in the sense of vi. 2, vii. 4 ff., Col. ii. 20, iii. 5, Gal. ii. 19, but it is precisely out of this *death* that the *being alive* here meant proceeds, which has vanquished death (Gal. ii. 20, *et al.*). Such a sacrifice is also, in the eminent sense of antitypical fulfilment, *ἀγία* (as pure and belonging to God in an ethical relation) and εὐάρεστος τῷ Θεῷ (comp. Eph. v. 2). That τ. Θεῷ is not, with Estius, Bengel, and Koppe, to be connected with παραστ., is shown by its very position, as well as by the superfluous character of a τ. Θεῷ with παραστ.—Passages from Porphyry, Hierocles, Philo, Josephus, and the Rabbins, in which likewise moral devotion to God is set forth as self-sacrifice, see in Wetstein and Koppe. On the *asyndeton*, as strengthening the force of the predicative notion, in ἀγ., εὐάρ. τ. Θ., comp. Nägelsbach, z. *Ilias*, p. 50, ed. 3. — τὴν λογ. λατρ. ἑμ.] accusative of *epexegetis*,—an appositional definition, and that, indeed, not to the mere *θυσίαν* (to the notion of which the wider notion of *λατρείαν* does not correspond), but to the whole παραστῆσαι κ.τ.λ., containing, respecting this whole act of presenting offering, the *judgment, what it ought to be* ; see Winer, p. 496 [E. T. 533] ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 243 f. Luther aptly remarks : “ the *which* is your reasonable service.”¹ *λατρεία*] *service of worship*, as in John xvi. 2. See on that passage. Comp. ix. 4. λογικός, *rational* (1 Pet. ii. 2 ; Plato, *Loer.* p. 99 E, 102 E ; Polyb. xxv. 9. 2), is not in contrast to ζῶα ἄλογα (Theodoret, Grotius, Koppe, and many others), which at most would only be to be assumed if *λατρεία* were equivalent to *θυσία*, but generally to the ceremonial character of the Jewish and heathen worship,—designating the *λατρεία* here meant as a *spiritual service, fulfilling itself in moral rational activity*,—of which nature the *opus operatum* of the Jewish and heathen cultus was not. The Test. XII. Patr. p. 547 calls the sacrifice of the angels λογικὴν κ. ἀναίμακτον προσφοράν. On the idea, comp. John iv. 24 ; Rom. i. 9 ; Phil. iii. 3 ; 1 Pet. ii. 5 ; Athenag. *Leg.* 13. Melancthon : “ *Cultus mentis*, in quo mens fide aut coram in-tuetur Deum, et vere sentit timorem et laetitiam in Deo.” The opposite is the character of *mechanical* action, the ἄλογος τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία (Plat. *Gorg.* p. 501 A).

Ver. 2. *Infinitives* (see the critical notes) : συσχηματίζεσθαι, *to become like-shaped*, and μεταμορφοῦσθαι, *to become transformed*. The two verbs stand in contrast only through the *prepositions*, without any difference of sense in the stem-words. [See Note CXXVIII. p. 483.] Comp. the interchange of μορφή and σχῆμα in Phil. ii. 7, also the Greek usage of συχηματίζειν and μορφοῦν, which denote any kind of conformation according to the context (Plut. *Mor.* p. 719 B : τὸ μεμορφωμένον καὶ ἐσχηματισμένον, Eur. *Iph.* T. 292 : μορφῆς σχή-

¹ Comp. Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 519 ; Nägelsbach, z. *II.* iii. 51 ; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 134 [E. T. 153].

ματα). Here of *moral* conformation, without requiring us to distinguish *μορφή* and *σχῆμα* as *inner* and *outer* (Bengel, Philippi), or as *appearance to others* and *one's own state in itself* (Hofmann).¹ On the interchange of the infinitive of the *aorist* (παρᾶσθαι) and *present*, comp. on vi. 12. — τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ] to the present age, running on the *Parousia*, פְּרִיזָה (see on Matt. xii. 32), the character (ethical mould) of which is that of immortality (Eph. ii. 2 ; Gal. i. 4 ; 2 Cor. iv. 4, *et al.*). συσχηματίζεσθαι is also found in rhetoricians with the dative (as also 1 Pet. i. 14), instead of with πρὸς or εἰς. — τῇ ἀνακαίν. τ. νοός] whereby the μεταμορφ. is to be effected : *through the renewal of the thinking power* (νοός here, according to its practical side, the reason in its moral quality and activity ; see on vii. 23 ; Eph. iv. 23). It *needs* this renewal in order to become the sphere of operation for the divine truth of salvation, when it, under the ascendancy of ἀμαρτία in the σάρξ, has become darkened, weak, unfree, and transformed into the ἀδόκιμος νοός (i. 28), the νοός τῆς σαρκός (Col. ii. 18). Comp. on vii. 23. And this renewal, which the regenerate man also needs on account of the conflict of flesh and spirit which exists in him (viii. 4 ff. ; Gal. v. 16 ff.) through daily penitence (Col. iii. 10 ; 2 Cor. vii. 10 ; 1 Thess. v. 22, 23), is *effected* by means of the life-element of *faith* (Phil. iii. 9 ff.), transforming the inner man (Eph. iii. 16, 17 ; 2 Cor. v. 17), under the influence of the *Holy Spirit*, Eph. iv. 23, 24 ; Tit. iii. 5. This influence restores the harmony in which the νοός ought to stand with the divine πνεῦμα ; not, however, annulling the moral freedom of the believer, but, on the contrary, presupposing it ; hence the *exhortation* : to be transformed (*passive*). As to the ἀνά in ἀνακαίν., see on Col. iii. 10. — εἰς τὸ δοκιμ.] belongs not merely to ἀνακαίνωσις τ. νοός ἡμ. as its *direction* (Hofmann), but (comp. Phil. i. 10 and on Rom. i. 20) specifies the *aim* of the μεταμορφ. τ. ἀνακ. τ. ν. ἡμῶν. To the man who is not transformed by the renewal of his intellect this *proving*—which is no merely theoretical business of reflection, but is the critical *practice* of the whole inner life—forms no part of the activity of conscience. Comp. Eph. v. 10. The sense : to be able to prove (Rückert, Köllner), is as arbitrarily introduced as in ii. 18. He who is transformed by that renewal not merely *can do*, but—which Paul has here in view as the *immediate object* of the μεταμορφοῦσθαι κ.τ.λ.—*actually does* the δοκιμάζειν, and has thereby the foundation for a further moral development ; he does it by means of the judgment of his conscience, stirred and illuminated by the Spirit (2 Cor. i. 12). On τὸ θέλημα Θεοῦ, *what is willed by God*, comp. Matt. vi. 10 ; Eph. v. 17, vi. 6 ; Col. i. 9 ; 1 Thess. iv. 3. — τὸ ἀγαθὸν κ. εἰάρ. κ. τέλ.] is, by the Peshito, the Vulgate, Chrysostom, and most of the older interpreters, also by Rückert and Reiche, united adjectively with τὸ θέλ. But as εἰάρ. would thus be unsuitable to this, we must rather (with Erasmus, Castalio, and others, including Tholuck, Flatt, Köllner, de Wette, Fritzsche, Reithmayr, Philippi, van Hengel, Hofmann) approve the *substantival* rendering (as apposition to τὸ θέλ. τ. Θεοῦ) : *that which is good and well-pleasing (to God) and perfect*. The repetition of the

¹ According to the latter supposed distinction, Hofmann hits upon the arbitrary definition of the relation of ver. 1 to ver. 2,

that ver. 1 contains how the Christian should stand towards God, and ver. 2 how he should present himself to those who surround him.

article was the less necessary, as the three adjectives used substantively exhaust *one* notion (that of moral good), and that climactically.¹

Ver. 3. The exhortation now passes on to *single duties*, amongst which that of *humility and modesty*, generally (vv. 3-5), and in respect of the individual *χαρίσματα* in particular (vv. 6-8), is the first—the first, too, compliance with which was indispensable to a prosperous life of the church. And Paul must have known how very necessary this same injunction was in the Roman community. [See Note CXXIX. p. 483.]—*γάρ* *for*. The *special* requirement which he is now to make serves in fact by way of *confirmation* to the general exhortation of ver. 2. As to *λέγω* in the sense of *enjoining*, see on ii. 22. — *διὰ τῆς χάρις. τῆς δοθ. μοι*] Paul does not command *δι' ἑαυτοῦ*, but *by means of, i.e. in virtue of the divine grace bestowed on him*. It is thus that he characterizes—and how at once truly and humbly! (1 Cor. xv. 10)—*his apostleship*. Comp. xv. 15; 1 Cor. iii. 10; Eph. iii. 7, 8. *This χάρις* was given to *him* (*μοι*), not in common with Christians generally (*ὑμῖν*. ver. 6). — *παντὶ . . . ὑμῖν* *to every one in your community*; none among you is to be exempt from this exhortation; not: to every one *who thinks himself to be something* among you (Koppe, Baumgarten-Crusius). — *μὴ ὑπερφρον.* κ.τ.λ.] *not loftily-minded* ought the Christian to be, *going beyond the standard-rule of that disposition which is conformable to duty* (*παρ' ὃ δεῖ φρ.*); *but his disposition should be such as to have wise discretion* (1 Pet. iv. 7) *for its aim* (comp. Hom. Il. xxiii. 305: *εἰς ἀγαθὰ φρονέων*, Eur. Phoen. 1135: *εἰς μάχην φρονεῖν*). *Paronomasia*. Comp. Plat. Legg. x. p. 906 B: *σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως*, Eur. Heracl. 388: *τῶν φρονημάτων . . . τῶν ἀγαν ὑπερφρόνων*; and see Wetstein. — *ἐκάστω ὡς* *ἐκάστω* depends on *ἐμέρισε* (comp. 1 Cor. iii. 5, vii. 17, and on Rom. xi. 31), not on *λέγω* (Estius, Köllner)—which view makes the already said *παντὶ . . . ὑμῖν* to be once more repeated, and, on the other hand, deprives *ἐμέρισε* of its essential definition. *Ὡς* designates the *scale according to which* each one ought *φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν*, and this scale is different in persons differently furnished with gifts, so that for one the boundary, beyond which his *φρονεῖν* ceases to be *εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν*, is otherwise drawn than it is for another. The *regulative* standard, however, Paul expressly calls *the measure of faith*, which God has assigned. This is the subjective condition (the objective is the divine *χάρις*) of that which every one can and ought to do in the Christian life of the church. According, namely, as faith in the case of individual Christians is more or less living, practical, energetic, efficacious in this or that direction,—whether contemplative, or manifesting itself in the outer life, in eloquence and action, etc.,—they have withal to measure their appointed position and task in the church. He, therefore, who covets a higher or another standpoint and sphere of activity in the community, and is not contented with that which corresponds to the measure of faith bestowed on him, evinces a wilful self-exaltation, which is without measure and not of God—not that spirit wherein the Christian *μετριοφροσύνη* consists, the *φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν*, *ἐκάστω ὡς* κ.τ.λ. The *πίστις* is therefore to be taken throughout in no other sense than the ordinary

¹ Comp. Winer, p. 121 [E. T. 127 f.]; Dissen, *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 373 f.; Kühner, II. 1, p. 528.

one : *faith in Christ*, of which the essence indeed is alike in all, but the individually different *degrees of strength* (comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 2), and *peculiarities of character* in other respects (vv. 4 ff.), constitute for individuals the μέτρον πίστεως in quantitative and qualitative relation. Comp. Eph. iv. 7. This likewise holds in opposition to Hofmann, who with violence separates μέτρ. πίστεως from ἐμέρισε, and takes it as an accusative of apposition, like τὴν λογικ. λατρείαν ἡμῶν, ver. 1 ; holding πίστεως to be the genitive of quality, which distinguishes the measure within which the thinking of the Christian is confined, from that which the natural man sets up for himself. Comp., in opposition to this strange separation, 2 Cor. x. 13, and in opposition to this artificial explanation of the genitive, 2 Cor. x. 13 ; Eph. iv. 7, xiii. 16.¹

Vv. 4, 5 ff. Motive for compliance with the previous exhortation.—For the prevalence of the parallel between a human body and a *corpus sociale* (1 Cor. xii.) also among the ancients, see Grotius and Wetstein. — τὰ δὲ μέλη πάντα κ.τ.λ.] *i.e. but the members, all of them, have different activity* ; thus, *e.g.*, the eyes another than the ears, the feet another than the mouth. Wrongly van Hengel takes the expression, as though οὐ πάντα were the reading, so that *only some*—namely, those we possess in pairs—would be meant, *not all*. — οἱ πολλοί] *the many*, *i.e.* the multiplicity of Christians taken together, in opposition to the unity of the body which they compose. Comp. v. 15. — ἐν Χριστῷ] The common element in which the union consists ; *out of Christ* we should not be ἐν σώμα, but this we are ἐν *Him*, in the fellowship of faith and life with Christ. He *is* the Head (Eph. i. 22, 23, iv. 15 ; Col. i. 18, ii. 19), — a relation which is understood of itself by the consciousness of faith, but is not denoted by ἐν Χριστῷ (as if this meant *on Christ*), as Koppe, Rosenmüller, and older interpreters hold. — τὸ δὲ καθ' εἰς] *but in what concerns the individual relation*. In good Greek it would be τὸ δὲ καθ' ἓνα (see on Mark xiv. 19, and Bernhardt, p. 329 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 414) ; but καθ' εἰς, in which κατά has quite lost its regimen, is a very frequent solecism in the later Greek writers (Mark, *l.c.* ; John viii. 9 ; 3 Macc. v. 34).² Τὸ καθ' εἰς is groundlessly condemned by Fritzsche as “ commentitia formula.” If καθ' εἰς and ὁ καθ' εἰς were in use (and this was the case), it follows that τὸ καθ' εἰς might be just as well said as τὸ καθ' ἓνα (comp. τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν and the like, Matthiae, § 283 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 272). See also Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 26 f. [E. T. 30].

Vv. 6-8. *In the possession, however, of different gifts.* This ἔχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα κ.τ.λ. corresponds to τὰ δὲ μέλη πάντα οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει πρᾶξιν, ver. 4. — As regards the *construction*, the view adopted by Reiche, de Wette, and Lachmann makes ἔχοντες a participial definition of ἔσμεν, ver. 5 ; accordingly, εἴτε προφητείαν and εἴτε διακονίαν depend on ἔχοντες as a specifying apposition to χαρίσματα ; whilst the limiting definitions κατὰ τὴν ἀναλ. τ. πίστ., ἐν τῇ διακ., ἐν τῇ διδασκ., ἐν τῇ παρακλ. κ.τ.λ. are parallel to the κατὰ τὴν χάριν δοθ. ἡμῖν, and with εἴτε ὁ διδάσκων the discourse varies, without however becoming

¹ Plat. *Theaet.* p. 161 E : μέτρον . . . τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας. Soph. *El.* 229 : μέτρον κακότητος. Eur. *Ion.* 354 : ἡβης μέτρον. Pind. *Isthm.* i. 87 : κερδέων μ.

² See Lucian *Soloe.* 9, and Graev. *in loc.* ; Thom. Mag. p. 483 ; Wetstein on Mark, *l.c.* ; Winer, p. 234 [E. T. 249].

ing directly hortatory. Comp. also Rückert. But usually κατὰ τὴν ἀναλ. τ. πιστ., ἐν τῇ διακ. κ.τ.λ., are regarded as *elliptical hortatory sentences*, whilst ἔχοντες is by some likewise attached to the foregoing (Theodoret, Erasmus, Luther, Castalio, Calvin, Estius, and others, including Flatt, Tholuëk, Reithmayr), and with others ἔχοντες begins a new sentence (so Olshausen, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, Philippi, van Hengel, Hofmann, following Beza). The *usual* construction is the only correct one (in which, most suitably to the progressive δέ, a new sentence commences with ἔχοντες), because, under the mode followed by Reiche and de Wette, the alleged limitations ἐν τῇ διακ., ἐν τῇ διδασκ., and ἐν τῇ παρακλ. either express nothing, or must be taken arbitrarily in a variety of meaning different from that of the words with which they stand ; and because ἐν ἀπλότῃ, ἐν σπουδῇ, and ἐν ἱλαρότῃ, ver. 8, are obviously of a hortatory character, and therefore the previous expressions with ἐν may not be taken otherwise. By way of *filling up* the concise maxims thrown out elliptically, and only as it were in outline, it is sufficient after κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογ. τ. πίστ. to supply : προφητεύωμεν, after ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ : ὡμεν, after ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ : ἔστω, the same after ἐν τῇ παρακλήσει ; and lastly, after the three following particulars, ἐν ἀπλότῃ κ.τ.λ., the imperatives of the corresponding verbs (μεταδιδότω κ.τ.λ.). Comp. the similar mode of expression in 1 Pet. iv. 10, 11. — χαρίσματα] denotes the different peculiar aptitudes for the furtherance of Christian life in the church and of its external welfare, imparted by God's grace through the principle of the Holy Spirit working in the Christian communion (hence πνευματικά, 1 Cor. xii. 1). On their great variety, amidst the specific unity of their origin from the efficacy of this Spirit, see esp. 1 Cor. xii. 4 ff.—Paul here mentions *by way of example* (for more, see 1 Cor. xii.), in the first instance, *four* of such χαρίσματα, namely : (1) προφητεία, the gift of theopneustic discourse, which presupposes ἀποκάλυψις, and the form of which, appearing in different ways (hence also in the plural in 1 Cor. xiii. 8 ; 1 Thess. v. 20), was not ecstatic, like the speaking with tongues, but was an activity of the νοῦς enlightened and filled with the consecration of the Spirit's power, disclosing hidden things, and profoundly seizing, chastening, elevating, carrying away men's hearts, held in peculiar esteem by the apostle (1 Cor. xiv. 1). Comp. on 1 Cor. xii. 10. Further, (2) διακονία : the gift of administration of the external affairs of the church, particularly the care of the poor, the sick, and strangers ; comp. 1 Cor. xii. 28, where the functions of the diaconia are termed ἀντιλήψεις. Acts vi. 1 ff. ; Phil. i. 1 ; 1 Tim. iii. 8, 12 ; 1 Pet. iv. 11 ; Rom. xvi. 1. The service of the diaconate in the church, which grew out of that of the seven men of Acts vi., is really of apostolic origin : Clem. Cor. I. 42, 44 ; Ritschl, *altkath. Kirche*, p. 359 ; Jul. Müller, *dogmat. Abh.* p. 560 ff. (3) The διδασκαλία, the gift of instruction in the usual form of teaching directed to the understanding (ἐξ οἰκίας διανοίας, Chrysostom, *ad* 1 Cor. xii. 28), see on Acts xiii. 1 ; Eph. iv. 11 ; 1 Cor. xiv. 26. It was not yet limited to a particular office ; see Ritschl, p. 350 f. (4) παράκλησις, the gift of hortatory and encouraging address operating on the heart and will, the possessor of which probably connected his discourses, in the assemblies after the custom of the synagogue (see on Acts xiii. 15), with a portion of Scripture read before the

people. Comp. Acts iv. 36, xi. 23, 24 ; Justin, *Apol.* I. c. 67. — κατὰ τὴν ἀναλ. τ. πίστ.] *Conformably to the proportion of their faith* the prophets have to use their prophetic gift, *i.e.* (comp. ver. 3) [See Note CXXX. p. 484] : they are not to depart from the proportional measure which their faith has, neither wishing to exceed it nor falling short of it, but are to guide themselves by it, and are therefore so to announce and interpret the received ἀποκάλυψις, as the peculiar position in respect of faith bestowed on them, according to the strength, clearness, fervour, and other qualities of that faith, suggests—so that the character and mode of their speaking is conformed to the rules and limits, which are implied in the proportion of their individual degree of faith. In the contrary case they fall, in respect of contents and of form, into a mode of prophetic utterance, either excessive and overstrained, or on the other hand insufficient and defective (not corresponding to the level of their faith). The same revelation may in fact—according to the difference in the proportion of faith with which it, objectively given, subjectively connects itself—be very differently expressed and delivered. ἀναλογία, *proportio*, very current (also as a mathematical expression) in the classics (comp. esp. on κατὰ τ. ἀναλογ. Plato, *Polit.* p. 257 B, *Loer.* p. 95 B ; Dem. 262. 5), is here in *substance* not different from μέτρον, ver. 3 ; comp. Plato, *Tim.* p. 69 B : ἀνάλογα καὶ ξύμμετρα. Hofmann groundlessly denies this (in consequence of his incorrect view of μέτρον πίστεως, ver. 3), yet likewise arrives at the sense, that prophetic utterance must keep *equal pace* with the life of faith. Paul might, in fact, have written συμμέτρως τῇ πίστει, and would have thereby substantially expressed the same thing as κατὰ τ. ἀναλ. τ. πίστ. or ἀναλόγως τ. π. The old dogmatic interpretation ¹ (still unknown, however, to the Greek Fathers, who rightly take τ. πίστει subjectively, of the fides *qua* creditur) of the *regula fidei* (πίστις in the objective sense, fides *quae* creditur), *i.e.* of the *conformitas doctrinae in scripturis* (see esp. Calovius), departs arbitrarily from the thought contained in ver. 3, and from the immediate context (κατὰ τ. χάρ. τ. δοθ. ἡμῖν), and cannot in itself be justified by linguistic usage (see on i. 5). It reappears, however, substantially in Flatt, Klee, Glöckler, Köllner, Philippi (“to remain subject to the norma et regula fidei Christianae”), Umbreit, Bisping, although they do not, like many of the older commentators, take prophecy to refer to the *explanation of Scripture*. — ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ If it be the case that we have *diaconia* (as χάρισμα), let us be in our *diaconia*. The emphasis lies on ἐν. He who has the gift of the *diaconia* should not desire to have a position in the life of the church *outside of* the sphere of service which is assigned to him by this endowment, but should be *active within that sphere*. That by *διακονία* is not intended *any ecclesiastical office generally* (Chrysostom, Luther, Reithmayr, Hofmann), is shown by the charismatic elements of the entire context. On εἶναι ἐν, *versari in*, comp. 1 Tim. iv. 15 ; Plato, *Prot.* p. 317 C, *Phaed.* p. 59 A ; Demosth. 301. 6, *et al.* ; Krüger, *ad Dion. Hist.* p. 269, 70. — εἴτε ὁ διδάσκων Symmetrically, Paul should have continued with εἴτε διδασκαλίαν

¹ Comp. Luther's gloss: “All prophecy, which leads to work and not simply to

Christ as the only consolation, however valuable it is, is nevertheless not like faith,”

(*sc. ἔχοντες*), as A actually reads. Instead of this, however, he proceeds in such a way as now to introduce the different possessors of gifts *in the third person*, and therefore no longer dependent on the *we* implied in *ἔχοντες*. The change of conception and construction may accordingly be thus exhibited : " While, however, we have different gifts, we should, be it prophecy that we have, make use of it according to the proportion of our faith,—be it *diaconia* that we have, labour *within* the *diaconia*,—*be it that it is the teacher*, (he should) be active within the sphere of teaching, etc." After *ὁ διδάσκων*, simply *ἔστι* is to be supplied : *if it*, viz. one charismatically gifted, *is the teacher*. The apostle, in the urgent fulness of ideas which are yet to be only concisely expressed, has lost sight of the grammatical connection ; comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 331 [E. T. 386]. Hofmann's expedient, that here *εἴτε . . . εἴτε* are subordinated to the preceding *ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ*, and *ὁ διδάσκων* and *ὁ παρακαλῶν* are to be taken as a parenthetical apposition to the subject of the verb to be supplied (" *be it that he, the teacher, handles teaching*," etc.), is an artificial scheme forced upon him by his incorrect view of *διακονία*, and at variance with the co-ordinated relation of the first two cases of *εἴτε*.

Ver. 8. 'Ο μεταδιδούς κ.τ.λ.] [See Note CXXXI. p. 484.] The detailed exposition with *εἴτε* ceases as the discourse flows onward more vehemently, but the series of those charismatically endowed is continued, yet in such a way that now there are no longer mentioned such as possess a *χάρισμα* for a definite function in the church, but such as possess it *generally for the activity of public usefulness in the social Christian life*. Hence, because with *ἐν ἀπλότητι κ.τ.λ.* the continuance of the exhortations is indicated, we are to place before *ὁ μεταδιδούς* not a full stop, but a comma, or, better, a colon. The reference of these last three points to definite ministerial functions (such as that *ὁ μεταδίδ.* is the *diaconus* who distributes the gifts of love ; *ὁ προϊστάμ.* the *president of the community*, bishop or presbyter ; *ὁ ἐλεῶν* he who takes charge of the sick) is refuted, first, by the fact that the assumed references of *μεταδίδ.* (according to Acts iv. 35, we should at least expect *διαδιδούς*) are quite incapable of proof, and indeed improbable in themselves ; secondly, by the consideration that such an analysis of the diaconal gift would be out of due place, after mention had been already made of the *διακονία* as a whole ; and thirdly, by the consideration that the position of the *πρόιστάμενος*, as the *presbyter*, between two diaconal functions, and almost at the end of the series, would be unsuitable. But if we should wish to explain *πρόιστάμ.* as *guardian of the strangers* (my first edition ; Borger), there is an utter want of proof both for this particular feature of the *diaconia* and for its designation by *πρόιστάμ.* (for the *προσπάτης* at Athens, the patron of the *metoeci*, was something quite different ; Hermann, *Staatsalterth.* § 115. 4). — *ὁ μεταδιδούς*] he who imparts, who exercises the *charisma* of charitableness by imparting of his means to the poor. Eph. iv. 28 ; Luke iii. 11. To understand the imparting of *spiritual* good (Baumgarten-Crusius), or this *along with* the other (Hofmann), receives no support from the context, especially seeing that the spiritual imparting has already been previously disposed of in its distinctive forms. — *ἐν ἀπλότ.*] *in simplicity*, therefore without any selfishness, without

boasting, secondary designs, etc., but in plain sincerity of disposition. Comp. 2 Cor. viii. 2, ix. 11, 13, and the classical collocations of ἀπλοῦς καὶ ἀληθής, ἀπλ. κ. γενναῖος κ.τ.λ. On the subject-matter, comp. Matt. vi. 2 ff. — ὁ προϊστάμενος] *the president*, he who exercises the χάρισμα of presiding over others as leader, of directing affairs and the like (comp. προϊστασθαι τῶν πραγμάτων, Herodian, vii. 10. 16), consequently one who through spiritual endowment is ἡγεμονικὸς καὶ ἀρχικός (Plato, *Prot.* p. 352 B). This χάρισμα προστατικόν had to be possessed by the presbyter or ἐπίσκοπος for behoof of his work (comp. 1 Cor. xii. 28) ; but we are not to understand it as applying to him exclusively, or to explain it specially of the office of presbyter, as Rothe and Philippi again do,¹ in spite of the general nature of the context, while Hofmann likewise thinks that the presbyter is meant, not as respects his *office*, but as respects his *activity*. What is meant is the *category* of charismatic endowment, under which the work destined for the presbyter falls to be *included*. — ἐν σπουδῇ] *with zeal* ; it is the earnest, strenuous attention to the fulfilment of duty, the opposite of φαυλότης. — ὁ ἐλεῶν] *he who is merciful* towards the suffering and unfortunate, to whom it is his χάρισμα to administer comfort, counsel, help. — ἐν ἡλαρότ.] *with cheerful, friendly demeanour*, 2 Cor. ix. 7, the opposite of a reluctant and sullen carriage.² — Observe, further, that ἐν ἀπλότ., ἐν σπουδῇ, and ἐν ἡλαρότ. do not denote, like the preceding definitions with ἐν, the *sphere* of service *within* which the activity is to exert itself, but the *quality*, with which those who are gifted are to do their work ; and all these three qualities characterize, in like manner, the nature of true σωφρονεῖν, ver. 3.

Vv. 9–21. *Exhortations for all without distinction, headed by love!*

Ver. 9. Ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκρ.] *sc. ἐστω* [See Note CXXXII. p. 485.] The supplying of the imperative (comp. ver. 7), which is rare in the classical writers (Bernhardy, p. 331 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 37), cannot occasion any scruple in this so briefly sketching hortatory address. ἀνυπόκριτος is not found in classical Greek, but it occurs in Wisd. v. 19, xviii. 16, 2 Cor. vi. 6, 1 Tim. i. 5, 2 Tim. i. 5, Jas. iii. 12, 1 Pet. i. 22. Antoninus, viii. 5, has the adverb, like Clem. Cor. II. 12. — The absolute ἡ ἀγάπη is always *love towards others* (see esp. 1 Cor. xiii.), of which φιλαδελφία is the special form having reference to Christian fellowship, ver. 10. As love must be, so must be also faith, its root, 1 Tim. i. 5 ; 2 Tim. i. 5. — The following participles and adjectives may be taken *either* together as preparing for the εὐλογεῖτε τοὺς δῶκ. in ver. 14, and as dependent on this (Lachm. *ed. min.*) ; *or*, as corresponding to the personal subject of ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκρ. (so Fritzsche), see on 2 Cor. i. 7 ; *or*, finally, by the supplying of ἐστέ as mere precepts, so that after ἀνυπόκρ. there should be placed a full stop, and another after δῶκοντες in ver. 13. So usually ; also by Lachmann, *ed. maj.*, and Tischendorf. The latter view alone, after ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκρ. has been supplemented by the imperative of the substantive verb, is the natural one, and correspondent in its concise mode of expression to the whole character stamped on the passage ; the

¹ So also Jul. Müller, *Dogmat. Abh.* p. 582.

² Comp. Xen. *Mem.* ii. 7. 12 ; ἡλαρά δὲ ἀντὶ συνθροπῶν.

two former modes of connection exhibit a formal interdependence on the part of elements that are heterogeneous in substance. — ἀποστρεφόντες] *abhorring*. The *strengthening* significance of the compound, already noted by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, and Theophylact, has been groundlessly denied by Fritzsche; it is quite appropriate in passages like Herod. ii. 47, vi. 129; Soph. *Oed. C.* 186, 691; Eur. *Ion.* 488; Parthen. *Erot.* 8. — τὸ πονηρὸν and τῷ ἀγαθῷ are to be taken *generally* of *moral evil and good*; abhorrence of the one and adherence to the other form the fundamental moral character of unfeigned love. The evil and good which are found *in the object of love* (Hofmann) are included, but not *especially* meant. Comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 6.

Ver. 10. Τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ.] *In respect of* (in point of) *brotherly love* (love towards fellow-Christians, 1 Thess. iv. 9; Heb. xiii. 1; 1 Pet. i. 22; 2 Pet. i. 7). On its relation to ἀγάπη, comp. generally Gal. vi. 10. — φιλόστοργοι] *fondly affectionate*; an expression purposely chosen, because Christians are *brothers and sisters*, as the word is also in classical Greek the usual one for *family affection*. Comp. also Cicero, *ad Att.* xv. 17. — τῇ τιμῇ] in the point of moral respect and high estimation. — προηγούμενοι] not: *excelling* (Chrysostom, Morus, Köllner), nor yet: *anticipating* (Vulgate, Theophylact, Luther, Castalio, Wolf, Flatt), but, in correspondence with the signification of the word: *going before*, as *guides*, namely, with conduct that incites others to follow. Without the support of usage Erasmus, Grotius, Heumann, Koppe, and Hofmann take προηγείσθαι as equivalent to ἡγεῖσθαι ὑπερέχοντας (Phil. ii. 3), *se ipso potiores ducere alios*, which would be denoted by ἡγεῖσθαι πρὸ ἑαυτῶν ἄλλ. (Phil. ii. 3). In Greek it does not elsewhere occur with the *accusative*, but only with the *dative* (Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 1. 1; Arist. *Plut.* 1195; Polyb. xii. 5. 10) or *genitive* of the *person* (Xen. *Hipp.* 4. 5; Herodian, vi. 8. 6; Polyb. xii. 13. 11); with the *accusative* only, as in Xen. *Anab.* vi. 5, 10, *προηγ. ὁ δ δόν.*

Ver. 11. Τῇ σπουδῇ] *in respect of zeal*, namely, for the interests of the Christian life in whatever relation. — τῷ πν. ζέοντες] *seething, boiling in spirit*, the opposite of ὀκνηροὶ τῇ σπουδῇ; hence τῷ πνεύμ. is not to be understood of the Holy Spirit (Oecumenius and many others, including Holsten, Weiss), but of the *human* spirit. Comp. Acts xviii. 25. That this fervent excitement of the activity of thought, feeling, and will for Christian aims is stirred up by the Holy Spirit, is obvious of itself, but is not of itself expressed by τῷ πνεύματι. Ζέω of the mental *aestuarie* is also frequent in the classics.¹ — τῷ καιρῷ δουλ.] consigns—without, in view of the whole laying out of the discourse as dependent on ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκρ., ver. 9, requiring a connective δέ (against van Hengel)—the fervour of spirit to the limits of Christian prudence, which, amidst its most lively activity, yet in conformity with true love, *accommodates itself to the circumstances of the time*,² with moral discretion

¹ Plato, *Rep.* iv. p. 440 C, *Phaedr.* p. 251 B; Soph. *Oed. C.* 435; Eur. *Hec.* 1055; and Pfugk *in loc.* See also Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* IX. p. 203; Dorville, *ad Charit.* p. 233.

² How much was Paul himself in this matter, with all his fervour of spirit, a shining

model! 1 Cor. ix. 19 ff.; Phil. iv. 12, 13; 1 Cor. iv. 11 ff., viii. 13; Acts xx. 35, xvi. 2, xxi. 23 ff. To the δουλεύειν τῷ καιρῷ, in the noble sense here meant, belongs also the having as though one had not, etc., in 1 Cor. vii. 29 ff.

does not aim at placing itself in independence of them or oppose them with headlong stubbornness, but submits to them with a wise self-denial' (1 Cor. xiii. 4-8). Comp. on the *δουλ.* τῷ καιρῷ (*tempori servire*, Cicero, *ad Div.* ix. 17, *Tuscul.* iii. 27. 66) and synonymous expressions (καίρῳ λατρεύειν, τοῖς καιρ. ἀκολουθεῖν), which are used in a good or bad sense according to the context, Wetstein and Fritzsche *in loc.*; Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* X. p. 261. On the thing itself, see Cic. *ad Div.* iv. 6: "ad novos casus temporum novorum consiliorum rationes accommodare." [See Note CXXXIII. p. 485.]

Ver. 12. *In virtue of hope* (of the future δόξα, v. 2) *joyful*. The dative denotes the *motive* (Kühner, II. i. p. 380). — τῇ θλ. ἵπομ.] *in the presence of tribulation holding out*, remaining constant in it. On the dative, comp. Kühner, *l.c.* p. 385. Paul might have written τὴν θλίψιν ἵπομ. (1 Cor. xiii. 7; 2 Tim. ii. 19; Heb. x. 32, *et al.*, and according to the classical use); he writes, however, in the line of formal symmetry with the other expressions, the dative and then the *absolute* ἵπομέν. (Matt. x. 22; 2 Tim. ii. 12; Jas. v. 11; 1 Pet. ii. 20). — τ. προσευχῇ προσκ.] *perseveringly applying to prayer*, Col. iv. 2; Acts i. 14.

Ver. 13. *Having fellowship in the necessities*¹ *of the saints* (comp. xv. 27), *i.e. so conducting yourselves that the necessities of your fellow-Christians may be also your own*, seeking therefore just so to satisfy them. Comp. on Phil. iv. 14. The *transitive* sense: *communicating* (still held by Rückert and Fritzsche, following many of the older interpreters), finds nowhere, at least in the N. T., any confirmation (not even in Gal. vi. 6). The ἅγιοι are the *Christians* in general, not specially *those of Jerusalem* (Hofmann), who are indicated in xv. 25, but not here, by the *context*. — τὴν φιλοξ.] *studying hospitality*. Comp. Heb. xiii. 3; 1 Pet. iv. 9. A virtue highly important at that time, especially in the case of travelling, perhaps banished and persecuted, Christian brethren. Comp. also 1 Tim. v. 10; Tit. i. 8. That those in need of shelter should not merely be received, but also *sought out*, belongs, under certain circumstances, to the *fulfilment* of this duty, but is not expressed by δίδωκοντες (as Origen and Bengel hold).²

Ver. 14. Τοὺς διώκ. ὑμ.] *who persecute you* (in any respect whatever). The saying of Christ, Matt. v. 44, was perhaps known to the apostle and here came to his recollection, without his having read however, as Reiche here again assumes (comp. on ii. 19), the Gospels.

Ver. 15. Χαίρειν] *i.e. χαίρειν ὑμᾶς δεῖ, infinitive*, as a briefly interjected expression of the necessary behaviour desired. See on Phil. iii. 16. On the subject-matter, comp. Ecclus. vii. 34. Rightly Chrysostom brings into prominence the fact that κλαίειν κ.τ.λ., γενναίας σφόδρα δέεται ψυχῆς, ὥστε τῷ εὐδοκимоῦντι μὴ μόνον μὴ φθονεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνήδεσθαι.

Ver. 16. These participles are also to be understood imperatively by sup-

¹ The reading *μνεῖαις* yields no sense, although Hofmann commends it and seeks to acquire for it, by a comparison of Gal. ii. 10 and Phil. i. 4, the sense of *renderings of assistance*, which is a linguistic impossibility. Yet even Theodore of Mopsuestia wished to assign to this reading, which is found in

some copies, the sense: ὅτι δίκαιον ὑμᾶς μνημονεύειν πάντοτε τῶν ἁγίων.

² Comp. ix. 30; ἀρετὴν δίδωκεν, Plato, *Theaet.* p. 176 B; τὸ ἀγαθὸν δίδωκεν and the like, Ecclus. xxvii. 8, *et al.*; ἀδικίαν δίδωκεν, Plat. *Rep.* p. 545 B.

plying *ἔσεσθε* (comp. on ver. 9), and not to be joined to ver. 15, nor yet to *μὴ γίνεσθε φρόν. παρ' ἑαυτ.* — *τὸ αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλ. φρονούντες*] characterizes the loving *harmony*, when each, in respect to his neighbour (*εἰς*, not *ἐν* as in xv. 5), has one and the same thought and endeavour. Comp. generally xv. 5; Phil. ii. 2, iv. 2; 2 Cor. xiii. 11. According to Fritzsche, *τὸ αὐτό* refers to *what follows*, so that *modesty* is meant as that towards which their mind should be mutually directed. But thus this clause of the discourse would not be *independent*, which is contrary to the analogy of the rest. — *μὴ τὰ ὑψηλά φρονούντες*] *not aiming at high things*,—a warning against ambitious self-seeking. Comp. xi. 20; 1 Tim. vi. 7. — *τοῖς ταπεινοῖς*] is *neuter* (Fritzsche, Reiche, Köllner, Glöckler, de Wette, Baumgarten Crusius, Borger, Reithmayr, Philippi, Maier, Bisping, following Beza and Calvin): *being drawn onward by the lowly*; *i.e.* instead of following the impulse to high things, rather yielding to that which is humble, to the claims and tasks which are presented to you by the humbler relations of life, entering into this impulse towards the lower strata and spheres of life, which lays claim to you, and following it. The *ταπεινά* ought to have for the Christian a force of attraction, in virtue of which he yields himself to fellowship with them (*συν*), and allows himself to be guided by them in the determination of his conduct. Thus the Christian holds intercourse, sympathetically and effectively, in the lower circles, with the poor, sick, persecuted, etc.; thus Paul felt himself compelled to enter into humble situations, to work as a handicraftsman, to suffer need and nakedness, to be weak with the weak, etc. With less probability, on account of the contrast of *τὰ ὑψηλά*, others have taken *τοῖς ταπειν.* as *masculine*,—some of them understanding *ταπεινός* of *inferior rank*, some of *humble disposition*, some blending both meanings—with very different definitions of the sense of the whole, *e.g.* Chrys.: *εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων εὐτέλειαν κατάβηθι, συμπεριφέρου, μὴ ἀπλῶς τῷ φρονήματι συνταπεινοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ βοήθει καὶ χεῖρα ὀρέγον κ.τ.λ.*; similarly Erasmus, Luther, Estius, and others; Grotius (comp. Ewald): “*modestissimorum exempla sectantes*,” Rückert (comp. van Hengel): “*let it please you to remain in fellowship with the lowly*,” Olshausen: *Christianity enjoins intercourse with publicans and sinners in order to gain them for the kingdom of Christ*;¹ Hofmann: “*to be drawn into the host of those who occupy an inferior station and desire nothing else, and, as their equals, disappearing amongst them, to move with them along the way in which they go.*” — *συναπαγ.*] has not in itself, nor has it here, the bad sense: *to be led astray along with*, which it acquires in Gal. ii. 13, 2 Pet. iii. 17, *through the context*. — *φρόνιμοι παρ' ἑαυτ.*] *wise according to your own judgment* Comp. Prov. iii. 7; Bernhardt, p. 256 f. One must not fall into that conceited *self-sufficiency of moral perception*, whereby brotherly respect for the perception of others would be excluded. Similar, but not equivalent, is *ἐν ἑαυτ.*, xi. 25.

Vv. 17–19. The *participles*—to be supplemented here as in ver. 16—are not to be connected with *μὴ γίνεσθε φρόν. παρ' ἑαυτ.* — *μηδενί*] *be he Christian*

¹ Certainly not here, for the discourse concerns the relations of Christians to one another (not to those who are without).

or non-Christian. Opposite : πάντων ἀνθρώπων. The maxim itself taught also by Greek sages, how opposed it was to the ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικούντι of *communio Hellenism* (Hermann, *ad Soph. Philoct.* 679 ; Jacobs, *ad Delect. Epigr.* p. 144 ; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Crit.* p. 49 B, *ad Phileb.* p. 49 D) and to Pharisaism (see on Matt. v. 43) ! — προνοούμενοι] reminiscence from the LXX., Prov. iii. 4. For this very reason, but especially because otherwise an entirely unsuitable limitation of the absolute moral notion of καλὰ would result, ἐνώπιον κ.τ.λ. is not to be joined to καλὰ (Ewald, Hofmann) ; it belongs to προνοούμ. Comp. 2 Cor. viii. 21 ; Polycarp, *ad Phil.* 6. *Before the eyes of all men*—so that it lies before the judgment of all—*taking care for what is good* (morality and decency in behaviour). Verbs of caring are used both with the *genitive* (1 Tim. v. 8) and with the *accusative* (Bernhardy, p. 176), which in the classics also is very frequently found with προνοεῖσθαι. Rightly Theophylact remarks on ἐνώπ. πάντων ἀνθρ. that Paul does not thereby exhort us to live πρὸς κενοδοξίαν, but ἵνα μὴ παρέχωμεν καθ' ἡμῶν ἀφορμὰς τοῖς βουλομένοις, he recommends that which is ἀσκανδάλιστον κ. ἀπρόσκοπον. — εἰ δυνατόν, τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν μετὰ κ.τ.λ.] to be so punctuated. For if the two were to be joined together (“as much as it is possible for you,” Glöckler), the injunction would lose all moral character. Still less are we to suppose that εἰ δυνατόν belongs to the preceding (Erasmus, Cajetan, Bengel), which indeed admits of no condition. Grotius' view is the correct one : “omnium amici este si fieri potest ; si non potest utrimque, certe ex vestra parte amici este,” so that εἰ δυνατόν allows the case of *objective impossibility to avail* (how often had Paul himself experienced this !) ; τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν (adverbially : *as to what concerns your part*, that which proceeds from you ; see generally on i. 15, and Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 225) *annuls* any limitation in a subjective respect, and does not *contain* a subjective limitation (Reiche), since we for our part are supposed to be *always and in any case* peaceably disposed, so that only the opposite disposition and mode of behaviour of the enemy can frustrate our subjective peaceableness. — ἀγαπητοί] urgent and persuasive. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 14, xv. 58 ; Phil. ii. 1, iv. 1. — ἀλλὰ δότε κ.τ.λ.] The construction changes, giving place to a stronger (independent) designation of duty. See Winer, p. 535 [E. T. 575].¹ *Give place to wrath* (κατ' ἐξοχήν, that of God), i.e. forestall it not by personal revenge, but *let it have its course and its sway*.² The morality of this precept is based on the holiness of God ; hence, so far as wrath and love are the two poles of holiness, it does not exclude the blessing of our adversaries (ver. 14) and intercession for them. The view, according to which τῇ ὀργῇ is referred to the *divine* wrath (comp. v. 9 ; 1 Thess. ii. 16)—as the absolute ἡ χάρις is the *divine* favour and grace (comp. v. 9 ; 1 Thess. i. 10, ii. 16)—is rightly preferred by most interpreters from the time of Chrysostom down to van Hengel, Hofmann, Delitzsch ; for, on the one hand, it corresponds entirely to the profane (Gataker, *ad Anton.* p. 104 ; Wetstein *in loc.*) and Pauline (Eph. iv. 27) use of τόπον (or

¹ Comp. here especially Viger. *ed. Herm.* p. 469.

² Quite analogous to the sense and sequence of thought of our verse is *Synops.*

Sohar, p. 95 : “Homo non debet properare, ut vindictamumat (comp. μὴ αὐτοῦς ἐδικούντες) ; melius est, si vindictam committit alii” (Deo), comp. ἀλλὰ δότε τόπ. τῇ ὀργῇ.

χώραν) δίδουαι—which primarily denotes to *make place for any one* (Luke xiv. 9), then to *give any one full play, time and opportunity for activity* (Eph. l.c., comp. Eccles. xiii. 21, xix. 17, xxxviii. 12, xvi. 14; Philo in Loesner, p. 263); and on the other hand it is most appropriate to the following Scriptural proof.¹ Non-compliance with the precept occasions the ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ διαπρατάνειν, Eph. iv. 26. Comp. on the thought 1 Pet. ii. 23; 1 Sam. xxiv. 13, 16. Others interpret it of *one's own wrath*,² which is not to be allowed to break forth. So de Dieu, Bos, Semler, Cramer, and Reiche: "Wrath produces terrible effects in the moment of its ebullition; give it time, and it passes away." The Latin use³ of *irae spatium dare* agrees indeed with this interpretation, but not the Greek use of τόπον δίδουαι—not even in the well-known expression in Plutarch (*de ira cohīb.* p. 462) that we should not even in sport δίδουαι τόπον to anger, i.e. *give it full play*, allow it free course. Since this "*giving way to wrath*" (justly repudiated by Plutarch as highly dangerous) cannot be enjoined by Paul, he must have meant by τ. ὀργῇ the *divine wrath*. For the interpretation given by others of the *wrath of an enemy*, which one is to *give place to*, to go out of the way of (Schoettgen, Morus, Ammon), must be rejected, since this, although it may be linguistically justified (Luke xiv. 9; Judg. xx. 36), and may be compared with Soph. *Ant.* 718 (see Schneidewin *in loc.*) and with the Homeric εἰκεῖν θυμῷ, yet would yield a precept, which would be only a rule of prudence and not a command of Christian morals. This applies also in opposition to Ewald: *to allow the wrath of the other to expend itself*, which, as opposed to personal revenge, has no positive moral character (it is otherwise with Matt. v. 39); not to mention that the injury, the personal avenging of which is forbidden, by no means necessarily supposes a *wrathful* offender.—γέγρ. γάρ] Deut. xxxii. 35, freely as regards the sense, from the Hebrew (*to me belongs revenge and requital*), but with use of the words of the LXX., which depart from the original (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐκδικήσεως ἀνταποδώσω), and with the addition of λέγει κύριος. The form of this citation, quite similar to that here used, which is found in Heb. x. 30, cannot be accidental, especially as the characteristic ἐγὼ ἀνταποδ. recurs also in the paraphrase of Onkelos (אֲנִי אֶפְדֵּם). But there are no traces elsewhere to make us assume that Paul made use of Onkelos; and just as little has the view any support elsewhere, that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews followed the citation of Paul (Bleek, Delitzsch). Hence the only hypothesis which we can form without arbitrariness is, that the form of the saying as it is found in Paul and in Heb. x. 30 had

¹ Yet it must be admitted, that either of the two other explanations (see below) would not be opposed to the sense of the following passage of Scripture, if only one of them were otherwise decidedly correct.

² So Zyro in a peculiar manner in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1845, p. 891 f.: "Give place to wrath, when it comes and seeks to get possession of your mind, and go from it (*turn your back upon it*)."³ This would be psychologically inappropriate (for wrath is *in* man,

an emotion which indeed is stirred up from without, but does not *come* thence, comp. Eph. iv. 31; Col. iii. 8; John xi. 33, 38), and at the same time how strange in point of expression!

³ Livy ii. 56, viii. 32; Seneca, *de ira*, iii. 39. Comp. especially Lactantius, *de Ira*, 18: "Ego vero laudarem, si, cum fuisset iratus, dedisset irae suae spatium, ut, residente per intervallum temporis animi tumore, haberet modum castigatio."

at that time acquired currency in the manner of a formula of warning which had become proverbial, and had influenced the rendering in the paraphrase of Onkelos. The λέγει κύριος Paul has simply added, as was frequently done (comp. xiv. 11) with divine utterances ; in Heb. x. 30 these words are not genuine.

Ver. 20. Without οὖν (see the critical notes), but thus the more in conformity with the mode of expression throughout the whole chapter, which proceeds for the most part without connectives, there now follows what the Christian—seeing that he is not to avenge himself, but to let God's wrath have its way—has rather to do in respect of his enemy.—The whole verse is borrowed from Prov. xxv. 21, 22, which words Paul adopts as his own, closely from the LXX. — ψάμμιζε] *feed him, give him to eat.* See on 1 Cor. xiii. 1 ; Grimm on Wisd. xvi. 20. The expression is affectionate. Comp. 2 Sam. xiii. 5 ; Bengel : “manu tua.” Eccles. vii. 32. — ἀνθρακας πυρὸς σαρῆς. ἐπὶ τὴν κεφ. αὐτοῦ] figurative expression of the thought : *painful shame and remorse wilt thou prepare for him.* So, in substance, Origen, Augustine, Jerome, Ambrosiaster, Pelagius, Erasmus, Luther, Wolf, Bengel, and others, including Tholuck, Baumgarten-Crusius, Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Philippi, Reithmayr, Bisping, Borger, van Hengel, Hofmann ; comp. Linder in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, p. 568 f. Glowing coals are to the Oriental a figure for *pain that penetrates and cleaves to one*,¹ and in particular, according to the context, for *the pain of remorse*, as here, where magnanimous beneficence heaps up the coals of fire. Comp. on the subject-matter, 1 Sam. xxiv. 17 ff. See the Arabic parallels in Gesenius in Rosenmüller's *Repert.* I. p. 140, and generally Tholuck in *loc.* ; Gesenius, *Thesaur.* I. p. 280. Another view was already prevalent in the time of Jerome,² and is adopted by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Occumenius, Theophylact, Photius, Beza, Camerarius, Estius, Grotius, Wetstein, and others, including Koppe, Böhme, Hengstenberg (*Authent. d. Pentat.* II. p. 406 f.),—namely, that the sense is : *Thou wilt bring upon him severe divine punishment.* Certainly at 4 Esr. xvi. 54 the burning of fiery coals on the head is an image of painful divine punishment ; but there this view is just as certainly suggested by the context, as here (see esp. ver. 21) and in Prov. *l.c.*, the context is opposed to it. For the condition *nisi resipiscat* would have, in the first place, to be quite arbitrarily supplied ; and how could Paul have conceived and expressed so *unchristian a motive* for beneficence towards enemies !³ The saving clauses of expositors regarding this point are fanciful and quite unsatisfactory.

Ver. 21. Comprehensive summary of vv. 19, 20.—“*Be not overcome* (carried

¹ Not for *softening* (from the custom of softening hard meats by laying coals upon the vessel), as Glöckler, following Vorstius and others, thinks, nor for *inflaming* to love (Calovius and others). The Jesuit Sanctius (see Cornelius à Lapide in *loc.*) even found in the figure an indication of the *blush of shame*. So again Umbreit, p. 353 ; comp. also van Hengel.

² “Carbones igitur congregabis super caput ejus, non in maledictum et condemnationem, ut plerique existimant, sed in correctionem et poenitudinem.” Jerome.

³ Augustine, *Propos.* 71 : “Quomodo quisquam diligit eum, cui propterea cibum et potum dat, ut carbones ignis congerat super caput ejus, si carbones ignis hoc loco aliquem gravem poenam significant?”

away to revenge and retaliation) *by evil* (which is committed against thee), *but overcome by the good* (which thou showest to thine enemy) the *evil*," bringing about the result that the enemy, put to shame by thy noble spirit, ceases to act malignantly against thee and becomes thy friend. "Vincit malos pertinax bonitas," Seneca, *de benef.* vii. 31. Comp. *de ira*, ii. 32; Valer. Max. iv. 2, 4. On the other hand, Soph. *El.* 308 f. : ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς | Πολλή 'στ ἀνάγκη κἀπιτηδένειν κακά. We may add the appropriate remark of Erasmus on the style of expression throughout the chapter : "*Comparibus membris et incis, similiter cudentibus ac desinentibus sic totus sermo modulatus est, ut nulla cantio possit esse jucundior.*"

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

CXXVII. Ver. 1. παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς.

Whether we hold with Meyer or not, that the immediate connection of this verse through the particle οὖν is with xi. 35, 36, there can be little doubt that the Apostle intends to place the practical section of the Epistle over against the doctrinal section, and to found upon the latter the first and comprehensive exhortation of the opening verses of this 12th chapter. The exhortation is pressed upon the readers by the mercies of God, which are set forth in ch. xi., but which are also manifested in the progress and development of that plan of salvation whose central doctrine is justification by faith.

The explanation which Meyer gives of the contents of the exhortation is to be accepted, because it meets satisfactorily the demands of the case, and because the appeal to the readers thus to consecrate themselves to God, both in the outer and inner man, is the most natural outgrowth of the preceding chapters. In those chapters the doctrine had been exhibited in its universality of blessing for all men, and in its universality of influence throughout the life of each man—tending to make every one who should receive it into his heart die to sin and live to holiness, and promising to every one at the end not only life for the spirit, but complete redemption for the body also. The objection urged against this view, which Meyer notices in his foot-note, is answered fully by him, and it is unnecessary to modify what he says, even as far as Weiss ed. Mey. does, so that ver. 2 is regarded as making the renewal of the νοῦς the means of the παραστήσαι τὰ σώματα. As Meyer expresses it, Paul *formally* separates the two. The objection, that τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν is opposed to such a separation, is not well founded, for this phrase is used with especial reference to the external and ceremonial offerings of the Jewish system, and hence is especially suited to this part of the exhortation. Philippi objects that the different tenses (aorist and present) are inconsistent with the parallelizing of the two verses, but the aorist in ver. 1 is easily accounted for as connected with the *figure* of offering a sacrifice—a single and definite act. In *fact*, the demand of the Christian teaching is as truly to renew the *mind* at once and by a single act, as it is to devote the *body*, or, as Philippi would say, the *entire self*, thus immediately to God. The account given above of the use of the aorist, therefore, is probably the true one.

CXXVIII. Ver. 2. συζηματίζεσθε—μεταμοφοῦσθε.

That Greek authors never used the words *σχῆμα* and *μορφή*, or their compounds, in the same sense, it may be difficult to affirm. The tendency of language is to some degree of freedom in such cases. It seems evident, however, that they have different meanings at the foundation, and in their ordinary use; and there is, apparently, no reason for denying that the Apostle intentionally employs the two words, in this place, because he desires to express two different shades of thought. Indeed, the fact that we find the two verbs, instead of one, and that their peculiarities of signification, as distinguished from each other, give additional force and emphasis to the entire sentence, renders it probable that such was his intention.

CXXIX. Vv. 3-8.

These verses are subordinated to vv. 1, 2. Some writers regard γάρ as explicative (e.g. Rückert, de Wette, Philippi, Shedd); others as causal (e.g. Meyer, Godet, Gifford, Beet). Probably the latter view is correct, and the precise relation of thought expressed by the γάρ is this:—I give the exhortation to complete consecration of the whole man to God, because it involves in itself, and leads to the fulfilment of, all the particular duties of the Christian life which I have to urge upon you as members of the Christian church in Rome. The particle is grammatically, indeed, confined in its force to the single verse in which it stands, but in the writer's mind it extended, no doubt, over all that follows.

The first of the specific exhortations is contained in these six verses. That it relates to modesty and humility, as Meyer says, is evident. There is, however, such a prominence given to the matter of gifts and offices of the spiritual life, that we must regard the Apostle as having a special reference, in what he says, to humility with respect to these. To the end of securing that proper and modest estimation of oneself which is a part of true Christian living, the limitation of oneself, in a Christian way, within the sphere of the divinely-assigned gifts, is essential. The "regulative standard" for this due estimate is mentioned in the words *ὡς ὁ Θεὸς ἐμέρισεν μέτρον πίστεως*, to which *κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως* (ver. 6) corresponds, as is made evident by the connection in thought of the verses throughout the paragraph. The explanation of the meaning of *μέτρον πίστεως* is rightly given in Meyer's note. Paul seems evidently in many places to look upon faith as developing its vital force in different lines—as, for example, here, in the qualification for special works and the exercise of special gifts, and, in ch. xiv., in the matter of Christian knowledge (comp. 1 Cor. viii. 1 ff.), as related to conscientious scruples. One man, thus, has "faith" to be a prophet, another has "faith" to "eat all things," and "whatsoever is not of 'faith' is sin." Paul himself had "faith" to be an Apostle to the Gentiles in the regions where others had not preached, just as he had "grace given to him" for this end. This was his *χάρισμα*; that is, it was that for which the particular development of the life-principle of Christianity within his mind and soul fitted him. It was his duty to have a sober-minded judgment of himself in accordance with this fact (*σωφρονεῖν*), and not to go beyond this (*ὑπερφρονεῖν παρ' ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν*). And so with other men. Compare what Paul says of himself, 2 Cor. x. 13 ff.

The fourth and fifth verses give a ground for the bidding of ver. 3, and, at

the same time, carry on the thought, by way of transition, to vv. 6-8. The reason for the sober-minded estimate of oneself, as here stated, is that the church is an organism, like the human body, wherein it is for the good, and even the life, of the whole that the several members should have different functions. But, inasmuch as this is so, those who have particular gifts (ver. 6 ff.) should devote themselves to the exercise of those gifts.

CXXX. Ver. 6. κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως.

The argument presented by Meyer with regard to the construction of these words seems decisive. They are to be connected with *προφητεύωμεν*, which is supplied in thought. Weiss. ed. Mey., who, as also Tisch. 8, favors the uniting of the entire clause with *ἔσμεν* of ver. 5, urges against this view, that the prophetic gift was conditioned upon a divine inspiration and impulse, not upon faith, and that faith, though a necessary antecedent to the reception of the gift, is not the energizing force in it. These two things are true, no doubt, but this fact is not inconsistent with an exhortation to the prophet, such as is here given. All the gifts are bestowments of the grace of God—the prophetic gift more exclusively so, perhaps, than any other, in so far as it involves an immediate and momentary inspiration;—but they are all alike (this one, as well as the others) bestowed according to what the Apostle here means by the *μέτρον πίστεως*, and they are to be used as they are bestowed. The *προφήτης*, like the *διδάσκαλος*, or the *διάκονος*, should move within the sphere of that which the *χάρις* and the *πίστις* had qualified him for, and should not, by reason of a *ὑπερφρονεῖν*, reach out beyond it. The unity of the entire paragraph indicates this to be the thought of the writer, and, as it does this, it determines both the construction and the meaning of these particular words (*κατὰ κ.τ.λ.*).

The view of this phrase which makes it mean *according to the proportion, analogy, rule of faith* (faith being taken in the sense of truths to be believed or a system of doctrine), is neither required by the word *ἀναλογίαν*, nor consistent with Paul's use of *πίστις*, nor harmonious with any of the parallel phrases (*ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ, ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, κ.τ.λ.*), nor suggested by anything in the context, nor within the line of the thought of ver. 3, to which vv. 6-8 are subordinate as giving special applications of what it suggests.

That *ἀναλογία* answers in idea to *μέτρον* is satisfactorily shown by Meyer, and hence the fact of the selection of a new word in this verse, which has been urged by some writers, cannot be considered an objection of any weight against that interpretation which makes the words equivalent to each other.

CXXXI. Vv. 7, 8. εἴτε ὁ διδάσκων κ.τ.λ.

There can be no doubt, it would seem, that the one who teaches and the one who exhorts belong in that "teaching" class of which the prophet is a member, and, by reason of his special inspiration, an exalted member. On the other hand, it may be regarded as probable that the "giver" and the one who "shows mercy" are in a kindred sphere with the *διάκονος*, as distinguished from the sphere of the *διδάσκαλος*. That the latter, however, are officials in the church is not to be inferred from any such general relationship of work. (1) There is no evidence that there was such a multiplication of offices in the small and scattered Christian bodies at this early period. (2) The probabilities in the

case are altogether against any such condition of things. No such offices are alluded to even in the latest of the Pauline Epistles no offices, indeed, except that of ἐπίσκοπος or πρεσβύτερος and that of διάκονος, unless possibly that of widows. The context has no suggestion of offices in the technical sense, but only in the sense in which gifts involve offices. (3) The exhortation on which the paragraph depends is addressed to all the members of the church, and has reference, accordingly, to gifts which any one among them might have. (4) The two words kindred with διάκονος are separated by a word of a different sort (προιστάμενος), and one which has a closer relation with διδάσκαλος. (5) These two words are, in themselves, not adapted to the description of church officials :—μεταδιδούς meaning *giving* or *imparting*, as of what belongs to the giver, rather than *distributing*, as of what belongs to the Christian company, and ἐλεῶν being, in its natural and ordinary use, characteristic of individuals. The fact that the participle προισταμένους is employed, in 1 Thess. v.12, as descriptive of persons who, also, “labor among you and admonish you,” and προεστῶτες, in 1 Tim. v. 17, in speaking of certain elders, cannot be regarded as evidence that here, where the word is used independently, it designates elders ;—especially considering the position which it has between two other words, whose relation (if, indeed, there is any such relation at all) is with an entirely different office. It may be held, rather, that the use of the participle in 1 Tim. iii. 4, where it is applied to the ἐπίσκοπος, i.e. the πρεσβύτερος, with reference to his presiding over his own family, is a proof that, in itself, it has no such technical signification.

CXXXII. Ver. 9. ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκριτος.

The transition here is not from offices and official duties to the duties of all members of the Church, but from that due estimate of oneself, which leads the Christian to move in the line of his own gifts and qualifications as one of a body (for the common benefit of which all are to work), to the suggestion of varied lines of action to which love, as the uniting principle of the common life of the body, would naturally lead. Hence we find the exhortation, *let love* (i.e. love to one another, not here meaning love to God) *be without hypocrisy*, placed at the beginning. This is followed by the words *abhorring*, etc. If there be a guileless love which joins itself to an abhorrence of whatever is evil and an ardent attachment to whatever is good, there is preparation in the man for each and every one of the works of the Christian life which are mentioned in the following verses.

CXXXIII. Ver. 11. τῷ κυρίῳ δουλεύοντες.

Meyer (see his critical notes at the beginning of the chapter) adopts the reading *καρῷ* on internal grounds. The external evidence, however, is very strong for *κυρίῳ*, and this reading is now generally adopted. (So also Weiss ed. Mey., and Westcott and Hort). The insertion of so general and comprehensive a duty as “serving the Lord” in the midst of a series of such special and individual matters is an argument against *κυρίῳ* not lightly to be set aside. Such an insertion seems more improbable in a case like this, than the somewhat similar insertions of general words in i. 29-32 and elsewhere. Serving the *opportunity*, the *occasion* or *critical season*, on the other hand, is a suggestion most appropriate as following and modifying the other two exhortations of the verse,

It has been objected to by de Wette and others, on the ground that it savors of worldly policy, rather than Christian morality, but when we observe what the Apostle has in mind, we find no foundation for this statement. It belongs both to Christian duty and to the highest Christian wisdom for the man who is not sluggish in respect to zeal, but fervent in spirit, to *serve the occasion* so far as to temper and direct his zeal by what it demands. The remark of de Wette, that the Christian may and should *make use* of time and opportunity, but should not *serve* it, is true, if *serve* be understood in a particular sense, but not so if it be taken in another sense. That other sense, given by Meyer in his note, is undoubtedly the one which Paul had in mind if he wrote *καὶρῶ*. The textual question, therefore, lies between the external and the internal evidence, which are here opposed to each other. Generally, no doubt, the external authorities must decide in such cases.

CHAPTER XIII.

Ver. 1. ἀπό] Lachm. and Tisch. 8 : ὑπό, which Griesb. also approved, according to preponderant evidence. But ἀπό also retains considerable attestation (D* E* F G, min., Or. Theodoret, Dam.), and may easily have been displaced by a ὑπό written on the margin from the following. After οὔσαι Elz. has ἐξουσίαι, which, according to a preponderance of evidence, has been justly omitted since Griesb. as a supplement; and τοῦ also before the following Θεοῦ is too feebly attested. — Ver. 3. τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ κακῷ] commended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Fritzsche, according to A B D* F G P κ, 6. 67**, several vss., and Fathers. But Elz., Matth., Scholz have τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων, ἀλλὰ τῶν κακῶν. A presumed emendation in case and number. — Ver. 5. ἀνάγκη ὑποτάσσεσθαι] D E F G, Goth. It. Guelph. Ir. have merely ὑποτάσσεσθε. Commended by Griesb. A marginal gloss, as the reading ἀνάγκη (or ἀνάγκη) ὑποτάσσεσθε (Lect. 7, 8, Aug., Beda, Vulg. : *necessitate subditi estote*; so Luther) plainly shows. — Ver. 7. οὖν] is wanting in A B D* κ, 67**, Copt. Sahid. Vulg. ms. Tol. Damasc. Cypr. Aug. Ruf. Cassiod. Omitted by Lachm., Tisch., Fritzsche. Rightly; for there was no ground for its omission, whereas by its insertion the logical connection was established. — Ver. 9. After κλέψει Elz. has οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις, against decisive evidence. Inserted with a view to completeness. — ἐν τῷ] bracketed by Lachm., is wanting in B F G, Vulg. It. and Latin Fathers. But its striking appearance of superfluity might so readily prompt its omission, that this evidence is too weak. — Ver. 11. The order ἡδὴ ἡμᾶς is decisively supported. So rightly Lachm. and Tisch. 8. Yet the latter has instead of ἡμᾶς : ὑμᾶς, according to A B C P κ, min. Clem., which, however, appeared more suitable to εἰδότες and more worthy of the apostle. — Ver. 12. καὶ ἐνθυσ.] Lachm. and Tisch. : ἐνθυσ. δέ, which also Griesb. approved, according to important witnesses; but it would be very readily suggested by the preceding adversative connection.

Vv. 1-7.¹ The proud love of freedom of the Jews (see on John viii. 33; Matt. xxii. 17), and their tumultuary spirit thereby excited, which was peculiarly ardent from the time of Judas Gaulonites (see Acts v. 37; Josephus, *Ant.* xviii. 1. 1) and had shortly before broken out in Rome itself (Suetonius, *Claud.* 25; Dio Cassius, lx. 6; see *Introd.* § 2, and on Acts xviii. 2), redoubled for the Christians—among whom, indeed, even the Gentile-Christians might easily enough be led astray by the Messianic ideas (theocracy, kingdom of Christ, freedom and *κληρονομία* of believers, etc.) into perverted thoughts of freedom and desires for emancipation (comp. 1 Cor. vi. 1 ff.)—the necessity of civil obedience, seeing that they, as confessing the Messiah (Acts xvii. 6, 7), and regarded by the Gentiles as a Jewish

¹ For good practical observations on this passage, see Harless, *Staat u. Kirche*, 1870.

sect, were much exposed to the suspicion of revolutionary enterprise. The danger thus lay, not indeed exclusively (Mangold, Beyschlag), but *primarily* and *mostly*, on the side of the Jewish-Christians, not on that of the Gentile-Christians, as Th. Schott, in the interest of the view that Paul desired to prepare the Roman church to be the base of operations of his western mission to the Gentiles, unhistorically assumes. And was not *Rome*, the very seat of the government of the world, just the place above all others where that danger was greatest, and where nevertheless the whole Christian body, of the Jewish as well as of the Gentile section, had to distinguish itself by exemplary civil order? Hence we have here the—in the Pauline epistles unique—*detailed and emphatic inculcation of obedience towards the magistracy*, introduced without link of connection with what precedes, as a new subject.¹ Baur, I. p. 384 f., thinks that Paul is here combating *Ebionitic dualism*, which regarded the secular magistrate as of non-divine, *devilish* origin. As if Paul could not, without any such antithesis, have held it to be necessary to inculcate upon the Romans the divine right of the state-authority! Moreover, he would certainly not merely have kept his eye upon that dualism in regard to its practical manifestations (Baur's subterfuge), but would have combated it in *principle*, and thereby have grasped it at the root.—The partial resemblance, moreover, which exists between vv. 1-4 and 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14 is not sufficient to enable us to assume that Peter made use of our passage, or that Paul made use of Peter's epistle; a view, which has been lately maintained especially by Weiss, *Petrin. Lehrbegr.* p. 416 ff., and in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1865, 4; see, on the other hand, Huther on 1 Pet. *Introd.* § 2. Paul doubtless frequently preached a similar doctrine orally respecting duty towards the heathen magistracy. And the power of his preaching was sufficiently influential in moulding the earliest ecclesiastical language, to lead even a Peter, especially on so *peculiar* a subject, involuntarily to echo the words of Paul which had vibrated through the whole church. Compare the creative influence of Luther upon the language of the church.

Ver. 1. *Πᾶσα ψυχὴ*] In the sense of *every man*, but (comp. on ii. 9) of man conceived in reference to his soul-nature, in virtue of which he consciously feels pleasure and displeasure (rejoices, is troubled, etc.), and cherishes corresponding impulses. There lies a certain *pathos* in the significant: *every soul*, which at once brings into prominence the *universality* of the duty. Comp. Acts ii. 43, iii. 23; Rev. xvi. 3. [See Note CXXXIV. p. 500.] — *ἐξουσιας ὑπερεχ.*] *magistrates high in standing (without the article). ὑπερεχ.* (see

¹ It is vain to seek for connections, when Paul himself indicates none. Thus, *e.g.*, we are not to say that the mention of *private* injuries leads him to speak of behaviour towards the heathen magistracy (Tholuck and older expositors). He does not in fact represent the latter as hostile. Arbitrarily also Th. Schott (comp. Borger) thinks that the discourse passes from subordination under God; to whom belongs vengeance, to sub-

ordination under the executors of the divine *ἐκδίκησις*. As though Paul in xii. 19 could have thought of such an *ἐκδίκησις*! Just as arbitrary, without any hint in the text, is the view of Hofmann: Paul makes the transition from the social life of men in general to their conduct in *political* organization, *which also belongs to the good, wherewith one is to overcome the evil*.

Wisdom. vi. 5 ; 1 Pet. ii. 13 ; 1 Tim. ii. 2 ; 2 Macc. iii. 11) is added, in order to set forth the *ὑποτάσσ.* — *ὑπέρ* and *ὑπό* being correlative—as corresponding to the standpoint of the magistracy itself (comp. the German : *hohe Obrigkeiten*) ; the motive of obedience follows.— *There is no magistracy apart from God* expresses in general the proceeding of all magistracy whatever from God, and then this relation is still more precisely defined, in respect of those magistracies which exist in concreto as a divine institution, by *ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τεταγμ. εἶναι*.¹ Thus Paul has certainly expressed the divine right of magistracy, which Christian princes especially designate by the expression “by the grace of God” (since the time of Louis the Pious). And *αἱ δὲ οὐσαι*, the extant, actually existing, allows no exception, such as that possibly of tyrants or usurpers (in opposition to *Reiche*). The Christian, according to Paul, ought to regard any magistracy whatever, provided its rule over him subsists *de facto*, as divinely ordained, since it has not come into existence without the operation of God’s will ; and this applies also to tyrannical or usurped power, although such a power, in the counsel of God, is perhaps destined merely to be temporary and transitional. From this point of view, the Christian obeys not the human caprice and injustice, but the will of God, who—in connection with His plan of government inaccessible to human insight—has presented even the unworthy and unrighteous ruler as the *οὐσα ἐξουσία*, and has made him the instrument of His measures. Questions as to special cases—such as how the Christian is to conduct himself in political catastrophes, what magistracy he is to look upon in such times as the *οὐσα ἐξουσία*, as also, how he, if the command of the magistrate is against the command of God, is at any rate to obey God rather than men (Acts v. 29), etc.—Paul here leaves unnoticed, and only gives the main injunction of obedience, which he does not make contingent on this or that form of constitution.² By no means, however, are we to think only of the magisterial office as instituted by God (Chrysostom, Occumenius, and others), but rather of the magistracy in its concrete persons and members as the bearers of the divinely ordained office. Comp. *οἱ ἀρχοντες*, ver. 3, and vv. 4, 6, 7 ; Dion. Hal. *Antt.* xi. 32 ; Plut. *Philop.* 17 ; Tit. iii. 1 ; also *Martyr. Polyc.* 10.—Observe, moreover, that Paul has in view Gentile magistrates *in concreto* ; consequently he could not speak more specially of that which Christian magistrates have on their part to do, and which Christian subjects in their duty of obedience for God and right’s sake are to expect and to require from them, although he expresses in general—by repeatedly bringing forward the fact that magistrates are the servants of God (vv. 3, 4), indeed ministering servants of God (ver. 6)—the point of view from which the distinctively Christian judgment as to the duties and rights of magistrate and subject respectively must proceed.

Ver. 2. [Ὡστε] Since it is instituted by God. — *ὁ ἀντίτασσ.*] Note the correlation of *ἀντίτασσ.*, *ὑποτάσσ.*, and *τεταγμ.* The latter stands in the middle. — *ἐναντίς*] *Dativus incommodi* : their resistance to the divinely-ordained

¹ Comp. Hom. *Il.* ii. 204 ff., ix. 38, 98 ; Soph. *Phil.* 140, et al. ; Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 15. 2.

² Comp. Jul. Müller, *dogmat. Abh.* p. 651.

magistracy will issue in *their own self-destruction*; comp. ii. 5; 1 Cor. xi. 29. According to Hofmann (who in his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 443, even imported a contrast to τῷ κυρίῳ, as in xiv. 6, 7), *ἐαυτοῖς* is to be viewed as in contrast to the *Christian body as such*; the punishment to be suffered is a judgment which lights on the doers *personally*, and is not put to the account of their *Christian standing*. This explanation ("they have to ascribe the punishment to themselves solely") is incorrect, because it obtrudes on the text a purely fictitious antithesis, and because the apostle lays down the relation to the magistracy quite *generally*, not from the *specific point of view* of *Christian standing*, according to which his readers might perhaps have supposed that they had become foreign to the political commonwealth. Had this comprehensive error in principle been here in Paul's view, in how entirely different a way must he have expressed what he intended than by the single expression *ἐαυτοῖς*, into which, moreover, that alleged thought would have first to be imported! — κρίμα] a judgment, is understood of itself, according to the connection, as a *penal judgment*. Comp. ii. 2, 3, iii. 8; 1 Cor. xi. 29; Gal. v. 10; Mark xii. 40. *From whom* they will receive it, is decided by the fact that with οἱ δὲ ἀνθεστηκότες, according to the context, τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ διαταγῇ is again to be supplied. It is therefore a *penal judgment of God*, as the *executors* of which, however, the ἀρχοντες are conceived, as ver. 3 proves. Consequently the passage does not relate to *eternal* punishment (Reiche and others), but to the *temporal* punishment which God causes to be inflicted by means of the magistrates. Philippi prefers to leave κρίμα without more special definition (comp. also Rückert); but against this is the consideration, that ver. 3 can only arbitrarily be taken otherwise than as assigning the ground of what immediately precedes.

Ver. 3. Οἱ γὰρ . . . κακῶ] Ground assigned for ἐαυτοῖς κρίμα λήψονται.¹ — τῇ ἀγαθῇ ἔργῳ] *The good work and the evil work*² are personified. We are not here to compare ii. 7 or ii. 15 (Reiche, de Wette). — φόβος] a terror, i.e. *formidandi*.³ — δέ] the simple μεταβατικόν. The proposition itself may be either *interrogatory* (Beza, Calvin, and others, including Lachmann, Tischendorf, Ewald, Hofmann), or as protasis in *categorical* form (see on 1 Cor. vii. 18, and Pflugk, *ad Eur. Med.* 386). So Luther and others, including Tholuck and Philippi. The former is more lively, the latter more appropriate and emphatic, and thus more in keeping with the whole character of the adjoining context. — ἐπαινον] *praise, testimony of approbation* (which the magistrate

¹ For if resistance to the ἐξουσία were not to draw the divine punishment after it, the relative position of rulers and subjects would necessarily be such, that in *good* behaviour people would have to stand in fear of them (which would in fact annul the divine ordinance); the converse, however, is the case with them, viz., they are a terror to *evil* deeds. The γὰρ consequently establishes here, generally, the duty of obedience to the magistracy (Philippi), nor the sense imported by Hofmann into ἐαυτοῖς. If the bearers of magisterial power were a

terror to *good* works, the maxim of resistance (to obey God rather than men) would assert its right, and we should have to say with Neoptolemus in Soph. *Philoct.* 1235 (1251): ξὺν τῷ δικαίῳ τὸν σὸν οὐ ταρβῶ φόβον.

² Beyond the *work*, and to the *intention*, the prerogative of the magistrate does not extend. Comp. Harless, *l.c.*

³ For examples of the same use, see Kypke, II. p. 188. Comp. Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 513; just so the Latin *timor*, e.g. Propert. iii. 5. 40.

is wont to bestow ; see also Philo, *Vit. M.* i. p. 626 C) ; not any more than in ii. 29, 1 Cor. iv. 5, *reward* (Calvin, Loesner, and others). Grotius rightly remarks : “Cum hæc scriberet Paulus, non saeviebatur Romæ in Christianos.” It was still the better time of Nero’s rule. But the proposition has a *general* validity, which is based on the divinely-ordained position of the magistracy, and is not annulled by their injustices in practice, which Paul had himself so copiously experienced. Comp. 1 Pet. ii. 14.

Ver. 4. Θεοῦ . . . ἀγαθόν] Establishment of the preceding thought—that the well-doer has not to fear the magistrate, but to expect praise from him—by indicating the relation of the magistracy to *God*, whose servant (διδάκωνος, *feminine*, as in xvi. 1 ; Dem. 762. 4, and frequently) it is, and to the *subjects*, for whose benefit (defence, protection, blessing) it is so. The σοί is the ethical relation of the Θεοῦ δάκων. ἐστὶ, and εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν adds the more precise definition.—οὐ γὰρ εἰκῇ] *for not without corresponding reason* (frequently so in classical Greek), but in order actually to use it, should the case require.—τὴν μάχαιρ. φορεῖ] What is meant is not the *dagger*, which the Roman emperors and the governing officials next to them were accustomed to wear as the token of their *jus vitæ et necis* (Aurel. Vict. 13 ; Grotius and Wetstein *in loc.*) ; for μάχαιρα, although denoting *dagger* = παραξίφος in the classics,¹ means in the N. T. always *sword*, viii. 35, according to Xen. *r. eq.* xii. 11 (but comp. Krüger, Xen. *Anab.* i. 8. 7), differing by its curved form from the straight ξίφος ; and also among the Greeks the *bearing of the sword* (Philostr. *Vit. Ap.* vii. 16) is expressly used to represent that power of the magistrates. They bore it themselves, and in solemn processions it was borne before them. See Wolf, *Cur.* On the distinction between φορέω (the continued habit of bearing) and φέρω, see Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 585.—Θεοῦ γὰρ δάκ. κ.τ.λ.] ground assigned for the assurance οὐκ εἰκῇ τ. μ. φ., in which the previously expressed proposition is repeated with emphasis, and now its *penal* reference is appended.—ἐκδικος εἰς ὀργὴν κ.τ.λ.] *avenging* (1 Thess. iv. 6 ; Wisd. xii. 12 ; Eccclus. xxx. 6 ; Herodian, vii. 4. 10 ; Aristaenet. i. 27) *in behalf of wrath* (for the execution of wrath) *for him who does evil*. This dative of reference is neither dependent on ἐστίν, the position of which is here different from the previous one (in opposition to Hofmann) nor on εἰς ὀργὴν (Flatt) ; it belongs to ἐκδικος εἰς ὀργ. Εἰς ὀργὴν is not “superfluous and cumbrous” (de Wette),² but *strengthens* the idea. We may add that our passage proves (comp. Acts xxv. 11) that the abolition of the *right* of capital punishment deprives the magistracy of a power which is not merely given to it in the O. T., but is also decisively confirmed in the N. T., and which it (herein lies the sacred limitation and responsibility of this power) possesses as God’s minister ; on which account its application is to be upheld as a principle with reference to those cases at law, where the actual satisfaction of the divine Nemesis absolutely demands it,

¹ See Spitzner on Hom. *Il.* xviii. 597 ; Duncan, *Lex.* ed. Rost, p. 715.

² The same opinion gave rise to the omission of εἰς ὀργ. in D* FG, 177. *et al.* Clar. Boern. And the fact that it is found in

EN* 1. 3. 4. *et al.* Chrys. Theodoret, before ἐκδικος, which Minck approves, is to be explained by an incorrect restoration of the dropped-out word.

while at the same time the right of pardon is still to be kept open for all concrete cases. The character of being unchristian, of barbarism, etc., does not adhere to the *right itself*, but to its *abuse* in legislation and practice.

Ver. 5. The *necessity* of obedience is of such a character, that it is not merely *externally* suggested (by reason of the punishment to be avoided), but is based also on *moral* grounds; and these two considerations are exhibited by *διό* as the result of all that has been hitherto said (vv. 1-4). It is clear, accordingly, that *ἀνάγκη* is not specially the *moral* necessity, but is to be taken generally, as it is only with the second *διά* that the *moral* side of the notion is brought forward. — *διὰ τὴν ὀργήν*] *on account of the magistrate's wrath*, ver. 4. — *διὰ τὴν συνείδ.*] *on account of one's own conscience*, *διὰ τὸ πληροῦν τὰ προσήκοντα*, Theodoret. It is with the Christian the *Christian* conscience, which as such is bound by God's ordinance. Hence 1 Pet. ii. 13 : *διὰ τὸν κύριον*. Aptly Melancthon : "Nulla potentia humana, nulli exercitus magis muniunt imperia, quam haec severissima lex Dei : necesse est obedire propter conscientiam." Both definitions given with *διά* belong, however, to *ἀνάγκη* (*sc. ἐστὶ*), which bears the emphasis, like Heb. ix. 23.

Ver. 6. *For on this account you pay taxes*—this is the *confirmation* of ver. 5, *from the actually subsisting payment of taxes*; *γάρ* retains its sense assigning a reason, and the emphatic *διὰ τοῦτο* (*from this ground*) is exactly in accordance with the context : *ὅτι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ὑποτάσσεσθαι*. At the basis of the argument lies the view, that the existing relation of tax-paying is a *result of the necessity indicated in ver. 5*, and consequently the confirmation of it. If *διὰ τοῦτο* be referred to vv. 1-4 : "ut magistratus Dei mandatu homines maleficos puniant, proborum saluti prospiciant," Fritzsche (comp. Calvin, Tholuck, de Wette, Borger), ver. 5 is arbitrarily passed over. It follows, moreover, from our passage, that the *refusal of taxes* is the practical rejection of the necessity stated in ver. 5. Others take *τελεῖτε* as *imperative* (Heumann, Morus, Tholuck, Klee, Reiche, Köllner, Hofmann). Against this the *γάρ*, which might certainly be taken with the imperative (see on vi. 19), is not indeed decisive; but Paul himself gives by his *οὖν*, ver. 7, the plain indication that he is passing for the first time in ver. 7 to the language of summons, which he now also introduces, not with the present, but with the aorist. — *καὶ* also denotes the *relation corresponding* to ver. 5. It is not "a downward climax" (Hofmann : "even this most *external* performance of subjection"), of which there is no indication at all either in the text or in the thing itself. The latter is, on the contrary, the immediate practical voucher most accordant with the experience of every subject. — *τελεῖτε*] Paul does not in this appeal to his readers' *own recognition* of what was said in ver. 5 (the summons in ver. 7 is opposed to this), but to what *subsists as matter of fact*. — *leitourgoi* γὰρ Θεοῦ κ.τ.λ.] justifies the fundamental statement, expressed by *διὰ τοῦτο*, of the actual bearing of the payment of taxes : *for they are ministering servants of God, persevering in activity on this very behalf* (on no other). The thought in ver. 4, that the magistracy is Θεοῦ διάκονος, is here *by way of climax* more precisely defined through *leitourgoi* (which is therefore *prefixed* with emphasis) according to the *official sacredness* of this relation of service, and that conform-

ably to the *Christian* view of the magisterial calling. Accordingly, those who rule, in so far as they serve the divine counsel and will, and employ their strength and activity to this end, are to be regarded as persons whose administration has the character of a divinely consecrated *sacrificial service*, a *priestly* nature (xv. 16 ; Phil. ii. 17, *et al.*). This renders the proposition the more appropriate for confirmation of the διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., which is a specifically religious one. — λειτουργοὶ Θεοῦ] is predicate, and the subject is understood of itself from the context : *they*, namely *magisterial persons* (οἱ ἄρχοντες). Incorrectly as regards linguistic usage, Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen take προσκαρτ. to be the subject, in which case certainly the article before the participle would be quite indispensable (Reiche erroneously appeals to Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14). — εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο] *Telic* direction not of λειτουργ. (Hofmann), but of προσκαρτ. : *for this very object*, by which is meant not the administration of *tax-paying* (Olshausen, Philippi, and older interpreters), but the just mentioned λειτουργεῖν τῷ Θεῷ, in which vocation, so characteristically *sacred*, the magistracy is continually and assiduously active, and the subject gives to it the means of being so, namely, taxes. Thus the payment of taxes is placed by Paul under the highest point of view of a religious conscientious duty, so that by means of it the divine vocation of the magistracy to provide a constantly active *sacrificial cultus* of God is promoted and facilitated. If εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο was to be referred to the administration of taxes, this would not indeed be “nonsensical” (Hofmann), but the emphatic mode of expression αὐτὸ τοῦτο would be without due motive, nor could we easily perceive why Paul should have selected the verb προσκαρτ., which expresses the moral notion *perseverare*. The reference of it to the nearest great thought, λειτουργοὶ κ.τ.λ., excludes, the more weighty and appropriate that it is, any other reference, even that of Hofmann, that αὐτὸ τοῦτο points back to the same proposition as διὰ τοῦτο.—Instead of εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, Paul might have said αὐτῷ τούτῳ (xii. 12) ; he has, however, conceived προσκαρτ. absolutely, and given with εἰς the definition of its aim. Comp. on the absolute προσκαρτερεῖν, Num. xiii. 20 ; Xen. *Hell.* vii. 5, 14.

Ver. 7. Hortatory application of the actual state of the case contained in vv. 5, 6 : *perform therefore your duties to all* (comp. on 1 Cor. vii. 3), etc.—a brief summary (ἀπόδοτε . . . ὀφείλ.) and distributive indication of that which is to be rendered to all magisterial persons generally (πᾶσι), and to individuals in particular (tax officers, customs officers, judicial and other functionaries), both *really* (φόρος, τέλος) and *personally* (φόβος, τιμή). [See Note CXXXV. p. 501.] — πᾶσι] to be referred to *magistrates*, not to *all men generally* (Estius, Klee, Reiche, Glöckler, comp. also Ewald) ; this is manifestly, from the whole connection—and especially from the following specification, as also from the fact that the language only becomes general at ver. 8—the only reference in conformity with the text. — τῷ τὸν φόρον] *sc.* ἀπαιτοῦντι, which flows *logically* from ἀπόδοτε πᾶσι τ. ὀφ. (Winer, p. 548 [E. T. 590] ; Buttmann, p. 338 [E. T. 395]), and is also suitable to τ. φόβον and τ. τιμὴν ; for, in fact, the discourse is concerning *magistrates*, who—and that not merely as respects the notions of that time—do certainly, in accordance with their respective positions of power and performances of service,

demand fear and honour. — φόρος and τέλος are distinguished as *taxes* (on persons and property) and *customs* (on goods). See on Luke xx. 22. — φόβος, *timē*, fear (not merely reverence), *veneration*. The higher and more powerful the magisterial personages, the more they laid claim, as a rule, to be *feared*; otherwise and lower in the scale, at least to be *honoured* with the respect attaching to their office.

Vv. 8-14. *General exhortation, to love* (vv. 8-10), *and to a Christian walk generally* (vv. 11-14).

Ver. 8. Μηδενὶ μηδὲν ὀφείλετε] negatively the same thing, only generally *referred to the relation to everybody*—and therewith Paul returns to the *general duty of Christians*—which was before said positively in ver. 7 : ἀπόδοτε πᾶσι τὰς ὀφειλάς. By this very parallel, and decisively by the subjective negations, ὀφείλετε is determined to be *imperative*: “*Leave toward no one any obligation unfulfilled, reciprocal love excepted*,” wherein you neither can, nor moreover are expected, ever fully to discharge your obligation. The *inexhaustibility* of the duty of love, the claims of which are not discharged, but renewed and accumulated with fulfilment, is expressed. Comp. Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Augustine, Beza, Grotius, Wetstein, Bengel (“*amare debitum immortale*”), and many others, including Tholuck, Rückert, Reithmayr, de Wette, Philippi, Ewald, Umbreit, Hofmann. The *point* lies in the fact that, while ὀφείλετε applies to those *external* performances to which one is bound (“*obligatio civilis*,” Melancthon), in the case of the ἀγαπᾶν it means the higher *moral obligation*, in virtue of which with the *quotidie solvere* is connected the *semper debere* (Origen). The objections of Reiche to the imperative rendering quite overlook the fact, that with εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀλλήλ. ἀγ. the ὀφείλετε again to be supplied is to be taken not objectively (remain owing mutual love !), but *subjectively*, namely, from the consciousness of the impossibility of discharging the debt of love. But Reiche's own view (so also Schrader, following Heumann, Semler, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Böhme, Flatt, and by way of suggestion, Erasmus), that ὁφ. is *indicative*: “all your obligations come back to love,” is decidedly incorrect, for οὐ must then have been used, as *e.g.* in Plato's testament (Diogenes Laert. iii. 43) : ὀφείλω δ' οὐδενὶ οὐδέν. The passages adduced on the other hand by Reiche from Wetstein are not in point, because they have μὴ with a *participle* or *infinitive*. Fritzsche (comp. Baumgarten-Crusius and Krehl) : Be owing no one anything ; only “*mutuum amorem vos hominibus debere censete*.” Thereby the whole thoughtfulness, the delicate enamel of the passage, is obliterated, and withal there is imported an idea (*censete*) which is not there. — ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπ. κ.τ.λ.] A summons to unceasing compliance with the command of love having been contained in the preceding εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀλλήλων ἀγαπᾶν, Paul now *gives the ground* of this summons by setting forth the *high moral dignity and significance* of love, which is nothing less than the fulfilment of the law. Comp. Gal. v. 14 ; Matt. xxii. 34 ff. — τὸν ἕτερον] belongs to ἀγαπᾶν : *the other*, with whom the loving subject has to do (comp. ii. 1, 21 ; 1 Cor. iv. 6, vi. 1, xiv. 17 ; Jas. iv. 12, *et al.*). Incorrectly Hofmann¹ holds that it belongs to νόμον : *the further, the remaining law*. For

¹ Who objects with singular erroneousness to the ordinary connection with ἀγαπ.,

the usage of *ἕτερος* and *ἄλλος* in the sense of *otherwise existing* (see thereon Krüger, *Xen. Anab.* i. 4. 2; Nägelsbach, *z. Ilias*, p. 250 f.) is here quite inapplicable; Paul must at least have written *καὶ τὰς ἑτέρας ἐντολὰς* (comp. also Luke xxiii. 32; Plato, *Rep.* p. 357 C, and Stallbaum *in loc.*). But most intelligibly and simply he would have written *τὸν πάντα νόμον*, as in Gal. v. 14. It is impossible to explain the *singular ὁ ἕτερος collectively* (with an irrelevant appeal to Rost, § 98, B. 3. 5); *ἕτερος νόμος* could only be *another* (second) law (comp. Rom. vii. 23), and *ὁ ἕτερος v.*, therefore, the definite *other of two*; Kühner, II. 1, p. 548. — *πεπλήρωκε*] present of the completed action, as in ii. 25; in and with the loving *there has taken place* (comp. on Gal. v. 14) what the Mosaic law prescribes (namely, in respect of duties towards one's neighbour, see vv. 9, 10; inasmuch as he who loves does not commit adultery, does not kill, does not steal, does not covet, etc.). But though love is the fulfilment of the law, it is nevertheless not the subjective cause of justification, because all human fulfilment of the law, even love, is incomplete, and only the complete fulfilment of the law would be our righteousness. Rightly Melancthon: "Dilectio est impletio legis, item est justitia, si id intelligatur de *idea* non de tali dilectione, qualis est in hac vita."

Ver. 9. *Ἀνακεφαλαιούται*] *συντόμως καὶ ἐν βραχεί* τὸ πᾶν ἀπαρτίζεται τῶν ἐντολῶν τὸ ἔργον, Chrysostom. But *ἀνα* is not to be neglected (is *again* comprised; see on Eph. i. 10), and is to be referred to the fact that Lev. xix. 18 *recapitulates*, summarily repeats, the other *previously* adduced commands in reference to one's neighbour. Comp. Thilo, *ad Cod. Apoc.* p. 223. — The arrangement which makes *the fifth*¹ commandment follow *the sixth* is also found in Mark x. 19, Luke xviii. 20 (not in Matt. xix. 18), Jas. ii. 11, in Philo, *de decal.*, and Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* vi. 16. The LXX. have, according to Cod. A, the order of the Masoretic original text; but in Cod. B the sixth commandment stands immediately after the fourth, then the seventh, and afterwards the fifth; whereas at Deut. v. 17, according to Cod. B, the order of the series is: *six, five, seven* in the LXX., as here in Paul. The latter *followed copies of the LXX.* which had the same order. The deviations of the LXX. from the original text in such a case can only be derived from a diversity of *tradition* in determining the order of succession in the decalogue, not from *speculative* reasons for such a determination, for which there is no historical basis.² — On *ἀγαπ.* *ὡς ἑαυτόν*,³ see on Matt. xxii. 39.

that Paul would surely (!) have written *ὁ γὰρ τὸν ἕτερον ἀγαπῶν τὸν νόμον πεπλήρ.* As though the very order *ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἕτερον* were not the most common of all (viii. 38, 37; 1 Cor. ii. 9; Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 28, *et al.*)! Quite as common is the use of *νόμος* without the article for the (comp. ver. 10) Mosaic law; see on ii. 12.

¹ Reckoning according to the Lutheran mode of division.

² This also against Hofmann, who thinks that the order of succession in our passage might be founded on the fact that the rela-

tion of man and woman according to the order of creation is earlier than that of man and man, etc. An arbitrarily invented reason, which indeed must have occasioned the transposition of the fourth commandment to a place after the sixth.

³ Of the reading *σεαυτόν* (Lachm., Tisch.), although preponderantly attested, we must judge as in Gal. v. 4. In the Greek writers also the emendation *σεαυτ.* is very frequently found in the odd. instead of *ἑαυτ.*, where by the latter the second person is meant. See especially Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 4. 9.

Ver. 10. Since all, that the law forbids us to do to our neighbour, is morally *evil*, Paul may now summarily conclude his grounding of the commandment of love, as he here does. — ἐργάζεσθαι with *τινὶ τι* instead of *τινὰ τι* is also found, though not frequently, in the Greek writers ; comp. 2 Macc. xiv. 40; Eur. *Hee*. 1085 and Pflugk *in loc.*; Kühner, II. 1, p. 277. — πλήρωμα νόμου ἢ ἀγάπῃ] ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἑτερον νόμον πεπλήρωκε, ver. 8. Other interpretations of πλήρωμα ("id quod in lege summum est," Ch. Schmidt, Rosenmüller ; "plus enim continet quam lex, est everriculum omnis injustitiae," Grotius ; see on the other hand Calovius) are opposed to the context. Comp. Gal. v. 14, where the point of view of the fulfilment of the law by love is still more comprehensive. Observe, moreover, that πλήρωμα is not equivalent to πλήρωσις, but in the love of one's neighbour that whereby the law is fulfilled has *taken place* and is *realized*.—The commentary on this point, how love works no ill to one's neighbour, is given by Paul in 1 Cor. xiii. 4-7.

Ver. 11. For compliance with the preceding exhortation to love, closing with ver. 10, Paul now presents a further weighty *motive* to be pondered, and then draws in turn from this (vv. 12 ff.) other exhortations to a Christian walk generally. — καὶ τοῦτο] our *and that*, i.e. *and indeed, especially as you, etc.* It adds something *peculiarly worthy of remark*—here a further motive particularly to be noted—to the preceding. See on this usage, prevalent also in the classics (which, however, more frequently use καὶ ταῦτα), Hartung, I. p. 146 ; Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 147. Comp. 1 Cor. vi. 6, 8 ; Eph. ii. 8 ; Phil. i. 28 ; Heb. xi. 12. That to which here τοῦτο points back is the injunction expressed in ver. 8, and more precisely elucidated in vv. 8-10, μηδενὶ μηδὲν ὀφείλετε, εἰ μὴ κ.τ.λ. The repetition of it is represented by τοῦτο, so that thus εἰδότες attaches itself to the injunction which is again present in the writer's conception, and hence all supplements (Bengel and several others, ποιείτε ; Tholuck, ποιῶμεν) are dispensed with. The connection of τοῦτο with εἰδότες (Luther, Glöckler) complicates the quite simple language, as is also done by Hofmann, who makes τὸν καιρὸν the object of τοῦτο εἰδότες, and brings out the following sense : "*and having this knowledge of the time, that, or, and so knowing the time, that.*" Even in Soph. O. T. 37¹ καὶ ταῦτ' is simply *and indeed* ; the use of τοῦτο as *absolute* object is irrelevant here (see Bernhardt, p. 106 ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 266), because τοῦτο in the sense of *in such a manner* would necessarily derive its more precise contents from *what precedes*. That which Hofmann means, Paul might have expressed by κ. τοῦτο εἰδ. τοῦ καιροῦ : Kühner, II. 1, p. 238. — εἰδότες] not *considerantes* (Grotius and others), but : *since you know* the (present) period, namely, in respect of its awakening character (see what follows). — ὅτι ὥρα κ.τ.λ.] Epexegesis of εἰδότες τὸν καιρὸν : *that, namely, it is high time that we finally* (without waiting longer, see Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 600) *should wake out of sleep.* ἡδὴ does not belong to ὥρα, but to ἡμᾶς ἐξ ὑπνου ἐγ., and by ὑπνος is denoted figuratively the condition in which the true moral activity of life is bound down and hindered by the power of sin. In this we must observe with

¹ Hofmann (citing ver. 42) professes to have compared Wunder *in loc.*, who, how-

ever, makes *no* remark upon the καὶ ταῦτ' of the passage, p. 18, ed. 3.

what right Paul requires this *ἐγερθῆναι ἐξ ὑπνου* of the *regenerate* (he even includes himself). He means, forsooth, the *full* moral awakening, the ethical elevation of life in that *final* degree, which is requisite in order to stand worthily before the approaching Son of man (see immediately below, *νῦν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*); and *in comparison with this* the previous moral condition, in which much of a sinful element was always hindering the full expression of life, appears to him still as *ὑπνος*, which one must finally lay aside as on awakening out of morning slumber. The Christian life has its new epochs of awakening, like faith (see on John ii. 11), and love to the Lord (John xiv. 28), and the putting on of Christ (ver. 14). This applies also in opposition to Reiche, who, because Christians were already awakened from the ethical sleep, explains *ὑπνος* as an *image of the state of the Christian on earth, in so far as he only at first forecasts and hopes for blessedness*,—quite, however, against the Pauline mode of conception elsewhere (Eph. v. 14 ; 1 Thess. v. 6 ff. ; comp. also 1 Cor. xv. 34). — *νῦν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*] Proof of the preceding *ώρα κ.τ.λ.* The *νῦν* is related to *ἡδη* not as the line to the point (Hofmann, following Hartung), but as the *objective* Now to the *subjective* (present in consciousness); comp. on the latter, Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 140 ff. *νῦν* is related to *ἄρτι* (comp. on Gal. i. 10) as line to point. — *ἡμῶν*] Does this belong to the adverb *ἐγγύτερον* (Beza, Castalio, and others, including Philippi, Hofmann), or to *ἡ σωτηρία* (Luther, Calvin, and others, following the Vulgate)? The former is most naturally suggested by the position of the words ; the latter would allow an emphasis, for which no motive is assigned, to fall upon *ἡμῶν*. — *ἡ σωτηρία*] *the Messianic salvation*, namely, in its completion, as introduced by the *Parousia*, which Paul, along with the whole apostolical church, regarded as near, always drawing nearer, and setting in even before the decease of the generation. Comp. Phil. iv. 5 ; 1 Pet. iv. 7 ; see also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 426. Not recognizing the latter fact,—notwithstanding that Paul brings emphatically into account the short time from his conversion up to the present time of his writing (*νῦν*),¹—commentators have been forced to very perverted interpretations ; e.g. that deliverance by death was meant (Photius and others), or the destruction of Jerusalem, a fortunate event for Christianity (Michaelis, following older interpreters), or the preaching among the Gentiles (Melancthon), or the *inner σωτηρία*, the spiritual salvation of Christianity (Flacius, Calovius, Morus, Flatt, Benecke, Schrader, comp. Glöckler). Rightly and clearly Chrysostom says : *ἐπὶ θύραις γὰρ, φησὶν, ὁ τῆς κρίσεως ἔστηκε καιρός*. Comp. Theodore of Mopsuestia : *σωτηρίαν δὲ ἡμῶν καλεῖ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, ἐπειδὴ τότε τῆς ἀληθινῆς ἀπολαύομεν σωτηρίας*. But the nearer the blessed goal, the more wakeful and vigilant we should be. — *ἡ ὅτε ἐπιστ.*]

¹ *νῦν*, as well as *ἐγγύτερον ἡμῶν* and *ἡ σωτηρία*, the latter in the *final-historical* sense, is to be left textually in the clear and definite literal meaning, in contradistinction to which inexact and vacillating generalizations of the concrete relation expressed by Paul, which mix up the nearness of time with the ethical approach, appear inadmissible. This applies also against Hofmann, accord-

ing to whom the expectation of the near return of Christ is not found at all in the Epistle to the Romans (see Hofmann on Col. p. 181) ; and Paul is here supposed to say that salvation came near to them, at the time when they became believers through the very fact of their becoming believers (?), but that now, after that they are believers (?), it stands so much (?) the nearer to them.

than when we became believers ;¹ 1 Cor. iii. 5, xv. 2 ; Gal. ii. 16 ; Mark xvi. 16 ; Acts xix. 2, and frequently.

Ver. 12. Το ἔσθινος corresponds here as correlate ἡ νύξ, i.e. the time before the Parousia, which ceases, when with the Parousia the day arrives. νύξ and ἡμέρα are accordingly figures for the αἰὼν οὗτος and μέλλον, and ἡμέρα is not equivalent to σωτηρία (de Wette), but the day brings the σωτηρία. [See Note CXXXVI. p. 502.] Comp. Heb. x. 25. — The image is appropriate ; for in regard to the knowledge, righteousness, and glory which will have a place in the future αἰὼν, this approaching blessed time will be related to the imperfect present time as day to night. Theodore of Mopsuestia aptly remarks : ἡ μέραν καλεῖ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρουσίας καιρὸν . . . νύκτα δὲ τὸν πρὸ τούτου χρόνον. — προέκοψεν] not : is past (Luther), but : has made progress, processit (see Gal. i. 14 ; Luke ii. 52 ; 2 Tim. ii. 46 ; Lucian, Soloe. 6 ; Joseph. Bell. iv. 4. 6), so that the day is no longer distant. It is very possible that Paul conceived to himself the time of the approach of the Parousia as the time of twilight, with which conception both the preceding ὥρα ἡμᾶς ἤδη κ.τ.λ. and the following ἀποθώμεθα aptly agree. — ἀποθώμεθα] as one puts off garments. This way of conceiving it (in opposition to Fritzsche and Hofmann) corresponds to the correlate ἐνδυσώμεθα, comp. on Eph. iv. 22. The ἔργα τοῦ σκότους, i.e. the works, whose element, wherein they are accomplished, is darkness (comp. Eph. v. 11), the condition of spiritual want of knowledge and of the dominion of sin, are regarded as night-clothes, which the sleeper has had on, and which he who has risen is now to put off. — ἐνδυσώμεθα] of the putting on of arms (ὅπλα, as vi. 13), which in part are drawn on like garments. Comp. Eph. vi. 11 ; 1 Thess. v. 8. — τοῦ φωτός] not glittering arms (Grotius, Wetstein), but in contrast to τοῦ σκότους : arms (i.e. dispositions, principles, modes of action) which belong to the element of (spiritual) light, which one has as πεφωτισμένος by virtue of his existence and life in the divine truth of salvation. τοῦ φωτός, has the spiritual sense, as also previously τοῦ σκότους, as being in the application of that which was said of the νύξ and ἡμέρα ; but the metaphorical expressions are selected as the correlates of νύξ and ἡμέρα. — The Christian is a warrior in the service of God and Christ against the kingdom of darkness. Comp. Eph. vi. 11, 12 ; 2 Cor. vi. 7, x. 4 ; 1 Thess. v. 8 ; 1 Tim. i. 18 ; Rom. vi. 13.²

Ver. 13.³ Ὡς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ] as one walks in the day (when one avoids everything unbecoming). This in a moral sense, Paul desires, should be the ruling principle of the Christian, who sees the day already dawning (ver. 12). — εἰσχημένως] becomingly, 1 Thess. iv. 12 ; 1 Cor. vii. 35, xiv. 40. It is moral decorum of conduct. — κῶμῳς κ.τ.λ.] The datives are explained from the notion of the way and manner in which the περιπατεῖν, i.e. the inner and outward conduct of life, ought not to take place (Kühner, II. 1, p. 382), namely,

¹ Incorrectly Luther: "than when we believed it." He appears, with Erasmus, to have thought of the belief, that salvation was to be obtained under the law, by works.

² For profane analogies, see Gataker, ad Anton. p. 58.

³ This verse, which once struck Augus-

tine's eye and heart on his opening the Bible, decided him, already prepared by the preaching of Ambrose, to final repentance and to baptism. Confess. viii. 12, 28 f. See Bindemann, d. heil. Augustinus, I. p. 281 f.

not *with revellings* (κώμοις ; see respecting this, on Gal. v. 21 ; Welker in Jacobs, *Philostr.* i. 2, p. 202 ff.) and *carousals* (comp. Gal. v. 21), etc. The *local* view (Philippi) is less in keeping with the particulars mentioned, and that of *dativus commodi* (Fritzsche, comp. van Hengel) less befits the figurative verb. — κοίταις] *congressibus venereis* (comp. on ix. 10), Wisd. iii. 13, and see Kypke, II. p. 185. — ἀσελγείαις] *wantonness* (especially of lust). See Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 151.¹ — ζηλῶ] *jealousy* (1 Cor. i. 11, iii. 3) ; neither *anger* (Fritzsche, Philippi, and others), which is not denoted by ζήλος (not even in 1 Cor. iii. 2 ; 2 Cor. xii. 20 ; Gal. v. 20), nor *envy* (Photius, Luther, and others), which is less in accordance with the preceding (κοίτ. κ. ἀσελγ.), whilst strife and *jealousy* follow in the train of the practice of lust.—The three particulars adduced stand in the internal connection of cause and effect.

Ver. 14. Ἐνδύσασθε τ. κύρ. Ἰ. Χρ.] This is the specifically *Christian* nature of the ἐνσχημόνως περιπ. But the expression is figurative, signifying the idea : *Unite yourselves in the closest fellowship of life with Christ, so that you may wholly present the mind and life of Christ in your conduct.* In classical Greek also ἐνδύεσθαι τινα denotes *to adopt any one's mode of sentiment and action.* See Wetstein and Kypke. But the *praesens efficacia Christi* (see Melancthon) is that which distinguishes the having put on Christ from the adoption of other exemplars. Comp. Gal. iii. 27 ; Eph. iv. 24 ; Col. iii. 12 ; and on the subject-matter, viii. 9 ; 1 Cor. vi. 17 ; Photius in Oecumenius : πῶς δὲ αὐτὸν ἐνδύεσθαι ; εἰ πάντα ἡμῖν αὐτὸς εἶη, ἔσωθεν καὶ ἔξωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν φαινόμενος. Observe further, that the having put on Christ *in baptism* was the entrance into the sonship of God (Gal. iii. 27), but that in the further *development of the baptized one* each new advance of his moral life (comp. on ver. 11) is to be a new putting on of Christ ; therefore it, like the putting on of the new man, is always *enjoined afresh*.² — καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς κ.τ.λ.] *and make not care of the flesh unto lusts*, i.e. *take not care for the flesh to such a degree, that lusts are thereby excited.* By μὴ the πρόνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι εἰς ἐπιθ. together is forbidden, not (as Luther and many) merely the εἰς ἐπιθ., according to which the whole sentence would resolve itself into the two members : τῆς σ. πρόνοιαν μὲν ποιεῖσθε, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς ἐπιθ. In that case μὴ must have stood after ποιεῖσθε (see xiv. 1) ; for a *transposition* of the negation is not to be assumed in any passage of the N. T. — τῆς σαρκὸς] is emphatically prefixed, adding to the putting on of the Lord previously required, which is the *spiritual* mode of life, that which is to be done *bodily*. The σάρξ is here not equivalent to σῶμα (as is frequently assumed ; see on the other hand Calovius and Reiche), but is that which composes the material substance of man, as the source and seat of sensuous and sinful desires, in contrast to the πνεῦμα of man with the νοῦς. Paul *purposely* chose the expression, because in respect of care for the *body* he wishes to present the point of view that this care nourishes and attends to the σάρξ, and one must therefore be on one's guard against caring for the latter *in such measure* that the lusts, which have their seat in the σάρξ, are excited and strengthened. According to Fritzsche, Paul *absolutely* forbids the taking care for the σάρξ (he urges that σάρξ must be *libidinosa caro*). But

¹ On the sense of the *plural*, see Lucian, *Amor.* 21 : ἵνα μὴδὲν ἀγνοῇ μέρος ἀσελγείας.

² Comp. Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsst.* p. 186 f.

to this the expression *πρόνοιαν ποιείσθε* is not at all suitable. The flesh, so understood, is to be *crucified* (Gal. v. 24), the body as determined by it is to be *put off* (Col. ii. 11), its *πράξεις* are to be *put to death* (Rom. viii. 13), because its *φρόνημα* is enmity against God and productive of death (viii. 6, 7). The *σάρξ* is here rather the living *matter of the σῶμα*, which, as the *seat of the ἐπιθυμίας*, in order to guard against the excitement of the latter, ought to experience a care that is to be *restricted* accordingly, and to be *subordinated* to the moral end (comp. on *σάρξ*, 1 Cor. vii. 28, xv. 50 ; 2 Cor. iv. 10, 11, vii. 1, 5, xii. 7 ; Gal. ii. 20, iv. 13, 14). In substance and in moral principle, the *ἀφειδία σώματος* (Col. ii. 23) is different from this. Chrysostom aptly observes : *ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐ τὸ πίνειν ἐκώλυσεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεθύειν, οὐδὲ τὸ γαμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀσελεῖν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ προνοεῖν τῆς σαρκὸς, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰς ἐπιθυμίας, οἷον τὸ τὴν χρεῖαν ὑπερβαίνειν*. Moreover it is clear in itself, that Paul has added the second half of ver. 14 in view of what is to be handled in chap. xiv., and has thereby prepared the way for a transition to the latter.

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

CXXXIV. Vv. 1, 2. *πᾶσα ψυχὴ* *ὑποτασσέσθω κ.τ.λ.*

Meyer supposes that Paul in the use of *πᾶσα ψυχὴ* conceives of "man in reference to his soul-nature, in virtue of which he consciously feels pleasure and displeasure, etc., and cherishes corresponding impulses." Weiss ed. Mey. denies this, and claims that the expression is employed because the thought turns here from duties of the common life of the Christian body to those of the individual life (the *ψυχὴ* being the seat of the individuality of the man). Godet thinks it is connected with the idea that the obligation referred to is not one arising from the *spiritual* life of the believer, but belonging to the *psychical* life, which is common to all mankind. The use of the expression elsewhere, however, shows that no such special sense is required, and it is much more probable that the meaning is *every soul*, as equivalent to *every man*. (Comp. iii. 20 ; 1 Cor. i. 29 ; cf. also ii. 9). So Philippi, Rückert, de Wette, Shedd, and others.

Meyer, and Weiss apparently agrees with him in this point, holds that *ὑπερεχούσας* refers to the higher authorities. The exhortation has its greatest emphasis, no doubt, with reference to these, but the participle is apparently intended to designate all magistrates. To all such, according to their station (cf. ver. 7), the Roman Christian is bidden to submit himself. The different words connected with the root of *τάσσω* are especially noticeable in this and the following verses : *ὑποτασσέσθω, τεταγμένοι, ἀντιτασσόμενος, διαταγῇ*.

αἱ δὲ οὐσαι refers to the then existing authorities, but suggests the same thing as relating to all times and places. Civil government is ordained of God. It should be recognized and obeyed by the subject of it as Divinely instituted. The Apostle is not discoursing or philosophizing on civil government, however, as if for the sole purpose of unfolding its true theory. He is in the midst of practical exhortations which bear upon the daily living of his readers. Consequently he moves in his expressions within the sphere of their life ; calling attention to the actual magistrates under whom they were placed, to the functions which these magistrates exercised, to the powers which they possessed, to the duties and obligations owed to them, to the evil of resisting their authority.

What he says, accordingly, is to be interpreted (and to receive its proper limitations also) in view of this fact. The opinion entertained by some writers, that he denies here the right of revolution, is entirely without foundation. There is no reference to this subject in the passage. This right, if it exists under any circumstances, is like that of self-defence, and the discussion of the question of its existence is altogether outside of the sphere of his present thought. In like manner, there is no ground in these verses for the idea that Paul declares capital punishment to be a right whose exercise by the supreme magistracy, in the case of certain crimes, should be continued during all ages. He simply refers to the power to inflict it as possessed by the government under which the readers lived, and as one ground of fear in case they did evil. A reference of this character added impressiveness to the suggestions of duty which he was giving for their guidance. But there was no occasion to go beyond this, and to announce the Divine will for other and distant times. The decision of such questions, appertaining to the welfare of society and the methods of administration, is left to the enlightened Christian mind under the general influence of Christian truth.

The exhortation here given to obey civil magistrates [as, also, those given elsewhere to wives and slaves, that they should yield obedience to their husbands and masters] was, doubtless, pressed by the Apostle *with special earnestness*, because of the doctrine of Christian equality which he had so emphatically preached. His converts and all who entered the new life were in danger of carrying this doctrine of equality into the sphere of social and family relationships, and thus not only of falling into error, but of bringing reproach upon the Church and endangering the success of the cause. The understanding of all such practical directions in his Epistles, having reference to matters within this sphere, is to be influenced by this circumstance. The same direction may have a deeper meaning or a greater emphasis in one age than in another, though it may not lose all force in any age. It may, possibly, have great significance at an earlier period, and at a later one have even none at all. Comp. 1 Cor. xi. 5 f. as illustrating this point and presenting an instance of practical advice or commands, which no Christian thinks of as literally applicable to the ordinary life of to-day. Another instance is found in 1 Tim. iii. 2, where the writer says that a bishop or elder should not marry a second time (i.e. after the death of his first wife).

CXXXV. Ver. 7. ἀποδοτε πᾶσι τὰς ὀφειλάς, κ.τ.λ.

This verse is commonly regarded (so Meyer) as belonging with those which precede it, and πᾶσι is supposed to mean all magistrates. Weiss ed. Mey. (with Reiche and others) connects it with ver. 8 ff. as a positive exhortation, to which ver. 8 answers as a negative. πᾶσι, thus, refers to all men. The most correct and satisfactory view may be that it is a transition verse, taking hold both of what goes before and what follows. The words *custom* and *tribute* are especially appropriate to the relation of the reader to the officers of state. *Fear* and *honour*, on the other hand, have no such limited application. The meaning is probably this: Pay to all men their dues, whether these be tribute and custom, as to the civil authorities, or honour and fear or reverence, as to any who may deserve such respect. And then, passing to the new paragraph, the writer adds, Owe no man anything, except the debt which, though you are always paying it, can

never be fully paid. In these words there is an implied exhortation to love all, and a reason for this is found in the next clause : *ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἕτερον νόμον πεπλήρωκεν*. That *νόμον* in this sentence, ver. 8, means the Mosaic law is evident from the fact that the proof (ver. 9) of its fulfilment is the fulfilling of the commands of the law of Moses. As *νόμος* stands on both sides of ver. 9 (vv. 8, 10), and in immediate and necessary connection with it, it must refer to the same thing which is distinctly presented in that verse.

CXXXVI. Ver. 12. *ἡ νύξ προέκυψεν, ἡ δὲ ἡμέρα ἤγγικεν*.

This compound sentence, together with the verse which precedes it, is introduced as an additional and special reason for giving heed to the words of exhortation already presented. Upon the thought which it expresses, however, is founded, also, the urgent appeal of the following verses to lay aside the works of darkness and to put on the armour of light. That the idea which it suggests is not that of the approach of the end of the earthly life for the individual believer, but that of the nearness of the Parousia, is admitted by most of the recent commentators. That the latter idea, if found in all the phrases used in the passage, gives a significance and impressiveness to the words, which otherwise they cannot have, is beyond question. That the same is the case with other passages of a similar character, wherever they occur in the Pauline Epistles, is also true. That such forms of expression as occur in 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52 and 1 Thess. iv. 15-17 are not easily explained except as involving this idea, will be evident to any one who considers how strange, or even impossible, it would be for a writer, having the ordinary view of the second coming which characterizes men of our own age, to use them in addressing his fellow-Christians :—After those who have died shall have been raised from the dead, we who survive to the coming of the Lord shall be caught up in the clouds for a meeting with the Lord ; and, while the dead are thus to be raised, we shall be changed. The time of the Parousia was distinctly declared by Christ (Acts i. 7) to be outside of the limits of the Divine communication to the Apostles. They were left, therefore, to the judgments and expectations of their own minds. Indeed, it seems to have been God's method in all matters of prophecy to reveal to His messengers the things which were to take place in the future, but to reserve within His own knowledge the date of their occurrence.

The genitive *ἡμῶν* in ver. 11, by reason of its position in the sentence, is probably to be regarded as depending on *ἐγγύτερον*. The emphasis of this and the other expressions is very marked. The brief, critical season ; the hour has already come to awake ; nearer to us now is the end than when we first believed ; the night is far on ; the day is at hand ; let us put off what belongs to the darkness and put on what belongs to the light ; let us live as if already in the day ; let us take to ourselves the spirit and character and life-principle of the Lord, whom we are to meet at His coming. How impressively the words must have sounded, as Paul uttered them, and how powerfully they must have moved the Roman believers, if the full establishment of the kingdom seemed to their thought a thing of the near future. And with what force and earnestness must these phrases, following each other in rapid succession, have filled the exhortations, which had just been given, to love all men and do every duty of the Christian life, consecrating body and mind alike to God.

CHAPTER XIV.

Ver. 3. καὶ ὁ] Lachm. and Tisch. : ὁ δέ, according to A B C D* N* 5. Clar. Goth. Clem. Damasc. Mechanical repetition from ver. 2. — Ver. 4. δυνατὸς γάρ ἐστιν] A B C D* F G N have δυνατεὶ γάρ (commended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. and Tisch.); D*** Bas. Chrys. : δυνατός γάρ (so Fritzsche). The original is certainly δυνατεὶ γάρ; for δυνατέω is found elsewhere in the N. T. only in 2 Cor. xiii. 3, and was there also in codd. exchanged for more current and better known expressions — ὁ Θεός] A B C* P N, Copt. Sahid. Arm. Goth. Aeth. Aug. *et al.* : ὁ κύριος (so Lachm. and Tisch.), the origin of which, however, is betrayed by *dominus ejus* in Syr. Erp. It was here (at ver. 3 the connection furnished no occasion for it) written on the margin as a gloss, and supplanted the original ὁ Θεός. — Ver. 5.] Instead of δς μὲν, A C P N*, Vulg. codd. of It. Goth. and some Fathers have δς μὲν γάρ; so Lachm. (bracketing γάρ, however) and Tisch. 8. But the testimony in favour of the mere δς μὲν is older, stronger, and more diffused; as is frequently the case, γάρ was here awkwardly inserted to connect the thought. — Ver. 6. καὶ ὁ μὴ φρονῶν τὴν ἡμέραν, κυρίῳ οὐ φρονεῖ] is wanting in A B C* D E F G N, 23. 57. 67.** Copt. Aeth. Vulg. It. Ruf. Ambrosiast. Pel. Aug. Jer. al. Lat.; Chrys. and Theodoret have it *in the text*. Condemned by Mill, omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. Rightly, since the evidence for omission is so decisive, and since the interpolation was so very readily suggested by the sense of a want of completeness in the passage, in view of the following contrast, that the explanation of the omission from *homoeoteleuton* (Rückert, Reiche, de Wette, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Philippi, Tischendorf, and several others)—however easily it might have been occasioned thereby (especially as καὶ before ὁ ἐσθίων, which Elz. has not, is undoubtedly genuine)—appears nevertheless insufficient. Among the oldest witnesses, Syr. is too solitary in its support of the words not to suggest the suspicion of an interpolation in the text of the Peshito. — Ver. 8. ἀποθνήσκωμεν] Lachm. both times has ἀποθνήσκομεν, according to A D E F G P min. But Paul has in *no* other place ἐάν with pres. indic. (in Gal. i. 8 only K and min. have the indic.), and how easily might a slip of the pen take place here! — Ver. 9. Before ἀπέθανε Elz. and Scholz have καὶ, against decisive testimony. — After ἀπέθανε Elz. has καὶ ἀνέστη (which is wanting in A B C N*, Copt. Arm. Aeth. and Fathers), and afterwards, instead of ἐξησεν, ἀνέξησεν (against largely preponderating evidence). Further, F G, Vulg. Boern. Or. Cyr. (twice) Pel. Ambr. Fulgent. have not ἐξησεν at all, although they have ἀνέστη (therefore ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη); D E, Clar. Germ. Ir. Gaud. have even ἐξησε κ. ἀπέθανε κ. ἀνέστη, but D** L P N** Syr. p. and several Fathers : ἀπέθανε κ. ἀνέστη κ. ἐξησε. The origin of all these variations is readily explained from ἀπέθανε καὶ ἐξησεν (Lachm. and Tisch.), the best attested, and for that very reason, among the many differences, to be set down as original. First ἐξησεν was glossed by ἀνέστη, comp. 1 Thess. iv. 14. Thus there arose, through the adoption of the gloss *instead of* the original word, the reading ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη; and by the adoption of the gloss *along with* the original word, in some

cases ἀπέθανε κ. ἐξῆσε κ. ἀνέστη, in some cases ἀπέθανε κ. ἀνέστη κ. ἐξῆσεν (so Matth.) — whence there then arose, by an accidental or designed repetition of the AN, the ἀπέθ. κ. ἀνέστη κ. ἀνέζησεν of the Recepta (very feebly attested, and diffused by Erasmus). Finally, the transposition ἐξῆσε κ. ἀπέθανε κ. ἀνέστη was formed, after ἀπέθανε κ. ἀνέστη was already read, by mistaken criticism, inasmuch as there was a desire to restore the original ἐξῆσε, but the non-genuineness of ἀνέστη was as little known as the proper place for ἐξῆσε, and hence the latter, explained of the earthly life of Jesus, was placed before ἀπέθ. — Ver. 10. Χριστοῦ] A B C* D E F G N* and several vss. and Fathers : Θεοῦ. So Lachm. and Tisch., also Fritzsche. Rightly ; Χριστοῦ was introduced from the preceding, and perhaps also (comp. Rufinus) through comparison of 2 Cor. v. 10. — Ver. 12. δώσει] Lachm. : ἀποδώσει, according to B D* F G 39. Chrys. But this compound is the usual expression with λόγον. — Ver. 14. αὐτοῦ] Elz. : ἐαυτοῦ, instead of αὐτοῦ (see exegetical notes). So again Tisch. 8, but only according to B C N, Chrys. Dam. Theophyl. A reflexive more precise definition. — Ver. 15. δέ] Lachm. and Tisch. : γάρ, which Griesb. also commended, according to decisive testimony. — Ver. 18. Instead of the Rec. ἐν τούτοις, Lachm. and Tisch. have ἐν τούτῳ, according to A B C D* F G P N*, 5. Vulg. It. Copt. Sahid. Ruf. Aug. But the Rec., sufficiently attested by D*** E L N***, and almost all min., Syr. utr. Goth. Chrys. Theodoret, Tert., is the more to be defended, since ἐν τούτῳ might very easily have intruded through the immediately preceding ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ. It was less likely that τούτῳ should be converted into τούτοις on account of the plurality of the particulars contained in ver. 17. The latter is rightly retained by Beng. Matth. Reiche, Fritzsche, van Hengel, and various others. — Ver. 19, διώκομεν] The reading διώκομεν, adopted by Tisch. 8, although in A B F G L P N, is an old error of the pen, attested by no version, abandoned rightly also by Lachm. *ed. maj.* (in the *ed. min.* he had adopted it, written ὦρα, and taken the sentence interrogatively). — After ἀλλήλ. D E F G, Vulg. It. and a few Fathers have φυλάξωμεν. A supplement. — Ver. 21. ἡ σκανδ. ἡ ἀσθ.] omitted by Tisch. 8, is wanting in A C 67.** Syr. Erp. Copt. Aeth. and some Fathers, including Origen. The former is suspicious as an addition from ver. 13, the latter as a gloss. However, in the case of synonyms, one or the other was often omitted, as *e.g.*, in ver. 13, πρόσκομμα (and therewith ᾗ) is wanting in B, and the evidence in favour of omission is not here sufficiently strong to condemn the words. Instead of προσκ. ἡ σκανδ. ἡ ἀσθ., N* has merely λυπῆται, a gloss in itself correct according to ver. 15. — Ver. 22. After πιστῶν Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have ᾗν, according to A B C N, Copt. Ruf. Aug. Pel. A double writing of IN, or explanatory resolution, to which the weight of evidence of almost all vss. and Greek Fathers especially is opposed. — On the doxology, xvi. 25–27, not belonging to the end of chap. xiv., see critical notes on chap. xvi.

As elsewhere (Acts xv. 1, 5 ; Gal. iii. 1 ff. ; Col. ii. 16 ff.), so there were even in the predominantly Gentile-Christian community at Rome, among the Jewish-Christian minority¹ belonging to it, persons who sought still to retain the standpoint of pre-Christian legalism. But these Jewish-Christians in Rome had not, as elsewhere, come forward as the defenders of circumcision, or generally in an aggressive anti-Pauline attitude. Hence Paul

¹ Comp. Beyschlag in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1887, p. 645.

speaks of them in so forbearing and mild a way, and keeps direct polemics entirely in the background. They were men not of hostile, but only of prejudiced minds, whose moral consciousness lacked the vigour to regard as unessential a peculiar asceticism, according to which they *ate no flesh* (ver. 2), and *drank no wine* (ver. 21), and still held to the observance of the *Jewish feast-days* (ver. 5), passing judgment withal, as is usually the case with men of a separatist bias, on those who were more free, but only earning the contempt of these in return. In presence of this asceticism, and in respect of its main feature, namely, abstinence from flesh and wine, the question arises: Was it based generally (Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Jerome, Calovius, and many others, including Reiche and Köllner) on the *Mosaic-Jewish* ordinances respecting meat and drink? or, in particular (Clement of Alexandria, Ambrosiaster, Augustine, Michaelis, *Anm.*, Flatt, Neander, Reithmayr, Tholuck, Philippi), on the dread of heathen *sacrificial* flesh and *sacrificial* wine (comp. the apostolic decrees, Acts xv.)? or on both (Erasmus, Toletus, and others, including Rückert, Borger, de Wette)? Against the *first* of these three possibilities it may be urged that vv. 2 and 21 do not allow us to assume any limitation of the abstinence at all, but require it to be understood of flesh and wine generally; while, on the other hand, the law does not forbid all flesh and does not forbid wine at all, and the Rabbins forbid only the flesh slaughtered by the Goyim and the wine of the Goyim (see Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. pp. 616 ff., 620 ff.). To assume now, with Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and Theophylact, that those persons had abstained from *all* flesh for the reason that they might not be blamed by the others on account of their despising swine's flesh, or from contempt towards the Gentiles (*τινές* in Theodoret), would be completely arbitrary, indeed opposed to the text; for they themselves were on one side the censurers, on the other the despised, ver. 3. Against the *second* opinion, that the abstinence in question referred only to the *flesh offered in sacrifice to idols* (Acts xv.) and the *wine of libation* (see Mischn. Surenh. IV. pp. 369, 384; Eisenmenger, *l.c.* p. 621), it may be urged that the whole section contains not a word on the sacrificial character of the flesh and wine, while yet we are bound to conclude from 1 Cor. viii. and x. that Paul would not have passed by this essential aspect of the matter without touching on it and turning it to account. Hence also the *third* view, which combines these, cannot be approved. In fact, the Jewish-Christian abstinence in question appears rather to be a *supra-legal* anxiety, such as was nothing rare in Judaism at that time (Philo, in Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* viii. *fin.*; Josephus, *Vit.* 2, 3; Grotius on ver. 2; Ritschl, in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1855, p. 353), under the influence of *Essenic* principles (see Ritschl, *altkath. K.* pp. 184, 187). It appears certainly as an *ἐθελοθρησκεία*, brought over from Judaism into Christianity by persons of Essenic tendencies, and fostered by the ethics of Christianity, which combated the flesh.¹ By its adherents, however, among the Jewish-Chris-

¹ Respecting the Apostle Matthew, Clement of Alexandria, *Paedag.* ii. 1, p. 174 Pott., informs us that he ate only vegetables, no flesh; and of James, the brother

of the Lord, Augustine, *de Faust.* xxii. 3, relates that he had used neither flesh nor wine. Comp. Hegesippus in Eusebius ii. 23. But see Ritschl, p. 224 f. The Peter of

tians of Rome at that time, it was not maintained in opposition to justification by faith, but was so practised without pretentiousness and polemics (and in particular without separation from a common table with the Gentile Christians), that the wisdom of the apostolic teaching deemed it inappropriate to enter into special conflict with such a remnant of an Essenic *Ἰουδαϊστέων*, or to speak of it otherwise than with the most cautious forbearance. Baur, I. p. 381 ff., declares those persons to be *Ebionite* Christians (according to Epiphanius, *Haer.* xxx. 15, the Ebionites abstained from all use of flesh, because flesh originated from generation ; see Ritschl, p. 205). But against this view it may at once be urged,¹ that complete abstinence from *wine* on the part of the Ebionites is nowhere expressly attested ; and further, that, if the weak brethren at Rome had been persons who regarded the use of *flesh* as on principle and absolutely sinful, as was the case with Ebionitism, Paul would not have expressed himself so mildly and tolerantly respecting an error which would have been fundamental, dualistic as it was and opposed to justification by faith. Moreover, the Ebionites date only from the destruction of Jerusalem (see Uhlhorn, *d. Homil. u. Recogn. d. Clem.* p. 387 ff.); hence the Roman weak brethren could only be termed Ebionitic in so far as their abstinence had the same root with the asceticism of the Ebionites, viz. Essenism. That among the numerous Roman Jews, who had arrived as prisoners of war from Palestine, there were various Essenes who thereafter became Christians, cannot be subject to any well-founded doubt (comp. Ritschl, p. 233 f.). And the less reason is there to call in *question* not merely the Ebionitic, but also the *Essenic*, root of the phenomenon (Th. Schott). To refer it to the general interest of *world-denying holiness* does not suffice for the explanation of the several passages, and in particular does not explain the *observance of days* and the *impure* character which was attributed to the use of flesh (ver. 14). Hence, too, we are not, with Hofmann, to abide by the mere general conclusion, that doubt prevailed as to whether it was compatible with the holiness of the church of God to use such food as man had not assigned to him *from the beginning*, and as the Christian should *for this very reason* rather dispense with than enjoy for the sake of good cheer. Thus the matter would amount to an odd theoretic reflection, without any connection with historical concrete antecedent relations,—a view with which we can the less be content, since the observance of days cannot exegetically be got rid of as a point which had likewise occasioned dispute (see on ver. 5). Eichhorn takes the weak brethren to be *earlier, mostly Gentile-Christian* adherents of *ascetico-philosophic, chiefly Neo-Pythagorean principles*. There was certainly at that time diffused among the Gentiles, through the influence of the Neo-Pythagorean philosophy, an abstinence quite analogous to that Jewish one, as we know from Senec. *Ep.* 108, Porphyry. *De abstin.*, and others (see Grotius on ver. 2, and Reiche, II. p. 463 f.); but, on the other hand, that view is at variance partly with ver. 5 (comp. Col. ii. 16, 17), partly with xv. 8, 9, where Paul

the Clementines also practises this abstinence.

¹ Whether the Ebionites of Epiphanius

may be derived from Essenism (the ordinary view, ably defended by Ritschl in opposition to Schliemann) or not.

sedulously brings into view the theocratic dignity of the *Jews*, while he bids the Gentiles praise God *on account of grace*—which is most in harmony with the view that the despised weak ones are to be sought among the *former*. It may be also conjectured *a priori* that our ascetics, if they had arrived at their habit by the path of philosophy, would hardly have behaved themselves in so passive and unpretentious a manner and have been merely regarded by Paul just as *weak ones*.¹ We may add that vv. 5, 6 do not justify us in assuming *two parties* among the Roman weak brethren, so that the κρίνοντες ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν, ver. 5, are to be distinguished from the λάχανα ἐσθίοντες, ver. 2,—the former as the stricter and probably Palestinian, the latter as the freer and probably Hellenistic, Jewish-Christians (so Philippi). As the observance of the feast days, especially of the Sabbaths, was essentially bound up with the Essenic tendency, the assumption of such a separation cannot be justified exegetically (from the κρίνειν). Just as little is there exegetical ground for the view that the community addressed and instructed in xiv. 1 ff. is notified as being *Jewish-Christian* in its main composition; whereas xv. 1 ff. betrays a *Gentile-Christian minority*, which had been more exclusive and intolerant towards the weak than the great body of the church, the relation of whom to the weak the apostle has in view in chap. xiv. (Mangold, p. 60 ff.)

Vv. 1–12. *Summons to brotherliness towards the weak ones* (ver. 1). *First point of difference between the two parties, and encouragement in relation to it* (vv. 2–4). *Second point of difference, and encouragement in relation to it* (ver. 5). *The right point of view for both in their differences* (ver. 6), and *reason assigned for it* (vv. 7–9); *reproof and disallowance of the opposite conduct* (vv. 10–12).

Ver. 1. Δέ] passing over from the due limitation of care for the flesh (xiii. 14) to those who, in the matter of this limitation, pursue not the right course, but one springing from weakness of faith. — τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει [See Note CXXXVII. p. 522.] That πίστις here also denotes *faith in Christ*, is self-evident; the *infirmity*, however, is not conceived of—according to the general πάντα ὁντα τῷ πιστεύοντι (Mark ix. 23; 1 Cor. xiii. 2)—in a general sense and without any more precise character, but, in conformity with the context (see vv. 2, 14, 22, 23), as a want of that *ethical strength of faith*, in virtue of which one may and should have, along with his faith, the *regulative principle of moral conviction and certainty* corresponding to its nature and contents. In this more definite and precise sense those ascetics were *weak in faith*. Had they not been so, the discernment of conscience and assurance of conscience, analogous to faith, would have enabled them to be

¹ Against Eichhorn's view also, as it seems to me, the passage in Origen militates: ὅρα δὲ καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ αἰτίου τῆς τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀποχῆς τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσκητῶν. Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς μετενσωματουμένης μῦθον ἐμψύχων ἀπέχονται . . . ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο πράττωμεν, ποιοῦμεν αὐτὸ, ἐπεὶ ὑποπιázομεν τὸ σῶμα καὶ δουλαγωγούμεν κ.τ.λ. (c. Cels. 4), where Origen

distinguishes expressly the Pythagorean abstinence as something fundamentally (ideally) different from the Christian, and traces the latter to an idea, which quite merited the lenient treatment of the apostle and makes the continuance of this asceticism in the Christian Church very readily intelligible.

free from doubt and scruple in respect to that which, in the life of faith, was right or wrong, allowable or not allowable, and to act accordingly ; and consequently, in particular, to raise themselves above the *adiaphora* as such, without prejudice and ethical narrowness. It is therefore evident that the ἀσθένεια τῇ πίστει carries with it defectiveness of moral γνῶσις, but this does not justify the explaining of πίστις as equivalent to γνῶσις (Grotius and others), or as equivalent to *doctrine* believed (Beza, Calvin). — προσλαμβάνεσθε] *take to you*, namely, to the intercourse of Christian brotherly fellowship. The opposite would be an ἐκκλῆισαι θέλειν (comp. Gal. iv. 17), whereby they, instead of being attracted, might be forced to *separation*. So in substance, Erasmus, Grotius, Estius, Semler, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche, Rückert, de Wette, Tholuck, Philippi, Hofmann, etc. But others take it as : *interest yourselves in him*, “of furthering, helpful support” (Olshausen, comp. Chrysostom), which, however, προσλαμβάνεσθαι τινα does not mean. Acts xxviii. 2 is appealed to, where, however, προσλ. is to *take to oneself*,—a meaning which is here also required by προσελάβετο, ver. 3, as well as by xv. 7, comp. also xi. 15. — μὴ εἰς διακρίσεις διαλογ.] *not to judgments of thoughts*. [See Note CXXXVIII. p. 523.] διακρίσεις διαλογ. is a *result*, which in the case of the enjoined προσλαμβ. must not be come to, so that thus μὴ εἰς διακρ. διαλ. contains a *negative more precise definition* of προσλαμβάνεσθε, in the sense, namely : *not in such a manner that the προσλαμβάνεσθαι, which you bestow on the weak, issues in judgments passed on the thoughts*. Those persons formed their ideas under the influence of conscience ; such scruples should be indulgently treated by the stronger, and criticisms passing judgments on them should not be instituted, whereby the προσλαμβάνεσθαι would be abused. Thus διάκρισις, *dijudicatio*, retains its usual signification (Heb. v. 14 ; 1 Cor. xii. 10 ; Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 765 A, xi. p. 937 B ; Lucian, *Herm.* 69) ; and διαλογισμός likewise (Matt. xv. 19 ; Mark vii. 21 ; Luke ix. 46, *et al.* ; Rom. i. 21 ; 1 Cor. iii. 20). Nothing is to be supplied, but εἰς is simply to be taken in the sense of the *result* (as just previously εἰς ἐπὶ, xiii. 14), not even as *usque ad* (Reiche). Substantially in agreement with this view of διακρίσ. διαλογ. are Chrysostom, Grotius, and others, including Köllner, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, Fritzsche, Krehl, Tholuck, Hofmann, likewise Reiche, who, however, makes the prohibition apply to *both* parties, which is opposed to the text, since the exhorted subject is the church, *in contradistinction to its weak members*, while the weak alone are the object of the exhortation. Augustine aptly, *Propos.* 78 : “non dijudicemus cogitationes infirmorum, quasi ferre audeamus sententiam de alieno corde, quod non videtur.” Others take διακρίσεις as *doubts*, which are not to be *excited* in the thoughts of the weak. So Luther, Bengel, Cramer, Ernesti, Morus, Böhme, Ammon, Flatt, Klee, Olshausen, Philippi, Umbreit. But διάκρισις never means doubt,¹ and therefore is not to be explained with Ewald, who takes the words as an addition by way of exclamation : “*may it not come from doubts to thoughts!*” may such an one not become uncertain in his conscience!” Following the

¹ Neither in the N. T. nor elsewhere in Greek. Theodoret on ver. 22 f. is appealed to, but there διάκρισις is to be taken as

distinction; as also in Oecumenius on ver. 20.

Vulgate, Beza, Camerarius, Er. Schmid, Toletus, Estius, Glöckler, and others, *διάκρι*. has also been explained as *dispute*, which is not unfrequently its meaning in the classics (Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 768 A ; Polybius, xviii. 11. 3). But dispute *concerning* thoughts would be at least far from clearly expressed by the mere genitive (instead of *περὶ διαλογ.*) ; and the notion *disceptatio* (*ζήτησις, συζήτησις*) is nowhere denoted in the N. T. by *διάκρισις*. Rückert takes it as *separation* : " But be on your guard lest the consequence thereof may possibly be this, *that thoughts and sentiments are severed*, become more abruptly parted." *Διάκρισις* may certainly bear this meaning (Job xxxvii. 16 ; Plato, *Phil.* p. 32 A) ; but in that case the article must have stood before *διαλογ.*, and the climactic sense (*more abruptly*) would be gratuitously imported.

Ver. 2. More particular discussion of the subject, and in the first place, *exhibition of the first point of difference between the two parties*. — *ὡς μὲν*] without a corresponding *ὡς δέ*, instead of which there is at once put the definite *ὁ δὲ ἀσθ.* : *the one (i.e. the strong) believes*, etc. ; *but the weak*, etc. Comp. Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* ii. 3. 15 ; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 507. — *πιστεύει φαγεῖν πάντα* may mean : *he is convinced that he may eat all things*, so that the notion *ἐξεῖναι* is implied in the relation of the verbal notion to the infinitive (Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 753 f. ; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 235 [E. T. 273 f.]) ; so Tholuck, Borger, and older interpreters. But more agreeable to the *τῇ πίστει*, ver. 1, and to the contrast *ὁ ἀσθεν.*, is the rendering : *he has the confidence, the assurance of faith, to eat all things* ; Winer, p. 302 [E. T. 322]. Comp. Dem. 866. 1, and generally Krüger, § 61. 6. 8. To supply *ὥστε* (van Hengel) is in accordance with the sense, but unnecessary. — *λάχανα*] excludes, according to the connection, *all* use of flesh, not merely that of Levitically unclean animals, or of flesh sacrificed to idols, or on feast and fast days,—limitations of which nature are introduced by most interpreters (including Reiche, Köllner, Neander, Tholuck, Philippi). The weak in faith eats *no* flesh, but *vegetables* are his food. Comp. Wieseler in Herzog's *Encyklop.* XX. p. 595. [See Note CXXXIX. p. 524.]

Ver. 3. Prohibition for each of the two parties. [See Note CXL. p. 524.] The self-consciousness of strength misleads into looking down with *contempt* on the weak ; the narrowness of weakness is unable to comprehend the free thinking of the strong one, and *judges* it. — *κρινέτω*] defined by the connection as a *condemning* judgment, *pronouncing against* the true Christian character, as in ii. 1 and frequently. — *ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*] ground assigned for *μὴ κρινέτω* ; hence *αὐτόν* is to be referred to *τὸν ἐσθίοντα* (i.e. him who eats all things), not with Reiche (following Calvin and others) to both, the strong and the weak, against which ver. 4 is also decisive. — *προσελάβετο*] *has taken him to Himself*, namely, *into His fellowship* (comp. ver. 1) through Christ ; not : into His *house* as servant (see on ver. 4), as Vatablus, Reiche, and Hofmann hold. — In *ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* is contained the *contrariety to God* of this *κρίνειν*, and its consequent *impiety* ; and

Ver. 4 then adds what a *presumptuous intermeddling* such a *κρίνειν* is. In this the emotion rises to an animated apostrophe, addressed to the *weak in faith* who passes judgment, not to *both* parties, as Reiche and Tholuck think ;

for κρινῶν corresponds to the κρινέτω of ver. 3. — σὺ τίς εἶ] comp. ix. 20. It discloses the presumption, without however standing in the relation of apodosis to the preceding ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸν προσελάβετο (Hofmann), which is nowise indicated and is forbidden by the fact that the following relation of domestic slave points to *Christ* as Master. — ἀλλότριον οἰκέτην] who is not in *thy* domestic service,¹ but in that of *another*. This other is *Christ* (see ver. 6), not *God*, who is rather distinguished from the master by δυν. γὰρ κ.τ.λ. — τῷ ἰδίῳ κυρίῳ] to his own master. The dative denotes the relation of subordination to the interest of the ἰδιος κύριος (Bernhardy, p. 85). His own master, and no other, is interested therein; whence the incompetence of the κρίνειν is obvious. — The figurative standing and falling is either explained of standing firm (Ps. i. 4; Luke xxi. 36), and of being condemned (causa cadere) in the divine judgment (Calvin, Cornelius à Lapide, Grotius, Estius, Wolf, and others, including Reiche, Köllner, Borger, Tholuck, Philippi), or, as in 1 Cor. x. 12, of continuance and non-continuance in the state of true Christian faith and life. So in substance, Erasmus, Beza, Vatablus, Toletus, Bengel, Semler, and others, including Flatt, de Wette, Fritzsche, Rückert, Maier, Baumgarten-Crusius, Umbreit, van Hengel, Hofmann. The use of πίπτειν would not tell against the former (Hofmann), for it would have its warrant as contrast to the σώζεσθαι in the divine judgment figuratively set forth by the standing;² but the second explanation is to be preferred, partly because the unwarranted κρίνειν denied to the more free the possession of a right Christian frame of life, partly because of the following δυνατεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For to make to stand in the judgment, i.e. without figure, to acquit and pronounce righteous,³ is not the work of divine power, but of grace. But according to His power (against Reiche's objection to this, see Eph. iii. 20) God effects an inner strengthening, so that the Christian stands in that which is good, and even he who thinks more freely does not succumb to the dangers to which the nature of his Christian faith and life is exposed by the very fact of his freer principles, but perseveres in the true Christian state. For this Paul looks to God's power, and promises it. When Tholuck, on the ground of the reading ὁ κύριος finds the thought, that the Judge will even find out sufficient reasons for exculpation, this is a pure importation into the text. δυνατεῖ] See on 2 Cor. xiii. 3. Comp. Clem. Hom. i. 6.

Ver. 5. *Second point of difference*, as is evident from the contents themselves, and in particular from the general laying out of the representation, which is quite similar in form to ver. 2. Hence we are not here to find,

¹ οἰκέτης is nowhere else found in Paul; in the N. T. it occurs in Luke xvi. 13, Acts x. 7, 1 Pet. ii. 18. It is a more restricted notion than δούλος: the οἰκέτης is a house-servant (Dem. 1359 ult.; οἰκέτης διάκονος), more closely bound to the family than other slaves; hence: οἰκέτας τε καὶ δούλους, Plat. Legg. vi. p. 763 A, comp. ix. p. 853 E.; so, too, οἰκέτης, housemaid; both together, οἰκεῖα, domestics. The fact that these words are used in the classics also of the members of the family themselves (as Xen.

Anab., iv. 5. 35, vi. 1), is here irrelevant; but see Wesseling, ad Herod. p. 621.

² Soph. Trach. 84, and see Ellendt, Lex. Soph. II. p. 568.

³ Not, according to the mediate turn, departing from the preceding and hence unwarranted, which Philippi now gives to the sense of the figurative expression: to uphold in judgment, so far as God upholds in that which is good, which alone subsists in the judgment.

with Hofmann (who defends the reading *ὅς μὲν γάρ*), merely the first member of a chain of thought which is intended to make good the correctness of the proposition *δυνατεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*,¹—so that Paul does not pass over to *another* controverted point. [See Note CXL. p. 524.] The fact that he does not thereupon enter at length on the question of *days*, but returns immediately in ver. 6 to the question of *food*, indicates that the latter formed in the church the controversy most *prominent* and *threatening* in an ascetic point of view.² Moreover, what he had said on the point of *food* might so readily of itself find its application in an analogous manner to the question of *days*, that an entering into equal detail in regard to both points was not required. — *κρίνει ἡμ. παρ' ἡμ.*] he sets his judgment on day before day, i.e. he is for preferring one day to another, so that he esteems one holier than another. This refers to the Jewish feast and fast days³ still observed by the weak in faith. The classical *ἡμέρα παρ' ἡμέραν*, in the sense *alternis diebus*,⁴ does not apply here (in opposition to Fritzsche, who imports into our passage the notion that the people had ascetically observed, in addition to the Sabbath, the second and fifth days of the week). Of so surprising a (pharisaical, Luke xviii. 12) selection of days there is no single trace in the Epistles to the Galatians (not even *ἡμέρας*, iv. 10) and Colossians, and hardly would it have met with such lenient treatment at Paul's hands. But the Jewish observance of days, continued under Christianity, so naturally agrees with the Essenic-Jewish character of the weak in faith generally, that there is no sufficient ground for thinking, with Ewald, of the observance of *Sunday* (at that time not yet generally established), and for seeing in vv. 5 and 6 only an *example illustrating* the preceding, and not a real point of difference (comp. Hofmann).⁵ — *κρίνει πᾶσαν ἡμέραν*] not *omnem diem judicat diem* (Bengel, Philippi), but corresponding to the first half of the verse: he declares himself for each day, so that he would have each esteemed equally holy, not certain days before others. — *ἐκαστος κ.τ.λ.*] Here too, as in the case of an *adiaphoron*, no more than in ver. 2, an objective decision, who is or is not in the right; but rather for both parties only the requisite *injunction*, namely, that each should have a complete assurance of faith as to the rightness of his conduct, without which persuasion the consciousness of the fulfilment of duty is lacking, and consequently the *adiaphoron* becomes sinful (vv. 20, 23). — *πληροφ.*] Comp. iv. 21. — *ἐν τ. ἰδίῳ νοί*] i.e. in the moral consciousness of his own reason (vii. 23), therefore, independently of others' judgment, assured in himself of the motives of action.

¹ This was in fact only an auxiliary sentence, which, as obvious in itself, might have been omitted. Were the reading *ὅς μὲν γάρ* correct, Paul would be introducing that which he has to say of the second matter of controversy, in the form of a confirmation of that which is just adduced respecting the first.

² It must have been a matter of practical offence, especially at the *agapæ*.

³ Comp. Col. ii. 16; Gal. iv. 10. To think merely of fast days (Mangold, comp. Weiss,

bibl. Theol. p. 414) is an arbitrary limitation, without any ground in the text.

⁴ Bernhardt, p. 258; Lobeck, *ad Aj.* 475.

⁵ On *κρίνειν τι*, in the sense of to declare oneself for something, i.e. *aliquid probare, eligere*, comp. Aesch. *Agam.* 471 (*κρίνω δ' ἀφ' ὁσον ὄλβον*), *Suppl.* 393 (*κρίνε σέβας τὸ πρὸς θεῶν*); Plat. *Rep.* p. 399 E; Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 11; Isocr. *Paneg.* 46. On *παρά* in the sense of preference, Xen. *Mem.* i. 4. 14. and Kühner *in loc.*; but in Soph. *Aj.* 475, *παρ' ἡμᾶρ ἡμέρα* is (in opposition to Valckenaer, *Schol.* II. p.

Ver. 6. The right point of view, according to which each must have his own full persuasion, expressed not imperatively, but indicatively, as the *Christian axiom* in these matters, which conditions and regulates that *πληροφορία*. — *ὁ φρονῶν τὴν ἡμέραν κ.τ.λ.*] *he who directs his carefulness to the day*, exercises this carefulness *in his interest for the Lord*, namely, in order thereby to respond to his relation of belonging to the Lord. *τὴν ἡμέρ.* with the article denotes textually the day *concerned*, that which comes into consideration conformably to the *κρίνειν ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν*, not the day as it happens (Hofmann). By *κύριος* most understand *God*, others (as Estius, Rückert, Köllner, Fritzsche, Philippi) *Christ*. The former *appears* to be correct, on account of *εὐχαρ. γὰρ τ. Θεῷ*; but the latter *is* correct, on account of ver. 9. The absence of the article is not at variance with this.¹ — *κυρίῳ ἐσθίει*] using his Christian freedom in regard to the use of flesh in the interest of the Lord, which definite ethical direction of his *ἐσθίειν* he attests by his *εὐχαριστεῖν τῷ Θεῷ* therein. [See Note CXLII. p. 526.] This refers to the *prayer at table*, and, as is also the case with the subsequent *εὐχ. τ. Θ.*, not to that offered *after* the meal (Hofmann), but to that *before* it; comp. Matt. xv. 36, xxvi. 26; Acts xxvii. 35; 1 Cor. x. 30, xi. 24; 1 Tim. iv. 4. The *thanksgiving to God*, consecrating the partaking of food, presupposes the conviction that one does the *ἐσθίειν* in the capacity of belonging to *Christ*, and conformably to this specific relation; for anything that is opposed to *Christ* the Christian cannot thank the *Father of Christ*. — *καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐσθ. κ.τ.λ.*] The opposite of the preceding point (the observance of days) Paul has not added (see critical notes), because he has not at the beginning of ver. 6 planned his language antithetically; and it is only on the mention of the second more important point that the conception of the opposite occurs to him, and he takes it up also. To append the antithesis also to the first clause of the verse, was indeed not *necessary* (Philippi); but neither would it have been *confusing* (Hofmann), especially as the selecting of days and its opposite, as well as the eating and not-eating, were for those respectively concerned equally matters of *conscience*. — *κυρίῳ οὐκ ἐσθίει*] *for the Lord he refrains from the eating* (of flesh), persuaded that this abstinence tends to serve the interest of Christ. — *καὶ εὐχαρ. τῷ Θεῷ*] That which was previously conceived as the *reason* (*γάρ*) is here conceived as the *consequence* (*καί*); and so he utters his *thanksgiving table-prayer to God*, namely, for the other, vegetable food, which forms the meal to be enjoyed by him. He is enabled to do so by the conviction that his *οὐκ ἐσθίειν* has its holy ethical reference to the *Lord*.

Vv. 7–9. Proof for the threefold *κυρίῳ*, ver. 6, and that generally *from the whole subjective direction of the life of Christians towards Christ*. Paul does not make the *objective* dependence on Christ (Rückert, Reiche, Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, II. p. 19), because it would not prove what was said in ver. 6, but would only establish the obligation thereto. — *ἐαντῷ ζῇ*] so that he believes that *his life belongs to himself*, that he lives for his own interest and aims. 2 Cor. v. 15. Comp. the passages in Wetstein and Fritzsche. The

153 ff.) to be otherwise understood; see Lobeck *ad loc.*

¹ See Winer, *de sensu vocum κύριος et ὁ κύριος*,

Erl. 1828; *Gramm.* p. 118 [E. T. p. 124]; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 573.

dative is thus to be taken in the ethically telic sense, and so, too, in *ἐαυτῷ ἀποθνῄσκει* ; for also the *dying* of the Christian—in so ideal a manner is Paul conscious of the moral power and consecration of fellowship of life with Christ—is a *moral act* (Bengel : “*eadem ars moriendi, quae vivendi*,” in the relation of belonging to Christ, in which the Christian at death feels and knows that he has stood with his life, and is now also to stand in his dying. Such is the conscious *ἐν κυρίῳ ἀποθνῄσκειν*, Rev. xiv. 13. Comp. Phil. i. 20 ; Rom. viii. 38. — Ver. 8 contains the positive counterpart, proving the negative contents of ver. 7, and is likewise to be understood as a *subjective* relation. — On *τὸ γὰρ . . . τέ*, for as well . . . as also, see Hartung, *Partikell.* I. pp. 88, 115 ; Baeumlein, *Part.* p. 219. — *τοῦ κυρίου ἔσμεν*] the Lord's property are *we*. This now derives the *sum* of the entire specifically Christian consciousness from its previously adduced factors.—In the threefold emphatic *τῷ κυρίῳ (τοῦ κυρίου)* observe the “*divina Christi majestas et potestas*” (Bengel), to which the Christian knows himself to be completely surrendered.

Ver. 9. Objective historical relation, on which this subjective attitude towards Christ, ver. 8 (*ἐὰν τε οὖν κ.τ.λ.*), is founded.—*ἐξῆσε*] *became alive*, to be understood of the *resurrection life*. Comp. Rev. ii. 8, xx. 4, 5 ; Rom. v. 10 ; 2 Cor. iv. 10. The *aorist* denotes the *setting in* of the state ; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 18. Wrongly Olshausen (so also Schrader) thinks that the *earthly life* of Jesus is meant, so that there occurs a *hysteron proteron* ; in which view he overlooks, first, that the mutual reference of the two elements in protasis and apodosis is only formal,¹ and secondly, that it was not Jesus' *life and death*, but rather His *death and life* (resurrection), which led to His attainment of the heavenly *κυριότης*. Comp. viii. 34, vi. 9, 10 ; Phil. ii. 8, 9 ; Luke xxiv. 26 ; Matt. xxviii. 18.—*ἵνα*] destination in the divine counsel. This aimed, in the death and resurrection of Christ, at the establishment of His *munus regium*, and that over the *dead* (in Scheol, Phil. ii. 10) and *living* ; hence Christians are conscious of belonging to Him in living and dying (ver. 8). Unsuitably to *ἐξῆσεν*, since the raising up of the Lord is certainly, in the apostle's view, the work of God (i. 4, iv. 24, vi. 4, viii. 11, and many other passages), Hofmann sees in *ἵνα* Christ's own purpose expressed.

Ver. 10. *Σὺ δέ*] discloses the contrast to the *κυριότης* of Jesus. — The first *σὺ* addresses the *weaker*, the second the *freer* Christian, as is clear from ver. 3. — *γάρ*] justifies the censure of presumption which lies in the preceding questions : *for all*, etc., and therefore in both cases thou as well as he. — *παράσῃς*, *we shall stand before* ; “*stare solent, quorum causa tractatur*,”

¹ Paul, namely, does not say : Christ *died*, in order that He might be Lord over the *dead*, and *lived*, in order that He might be Lord over the *living* ; but *He died and became alive* (both together had the end in view), in order that He might rule over *dead and living* (both together). Fritzsche also, although rightly understanding *ἐξῆσε* of the resurrection life, urges the mutual refer-

ence of *ἀπέθανε* and *νεκρῶν*, and of *ἐξῆσε* and *ζώντων* : By the *death* of Jesus, God desired to make known that He was Lord over the *dead*, and by the new *life* of Christ, that He was Lord over the *living*. But this merely declarative view is quite arbitrary ; moreover, the *ζωή* in *ἐξῆσε* would be quite another than the *ζωή* of the *ζώντων*.

Grotius ; Acts xxvi. 6 ; Matt. xxv. 33.—τῷ βῆμ. τ. Θεοῦ (see critical notes) : for *God* will cause the judgment to be held (John v. 22) by Christ (ii. 16 ; Acts x. 42, xvii. 31). So the judgment-seat upon which Christ will sit (2 Cor. v. 10 ; Polycarp, *ad Phil.* 6 ; Matt. xxv. 31) is *God's*.—Note how decisive is the testimony of such passages against any limitation of the universality of the final judgment.¹

Ver. 11. Scripture proof for the πάντες παραστήσμεθα κ.τ.λ., ver. 10. The *point* of its bearing on the matter lies in the *universality*, as is clear from the reference of πᾶν and πᾶσα, ver. 11, to πάντες above, ver. 10. Thus the proposition of ver. 10, πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—although in and by itself it required no scriptural proof—receives, nevertheless, a hallowed confirmation, which makes the injustice of the previously censured judging and despising the more apparent, because it encroaches on the universal final judgment of God.—The citation is Isa. xiv. 23, quoted very freely with deviations, partly of memory, partly intentional, from the LXX., and abbreviated. In Isaiah, God certifies upon His oath that all men (including the Gentiles) shall render to Him adoring homage. This divine utterance—Messianic, because promising the universal triumph of the theocracy—is here taken by Paul in the light of that highest *final historical* fulfilment which will take place at the judgment of the world.—ζῶ ἐγώ] Instead of κατ' ἐμαντοῦ ὀμνῶν, as the LXX. following the Hebrew have it, Paul uses, by a variation of memory, a frequently-occurring verbal formula of the divine oath : יְהוָה (Num. xiv. 21, 28 ; Deut. xxxii. 40, *et al.* ; Dan. xii. 7 ; Ruth iii. 13 ; Judith ii. 12).—λέγει κύριος] is added by Paul according to the elsewhere familiar O. T. formula. Comp. xii. 19.—ὅτι] *that*, because in ζῶ ἐγώ is involved the *assurance* on oath, *that*, etc. Comp. 2 Chron. xviii. 13 ; 1 Sam. xiv. 44 ; Judith xi. 7 and Fritzsche *in loc.*—ἐμοί] *to me*, as the Judge (so in the sense of the apostle) *for homage and submission*.—ἐξομολογ. τ. Θεῷ] departing from the LXX., which, following the Hebrew, has ὁμείται πᾶσα γλ. τὸν Θεόν, for the reading of Cod. A of the LXX. (also ⲛ on the margin), ἐξομολογήσεται instead of ὁμείται, was probably—seeing that the Septuagint has very frequently undergone similar alterations of the text from N. T. citations—first introduced from our passage, and not a reading which Paul found in his copy of the LXX. (Fritzsche), as is too rashly inferred from Phil. ii. 11. The variation itself is—as was allowed by the freedom in the handling of Messianic proof-passages—*intentional*, because Paul required, instead of the oath of God, a more *general* conception, which, however, lies at the basis of that special conception ; for the swearing is the actual acknowledgment and glorification of God as the Judge. The correct explanation is : *and every tongue shall praise God* (as the Judge), and therewith submit to His judicial authority—parallel in sense to ἐμοὶ κάμψει πᾶν γόνυ. ἐξομολογεῖσθαι with the dative always denotes *to praise* (xv. 9 ; Matt. xi. 25 ; Luke x. 21 ; frequently in the LXX. and Apocrypha, see Biel and Schleusner, *s.v.*) : it only denotes *to confess*, as in later Greek, with the *accusative* of the object, Matt.

¹ This applies also in opposition to Gerlach, *d. letzten Dinge*, p. 108 ff. Comp. i. 6,

16, iii. 6 ; 2 Cor. v. 10 ; Gal. vi. 7 ff. ; Acts xvii. 31.

iii. 6 ; Jas. v. 16 ; Tob. xii. 22. Hence the explanation of Er. Schmid, Reiche, Köllner, following Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, is erroneous : to *confess sins*, which would only then be admissible if the parallelism obviously suggested the supplying of τὰς ἀμαρτίας. — With the reading τῆ βήματι τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ver. 10, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Luther, Calvin, and many others, including Philippi, have found in τῷ Θεῷ a proof for the *divinity of Christ*. There would rather be implied the idea, that it is *God*, whose judgment *Christ* is entrusted by the Father to hold ; and this thought is contained also in the reading τ. β. τ. Θεοῦ, ver. 10.

Ver. 12. What *follows* from the preceding (from πάντες γὰρ . . . onward). — The emphasis is neither on περὶ ἑαυτοῦ (so usually) nor on τῷ Θεῷ (Philippi), but on the ἕκαστος for that purpose prefixed, which corresponds to the emphatic πάντες, πᾶν, πᾶσα, vv. 10, 11 ; hence it *alone* bears the stress, not sharing it with περὶ ἑαυτ. and τῷ Θεῷ (Hofmann). *Each of us*, none excepted, *will respecting himself*, etc. How at variance with this, therefore, to judge or to despise, as though one were not included in the subjection to this our *universal* destiny of having to give a personal account to God ! — δώσει] purely future in sense, like the preceding futures.

Vv. 13-23. *Christians ought not, therefore, mutually to condemn one another, but rather to have the principle of giving no offence*, ver. 13. *Further elucidation of this principle, and exhortations to compliance with it*.

Ver. 13. Μηκέτι (no more, as hitherto) ἀλλήλους κρίνωμεν is deduced (οὖν) from ἕκαστος ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ. ; but κρίνωμεν here refers, as ἀλλήλ. shows, to *both* parties. [See Note CXLIII. p. 526.] — κρίνατε] *antanaclasis* : the same word, in order to make the contrast striking (for to the κρίνειν which is *against one's duty* that which is *in accordance with duty* is opposed), is repeated, but with the modification of reference and of sense, that it addresses the *freer* Christians (for it was they who gave the offence), and means in general : *let this be your judgment, your moral maxim* in this point. [See Note CXLIV. p. 526.] On the infinitive with the article after a preparatory demonstrative, comp. 2 Cor. ii. 1.¹ — πρόσκομμα and σκάνδαλον : both quite synonymous in the metaphorical sense : *moral stumbling-block*, an occasion for acting contrary to conscience. But τιθέναι refers to the original *proper* sense of the two words. Comp. on ix. 32, 33, xi. 9 ; LXX. Lev. xix. 14 ; Judith v. 1. The twofold designation is an earnest and exhaustive expression of the idea ; hence to attempt a real distinction between the synonyms, which differ only figuratively (*stone . . . trap*), is arbitrary.

Ver. 14. [See Note CXLV. p. 527.] Discussion of the preceding injunction, giving information regarding it. Paul grants, namely, *in principle*, that the freer brethren are *right*, but immediately adds an *exception* which arises *in practice*, and, in assigning the reason for this addition, declares (ver. 15) the not attending to the exception a proof of want of love. — καὶ πείσασθαι ἐν κυρ. 'I.] More precise definition of the preceding οἶδα. — ἐν κυρ.] *i.e. in my fellowship with the Lord* ; οὐκ ἄρα ἀνθρωπίνης διανοίας ἡ ψήφος, Chrysostom. — κοινῶν]

¹ Xen. de Rep. Lac. 9. 1, and see Haase *in loc.* ; Breitenbach, *ad Xen. Oec.* 14. 10.

corresponding to the βέβηλον of the Greeks : *profane*, ἀκάθαρτον (Chrysostom), Acts x. 14, 28, xi. 8 ; Heb. x. 29. Thus the eating of flesh was held to be unholy and unclean, and therefore a thing at variance with the holiness of a Christian's position. Comp. Ezek. xlii. 20 ; 1 Macc. i. 47, 62. — δι' αὐτοῦ] Since the *reflexive αὐτοῦ* (with the rough breathing) is generally doubtful in the N. T. (comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 97 f. [E. T. 111]), and here the *personal αὐτοῦ* (with the soft breathing) is quite sufficient and appropriate in sense, the latter is to be preferred (Bengel, Matthaei, Lachmann, Tischendorf, 7, Hofmann) ; not, however, to be referred to Christ (Theodoret, Bisping, Jatho, and others), but to be explained : *through itself*, i.e. *through its nature*. In δι' αὐτοῦ is thus implied the *objectively* existing uncleanness, in contrast (see below) to that which subjectively accrues *per accidens*. On account of the laws relating to food of the O. T., Olshausen thinks that the thought of the apostle is intended to affirm that “*through Christ and His sanctifying influence the creation has again become pure and holy*.” This arbitrary importation of a meaning (followed by Bisping) is overthrown by the very circumstance that the abstinence of the Roman ascetics was by no means founded on the law—which did not in fact forbid the *use of flesh generally*—but was of a supra-legal Essenic character. Moreover, Paul was clear and certain, so far as concerns the O. T. laws of food, that they had outlived the time of obligatoriness appointed for them by God, and were abolished by God Himself, inasmuch as in Christ the end of the law had come, and the *temporary* divine institute had given place to the *eternal* one of the gospel as its fulfilment, Matt. v. 17. Comp. on x. 4 ; Col. ii. 16 ff. ; also on Acts x. 15, 16. — εἰ μὴ] not equivalent to ἀλλά, but *nisi*, which, without taking δι' αὐτοῦ also into account, applies merely to οὐδὲν κοινόν. Comp. on Matt. xii. 4 ; Gal. ii. 16. — ἐκέλευε κοινόν] ἐκ. with emphasis, as in 2 Cor. x. 18, Mark vii. 15, 20, and very frequently in John. The uncleanness is in such a case *subjective*, coming into existence and subsisting actually for the individual through the fettered condition of his own conscience.

Ver. 15. γάρ] According to this reading critically beyond doubt (see the critical notes),—which, however, Philippi, on account of the sense, regards as “*absolutely untenable*,”—the apostle specifies *the reason, why he has expressly added the exception* εἰ μὴ τῷ λογί. κ.τ.λ. The γάρ belonging to the principal sentence is, according to a very prevalent usage (see Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 85), taken into the prefixed accessory sentence, so that the argumentative thought is : “*not without good moral ground do I say : εἰ μὴ . . . κοινόν ; for it indicates a want of love, if the stronger one has not regard to this relation towards the weaker*.” — διὰ βρώμα] *on account of food*, i.e. *because of a kind of food, which he holds to be unclean and sees thee eat*. — λυπεῖται] not : *is injured*, which would consist in the ἀπόλλυσθαι (Philippi, contrary to N. T. usage), but of *moral affliction*, i.e. *vexation of conscience*, which is occasioned by the giving of a σκάνδαλον (ver. 13). Analogous is Eph. iv. 30. [See Note CXLVI. p. 527.] To understand it of the *making reproaches on account of narrow-mindedness* (Grotius, Rosenmüller, Ewald), is gratuitously to import the substance of the thought, and does not correspond to the connection (vv. 13, 14, 20, 21). — οὐκέτι κατὰ ἀγάπ. περιπατεῖς] i.e.

in that case thou hast ceased to bear thyself conformably to love. This is the actual state of things which subsists, when what is expressed in the protasis occurs ; the *λυπείται*, namely, is conceived as *the fault of the subject addressed*.¹ On *εἰ . . . οὐκ ἐτι*, comp. vii. 20, xi. 6 ; Gal. iii. 18. To take the apodosis *interrogatively* (Hofmann), is—considering the definite character, quite in keeping with the context of the *λυπείται* which is occasioned by the offence given—quite unwarranted, and does not suit the words.²—The *ἀπόλλυε* is the possible result of the *λυπείται* : *destroy him not*, bring him not into destruction, namely, through his being seduced by thy example to disregard his conscience, and to fall out of the moral element of the life of faith into the sinful element of variance with conscience. That we are to explain it of the *eternal ἀπώλεια*, is clear from *ὑπὲρ οὗ* X. *ἀπέθανε* ; for in order to redemption from *this* Christ offered up His life—therefore thou oughtest not to thrust back into *ἀπώλεια* thy (so dearly bought) brother through the loveless exercise of thy free principles. Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 11, 12. “Ne pluris feceris tuum cibum, quam Christus vitam suam,” Bengel.

Ver. 16. *Μὴ βλασφημείσθω*] namely (comp. 2 Thess. ii. 3 ; 1 Tim. iv. 12), *through your fault*. — *ὑμῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν*] *your good* κατ' ἐξοχήν, *i.e.* ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ver. 17. [See Note CXLVII. p. 528.] So also Ewald and Umbreit. It is the sum of the *μέλλοντα ἀγαθά*, Heb. ix. 11, x. 1. How easily it might come to pass that a schism, kept up by means of condemnation and contempt, on account of eating and drinking, might draw down on that jewel of Christians—the object of their whole endeavour, hope, and boast—calumnious judgments at the hands of unbelievers, as if maxims respecting eating and drinking formed that on which the Christian was dependent for attaining the blessing of the kingdom ! In opposition to the context in ver. 17, following the Fathers (in Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 14), de Wette holds that *faith* is meant ;³ Luther, Calovius, and others, including Philippi : the *gospel* ; Origen, Pelagius, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, and many others, including Flatt, Borger, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Nielsen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, Maier, Bisping, with irrelevant appeal to 1 Cor. x. 30 : *Christian freedom* ; van Hengel generally : *quod in vobis Romanis bonum est* ; better Hofmann : that which, as *their essential good*, gives Christians the *advantage over non-Christians*,—a view, however, which leaves the precise defini-

¹ Note that the presents *λυπείται* and *περιπατεῖς* coincide in *time*, as indeed the two regarded practically coincide in *reality*. For that, which causes to the weak one distress of conscience διὰ βρώμας, is simply the unsparing conduct of the strong one no longer under the guidance of love.

² According to Hofmann, *οὐκ ἐτι κ.τ.λ.* is designed simply to submit to the person addressed the question *whether he really allows himself to be induced—through the weakness of his fellow-Christian in falling into concern on account of a particular food—to alter his conduct so as to behave with a want of love*. In that case, the apostle must at least have

expressed himself by the future *περιπατήσεις* (wilt thou then no longer behave in conformity with love?), or by *θέλεις περιπατεῖν*, or, most clearly, because implying a *negative* answer : *μὴ οὐκ ἐτι κ. ἀγ. περιπατήσης* (thou wilt not thus cease, etc.?) ; comp. x. 18 ; 1 Cor. ix. 4.

³ Among the Fathers, Chrysostom's view is very vacillating and indefinite : ἡ τὴν πίστιν φησὶν, ἡ τὴν μέλλουσιν ἐλπίδα τῶν ἐπαύλων, ἡ τὴν ἀπηρητισμένην εὐσέβειαν· μὴ χρῶ κακῶς τελειότητι σου, μηδὲ ποιεῖς ταύτην βλασφημείσθαι. Theodoret explains definitely of *faith* ; so also Photius.

tion of the notion unsettled. With *ὑμῶν*, Paul, after having previously addressed a single party in the singular, turns to *all*; hence we are not, with Fritzsche, to think in *ὑμ.* of the strong believers only (and in *βλασφ.* of the weak believers). Note, further, the emphasis of the *prefixed* *ὑμῶν* (comp. Phil. iii. 20) : the possession belonging to *you*, to you Christians, which you must therefore all the more guard against slander from without.

Ver. 17. Motive for complying with the *μὴ βλασφημ.* κ.τ.λ., with reference to the contents of the possible slander. — *ἡ βασιλ. τ. Θεοῦ*] is not anywhere (comp. on Matt. iii. 2, vi. 10; 1 Cor. iv. 20; Col. i. 13), and so is not here, anything else than the *Messiah's kingdom*, the erection of which begins with the *Parousia*,¹ belonging not to the *αἰὼν οὗτος*, but to the *αἰὼν μέλλων* (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, xv. 24, 50; Gal. v. 21; Eph. v. 5; Col. iv. 11; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. i. 5); not therefore the (invisible) *church*, the *regnum gratiae*, or the earthly *ethical kingdom of God* (Reiche, de Wette, Philippi, Lipsius, following older expositors), *res christiana* (Baumgarten-Crusius), and the like. "*The Messianic kingdom is not eating and drinking*;" i.e., the essential characteristic of this kingdom does not consist in the principle that a man, in order to become a member of it, should eat and drink this or that or everything without distinction, but in the principle that one should be upright, etc. Less accurate, and, although not missing the approximate sense, readily liable to be misunderstood (see Calovius), is the view of the Greek Fathers, Grotius, and many others : the kingdom of God is not *obtained* through, etc. Comp. on John xvii. 3. [See Note CXLVIII. p. 529.] — *βρώσει*, *eating*, i.e. *actus edendi*, different from *βρῶμα*, *food*, ver. 15 (comp. Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 159), which distinction Paul always observes (in opposition to Fritzsche); see on Col. ii. 16. — *δικαιοσύνη κ. εἰρήνη*] can, according to the entire context (comp. esp. ver. 15), and specially according to ver. 18 (*δουλεύων τῷ Χ.*) and ver. 19 (*τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης*), be taken only in the *moral* sense, and therefore as *ethical uprightness* and *peace* (concord) with the brethren; not in the *dogmatic* sense : *righteousness* and *peace* (of reconciliation) *with God* (Calvin, Calovius, and many others, including Rückert, Tholuck, and Philippi; de Wette blends the two meanings). But that these virtues presuppose faith in Christ as the soil from which they sprang, and as the fundamental *principium essendi* of the kingdom, is self-evident from the whole connection, — *χαρὰ ἐν πνεύμ. ἁγ.*] forms one phrase. Comp. 1 Thess. i. 6. It is the *holy joyfulness*, the morally glad frame of heart *which has its causal basis and subsistence in the Holy Spirit*, who rules in the Christian; comp. Gal. v. 22, also Phil. iv. 4. It is present even in tribulation, 2 Cor. vi. 10, and does not yield to death, Phil. ii. 17. The transitive explanation of the joy *which the Christian diffuses over others* (Grotius, Koppe, Reiche, and others) is supported neither by the simple word nor by N. T. usage elsewhere.

Ver. 18. Not an explanation, *why he has mentioned by name these three particulars*, as those in which the kingdom consists (Hofmann), but a *confirmation of the contents of ver. 17*; and how greatly must this confirmation have conduced to the recommendation and support of the precept *μὴ βλασφημ.*

¹ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, Theodore of Mopsuestia.

κ.τ.λ. of ver. 16 as established by ver. 17!—*ἐν τοῦτοις*] (see the critical notes) refers to the just mentioned three great moral elements. He who *in these* (not therefore possibly in βρώσις and πόσις, and the like unspiritual things) serves Christ, etc. On *ἐν* with δουλεύειν, denoting its moral life-sphere, comp. vii. 6.—*εὐάρεστ. τ. θεῷ*] “testimonium, quod expresse adfirmat bona opera renatorum placere Deo,” Melanchthon.—*δόκιμος τοῖς ἀνθρ.*] approved¹ by men; such is the relation according to its moral nature,—a fact not annulled by abnormal manifestations, in which misapprehension, perversion of the moral judgment, and the like are at work. “Paulus hic de *sin-cero* judicio loquitur,” Calvin.

Ver. 19. *Exhortation*, inferred from the doctrinal proposition, ver. 17; not a *question* (Buttmann).—*τὰ τῆς εἰρ.*] *what belongs to peace*, composes the *substance of peace*, not different in matter of fact from τὴν εἰρήνην. See Bernhardy, p. 325 f.; Kühner, II. 1, p. 230.—*τῆς οἰκοδομῆς*] figurative designation of *perfecting* (here *active*) in the Christian life. Comp. 2 Cor. x. 8, xiii. 10; 1 Cor. xiv. 4. According to the context in each case, the individual, as here, or the church, or the whole Christian body, is a building of God (of which Christ is the foundation, 1 Cor. iii. 11; Eph. ii. 20, 21), on which the work of building is to proceed until the *Parousia*.—*εἰς ἀλλήλ.*] *οἰκοδομεῖτε εἰς τὸν ἕνα*, 1 Thess. v. 11.

Ver. 20. Prohibition of the opposite of τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλ.—*κατάλνε*] *pull down*. Comp. 2 Cor. v. 1; Gal. ii. 18; Matt. xxvi. 61.—*τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ*] here, according to the context, the *building of God*, by which, however, is represented not what is mentioned in ver. 17 (the *δικαιοσύνη* κ.τ.λ. so Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius); nor yet the *faith* of one's fellow-Christian (Theodoret, Reiche) or his eternal *salvation* (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact); nor *all blessings vouchsafed through Christ* (Köllner, comp. Borger); but, according to ver. 15, *the Christian as such*, in so far as his Christian life, *his Christian personality*, is God's work (viii. 29, 30; 2 Cor. v. 17; Eph. ii. 10). Aptly Estius says: “fratrem, quem Deus fecit fidelem.” Accordingly, what was expressed in ver. 15 by *μὴ ἐκείνον ἀπόλλυε, ὑπὲρ οὗ Χ. ἀπέθανε*, is here expressed by *μὴ κατάλνε τὸ ἔργον τ. θεοῦ*; but it is differently conceived and presented, in such a way that the brother is thought of there in his relation of redemption to Christ, here in his relation of spiritual origin to God. The *importance* of the latter conception is rightly pointed out by Calovius: “non levis est culpa, sed horribilis *θεομαχία*, opus Dei destruere.”—*πάντα μὲν καθαρὰ* κ.τ.λ.] the same thought as in ver. 14, repeated in order to enter further into the *μὴ ἔνεκεν βρώματος*. “*All (all food) indeed is clean* (not immoral to enjoy in and by itself), *but it is sinful for the man who eats amidst offence*,” who nevertheless uses a food, *although he experiences moral offence* in the using it—so that he thus *against his conscience* imitates the freer Christian. Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 9, 10. This reference of the ethical dative τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ διὰ προσκ. ἐσθ. to the *weak in faith* (Chrysostom, Luther, Beza, Carpzov, Semler, and others, including Rückert, Köllner.

¹ So *δόκιμος* in all N. T. passages (not: *worthy, esteemed*, and the like); see Buttmann, in the *Stud. u. Krit.*, 1860, p. 368, who

however prefers the reading *δοκίμοις* in B G* 77 (a copyist's error).

Philippi, Tholuck, Hofmann) is confirmed by the parallel in vv. 13, 14, and admirably suits the connection, inasmuch as ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. unfolds the *way and manner in which* ἐνεκεν βρώματος destruction may befall the work of God. Hence we must reject the explanation (Pelagius, Grotius, Bengel, and others, including Reiche, de Wette, Nielsen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Fritzsche, Reithmayr, Krehl, Umbreit, van Hengel) of the *strong in faith*, who acts wrongly in eating *under offence given*, i.e. although to the offence of the weak. For in that case we should have here no reference at all relevant to the κατάλυσις of the ἔργον τ. Θεοῦ, but only the vague remark that it is wrong to eat to the offence of others. — ἀλλὰ] after μέν; see Vigerus, *ed. Herm.* p. 536; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 403 f.; Baumelein, p. 170. — κακόν] not *hurtful* (Rückert), nor yet *bad* in the sense of what *is not good for him* (Hofmann), but *sinful*, the ethical contrast of καθαρά. The subject (*it*) is to be understood of itself from what precedes, namely τὸ καθαρόν, the pure in itself. Others supply πᾶν (Reiche), τὸ βρώμα (Grotius), τὸ ἐσθίειν (Rückert), τὸ πάντα φαγεῖν (Fritzsche, Philippi). Hofmann also renders incorrectly, as though it ran, κακὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ διὰ προσκόμματος ἐσθίειν. — διὰ] as in ii. 27.

Ver. 21. Maxim for the strong in faith, which results from the preceding ἀλλὰ κακόν κ.τ.λ.: “*It is excellent, morally right and good, to eat no flesh, and to drink no wine, and (generally) to do nothing whereby thy brother takes offence,*” etc. Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 13. On μὴ, as joined to the infinitive with the article, see Baumelein, p. 296. The article belongs only to μὴ φαγ. κρ. With the second μηδέ, the general ποιεῖν is simply to be supplied¹ (Winer, p. 542 [E. T. p. 583]; Buttmann, p. 336 [E. T. 393]), and ἐν ᾧ also refers back to the eating of flesh and drinking of wine. Rückert and Köllner (following Luther, Grotius, Flatt) are mistaken in holding that καλόν is to be taken *comparatively*, and that the comparison lies in ἐν ᾧ κ.τ.λ.; in which case we should have very arbitrarily to assume that the apostle, instead of following it up with an ἡ κ.τ.λ. (see on Matt. xviii. 8), had been led away from the construction. According to Hofmann, we should read μηδὲ ἐν. But this would in fact denote, not, as Hofmann thinks, *nor yet anything at all*, but *neque unum*, or *ne unum quidem* (see on 1 Cor. vi. 5; John i. 3), which would be unsuitable here. Quite unfounded withal is the objection against the reading ἐν ᾧ, that προσκόπτειν with ἐν is not elsewhere found; for προσκόπτει is to be taken by itself (absolutely), and ἐν ᾧ means *whereby*, as ἐν is also to be understood in Ecclus. xxx. 13; see Fritzsche on Ecclus. p. 167. On the absolute προσκοπτῖ: comp. Ecclus. xxxiv. 17, xiii. 23, also John xi. 9, 10. — The following *threefold* designation of the same thing, namely, of the giving occasion for conduct opposed to conscience (comp. ver. 13), is explained by the *urgency* of the sorrowful thought. — ἀσθενεῖ] not: *becomes weak*, but, as it always denotes: *is weak*, i.e. morally powerless to withstand temptation and to follow his moral conviction,—not different in substance from the two preceding *figurative* designations already employed in ver. 13.—Further, that

¹ The *zeugmatic* breviloquence, which leaves the reader to supply, after special notions (such as φαγεῖν and πειν here), a more general word, is found also from Ho-

mer onward among the Greek writers (see Nägelsbach, *z. Ilias*, p. 179, ed. 3). Comp. generally, Krüger, § 62. 3.

in ver. 21 not a merely problematic extension of abstinence is expressed, as those suppose who hold the abstinence on the part of the weak not to refer to all flesh, and to refer to wine either not at all, or only to the wine of libation (see introd. to the chapter, and on ver. 2), is evident from ver. 2, where abstinence from *all* flesh is expressed; and hence here, alongside of the *μὴ φαγεῖν κρέα*, the *μηδὲ πίνειν οἶνον* admits of no other conclusion than that the weak in faith drank *no* wine, but held the use of it likewise (see ver. 14) to be defiling.

Vv. 22, 23. *Σὺ πιστὺν ἔχεις* [See Note CXLIX. p. 530.] may be viewed either *concessively* (Luther, Beza, and many others, including Scholz, Tischendorf, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Hofmann) or *interrogatively* (Calvin, Grotius, Calovius, and most moderns). Comp. on xiii. 3. The latter (already in Oecumenius, and probably also Chrysostom) corresponds better to the increasing animation of the discourse. Paul hears, as it were, how the strong in faith opposes him with an *ἐγὼ πιστὺν ἔχω*, and he replies thereto: *Thou hast faith?* Thou partakest of the confidence of faith grounded on Christ, respecting the allowableness of the eating and drinking (vv. 2, 21), which is here in question?—*Have it for thyself* (*ἀρκείτω σου τὸ συνειδός*, Chrysostom) *before God*, so that God is the witness of thy faith, and thou dost not make a parade of it before men to the offence of the weak. “*Fundamentum verae prudentiae et dissimulationis*,” Bengel.—*ἔχε*] not: *thou mayest have it* (Reiche), which deprives the *imperative* expression of its force.—*κατὰ σῶν τόν*] *for thyself alone*; see Kühner, II. 1, p. 414.¹—*μακάριος . . . κατακρίνεται* forms a twofold consideration, which must influence the strong one not to abuse his strong faith to the prejudice of the weaker; namely, (1) he has in truth on his side the high advantage, which is expressed by *μακάριος . . . δοκιμάζει*; on the other hand, (2) the danger is great for the weak one, if he through the example of the strong one is tempted to a partaking contrary to his conscience (*ὁ δὲ διακρινόμενος κ.τ.λ.*). How shouldst thou not content thyself with that privilege, and spare this peril to the weak! On the formal mutual relation of *κρίν.*, *διακρίν.*, and *κατακρίν.*, comp. 1 Cor. xi. 31, 32, where, however, the definition of the sense is not as here.—*μακάριος*] for the *Messianic blessedness*, which has been acquired for him through Christ, does not become lost to him through conscientious doubts in the determining of his action.—*κρίνων*] not equivalent to *κατακρίνων*, as, since Chrysostom, most interpreters think; against which the climax *κρίνων, διακρινόμενος, κατακρίνεται* is decisive. It means: *he who does not hold judgment upon himself*, i.e. he who is so certain of his conviction, that his decision for this or that course is liable to no self-judgment; he does not institute any such judgment, as the anxious and uncertain one does.—*ἐν ᾧ δοκιμάζει*] *in that which he approves*, i.e. “*agendum eligit*” (Estius). Luther aptly renders: *in that which he accepts*.²—Ver. 23: *But he who wavers* (*διακρίν.*, *qui dubius haeret*, see on iv. 20), as to whether, namely, the eating is really allowed or not, *is, if he shall have eaten, condemned*, eo ipso (comp. on

¹ Comp. Heliodorus, vii. 16: *κατὰ σῶν τόν ἔχε* καὶ *μηδὲν φράζε*, also the classical *αὐτὸς ἔχε*, keep it for thyself.

² Comp. 2 Macc. iv. 3; Dem. 1381. 6; Plato, *Legg.* p. 579 C; Diod. Sic. iv. 7.

xiii. 8 ; John iii. 18) *liable to the divine penal judgment*, the opposite of *μακάριος* ; comp. ἀπώλλυε, ver. 15. The matter is apprehended from the point of view of morally ideal strictness. Actual *self-condemnation* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius, and others, including Hofmann) would have required a more precise designation. — *ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως* sc. ἔφαγε. — *πάν δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] may be still connected with *ὅτι* : *because he ate not from faith, but all, that comes not from faith, is sin.* If it is taken independently, however, the sense is more emphatic. In the conclusion, which proves the *κατακέκριται*, *πάν δὲ . . . ἁμαρτ. ἐστίν* is the major, and *οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως* sc. ἔφαγε the minor premiss. — *πίστις* is here also none other than faith according to its *moral* quality (“*conscientiam informans et confirmans*,” Bengel), *i.e.* faith in Christ, so far as it brings with it the moral confidence as to what in general, and under given circumstances, is the right Christian mode of action. Respecting the conduct of the *Christian*, Paul lays down the axiom which regulates it generally, and more especially in *adiaphora*, that all which does not proceed from that confidence of faith as the moral spring of action is sin ; to express a moral fundamental law *beyond* the Christian sphere of life, is foreign to his intention. Hence it was an alien proceeding to draw from the present expression, indirectly or directly,—in disregard of the natural law of conscience (ii. 14, 15),—the inference that the works and even the virtues of unbelievers were all of them sins (Augustine, *c. Julian.* iv. 3, *et. al.* ; Luther ; *Form. Conc.* p. 700 ; Calovius, and others). Very correctly Chrysostom : *ταῦτα δὲ πάντα περὶ τῆς προκειμένης υποθέσεως εἰρηται τῷ Παύλῳ, οὐ περὶ πάντων.* But against the abuse of this passage, as though it made all accountability dependent only on subjective moral conviction,¹ see Jul. Müller, *von d. Sünde*, I. p. 285, ed. 5 ; comp. also Delitzsch, *Psychol.* I. p. 139.

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

CXXXVII. Ver. 1. τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει.

The use of the word *πίστις* here is kindred to that in xii. 3, though the special application is not the same. It is evident that the writer's thought is not of the strength or weakness of the principle of trust in Christ in itself considered, but as viewed in its relation to questions of conscience and practice. As faith develops itself to its full measure in the soul, its natural result is to give intelligence and Christian freedom in all points belonging to the sphere of the *adiaphora*. Faith is not knowledge ; but it manifests itself on the side of knowledge, so that as the believer grows in his faith he comes more and more to understand (if, indeed, the faith-growth is a legitimate one) that the *adiaphora* are not in themselves wrong. The man who has the fulness of faith knows that, as there is no idol-god, there can be no polluting influence in meats taken from animals which have been sacrificed to idols, and that, as the earth with all that it furnishes for the support of life belongs to God, no food can be unclean in itself. Hence we find the Apostle speaking of himself, in

¹ In this view, the objective will of God would cease to be the *standard* of accountability. The bloody deed of Sand, *e.g.*,

would have been exempted from responsibility.

ver. 14, as knowing and being persuaded in the Lord Jesus of this truth respecting meats, and, in 1 Cor. viii. 1 ff., of all who had fully received his teaching as having knowledge of the nothingness of εἰδωλα. Paul's conception of faith, thus, is that of the vital and all-pervading force of the Christian's life, which not merely secures him justification and becomes the source of holy living, but gives him true understanding in questions of duty and fitness for his special work, to which he is called of God. Weiss ed. Mey. holds that the weakness of faith here spoken of consists in such a fear that salvation may easily be lost as leads one anxiously to avoid, or painfully to do, things which are irrelevant to its attainment, in order that it may not be forfeited. If this be accepted as the true explanation, and not improbably it should be, we must still hold that, as this weakness gives way to growing strength, the knowledge which removes the fear enters the mind, and thus the increase of faith gives the man power to do what he shrank from doing before. That such fear and weakness sometimes arose in the apostolic age from the remaining influence of old beliefs (cf. 1 Cor. viii. 7) is not to be doubted, but we cannot affirm that they did in every individual case. That they were always attended by conscientious scruples was natural or even necessary.

CXXXVIII. Ver. 1. *μὴ εἰς διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν.*

The meaning of this expression, though so uncertain as to preclude any absolute affirmation respecting it, seems to be indicated by the following points. (a) *προσλαμβάνεσθε* is addressed to the "strong" party, i.e. those who are free from the weakness referred to. This is evident, because the subject of the verb is contrasted with the object. It must be the "not weak" who are to receive the "weak." Nor will it be otherwise if, with Meyer, we say "the exhorted subject is the church, in contradistinction to the weak members;" for the church, as thus contradistinguished, is the strong party. That this is the correct view is confirmed by the fact that in Gal. v. 13 ff. (where Paul, not improbably, has the same general subject of thought in his mind) and 1 Cor. viii.-x. the exhortations are mainly addressed to this party in their relation to the other. If, however, the demand is made of the strong in faith, that they should take to their kindly fellowship their weaker brethren, it would seem probable that whatever words are added as bearing upon the purpose of the reception must describe what the strong are to do, or are to avoid doing, respecting the condition of the weak. (b) *μὴ εἰς κ.τ.λ.*, as indicating the purpose, sets forth also, as Meyer remarks, a negative more precise definition of the verb. The reception to fellowship, that is, was to be a reception *μὴ κ.τ.λ.* The words *διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν* imply, therefore, an unkindly attitude towards the weak party, and the most natural suggestion is that the unkindness, if manifested, would consist in some action bearing upon their thoughts or feelings. (c) The primary idea of *διαλογισμός* is a *thinking through* or *over* as with one's self, or in one's own mind. Hence it comes to mean, in the plural, *speculations* or *reasonings*. This primary idea is apparently suggested directly or indirectly in most, if not indeed all, of the N. T. passages where it occurs. It is thus adapted to express that mental state which, in connection with questions such as are here under consideration, is described by our word *scruples*. (d) *διάκρισις* does not seem to derive from its corresponding verb the meaning *doubts*. Of the other possible significations, it is probable that *decision* or

judgment is the one here intended, because *διάκρισις* in the two other cases where it occurs in the N. T. (1 Cor. xii. 10 ; Heb. v. 14) has this meaning or the one which lies at the basis of it ; and because a *dispute* or discussion respecting the subject of the scruples would not, in itself, be necessarily otherwise than beneficial. The impropriety or undesirableness of it would depend on the spirit in which it was carried on. On the other hand, the passing of condemnatory judgments could not but be evil.—The probabilities as to the sense of each of the two words and the indications of the two clauses of the verse as related to each other, accordingly, combine together in favour of the explanation, *not for the purpose of passing judgments upon their scruples*. Such a purpose would be contrary to kindly fellowship.

CXXXIX. Ver. 2. *ὃς μὲν πιστεύει κ.τ.λ.*

That *πιστεύει* means here not *believes that he may*, but *has faith to*, eat all things, is clear from the *ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει* of ver. 1, and from the *ἐκ πίστεως* of ver. 23. There seems to be no reason discoverable from the chapter to lead us to the belief that any limitation should be put upon the language used in this verse ; and hence we may hold, with Meyer, that the weak man is represented as refusing all meats, and not merely all ceremonially unclean meats, or all flesh sacrificed to idols. The extreme cases are taken for the purpose of emphasis.

CXL. Ver. 3. *ἐξουθενεῖτω — κρινέτω.*

After setting forth the condition of the two parties, as represented by two supposed cases, the bidding appropriate to each is given. The one who is free from scruples must not have contempt for the Christian brother who is under bondage to them ; and the latter must not judge or condemn the former. The grounds for the command are added : because God has accepted as His own the one on whom judgment is passed ; because, being the servant of God, he is responsible to God only ; and because the subjects referred to are such as involve no sin, provided the man is fully persuaded in his own mind—he may live to the Lord equally whether he eats or declines to eat.

CXLI. Ver. 5. *ὃς μὲν γὰρ κρίνει ἡμέραν κ.τ.λ.*

Tisch. (8) adopts *γάρ*. Treg. Alf. reject it. W. & Hort place it in brackets. The commentators generally, with Meyer, do not accept it as belonging to the text. If it is read, the passage respecting “days” is evidently introduced in a subordinate way, as an illustrative proof of what is said concerning the matter of eating, or, according to Hofmann, of the sentence *δυνατεῖ . . . αὐτόν* (ver. 4). If, on the other hand, *γάρ* is omitted, there is a certain parallelism between this verse and ver. 2. The fact alluded to by Meyer, however,—that there is only a passing reference to this subject, while the other matter fills the whole remaining portion of the chapter,—makes it evident that the observance or non-observance of days was a thing of secondary importance to the Apostle’s present thought. The main point is the question of meats.

We may infer from Gal. iv. 10 and Col. ii. 16, which are apparently kindred in thought to this verse, that the days here referred to were those observed by the Jews. Meyer regards them as including both feast and fast days. Weiss ed. Mey. would limit them to the latter. . There seems, however, to be no sufficient

ground for this limitation. The different attitude which Paul takes in the three Epistles does not show that he is thinking of different observances. It is perfectly explicable without this supposition. He is here, as in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, addressing the church members with regard to their private and social life in these matters. They were holding different opinions, as connected with the stronger or weaker measure of their faith, and were passing judgments privately on actions and scruples. Under such circumstances he could write calmly—telling them that the questions of this class were not of vital importance; that the kingdom of God was not eating and drinking, but righteousness; that, whether one should eat all things or vegetables only, he would neither gain nor lose anything at the day of final judgment; that there was no sin in freedom; that freedom in such things was even the highest and normal state for the intelligent believer; but that, as some believers were still under the bondage of conscientious scruples, the rule of the Christian society should be, here as it was everywhere, love to the brethren. Each one should, for himself, see that he was, before acting, fully persuaded in his own mind. Each one should, in his relations to others, be animated by the spirit of Christ. There should be no condemnation of the strong by the weak, and no contempt of the weak on the part of the strong. In the case of the Galatian and Colossian churches, on the contrary, there was quite a different condition of things. In Galatia, he saw his converts, under the influence of teachers who bitterly opposed his doctrine, moving away from the freedom of the gospel to the bondage of Judaistic views. At Colossae, there were men who insisted upon these observances as essential to the highest life, in connection with the idea of matter as the source of evil. The truth of Christianity was, thus, involved by reason of the assaults of dangerous and insinuating enemies. He was compelled to arouse his unthinking followers by the sound of alarm, and to bid them claim independence for themselves as related to the judgment or demand of any who would condemn them. But the subject of controversy was the same in all cases. The difference was only in the position of the adversaries, and, consequently, of the Apostle himself.

The bearing of this verse upon the observance of the Christian Sunday is discussed by many writers. The following points may be noticed in a candid and impartial examination of this question. (a) The primary, and probably exclusive direct reference of the words, as related to the differences in the churches addressed by Paul, was to Jewish, not to Christian observances. (b) An agreement respecting the latter, connected with a difference respecting the former, is conceivable. (c) The writer may possibly, therefore, have had no intention of including the Christian Sunday among the days whose observance or non-observance might be left to the individual judgment. (d) On the other hand, the contrast in the words of the verse is between esteeming one day above another and esteeming every day alike. The universality of the expression is noticeable. (e) No command is given by the Apostle in any of his Epistles with reference to the Christian Sunday, and no reference is made to it except in 1 Cor. xvi. 2. (f) The mode of dealing with the general subject of "days" must be considered. Is it probable or improbable that Paul would have written as he did in the three Epistles, if the error of the Sabbath-observers had been simply, or mainly, an error in keeping the seventh day instead of, or in addition to, the first? The determination of these points and their adjustment in relation to one another are

necessary to a decision. The decision when made, will not in itself settle the question as to the grounds or the proper character of Sunday-observance, but it must find its place in the main argument on that question. What Paul's view of the matter was is an important element in the discussion as to whether the Christian Sunday depends on, and finds its inviolable Divine ordinance in, the Fourth Commandment. The question in its wider range, however, extends beyond this point of the relation of the Christian institution to the Mosaic Law.

CXLII. Ver. 6. ὁ ἐσθίων κυρίῳ ἐσθίει κ.τ.λ.

Paul recognizes the fact that both the eater and the non-eater take the course of action which they follow with that regard for the Lord and their duty to Him, which animates the Christian in everything. Whether he lives or dies, it is not for himself, but for Christ. It is to be observed here, (a) that *κυρίῳ* refers to Christ, because the believer, according to the Pauline phraseology, is *δοῦλος* (here *οἰκέτης*, ver. 4) *Χριστοῦ*, and because *Χριστός* is used in ver. 9 with manifest reference to *κυρίῳ* (comp. also *κυριεύσας*, ver. 9). (2) that *living* and *dying* are mentioned, as in viii. 38, 1 Cor. iii. 22, as the two extremes between which everything else must be included :—if for Christ *in these*, for Him *in all things* ; (3) that the proof on which he rests his statement that both parties act with true regard to the Lord's service is, that they each of them offer the prayer of thanksgiving for that which they eat ; (4) that the use of the words *no man liveth to himself* (ver. 7), which is often made in public discourse, as meaning that the Christian, according to the law of his life, should live for others, is not justified by the thought of the passage. Living for others is a teaching of Christianity, but not of these words.

CXLIII. Ver. 13. μηκέτι οὖν ἀλλήλους κρίνωμεν.

The immediate connection of *οὖν* is (as Meyer also says) with *ἐκαστος κ.τ.λ.* of ver. 12. In the progress of the thought, however, it may be regarded as introducing a conclusion from all that has been said. As the Christian is not his brother-Christian's servant, but Christ's ; as the one who eats the meats and the one who does not both act in devotion to the common Master ; and as the judgment of God is to decide all questions at the end, the duty of the two parties is to refrain from judging each other. The two words *ἐξουθενεῖν* and *κρίνειν* are here included in *κρίνωμεν*, because the *ἐξουθ.* is really a *κρίνειν*.

CXLIV. Ver. 13. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κρίνατε μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ.

From the negative exhortation *μηκ . . . κρίν.*, which is addressed to both parties, and in which he also includes himself, Paul turns immediately to a positive one directed to the "strong" section only. The remainder of the chapter appeals to them ; bidding them resolve to put no hindrance in the way of the Christian life and progress of the weak, and setting forth reasons why they should follow the bidding. These reasons, which, in the earnestness and natural flow of the thought, are not presented in carefully arranged succession, are the following : (1) that the weak will be "grieved ;" (2) that the one for whom Christ died and in whose life is God's work may be thus injured or even destroyed ; (3) that the danger of this injury and loss is occasioned for the sake of what is not essential to the kingdom of God, but is comparatively unimportant.

CXLV. Vv. 14-23.

The doctrine of Paul on the subject of the *ἀδιόφορα*, as indicated in these verses, involves the following points. (a) There is no real ground for conscientious scruples in such matters. He distinctly declares himself to be of the strong and free party. As living in the sphere of Christ, and taught by Him, he is persuaded, he even knows that nothing is unclean in and through itself. (b) The man who has this knowledge and persuasion (i.e. this faith to eat all things) is to be called happy, and may rightly for and by himself enjoy his freedom before God. (c) The man who is not fully persuaded, i.e., who thinks a certain thing to be unclean, will do wrong if he eats. His subjective state makes the action wrong, not *in itself*, but *for him*. (d) The strong, as they are brought into relations with the weak, must not insist upon the exercise of that liberty which they may indulge in private, because Christian love must help and not hinder or harm the weak. (e) The principle of action in all such matters must be love.

It is evident, however, that Paul did not hold the view that the Christian body should always limit its opinions, or its acts, by the limitations of those among its members whose knowledge and faith, in the sense here indicated, are at the lowest point. He asserts most definitely and emphatically the rights of the individual conscience. "Why is my liberty judged by another man's conscience," 1 Cor. x. 29. He affirms that conscientious scruples of the class referred to belong to and are occasioned by imperfect Christian knowledge. Growth in faith will remove them. Freedom from them is a blessedness. If they do not exist, they are not to be originated by anxious questioning (comp. 1 Cor. x. 25-27). He expresses apprehension in the case of those who are falling back into them (Gal. iv. 11), that his labour for their conversion and Christian life has been in vain. He boldly advocates freedom against the Judaistic party. In a word, he preaches the Pauline Gospel.

No interpreter can understand the Apostle's whole doctrine, who does not take both sides of the matter into his consideration. No body of Christian believers, it may be added, can fulfil the apostolic injunction so long as the men of freedom respecting the indifferent things are alone called upon to obey its voice, and cease to despise their weaker brethren. The weaker party must also do what has often been forgotten in later times, as it was in Paul's day—cease to condemn those who are raised, through faith and knowledge, into the understanding that none of these things are unclean in themselves, but that they are so only to him who thinks them to be so.

CXLVI. Ver. 15. *εἰ γὰρ . . . ὁ ἀδελφὸς λυπεῖται.*

λυπεῖται evidently is not the same word as *ἀπόλλυε*, but the connection of the sentences shows that it must be either equivalent to that verb or must denote something in the line of its meaning. It cannot, therefore, be the mere feeling of pain that another person does something which we regard as wrong. It must involve an injury to our Christian life, of greater or less moment. Whether, however,—this being admitted,—*λυπεῖν* is to be regarded (with Philippi and others) as directly conveying the idea *to injure*, or (with Weiss ed. Mey.) as pointing to it more indirectly, in that the weaker person, being led on by the example of the strong, is thrown into much internal conflict and sorrow, is more difficult to determine. The comparison of this expression with

1 Cor. viii. 9, 10, 11, 12, where there is much similarity in language to the present passage, though indeed a reference to a different subject, would suggest the latter idea. Comp. especially *συνείδησις αὐτοῦ ἁσθενοῦς ὄντος οἰκοδομηθήσεται εἰς τὸ . . . ἐσθίειν* and *τύποντες αὐτῶν τὴν συνείδησιν ἁσθενοῦσαν*.

CXLVII. Ver. 16. *μὴ βλασφημείσθω σὺν ὑμῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν.*

The similarity of the entire passage to what is found in 1 Cor. viii. suggests that the reference in *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is to the "liberty" of the strong party. This explanation, which is favored by many writers (so Fritzsche, Tholuck, Godet, Gifford, and others), is rejected by Meyer, Weiss ed. Mey., Hofmann, de Wette, Alford, Philippi, and others. The last mentioned writers, however, differ in their views, as to what the good thing referred to is (see Meyer's note). The objections urged against the reference to *liberty* seem to have no real foundation. They are the following: (a) That the plural "you" being used here, instead of the singular as in ver 15, shows that the writer is addressing the whole church, and not the strong party. But it should be noticed, (1) that the plural is used in ver. 13 in addressing this party, and (2) that the whole church is nowhere spoken of throughout the entire chapter except with the use of the first person plural. (b) That the emphatic position of *ὑμῶν* indicates a reference to the church. But the position of *ὑμῶν* is altogether consistent with a designed prominence given to the strong party in contrast with the weak. Paul was exhorting the strong with respect to that which belonged to them alone. Comp. the emphatic *σύ*, ver. 22. (c) That the reading *ἡμῶν* found in D and some later authorities, also in the Peshito, indicates the same reference. But *ἡμῶν* simply unites the writer with the persons to whom he directs his remarks, and is just as applicable to the free party as it is to the whole body of believers. Comp. *ἡμεῖς οἱ δυνατοί* xv. 1, 1 Cor. xv. 52, and other passages, where Paul refers to a class of persons and adds himself to them by the use of the "communicative we." Moreover, this reading may have been, at the most, what some copyist thought to be the Apostle's meaning, and may have been due to an error on his part as to what that meaning was. (d) That the verb *βλασφημείσθω* points to reproaches of unbelievers against the church. It is to be admitted that the verb often has this reference, but that it may be used of believers also, is beyond doubt. It is thus used in 1 Cor. x. 30, where Paul is speaking of a matter kindred to that which is alluded to here. The argument derived from that passage as proving the same sense in this place is a very strong one. (e) That ver. 17 favors the interpretation of *ὑμῶν* as meaning all the church members. Not so, it may be answered, when the force of ver. 17 is rightly understood. As, in 1 Cor. viii. 8, the Apostle urges, as a reason why the strong party should not allow their liberty to become a stumbling-block to the weak, the fact that food will not commend (or present) us before the Divine judgment-seat; so here he presses the same thing on the ground that the kingdom of God does not consist in eating and drinking. (f) That *τοῖς ἀνθρώποις* (ver. 18) shows that the *βλασφημία* is that of unbelievers. But there is neither any statement by the writer, nor any decisive evidence, that *ἀνθρώποις* means only unbelievers, and, if it does, there is no evidence that the 18th verse has any force except as confirming the declaration of ver. 17, or, in other words, that it has an immediate connection with ver. 16 of such a sort as to have any bearing whatever on the question under consideration. It is worthy of notice that

there is no allusion to unbelievers anywhere else in the chapter, but, on the other hand, that all the other suggestions of every sort have reference to the two parties of believers in their relation to each other. When we take this fact into view, and at the same time the insufficiency of the counter arguments, the parallelism of the expressions in the passage in the First Epistle to the Corinthians must be allowed its full weight. This parallelism and the naturalness of the interpretation when the verse and the context are considered by themselves, render the reference of τὸ ἀγαθόν to the liberty of the strong party altogether probable.

CXLVIII. Ver. 17. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ κ.τ.λ.

Meyer claims that *the kingdom of God* here, and everywhere else, signifies "nothing else than the Messiah's kingdom, the erection of which begins with the Parousia, belonging not to the αἰὼν οὗτος, but to the αἰὼν μέλλων." Weiss ed. Mey. admits that this is the ordinary meaning of the phrase in Paul's writings, but he denies that the reference here is to the kingdom as established hereafter. It is, rather, to the essential idea of the kingdom, which is not such that a man must eat and drink this or that in order to participate in it. The view of Weiss is more nearly correct. The vital element of the kingdom is not eating and drinking, but righteousness. The atmosphere of the kingdom is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. For those whose life is in this atmosphere the minor questions pertaining only to the physical life (cf. 1 Cor. vi. 13a) are insignificant.

In regard to the words δικαιοσύνη and εἰρήνη, on the other hand, Meyer seems to have the right view as compared with Weiss. The latter, with Rückert, Tholuck, Philippi, Shedd, and others, holds that δικ. here means δικ. ἐκ πίστεως and refers to justification, and that εἰρ. means reconciliation with God. The ordinary sense of δικ. is more appropriate to the context and the chapter—conformity to what one ought to be and do. The context also points to peace with one another, rather than peace with God, as the idea in the writer's mind. Comp. vv. 18, 19. It is certainly more natural to use the form of expression found in ver. 18, ὁ δουλεύων Χριστῷ ἐν τούτῳ or τοῦτοις, if the words have the latter meaning. The whole chapter, also, has reference to actions and relations to the Christian brethren. It is not sufficient to urge, as counterbalancing the force of these suggestions, that the Apostle is stating what the essence of God's kingdom consists in: for though the things which are fundamental to that kingdom are justification and reconciliation, yet, in a true and proper sense, the essence of the kingdom is righteousness of life and peace, which is the fruit of love. Weiss objects that love is not mentioned, but it is plainly suggested in the use of εἰρήνη, and the circumstances of the case called especially for the mention of this particular manifestation of love.

The words χαρὰ ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ have been made an objection to the reference of δικ. and εἰρήνη favored by Meyer. It is affirmed that this joy is not an active virtue, but a mere condition subjective to the individual mind. In answer to this, however, it may be said that joy may here be referred to as both the origin of and the attendant upon the state of Christian peace, or that it may be mentioned as one of the chief fruits of the Spirit in connection with the others, although it is not intended to have precisely the same application. The strongest argument for the other view is that connected with this ex-

pression. But everything else points so decidedly towards Meyer's explanation, that it is to be regarded—not, indeed, as certain—but as the more probable of the two. Godet, Gifford, Beet, Sanday, Hofmann, and others among the most recent writers agree substantially with Meyer. Grimm Lex. N. T. is doubtful. Both views are united by de Wette. If Meyer's explanation is adopted, the righteousness and peace are (as he also says himself) those of the Christian life;—having faith in Christ as the soil from which they spring

CXLIX. Vv. 22, 23. *οὐ πίστιν ἦν ἐχεις, κ.τ.λ.*

(1) Meyer, with whom, among recent commentators, Godet, Weiss ed. Meyer, Philippi, and some others agree, rejects *ἦν*. He supposes it to be occasioned by a double writing of the last two letters of *πίστω*, or to have been added as explanatory. Philippi regards it as a paraphrastic gloss. Godet decides against its insertion on the ground that the ancient versions generally do not favour it, and that it is not in keeping with the context. Weiss thinks that if it had been genuine, we should have found *τῇν πίστιν* in the text, and not *πίστιν*. The external evidence is admitted to be favourable to its insertion, and it is adopted by Treg. Tisch. (8), W. & Hort. With *ἦν* the sentence is certainly affirmative; without *ἦν* it is probably so, though possibly interrogative. R. V. accepts *ἦν* as the true reading. (2) *πίστιν*, by reason of the connection of thought throughout the chapter, must mean faith in the sense and application of the word suggested in vv. 1, 2. (3) *κατὰ σεαυτόν*. The emphasis is evidently upon these words. This, however, does not prove that the sole purpose of the sentence is to forbid the pressing of one's freedom in the presence and to the injury of the weak. The following clauses, as well as the wording of this clause itself, make it probable that, along with this idea, it is also implied that the strong may retain and enjoy and exercise the freedom of his faith when he is "by himself," and "before God" only. (4) *μακάριος* is referred by Meyer to the fact that "the Messianic blessedness [*i.e.* in the established Messianic kingdom] does not become lost to him through conscientious doubts." But, more probably, it refers to the present happiness, which the believer who is not troubled by such doubts in the sphere of the *adiaphora* must necessarily have. (5) The explanation given by Meyer of *ὁ μὴ κρίνων . . . δοκιμάζει* is undoubtedly correct. The man asks no questions for conscience' sake (1 Cor. x. 25) before the action, and subjects himself to no self-judgment in and after it. As he practically approves it (*δοκιμάζει*), so he has no inward doubt that it is right. He has faith for "all things." (6) On the other hand, the one who doubts is condemned, provided he eats. He moves forward to action before he is inwardly ready for it. *διακρίνεσθαι* is here used in the same sense as in Matt. xxi. 21. As Godet says, "Conscience has not yet reached oneness with itself; hence the term *διακρίν*, to be divided into two men, the one of whom says yes, the other no." *κατακρίνεται* refers apparently to God's judgment (Meyer says, "is liable to the divine penal judgment"), but does not carry with it the idea that the person will, necessarily, be a subject of eternal condemnation. (7) *ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως*. The reason of the condemnation is because the eating, in the case supposed, does not originate in, have its source in, faith. The man eats all things (*ver.* 2) while he has faith only to eat vegetables. (8) *πάν δὲ ὃ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως ἁμαρτία ἐστίν*. *πίστις* in this clause is to be understood in the sense in which it is used throughout the chapter. The interpretation of the clause is determined by

this fact. Paul is speaking of the action of Christians in the region of the adiaphora, and of this only. The explanation which applies the words to all actions and life, and which even makes them apply to unbelievers, declaring that everything which they do is sin because they do not believe in Christ, is founded on a misapprehension of what the Apostle's purpose is. He has no reference to this matter, nor indeed to anything beyond the limits of the chapter.

CHAPTER XV.¹

Various writers formerly, from the days of Semler,² disputed, not that Paul was the author of chap. xv. and xvi. (as to the doxology, xvi. 25-27, see, however, the critical notes on chap. xvi.), but *that chap. xv. and xvi. along with chap. i.-xiv. compose one epistle*. Semler himself thought that Paul had given to the bearers of the letter—of which Phoebe was *not* the bearer—a list, which they might exhibit, of the teachers whom they were to visit on their journey by way of Cenchreae (where Phoebe dwelt) and Ephesus (where Aquila dwelt), and to whom they were to hand a copy of the letter. This list was in his view chap. xvi., of which, however, vv. 25-27 had their original place after xiv. 23 (which also Paulus, Griesbach, Flatt, Eichhorn assumed); and chap. xv. was an open letter to those same teachers, with whom the travellers were to confer respecting the contents.—Paulus (*de originib. ep. ad Rom.*, Jen. 1801, and in his *Kommentar*, z. *Gal. u. Rom.* 1831, *Introd.*) held chap. xv. to be an appended letter for those who were enlightened, and chap. xvi. to have been a separate leaf for the bearer of the letters, with commendations to the overseers of the church and commissions to those whom they were particularly to greet from Paul. Griesbach (*curae in hist. text. Gr. epp. P.* p. 45, and in his *Opusc.* ed. Gabl. vol. ii. p. 63; comp. in opposition to him, Gabler himself in the Preface, p. xxiv.), whom in the main Flatt followed, saw in chap. xv. an appendix for the further discussion of the last subject, subjoined after the conclusion of the letter, while chap. xvi. consisted originally of various, appended leaflets. A similar hypothesis was constructed by Eichhorn (*Einleit.* III. p. 232 ff.), who, however, regarded xvi. 1-20 as not belonging to Rome at all, but as a letter of commendation for Phoebe, probably destined for Corinth, but taken along with her to Rome. Among all the *grounds* by which these varied assumptions have been supported, there are none which are valid, not even those which appear the least to rest on arbitrary assumption. For the statement that Marcion did not read chap. xv. and xvi. amounts to this, that he, according to his fashion (see Hahn, *d. Ev. Marcion's*, p. 50 ff.), excised them.³ See, besides, Nitzsch in the *Zeitschr. f. histor. Theol.* 1860, I. p. 285 ff. Further, that Tertullian, c.

¹ Comp. Lucht, *üb. d. beiden letzt. Kap. d. Römerbriefs, eine krit. Unters.*, Berlin 1871.

² Keggemann, praes. Semler *de duplici ep. ad Rom. appendice*, Hal. 1767, and afterwards in Semler's *Paraphrase*, 1769. See in opposition to him, Koppe, *Exc.* II. p. 400 ff., ed. Ammon, Flatt, and Reiche.

³ Origen on xvi. 25: "Caput hoc (viz. xvi. 25-27) Marcion, a quo scripturae evangelicae et apostolicae interpolatae sunt, de hac epistola penitus abstulit; et non solum hoc, sed et ab eo loco, ubi scriptum est (xiv. 23): omne autem, quod non ex fide est, peccatum est, usque ad finem cuncta dissecuit,"

—which *dissecuit* cannot denote a mere mutilation (Reiche and others), but must be equivalent in sense to the preceding *abstulit*. The validity of this testimony cannot be overthrown by the silence of Epiphanius on this omission of Marcion, as a merely negative reason against it. Marcion's stumbling-blocks, as regards chap. xv., were probably vv. 4 and 8 in particular. Altogether Marcion allowed himself to use great violence to this epistle, as he, for example, extruded x. 5-xi. 32; Tertullian, *c. Marc.* v. 14. Comp. generally, Hilgenfeld, in the *Zeitschr. f. hist. Theol.* 1855, iii. p. 426 ff.

Marc. v. 14, designates the passage xiv. 10 as to be found in *clausula* of the epistle, is sufficiently explained from the fact that he is arguing against *Marcion* and hence refers to *his* copy. Comp. also Rönseh, *d. N. T. Tertullian's* p. 350. Again, the repeated formulae of conclusion before the final close of the letter (xvi. 20, 24; xv. 33 is merely the concluding wish of a section) are most readily and naturally understood from the repeated intention of the apostle actually to conclude; which was to be done first of all at xvi. 16, but was frustrated through the intrusion of the further observation ver. 17 ff., and was deferred till ver. 20, after which, however, some further commissions of greeting were introduced (vv. 21-23), so that not until ver. 24 did the last wish of blessing—and now, for the complete conclusion of the whole, the ample doxology, vv. 25-27—finish the epistle. Most plausible are the two difficulties felt in reference to chap. xvi.; namely, (1) that Paul would probably not have had so many acquaintances in Rome, where he had not yet been at all, as he greets in chap. xvi., especially seeing that, in the epistles subsequently written from Rome, he mentions none of them; and (2) that Aquila and Priscilla could hardly at that time have been in Rome (xvi. 3), because they not long before were still dwelling in Ephesus (1 Cor. xvi. 19), and were at a later period likewise in Ephesus (2 Tim. iv. 19). This has been regarded as the most serious difficulty by Ammon (*Praefat.* p. 24)—who held chap. xvi. to be a letter of commendation written by the apostle for Phoebe to Corinth after the imprisonment at Rome—and recently by Dav. Schulz (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1829, p. 609 ff.), Schott (*Isag.* p. 249 ff.), Reuss (*Gesch. d. h. Schrift.* § 111), Ewald, Laurent, Lucht. Schulz regards chap. xvi. as written from Rome to Ephesus; while Schott's judgment is as follows: "Totum cap. xvi. compositum est fragmentis diversis alius ejusdem epistolae brevioris (maximam partem amissae), quam Paulus Corinthi ad cœtum quendam Christianum in Asia Minori versantem dederat, ita ut qui schedulas singulas hæc fragmenta exhibentes sensim sensimque deprehendisset, continua serie unum adjiceret alteri." Reuss (so also Hausrath and Sabatier) sees in xvi. 1-20 a letter with which Phoebe, who was travelling to Ephesus, was entrusted to the church there; while Ewald (comp. Mangold, also Ritschl in the *Jahrb. f. D. Theol.* 1866, p. 352) cuts out only vv. 3-20, but likewise regards this portion as having originally pertained to an epistle of the apostle to the Ephesians, which, according to ver. 7, was written from the Roman captivity; as, indeed, also Laurent (*neuest. Stud.* p. 31 ff.) extracts from vv. 1-24 a special commendatory letter for Phoebe, written by the apostle's own hand to the Ephesians, assuming at the same time marginal remarks; and Lucht assigns the commendation of Phoebe, and the greetings by name in vv. 3-6, to a letter to the Ephesians, but the greetings following in ver. 7 ff. to the editor of the Epistle to the Romans. But (1) just in the case of Rome it is readily conceivable that Paul had many acquaintances there, some of whom had come from Asia and Greece, and had settled in Rome, whether permanently or temporarily (several perhaps as missionaries); while others, like Aquila, had been banished as Jews under Claudius, and then had returned as Pauline Christians. (2) It is by no means necessary that Paul should have known the whole of those

¹ These being vv. 1-16, vv. 17-20, vv. 21-24, vv. 25-27.

² And that to such an extent, that of the 15th chapter nothing further is supposed to have been written by Paul for the *Romans*

than vv. 21, 23, 24. See, in opposition, Ritschl, *l.c.*, and Lucht, p. 23 f.—Weisse would have chap. xvi. together with chap. ix.-xi. directed to Ephesus.

saluted by sight ; how many might, though personally unknown, be saluted by him ! (3) The fact that Paul at a later period, when he himself was a prisoner in Rome and wrote thence (in my judgment, the Epistle to the Philippians here *alone* comes into consideration ; see Introd. to Eph. and Col. ; the *Pastoral Epistles*, as non-apostolic, must be disregarded), does not again mention any one of those here saluted, may have arisen from the altered circumstances of the time ; for between the composition of the epistle to Rome and the apostle's sojourn in Rome there lies an interval of three years, during which the majority of those referred to might have obtained other places of destination. Besides, the *salutation* which Paul in the Epistle to the Philippians offers to others (iv. 22) is merely a quite summary one. (4) There exists no ground at all for denying that Aquila and Priscilla might, after the writing of our First Epistle to the Corinthians (1 Cor. xvi. 19), have returned from Ephesus to Rome and have informed the apostle of their sojourn and activity there. (5) The greeting from *all churches* in ver. 16 is suitable enough for an epistle addressed to the church of the *capital city of the empire* ; and the *first-fruits of Asia*, ver. 5, was *everywhere* a distinguishing predicate, so that it does not presuppose one living precisely in Ephesus.¹ (6) Were vv. 3-20 a portion cast adrift of an epistle to the *Ephesians*, or even a separate small letter to the Ephesians, it would not be easy to see how it should have come precisely to *this place* ; it must have from the outset lost every trace of the tradition of its original destination to such an extent, that no occasion was found even afterwards, when an epistle to the Ephesians was already in ecclesiastical use, to subjoin it to *that* epistle. From all this there just as little remains any sufficient ground for severing, in opposition to all testimony, chap. xvi., as there is for severing chap. xv., having otherwise so close an external and internal connection with chap. xiv., from the Epistle to the Romans, and giving up the unity of the latter as handed down.

It was reserved at last for the criticism of Baur to contest the *apostolic origin* of chap. xv. xvi. (in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1836, 3, and *Paulus*, I. p. 394 ff., ed. 2 ; comp. also in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1849, 4, p. 493 ff. ; Schweigler, *nachapostol. Zeitalt.* p. 123 ff. ; Volkmar, in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1856, p. 321 ff., and *Röm. Kirche*, 1857, p. 3). Baur finds in the last two chapters a *making of advances towards the Jewish Christians*,² such as does not suit the tenor of the rest of the epistle. In this view he objects particularly to vv. 3, 8, 14 in chap. xv. ; vv. 9-12 is a mere accumulation of Bible passages to pacify the Jewish Christians ; ver. 15 is irrelevant, ver. 20 no less so ; the statement of ver. 19 : from Jerusalem to Illyricum, is unhistorical, derived from a later interest ; vv. 22, 23 do not agree with i. 10-13 ; vv. 24, 28, intimating that Paul intended to visit the Romans only on his route to Spain, are surprising ; vv. 25, 26 have been taken by the writer from the epistles to the Corinthians for his own purpose, in order to win over the Jewish Christians ; the long series of persons saluted in chap. xvi.—a list of notabilities in the early Roman church—was intended to afford proof that Paul already stood in confidential relations to the best known members of the church, in connection with which several names, among them the *συγγενεῖς*

¹ Comp. besides, on the arguments numbered 1-5, van Hengel, II. p. 783 ff.

² The two chapters are supposed, forsooth, to belong to a *Pauline writer*, "*who, in the spirit of the author of the book of Acts, wished to oppose to the sharp anti-Judaism of*

the apostle a softening and soothing counterpoise in favor of the Judaists, and in the interests of unity." The 15th chapter is supposed to have its original in 2 Cor. x. 13-18.—Hilgenfeld has not adhered to Baur's view.

of the apostle as well as Aquila and Priscilla, and their characterization are suspicious; vv. 17-20 are unsuitably placed, and without characteristic colouring; the position of the final doxology is uncertain; the entire complaisance towards the Jewish Christians conflicts with Gal. i. and ii. But this same (so-called) complaisance (according to Volkmar, "with all manner of excuses and half compliments") is assumed utterly without ground, especially seeing that Paul had already in an earlier passage expressed so much of deep and true sympathy for his people (comp. ix. 1 ff., x. 1, 2, xi. 1, 2, 11 ff., *et al.*); and whatever else is discovered to be irrelevant, unsuitable, and unhistoric in the two chapters is simply and solely placed in this wrong light through the interest of suspicion; while, on the other hand, the whole language and mode of representation are so distinctively Pauline, that an interpolation so comprehensive would in fact stand *unique*, and how *singular*, at the same time, in being furnished with such different conclusions and fresh starts! See, further, Kling in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1837, p. 308 ff.; Delitzsch in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1849, p. 609 ff.; Th. Schott, p. 119 ff.; Wieseler in Herzog's *Encyklop.* XX. p. 598 f.; Mangold, p. 67 ff.; Riggenbach in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1868, p. 41 ff.—Nevertheless Lucht, *i.e.*, has once more come into very close contact with Baur, in proposing the hypothesis that the genuine epistle of Paul, extending to xiv. 23, existed in an incomplete state; that thereupon, one hand, summing up the main points of the epistle in the (un-Pauline) doxology, added the latter after xiv. 23; while another further continued the theme broken off at xiv. 23, and subjoined an epilogue, along with greetings, to the Romans. In this way *two editions* arose, of which one (A) contained chap. i.-xiv. and xvi. 25-27; while the other (B) contained chap. i.-xiv. and xv. 1-16, 24; A and B were then supplemented from one another. That which Paul himself had appended after xiv. 23, was removed from it by the Roman clergy, and laid out in their archives (out of consideration for the ascetics, namely); but subsequently it, along with fragments of an epistle to the Ephesians, which had also been placed in the archives, had been worked in by the composer of chap. xv. and xvi. This entire hypothesis turns upon presuppositions and combinations which are partly arbitrary in themselves, and partly without any solid ground or support in the detailed exegesis.

Ver. 2. After *ἐκαστος* Elz. has *γάρ*, against decisive witnesses. — Ver. 4. Instead of the second *προεγράφη*, B C D E F G *Σ**, 67**, 80, most vss., and several Fathers have *ἐγράφη*. Approved by Griesb., adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Fritzsche. Rightly; the compound is an intentional or mechanical repetition. — Not so strongly attested (though by A B C* L *Σ*) is the *διά* repeated before *τῆς παρακλ.* in Griesb., Lachm., Tisch. 8, which, since the article again follows, became easily added. — Ver. 7. *ὑμᾶς* Elz.: *ἡμᾶς*, against A C D**, E F G L *Σ*, min., most vss., and several Fathers. A correct gloss, indicating the reference of *ὑμᾶς* to the Jewish and Gentile Christians. — Ver. 8. *γάρ* approved by Griesb., adopted also by Lachm. and Tisch. But Elz. and Fritzsche have *δέ*; against which the evidence is decisive. Moreover, *λέγω δέ* is the customary form with Paul for more precise explanation, and hence also slipped in here. — *γενησθαι* Lachm.: *γενέσθαι*, according to B C* D* F G, Arm. Ath. But how readily one of the two syllables *ΓΕ* might be passed over, and then the familiar (comp. also Gal. iv. 4) *γενέσθαι* would be produced! — Ver. 11. After *πάλι* Lachm. has *λέγει*, according to B D E F G, 1, and several vss.; manifestly an addition in accordance with ver. 10. — *ἐπαινέσατε* Lachm. and Tisch.: *ἐπαινεσάτωσαν*, according to A B C D E *Σ*, 39, Chrys. ms. Dam. Both readings are

also found in the LXX., and may be borrowed thence. The circumstance that after *αἰνεῖτε* the form *ἐπαινέσατε*, as more conformable, readily offered itself, speaks in favour of *ἐπαινέσάτωσαν*. — Ver. 15. *ἀδελφοί*] is wanting indeed in A B C $\aleph^*$, Copt. Aeth. Cyr. Chrys. Ruf. Aug. (omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8), and stands in 3, 108, after *μέρους*; but why should it have been added? On the other hand, its omission was readily suggested, since it had just appeared for the first time in ver. 14, and since it seemed simply to stand in the way of the connection of *ἀπὸ μέρ.*; hence also that transposition in 3, 108. — Ver. 17. *καύχησιν*] Rightly Lachm. and Tisch.: *τὴν καύχησιν*. The reference of the preponderantly attested article was not understood. — Ver. 19. *ἀγίου*] So A C D E F G, min., and most vss. and Fathers. Adopted also by Griesb., Lachm., and Scholz. But Elz. (so also Matth., Fritzsche, Tisch. 8), in accordance with $\aleph^*$ and D** L P, most min., Syr. Chrys. and others, has *Θεοῦ*. In B, Pel. Vigil. there is merely *πνεύματος*. So Tisch. 7. Since there is absolutely no reason why *ἀγ.* or *Θεοῦ* should have been omitted or altered, probably the simple *πνεύματος* is the original, which was only variously glossed by *ἀγ.* and *Θεοῦ*. — Ver. 20. *φιλοτιμούμενον*] Lachm.: *φιλοτιμοῦμαι*, according to B D* F G P. To facilitate the construction. — Ver. 22. *τὰ πολλὰ*] B D E F G: *πολλὰκις*, so Lachm. An interpretation in accordance with i. 13. — Ver. 23. *πολλῶν*] Tisch. 7: *ἱκανῶν*, according to B C, 37, 59, 71, Dam. A modifying gloss, according to an expression peculiarly well known from the book of Acts. — Ver. 24. After *Σπανίαν* Elz. and Tisch. 7 have *ἐλεύσονται πρὸς ὑμᾶς*, which is omitted by Griesb., Lachm., and Tisch. 8. A contrast to ver. 22, written at the side, and then introduced, but rejected by all uncials except L $\aleph^{**}$, and by all vss. except Syr. p.; attested, however, among the Fathers by Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, and preserved in nearly all the cursives. This old interpolation occasioned the insertion of an illustrative *γάρ* after *ἐλπίζω* (so Elz., Tisch., and also Lachm.), the presence of which also in principal witnesses (as A B C $\aleph^*$), in which *ἐλπίς*. *πρ. ὑμ.* is wanting, does not point to the originality of these words, but only to a very early addition and diffusion of them, so that in fact those witnesses represent only a half-completed critical restoration of the original text, whilst those which omit both (as F G) still contain the original text or a complete purification of the text. — Instead of *ὅφ' ὑμῶν*, Lachm. and Tisch. 7 have *ὅφ' ὑμῶν*, according to D E F G, min., which presents itself as genuine, and is explained by *ὅφ' ὑμῶν* on account of the passive. B has *ἀπὸ ὑμῶν*. — Ver. 29. *Χριστοῦ*] Elz.: *τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ Χ.*, against decisive evidence. A gloss. — Ver. 31. *διακονία*] Lachm.: *δοροφορία*, according to B D* F G, which, however, Paul, considering the delicacy of designation here throughout observed, can hardly have written; it appears to be an explanation. — The repetition of *ἵνα* before *ἡ διακ.* (in Elz.) is, according to A B C D* F G $\aleph^*$, 80, justly also omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. — Instead of *ἡ εἰς* Lachm. has *ἡ ἐν*, according to B D* F G, 213. Both prepositions are suitable to the sense; but the omission of the article in the majority of witnesses enables us to perceive how *ἡ ἐν* arose. This omission, namely, carried with it the alteration of *εἰς* into *ἐν* (66, Chrys. really have merely *ἐν*), and then *ἡ ἐν* arose through an only partial critical restoration. — Ver. 32. *ἐλθῶν*] A C $\aleph^*$, Copt. Arm. Ruf.: *ἐλθῶν* with omission of the subsequence *καί*. Too weakly supported; an emendation of style, yet adopted by Tisch. 8. — Instead of *Θεοῦ*, B has *κυρίου Ἰησοῦ* (so Lachm.); D E F G, It.: *Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*; $\aleph^*$: *Ἰησοῦ Χρ.* But the apostle never says *δὲ θελήμ. Χριστοῦ*, but always *δ. θ. Θεοῦ* (comp. i. 10; 1 Cor. i. 1; 2 Cor. i. 1, viii. 5, *et al.*), as

throughout he uses *θελήμα* constantly of *God*, when there is mention of His omnipotence or gracious will; where said of Christ, the *θελήμα* is for him only the *moral will* (Eph. v. 17). Hence those readings are to be regarded as unsuitable glosses after vv. 29, 30. — *καὶ συναναπ. ὑμῖν*] has been omitted by Lachm. on the authority of B only, in which he is followed by Buttmann. From i. 12 *συμπαρακληθῆναι* would have been employed as an addition, and not *συναναπ.*; D E have *ἀναψύξω μεθ' ὑμῶν* (2 Tim. i. 16). — Ver. 33. The omission of the *ἀμήν* (bracketed by Lachm.) is too weakly attested.

Vv. 1-13.¹ More general continuation of the subject previously treated: *Exhortation to the strong to bear with the weak, according to Christ's example* (vv. 1-4); *a blessing on concord* (vv. 5, 6); *and a summons to receive one another as brethren, as Christ has received them, Jews and Gentiles* (vv. 7-12). *Blessing* (ver. 13).

Ver. 1. *Connection*: To the preceding exposition of the perniciousness of the eating indicated in xiv. 23, Paul now subjoins the general *obligation*,² which is to be fulfilled by the strong, over against (*δέ*) that imperilling of the weak. The contrast of *δυνατοί* and *ἀδυνατοί* is just as in chap. xiv.; the *τῇ πίστει* of more precise definition in xiv. 1 is so fully understood of itself after the preceding discussion, that we have here no right either to *generalize* the contrast (Hofmann: of the soundness and frailty of the *Christian state* of the subjects *generally*), or to single out the *δυνατοί* as a *peculiar extreme party* which in their opposition to the weak had gone further and had demanded more than the remaining members of the church who did not belong to the weak (Mangold, employing this interpretation in favour of his view as to the Jewish-Christian majority of the church, as if the *δυνατοί* had been a Gentile-Christian minority). Against this, *ἡμεῖς* is already decisive, whereby Paul, in agreement with xiv. 14, 20, has associated himself with the strong, making his demand as respects its positive and negative portions the more urgent. — *τὰ ἀσθενήματα*] the actual manifestations, which appear as results of the *ἀσθενεῖν τῇ πίστει* (xiv. 1). The word is not found elsewhere. These *imbecillitates* are conceived as a *burden* (comp. Gal. vi. 2) which the strong *take up and bear* from the weak, inasmuch as they devote to them, in respect to these weaknesses, patience and the helpful sympathy (2 Cor. xi. 29) of ministering love.³ Thus they, in themselves strong and free, become

¹ According to Lucht, p. 160 ff., the entire passage vv. 1-3 is *post-apostolic*, not merely in the mode of its presentation, but also in that of its view. In comparison with chap. xiv., all is delineated too generally and abstractly; the example of Christ has in no other place been applied by Paul as it is here in vv. 3-7; the citations are after the manner of a later point of view; the argument in vv. 9-12 is not free from Jewish-Christian prejudices, etc. All of them grounds, which do not stand the test of an unprejudiced and unbiassed explanation of details—evil legacies from Baur's method of suspicion.

² In opposition to Hofmann, who, assign-

ing to the concluding verses of the epistle (xvi. 25-27) their place after xiv. 23, places *οφείλομεν* in connection with *τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ κ.τ.λ.*, xvi. 25; see on xvi. 25-27.

³ *βαστάζειν* can the less indicate, as the subjects of the present exhortation, persons who were distinct from those addressed by *προσλαμβάνεσθε*, xiv. 1 (Mangold), because in fact *προσλαμβάν.* recurs in ver. 7. How frequently does Paul give different forms to the same injunctions! Mangold also lays an incorrect stress on the *δέ*, with which chap. xv. opens, as though, according to our view, *οὖν* should have been used.

servants of the weak, as Paul was servant of all, 1 Cor. ix. 19, 22. — *μὴ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκειν*] *not to please ourselves* (1 Cor. x. 33); “*quemadmodum solent, qui proprio judicio contenti alios secure negligunt*,” Calvin. This is *moral selfishness*.

Ver. 2. *εἰς τὸ ἀγαθ.*] *for his benefit*. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 33; 1 Thess. ii. 4. A more special definition thereof is *πρὸς οἰκοδομήν*, *in order to build up*, to produce Christian perfection (in him). See on xiv. 19. According to Fritzsche, *εἰς τὸ ἀγαθ.* is *in respect of what is good*, whereby immoral men-pleasing is excluded. But its exclusion is understood of itself, and is also implied in *πρὸς οἰκοδομήν*. On the interchange of *εἰς* and *πρός*, comp. iii. 25, 26.

Ver. 3. Establishment of this duty by the pattern : *for Christ also*, etc. — *ἀλλὰ, καθὼς κ.τ.λ.*] *but, as it is written, the reproaches of those reproaching thee fell on me*. After ἀλλά a comma only is to be placed, and nothing is to be supplied, neither *sibi displicuit* with Erasmus, nor *fecit* with Grotius and others, nor *ἐγένετο* (Borger) and the like. Had Paul desired to express himself in purely narrative form, he would have written instead of *σέ* : *θεόν*, and instead of *ἐμέ* : *αὐτόν*. But he retains the scriptural saying, which he adduces, literally, enhancing thereby the direct force and vivacity of the discourse. Comp. 1 Cor. i. 31; Winer, 534, 556 [E. T. pp. 574, 599].—The passage is Ps. lxxix. 10 (literally after the LXX.), where the suffering subject is a type of the Messiah (comp. xi. 9; John ii. 17, xv. 25, xix. 28). —*That the reproaches of the enemies of God fell on Christ*, i.e. *that the enemies of God vented their fury on Christ*, proves that Christ was bent on pleasing *not Himself* (for otherwise He would have abstained from taking these His sufferings upon Himself; comp. Heb. xii. 2, 3, Phil. ii. 6–8), but *men*, inasmuch as He in order to their redemption surrendered Himself, with full self-renunciation of His *αὐτάρκεια*, to the enmity against God of His adversaries. Calvin and others : “*Ita se Domino devovisse, ut descinderetur animo, quoties sacrum ejus nomen patere impiorum maledicentiae videret*,” so that the idea of self-denying devotion to the cause of God (so also de Wette and Philippi) is expressed. But according to the connection, it is the devotion of Christ, not for the cause of God, but for the *salvation of humanity* (see ver. 2), into fellowship of suffering with which He entered, that is to be proposed as an example. Comp. Matt. xx. 28. — *ὀνειδισμός* belongs to later Greek. See Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 512.

Ver. 4. In *O. T.* words Paul had just presented the example of Christ as an encouragement, and not without reason : *for all that was previously written*, etc. This reason¹ might, in truth, cause the example of Christ set before them to appear all the more inviting and involving the more sacred obligation to follow it. — *προεγράφη*] *προ* clearly obtains its definition through

¹ Even if the closing verses of chap. xvi. had their critically correct position at the end of chap. xiv., we still could not, with Hofmann, put the γὰρ in our passage into relation to the designation of God contained in those concluding verses. This—even apart from the fact that xvi. 25–27 is an inde-

pendent doxology—would be impossible on account of the already interposed vv. 2 and 3, and after the καθὼς γεγραπται just preceding (to which every reader must have referred the προεγράφη, ver. 4). Comp. 1 Cor. x. 11.

the *ἡμετέραν* in the second clause, prefixed with emphasis; hence: all that was written *before us, before our time*,¹ by which is meant the collective contents of the O. T. Wrongly, therefore, Reiche and Hofmann think that it refers to the *Messianic oracles* written *before their fulfilment*. On *διδασκ.* comp. 2 Tim. iii. 16. — διὰ τῆς ὑπομ. κ. τ. παρακλ. τ. γρ.] *through the perseverance and the comfort which the Scriptures afford to us*. That τ. ὑπομ. is to be connected with τῶν γραφ. (in opposition to Melanchthon, Grotius, Ammon, Flatt, van Hengel, and others), is clear from the fact, that otherwise τ. ὑπομ. would stand severed from the connection, as well as from ver. 5: ὁ Θεὸς τῆς ὑπομ. κ. τ. παρακλ. The ὑπομονή is here also, according to ver. 3, and conformably to the connection with παράκλησις, self-denying *endurance* in all *sufferings* (see on v. 3), opposed to ἐαντῷ ἀρέσκειν; and the γραφαί are conceived as "*ministerium spiritus*" (Melanchthon). Incorrectly Hofmann understands the ὑπομονή τ. γραφ. as the *waiting upon Scripture* (namely, upon that *which stands written in it*), upon its *fulfilment*. Thus there is substituted for the notion of ὑπομονή that of ἀποκαρδοκία (viii. 19), or ἀναμονή (Symmachus, Ps. xxxviii. 8, lxx. 6), which even in 2 Thess. iii. 5 it by no means has (see Lünemann); and how strangely would the only once used τῶν γραφ. be forced into two entirely different references of the genitive! — τὴν ἐλπίδα ἔχωμεν denotes *having the hope* (i.e. the definite and conscious Christian hope of the Messianic glory): for to promote the possession of this blessed hope by means of patience and comfort in Christians, is the object for which the contents of the O. T. were written for the instruction of Christians. Accordingly neither is ἔχωμ. to be taken as *teneamus*, with Beza and others; nor is ἐλπ., with Reiche and others, of the *object of hope*. Against the latter (see on Col. i. 5) militates the fact that ἐλπίδα ἔχειν never denotes anything else than the subjective *spem habere*. Acts xxiv. 15; 2 Cor. x. 15; Eph. ii. 12; 1 Thess. iv. 13; 1 John iii. 3, *et al.*; Wisd. iii. 18; Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2. 28; Polyb. i. 59. 2. Comp. Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* I. p. 70. But that the ἐλπίς refers to the *conversion of the world of nations* is a misunderstanding of Hofmann's, which is connected with his erroneous reference of γάρ, ver. 4 (see on ver. 4). It is the hope of *eternal salvation* which, warranted and fostered by the influence of Scripture imparting patience and consolation, can and should merge and reconcile all separate efforts of ἀνταρτέσκεια, which divide men, into the mutual unanimity of Christian sentiment. Comp. Eph. iv. 3, 4.

Ver. 5. Δέ] leading over to the *wish* that *God* may grant them the concord which it was the design of the previous *exhortation*, vv. 1-4, to establish. — The characteristic designation of God as *the author of the perseverance and of the consolation*,² is intended not merely to supply an external connection with ver. 4, but stands in an internal relation to the following τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, since this cannot exist if men's minds are not patient and consoled, so that they do not allow themselves to be disturbed by anything adverse in

¹ The *compound* is then followed (see critical notes) by the *simple* expression, — a frequent interchange also in the classics; see Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 59 B.

² Calvin aptly remarks: "Solus sane Deus

patientiae et consolationis auctor est, quia utrumque cordibus nostris instillat per Spiritum suum; verbo tamen suo velut instrumento ad id utitur."

the like effort which must take place in their mutual fellowship (ἐν ἀλλήλ.). Through this identity (τὸ αὐτό, comp. on xii. 16) of purpose and endeavour there exists in a church ἡ καρδιά καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μία, Acts iv. 32.¹—κατὰ X. 'I.] *conformably to Christ*. Either Christ is conceived as the regulative *ideal* of the frame of mind, according to which each is to adjust himself for his part in the common τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν; or: *according to the will of Christ* (comp. John xvii. 21), like κατὰ Θεόν, viii. 27. The first is to be preferred, since the *model* of Christ, ver. 3 (comp. ver. 7), is still the conception present to the apostle's mind. Comp. Col. ii. 8; Phil. ii. 5; κατὰ κύριον, 2 Cor. xi. 17, is somewhat different.

Ver. 6. 'Εν ἐνὶ στόματι] By this the preceding ὁμοθυμαδόν is not *explained* (Reiche)—which is an impossible notion—but ὁμοθ. specifies the source of the ἐν ἐνὶ στ., and is to be closely joined with it: *unanimously with one mouth*, not: *unanimously, with one mouth*. It is otherwise, e.g., with Dem. 147. 1: ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐκ μιᾶς γνώμης, where the explanatory addition has a place. If God is so praised, that each is led by the like disposition to the like utterance of praise, then all dissension is removed, and the unanimity of the fellowship has found in this σύμφωνος ὑμνωδία (Theodore of Mopsuestia) its holiest expression. On ἐν ἐνὶ στόματι (instrumental), comp. the classical ἐξ ἐνὸς στόματος, Plato, 640 C, p. 364 A; Legg. i. p. 634 E; Rep. Anthol. xi. 159. — τοῦ κυρίου κ.τ.λ.] belongs simply to πατέρα, not also to Θεόν in opposition to Grotius, Bengel, and others, including Rückert, Reiche, Tholuck (?), Fritzsche), and καί adds exegetically the specific more precise definition. [See Note CL. p. 558.] So throughout with this description of God habitually used by the apostles, as 2 Cor. i. 3, xi. 31; Eph. i. 3; Col. i. 3; 1 Pet. i. 3. This is clear from the passages, in which with πατ. the genitive (Ἰησοῦ X.) is not subjoined, as 1 Cor. xv. 24; Eph. v. 20; Col. iii. 17; Jas. i. 27, iii. 9. See on 1 Cor. v. 24; 2 Cor. xi. 31; Eph. i. 3. It ought not to have been objected, that the form of expression must either have been τὸν Θεὸν ἡμῶν κ. πατέρα 'I. X. or τὸν Θεὸν τὸν πατ. 'I. X. Either of these would be the expression of *another* idea. But as Paul has expressed himself, τὸν binds the conceptions of *God* and "*Father of Christ*" into unity.² Rightly Theodoret: ἡμῶν Θεὸν ἐκάλεσα τὸν Θεόν, τοῦ δὲ κυρίου πατέρα.

Ver. 7. Διό] in order, namely, that this object, ver. 6, may be attained, that its attainment may not be hindered on your part.³—προσλαμβ.] See on xiv. 1. That not the *strong* alone (Hofmann), but *both* parties, and thus the readers *collectively*, are addressed, and that subsequently ἡμᾶς refers to both (not merely or principally to the Gentile-Christians, as Rückert and Reiche think), follows from ἀλλήλους; and see vv. 8, 9. — προσελάβετο] "*sibi sociavit*," Grotius. Comp. xiv. 3. — εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ] belongs to προσελάβ. ἡμᾶς, beside which it stands, and to which, in accordance with vv. 8, 9 ff., it is alone suitable. Hence it is not to be connected with προσλαμβ. ἀλλήλ. (Chrysostom,

¹ On the form δῶν, instead of the older Attic δῶν, see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 346; Kühner, I.^p 644.

² Comp. Dissen *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 373 f.; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 19, *ad Anab.* ii. 2. 8.

³ Hofmann incorrectly (in accordance with his incorrect reference of ver. 1 ff. to xvi. 25-27) renders: "*for the sake of the hope*," which you may learn from Scripture.

Oecumenius, Erasmus, and others); and just as little with the latter *immediately*, but with *προσελάβ. ὑμᾶς* only *mediately* (as Hofmann splits the reference). But it means: *that God might be thereby glorified*, not: “ut aliquando divinæ gloriæ cum ipso simus (sitis) participes,” Grotius (so also Beza, Piscator, Calovius, Klee, Benecke, Glöckler), which is condemned by vv. 8, 9 ff. as opposed to the context. Comp. Phil. ii. 11; Eph. i. 12.

Vv. 8, 9. A more precise explanation—which furnishes a still more definite motive for compliance with the *προσλαμβ. ἄλλ.*—respecting *ὁ Χριστὸς προσελάβ. ὑμ. εἰς δόξ. Θεοῦ*, first in respect of Jewish-Christians (ver. 8), and then of Gentile-Christians (ver. 9), and that in such a manner that the connection of the former with Christ appears as the *fulfilment of their theocratic claim*, but that of the latter as the *enjoyment of grace*;—a distinction so set forth, not from the Jewish-Christian narrowness of the author (Lucht), but designedly and ingeniously (comp. xi. 28, 29), in order to suggest to the Gentile-Christians greater esteem for their weaker Jewish brethren,¹ and humility. — *λέγω γάρ*] *I mean, namely*, in order more particularly to explain myself respecting the *προσελάβετο ὑμᾶς κ.τ.λ.*; otherwise in xii. 3. But comp. 1 Cor. i. 12; Gal. iv. 1, v. 16. Frequently thus in the Greek writers. — *διάκονον γεγεν. περιτ.] διάκ.* has emphasis, in order to bring out the original theocratic dignity of the Jewish-Christians. [See Note CLI. p. 558.] Christ has become *minister* of the *circumcised*; for to devote His activity to the welfare of the Jewish nation was, according to promise, the duty of His Messianic office. Comp. Matt. xx. 28, xv. 24. — *ὑπὲρ ἁληθ. Θεοῦ*] more particularly explained at once by what follows; hence: *for the sake of the truthfulness of God*, in order to justify and to demonstrate it through the realization of the hallowed promise given to the fathers; comp. 2 Cor. i. 20. Thus the *προσελάβετο ὑμᾶς* in respect of the *Jewish-Christians* redounded *εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ*; but it redounded to this quite otherwise in respect of the *Gentile-Christians*, ver. 9. — *ὑπὲρ ἐλέους*] contrast to *ὑπὲρ ἁληθ. Θεοῦ*, ver. 8: *on behalf of mercy*, i.e. *for mercy*, which God has evinced towards them by His making them joint partakers in redemption. The references of *ὑπὲρ* in the two cases are thus not alike. — *δοξάσαι*, ordinarily understood as dependent on *λέγω*, may neither denote: *have praised* (namely, at their adoption), as Reiche, Rückert, de Wette, Bisping would explain it, which not merely introduces an irrelevant idea, but also runs counter to the usage of the aorist infinitive (even 2 Cor. vi. 1, see *in loc.*); nor: *have to praise* (Tholuck, Philippi, and most), for there is no mention of a *duty* according to the parallelism of the two verses, since *λέγω γάρ* has not here the sense of commanding (see on xii. 3, ii. 22); nor, finally, is it an infinitive *without reference to time* (I say, that the Gentiles *praise*), as Winer, p. 311 f. [E. T. p. 332], and Fritzsche, after the Vulgate, Luther, and others, take it, which would have required the *present* infinitive, because *λέγω* does not here express the notion

¹ The contrast of Jewish and Gentile Christianity is so essentially and radically connected with the difference respecting the use of food, that it is wholly groundless to ascribe the treatment of that contrast in

our passage to the supposed editor of the epistle (Lucht), who has worked up the Pauline portion of the letter, following xiv. 23, into conformity with a later, entirely altered state of things.

of *willing*, hoping, and the like (see Lobeck, *ad Phrygn.* p. 749), but simply that of affirming with statement of the object. Moreover, the *aorist* infinitive necessarily leads to *this*, that *δοξάσαι* is parallel to the preceding *βεβαιῶσαι*, and consequently is not governed by *λέγω* at all, but is connected with *εἰς τὸ*, as Castalio and Beza have rightly perceived; comp. also Bengel (“*glorificent*”) and van Hengel. Hence: “in order that He might ratify the promises of the fathers, *but that the Gentiles, on behalf of mercy, might praise God.*” The former, namely, *ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας Θεοῦ εἰς τὸ βεβαιῶσαι κ.τ.λ.*, was the *proximate* design of Christ’s having become minister of the circumcised; and the *more remote* design, which was to be attained through the passing of salvation from the Jews to the Gentiles (comp. Gal. iii. 14), consisted in this, *that on the other hand the Gentile should praise God on account of mercy.* Incorrectly, Hofmann takes *δοξάσαι* as *optative*: Paul *wishes* that the Gentiles, etc. In this way the *εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ*, ver. 7, would be something which *was* still only to set in, although it *had set in* long ago (comp. ix. 24, 25, and see xv. 16-24). Without ground, Hofmann imports into the simple *τὰ ἔθνη* the idea of “*the Gentile world as a whole*;” it can in fact according to the context denote only the Gentile portion of *those*, whom Christ *προσελάβετο εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ*. — Observe, moreover, how logically correct is the contrast of *ὑπὲρ ἀληθ.* and *ὑπὲρ ἑλλένος* (in opposition to Olshausen, Fritzsche); for although God had promised the future *πρόσληψις* of the Gentiles also (in the prophets), He nevertheless cannot have promised it to *the Gentiles themselves*, as He has given the Messianic promise to *the Jews themselves* and chosen them for His people, in accordance with which, He, by virtue of His truthfulness, was bound to His word, and consequently the *Jews*, not the Gentiles, were *de jure* the children in terms of the covenant and heirs of the kingdom; comp. ix. 4, 5; Acts iii. 25; see also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 397. — *καθὼς γέγραπ.*] This praising by the Gentiles takes place in conformity with (as a fulfilment of) Ps. xviii. 50, which passage is quoted after the LXX. The *historical* subject of the passage, *David*, is a type of *Christ*; hence neither the *Gentile-Christian* (Fritzsche), nor the *apostle of the Gentiles* as the organ of Christ (Hofmann, comp. Reiche), nor any *messenger of salvation generally* to the Gentile world (Philippi), is in the sense of the apostle the subject of the fulfilment of the prophecy, but only *Christ* can be so. The *latter* says to God that He, as present among the Gentiles (whom He has made His own through their conversion), will magnify Him. This, however, is a plastic representation of *the praise of the Gentiles themselves*, which in fact takes place *ἐν ὀνόματι κυρίου Ἰησοῦ* and *δι’ αὐτοῦ* (Col. iii. 17). Comp. already Augustine: “*tibi per me confitebantur gentes.*” Bengel aptly says: “*Quod in psalmo Christus dicit se facturum, id Paulus gentes ait facere; nempe Christus facit in gentibus*, Heb. ii. 12.” — *διὰ τοῦτο*] included as a constituent part of the citation, but without reference to the matter in hand in Paul’s text. — *ἐν ἔθνεσι*] to whom He, through the Spirit, by means of the preaching of the gospel has come, and has placed them in communion with Himself. — *As to ἐξομολογ.* with the dative, comp. on xiv. 11. It presupposes, as well as *ψαλῶ* and the corresponding verbs, vv. 10, 11, the divine *ἔλεος*, which had been vouchsafed to the Gentiles, as motive.

Ver. 10. Πάλιν] *Again*, namely, in another passage containing the same thing. Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 20 ; Matt. iv. 7, v. 33. — λέγει] *sc. ἡ γραφή*, which is to be taken from γέγραπται, ver. 9. — The passage is Deut. xxxii. 43, closely following the LXX., who, however, probably following another reading (עַמִּי-תָּ in Kennicott), deviate from the Hebrew.¹

Ver. 11. Ps. cxvii. 1 (closely following the LXX., but see the critical notes) contains a twofold parallel summons to the praise of God, addressed to all *Gentile peoples*.² In this case αἰεῖν and ἐπαυεῖν are not different in degree (Philippi), but only in form, like *praise* and *bepraise* [loben and beloben].

Ver. 12. Isa. xi. 10, with omission of ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ after ἔσται, literally after the LXX., who, however, translate the original inaccurately. The latter runs : “ *And it comes to pass at that day, that after the root-shoot of Jesse, which stands as a banner of peoples (לְנֶשֶׁן עַמִּים) Gentiles shall inquire.* ” But the words of the LXX., as Paul has quoted them, run as follows : “ *There shall be the root-shoot of Jesse and (i.e. and indeed, explanatory) He who arises (raises himself) to rule over Gentiles ; on Him shall Gentiles hope.* ” This passage and its entire connection are Messianic, and that indeed in so far as the idea is therein expressed, that the promised descendant of David, the ideal of the theocratic king, will extend His kingdom over Gentiles also, and will be the object of their desire (according to the LXX. and Paul : of their believing *hope*). This prophecy likewise Paul sees fulfilled through the magnifying of the divine mercy by the already converted Gentiles (vv. 7, 9). Observe that ἐθνῶν and ἐθνῇ are *without the article*, and hence do not denote “ *the Gentile world* ” (Hofmann). — ἡ ρίζα is here, according to the Heb. שֹׁרֵשׁ, *the root-shoot* ; comp. Eccles. xlvii. 22 ; Rev. v. 5, xxii. 6 ; 1 Macc. i. 10 ; Eccles. xl. 15. He is the root-shoot of *Jesse*, because Jesse is the root from which He springs, as the ancestor of the Messianic king, David, Jesse's son, sprang from it. *This* descendant of Jesse is the Messiah (comp. Isa. xi. 1, liii. 2), who (according to the original text) is a banner for peoples, and consequently their leader and ruler. Christ has *entered on* this dominion at His *exultation*, and He carries it out by successive stages through the *conversion of the Gentiles*. — ἐπ' αὐτῶν! of the *resting of hope upon*

¹ The original, according to the present reading, does not mean : “ *Rejoice, ye tribes, His people* ” (de Wette and others ; comp. Luther : “ all ye who are His people ”), since עַמִּים cannot denote the tribes of the Jewish people ; but, as the Hiphil הִרְנִינִי allows, either with the Vulgate : “ *laudate, gentes, populum ejus* ” (so Gesenius, *Thes.* I. p. 272, and Umbreit, p. 358 ; comp. Kamphausen, *Lied Mos.* p. 219 f.) ; or : “ *make to shout for joy, ye Gentiles, His people,* ” which, however, does not fit the connection ; or (with Aquila and Theodotion, comp. Hofmann), *Shout for joy, ye Gentiles, ye who are His people.* The latter is to be preferred, because הִרְנִינִי in the sense of Kal, in the few pas-

sages where it is so found, is not joined with the accusative, but either is joined with the dative (ךָ) — as Ps. lxxxi. 2 — or stands absolutely (Ps. xxxii. 11).

² The Messianic fulfilment of this summons is recognized by Paul in the magnifying of God on the part of the Gentiles *converted to Christ* from all nations. This fulfilment he looks upon already as *present* (for see ver. 7), not merely as a fact of the *future*, “ when the Gentile world as a *united whole* ” magnifies God (Hofmann).

³ See Umbreit in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1835, p. 553, and the explanation in reference thereto, p. 880 f. ; Drechsler and Delitzsch, *in loc.*

Him,¹ 1 Tim. iv. 10, vi. 17 ; LXX. Isa. xlii. 4. Comp. πιστεύειν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ix. 33, x. 11. The contents of the hope is the attainment of eternal salvation, which will be fulfilled in them at the *Parousia*.

Ver. 13. As vv. 1-4 passed into a blessing (vv. 5, 6), so now the hortatory discourse, begun afresh in ver. 7, passes into a blessing (δέ), which forms, at the same time, the close of the entire section (from chap. xiv. onwards). — ὁ Θεὸς τῆς ἐλπίδος] *God, who produces the hope* (of eternal glory), namely, through His Spirit ; see the closing words of the verse. This description of God (comp. on ver. 5) attaches itself formally to ἐλπιούσιν, ver. 12,² but rests upon the deeper substantive reason, that the becoming filled with joyfulness and peace here wished for is not possible without having hope as its basis, and that, on the other hand, this becoming filled produces the rich increase of hope itself (εἰς τὸ περισσ. κ.τ.λ.). — πᾶς. χαρὰς κ.τ.λ. [with all, i.e. with highest joyfulness.³ χαρά and εἰρήνη (peace through concord), as xiv. 17. — ἐν τῷ πιστεύειν] in the believing, to which without χαρά and εἰρήνη the fruits would be wanting, and without which no χαρά and εἰρήνη could exist. Comp. xiv. 17. — εἰς τὸ περισσ. κ.τ.λ.] Aim of the πληρῶσαι κ.τ.λ. : in order that ye, in virtue of the power (working in you) of the Holy Spirit, may be abundant in hope, may cherish Christian hope in the richest measure (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 58 ; 2 Cor. viii. 7 ; Phil. i. 9 ; Col. ii. 7).

Vv. 14-33.⁴ The apostle has now come to an end with all the instructions and exhortations, which he intended to impart to the Romans. Hence he now adds, up to ver. 33, an *epilogue* (which, however, he then follows up in chap. xvi. with commendations, greetings, etc.). [See Note CLII. p. 558.] In this epilogue, which in substance corresponds to the introduction, i. 8-16, and by no means applies only to the section respecting the weak in faith (Melancthon, Grotius), but to the whole epistle, he testifies his good confidence towards the readers, and justifies his in a partial degree bold writing by his Gentile-apostolic calling (vv. 14-16) and working (vv. 17-21), which latter had also been usually the hindrance to his coming personally to Rome (ver. 22). This observation leads him to his present plan of travel, the execution of which will bring him, in the course of his intended journey to Spain, to Rome, after he has been at Jerusalem (vv. 23-29). For this impending journey he finally begs the prayers of the Romans on his behalf (vv. 30-33), and then concludes with a blessing (ver. 33).

Ver. 14. Πέπεισμαι δέ] but I am of the conviction ; viii. 38, xiv. 14. The δέ is the simple μεταβατικόν, leading over to the concluding portion of the epistle. — καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγώ] et ipse ego ; comp. on vii. 25. The apostle is, independently of the general advantageous estimation in which the Roman

¹ Hemsterh. *ad Xen. Eph.* p. 128.

² An attachment which, since ὑμᾶς then addresses the church, does not suit the view which holds the latter to be a Jewish-Christian one (Mangold).

³ Comp. Thelle, *ad Jac.* p. 8 ; Wunder, *ad Soph. Phil.* 141 f.

⁴ According to Lucht, vv. 14-33 contain much that is Pauline and various matters

historically correct, but also incorrect statements, and, on the whole, a non-Pauline tendency. The parallels with passages in the Epistles to the Corinthians are to be explained simply by dependence on the latter, etc. ; p. 185 ff. These are self-deceptions of a fanciful criticism, against which it is vain to contend.

church stood with *others* (i. 8), also for his own personal part of the conviction, etc. The emphasis lies on αὐτός. If the thought were: “even I, who have hitherto so unreservedly exhorted you” (Philippi, comp. de Wette, Fritzsche, and older interpreters), ἐγὼ would have the emphasis (comp. καὶ αὐτός, Acts x. 26); but καὶ αὐτός corresponds entirely to the following καὶ αὐτοί, *et ipsi*, i.e. even without first of all requiring influence, exhortation, etc., on the part of others. Comp. afterwards καὶ ἀλλήλους. Thus, accordingly, Paul denotes by κ. αὐτὸς ἐγὼ the *autonomy* of his judgment, but with a subtle indication of the judgment of others as coinciding therewith. Comp. Bengel: “Non modo alii hoc de vobis existimant.” Paul intends therewith to obviate the idea as if he for his part judged less favourably of the church, with reference to the fact, not that he had written this letter generally (Hofmann), but that he had written it in part τοῦ μνηρότερον. This is shown by the contrast, ver. 15. — ἀγαθωσύνης] *goodness, excellence* generally (that you also of yourselves are very excellent people), not equivalent to χρηστότης (as Thom. Mag. p. 391 states), not even in Gal. v. 22. Comp. 2 Thess. i. 11; Eph. v. 9; Eccles. ix. 18. The word is not found in the Greek writers. — The three predicates, μεστοί κ.τ.λ., advance in co-ordination from the general to the particular. — καὶ ἀλλήλ.] also to admonish you among one another, without having need for a third, who should admonish you. On νοουθετεῖν, in which the notion of its being well-meant, though not involved in the word of itself, is given by the connection or (as in Isocr. *de pace*, 72) by express contrast, see on 1 Cor. xiv. 14, Eph. vi. 4. Paul does not express in this verse something more than he strictly means (Reiche), but that which he really believes of the Roman church, taken as a whole; at which favourable conviction he—apart from the universally-diffused good report of the church (i. 8)—has arrived by means of experiences unknown to us, and perhaps also in virtue of his feeling assured that he might draw from the individuals and influential persons with whom he was acquainted a conclusion respecting the whole. But the fact that he does express it,—this commendation,—rests on his apostolic truth, and on that wisdom of teaching which by good and real confidence attracts a zeal of compliance.

Ver. 15. *More boldly, however* (than so good a confidence appears to imply), *I wrote to you in part*, etc. “Quasi dicat: σπεύδομαι καὶ αὐτὸν ὀτρύνω,” Grotius. — τοῦ μνηρότερον] adverbially.¹ The comparative sense is not to be obliterated (Bernhardy, p. 433; Winer, p. 228 [E. T. p. 243]), but may not be derived from the lesser right of the apostle² to write to a church not founded by him (Hofmann); comp. Bengel, who introduces the farther idea: “cum potius ipse venire deberem.” It must, in fact, especially seeing that the more precise definition ἀπὸ μέρους is added, be necessarily a specification of the

¹ Thuc. iv. 126. 3; Polyb. i. 17. 7; Lucian, *Icarom.* 10.

² This lesser right is assumed quite without warrant. Paul certainly wrote to other churches of Gentiles not founded by him (Colossians, Laodiceans); and how could he, as the apostle of the Gentiles, be of opinion that he thereby was taking any

special liberty? He had to glorify his office (xi. 13), in doing which his care for all churches (2 Cor. xi. 28) certainly suggested no limitation of epistolary intercourse to such as he himself had founded, as if it were a boldness in him needing excuse, when he also wrote to others.

mode, expressing the *how* of the ἔγραφα. The repetition of ἀδελφοί flows from the earnestness of feeling. Comp. 1 Cor. i. 10, 11; Gal. v. 11, 13; Jas. v. 7, 9, 10. — ἀπὸ μέρους] belongs not merely to τοῖς. (“*paulo liberius*,” Grotius, following the Peshito), but, as its position shows, to τοῖς. ἔγραψα together: *partly, i.e. in particular places*, I wrote more boldly. This refers to passages like vi. 12 ff., 19, viii. 9, xi. 17 ff., xii. 3, xiii. 3 ff., 13, 14, xiv. 3, 4, 10, 13, 15, 20, xv. 1, *et al.* In ἀπὸ μέρους is implied the contrast, that he has *not* written τολμηρότερον *all* that he has written (comp. xi. 25; 2 Cor. i. 14), but only a *part* thereof. Hofmann has now exchanged his earlier incorrect view, “*provisionally and in the meantime*” (*Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 95), for another also incorrect (similarly Th. Schott), namely *piecemeal*, in contrast to a *complete exposition of Christian truth*, thus equivalent to ἐκ μέρους, 1 Cor. xiii. 10 (not also in 1 Cor. xii. 27). Besides, this arbitrarily imported contrast would suit no Epistle less than the Epistle to the Romans, which treats the *whole* gospel in the *most complete manner*. According to Lucht, the expression in this passage is only the product of a post-apostolic effort to *wipe away* the “*bad impression*” of the epistle on the highly esteemed church, which had in fact been founded by Peter (comp. Theodore of Mopsuestia). — ὡς ἐπαναμ. ὑμᾶς] *as again reminding you*,¹ *i.e. in the way and manner of one who reminds you*, etc.² — διὰ τὴν χάρ.] *i.e. in order to comply with the apostolic office, with which God has favoured me.* See ver. 16.

Ver. 16. Εἰς τὸ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.] Specification of the object aimed at in τὴν δόξισάν μοι ὑπὸ τ. Θεοῦ. — λειτουργῶν] Comp. on xiii. 6. Paul sets forth the service of his apostolic office, in the consciousness of its hallowed dignity, not merely as a public οἰκονομία (Ewald: “*steward of the people*”), but as a *priestly service of offering*, in which Ἰησοῦ Χ. expresses the λειτουργός *as ordained by Christ*. That Christ should be conceived of as *He to whom the offering is presented* (Reiche), is contrary to the conception of offering, which always refers to *God* as the receiver of it. Comp. xii. 1; Eph. v. 2; Phil. ii. 17. But neither is Christ to be conceived of (as by Bengel and Rückert) as *high priest* (a conception not of Paul, but rather of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and applying to Christ as the *sole Atoner*, in which case the idea of inferior

¹ In opposition to Baur's erroneous explanation of ἐπαναμ., “*further therein to remind*,” and its reference to *what follows*, see Mangold, p. 69, who, however, on his part, in virtue of the assumption of the Jewish-Christian character of the church, limits the ἀπὸ μέρους arbitrarily to those portions of the epistle (especially chap. ix. and x.) in which, in the interest of the Gentile-Christian apostolate, *Jewish-Christian pretensions* had been combated. It is just such entirely doctrinal discussions as chap. ix. x. which answer least to the character of τολμηρότερον, which presupposes the ready possibility of *offence* being given. The exculpation implied in ver. 15 is not calculated for a Jewish-Christian church (Mangold, p. 73), but rather for a

church as yet strange to the apostle and held in very good repute, towards which he felt himself not in a like relation as *e.g.* to the Galatians and Corinthians, but in one more delicate and calling for more forbearance. Artfully and gently, too, is the ὡς ἀναμιν. κ.τ.λ. added, as if what was written τολμηρότερον was only meant to be a help to *their memory*. Ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροή φρονήσεως ἀπολειψίσεως, Plat. Legg. v. p. 732 B.

² See Bernhardt, p. 476; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 263 [E. T. 307]; Kühner, II. 2, p. 649 f.; 1 Thess. ii. 4; Heb. xiii. 17. ἐπαναμ. denotes *in memoriam revocare*. See Plat. Legg. iii. p. 688 A; Dem. 74. 7. Comp. ἐπανάμνησις, Dion. Hal. *Rhet.* x. 18. Theodore of Mopsuestia: εἰς ὑπόμνησιν ἄγειν ὧν μεμαθήκατε.

priests is out of place), but as Lord and Ruler of the church, who has appointed His apostle, i. 5. Lucht oddly thinks that the writer did not venture to call Paul, in consequence of his disputed position, ἀπόστολος, but only λειτουργός. — εἰς τὰ ἔθνη] in reference to the Gentiles; for these, as converted by the apostle, are to form the offering to be presented.—In the sequel, λειτουργοῦντα τὸ εὐαγγ. τ. Θεοῦ contains the more precise explanation of λειτουργ. 'I. X., and ἵνα γένηται ἡ προσφορά τῶν ἔθνων κ.τ.λ. that of εἰς τὰ ἔθνη; hence the latter belongs not to λειτουργ. (Th. Schott, Hofmann), but to what precedes, and is not (with Buttmann) to be omitted on the authority of B. — λειτουργ. τὸ εὐαγγ. τ. Θεοῦ] in priestly fashion administering the gospel of God, i.e. "administrans evang. a Deo missum hominibus, eoque ministerio velut sacerdotio fungens," Estius; comp. Chrysostom, Erasmus, and most older interpreters, also Rückert, Tholuck, Fritzsche, de Wette, Philippi. This usage of λειτουργ. is confirmed by passages like Herodian. v. 3. 16; Joseph. Antt. vi. 6. 2; also by 4 Macc. vii. 8, where ἰδίῳ αἵματι is to be connected with λειτουργοῦντας τὸν νόμον (in opposition to Hofmann, who will not admit the priestly notion in the word), not with ὑπερασπίζοντας (see Grimm, Handb. p. 329 f.).¹ Without warrant, Hofmann insists on adhering to the conception of "administering holy service." The gospel is not indeed the offering (Luther and others), which is presented, but the divine institute, which is administered—is in priestly fashion served—by the presenting of the offering. As to εὐαγγ. Θεοῦ, see on i. 1. — ἡ προσφορά τῶν ἔθνων] the offering of the Gentiles, i.e. the offering which the Gentiles are, Heb. x. 10; Eph. v. 2. The Gentiles converted, and through the Spirit consecrated as God's property, are the offering which Paul, as the priest of Jesus Christ, has brought to God. Observe, however, the stress laid on the prefixed γένηται: in order that *there may prosper* (see on this use of γίνεσθαι as regards offerings, Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* vi. 4. 9), in accordance with which εἰπρόσδ. is then *attributive* (as *well-pleasing*), and ἁγιασμ. ἔ. πν. ἁγ. is subordinated to the latter as its ground: *sanctified through the Holy Spirit*, which is received through the gospel in baptism, Gal. iii. 2, 5; Tit. iii. 5; Eph. v. 26. A contrast to the ceremonial consecration of the Levitical offerings. Comp. xii. 1.

Ver. 17. [See Note CLIII. p. 559.] How readily might what was said in ver. 16 carry with it the appearance of vain self-boasting! To obviate this, the apostle proceeds: *I have accordingly* (in pursuance of the contents of ver. 16) *the boasting* (τὴν καύχησιν, see the critical notes) *in Christ Jesus in respect of my relation to God; i.e., my boasting is something which, by virtue of my connection with Christ* (whose λειτουργός I am, ver. 16), *in my position towards God* (for I administer God's gospel as an offering priest, ver. 16), *properly belongs to me.* The ἔχω is prefixed with emphasis: *it does not fail me*, like a something which one *has* not really as a possession but only ventures to ascribe to himself; then follows with ἐν Χ. 'I. and τὰ πρ. τ. Θ., a twofold more precisely defined character of this ethical possession, *excluding everything self-*

¹ Comp. Suicer, *Thes. s. v.*; Kypke *in loc.*; also λειτουργός, Callim. *fr.* 450; ἐπουργημα,

Joseph. Antt. viii. 4. 5: λειτουργία, 4 Macc. iv. 1; Plat. *Legg.* p. 774 E; Pollux, i. 29.

*ish.*¹ Accordingly, we are not to explain as though ἐν Χ. 'I bore the main stress and it ran ἐν Χριστῷ ὅντι τὴν καύχην ἐχω κ.τ.λ. (which is Fritzsche's objection to the reading τῇ ἐν καίχ.); and καίχης is neither here nor elsewhere equivalent to καύχημα (*materies gloriandi*), but is *gloriatio* (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 31), and the article marks the definite self-boasting concerned, which Paul makes—(vv. 16, 18). Reiche connects ἐν Χ. with τ. καύχην, so that τὸ καυχᾶσθαι ἐν Χ. is to be explained as *the boasting oneself of Christ* (of the aid of Christ). Comp. also Ewald. Admissible linguistically, since the construction καυχᾶσθαι ἐν (v. 3, ii. 17, 23; Phil. iii. 3) allowed the annexation *without* the article; but at variance with the sequel, where what is shown is not the *right* to boast of the help of Christ (of this there is also in ver. 16 no mention), but *this*, that Paul *will never boast himself* otherwise than as simply the instrument of Christ, that he thus has Christ only to thank for the καυχᾶσθαι, only through Him is in the position to boast. — τὰ πρὸς τ. Θεόν] Comp. Heb. ii. 17, v. 1. Semler and Rückert take the article in a limiting sense: *at least before God*. But the "at least" is not expressed (τά γε πρ. τ. Θε., or πρὸς γε τ. Θε., or τὰ πρ. τ. Θε. γε), and Paul has indeed actually here and elsewhere frequently boasted *before men*, and with ample warrant, of his sacred calling.—We may add that this whole assertion of his calling, vv. 17–21, so naturally suggested itself to the apostle, when he was on the point of extending his activity to Rome and beyond it to the extreme west of the Gentile world, that there is no sufficient ground for seeking the occasion of it in the circumstances and experiences of the *Corinthian* church at that time (so especially Rückert, comp. also Tholuck and Philippi); especially since it is nowhere indicated in our epistle (not even in xvi. 17), that at that time (at a later epoch it was otherwise, Phil. i. 15 ff.) anti-Pauline efforts had occurred in Rome, such as had emerged in Corinth. See *Intro.* § 3.

Ver. 18. Negative confirmation of what is asserted in ver. 17. The correct explanation is determined partly by the connection, to be carefully observed, of ὃν with κατεργ., partly by the *order of the words*, according to which ὃν κατεργάσατο must have the emphasis, not Χριστός (Theodoret and others, including Calovius, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Tholuck). Hence: "*for I will not (in any given case) embolden myself to speak about any of those things (to boast of anything from the sphere of that) which Christ has not brought about through me, in order to make the Gentiles obedient to Him, by means of word and work.*" That is, affirmatively expressed: *for I will venture to let myself be heard only as to such things, the actual fulfilment of which has taken place by Christ through me, etc.*; I will therefore never pride myself on anything which belongs to the category of those things, which *have not been put into execution by Christ through me.*² This would be an untrue speaking of

¹ Not exactly specially "the consciousness of superior knowledge or singular spirituality," Hofmann. Comp. generally 1 Cor. xv. 10.

² The objection of Hofmann: "The non-actual forms no collective whole, as a constituent element of which a single thing

might be conceived," is a mere empty subtlety. Had Paul, *e.g.*, boasted that Christ had wrought many conversions through him when he was in Athens, he would have spoken about something which would have been a single instance out of the category of the *non-actual*, namely, of

results, as if the Lord had *brought them about* through me—which nevertheless had *not taken place*. — εἰς ὑπὸν. ἐθνῶν] namely, through the adoption of faith in Him ; comp. i. 5. — λόγῳ κ. ἔργῳ] applies to κατεργ. . . . ἐθνῶν.

Ver. 19. *In virtue of what powers* Christ, by means of word and work, has wrought through the apostle as His organ : (1) ἐν δυνάμ. σημείων κ. τερ., —this refers back to ἔργῳ ; (2) ἐν δυν. πνεύματος, —this applies to λόγῳ and ἔργῳ together, and is co-ordinated to the above ἐν δυν. σημ. κ. τερ, not *subordinated*, as Beza, Glöckler, and others think, whereby the language would lose its simplicity and half of its import (the δύναμις πνεύμ. would pass into the background). According to Hofmann, who reads in ver. 20 φιλοτιμούμαι (see the critical notes), a new sentence is meant to begin with λόγῳ κ. ἔργῳ, the verb of which would be φιλοτιμούμαι. This yields, instead of the simple course of the language, a complicated structure of sentence which is in nowise indicated by Paul himself, as he has not written ἐν λόγῳ κ. ἔργῳ (conformably to the following). Besides, the εὐαγγελίζεσθαι by word and deed (thus the *preaching through deeds*), would be a modern conception foreign to the N. T. The ἔργα accompany and accredit the preaching (John x. 38, xiv. 11), but they *do not preach*. Comp. Luke xxiv. 19 ; Acts vii. 22 ; 2 Cor. x. 11. If φιλοτιμούμαι is to be read, then with Lachmann a new sentence is to be begun with ver. 20, so that all that precedes remains assigned to the *efficiency of Christ*, which is not the case with the view of Hofmann, although it is only in entire keeping with the language of *humility* which Paul here uses. The *genitives* are those of *derivation* : *power which went forth from signs and wonders* (which Paul, as instrument of Christ, has performed), and *power, which went forth from the (Holy) Spirit* (who was communicated to the apostle through Christ) *upon the minds of men*. Comp. on ἐν δυν. πνεύμ., 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5. — σημεία κ. τέρατα] not different in substance ; both *miracles*, both also denoting their *significant* aspect. See Fritzsche, p. 270 f. The collocation corresponds to the Heb. מִלְאָכִים וּמוֹדָעִים, hence usually (the converse only in Acts ii. 22, 43, vi. 8, vii. 36, comp. ii. 19) *σημεία stands first*, and where only one of the two words is used, it is *always σημεία*, because מִלְאָכִים was the *striking word* giving *more immediately* the character of the thing designated. Contrary to the constant usage of the N. T., Reiche understands not outward miraculous facts, but *mental miracles*, which the preaching of the gospel has produced in the hearts of the newly-converted. Even 2 Cor. xii. 12 is not to be thus understood ; see *in loc*. Miracles belonged to the σημεία τοῦ ἀποστόλου (2 Cor. l.c.), hence there is already of itself motive enough for their mention in our passage, and there is no need for the precarious assumption of a reference to pseudo-apostolic jugglers in Rome (Ewald). — ἐν δυνάμ. πνεύμ. ἁγ.] is related, not “awkwardly” (Hofmann), to ὧν οὐ κατεργ. Χριστός ; for Christ has, for the sake of His working to be effected *through the apostle* (δὲ ἐμοῦ), given to

that which Christ has *not wrought*. The view of Hofmann himself amounts to the sense, that the apostle wished to set aside *all his own, which was not a work of Christ performed through him, with the object of*

converting the Gentiles. But thus, through the contrast of his *own* and the *work of Christ*, the emphasis would be transposed, resting now on Χριστός, as if it ran ὧν οὐ Χριστὸς κατεργάσατο δι' ἐμοῦ.

him the Spirit. Very unnecessarily, and just as inappropriately,—since ὥστε must comprise *all* the preceding elements,—Hofmann forces ἐν δυν. πν. ἄγ., by means of an *hyperbaton*, into special connection with ὥστε. — ὥστε κ.τ.λ.] *Result*, which this working of Christ through Paul has had in reference to the extension of Christianity. — ἀπὸ Ἱερουσ.] From *this* spot, where Paul first entered the *apostolical* fellowship, Acts ix. 26 ff. (he had already previously worked three years, including the sojourn in Arabia, at *Damascus*; see on Gal. i. 17, 18), he defines the *terminus a quo*, because he intends to specify the greatest extension of his working *in space* (from south-east to north-west).¹ — καὶ κύκλῳ] enlarges the range of the *terminus a quo*: *and round about*, embracing not merely Judaea, but, in correspondence to the magnitude of the measure of length, Arabia and Syria also. Of course, however, κύκλῳ is not included in the dependence on ἀπό, but stands in answer to the question *Where?* inasmuch as it adds to the statement *from whence* the working took place, the notice of the *local sphere*, which had been jointly affected by that local beginning as its field of action: *from Jerusalem, and in a circuit round*, Paul has fulfilled the gospel as far as Illyria. Flacius, Calovius, Paulus, Glöckler, following Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others, refer κύκλῳ to the *arc* which Paul described in his journey from Jerusalem by way of Syria, Asia, Troas, Macedonia, and Greece to Illyria. According to this, κύκλῳ would specify the *direction* in which he, starting from Jerusalem, moved forward. So also Hofmann. This direction would be that of a *curve*. But κύκλῳ never denotes this, and is never merely the opposite of *straight out*, but always *circumcirca* (comp. Judith i. 2; Mark iii. 34, vi. 6, 36; Luke ix. 12; Rev. iv. 6; very frequently in the Greek writers); and the addition “*and in the arc of a circle*,” would have been very superfluous and indeed like an empty piece of ostentation, seeing that in truth the *straight* direction from Jerusalem to Illyria passes for the most part through water. No reason also would be discoverable for Paul’s adding the *καί*, and not merely writing κύκλῳ, in order to express: *from Jerusalem in a circular direction as far as Illyria*. — μέχρι τοῦ Ἰλλυρ.] The idea that Paul, as has recently been for the most part assumed, did not get to Illyria *at all*, but only to the *frontier* of this western region during a Macedonian by-journey, throws upon him an appearance of magnifying his deeds, for which the silence of the Acts of the Apostles, furnishing, as it does, no complete narrative, supplies no warrant. Now, since in ver. 23 Illyria may not, without arbitrariness, be excluded from the regions where he has already laboured, because this country would otherwise have still afforded scope for labour, we must assume that Paul had really made an intermediate journey to Illyria. From what starting-point, cannot indeed be shown; hardly so soon as Acts xviii. 11, but possibly during the journey mentioned in Acts xx. 1–3 (see Anger,

¹ Yet he does not say “from Arabia” (Gal. I.c.), because it was very natural for him significantly to place the beginning at that spot where all the other apostles had begun their work and the apostolic church itself had arisen—in doing which, however, he, by adding καὶ κύκλῳ, does nothing to the

prejudice of history. The less is there to be found in ἀπὸ Ἱερουσ. an inconsistency with the statements of the Epistle to the Galatians. This in opposition to Lucht, who sees also in μέχρι τ. Ἰλλυρ. an *incorrect* statement, and attributes to both points a *special design*.

temp. rat. p. 84), so that his short sojourn in Illyria took place *not long before* his sojourn in Achaia, where he at Corinth wrote the Epistle to the Romans. Tit. iii. 12 can only be employed in confirmation of this by those who assume the authenticity of the Epistle to Titus, and its composition thus early (see Wieseler, Philippi). — πεπληρωκέναι τὸ εὐαγγ. τ. X.] *have brought to fulfilment* (comp. Col. i. 25) the gospel of Christ. This πληροῖν has taken place in an *extensive* sense through the fact that the gospel is spread abroad everywhere from Jerusalem to Illyria, and has met with acceptance. Analogous is the conception : ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡύξανε, Acts vi. 7, xii. 24, xix. 20. So long as the news of salvation has not yet reached its full and destined diffusion, it is still in the course of growth and increase ; but when it has reached every quarter, so that no place any longer remains for the labour of the preacher (ver. 23), it has passed from the state of growing increase into the *full measure of its dimensions*. This view of the sense is alone strictly textual (see ver. 23), while closely adhering to the literal signification of εὐαγγ., which denotes the message itself, not the act of proclamation (Th. Schott, Mangold) ; and hence excludes the many divergent interpretations, namely : (1) That of Beza, Piscator, Grotius, Bengel, de Wette, Rückert, in substance also Köllner, Tholuck, van Hengel, and permissively, Reiche, that εὐαγγ. is equivalent to *munus praedicandi evang.* which it does not mean ; similarly Ewald ; the executed *commission* of preaching. (2) That of Luther, Flacius, Castalio, and others : “that I *have fulfilled everything with the gospel*,” which is opposed to the words as they stand, although repeated by Baur. (3) That of Theophylact, Erasmus, and others, including Reiche and Olshausen : πληρ. τὸ εὐαγγ. denotes *completely to proclaim* the gospel. But the “*completely*” would in fact have here no relevant weight at all (such as at Acts xx. 27) ; for that Paul had not *incompletely* preached the gospel, was understood of itself. Others arbitrarily take it otherwise still, e.g. Calvin : “praedicationem ev. quasi *supplendo diffundere* ; coeperunt enim alii priores, sed ipse longius sparsit ;” Krehl : that I have *put the gospel into force and validity* ; Philippi : that I have *realized* the gospel, have introduced it into life (the gospel appearing as *empty*, before it is taught, accepted, understood) ; Hofmann, with comparison of the not at all analogous expression πληροῖν τὸν νόμον : the message of salvation misses its destination, if it remain *unproclaimed*—whereby πληροῖν would be reduced simply to the notion of *κρίσσειν*.—The whole of the remark, ver. 19 f., connected with ver. 24, is to be explained, according to Baur, I. p. 307, simply from the intention (of the later writer) to draw here, as it were, a geographical line between two apostolic provinces, of which the one must be left to Peter. In opposition to *such* combinations, although Lucht still further elaborates them, it is sufficient simply to put into the scale the altogether Pauline character and emotional stamp of the language in vv. 19–33, in its inner truth, simplicity, and chasteness.

Vv. 20, 21. *But prosecuting it as a point of honour to preach in this way*, the οὕτω is now first negatively stated : *not where Christ was named*, then positively : *but, agreeably to the word of Scripture*, etc. Hence οὐχ ὅπου, not ὅπου οὐκ. — φιλοτιμ.] dependent on με, ver. 19. Ὁν φιλοτιμεῖσθαι, to *prosecute*

anything so that one seeks one's honour in it, comp. 2 Cor. v. 9 ; 1 Thess. iv. 11 ; see Wetstein and Kypke. This full signification (not merely the more general one : *zealously to prosecute*) is to be maintained in all passages, including the classical ones, and admirably suits the context. The matter was a special point of honour with the apostle in his working ;¹ 2 Cor. x. 15, 16. — ὀνομάσθη] *His name*, as the contents of confession, *has been named*, namely, by preachers and confessors. See ver. 21. — ἵνα μὴ κ.τ.λ.] *i.e.*, in order not simply to continue the work of conversion already begun by others. Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 10. The reason why Paul did not desire this, lay in the high consciousness of his *apostolic destination* (Acts xxvi. 17, 18), according to which he recognized the greatest and most difficult work, the *founding* of the church, as the task of the apostle, and found his *apostolic honour* in the solution of this task.² Others, as Reiche, specify as the reason, that he had sought on account of his freer system of doctrine to avoid polemical controversies. This would be a principle of practical prudence, corresponding neither to the apostolical *idea*, nor to Paul's magnanimous character in following it out. — καθὼς γέγρα.] Isa. lii. 15, closely cited after the LXX., who took Ἰσραὴλ in each case as *masculine*. The passage runs according to the original : “ *What was never told to them, they see ; and what they have never heard, they perceive ;*” and the subject is the *kings*, who become dumb before the glorified Servant of God, not the *nations* (Hengstenberg, *Christol.* II. p. 305 ; Philippi). But the actual state of the case—seeing that, along with the kings, their peoples also must see the glory of the Servant of God—allowed the apostle here to put the *nations* as the subject, the *Gentile-peoples*, to whom, through him, the Servant of God as yet unknown to them is made known, *i.e.* Jesus Christ, in whom the Messianic fulfilment of that prophetic idea concerning the Servant of God, as the ideal of Israel, had appeared realized.³ — περὶ αὐτοῦ] addition of the LXX.— ὀφονται] *they shall see*, namely mentally, in knowledge and faith, *it* (that which the preaching now brings before them). — οἱ οὐκ ἤκηκ.] namely, the news of Him (the gospel). — συνήσουσι] *shall understand it* (this news). Comp. Matt. xiii. 23, xv. 10.

Ver. 22. Διό] because, namely, my apostolic mode of working, just described (vv. 20, 21), did not yet permit me to depart from the districts mentioned, inasmuch as there was still work to do in founding. [See Note CLIV. p. 560.] Comp. Beza : “ *dum huc et illuc avocor, interpellatus et ita prohibitus.*” Incorrectly Bengel, Reiche, and others : because in Rome the foundation was laid by others. Ver. 23 is decisive against this. — τὰ πολλά] more than πολλάκις, i. 13 (πολλά) : *in the most cases* (πλεῖστα, Plat.

¹ Lucht here conceives the writer to be dependent even on a mistaken understanding of 2 Cor. x. 15, 16.

² The objection of Baur, II. p. 399, that in truth, if this had been really Paul's principle, the Epistle to the Romans itself would stand in contradiction to it, is invalid, since that principle referred only to his working as *present in person*; whence he thought of visiting the Romans only as διαπορευόμενος (ver. 24), on his intended journey

to Spain. But to address *letters* to a church of a Pauline stamp, which had nevertheless been founded by others, such as, in fact, he wrote to the Colossians and Laodiceans, was not excluded by the above principle, the point of which was rather the *personal presence at the founding of churches, and the oral proclamation of salvation.*

³ Comp. Schultz, *alttestam. Theol.* II. p. 263 ff.

Hipp. maj. p. 281 B), as a rule, not "so often" (Th. Schott). The Vulgate renders correctly: *plerumque*.¹ Paul has had *other* hindrances also, but *mostly* such as had their ground in the above regulative principle of his working. Hofmann understands ἐνεκοπτ. of *external hindrances*; so that Paul means that he, even if he would, could not come otherwise than in pursuance of that principle, to Rome (whither that principle did *not* lead him). This is at variance with the following νυνὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., which in μηκέτι τόπον ἔχων ἐν τ. κλ. τ. expresses the removal now of the hindrance meant by ἐνεκοπτ. — τοῦ ἐλθεῖν] genitive dependent on the verb of hindering. See Bornemann, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 7. 20; Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 845.

Vv. 23, 24.² *But since I have now no longer room* (scope, i.e. *opportunitatem*, see on xii. 19; Kypke, II. p. 190) *in these regions* (from Jerusalem to Illyria, ver. 19). Paul had in all these countries founded churches, from which Christianity was now spreading through other teachers, and especially through his own disciples, over the whole; and consequently he considered his apostolic calling to be fulfilled in respect of the region mentioned. His further working was to belong to the far west, where Christ was not yet named; hence he meditated, in the next instance, transferring his activity in founding churches to Spain—a design, indeed, which Lucht denies that the apostle entertained, and imputes it to a *later* conception of his task, in accordance with which the plan of a journey to Spain was *invented*. Probably the comprehensive maxim, that he had no longer a sphere of activity where Christianity might be planted at the principal places of a district by his personal exertions, was connected with the expectation of the nearness of the *Parousia*, before which the πλήρωμα of the Gentiles, and in consequence of this also all Israel, had to be brought in (xi. 25). — ἐπιποθῖαν] *not sumnum desiderium* (Beza), but see on iv. 11. The word is not found elsewhere; but comp. ἐπιπόθεις, 2 Cor. vii. 7. — τοῦ ἐλθεῖν] genitive dependent on ἐπιποθ. — ἀπὸ πολλ. ἐτ.] *now for many years*; comp. Luke viii. 43. — ὡς ἂν] *simulacque, so soon as*. See on 1 Cor. xi. 34; Phil. ii. 23. It is a more precise definition to *what follows*, not to the preceding ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς (Hofmann), because otherwise Paul must have had in mind the *plan of the journey to Spain for many years*, which cannot be supposed either in itself or on account of Acts xvi. 9. This applies also against Tischendorf in his 8th edition. — Σπανίαν] The usual Greek name is Ἰβηρία (Herod. i. 163; Strabo, iii. 4. 17, p. 166), but Σπανία (although in the passages in Athenaeus and Diodorus Siculus the variation Ἰσπανία is found) was probably also not rare, and that as a *Greek* form (Casaubon, *ad Athen.* p. 574). The *Roman* form

¹ See Schaefer, *ad Bos. Ell.* p. 427; Ast, *ad Plat. Legg.* p. 62 f.

² With the omission of ἐλεύσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς after Σπανίαν, and of γάρ after ἐλπίζω (see the critical notes), the course of the passage flows on simply, so that νυνὶ δὲ, ver. 23, is connected with ἐλπίζω, and all that intervenes is parenthetical. If ἐλεύσ. πρὸς ὑμᾶς only be struck out and the γάρ be retained, with Lachmann, Hofmann, Tischendorf, 8, a striking interruption of the construction

results. To parenthesize ἐλπίζω γάρ. . . ἐμπλησθῶ (Lachmann, followed by Buttmann. *l.c.* p. 252 [E. T. 294], comp. also Hofmann) is not suitable to the contents of the continuation, ver. 25. Ewald extends the parentheses from ἐλπίζω γάρ even to λειτουργῆσαι αὐτοῖς, ver. 27. But considering the entirely calm tenor of the whole passage, the probability of such large parentheses, with all their intermediate clauses, is just as slight as the probability of an *anacoluthia* (Tisch. 8).

was Ἰσπανία (1 Macc. viii. 3). It is the entire Pyrenean peninsula. See Strabo, *l.c.*—That this project of a journey to Spain was not executed, see *Introd.* § 1. Primasius aptly remarks: “Promiserat quidem, sed dispensante Deo non ambulavit.” Already at Acts xx. 25 a quite different certainty was before the apostle’s mind, and in his captivity he no longer entertained that plan of travel, Philem. 22, Phil. ii. 24.—*διαπορευόμεν.*] “quia Romae jam fundata est fides,” Bengel.—*ἀφ’ ἡμῶν*] (see the critical notes): *from you away.*—*προπεμφθ. ἐκεῖ*] comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 6, 2 Cor. i. 16, and on Acts xv. 3. As was his wont on his apostolical journeys, Paul hoped (“quasi pro jure suo,” Bengel) to obtain an accompaniment on the part of some belonging to the church from Rome to Spain, by which we must understand an escort *all the way thither*, since Paul would without doubt travel *by sea* from Italy to Spain, the shortest and quickest way. *ἐκεῖ*, in the sense of *ἐκεῖσε*, according to a well-known attraction. See John xi. 8, *et al.*, and on Matt. ii. 22.—*ἀπὸ μέρ.*] “non quantum vellem, sed quantum licebit,” Grotius. It is a limitation *out of compliment*. Comp. Chrysostom. But the reservation of *later complete* enjoyment (Hofmann) is an idea imported: *πρῶτον* denotes *in the first place* (before I travel further), as Matt. vi. 33, vii. 5, viii. 21, and frequently.—*ἐμπλησθῶ*] of *spiritual satisfaction* through the enjoyment of the longed-for personal intercourse (*ἑμῶν*).¹ The commentary on this is given at i. 12.

Ver. 25. *νυνὶ δέ*] is not, like the above *νυνὶ δέ* (ver. 23), to be regarded as *resumptive*, as Buttmann and Hofmann, in consequence of the reading *ἐλπίζω γάρ*, ver. 24, take it,—a view with which what was previously said of the journey to Spain by way of Rome does not accord,² and the passage itself assumes a very stiff, contorted form. Observe, rather, that the first *νυνὶ δέ*, ver. 23, was said in contrast to the *past* (*ἐνεκοπτόμεν κ.τ.λ.*), but that the second *νυνὶ δέ*, ver. 25, commencing a new sentence, is said in contrast to the promised *future*. “So I design and hope to do (as stated in ver. 24): *but at present* a journey to Jerusalem is incumbent upon me; after *its* accomplishment, I shall then carry out that promised one by way of Rome to Spain (ver. 28).” This *νυνὶ δέ* is more definite than if Paul had said, “*but beforehand*” (which Hofmann with this view requires); for he thinks that *now* he is *just on the point of* travelling to Jerusalem, whereas “*but beforehand*” would admit a *later* term of the *πορεύομαι*.—*διακονῶν τοῖς ἁγ.*] *in service for the saints* (Christians in Jerusalem), consequently not delaying the Romano-Spanish journey in his own interest. The *present* participle (not *future*, as Acts xxiv. 17, and see Bornemann, *ad Xen. Anab.* vii. 7. 17) designates the very travelling itself as part of the service.³—The intention, ascribed to the apostle, of protecting himself in rear by the collection-journey, before he passed into the far west (Th. Schott), is a purely gratuitous assumption.

¹ Comp. Hom. *Il.* xi. 452; Kypke, *II.* p. 191.

² Hofmann imports the connection: The participial sentence, ver. 23, is intended to express, “*under what circumstances Paul is now setting out on a journey to Jerusalem,*” instead of coming to Rome, *whither he*

would otherwise at this time see himself destined and impelled.” This is certainly not expressed.

³ See Markland and Matthiae, *ad Eur. Suppl.* 154; Heindorf, *ad Phaed.* p. 249 f.; Dissen, *ad Pind.* p. 81.

Ver. 26. More precise information respecting the *διακονῶν τοῖς ἀγ.* : "*Placuit enim Macedonibus*," etc. On *εὐδόκ.*, they have been pleased, comp. Luke xii. 32 ; 1 Cor. i. 21 ; Gal. i. 15 ; Col. i. 19 ; 1 Thess. ii. 8. — *κοινων.* τινὰ ποιῆσ. κ.τ.λ.] to bring about a participation, in reference to the poor, i.e. to make a collection for them. The contributor, namely, enters into fellowship with the person aided, in so far as he *κοινωνεῖ ταῖς χρεαῖς αὐτοῦ*, xii. 13 ; *κοινωνία* is hence the characteristic expression for *almsgiving*, without, however, having changed its proper sense *communio* into the active one of *communication* ; "*honesta et acuitatis plena appellatio*," Bengel. Comp. 2 Cor. ix. 13 ; Heb. xiii. 16. The added τινὰ, of some sort or other, corresponds to the freedom from constraint, and the consequent indefiniteness, of the amount to be aimed at. On the collection itself, see 1 Cor. xvi. 1 ff. ; 2 Cor. viii. 9 ; Acts xxiv. 17. — τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῶν ἀγ.] the poor among the saints at Jerusalem. These were thus not all of them poor. Comp. Kühner, II. 1, p. 290. Of the community of goods there is no longer a trace in Paul. Philippi incorrectly holds that the *πτωχοὶ τῶν ἁγίων* are the *poor saints generally*. Since the genitive is in any case partitive (even in the passages in Matthiae, § 320, p. 791), the expression must at least have been τοὺς (not τῶν) ἐν Ἱερουσ.

Ver. 27. Information, why they did so, by way of more precisely defining the mere *εὐδόκησαν* previously expressed.¹ "*They have been pleased, namely, to do it, and (this is the added element) their debtors they are.*"—The Gentiles have acquired a share (*ἐκοινωνήσαν*) in the spiritual possession of the Christians of Jerusalem (*αὐτῶν*), in so far as the *mother church* of Christianity was in Jerusalem, so that thus the spiritual benefits of Christianity, which in the first instance were destined for and communicated to the Jews and subsequently passed over also to the Gentiles, have been diffused from *Jerusalem forth* over the Gentile world (which march of diffusion so begun continues), as indeed in Antioch itself the first church of Gentile Christianity was founded from Jerusalem (Acts xi. 20). — τοὺς πνευματικ] for the benefits of Christianity (faith, justification, peace, love, hope, etc.) proceed from the *Holy Spirit*, are τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος δῶρα : comp. on Eph. i. 3. — τοὺς σαρκικοῖς] for the earthly possessions concern the *material and physical phenomenal nature* of man, which is his bodily form of existence. Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 11. — The conclusion is a *majori*, which they have received, *ad minus*, with which they are under obligation to requite it. Comp. Chrysostom. By *λειτουργήσαι*, Paul places the almsgiving of love under the sacred point of view of a *sacrificial service* (see on xiii. 6, xv. 16), which is performed for the benefit of the recipients. Comp. 2 Cor. ix. 12 ; Phil. ii. 30, ii. 25. — That further, as Chrysostom, Calvin, Grotius, and many, including Rückert and Olshausen, assume, Paul intended "*courteously and gently*" (Luther) to suggest to the Romans that they should likewise bestow alms on those at Jerusalem, is very improbable, inasmuch as no reason is perceivable why he should not have ventured on a direct summons, and seeing, moreover, that he looked upon the work of collection as concluded, ver. 25. Without any particular

¹ "Est egregia ἀναφορὰ simul cum ἐπανορθώσει," Grotius.

design in view (Th. Schott thinks that he desired to settle the true relation between the Gentile Christians and the apostle to the Gentiles), he satisfies merely his own evident and warm interest.

Ver. 28. *Τούτο*] This work of service for Jerusalem. — κ. σφραγισ. κ.τ.λ.] and when I shall have sealed to them this fruit, i.e. shall have confirmed the produce of the *κοινωνία*, ver. 26, to them, secured it as their property. σφραγίζ. in the *figurative* sense : to confirm, to ratify (see on John iii. 33) ; for by delivery of the moneys they were, on the part of the apostle, confirmed to the recipients as the fruit collected for them, after the manner of the law of possession, as with seal impressed.¹ The expression chosen has a certain solemnity ; the apostle is moved by the thought that with the close of the work of love to which he refers he was to finish his long and great labours in the East, and was to take in hand a new field in the far West. In these circumstances, an unusual thoughtful expression for the concluding act offers itself naturally. But that which Fritzsche finds in it (rendering of an account and other formalities) neither lies in the simple figurative word, nor was it doubtless intended by Paul, considering his apostolical dignity. Others take σφραγισ. in the *proper* sense, either thus : “when I have brought over the money to them, sealed” (Erasmus, Cornelius à Lapide, Estius), which, however, the words do not express at all, and how paltrily unapostolic the thought would be ! or, referring αὐτοῖς to the Greek Christians (so already Theodoret) : “when I have made them secure with letter and seal respecting the right delivery of their collection” (Glöckler, and so already Michaelis), against which, apart from the unsuitableness of the sense, it is decisive that αὐτοῖς brooks no other reference than αὐτῶν and αὐτοῖς, ver. 27 (comp. τοῖς ἁγίοις, ver. 25). This also against Reithmayr, who brings out even a *depositing* for the almsgivers in *God's treasury* !

Ver. 29. Paul is convinced that his advent to the Romans will not be without rich blessing from Christ ; he will bring with him a *fulness* (*copia*, see on Eph. iii. 19) of Christ's blessing. On the matter itself, comp. i. 11. — ἐν is to be explained : *furnished with*. See Bernhardt, p. 209, and on 1 Cor. iv. 21. Quite contrary to the words, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Calvin, and others : “Scio me . . . vos inventurum repletos omnibus donis spiritualibus,” Estius. — ἐρχόμενος with the same verb ἐλεύσονται ; see Kühner, II. 2, p. 656, and *ad Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 21. Comp. on 1 Cor. ii. 1 ; Phil. ii. 2.

Vv. 30, 31. Even now (comp. Acts xx. 22, 23, xxi. 10 ff.) Paul anticipates that persecutions await him in Judaea on the part of the *unbelieving*

¹ The act of handing over itself, namely, was the σφραγίς of the collection for the recipients. Before the delivery the moneys were indeed destined for them, but not yet *de facto* assured to them as property on the part of the apostle, the bearer. Theodore of Mopsuestia well explains the σφραγισάμ. by ἀποκομίσας καὶ δεδοκώς, and adds, by way of assigning the reason : εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ τῶν δεδοκῶτων τέλειος ἦν ὁ καρπός, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρείᾳ ἀτελής, οὕτω δεξαμένων ὡς περ οὖν ἐνεκεν ἐδόθη. Without any ground in the text,

Hofmann introduces *bearers appointed on the part of the church*, whom the apostle himself conducts to Jerusalem, thereby designating the gift to the recipients as one *destined for them with his knowledge and will*. Hofmann's objection, that the interpretation given above rather suggests that it should be termed an *unsealing* than a *sealing*, is a cavil running counter to the figurative usage elsewhere of σφραγίζειν and σφραγίς, and which might just as aptly be applied to Hofmann's own explanation.

(ἀπειθεῖντων, *inobedientium*, who refuse the ὑπακοή πίστεως ; comp. xi. 30, 31 ; John iii. 36 ; Acts xiv. 2) ; but even on the part of the Palestinian *Christians* (τ. ἁγίους), he is not sure of a good reception for his διακονία, because he, the *anti-Judaic apostle* (comp. x. 21 ; Acts xxi. 21), had set on foot and conducted a *Gentile-Christian* collection. Hence the addition of the *exhortation* (παρακαλῶ) to the readers, subjoined by the continuative δέ, and how urgent and fervent! — διὰ] belonging to παρακ. : by means of a moving reference to Christ, as xii. 1, 2 Cor. x. 1. — The ἀγάπη τοῦ πνεύμ. is the love wrought by the *Holy Spirit* (Gal. v. 22) ; it Paul calls in specially by way of inciting his readers to compliance. — συναγων. μοι ἐν ταῖς προσευχ.] *to contend along with me in the prayers* which you make, hence : *in your prayers*. A very correct gloss is ἑμῶν (after προσευχ.) in codd. and vss. ; not one *disfiguring the sense*, as Reiche thinks, who explains : *in my prayer*. So also Ewald. Paul might certainly, according to the sympathy of the fellowship of love, claim the joint striving of the readers in *his* prayers ; but ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, which would otherwise be superfluous, points most naturally to the conclusion that the προσευχαί are those of the *readers* ; comp. 2 Cor. i. 11 ; Col. iv. 12. The ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν is closely, and without the article, attached to ταῖς προσευχαῖς (similarly to προσεύχεσθαι ὑπέρ, Col. i. 9, et al.) : *in the prayers which you address to God for me* (for my welfare). Fervent prayer is a *striving* of the inner man against the hostile or dangerous powers, which it is sought to avert or overcome, and for the aims, which it is sought to attain. Comp. on Col. *l.c.* — ἵνα ῥυθῶ ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ.] Aim of the joint striving : *in order that I may be delivered from*, etc. See on Matt. vi. 13. It did *not* pass into fulfilment ; even now the counsel of his Lord, Acts ix. 16, was to be accomplished. — ἡ διακ. μου ἡ εἰς Ἱερουσ.] *my rendering of service destined for Jerusalem*. See vv. 25, 26. Comp. 2 Cor. viii. 4, ix. 1.

Vv. 32, 33. Ἰνα] Aim of ver. 31, and so *final aim* of συναγωνίσασθαι κ.τ.λ., ver. 30. Comp. Gal. iv. 5. — ἐν χαρῇ] *in joyfulness*.¹ But as a *prisoner* he came to Rome, whither the will of God (διὰ θελήμ. Θεοῦ) led him, nevertheless, otherwise than it had been *his* desire (comp. i. 10). — συναναπαύωμαι] *refresh myself with you*, namely, through the mutual communication of faith, of inward experiences, of love, of hope, etc. Comp. συμπαρακληθῆναι, i. 12. — In the closing wish, ver. 33, the designation of God as ὁ Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης, the God who brings about peace, was the more naturally suggested, as the forebodings of the opposite of εἰρήνη which he was going to encounter had just been before the apostle's mind. Hence we have neither to assume a reference to the differences in xiv. 1 ff. (Grotius and others), nor to take εἰρήνη of the peace of reconciliation, v. 1 (Philippi), or in the wide sense of *salus* (Fritzsche). Comp. rather 1 Cor. xiv. 33 ; 2 Cor. xiii. 11 ; Phil. iv. 9 ; Rom. xvi. 20 : 1 Thess. v. 23.

¹ It would even with the reading ἐλθῶν (see the critical notes), which Hofmann

follows, belong to *this* word, beside which it stands, not to συναγαγ. (Hofmann.)

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

CL. Ver. 6. τὸν Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ.

That this phrase may mean *the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ* cannot be questioned. Meyer urges against this interpretation the cases in which ὁ Θεὸς καὶ πατήρ occurs with no genitive following. These cases may be regarded as having weight, although it may, perhaps, be claimed that a genitive is suggested to the mind in every such instance. Wieseler urges that in cases where καὶ is omitted (as Rom. i. 7, 1 Cor. i. 3) πατήρ is evidently appositional and explanatory, showing *how* God is related to the defining genitive; and Ellicott presses the fact that, inasmuch as *God* is an *absolute* word and *Father* a *relative* one, it is more natural to connect the genitive with the one only which needs it. These considerations, when taken together, favor very strongly the view which makes τοῦ κυρίου Ἰ. Χ. depend on πατέρα, and not also on Θεόν.

CLII. Vv. 8, 9. λέγω γὰρ . . . γεγενῆσθαι κ.τ.λ.

If γεγενῆσθαι is the correct textual reading, as it probably is, the construction of δοξάσαι as parallel with βεβαιῶσαι and dependent on εἰς τό, which is favoured by Meyer, seems to be the one most accordant with the language. The more common view, however, regards δοξ., like γεγεν., as dependent on λέγω. Weiss (who, however, reads γενέσθαι) calls Meyer's construction artificial. On the contrary, the parallelism in form of the two verbs, δοξ. and βεβ., as distinguished from γεγεν., and the fact that Paul's representation elsewhere is that Christ came in the line of the Jews to benefit also the Gentiles, comp. Gal. iii. 13, 14 (see also xi. 12 ff.), make this the simplest and most natural construction of the passage. The verse is introduced (γὰρ) as a ground of the preceding statement. It thus explains who are meant by ἡμᾶς of ver. 7, and consequently indicates that, in the use of ἀλλήλους of that verse, Paul had in mind the division between Jews and Gentiles in the church as, approximatively at least, answering to that between the weak and strong parties.

Whether there is an intentional contrast between ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας and ὑπὲρ ἐλέους is uncertain, but not improbably this is the case. It was on behalf of God's *truth*, and in fulfilment of the promises, that Christ appeared among and for the Jews. Though the declarations of the O. T. foreshadowed blessings also for the Gentiles, the relation of the spiritual plan to them was, in a certain peculiar sense and degree, a matter more completely of *mercy*.

CLIII. Vv. 14-33.

In this passage, as Meyer remarks, we find the conclusion or epilogue of the epistle; the Pauline letters generally having both an introductory and a concluding section, each consisting of a few verses and being of a more or less general character. In this case, the conclusion is partly apologetic, and partly expressive of his desire and purpose with respect to visiting Rome. In both parts, but especially in the latter, there is a correspondence with the introductory passage, i. 8-15. In that passage he *first* expresses his thanks to God in view of their Christian position and advance in faith; here, again, his apology is occasioned by his conviction that they have made such progress in knowledge and goodness as to be able to dispense with his admonitions. The apology

which he presents, however, justifies his boldness in writing, in parts of the epistle, by the special commission which he has from God. This commission he sets forth with greater minuteness than we find in almost any other place, and thus, as mentioned in a former note, we get the idea which he had of χάρις as employed in such cases. His χάρισμα, as stated, also, in that note, was to be a minister of Christ to the Gentiles in regions where Christ had not been named. The *second* thought of the introduction—his long-cherished wish to see the Roman Christians which he had been prevented from accomplishing thus far, but hoped that he might now at last realize—is only presented more definitely in these verses, both as to the past and the future.

CLIII. Ver. 17 ff. ἔχω οὖν τὴν καύχησιν κ.τ.λ.

These verses, so far as the *main thought* is concerned, serve only to define more precisely the Apostle's mission and work, as giving him the right to address the church as he does. In their *grammatical connection* they are founded, as an inference or conclusion, on the statement of ver. 16. The position of ἔχω indicates (as Meyer says) a special emphasis, which is connected with the manner in which, in the progress of the sentences, the thought is brought out. Paul claims that he *has*, as something which properly appertains to him, the glorying to which he gives expression,—but it is a glorying in Christ Jesus, and not in anything which Christ has not wrought by his means. The construction of the following sentences is peculiar and somewhat involved. γάρ of ver. 18 confirms the declaration that his boasting is *in* (not outside of) Christ Jesus. The confirmatory words are put in the negative form, but they suggest also the corresponding positive. With that suggested positive, the connection of ὥστε κ.τ.λ. becomes free of difficulty. Christ has accomplished through me results, to the end of bringing about obedience to faith among the Gentiles, by means of my teaching and working accompanied by miracles and the power of the Divine Spirit; and this, moreover, so far that I have completed the work of preaching the gospel from Jerusalem and the region around it to Illyricum, always making it my special aim not to preach where there had been preachers before me, and thus not to build upon foundations laid by another.

In regard to the individual words and phrases of this passage the following points may be noticed. (1) καύχησις denotes not the ground of glorying (καύχημα), but the glorying itself. This the Apostle declares to belong to him rightfully. (2) οὐ γὰρ τοιμήσω. If he had ventured beyond these things, the boasting in Christ would not have been thus rightfully his. (3) λόγῳ and ἔργῳ are so far correlative with ἐν δυν. πν. ἰγ., ἐν δυν. σημ. κ. τεράτ., that the latter words accompany in each case the former. (4) κύκλῳ is to be connected with Ἱερουσα. (so Meyer and many others), and not with Ἰλλυρ. It refers to the circuit, whether smaller or larger, around Jerusalem, where Paul's first labours in the gospel were put forth, not to a circuit which he made in his work of preaching from Jerusalem to Illyria. (5) πεπληρωμέναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον. It seems unnecessary to adopt Meyer's explanation of these words, as if, so long as the gospel has not reached every place, it has not attained the full measure of its dimensions, but is only in a state of growth and increase. It would appear to be according to the natural usage of any language to make the gospel, in such a sentence, equivalent to the preaching of the gospel; and the εὐαγγελίζεσθαι of ver. 20

favours such a sense in this case. (6) φιλοτιμούμενον is regarded by Meyer as having here its strict and full meaning, *making it a point of honour*, and this is, in all probability, the correct view. (7) οὐκ ὕπον. The corresponding affirmative. ἀλλὰ ὕπον κ.τ.λ. is found in ver. 21, not in form, but substantially—the construction being changed to introduce a citation from the O. T. (comp. 1 Cor. i. 31 and other passages).

CLIV. Ver. 22. διὰ καὶ ἐνεκοπτόμην κ.τ.λ.

The reason of the ἐκωλύθητι ἄχρι τοῦ δεῦρο of i. 13 is here given, or rather the main reason, for Meyer has probably the right explanation of τὰ πολλά, *in most cases, plerumque, for the most part*. There were other hindrances, but the chief one, and the one ordinarily standing in his way, was the labour which he had to perform before reaching the limits next eastward of Italy. Now, however, this hindrance was removed, because the work was done.

The view which Paul had as to the completion of the work of preaching the gospel from Jerusalem to the western boundary of Illyria, and the outlook towards the regions beyond which seemed to bring the remainder of that preaching (which was to be, in the largest sense, the πληροῦν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον), so near, suggest two things respecting the state of his thought. (1) He must, apparently, have regarded the gospel as “made known” in a large region of country, when churches had been founded in a few of the more prominent places within its limits. There were many parts of the different provinces which he had visited, as he well knew, where no sound of the Divine message had been heard. (2) When we consider the light as compared with the darkness, at the time of his writing these words, and think how great was the latter and how small the former, it would seem as if he must have expected some great Divine manifestation, or the Parousia itself, at an early date,—as if only such an expectation as this could have enabled him to write with such a feeling, that the work had been accomplished in the east, and would so soon be accomplished even in the farthest west.

CHAPTER XVI.

Ver. 3, Πρίσκαν] Elz. : Πρίσκιλλαν, against decisive evidence. After Acts xviii. 2; 1 Cor. xvi. 19 (Elz.). — Ver. 5, 'Ασίας] Elz. has 'Αχάϊας, against almost equally decisive evidence; but it is defended by Ammon and de Wette on the testimony of the Peshito, and because 1 Cor. xvi. 15 might certainly give occasion for changing 'Αχ. into 'Ασ. But the reading 'Αχ. might readily also have come into the text through the mere marginal writing of the parallel passage 1 Cor. *l.c.*, especially if it was considered that Paul wrote his letter in Achaia; hence the greatly preponderant external attestation in favor of 'Ασ. retains its validity. — Ver. 6, ὑμᾶς] approved by Griesb., adopted also by Lachm. and Tisch. 8, according to A B C* N* min. Syr. utr. Arr. Copt. Aeth. But Elz., Scholz, Tisch. 7, Fritzsche have ἡμᾶς. Since Paul in the context sends greeting to persons who stood in a peculiar relation to himself, and thereby the alteration of ὑμᾶς into ἡμᾶς was very easily suggested, the more does the external evidence turn the scale in favour of ὑμᾶς, especially as the reading ἐν ὑμῖν in D E F G, Vulg. It. Ruf. Ambrosiast. attests the original εἰς ὑμᾶς (of which it is an interpretation). — Ver. 7, οἱ . . . γέγον] D E F G : τοῖς πρὸ ἑμοῦ. Gloss, following on a mistaken reference of the relative to ἀποστόλους. — Ver. 14. The order of the names : Ἐρμῆν, Πατρόβαν, Ἐρμῶν (so Lachm. and Tisch., also Fritzsche) is rendered certain by A B C D* F G P N, min. vss. Ruf. — Ver. 16, πᾶσαι] is wanting in Elz., but is justly adopted by Griesb., following Mill, and by later editors on decisive evidence, and because it might easily give offence. — Ver. 18, καὶ ἐὺλογίας] is wanting in D E F G, min. It. Omitted through the *homoeoteleuton*. — Ver. 19, ἐφ' ὑμῖν] The ordinary reading of τὸ before ἐφ' ὑμῖν has the greatest preponderance of evidence against it. Lachm. and Tisch. : ἐφ' ὑμῖν οὖν χαίρω as A B C L P N*, min. Dam. Ruf. read. Rightly : the sequence of the words in the *Recepta* (χαίρω οὖν first) is the ordinary one. — After ver. 20, ἡμῖν in Elz. is condemned by decisive testimony. — Ver. 21, ἀσπάζονται] Decisive witnesses have ἀσπάζεται. Commended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm., Tisch., and Fritzsche. The plural came to be introduced on account of the plurality of persons. — Ver. 24 is wanting entirely in A B C N, 5, 137, Copt. Aeth. Vulg. ms. Harl.* Ruf.; it is found after ver. 27 in P, 17, 80, Syr. Arm. Aeth. Erp. Ambrosiast. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8; rejected also by Koppe and Reiche, who think that it is an interpolated repetition of the benediction, ver. 20, which, after the transference of vv. 25-27 to the end of chap. xiv., was added in order not to leave the epistle without a conclusion. But the witnesses for *omission* are precisely those which have the doxology vv. 25-27 in the ordinary place, either merely in this place (as B C N, 137), or likewise also after chap. xiv. (as A P, 5); and the witnesses for the *transposition* of the verse to the end are likewise not those, which have the doxology merely after chap. xiv. or not at all. Hence we may with safety conclude that ver. 24 was omitted or transposed for the reason that copyists stumbled partly at the fact that Paul, contrary to his manner elsewhere, should have joined a blessing and a doxology together,

and partly at least at the circumstance that he should have placed the latter after the former (all other epistles conclude with the blessing).

On the doxology, vv. 25-27. This is found (1) at the end of chap. xvi., in B C D* E 8, 16, 66,¹ 80, 137, 176, codd. in Ruf. codd. in Erasm. Syr. Exp. Copt. Aeth. Vulg. ms. and ed. Clar. Germ. Ruf. Ambrosiast. Pel. and the other Latin Fathers. (2) It is found at the end of chap. xiv. in L and almost all min.; further, in the Greek lectionaries, the Arab. vss., in polyglots, Syr. P. Goth. (?) Slav. ms. and ed. codd. in Ruf. Chrys. Theodoret, Damasc. Theophyl. Oecum. Theodul. (3) It is found at both places in A P, 5, 17, 109, lat. Finally (4), it is not found at all in D***² F G (where, however, after chap. xiv. a gap of six lines is left), codd. in Erasm. codd. in Jerome,³ Marcion. See the complete examination of the evidence in Reiche, *comm. crit.*, and Tisch. 8, also Lucht, p. 49 ff. — Among the critics and exegetes, (1) the ordinary position in chap. xvi. has been maintained by the Complut. Erasm. Steph. Beza (ed. 3-5), Calvin, Bengel, Koppe, Böhme, Rinck, Lachmann, Köllner, Scholz, Fritzsche, de Wette, Rückert, Reithmayr, Philippi, Tischendorf, Tholuck, Ewald, van Hengel, and others. (2) The position after xiv. 23 has been approved by Grotius, Mill, Wetstein, and Semler, following Beza (ed. 1 and 2); Griesbach and Matthiae removed it to that place in their critical texts; and Morus, Paulus, Eichhorn, Klee, Schrader, Hofmann, Laurent, and others agree thereto. (3) The verses were rejected as spurious by Schmidt, *Einkl. in's N. T.* p. 227, Reiche, Krehl, Lucht. — Now the question is: Is the doxology genuine? and if it is, has it its original position at the close of chap. xiv. or of chap. xvi.? We answer: I. The doxology is genuine. For (a) the witnesses for entire omission are, as against the preponderance of those who have it in one of the two passages or in both, much too weak, especially as the transposition and double insertion are very capable of explanation (see below). (b) The language and the entire character of it are highly Pauline, — a fact which even opponents must admit, who accordingly assume its compilation out of Pauline phrases.⁴ (c) The contents of it admirably suit the entire contents of the epistle. (d) The internal reasons adduced against it by its assailants are completely untenable. It is maintained (see especially Reiche, and comp. Lucht): (a) That at each place, where the doxology appears, it is unsuitable. But it appears as disturbing the connection only after xiv. 23, and it is not at all unsuitable after chap. xvi., where it rather, after the closing wishes more than once repeated, forms with great appropriateness and emphasis the main conclusion which now actually ensues. (β) That it has not the simplicity of the Pauline doxologies, is pompous, overloaded, etc. It is certainly more bulky and laboured than others; but no other Pauline doxology stands at the end of an entire epistle where the

¹ A transcript of the first Erasmusian edition, which, however, has on the margin the observation, that *ἐν τοῖς παλαιαῖς ἀντιγράφοις* this doxology stands at the end of chap. xiv.

² In D, namely, the doxology from the first hand stands after chap. xvi., but the emendator indicates it as to be deleted, without assigning it to the end of chap. xiv.

³ Jerome on Eph. iii. 5: "Qui voluit prophetas non intellexisse, quod dixerint . . . illud quoque, quod ad Rom. in plerisque

codd. invenitur, ad confirmationem sui dogmatis trahunt legentes: ei autem, qui potest vos roborare, etc." But that already before Marcion the doxology was wanting in codd., there is no certain trace.

⁴ Un-Pauline constituent elements and modes of representation, which Lucht believes are to be found generally in the two last chapters, have no existence in reality; the grounds of offence are disposed of by the exposition.

great power of thought in the writing concentrated itself in feeling—no other at the end of a section, the purport and importance of which can be compared with that of the entire Epistle to the Romans. Hence it can by no means appear strange that such a doxology has obtained the character of overflowing fulness from the whole recollection of what had been written,—a collective recollection which, so far from being fitted to beget in a rich and lively disposition only an ordinary and plain thanksgiving to God, is fitted rather to produce an outpouring of fervor and fulness of thought, under the influence of which the interest of easy expression and of simple presentation falls into the background. (γ) That the whole conception is uncertain, many expressions and combinations are obscure, unusual, even quite unintelligible; and (δ) that the conjunction of εὐαγγ. μου καὶ τ. κήρυγμα Ἰ. X. is un-Pauline and unsuitable; as is in like manner φανερωθέντος, which verb is never used by Paul of the utterances of the prophets,—groundless occasions of offence, which are made to disappear by a correct explanation. On such internal grounds Reiche builds the hypothesis, *that in the public reading the merely epistolary last two chapters were omitted; that the public reading thus ended at xiv. 23; and the doxology spoken at the end of that reading was written first on the margin, afterwards also in the text, consequently after xiv. 23, whence copyists, on recognizing its unsuitable position, removed it to the end of the epistle. It is thus the work of an anagnostes, who compiled it clumsily from Pauline formulas, and that in imitation of the conclusion of the Epistle of Jude.*¹ In opposition to this whole view, it is particularly to be borne in mind: (1) that the assumption that only the doctrinal part of the epistle was publicly read is a pure fancy, and is as much at variance with the high reverence for what was apostolic, as with the circumstance that, according to the lectionaries, these very chapters xv. and xvi. consist wholly of sections for reading; (2) that at least xv. 1-13 would have been included in the reading, and the doxology must thus have obtained its place after xv. 13; (3) that the presumed custom of uttering a doxology when the reading of an apostolic writing was finished, does not at all admit of proof; (4) that a Pauline doxology would have been chosen for imitation more naturally than that of Jude 24, 25, as indeed, conversely, Jude *l.c.* would more naturally presuppose an acquaintance with our passage; (5) that τὸ εὐαγγ. μου was not at all suitable to the person of an anagnostes; and indeed an imitative reader was hardly in the position and mood to pour forth an expression of praise in so overflowing a gush, and thereby in anacoluthic construction. But when Lucht refuses a Pauline character to the doxology, in respect not merely of form and diction, but also of the thought which it contains, and recognizes in it a gnosticizing and conciliatory stamp, this judgment rests on misinterpretations in detail and on pre-suppositions, which lie altogether outside the range of the N. T., along with a recourse to the rejection of the genuineness not merely of the Pastoral epistles, but also of the so-called epistles of the captivity.—II. *The position of the doxology after xvi. 24 is the original one.* For (a) the external witnesses for this view are preponderant, not indeed in number, but in value. See above, and compare Gabler, *Praef. ad Griesb., Opusc.* p. 24. (b) Its position at the end of chap. xvi. was quite fitted to excite offence and to occasion a transposition, partly because no other epistle of the apostle concludes with a doxology; partly

¹ In the *Comment. crit.* p. 116, Reiche is of opinion that it may have been added "a homine privato, qui ingenio suo indulgeret."

because here even the usual formal conclusion of an epistle (the apostolical blessing) immediately precedes; partly because *ὁὐὰς στήριξαι* seemed specially to refer back to the section respecting the weak in faith. The latter point was decisive at the same time as to the place to which—the connection between chap. xiv. and xv. as a unity being far from sufficiently appreciated—the doxology was referred, namely after xiv. 23, where there is the last direct mention of the *weak*, while xv. 1 then turns directly to the strong. Several other defenders of the ordinary position (see especially Koppe, *Exc.* II. p. 404; Gabler, *l.c.* p. 26; Bertholdt, *Einleit.* VI. § 715; Hug, *Einl.* II. p. 397, with whom Reithmayr agrees) thought, indeed, that the omission of at least chap. xvi. in the reading of the letter had occasioned the beautiful and weighty doxology, which it was desired should not be excluded from the reading, to be placed after chap. xiv.—not after chap. xv., either (Bertholdt, Hug) because chap. xv. has already a conclusion, or because the supposed reference of *στήριξαι* to the weak in faith pointed out that place. But the whole supposition that an integral portion of the epistle was omitted in reading is entirely incapable of being established. Not more plausible is the theory to which Rinck has recourse (comp. already Zeger and Böhme): “*In codd. ex recensione Marcionis perscriptis librariorum, ipso fortasse Marcione auctore, clausulam ex fine epistolae assuissse, et postquam quod deerat a correctoribus suppletum esset, alios hanc clausulam iterasse, alios hinc, alios illinc, alios utrinque ejecisse*” (*Lucubr. crit.* p. 135). Marcion himself and his disciples rejected (Origen, *interpr. Ruf.*), indeed, the doxology on account of its contents (see especially ver. 26, *διὰ τε γραφῶν προφητικῶν*); but the orthodox certainly did not concern themselves with Marcionite copies; indeed, Origen says expressly, that in the copies “*quae non sunt a Marcione temerata*,” the doxology is found differently placed either after chap. xiv. or after chap. xvi. Ewald, regarding vv. 3-20 as the fragment of an epistle to the Ephesians, believes that a reader somewhere about the beginning of the second century observed the heterogeneous character of that portion, but then excised too much, namely chap. xv. and xvi. Such a copy, in his view, Marcion had; but now that chap. xiv. was without a proper conclusion, at least the doxology xvi. 25-27 came to be appended thereto by other copyists. But apart from the above opinion respecting vv. 3-20 in itself (see, in opposition to it, the critical notes on chap. xv.), it would not be at all easy to see why they should not have removed *merely* vv. 3-20 from the copies, and why, instead of this, chap. xvi. should have been entirely excised, and even chap. xv. in addition. To explain this, the smaller importance of this chapter—which, moreover, is assumed without historical warrant—does not suffice.—Further, if the genuineness of the doxology itself, as well as its customary position, is to be esteemed assured, it follows at the same time from what we have said (1) in respect of the *duplication* of the doxology after chap. xiv. and xvi. in critical authorities, that it proceeds from those who, while aware of the difference as to the place of the words, were not able or did not venture to decide respecting the original position, and hence, taking the certain for the uncertain, inserted the words in *both* places; (2) in respect of the *entire omission* in authorities, that it is the work of an old precarious criticism, which drew from the uncertain position the conclusion of non-genuineness, along with which there operated the consideration that the doxology was unsuitable after xiv. 23 as interrupting the connection, and after xvi. 24 as having its place even after the concluding wish.

Vv. 1, 2. *Recommendation* (συνίστημι, comp. 2 Cor. v. 12, *et al.*)¹ of *Phoebe*, who is held to be the bearer of the epistle,—a supposition which there is nothing to contradict. In the twofold predicate, ἀδελφ. ἡμῶν (*our*, *i.e.* my and your Christian *sister*) and οὖσαν διάκ. κ.τ.λ., there lies a twofold motive, a more general and a more special one, for attending to the commendation. — διάκονον] *feminine*, as Dem. 762. 4 : διάκονον, ἡ τις ἐκλήροτο. The designation by the word διακόνισσα, not used in classical Greek, is found only subsequently, as frequently in the *Constitut. apost.* See, on these *ministræ*, as they are called in Pliny, *Ep.* x. 97, the female attendants on the poor, sick, and strangers of the church, Bingham, *Orig.* I. pp. 341-366 ; Schoene, *Geschichtsforsch. Eb. d. kirchl. Gebr.* III. p. 102 ff. ; Herzog, in his *Encykl.* III. p. 368 f. Very groundlessly Lucht, because this service in the church was of later date (but comp. xii. 7 ; Phil. i. 1), pronounces the words οὖσαν . . . Κεχρη. not to belong to Paul, and ascribes them to the supposed editor. Respecting the χῆραι, 1 Tim. v. 9, see Huther *in loc.* — Κεχρηαί eastern port of Corinth, on the Saronic Gulf. See Wetstein. Comp. on Acts xviii. 18. — ἵνα αὐτῇν, κ.τ.λ.] Aim of the commendation. — ἐν κυρίῳ] characterizes the προσδέχεσθαι as *Christian* ; it is to be no common service of hospitality, but to take place *in Christ*, *i.e.* so that it is fulfilled in the fellowship of Christ, in virtue of which one lives and moves in Christ. Comp. Phil. ii. 29. — ἀξίως τῶν ἁγίων] either : *as it is becoming for saints* (Christians) *to receive fellow-Christians* (so ordinarily), or : “*sicut sanctos excipere oportet*,” Grotius, Chrysostom. The former (so also Fritzsche and Philippi) is the correct explanation, because most naturally suggesting itself, as modal definition of the action of receiving. — καὶ γὰρ αὐτῇ] *nam et ipsa*, for she also on her part (not αὐτῇ *haec*). — προστάτις] a *directrix*, *protectress*.² She became (*i.e.* *se praestitit* Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 7. 4) a *patrona multorum* through the exercise of her calling. Paul might, indeed, have written παραστάτις, corresponding to παρῳσῆτε ;³ but he selects the word which is conformable to her official position, and more honourable. — καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐμοῦ] *and of myself*, my own person (see on vii. 25). Historical proof of this cannot be given. Perhaps Paul had once been ill during a sojourn with the church of Cenchreae.

Vv. 3-16. The apostle's *salutations*.

Vv. 3, 4. Πρίσκα (2 Tim. iv. 19) is not different from Πρίσκιλλα ; comp. on Acts xviii. 2. — Her husband⁴ Aquila was a native of Pontus (Acts xviii. 1), and Reiche incorrectly conjectures that he was called *Pontius Aquila*, which name Luke erroneously referred to his native country ;⁵ for,

¹ See Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* IX. p. 438 ; Bornemann, *ad Xen. Symp.* iv. 63, p. 154.

² Lucian, *bis accus.* 29 ; Dio Cass. xlii. 39 ; Dindorf, *Soph.* O. C. 459, and *Praef. ad Soph.* p. LXL ; Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 271.

³ Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 32 ; Soph. *Trach.* 891, *Oed.* C. 559 ; comp. ἐν νόσοις παραστάτις, Musonius, in *Stob. A.* p. 416, 43.

⁴ That Paul names the wife *first*, is not to be regarded as accidental. Probably the pre-

ponderant Christian activity and estimation were on her side. Hence here, where both *are saluted* (comp. 2 Tim. iv. 19), the precedence of the wife,—a distinction for which in 1 Cor. xvi. 19, where both *salute*, no occasion was given. On the precedence given to the wife in Acts xviii. 18, see *in loc.*

⁵ Aquila also, the translator of the Bible, was, as is well known, from Pontus (Sinope).

looking to the close connection in which Aquila stood with Paul, and Paul again with Luke, a correct acquaintance with the matter must be presumed in the latter. This married couple, expelled from Rome as Jews under Claudius, had been converted at Corinth by Paul (see on Acts xviii. 1), had then migrated to Ephesus (Acts xviii. 18, 26 ; 1 Cor. xvi. 19), are now again in Rome, but, according to 2 Tim. iv. 19, were at a later period once more in Ephesus. — ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ] Distinctive character of συνεργοίς ; for labour for the gospel lives and moves in Christ as its very element, Comp. vv. 9, 12. — Ver. 4. The marks of parenthesis are to be omitted, because the construction is not interrupted. — οἵτινες κ.τ.λ.] Note the peculiar grounds assigned (*quippe quī*) for this and several following greetings. — ὑπέρ] not *instead of*, but *for*, in order to the saving of my life. — τὸν ἑαυτ. τράχηλ. ὑπέθηκεαν] *have submitted their own neck, namely, under the executioner's axe*. In the absence of historical information we can just as little decide with certainty on the question whether the expression is to be taken *literally*, that is, of a moment when they were to be actually executed but in some way or other were still saved, or (so the expositors) *figuratively*, of the incurring of an extreme danger to life—as on the question where the incident referred to took place ? whether at Ephesus, Acts xix. ? or 2 Cor. i. 8 ? or at Corinth, Acts xviii. 6 ff. ? or elsewhere ? or, generally, in the midst of labour and tribulation shared with Paul ? Wetstein, Heumann, and Semler think of *bail* (ὑπέθηκεαν would then be : *they gave pledge* ; see Lobeck, *ad Phyrn.* p. 468). Possibly ; but the nearest conception which offers itself as the words stand is that of *τραχηλοκοπεῖν* (Plut. *Mor.* p. 398 D), whether it be thought of as a reality or as a figure. The latter, however, is, as being said of both, the most probable. The readers *knew* what was meant. — τῶν ἐθνῶν] On account of this sacrifice for me, the apostle of the Gentiles. The notice contemplates the inclusion of the *Roman church*, which in fact was also a *Gentile church*.

Ver. 5. Καὶ τὴν κατ' οἴκ. αὐτ. ἐκκλ.] *and the church which is in their house*. Considering the size of Rome, it may be readily conceived that, besides the full assembly of the collective church, particular sectional assemblies were also formed, which were wont to meet in the houses of prominent members of the church. Such a house was that of Aquila and Priscilla, who had also in Ephesus given their dwelling for a similar object, 1 Cor. xvi. 19 ; Col. iv. 15 ; Philem. 2. Such house-churches are related therefore to the collective community, to which, as such, the epistles are directed, simply as the part, which has in addition its own special greeting, to the whole. Others (following Origen, Chrysostom, Theophylact, etc., with Koppe, Flatt, Klee, Glöckler) hold that the *inmates of the household* are intended. An arbitrary assumption of an unexampled hyperbole in the use of ἐκκλησία. That all the following saluted persons, up to ver. 12, were *members of the house-church of Aquila and Prisca* (Hofmann), is an arbitrary assumption, which is rendered very improbable by the repeated ἀσπάσασθε, forming in each case a fresh beginning. — Ἐπαίνετον¹] Unknown like all the following down to ver.

¹ On the accentuation of the name, as well as that of Ἐπαῖστος, ver. 22, see Lipsius, *gramm. Unters.* p. 30. The name itself is also frequently found in the Greek writers.

15, but see the note on 'Ποῦφον, ver. 13. The traditions of the Fathers made most of them bishops and martyrs (see Justiniani, *Comm.*, and Braun, *Sel. sacr.* i. 2. 29 ff.), and the Synopsis of Dorotheus places most of them among the seventy disciples. That Epænetus had come to Rome with Aquila and Prisca (Hofmann), is very precariously conjectured from his being mentioned immediately after that couple. — ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀσ. εἰς Χ.] *first-fruits of Asia* (partitive genitive, see on viii. 23) *in reference to Christ, i.e.* that one of the Asiatics, who had first been converted to Christ.¹ — Ἀσ. is the western portion of Asia Minor, as in Acts ii. 9; 1 Cor. xvi. 19; 2 Cor. i. 8.

Ver. 6. *How far Mary had toiled much for the Romans* (εἰς ὑμᾶς), was as well known to the readers and to the apostle himself, who awards to her on that account the salutation of acknowledgment and commendation, as it is unknown to us. It may have happened abroad (as van Hengel and others think) or in Rome itself through eminent loving activity, possibly in a special emergency which was now past (hence not κοπιῶ, but the *aorist*). Reiche refers ἐκοπ. to *activity in teaching*, for which, however, since the text annexes no definition (as in 1 Tim. v. 17), and since Mary is not more specially known, there is no reason, and generally, as respects public teaching (1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35), little probability. On εἰς, comp. Gal. iv. 11.

Ver. 7. Ἰουλίαν] is taken by Chrysostom, Grotius, and others, including Reiche, as *feminine* (Junia, who is then to be regarded probably as the wife or sister of Andronicus); but by most of the more recent expositors as a *masculine* name, Junias, equivalent to Junianus (therefore to be accented Ἰουλιᾶς). [See Note CLV. p. 581.] No decision can be arrived at, although the following description, ver. 7 (in opposition to Fritzsche), commends the latter supposition. — συγγενεῖς] is explained by many (including Reiche, de Wette, Hofmann) as *member of the same race or people* (according to ix. 3). But the explanation *kinsmen* is to be preferred, partly because the word itself, without other definition in the context, immediately points to this (Mark vi. 4; Acts x. 24, *et al.*); partly because it is only in this sense that it has a significance of special *commendation*; especially as in Rome there were many Jewish-Christians, and hence one does not see how the epithet was to be something *characteristic* in the particular case of those named, if it signified only kindred in the sense of belonging to the same *people*. We know too little of the apostle's kindred (comp. also Acts xxiii. 16), to reject this explanation on account of vv. 11, 21, or to venture to employ it in throwing suspicion on the genuineness of the chapter (Baur). But Reiche's reason—that Andronicus and Junias are expressly designated as Jews, because it would just be non-Jews who were saluted—is quite futile, since the nationality of those previously saluted is unknown to us, and Aquila and Prisca were likewise Jews.² Just as groundlessly, Hofmann thinks that in

¹ With the reading ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀχαίας, it was necessary, in order not to fall into variance with 1 Cor. xvi. 15, to take ἀπαρχὴ, as a *first-fruit, one of the first converted*,—certainly an explanatory makeshift, which weakens greatly the significance of the notice, and by which 1 Cor. *l.c.* would also

be affected. Not less forced would be the combination, by which we should regard Epænetus as an inmate of Stephanas' house, who had been converted at the same time with him (Tholuck, yet only permissively, following older interpreters).

² Probably Mary also—the name already

an epistle to the *Gentile-Christian* church the *kinsmen* of the apostle would be *Jews*. This is purely arbitrary, and yields, besides, for the designation of the persons intended an element, which, in the case of the *actual* relatives of the Jewish-Christian apostle, is quite obvious *of itself*, and the mention of which, moreover, in presence of the Gentile-Christians, would have been somewhat indelicate.—Where and in what manner they *had been imprisoned with Paul*,¹ is, owing to the incompleteness of the information in the book of Acts (comp. on 2 Cor. vi. 5), entirely unknown. Clement, 1 Cor. v., states that Paul had *seven times* borne fetters. Ewald, in connection with his view that we have here a fragment of an epistle to the Ephesians, assumes that Andronicus and Junias, while Paul was imprisoned in *Rome*, lay at the same time confined in *Ephesus*; and Lucht perceives only the anachronism of a forger. — ἐπίσημοι ἐν τ. ἀποστ.] ἐπίσημος, like *insignis*, a *vox media* (comp. Matt. xxvii. 16), here in the good sense: *distinguished, i.e. most honourably known by the apostles*.² So Beza, Grotius, and others, including Koppe, Flatt, Reiche, de Wette, Fritzsche, Philippi, van Hengel, Hofmann, and rightly; for ἀπόστολος is used by Paul only in 1 Cor. xv. 7 in the wider sense (comp. Acts xiv. 4, 14), nevertheless even there with such restriction that James and the twelve are *included* in the reference. Hence we must not, especially considering our entire ignorance of the two persons, explain, with Origen, Chrysostom, Luther, Calvin, Estius, Wolf, and many others, including Tholuck, Köllner, Rückert, Reithmayr, Ewald, *distinguished among the apostles* (in other words distinguished apostles). That Andronicus and Junias were held in peculiar honour by the apostles, does not exclude their repute with the Christians generally, but rather points, for their especial commendation, to closer relations which they had with the apostles. Lucht misinterprets the expression οἱ ἀπόστ. of the *original apostles* in contrast to Paul. — πρὸ ἐμοῦ] That they had been converted exactly at Pentecost (Grotius, Koppe), is just as little capable of proof, as that they had been the first preachers of the gospel in Rome (Wolf). — γέγονασιν ἐν Χ.] not: became apostles in Christ (Reithmayr, following Origen), but: became *Christians*, entered the *fellowship of Christ*, attained to the ἐν Χριστῷ εἶναι. They were thus ἀρχαῖοι μαθηταί (Acts xxi. 16). “Venerabiles facit aetas, in Christo maxime,” Bengel. On γίνεσθαι ἐν, see Nägelsbach, *z. Ilias*, p. 295, ed. 3; comp. on Phil. ii. 7.

points to this—was a Jewess; indeed, Epænetus himself appears to have been a Jew (against Hofmann), since he is characterized generally as the first-fruits of *Asia*, not as ἀπαρχὴ τῶν ἐθνῶν of this country, and according to history, the Christian first-fruits of a country inhabited also by Jews were, as a rule, Jews. Comp. Acts xviii. 6, xxviii. 24 ff.

¹ The expression itself places the relation of their captivity under the figurative conception of captivity in *war* (vii. 23; 2 Cor. x. 5; Eph. iv. 8). Comp. Lucian, *Asin.* 27; Photius, *Bibl.* p. 133, 8. As the Christians, and peculiarly the teachers and overseers

in the service of Christ, their commander-in-chief, are συστρατιῶται amongst one another (see on Phil. ii. 35, Philem. 2), so also are they, in captivity with one another, συναχμαλῶται (see on Col. iv. 10, Philem. 23). An arbitrary play of interpretation occurs in Hofmann: those *whom Christ has won from the world and made His own*, just as the apostle himself. Aptly Chrysostom points out the *fellowship of suffering* with Paul, implied in συναχμαλ, as the most glorious crown of these men.

² Comp. Eur. *Hec.* 379: ἐπίσημος ἐν βροτοῖς, *Illyrol.* 103; Polyb. x. 3. 3, xv. 34. 3; Lucian, *merc. cond.* 28.

Vv. 8, 9. Ἀμπλιῶν] the abbreviated Ἀμπλιάτων, as codd., vss., and Fathers actually read, a name which (in form like Donatus, Fortunatus, etc., see Grotius) was frequent; see Gruter, *Ind.* — ἐν κυρίῳ] gives to the ἀγαπ. μ. the specific *Christian character*; comp. on ver. 2. — τ. συνεργ. ἡμῶν] ἡμῶν refers, since Paul speaks always of himself in the *singular* here, to the readers along with himself, comp. ver. 1, not to those named in vv. 3-8 (van Hengel). He was probably a stranger who was at this time in Rome, and united his activity with that of Roman Christians towards the extension and furtherance of the gospel, whereby he was a fellow-labourer of the apostle and of the readers. — The name Σράχης: *Inscr.* 268.

Ver. 10. Apelles (comp. Hor. *Sat.* I. v. 100) is not to be confounded with the celebrated Apollos (Acts xviii. 24; 1 Cor. i. 12, iii. 4), as Origen, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Grotius, and others have done. Whether he was a freedman remains an open question, owing to the frequency of the name, which also occurs of freedmen. — τὸν δόκιμον ἐν Χ.] *i.e.* the tried Christian. Christ, the personal object of his believing fidelity, is conceived as the element wherein he is approved. Comp. φρόνιμος ἐν Χ., 1 Cor. iv. 10, and similar passages. — τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοβούλου] those of the people (perhaps: slaves) of Aristobulus, comp. 1 Cor. i. 11. That Paul means the Christians among them, is self-evident; in the similar salutation, ver. 11, he adds it redundantly. Aristobulus himself was therefore no Christian; unless he (so Grotius) had been already dead, in which case he might have been a Christian.

Vv. 11, 12. Narcissus is by Grotius, Michaelis, and Neander, held to be the powerful freedman of Claudius (Suet. *Claud.* 28; Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 29 ff., xii. 57). It is possible, although Narcissus, according to Tacitus, *Ann.* xiii. 1, was already dead (see Wieseler, *Chronol.* p. 371 ff.). A decision, however, cannot be arrived at; but, considering the frequency of the name, the suspicion of anachronism (Lucht) is groundless.—The three women, ver. 12, perhaps deaconesses, are otherwise unknown. Note how Persis is distinguished above the two previously named women; as also how delicately Paul has not added μου, after τὴν ἀγαπήτην, as with the men's names, vv. 8, 9, although he means his sentiment of love towards Persis. Observe, also, the distinction between κοπιῶσας (present) and ἐκοπίασεν. The particular circumstances of the case are unknown to us.

Ver. 13. Rufus may be the son of Simon of Cyrene, Mark xv. 21. Comp. *in loc.* The fact that in Mark, who probably wrote in Rome, the man is assumed to be well known, would agree with the eulogy here: τὸν ἐκλεκτὸν ἐν κυρίῳ, the elect one in the fellowship of the Lord, *i.e.* who is distinguished as a Christian.¹ For if these words denoted merely the Christian, "who in fellowship with the Lord is chosen to blessedness" (Reiche), they would not

¹ Ὁ ἐκλεκτός, *exquisitus*, in the sense of *excellens* (comp. 1 Tim. v. 21; 1 Pet. ii. 4; 2 John i. 13; Wisd. iii. 14; Bar. iii. 30), because it is just the selected that is wont to be the eminently qualified, see Schleusner, *Thess.* II. p. 289. But Hofmann explains as if it ran τὸν ἐκλεκτὸν μου; who is to me a choice

Christian brother; he calls the ordinary interpretation unapostolic (wherefore?), and groundlessly appeals to τὴν ἀγαπήτην, ver. 12. In the case of the latter the loving subject is, according to a very common usage, self-evident.

—as is, nevertheless, the case with all the remaining predicates—express a *special* element of commendation. — καὶ ἐμοῦ] pregnant, delicate, and grateful hint of the peculiar love and care which Paul (*where and how*, is entirely unknown!) had enjoyed at her hands. Comp. ver. 2 ; 1 Cor. xvi. 18 ; Philem. 11 ; and see on 1 Cor. i. 2.

Vv. 14, 15. Hermas was not, as already Origen declared him to be, the composer of the book ὁ ποιμήν,² which, according to the Canon Muratorianus, is said to have been composed by a brother of the Roman bishop Pius I., and in any case belongs to no earlier period than the second century. — κ. τ. σὺν αὐτῷ ἀδελφ.] It is possible, but on account of the more general designation deviating from ver. 5, not probable, that those named here as well as in ver. 15 were members, well known to the apostle, of two ἐκκλησίαι in Rome (so Hofmann), according to which view by the *brethren with them* would be meant the remaining persons taking part in these assemblies, for the most part doubtless unknown to him. It is possible also that some other Christian associations unknown to us (Fritzsche and Philippi think of associations of trade and commerce) are intended. We have no knowledge on this point. Reiche thinks of two *mission-societies*. But πάντες, ver. 15, points to a considerable number, and there is no trace in the Book of Acts of so formal and numerous mission-societies ; they were doubtless still foreign to that period. Probably also Paul would have given some thoughtful indication or other of this important characteristic point.—The whole of the names in vv. 14, 15 are found in Gruter and elsewhere.—Julia appears to have been the wife of Philologus ; the analogy of the following Νηρέα κ. τὴν ἀδελφὴν αὐτοῦ makes it less probable that the name denotes a man (*Julias*, comp. on ver. 7).

Ver. 16. The series of greetings which Paul has to offer *from himself* is concluded. But he now desires that his readers should also exchange greetings *among one another, reciprocally*, and that with the loving sign of the holy *kiss*. The subject of this greeting is thus *every member of the church himself*, who kisses another (see on 1 Cor. xvi. 20), not *Paul*, so that *meo nomine* should be supplied (Bengel, Koppe). This is forbidden by ἀλλήλους. Comp. 1 Cor. i.e. ; 2 Cor. xiii. 12 ; Justin, *Ap.* i. 65. The case is otherwise with 1 Thess. v. 26 (see Lünemann *in loc.*). The ancient custom, especially in the East, and particularly among the Jews, of uniting a greeting with a kiss, gave birth to the Christian practice of the ἅγιον φίλημα (1 Pet. v. 14),³ termed ἅγιον, because it was no profane thing, but had Christian consecration, expressing the holy Christian-fellowship of love.⁴ — πᾶσαι] From *many* churches

¹ Hofmann entertains the conjecture, which is in no way capable of proof, that Rufus lived with his mother in Jerusalem when Paul himself sojourned there ; and that then Paul dwelt in the house of the mother, and enjoyed her motherly care.—If, again, the demonstration of love intended falls in a *later* period of the apostle's life, his expression in our passage is the more *courteous* ; hence it by no means requires the above precarious combination.

² The critical discussions as to this work,

quite recently conducted by Zahn, and Lipsius in particular, have no bearing here.

³ φίλημα ἀγάπης ; *Const. ap.* ii. 57. 12, viii. 5, 5 : τὸ ἐν κυρίῳ φίλημα, Tertullian, *de orat.* 4 : *osculum pacis*.

⁴ That Paul actually desires that the reciprocal greeting by a kiss on the part of all should take place after the reading of the epistle, ought not to have been disputed (Calvin, Philippi). A ceremony indeed he does not desire ; but he summons not merely to *love*, but to the *kiss* of love.

greetings had been doubtless entrusted to the apostle for the Romans, since he had certainly not previously withheld from them his project of travelling to Rome (perhaps also, of writing thither beforehand). Concerning the *rest*, what Erasmus says holds good: "Quoniam cognovit omnium erga Romanos studium, omnium nomine salutatur." The *universal* shape of the utterance by no means justifies us in pronouncing this greeting not to be the apostle's, and deriving it from 1 Cor. xvi. 19, 20 (Lucht); it rather corresponds entirely to that cordial and buoyant consciousness of fellowship, in which he did not feel himself prompted *narrowly* to examine his *summary* expression. Others arbitrarily limit *πάσαι* to the *Greek* churches (Grotius), or simply to the churches in *Corinth* and its ports (Michaelis, Olshausen, and others), or at least to those in which Paul had been (Bengel).

Vv. 17-20. A *warning*, added by way of supplement, *against the erroneous teachers* who were then at work. This very supplementary position given to the warning, as well as its brevity, hardly entering at all into the subject itself (comp. on the other hand, the detailed treatment in chap. xiv. xv. of a less important contrast), evinces that Paul is *not* here speaking, as Wieseler, following older interpreters, holds, against such as *already were actually making divisions in Rome*. He would have treated so dangerous an evil in the doctrinal connection of the epistle and at length, not in such a manner as to show that it only occurred to him at the close to add a warning word. Hence this is to be regarded as directed against an evil *possibly setting in*. Doubtless he was apprehensive from the manifold experience acquired by him, that, as elsewhere (comp. Gal. iii. 6, 11 ff.; Col. ii. 8 ff.; Phil. iii. 2 ff., 18, 19; 2 Cor. xi. 13 ff.), so also in Rome, *Jewish zealots for the law*¹ might arise and cause divisions in their controversy with Pauline Christianity. This occasioned his warning, from which his readers knew to what kind of persons it referred,—a warning, therefore, against *danger*, such as he gave subsequently to the Philippians also (Phil. iii.), to whom the evil must have been all the nearer. Paul might, however, the more readily consider it enough to bring in this warning only supplementarily and briefly, since in Rome the Gentile-Christian element was the preponderant one, and the mind of the church in general was so strongly in favour of the Pauline gospel (vv. 19, 20, vi. 17), that a permanent Judaistic influence was at present not yet to be apprehended. How, notwithstanding, an anti-Pauline doctrinal agitation took place later in Rome, see Phil. i. 15 ff. Moreover, the *precautionary* destination of our passage, and that in presence of the greatness of the danger, is sufficient to make us understand its contents and expression as well as its isolated position at the close. At least there does not appear any necessity for setting it down as an original constituent por-

¹ The brief indications, vv. 17, 18, do not suggest philosophical *Gentile-Christians* (Hammond, Clericus), but (see on ver. 18) *Judaizers*, against whom Paul offers his warning. Hofmann prefers to abide by the *generality* of the warning, whether the troubles might be of Gentile origin or might arise from doctrines of Jewish legalism.

But this view does not satisfy the concrete traits in vv. 17, 18, 20. See the correct interpretation already in Chrysostom and Theodore of Mopsuestia. The latter says: λέγει δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ Ἰουδαίων, οἱ ἀπανταχόσε περιιόντες τοὺς ἀπὸ ἰδνῶν πιστεύοντας τῆς νομικῆς ἔχειν παρατηρήσεως πείδην ἐπειρώντο.

tion of an epistle addressed to a church founded by Paul himself, namely, to the church of the Ephesians (Ewald, Lucht).

Ver. 17. σκοπεῖν] *to have in view*, in order, namely, to guard against; comp. βλέπετε, Phil. iii. 2; but σκοπεῖν *speculari*, is stronger, comp. also Phil. iii. 17. — τὰς διχοστ.] [See Note CLVI. p. 582.] comp. Gal. v. 20; 1 Macc. iii. 29.¹ The article denotes those anti-Pauline *divisions and offences*, σκάνδαλα, — *i.e.* temptations to departure from the true Christian faith and life, *well known* to the readers, — which at that time arose in so many quarters in Pauline churches, and might readily threaten the Romans also. — ἐκκλίνατε ἀπ' αὐτῶν] *turn away from them*, shun them, go out of their way. Comp. 1 Pet. iii. 11; Ps. cxix. 102; Ecclus. xxii. 11; Thucyd. v. 73. 3; more usually with the accusative. Grotius rashly concludes: “non fuisse tunc conventus communes aut presbyterium Romae; alioquin voluisset tales excommunicari.” Paul rather counsels a rule of conduct for each individual member of the church, leaving the measures to be adopted on the part of the church, in case of necessity, to the church-government there (which was one regularly organized, in opposition to Bengel, see xii. 6 ff.). The disturbers, besides, against whom they are warned, are in fact viewed not as members of the church, but as intruders from without. Comp. Acts xv. 1; Gal. ii. 4.—The reference to *the doctrine received* certainly implies a church having Pauline instruction, but not exactly one founded by Paul himself (Ewald), like that at Ephesus. Comp. vi. 17; Col. i. 23.

Ver. 18. Reason assigned for the injunction of ver. 17. — οἱ τοιοῦτοι] “*hi tales*; notatur substantia cum sua qualitate,” Bengel. — οὐ δοῦλ.] Note the position of the negation; the thought is: *to the Lord they refuse service, but their own belly they serve*. Thereby they belonged to the category of the ἐχθροὶ τοῦ σταυροῦ τ. Χρ., Phil. iii. 18.—On τῇ κοιλίᾳ δουλεύειν, τῇ γαστρὶ δουλεύειν *abdomini servire* (Seneca, *de benef.* vii. 26), as a designation of selfishness, bent only on good cheer in eating and drinking, comp. on Phil. iii. 19; Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* IX. p. 416. For this object the sectaries sought to make use of the influence and following which they obtained. Comp. Lucian, *de morte Peregr.* 11 ff. Behind their teaching, although this was not itself of an Epicurean nature (Hofmann), there lurked, hypocritically concealed, the *tendency to epicurean practice*. — διὰ τῆς χρηστολ. κ. εὐλογ.] *by means of the kind* (having a good-natured sound) *and fair-set language*, which they hold.² The two words characterize *contents* (χρηστολ.) and *form* (εὐλ.); hence it is preferable to take εὐλογ. in the above signification than in the ordinary one of *praise, extolling* (Philippi). Comp. Luther: *stately language*. — τῶν ἀκάκων] *of the guileless* (Heb. vii. 26), who themselves have nothing evil in their mind, and are prepared for nothing evil.³—The assertion that Paul appears too severe in the accusation of his opponents (Rückert) cannot be made good. He writes from long and ample experience.

¹ Dem. 423. 4; Plat. *Legg.* i. p. 630 A; Dion. Hal. viii. 72.

² On χρηστολ. comp. Jul. Capitól. *vii. Perfin.* 13; Eustath. p. 1437, 53, and the classical λόγοι χρηστοί, λέγειν χρηστά κ.τ.λ.; on

εὐλογία, language finely expressed (here: fine phrases), Plat. *Rep.* p. 400 D; Lucian, *Leisiph.* 1; Aesop. 229.

³ See Wetstein *in loc.*; Ruhnken, *ad Tim.* p. 56; Schaefer, *ad Greg. Cor.* p. 342.

Ver. 19. Not a second ground assigned for, or justification of, the warning of ver. 17 (Tholuck, de Wette, Philippi; comp. also Reithumayr and Hofmann); for this use of a second really co-ordinated γάρ is nowhere to be assumed in the N. T. See, on the contrary, on viii. 6. Nor is it to be taken, with Fritzsche: "nam vos *innocentibus* qui facile decipiuntur hominibus annumerandos esse, ex eo intelligitur, quod vos Christo obediētes esse nemo ignorat;" for the latter is exactly the opposite of ready liability to seduction. Nor with Rückert: for the general diffusion of the news that you are such good Christians will soon bring those men to Rome, that they may sow their tares; which is not expressed. Nor yet again with Calvin and others, Reiche, and Köllner: for you are indeed good Christians, whereat I rejoice; but I desire, etc.—against which the expression, especially the want of μέν and the presence of οὐν, is decisive. In order to a correct understanding, one should note the emphatically prefixed ὑμῶν, which stands in correlation—and that antithetic—with τῶν ἀκάκων. Hence (as also Philippi admits, comp. van Hengel): "not without reason do I say: the hearts of the guileless; for you they will not lead astray, because you do not belong to such as the mere ἀκακοί, but distinguish yourselves so much by obedience (towards the gospel), that this has become universally known; respecting you therefore (here, too, ἐφ' ὑμῖν stands first emphatically; see the critical notes) I rejoice,¹ yet desire that you may be wise and pure,"—a delicate combination of warning with the expression of firm confidence. Strangely, Lucht, comparing Acts xx. 29, assigns ver. 19 to an epistle to the Ephesians. —εἰς τὰ ἀγαθ.] in reference to the good, which you have to do. By this general expression Paul means specially fidelity towards the pure gospel. —ἀκεραίους εἰς τὸ κακόν] pure in reference to evil, so that you keep yourselves unmixed with it, free from it. Comp. Phil. ii. 15, Matt. x. 16; and see respecting ἀκεραῖος generally, Ruhnken, *ad Tim.* p. 18.

Ver. 20. Encouraging promise; hence συντρέψαι is not with Flatt to be taken as optative, contrary to linguistic usage, nor is the erroneous gloss of the reading συντρέψαι (A, 67**, Theodoret, Oec., Jer., Ambros., Rup.) to be approved.—Paul regards the sectaries, because they are servants not of Christ, but of their belly (ver. 18), as organs of Satan (comp. 2 Cor. xi. 15); hence his figurative expression of the thought, founded on Gen. iii. 15: "The God of peace will grant you (when the authors of division appear amongst you) shortly the complete victory over them."—As Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης (pacificus) God appears in contrast to those ποιῶντες τὰς διχοστασίας (ver. 17). Comp. on xv. 33.—The bruising of Satan and treading him under feet takes place in God's power; hence ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ. Comp. 1 Macc. iii. 22 (and Grimm *in loc.*), iv. 10, *et al.* —ἡ χάρις κ.τ.λ.] The grace of our Lord, etc.; therewith, as with the usual concluding blessing of his epistles, Paul would

¹ In the reading of the Recepta defended by Hofmann, χαίρω οὖν τὸ ἐφ' ὑμῖν, χαίρειν would not have to be supplied after τό (as Hofmann very oddly thinks); but τὸ ἐφ' ὑμῖν sc. ὅν would, according to a well-known usage (see Bernhardt, p. 329; Krüger, § 68,

41. 9; Schaefer, *ad Bos. Ell.* p. 277; Kühner, II. 1, p. 434), be a more precise definition to χαίρω: I rejoice, as to what concerns you. In this case, ἐφ' ὑμῖν would be by no means dependent on the notion χαίρω, but the latter would stand absolutely.

close. But he has as yet delivered no special greetings from those around him at Corinth, whether it be that they are now for the first time entrusted to him, or that he now for the first time observes that he has not yet mentioned them in what precedes (as after ver. 16). This induces him now further to add vv. 21-23 after the conclusion already written down in ver. 20; then to repeat the above blessing in ver. 24; and finally, after recalling anew all which he had delivered to the Romans, in a full outburst of deeply moved piety to make the doxology, vv. 25-27, the final close of the entire letter.

Ver. 21. *Τιμόθε.*] It may surprise us that he is not brought forward at the head of the epistle as its joint writer (as in 2 Cor. i. 1; Phil. i. 1; Col. i. 1; 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 1), since he was at that time with Paul. But it is possible that he was absent just when Paul began to compose the epistle, and hence the apostle availed himself in the writing of it of the hand of a more subordinate person, who had no place in the superscription (ver. 22); it is possible also that the matter took this shape for the inward reason, that Paul deemed it suitable to appear with his epistle before the Roman church, to which he was still so strange, in all his unique and undivided apostolic authority. — *Λούκιος*] Not identical with *Luke*, as Origen, Semler, and others held;¹ but whether with Lucius of Cyrene, Acts xiii. 1, is uncertain. Just as little can it (even after Lucht's attempt) be ascertained, whether *Ἰάσον* is the same who is mentioned in Acts xvii. 5. *Σωσίπατρος* may be one with *Σώπατρος*, Acts xx. 4; yet both names, *Σωσίπ.* and *Σώπ.*, are frequently found in the Greek writers. — *συγγενεῖς*] as vv. 7, 11. Why it should be reckoned “more than improbable” (Hofmann) that Paul had at that time three kinsmen in Rome (vv. 7, 11), and three in his neighbourhood at the time of writing, it is not at all easy to see.

Ver. 22. *Tertius*, probably an Italian with whom the readers were acquainted, was at that time with Paul in Corinth, and wrote the letter, which the apostle dictated to him. The view that he made a fair copy of the apostolic draught (Beza, Grotius) is the more groundless, since Paul *was wont* to dictate his epistles (1 Cor. xvi. 21; Gal. vi. 11; Col. iv. 16; 2 Thess. iii. 17). *In his own name* Tertius writes his greeting; for it was very natural that, when he called the apostle's attention to his personal wish to send a greeting, his *own* greeting (which Grotius and Laurent, without sufficient ground, relegate to the margin) would *not* be dictated by the apostle, but left to himself to express. In ver. 23, Paul again proceeds with his dictation. Quite groundlessly, Olshausen (following Eichhorn) thinks that Paul wrote the doxology immediately after ver. 20, and did so on a small separate piece of parchment, the other blank side of which the scribe Tertius used, in order to write on it in his own name vv. 21-24. But how uncontestedly *ὁ ἀνεργός μου*, ver. 21, points to Paul himself! — *ἐν κυρίῳ*] To be referred to *ἀπ.*; the *Christian* salutation, offered in the consciousness of living fellowship with Christ. Comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 19.

Ver. 23. *Γάιος*] Perhaps the same who is mentioned in 1 Cor. i. 14; it

¹ Considered probable also by Tiele in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1858, p. 753 ff.—In the *Constit. ap.* vii. 46. 2, Lucius is mentioned as

the name of the bishop of *Cenchreae* appointed by Paul.

may at the same time be assumed, that the person mentioned in Acts xx. 4 (not also he who appears in Acts xix. 29) is not a different one, against which the circumstance that he was of Derbe is no proof. But considering the great frequency of the name (see also 3 John 1; *Constitt. ap.* vii. 46. 1; *Martyr. Polye.* 22), no decision can be given. Origen: "Fertur traditione majorum, quod hic Caius fuit episcopus Thessalonicensis ecclesiae." — ξένος, *guest-friend*, is in the Greek writers not merely the person entertained, but also, as here, the entertainer.¹ Paul lodged with Caius, as during his first sojourn in Corinth with Aquila, and then with Justus (Acts xviii. 1-7). — καὶ τῆς ἐκκλ. ὄλ.] Whether this be a reference to the circumstance that Caius gave his house for the meetings of the church (Grotius), or to the fact that, while the apostle lodged with him, there were at the same time very numerous visits of persons belonging to the church of Corinth, whom Caius hospitably received,—a view which corresponds better to the thoughtfully chosen designation—in any case ξένος does not stand to τῆς ἐκκλ. ὄλ. in the same strict relation as to μου. Comp. ver. 13, τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμοῦ. If the lodging of those *coming from abroad* (Hofmann, following Erasmus and others) were meant, τῆς ἐκκλ. ὄλης would have been understood of the collective *Christian body*, and the *hyperbolic* expression would appear more *jesting* than *thoughtful*. Comp. rather on ἡ ἐκκλησία ὄλη, 1 Cor. xiv. 23, also v. 11, xv. 22. Nor is the expression suitable to the *Roman church*, in so far, namely, as Paul converted many of its members during their exile (Mäcker), because it would be too disproportionate. — Ἐραστός] Different from the one mentioned in Acts xix. 22 and 2 Tim. iv. 20; for the person sending greeting here was not, like Timothy, a travelling assistant of the apostle, but *administrator of the city-chest*, city-chamberlain in Corinth (*arcarius civitatis*, see Wetstein); unless we should assume—for which, however, no necessity presents itself—that he had given up his civic position and is here designated according to his *former office* (Pelagius, Estius, Calovius, Klee, and others, comp. also Reiche). For another, but forced explanation, see Otto, *Pastoralbr.* p. 55. The name Erastus was very frequent. The less are we, with Lucht, to discover an error in Acts xix. 22 and 1 Tim. iv. 20. Grotius, moreover, has rightly observed: "Vides jam ab initio, quamquam paucos, aliquos tamen fuisse Christianos in dignitate positos." Comp. 1 Cor. i. 26 ff. — Respecting *Quartus* absolutely nothing is known. Were ἀδελφός a *brother according to the flesh*, namely of Erastus, Paul would have added αὐτοῦ (comp. ver. 15); hence it is to be understood in the sense of *Christian brotherhood*, and to be assumed that the relations of this Quartus suggested to the apostle no more precise predicate, and were well known to the readers.

Ver. 24. In 2 Thess. iii. 16, 18, the closing blessing is also repeated. Wolf aptly observes: "Ita hodiernum, ubi epistola *vale dicto* consummata est, et alia paucis commemoranda menti se adhuc offerunt, scribere solemus: *vale iterum.*"

Vv. 25-27. [See Note CLVII. p. 582.] As a final complete conclusion, we have now this *praising of God*, rich in contents, deep in feeling (perhaps

¹ See Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* III. p. 218; Duncan, *ed. Rost.* p. 799.

added by the apostle's own hand), in which the leading ideas contained in the whole epistle, as they had already found in the introduction, i. 1-5, their prelude keynote, and again in xi. 33 ff. their preliminary doxological expression, now further receive, in the fullest unison of inspired piety, their concentrated outburst for the ultimate true consecration of the whole. No one but Hofmann, who assigns to these three verses their place after xiv. 23 (see the critical notes), could deny that they form a *doxology* at all. According to him, τὰ δὲ δυναμένω is to be connected with ὀφείλομεν, xv. 1, and to be governed by this verb (thus : *to Him, who is able . . . we are debtors*, etc.). This is, however, nothing less than a monstrosity of exegetical violence, and that, first, because the verses carry on their front the most immediate and characteristic stamp of a doxology (comp. especially Jude 24, 25), in which even the ἁμῶν is not wanting (comp. ix. 5, xi. 36) ; secondly, because the fulness and the powerful pathos of the passage would be quite disproportionate as a preparatory basis for the injunction that follows in xv. 1, and would be without corresponding motive ; thirdly, because in ver. 25 ὑμᾶς stands, but in the supposed continuation, xv. 1, ἡμεῖς, which is an evidence against their mutual connection ; and lastly, because the δέ, xv. 1, stands inexorably in the way. This δέ, namely, could not be the *antithetic* δέ of the *apodosis* and after *participles*, especially after absolute participles (Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 372 ff. ; Kühner, II. 2, p. 818 ; Baeumlein, *Partik.* pp. 92 f., 94), but only the *resumptive* (Kühner, II. 2, p. 815 ; Baeumlein, p. 97) ; and then Paul must have written not ὀφείλομεν δέ, but either αὐτῷ δέ ὀφείλομεν, which αὐτῷ would reassume the previously described subject, or he must have put his δέ in ver. 27 along with μόνω σοφῷ Θεῷ, and therefore somewhat thus : μόνω δὲ σοφῷ Θεῷ . . . ὀφείλομεν.

Ver. 25. Στηρίζαι] *to make firm and steadfast.* Luke xxii. 32 ; Rom. i. 11 ; 1 Thess. iii. 2 ; 2 Thess. ii. 17, *et al.* The description of God by τῷ δυναμένῳ ὑμᾶς στηρίζαι corresponds to the entire scope of the epistle. Comp. i. 11 (in opposition to Lucht). — ὑμᾶς] ὑμῶν τὰς καρδίας, 1 Thess. iii. 13. — κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγ. μου] is closely connected with στηρ. (*to strengthen in respect of my gospel*), so that we are not to supply *in fide* (Koppe, de Wette, van Hengel) or the like (Reiche : “in the religious and moral life,”) ; but the sense is not different from στηρ. ἐν τῷ εὐαγγ. μου (comp. 2 Thess. ii. 17 ; 2 Pet. i. 12), namely : *so to operate upon you that you may remain steadfastly faithful to my gospel*, and not become addicted to doctrines and principles deviating from it. More far-fetched is the explanation of others (taking κατὰ in the sense of the rule) ; “*so to strengthen you, that you may now live and act according to my gospel*” Köllner (comp. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Wolf, Koppe, Tholuck) ; or (κατὰ of the *regulative modal character*) : *after the fashion of my gospel* (Hofmann).—The expression τὸ εὐαγγέλιον μου, *the gospel preached by me*, cannot, seeing that in Rome Pauline Christianity was in the ascendant, be accounted, on an impartial consideration of the apostolic consciousness, and in comparison with ii. 16 (see also 2 Thess. ii. 14 ; 2 Tim. ii. 8 ; Gal. ii. 2), as in itself surprising, least of all when we attend to the added : καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. This, namely, far from aiming at a conciliatory comparison with the preaching of the *other apostles* (Lucht), is

a more precise definition of τὸ εὐαγγ. μου, proceeding from the humble piety of the apostle. As he wrote or uttered the latter expression, he at once vividly felt that *his gospel* was withal nothing else than *the preaching which Christ Himself caused to go forth (through him as His organ)*; and by making this addition, he satisfies his own principle: οὐ γὰρ πολυήσω λαλεῖν τι ὃν οὐ κατειργάσατο Χριστὸς δι' ἐμοῦ λόγῳ. κ. ἐργῳ, xv. 18. Comp. on the thought, Eph. ii. 17; 2 Cor. xiii. 3. This *humility*, amidst all the boldness in other respects of his apostolic consciousness, suggested itself the more to his heart, because in connection with a praise of *God*. With this view of the genitive agree substantially Rückert, de Wette, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald. The more usual explanation: the preaching *concerning Christ* (Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, and many others, including Köllner, Tholuck (?), Reithmayr, Philippi), yields after τὸ εὐαγγ. μου somewhat of tautology, and forfeits the thoughtful correlation between μου and Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. The personal *oral* preaching of *Christ Himself during His earthly life* (Grotius, Wolf, Koppe, Böhme, Hofmann), to which Paul never expressly refers in his epistles (not even in Gal. v. 1) is not to be thought of. — κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρ. κ. τ. λ.] co-ordinated to the preceding κατὰ . . . Χριστοῦ, and likewise dependent on στήριξαι. In the exalted feeling of the sublime *dignity* of the gospel, in so far as he has just designated it as the κήρυγμα of *Jesus Christ*, the apostle cannot leave the description of its character without also designating it further according to its grand and *sacred contents* (not according to its *novelty*, as Hofmann explains, which lies neither in the text nor in the connection), and that with a theocratic glance back upon the *primitive* counsel of salvation of God: *as revelation of a secret kept in silence in eternal times* (comp. Col. i. 26; Eph. iii. 9, i. 4; 1 Cor. ii. 7). Note the *bipartite* character of the designation by the twofold κατὰ, according to which Paul sets forth the gospel, (1) *ratione subjecti*, as *his* gospel and κήρυγμα of *Christ*, and (2) *ratione objecti*, as the revelation of the *primitive sacred mystery*. — The second κατὰ is to be taken quite like the first (comp. Col. ii. 8); but Paul designates *the divine decree of the redemption of the world*¹ as μυστήριον (comp. generally on xi. 25), in so far as it, *formed* indeed by God from eternity (hidden in God, Eph. iii. 9), and in the fulness of time accomplished by Christ, was first *disclosed*² through the gospel, *i.e.* laid open to human contemplation (Eph. iii. 4, 8, 9, vi. 19); hence the *gospel* is the actual ἀποκάλυψις of this secret. The article was not requisite with ἀποκ., since the following genitive has no article, and, besides, a preposition precedes (Winer, p. 118 f. [E. T. p. 125]; comp. 1 Pet. i. 7). But μυστήριον, if it was to be in itself the *definite* secret, must have had the article (Eph. iii. 3, 9; Col. i. 26); hence we must explain “*of a secret*,” so that it is only the subsequent concrete description which

¹ The bestowal of blessing on the *Gentiles* (Eph. iii. 6) is an essential *feature* of the contents of the μυστήριον; but to refer the latter in our passage to this *alone* (Beza, Bengel, Philippi, Tholuck, and others), is not justified by the context.

² This disclosure made to men *through the*

preaching of the gospel (i. 17; Gal. iii. 23) is meant according to the context, and not “*mihi data patefactio*” (van Hengel), which Paul elsewhere, when he *means* it, actually *expresses*. Comp. Gal. i. 16; Eph. iii. 3; 1 Cor. ii. 10; Eph. iii. 5; Gal. i. 12.

expresses *what* secret is meant : “in respect to the revelation of a secret, which was kept silent in eternal times, but now has been brought to light,” etc. Among the *varying* explanations, the only one linguistically correct is that of Fritzsche (comp. Köllner, Rückert, Tholuck, and Philippi), who makes *κατὰ ἀποκ. μυστ.* dependent not merely on *στηρίζαι*, but on *τῷ δὲ δυναμ. ὑμᾶς στηρ.* taken together; and takes *κατὰ* as in consequence of, thus namely : “*qui potest vos corroborare in . . . secundum patefactionem arcani, h. e. postquam facta est patefactio arcani, i. q. ἐπεὶ ἀπεκαλύφθη μυστήριον* ;” more exactly Rückert, Philippi, Tholuck : *in correspondence with the revelation, etc.* But no necessity exists for taking *κατὰ* here in another sense than previously, (as *e.g.* there is such a necessity, obviously, with *κατ’ ἐπιταγήν* immediately below) ; on the contrary, after the words, “who is in a position to strengthen you in respect of the gospel,” the idea “*secundum patefactionem arcani*” would be superfluous and self-evident, and therefore the weighty mode of its expression would be without motive and turgid. It would be otherwise if *κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν κ.τ.λ.* were intended to establish not the *ability* of God, but His *willingness*. Incorrectly, in fine, Olshausen and older expositors think that *τὸ γεγενημένον* should be supplied : “*which preaching has taken place through revelation of a secret,*” etc. This Paul would have known how to say properly, had he meant it. — *χρόνοις αἰών.*] *Period in which the σέσις* took place ; Acts viii. 11, xiii. 20 ; Josh. ii. 20 ; Winer, p. 205 [E. T. p. 218] ; Kühner, II. 1, p. 386. From the very beginning down to the time of the N. T. proclamation reach the *χρόνοι αἰώνιοι*, which are meant and popularly so designated. Bengel : “*tempora primo sui initio aeternitatem quasi prae-viam attingentia.*” Comp. 2 Tim. i. 9 ; Tit. i. 2. As at almost every word of the doxology, Lucht has taken offence at the expression *χρόνοις αἰών.*¹ And Reiche incorrectly understands the course of eternity down to the time of the prophets. For by *ἀποκάλ. μυστηρ. κ.τ.λ.* Paul wished to designate the *New Testament gospel* (*κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*), which therefore had *not* been preached before Christ ; but he thinks of the prophetic predictions as the *means* used (ver. 26) for the making it known, and justly, since in them the publication has not yet taken place, but there is contained merely the still obscure preindication and preparatory promise (i. 2) which were only to obtain their full and certain light through the far later *ἀποκάλυψις* of the mystery, and consequently were to serve as a medium of faith to the preaching which announces the secret of salvation. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 293. Suggestively Bengel remarks : “*V. T. est tanquam horologium in suo cursu tacito ; N. T. est sonitus et pulsus aeris.*” The *silence* respecting the secret was first put an end to by the preaching of the N. T., so that now the *φάνερωσις* came in its place ; and up to that time even the *prophetic* language was, in reference to the world, as yet a *silence*, because containing only *συνεσκιασμένως* (Theodoret) what afterwards (“*a complemento,*” Calovius) was to become through the *evangelical* preaching manifest, brought clearly to light

¹ The fashion, in which he professes to explain the separate elements from a Gnostic atmosphere, is so arbitrary as to place itself beyond the pale of controversy.

Thus, *e.g.*, *χρον. αἰων.* is held to refer to the Gnostic *aeons*, *σεσιγγμ.* to the Gnostic *Sige*, *διὰ γραφ. προφητ.* to the *γνώσις* of allegorical explanation of Scripture.

(comp. i. 19, iii. 21 ; Col. iv. 4 ; 1 Pet. i. 10, 11, 20 ; Tit. i. 2, 3 ; 2 Tim. i. 10).

Ver. 26. Contrast of χρόνους αἰων. σέσωγ. — *But which has been made manifest in the present time, and by means of prophetic writings, according to the commandment of the eternal God, in order to produce obedience of faith, has been made known among all nations.* In this happy relation of the present time, with regard to that which the χρόνοι αἰώνιοι lacked, how powerful a motive to the praise of God ! — φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν] Comp. Col. i. 26, νῦν δὲ ἐφανερώθη, in the same contrast ; but here the stress lies, in contradistinction to the immediately preceding σείσημι. on φανερωθ. Reiche's observation, that the φανέρωσις is never attributed to the prophets, is not at all applicable ; for it is not in fact ascribed to the prophets here, and φανερωθ. is not even connected with διὰ γραφ. προφ., which τε¹ undoubtedly assigns to the following participle γνωρισθ.² The mystery has, namely, in the Christian present been clearly placed in the light, has been made an object of knowledge (comp. on i. 19), a result obviously accomplished through the gospel (comp. Col. i. 26 ; Tit. i. 3) ; and with this φανέρωσις, in and by itself, there was connected in further concrete development the general publication of the secret, as it is more precisely designated by διὰ τε γραφῶν . . . γνωρισθ. This general publication was, namely, one which took place (1) *by means of prophetic writings* (comp. i. 2), inasmuch as, after the precedent of Jesus Himself (John v. 39 ; Matt. v. 17 ; Luke xxiv. 27, 44), it was brought into connection with the prophecies of the O. T. testifying beforehand (1 Pet. i. 11), the fulfilment of the same was exhibited, and they were employed as a proof and confirmation of the evangelical preaching (comp. also Acts xvii. 11), and generally as a medium enabling the latter to produce knowledge and faith. (2) It took place *at the command of God* (x. 17 ; Tit. i. 3), whose servants (i. 9) and stewards of His mysteries (1 Cor. iv. 1). the apostles are, conscious of His command. (Gal. i. 1, 15). (3) It was made *in order to produce obedience towards the faith* (comp. on i. 5), and that (4) *among all nations.* — τοῦ αἰωνίου Θεοῦ] αἰων. is not a faint allusion to χρόνους αἰωνίους (Reiche) ; but stands in a very natural and apt relation of meaning thereto, since it is only as eternal (Baruch iv. 8, 22 ; Hist. Susann. 42) that God could dispose of the eternal times and of the present, so that what was kept silent in the

¹ Té is wanting indeed in DE 34, 87, Syr. Etp. Copt. Aeth. Arm. Slav. Vulg. Clar. Germ. Chrys. and some Latin Fathers ; but this is to be regarded as a hasty deletion, occasioned by the fact that, without precise consideration of the sense and of the following connection, διὰ γραφ. προφ. was mechanically attached to φανερωθ. as nearest in position, and the necessity in point of construction for its belonging to γνωρισθ., widely separated by the intervening notices, was not perceived. In order thereupon to supply the want of connection between the two participles, which arose through the omission of the τέ, an *et* was inserted before

κατ' in versions (Syr. Etp. Aeth.).

² This, too, against Hofmann, who makes διὰ γραφ. προφ. be added to νῦν by means of τέ, in the sense of "*just as also.*" But the τέ must have added to the νῦν something homogeneous, supplementing (Baumlein, *Partik.* p. 211 ; Kühner, II. 2, p. 787), not a notion dissimilar to it. Generally, it would not be easy to see why Paul should not have placed his τέ only after κατ' ἐπιταγήν, and thereby have given to the second participial sentence—which, according to Hofmann's explanation, follows without connecting particle—a connecting link in conformity with the sense.

former should be made known in the latter. — εἰς π. τ. ἐθνῶν] Consequently the publication was not confined to the Jews, but was accomplished *among all Gentile peoples*; comp. i. 5. As to εἰς of the direction, comp. John viii. 26, and see on Mark i. 39, xiv. 9.

Ver. 27. Μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χ.] to be closely connected (without a comma after Θεῷ): *to the through Jesus Christ only wise God, i.e. to the God who through Christ has shown Himself as the alone wise, so wise, that in comparison with Him this predicate can be applied to no other being* (comp. Luke xviii. 19; John xvii. 3; 1 Tim. vi. 15, 16, i. 17; 2 Macc. i. 25), the *absolutely wise*.¹ The connection: “to the alone wise God *be the glory through Christ*” (Pesch., Chrysostom, Luther, Beza, Calvin, Estius, Grotius, Morus, van Hengel, and several others), is inadmissible because of ὁ, which indeed is omitted by Beza and Grotius after the *Complut.* edition, but is critically so certified (it is wanting merely in B) that it can only appear to have been omitted with a view to relieve the construction; although Rückert also sees himself forced to omit it, and Ewald (comp. Märcker, p. 8), while retaining the ὁ, so translates as if it ran ὁ διὰ Ἰ. Χ. ἡ δόξα. Thus, too, Hofmann connects the words, seeking through the dative μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ to bring them into government with ὀφείλομεν, xv. 1 (see on vv. 25–27). Instances of such a prefixing of parts of sentences having an emphasis before the relative are found, indeed, in the Greek writers;² yet in the N. T. we have no passage of this kind (wrongly Hofmann adduces 1 Pet. iv. 11, Heb. xiii. 21, as bearing on this); and it would not be easy to perceive any special reason why Paul should have so uniquely laid stress on διὰ Ἰ. Χ. — The description of God, begun on the side of His *power*, in ver. 25, passes over at the conclusion of the doxology into the emphasizing of His *wisdom*, to which the representation of the gospel as ἀποκάλυψις μυστηρίου . . . γνωρισθέντος involuntarily led him in a very natural process of thought; for so long as the mystery was covered by silence, the wisdom of God in its highest potency was not yet brought to light,—a result which took place by the very means of that ἀποκάλυψις. Comp. xi. 32–34. This at the same time applies against Reiche, who believes μόνῳ σοφῷ to be unsuitable here and to be taken from Jude 25 var. (the spurious addition σοφῷ, Jude 25, as also in 1 Tim. i. 17, has manifestly flowed from our passage). — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] *i.e. through the appearance and the whole work of Jesus Christ*. Thereby God caused Himself to be practically recognized as the alone wise. Comp. xi. 33 ff.; Eph. iii. 8 ff. Similarly, in Jude 25, διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κ.τ.λ. is connected, not with the following δόξα, but with the preceding σωτῆρι ἡμῶν. Too narrowly, Fritzsche limits διὰ Ἰ. Χ., in accordance with Col. ii. 3 (but see *in loc.*), to the contents of His *teaching*. It is precisely the *facts* which bring to light the wisdom of the divine measures in the execution of the plan of redemption through Christ,—the death and the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus (iv. 24, 25, viii. 34, *et al.*),—that form the sum and substance of the conception of our διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. — ὧ] In the lively pressure

¹ Comp. Plato, *Phaedr.* p. 278 D; Diog. Laert. i. 12; Philo, *de migr. Abr.* i. p. 457. 4.

² Schaefer, *App. ad Dem.* IV. p. 463; Stall-

baum, *ad Plat. Phaedr.* pp. 238 A, 363 A; comp. on Acts i. 2.

of the great intermediate thoughts connected with the mention of the gospel, vv. 24, 25, the syntactic connection has escaped the apostle. Not taking note that τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ and the resumptive μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ are still without their government, he adds, as though they had already received it at the beginning of the over-full sentence (through χάρις δὲ τῷ δυναμένῳ κ.τ.λ. or the like), the expression—still remaining due—of the praise itself by means of the (critically certain) *relative*, so that now the above datives are left to stand as anacoluthic. Comp. Acts xxiv. 5, 6, and the remark thereon. See also Winer, p. 528 [E. T. p. 567] ; Buttmann *neut. Gr.* p. 252 [E. T. 293]. Others, indeed, think that Paul allowed himself to be induced by the intermediate thoughts to turn from the doxology to God at first designed, and to direct the tribute of praise to Christ instead, the Mediator and Revealer of the wisdom of God, so as thereby *mediately* to praise God Himself. See especially Philippi, also Reithmayr, Baumgarten-Crusius, and Tholuck (doubtfully). Such doxologies as if to God, are found addressed to Christ doubtless in Heb. xiii. 21, 2 Tim. iv. 18, Rev. i. 6, and later in Clement *et al.*, but in the really apostolical writings nowhere at all (see on ix. 5) ; and that Paul here still, even after the intermediate observations, retained the idea of praising God, so that that ᾧ must accordingly be referred not to Christ, but to God, is quite clearly proved by the resumptive μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ. For a formally quite similar anacoluthon¹ in the doxology, see *Martyr. Polyc.* 20 : τῷ δυναμένῳ πάντας ἡμᾶς εἰσαγαγεῖν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι κ. δωρεῷ εἰς τὴν αἰώνιον αὐτοῦ βασιλείαν διὰ τοῦ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ μονογενοῦς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ᾧ ἡ δόξα, ἡ τιμή, κράτος, μεγαλυσύνη εἰς αἰῶνας. — ἡ δόξα] *sc.* εἰη, not ἐστί, according to 1 Pet. iv. 11 (Hofmann), where the connection is different and ἐστὶν must be written (Lachm.), and its emphasis is to be noted. The *article* designates the *befitting honour*, as in xi. 36.

NOTES BY AMERICAN EDITOR.

CLV. Ver. 7. ἐπίσημοι ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις.

The two explanations mentioned by Meyer in his note being alike possible, it cannot be determined with certainty whether Andronicus and Junias are here called apostles or not. As we have no mention of them elsewhere, however, and as the title of *apostle*, when applied to others than the Twelve, was apparently limited to a very few of the leading men in the Church, such as Barnabas and James, the Lord's brother, it seems probable that the interpretation which Meyer gives to the words should be adopted. If the two were "apostles," the person whose name in the accusative is Ἰουλίαν could not have been a woman, as there is no reason to believe that a woman ever had this title. The nominative must, in this case, be Ἰουλιᾶς. If they were not themselves apostles, but were most honorably known by the apostles, the nominative corresponding to Ἰουλίαν may be either masculine or feminine. That these two persons were relatives of Paul is, perhaps, not to be confidently affirmed ; but

¹ For the suggestion that in this passage from the *Martyr. Polyc.* τῷ δυναμ. is dependent on the preceding ἐκλογάς (Hofmann) is

simply a violent and very unsuitably devised evasion. Dressel has the unbiassed and correct punctuation.

from the word that is used, it would seem not improbable that this was the fact.

CLVI. Ver. 17. τοὺς τὰς διχοστασίας . . . ποιούντας.

There are two noticeable points connected with these words and those which surround them, which may have an important bearing on the true understanding of the passage. (1) The articles with διχοστασίας and σκάνδαλα, the addition to those words of παρὰ τὴν διδαχὴν κ.τ.λ., and the words in ver. 18 descriptive of the persons alluded to, indicate that Paul has in mind opposers of his doctrine. This being the case, and the date of the Epistle being near to the dates of those addressed to the Galatians and Corinthians, it must be regarded as probable that the references in all the letters are to teachers and adversaries of the same general class. The question may be raised, however, whether the words of ver. 18 do not appear more characteristic of such adversaries as they were a few years later; and if such is the fact, this verse may have some relation to the time of the writing of the present chapter as compared with the rest of the Epistle. See, however, Meyer's notes on vv. 17-20. (2) The fact that the whole subject of such adversaries and their influence is passed over with so brief a reference shows that they could not have, as yet, wrought any considerable evil in the Roman church. Meyer thinks, and this may be the correct view, that they had not yet actually appeared at Rome. It was not unnatural that tendencies of this sort should have manifested themselves in some small beginnings, or, if they had not, that the Apostle should have apprehended their existence and evil effects in the future. The presence of such an exhortation in the chapter is not inconsistent with the Pauline authorship of it.

CLVII. Ver. 25 ff. τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ ὑμᾶς στήριξαι κ.τ.λ.

This final doxology is Pauline in its character and forms an appropriate close to the Epistle. It gathers into itself (as Meyer also says) some of the fundamental thoughts on which the Epistle rests: that his gospel and the preaching of Jesus Christ were for the establishment and confirmation in the Christian life of the readers, στήριξαι (comp. i. 11 and note); that the revealed mystery was so far contained in the writings of the prophets that when proclaimed *now*, it could be made manifest by their means; that the end of the preaching and the revelation, as related to the apostolic mission assigned to him, was obedience to faith among the Gentiles; that the whole plan and its outworking belonged to the marvellous wisdom of the one God. But these thoughts are wrought into a single truly characteristic Pauline sentence—expressing praise to God, and, at the same time, showing the desire of his heart that God would strengthen the Roman church in the truth and in the true way of living.

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